Government Policies towards Drought and Development in the Brazilian SertPo

Ian Livingstone and Mhrcio AssunqHo

Much has been written about the chronic problem of drought in the Sertiio, the semi-arid portion of the Brazilian north-east. This region, which falls within the same climatic zone as Africa’s Sahel, differs in that it happens to be within a much bigger country which also encompasses relatively rich regions, so that a great deal of finance has been available to support efforts at reducing the North- South dichotomy in general, and mitigating the impact of droughts in particular.

Government policy may be said to have been pursued in two phases: the first, up to the mid-l970s, centred upon the construction of very large public dams, together with a much larger number of smaller private dams; and the second, still being pursued, focusing more directly on irrigation. Both phases have been based on the provision of water, and may be described as ‘hydrological solutions’ to the problem of drought. The ostensible purposes are the same in both cases, to reduce poverty and vulnerability to drought, and thus to stem rural-urban migration within, and especially outside, the region. Evidence and argument is presented here that neither policy was or is well designed to achieve the purported aims, being based on inadequate appraisal and understanding of the rural economy of the Sertiio.

1. ECONOMICS OF THE FIRST PHASE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC DAMS AS AN ANTI-DROUGHT

STRATEGY IN THE SERTAO.

This policy, centred upon the construction of large public dams, constructed through the medium of DNOCS (the National Depart-

Development and Change (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 20 (1989), 461-500.

Tab

le 1

. P

ublic

Dam

s C

onst

ruct

ed by

DN

OC

S,

I898- I981

I8L)

R-9

19

00-9

19

10-1

9 1920-9

1930-9

1944-9

1950-9

1960-4

1965

-9

1970-4

1975-9

1980- I

-

4 12,924

4 I.RY7

I 54,Mx)

~

I 24,702

2 78.520

-

-

2 I5

19 6 I 6 3 5 I 3

-

177.694

163.

336

192.816

670,432

4,571

1.56

4.59

0 2,356.000

I.042.823

434.049

57.361

-

70 5 6 9

-

42.36

42.21R

138.611

144,089

-

148,670

76.349

12.350

8,292

I 267

3 3.934

8 14.289

x 405,236

I 720,000

10

1,231,000

2 37,582

5 33.159

-

-

8-

I 205

2 735

6 51,085

9

576,748

7 38,136

6 64.240

1 12

3.50

0

-

-

5 7.552

5 12.434

3 28,537

I 4.640

8 183,057

6

163.958

2 258.216

2 4.1 I

5

-

-

I 3.731

II

10,3

35

2 1.

686

9

40,966

-

-

I I1

5

I 824

5 5.

381

I 1,062

3 11.472

~ -

~

Tota

l I2

172,643

61

6.663.672

50

612.835

38

2,445.467

32

854,649

32

662.509

23

56.725

II

18.854

4 79.116

Perc

enta

ge

of c

apac

ity

I .5

57.6

5.3

21.1

7.4

5.7

0.5

0.2

0.7

Mea

n si

ze

of d

am (0

00 m

’)

Sou

rce.

MIN

TE

R/U

NO

CS

(1982)

P 13

Mea

n an

nual

ca

paci

ty

TO

TA

L

built

(N

o )

(000

m’)

(000

m’)

i 2 49

43

31 4 62

16

41 4 4 6

263

267

134

177.694

17,769

230,322 23,012

264,389 26.439

1,298,463 129,846

783.811

78.381

1.743.154 374.315

.+ 2,510,330 502.066

1.583.808 316.762

C. tcl

458.065

91.6

13

446,399

89,280

00 f ’

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertao 463

ment of Drought-related Works), is amazingly long-standing for a programme which has brought few tangible benefits. There can be no other major development programme in a developing country which has been pursued so consistently and for such a long period with so little success. Table 1 shows that the first public dam was constructed in 1898-9, with major construction in the three decades 1910-39, and again in the 1950s and 1960s. In these last two decades nearly 8,OOO million m3 of capacity were constructed. Since that time construction has continued at a reduced rate, the total accumulated capacity by 1980-1 reaching more than 11,500 million m3. The dams were large, with a mean capacity of 44 million m3. A substantial proportion of the total capacity, some 57 per cent, was concentrated in Ceara State, and nearly 80 per cent in Ceara and Paraiba States combined. If this was seen as the solution, therefore, it was applied in an extremely uneven manner.

DNOCS also constructed a large number of private dams, par- ticularly in Ceara State (Table 2). Although the mean size of dam was naturally much smaller (just over 2 million m3), nearly 600 dams were constructed with a total capacity approaching 1,300 million m3. Given the evident difficulty here of private benefit being funded at public cost, even if , as justification, some employment creation was involved, this policy was abandoned earlier, in most states by the mid-1960s and in Ceara by 1967.

Although early references by politicians to the possible use of the public dams for irrigation exist, the first settlers on planned irriga- tion schemes associated with the dams were installed only in 1970, towards the end of the long history of public dam construction. The idea of using the water available from public dams for irrigation must thus be viewed very much as an afterthought, not associated with the original decisions to invest and install capacity. It is therefore legitimate to treat separately as two phases of policy the building of large public reservoirs, up to 1975, and the irrigation development policy emerging from about this time or a bit earlier. The number of settlers increased rather slowly between 1970 and 1975 (Table 3), after which it accelerated; but since 1984 the increase has remained rather slow. The total for 1984, associated with 19 substantial public dams, was equivalent to numbers one would expect on a single moderate-sized irrigation scheme. The mean number of settlers per dam in 1984 was no more than 150.

1898

-9

1-9

1910

-19

1920

-9

1930

.9 19

40-9

19

50-9

I w

-4

1%

5-9

1970

-4

1975

-9

1980

-1

Tot

al

Tab

le 2

. Pr

ivat

e D

ams

Con

stru

cted

by

DN

OC

S,

1912

-67

Mea

n an

nual

R

io C

rand

e M

mac

ca

paci

ty

Piau

i C

eara

do

Nor

te

Para

iba

Pern

arnb

uco

Bahi

a A

lago

as

Serg

tpe

Cer

air

Tot

al

built

(No.

) (O

OO

rn?)

(N

o.)

(000

111~

) (No.) (O

OOrn

’) (N

o.)

(oO

ornJ

) (N

o.)

(OO

Orn

’) (N

o.)

(OO

Orn

’) (N

O.)

(m

rn’)

IOO

O~’

)

~ -

13

8.67

7 8

15.2

36

101

175,

970

I25

295.

398

I05

276.

769

77

194,

590

II

21.7

98

(last

yea

r)

1x

7

-

-

6 1.

738

-

4 2,

122

18

44.3

79

4 4.

2%

(last

yea

r)

1961

31

48.2

26

-

-

-

2 1.

063

2 93

6 3

12.5

84

16

26.5

88

23

33,4

97

I2

32,2

03

I

524

(last

yea

r)

1%5

-

-

-

-

2 38

.508

3

3.45

8 6

8.51

3 -

-

(last

yea

r)

1957

-

-

3 41

9 -

2 1.

561

2 2.

385

I2

16.1

61

I 3,

182

(last

yea

r)

I %3

-

-

-

I 1.8

97

16.1

72

23 1

,545

37

2.20

8 38

3.16

6 23

4.27

1 22

.322

~

-

-

1,19

0 1.

617

2,31

5 3.

722

3.83

2 4.

685

4.46

4 -

Perc

enta

ge

of ca

paci

ty

~ 17

7

79

8.

4 4.

0 1.

9 -

Mean s

ize

of

dam

(OOO

rn’)

Sou

rce:

as T

able

I

0.1

-

I on

2.14

1

4

m 4

Prop

ortio

n o

f to

ial

built

by

DN

OC

S

(%)

-

4.9

5.8

I .8

4.5 I .o

0.

5

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertclo 465

Table 3. Evolution of the Number of Settled Irrigators Associated with Public Dams, 1970-84

Year No. of dams with No. of Mean no. of irrigators irrigators irrigators per dam

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 (planned)

2 2 5 8 8

12 13 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19

20 54

197 450 518 810

1403 1885 21 18 241 1 2482 2618 2703 2690 2865

10 27 39 56 65 68

I08 I05 118 134 138 138 142 I42 1 5 1

Source: Perimeter plan documents.

A different kind of ‘irrigation’, made possible through the con- struction of dams, is the use of ‘vazantes’, areas of flood recession around the edges of dams which may be utilized as the reservoirs dry up. The use of these areas may make a significant difference to the balance of costs and benefits of small and medium-sized dams where the capital costs of construction are not so dominant: it would be surprising if they were significant in relation to the very large public dams, or included at all in the original cost-benefit calculations, if such existed. This is clear from the fact that tenants were actually prohibited from the areas of the large dams prior to 1970-2, after which the authorities were under more pressure to demonstrate some positive values associated with the dams. This led to some increase and in the 3rd Directorate, for example, the position had changed considerably in 1983, with over 5,000 tenants around the 24 dams in that Directorate. The average area of the vazantes here was just over 1 0 0 ha per dam, and % ha per tenant. The total of 2,600 ha, however, could again be considered the equivalent of one standard irrigation scheme, at most, and is minute in relation to the 24 major dams involved. One might note further that the steep sides of many of the larger dams make them less suited to the creation of vazantes.

While these first two types of benefit may be dismissed as quanti-

466 I . Livingstone and M. Assunp7o

tatively small, in respect of public dams, much wider potential bene- fits might have been expected to stem from a quite different objec- tive, that of river regulation, through reduction of periodic flood damage affecting large numbers of people along the length of the rivers passing through the Sertiio: the most important one, the Jaguaribe river, for example, flows through 12 municipios. Unlike private dams, moreover, such benefits would accrue to the down- stream community as a whole. Benefits from river regulation could also accrue to some extent from the watering of livestock as a result of water being made available steadily thoughout the year, or in months when otherwise a river would be dry. It will be suggested later in the paper that the critical defect of the decision to concen- trate new water resources in large dams was that it ignored the enormous costs of transporting water. This is a significant potential advantage where the objective is river regulation, as these costs might be substantially avoided, the natural flow of the river being relied upon.

With a regulated river there would appear to be more potential also for private or public run-of-the-river irrigation. As it turns out there is in general no run-of-the-river irrigation in the Sertiio. Water needs to be pumped from the river bed. This means that irrigation is available mostly only to strip farms of 3-4 km in length along each side of the river, of which only some 150 m of the most adjacent land may be watered. This limits or eliminates the scope for transferring population away from the overcrowded banks towards fertile soils away from the river and for targeting the poorest groups. The need for pumps means that additional investment is needed to realize irrigation benefits beyond that associated with dam construction itself. Water may also be raised from wells constructed in areas alongside the river: again involving capital investment, however. These requirements impose major economic and financial con- straints on irrigation, which has put it beyond the means of the great majority of farmers. This raises a question of equity, as well as limiting the number of beneficiaries from regulation.

Perhaps the most fundamental limitation is that extensive sec- tions of the rivers pass through areas used primarily for livestock or exploited with only low intensity by large landowners. The size distribution of land holdings in the municipios through which the 15 related river systems of the North SertZio pass is very similar to that for North Sertiio as a whole, with 70-80 per cent of land in holdings of 100 ha or more, and 40-50 per cent in holdings of 500 ha

Drought and Development in the Brazilian SertBo 467

plus. Despite this fact, large owners have - in the case of the Jaguaribe, and no doubt more widely - made difficult, or actually prevented, the expropriation of land for development schemes. The construction of public works for avoiding flooding and salinization were similarly obstructed. For whatever reasons, the present level of utilization of the rivers for irrigation purposes is minimal and cannot be used to justify historical investments in the dams.

It will be argued later that a much higher-return use of scarce water would be for livestock rather than crops. In fact, if we take the example of the 3rd Directorate, covering Pernambuco, Paraiba and Rio Grande do Norte States, there was in 1983 an average number of some 500 cattle per dam, no more than could be serviced by a relatively small dam, and a further 150-200 livestock units in the form of sheep and goats (1,000 animals). One may conclude that the overwhelming proportion of water stored in large public dams such as these has zero productivity in terms of the maintenance of livestock. Quantities needed for watering animals at any given time are very small, of course; the rationale for storage is that some water is made available in 'dry' months when other drinking sources have dried up.

It is likely, indeed, that losses of potential pasture in those areas now occupied by water surfaces imply a substantial net loss in main- tained livestock, just as it has been argued that, despite irrigation, there has been a net loss to cultivation.

The basic reason for minimal livestock usage of the public dams is, of course, that livestock-raising requires large numbers of dis- persed water sources, particularly in the case of sheep and goats, which are closely tied to the rural household. Even in respect of cattle it is desirable for the livestock owner to have water supplies attached to his own land-holding, even if access exists to natural or supplementary water sources provided communally within not too great a distance. Even as a drought reserve, large public dams are scarcely relevant for the maintenance of livestock throughout the agricultural sector because of this distance factor.

Leaving aside river regulation, already discussed, stored water can be used to irrigate crops, to water livestock or to supply people.' We can turn now to the situation with respect to this third use. Lack of water for domestic purposes, even for short periods, is serious: prolonged scarcity affects the quality of life in rural areas in a major way, and might well act as a factor in the decision to out-migrate alongside loss of cash income and food supply during drought.

468 I . Livingstone and M . Assunco

Politicians may view failure of water supplies in urban areas as having even more serious consequences: here it may be noted that in 1980 quite a large proportion of the population, 37 per cent in North Sertlo, could be classified as urban (without including Fortaleza).

In the course of the decade from 1970 significant improvements were made in the domestic provision of water throughout Brazil: but whereas in the southeast the percentage of rural households still without access to water from the general network or from a well or spring had fallen from 55 per cent in 1970 to below 14 per cent in 1980, in the northeast the corresponding percentage had fallen only from 95 to 62 per cent. In two states, Piaui and Rio Grande do Norte, in 1980 it was still as high as 80 per cent.

The proportion of urban households in this position was substan- tial in the northeast, at 25 per cent in 1980, but of a different order from that in rural areas. Two separate aspects need to be considered, therefore: the provision of urban water supplies and the provision of water in rural areas. Appropriate sources and mechanisms of stor- age and delivery of water may or may not be the same in the two cases.

In fact dams are not the main vehicle for the provision of water even in the case of towns. Thus in Ceara State only 25 out of 92 functioning water supply systems depended entirely on dams in 1983, a greater number depending on tubewells and a similar num- ber merely on amazonas (wells). Even among the larger townships exceeding 10,OOO in population, 7 out of 16 depended on dams (though only 4 on dams alone) and 9 on either tubewells or ama- zonas. In terms of population served only 27 per cent depended only on dams, compared with over 50 per cent dependent principally on tubewells. However the use of DNOCS dams for urban supplies is even more limited than for dams in general: the DNOCS Annual Report of 1981 (in its Table 3) shows that only 5 dams out of 263 were used for ‘water supplies to communities’.

This dependence on tubewells even for urban water supplies is surprising, again, given the vast number of substantial dams which have been built. Once more the cost of transporting water from the source to the point of use appears to be vital, and is thus a critical omission in relation to the dam construction programme under- taken in the northeast. Moreover, examination of information on 16 urban supply systems completed in Ceara State in 1983, affecting 19 townships, showed that only 5 townships were located 6 km or more from the supply point, in all these cases a dam. The majority of

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertbo 469

townships were within 6 km of their water source, often within 2 km, and tubewells, particularly (amazonas, a lagoon and a spring were other sources), were more important than dams.

The implication of this is that it is not only in the cases of supply for rural households and for watering livestock that distributed water supplies are important: even with respect to urban supplies concentration of water supply at a limited number of major sources carries important disadvantages. It happens that in the Northern Sert%o there is a large number of small townships, more than 200 out of 243 in 1980, in the range 2,000 to 10,000, distributed over all 5 states.

Large reservoirs could serve as a supply of last resort for urban, as well as rural, water supply in periods of crisis: this could in principle provide justification for dams even if normal situations did not warrant the provision of large-scale storage. The stress we have placed on the cost of transporting water appears well placed if we consider the number of water tankers used to distribute water during the last major drought, 1979-84. This was a substantial operation, involving the use of more than 5,000 tankers in the peak year, 1983-4. It is noteworthy, however, that in that year the 30 million m3 of water distributed compared with an aggregate reservoir capacity (not the actual water stored, it should be said) in the 5 states of North Sert%o of some 9,700 million m3. If the dams were just one-third full, emergency demand by tankers would amount to just 0.9 per cent of this. If the dams were one-tenth full the demand by tankers in the peak year would amount to only 9 per cent of the water stored. If these quantities for 1983-4 represent the maximum that was eco- nomic or financially feasible to deliver, such quantities would not require volumes of storage anything like what has been made available.

If urban centres are not principally served by the large public dams, we should expect this to be even more true of rural house- holds. In order to obtain a clearer idea of how rural households in the Serttio currently obtained their water supplies a sample of 277 households was taken, distributed across a range of municipios. The small size of the sample should be stressed.

This confirmed that large dams were comparatively unimportant as sources of household water, and stood out as by far the most distant, at a mean of 6 km from the household, of all the sources, except that the DNOCS-built dams were even further away, at a mean distance of 8 km. The most important sources were barrows,

470 I . Livingstone and M . Assunqdo

amazon wells, and dug water holes (in rivers and rivulets); small and medium dams; and, to a lesser extent, tubewells. The advantage of river water holes, barrows and amazonas was obvious: they were generally within 200-300 m of the household, compared with on average 1 km or more in the case of small dams and tubewells. The extent to which small dams are used is perhaps surprising: if some of the vast dams (mean capacity 44 million m3 in Table 1) failed to survive the worst year of the recent drought, 1983, it is clearly unlikely that small dams of 30,000-50,000 m3 would be of much use for between-year storage. Their value is clearly in extending the availability of water in any given year into the dry-season period. When households were asked to specify their principal sources of water to satisfy the three needs of human drinking, other domestic use and livestock use, the three main sources were shown to be amazonas, barrows and small/medium dams, with DNOCS and other large dams providing a negligible proportion, even for livestock.

The implication is that access to water for all these basic purposes would have been very much wider had only a portion of the vast financial and technical resources devoted over such a long period to large dams been focused instead on extending the availability of these more popular sources.

Given the inaccessibility of the large public dams and the dis- advantages of small dams (quality of water for human consump- tion, drying up in drought years and in dry seasons), there are obvious advantages in tubewells, subject to technical feasibility and cost. Interesting reference may be made here to an early diagnosis of the problems of the SertBo, and their remedy, by the famous agronomist RenC Dumont in 1961, who asked:

But has the problem of the SertBo been seriously put? Two Frenchmen, hydrological specialists, Stretta and Taltasse, have demonstrated that over two thirds of this immense region (as big as France . . .) the crystalline rocks are impermeable and that there is therefore no hope of finding underground water. The ‘useful’ SertHo therefore is reduced to a small fraction of the sedimentary areas and it is obviously there that one should concentrate the search for deep underground water. Dams, yes! - but ‘underground’ ones . . . why squander so much money - since national resources are modest - in maintaining such a large population in one of those rare parts of Brazil which cannot allow it to live adequately on a regular basis, when everywhere else the development potentials are as manifest as is their underpopulation? A rational solution for the SertBo? I f one is willing to put aside emotions and interests, it would be, quite clearly, to evacuate it and to limit its exploitation to the good years, a bit like our mountain

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertcio 47 1

residents do with the alpine meadows, as vast seasonal pastures (Dumont, 1961: 48).

This diagnosis was valid only in respect of large dams. In fact much more underground water exists than Dumont supposed, and it has proved possible to develop quite a network of tubewells throughout the SertBo, with potential for further development.

Both quality and quantity of water available from tubewells is important. Table 4 offers recent data for two states, Paraiba and Pernambuco. This indicates that in the crystalline areas of Pernambuco 76 per cent of wells are without residual, and 84 per cent are good or tolerable. In Paraiba the proportions are lower, but overall the figures are 7 1 per cent in crystalline areas and 90 per cent in non-crystalline areas. What is critical also, in cost-benefit terms, is the level of water flow obtainable from the wells. It can be assumed that the flow in the non-crystalline alluvial areas is good. This is shown for three States in Table 5 to average 11.93 l/min. The flow in the crystalline areas is low in Paraiba and Rio Grande do Norte, but overall comes to 46 per cent of that in non-crystalline areas. While this will make tubewell water at least twice as expensive in crystalline areas, it may be, of course, more than twice as valu- able, given the scarcity of water in those areas. As it happens, con- struction costs in sedimentary rock are twice as high, due to the need to line the wells. Certainly water is available in the crystalline areas, at a price. A criticism of the reliance on wells has been made by Coelho, writing in the Dicirio de Pernambuco (May 1984), on grounds that ‘some of the wells are disactivated, some do not have proper water for consumption or irrigation’ (because of salinization). The fact that a fraction of wells become disactivated is not itself conclusive. Another fraction of drillings for water will be unsuccessful also. This will raise average development costs per effective well. What is important is the size of that fraction and the extent, therefore, to which average costs are raised. The data in Table 4 do not lead one to expect that a disproportionate number of wells would prove unviable. A SUDENE official asserted to the authors in 1984 a 90 per cent success rate with tubewells.

In summary, the two modes of water provision which have failed to reach any significant fractions of the population are the large DNOCS public dams and the large private (often subsidized) dams. Otherwise small dams, tubewells, amazonas and barreiros have all contributed to overall water provision and should be considered as

Tab

le 4

. D

istr

ibut

ion of W

ells

by Q

ualit

y of

Wat

er, C

ryst

allin

e an

d N

on-c

ryst

alin

e Are

as, i

n Pa

rai3

a an

d Pe

rnam

buco

Sta

tes,

198

3

P 4

h)

Wel

ls w

ith r

esid

ual (

mea

sure

d in

mg/

l)

No.

of

wel

ls

Wel

ls

0-

1001

- 20

01-

7001

or

Tot

algo

od

Tot

al b

ad

with

flo

w

with

out

mor

e or

tole

rabl

e or

wor

se

resi

dual

(n

il-10

00)

(200

1 or

mor

e)

Para

iba

Wel

ls su

itabl

e fo

r N

o.

460

15

38 1

40

20

4 39

6 24

no

n-cr

ysta

lline

are

as

Vo

100

3 83

9

4 1

86

5 W

ells

sui

tabl

e fo

r N

o.

1,58

5 48

3 30

4 21

3 42

3 I6

2 78

7 58

5 cr

ysta

lline

are

as

To

100

30

19

13

21

10

50

37

(Fen

des)

Pern

am bu

co

Wel

ls su

itabl

e fo

r N

o.

641

417

non-

crys

talli

ne a

reas

Vo

10

0 65

W

ells

suita

ble

for

No.

2,

747

2,08

8 cr

ysta

lline

area

s To

100

76

Tota

l, bo

th S

tate

s W

ells

suita

ble

for

No.

1,

101

432

Wel

ls su

itabl

e fo

r N

o.

4,33

2 2,

571

non-

crys

talli

ne a

reas

Vo

10

0 39

crys

talli

ne ar

eas

Vo

100

59

Sour

ce: SUD

ENE

unpu

blis

hed

surv

ey d

ata.

N

ote:

Qua

lity

mea

sure

d by

mg/

l of

sol

id re

sidu

al, m

ainl

y sa

lt.

med

iocr

e; 2

000

to 4

000

bad;

400

0 to

800

0 ba

rely

pot

able

.

.+ 17

9 21

18

6

596

24

g 28

3

3 1

93

4 3

269

3 21

6 17

4 21

2 51

2,

304

8 6

8 2

84

10

5

(0

Q

560

61

38

10

992

48

51

6 3

1 90

4 52

0 38

7 63

5 21

9 3.

091

854

12

9 15

5

71

20

is L 3 E 3

r, 2

H. S

choe

ller c

lass

ific

atio

n is

: up

to 5

00 m

g go

od; 5

00 lo

100

0 to

lera

ble;

100

0 to

2000

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertdo 473

Table 5 . Level of Water Flow from Tubewells in Crystalline and Non-crystalline areas,

in PuraiBa, Pernumbuco and Rio Grande do Norte. 1983

Paraiba Pernambuco Rio Grande do Norte

Wells suitable for non-crystalline areos No. of wells 460 64 1 1.828 Total estimated flow

of water 7,942.1 8,462.2 18,533.2 Mean flow per well (11s) 17.3 13.2 10.1

Wells suitable for crystalline areos (Fendes) No. of wells 1,585 2,747 537 Total estimated flow

of water 6,147.9 18,542.3 1,820.4 Mean flow per well (l/s) 3.88 6.75 3.39 Mean flow as percentage

of that for non- crystalline areas 22 51 34

Source: as Table 4.

Total, all three States

2,929

34,937.5 11.93

4,869

26,5 10.6 5.44

46

complementary. The subsidies and subsidized credit which have been extensively provided over a long period have not contributed to a widening of access to water. These need to be re-assessed but, more importantly, public water development efforts, plans and equip- ment must be re-oriented to ,provide a frontal assault on the require- ments of the mass of ordinary rural households and keepers of small stock, based on a combination of different small-scale modes capa- ble of providing distributed water supplies to that population: ulti- mately it is a matter of defining the proper goalof water provision in the SertBo.

2. THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE DAMS

Some of the reasons for building large public dams, despite their low degree of utilization, have been hinted at by other authors: the dominant role of engineers and technical experts rather than economists or sociologists; the political and financial interests which have benefited directly from the dam construction; the

474 I . Livingstone and M. Assuncdo

symbolic value of their reservoirs to politicians needing to demon- strate their activity on behalf of the public.

A paradox to which, inexplicably, little or no attention has been paid, however, is why private dams should be constructed if they did not bring actual direct benefit to the farmers or landowners for whom they were built. Some of them were built using the owner’s own private funds, even if many benefited from a major element of State subsidy. A significant fraction was financed by private or State banks, but using credit lines provided to special programmes by government, and involving special terms, usually with negative real rates of interest. Others have been built by direct government con- struction using public funds as part of labour-intensive works programmes, but on privateland, perhaps with some limited sort of service to government or community expected in return. The num- ber of private dams is extremely large. Hall (1978: 7) refers to ‘thou- sands of small, private reservoirs belonging to landowners’ and their number appears to be increasing at a quite rapid rate. DNOCS discontinued its policy of building dams for use by private land- owners at the end of the 1960s, but by then had constructed nearly 600 (Table 2). Many of these were very substantial, as noted above, the mean cubic capacity being more than 2 million m3. Whether subsidized or not, and assisted by cheap credit or not, this large and increasing number of dams would clearly not have been built if they did not yield direct economic benefit to their owners, and substan- tial benefit at that. This provides a curious point of contrast with the large public dams, and makes the failure of the latter so much more surprising. It is evident that the resources so obviously wasted in constructing public dams could have been made available for much more productive water investment.

We may ask, therefore, what has made the smaller, private dams so useful, and the large public dams so useless? It should be noted, first of all, that a major aim of the engineers in constructing public dams of such vast size was to maintain sufficient storage capacity to deal with between-year variations in rainfall, and beyond that, to deal with the worst-possible drought event. We noted in the previous section that even those large sizes were defeated by the 1983 drought, although they were adequate - given their lack of signifi- cant use for irrigation, of course - to retain water in other years. The greater utility of the smaller dams brings out the need to assess the specific economic benefits associated with a given size of dam, and in comparison with the costs of constructing a dam of this size.

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertdo 47 5

The optimum size may not be the largest, whatever its technical advantages. In turn, in order to identify the specific benefits, we need to know the precise objectives of the water stored and the uses to which it is to be applied (cf. Hazlewood and Livingstone, 1981).

We have already referred to the vazantes, areas of flood recession irrigation, attached to the dams. In good years it is possible to obtain two crops, one rain-fed and one following flood recession. The flood recession areas have been interplanted with elephant or other grass for livestock and sweet potatoes for subsistence, particularly by small farmers. Larger landowners are interested especially in producing grass for cattle fodder, cattle representing their main commercial activity. In many cases the main benefit secured by landowners is that from leasing the flood recession land to renters and sharecroppers: which would have certainly not been adequate compensation had the full cost of construction been borne by the landowner. In Rio Grande do Norte some 30 per cent of private dams are said to have sharecroppers. A useful further benefit in the case of a great many dams has been the introduction of fish. The DNOCS official report of 1981 mentions the distribution of fish by that time to 1,254 separate dams.

But the reason why small and medium dams pay private owners and large, public dams do not pay is, quite simply, livestock. This is the main commercial activity, as just stated, of the large owners. A small or medium-sized dam may not offer across-year security. If it does not, it may nevertheless (a) provide within- year supply and (b) permit an extension of water availability further into the dry season (especially in bad years), reducing the distance which livestock need to travel for water, and allowing more effective use of pasture in average years: thus permitting a more substantial herd to be built up and maintained. Benefits do not arise simply out of coping with the worst year, and water investment which focuses on that one objec- tive is therefore not necessarily the most cost-effective. It should be noted here that other possibilities exist for coping with the ‘worst’ year: the use of cactus (of certain types) for fodder (compensating for pastures no longer served by water). As regards water provision, wells may constitute a better form of insurance for really bad years.

Given the very real advantages associated, therefore, with the small/medium dam, there is an obvious issue as to whether direct or indirect (through cheap credit) subsidy for their construction should be afforded to rich landowners maintaining cattle, especially in the context of widespread poverty. A minimum policy recommendation

476 I. Livingstone and M. Assunqdo

would be for large owners to be charged a full market rate of inter- est. More fundamentally it may be appropriate to concentrate con- struction efforts and financial resources instead towards the provi- sion of shared, community sources of water - whether small dams or wells or even a larger number of small barrows, or some combina- tion of these, so that these sources could contribute to the mainte- nance of large numbers of small stock (or small-holdings of cattle) and thus of large numbers of households. If the dams afford impor- tant advantages to large farmers, they clearly do so also for groups of smaller stock-owners. Construction of community dams need not therefore be confined to times of declared emergency: they can contribute to the development of small-scale mixed farming by aver- age households. The opportunity cost of the resources which have already been allocated, through subsidy, to water provision for private landowners may be very great. For the future, a re- orientation of planning priorities is clearly called for. One weakness of community-built dams has been in construction, due to shortage of water for compacting. If subsidy is to be provided for dam con- struction this could be a more valid objective.

The popularity of dams among landowners and large farmers has actually led to virtually uncontrolled proliferation of dams in some areas, which raises a further issue. These may constitute a hazard, particularly since, if a dam breaks in the rains, it may carry with it another dam. Dams may also be constructed without regard as to whether they restrict the supply of water to other properties. It is surprising, therefore, that no licensing law of any kind controls construction of such dams. This could be introduced within the context of a more rational water resource development plan.

3. THE SPECIAL PROGRAMMES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL CREDIT IN THE NORTHEAST

From the mid-1970s policy changed significantly, with the adoption of a more diversified approach incorporating a range of special programmes.

The special programmes are so called because they are supposed to comprise unusual and specially conceived measures to fit the needs of northeast regional development, and particularly of the semi-arid area. There are problems of definition here, however, as some programmes which are of importance in the northeast are

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertdo 477

actually constituent parts of national programmes, while some pro- grammes are not confined to the semi-arid parts of the northeast.

1. The Irrigation Programme is referred to as a special pro- gramme, though it is part of a national programme with its own special plans for the semi-arid zone.

2. The Sertanejo Project (Special Programme for Supporting the Development of the Semi-arid Region of the Northeast), initiated in 1976, aims at increasing the resistance of small and medium farms to the effects of drought.

3. Prohidro (the Programme for the Use of Water Resources) was created in September 1979, and provides public and private water facilities ‘for continuing economic activity during droughts’. 4. Provarzeas (the National Programme for the Rational Use of

Irrigable Lowland) was set up in June 1981, and was really an exten- sion to the whole country of a programme originating in Minas Gerais in 1975.

5. Profir, the Financing Programme for the Acquisition of Irri- gation Equipment, is again strictly a national programme, but is worth listing here because of its close complementary with the other programmes, which are obviously water- and irrigation-related.

6 . Polonordeste, the Development Programme for Integrated Areas in the Northeast, was started in October 1974. It is designed specifically for the Northeast but not particularly for the’ semi-arid part. It was supposed, indeed, to concentrate on the wetter and more fertile areas, but progressively expanded its area of intervention to cover a large part of the drier areas of the semi-arid subregion.

Sertanejo, Prohidro and Polonordeste all come under the Minis- try of the Interior (MINTER), the ministry directly concerned with the issue of regional imbalances. Provhrzeas and Profir, as national programmes, are the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. Together with the basic national irrigation programme, they con- tribute to the new thrust of efforts in respect of the northeast prob- lem, which centres upon irrigation. Whether these efforts are likely to be successful in achieving the basic objectives must therefore hinge on two things: whether irrigation is generally economic, and whether a programme focusing on irrigation can have the coverage necessary to reach the broad target group or groups in question.

7. The Emergency Programme, though part of a national pro- gramme, is specially intended and designed for the semi-arid north- east, and it is coordinated regionally. It should be distinguished

1978

Polo

nord

este

74

,324

Pr

ohid

ro

-

Sert

anej

o 9,

541

Subt

otal

83

.865

Irri

gatio

n T

SA

Emer

genc

y

64,3

21

2,87

2 81

1

Tot

al

151,

869

Tot

al U

S $

mn

at

1983

aver

age

annu

al

exch

ange

rate

25

6 Tab

le 6

. Fu

nds A

lloca

ted

to S

peci

al P

rogr

amm

es,

1978

-83

(Pub

lic In

vest

men

t and

Em

erge

ncy

Exp

endi

ture

)

Mill

ion

cruz

eiro

s at

con

stan

t 19

83 p

rice

s*

1979

30,6

78

6,86

4

37,5

42

49,5

06

3,73

4

-

94,4

19

185,

201

312

1980

46,4

15

35,5

01

17,9

01

99,8

17

53,0

61

1,67

1 14

7,48

1

302,

036

510

1981

41,1

54

12,4

87

13,5

15

67,1

56

62,5

17

1,61

3 22

7,78

8

359,

174

606

1982

78,9

65

28,0

20

12,4

80

1 19,

465

91,6

30

1,67

2 13

1,43

6

344.

203

581

1983

78,2

10

34,1

21

1 1,9

79

124,

310

82,5

21

903

306,

72 I

514,

455

868

Tot

al

Mn.

Cr.

275,

423

110,

129

62,7

39

448,

29 I

339,

236

9,60

0 90

7,84

5

1,70

4,97

2

2,87

8

Sou

rce:

SU

DE

NE

, 198

3 R

epor

t *G

ener

al P

rice

Ind

ex, F

GV

. N

ote:

A p

art o

f Po

lono

rdes

te a

nd a

sm

all f

ract

ion

of E

mer

genc

y sp

endi

ng w

as m

ade

outs

ide

the

sem

i-ar

id z

one.

% 16 6 4 26

20

0.6 53

100 -

p. 4

m

Perc

enta

ge

incr

ease

19

80-3

+

69

-4

- 33

+ 25

Drought and Development in the Brazilian SertiTo 479

from the rural development programmes above in that it is con- cerned essentially with short-term employment relief during the actual drought period.

8. The Semi-arid Tropic Research Programme (TSA) may also be distinguished from the others, which are all direct action pro- grammes involving the injection of substantial amounts of funding into rural development. The TSA is a relatively small-scale research programme aimed at providing appropriate technologies for the semi-arid area. It is not confined to irrigation aspects, however, and may prove to have a wider bearing on the problem in the long run.

9. One or two programmes have been organized by State govern- ments, although the high degree of centralized control of funding for northeastern development means that these are relatively small.

Table 6 gives some indication of the relative importance of the various programmes in the course of the most recent major drought. Spending on the Emergency programme was twice as important as that on the three credit programmes taken together. Of the latter Polonordeste is quantitatively easily the most important though, as indicated, not all of the spending was within the drought area. Although the Sertanejo project predates Prohidro, the latter rapidly overtook it in terms of amounts disbursed. Polonordeste was initi- ated in 1974, Sertanejo in 1976 and Prohidro in 1979, with the first expenditures in 1980.

Leaving aside the Emergency Programme, these programmes have between them involved:

1. A strong and increasing concentration on irrigation and other hydrological projects.

2. A component of rural credit also directed towards water sup- ply and to a lesser extent assistance to livestock development other than by water development.

3. Expenditure on public works, particularly of a hydrological nature again, but also more general social expenditure.

4. Attempts at integrated rural development planning (IRDP) incorporating the above, but also in Sertanejo particularly, agricul- tural extension through the medium of ‘nuclei’ of extension work- ers. The programmes have ostensibly been aimed at the small or ‘small and medium’ producers, while the general rationale for inte- grated rural development programmes is that a frontal approach encompassing all groups is pursued.

Num

ber o

f loa

ns

Ban

k of

Bra

zil

Ban

k of

the

Nor

thea

st

Stat

e B

ank

of P

erna

mbu

co

Val

ue o

f loa

ns

Ban

k of

Bra

zil

Ban

k of

the

Nor

thea

st

Stat

e B

ank

of P

erna

rnbu

co

Tota

l all

bank

s

Mea

n va

lue of

loan

s B

ank

of B

razi

l

Ban

k of

the

Nor

thea

st

Stat

e B

ank

of P

erna

mbu

co

Tab

le 7

. Th

e Dis

trib

utio

n of

Rur

al C

redi

t in

Pern

ambu

co, 1

983

No.

To

N

o.

%

No.

%

US$O

Oo

%

US$O

Oo

VO

US$

Ooo

%

vo US$

R

atio

U

S$

Rat

io

US$

R

atio

Min

i- pr

oduc

ers

66,6

73

78

-

-

4,57

5 69

32,0

89

35

-

-

6,19

0 21

27

48 I I

-

-

1,47

4 1

Smal

l pr

oduc

ers

15,1

89

18

2,01

2 57

1,15

2 17

17,0

29

19

1,26

7 7 4,

472 13

16

1,12

1

630 I

3.88

2

Med

ium

pr

oduc

ers

2, I8

0 3 73

4 21

534 8

14,0

30

15

1,52

1 9 4,

145 13

14

6,43

6

2,07

4

7,70

4 32

Larg

e pr

oduc

ers

985 I

782 22

319 6

26,5

36

29

14,7

09

17.7

92

53

41

a4

26.9

40

56

18.8

10

30

46,9

45

Coo

pera

tives

22 0

-

-

-

-

2,01

0 2 -

-

-

-

I .4

91,3

60

-

P !s

Tot

al

85,0

49

100

3,52

8 10

0 6,

444

I00

91,6

94

100

17,4

98

.+ 33

,268

lo

o 5

100

f’

100

2 D E -

g

-

0

9

-

-

z So

urce

: Pro

jelo

Nor

desf

e, P

rogr

amm

a E

srad

uald

e A

poio

00

Pequ

etio

Pro

duto

r R

ural

, Cre

difo

Rur

al, V

I I-A

nexo

1, P

ro-R

ural

, Sta

te G

over

n-

men

t of

Pern

ambu

co, P

lann

ing/

Agr

icul

tura

l Se

cret

aria

ts.

3

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertao 48 1

However, while on paper the programmes were designed to deal, as in the case of the large dams, with the general problems of poverty, drought and outmigration in the northeast, in practice this has not been the case in the implementation. The element of IRDP has been quite weakly pursued, while rural credit has not been tar- geted towards the most vulnerable producers but applied selectively in a manner likely to have benefited only a better-off minority who have enjoyed massive subsidy.

Although each programme had its own financial allocation for rural credit, these funds were actually disbursed under the National Rural Credit Scheme managed from above by the National Mone- tary Council and implemented locally via branches of the Bank of Brazil, the Bank of the North East and by State banks. Table 7 shows how credit was distributed in the case of one state, Pernambuco, between large, medium, small and ‘mini’ producers in 1983. If the aim were to support the poorest households for equity reasons, and because these are the most vulnerable to drought, concentration would have been on the smallest producers, the mini- producers. Some attempt was made in this direction by the Bank of Brazil, much less in the case of the remaining two. However, although mini-producers received more than 70 per cent of the num- ber of loans from the Bank of Brazil, their share of resources lent was only 35 per cent, and for all three banks together just 27 per cent, compared with 41 per cent for large producers. The latter figures for 1981 were 23 and 44 per cent respectively, and for 1982 they were 24 and 48 per cent. The mean value of loans accorded by the Bank of Brazil to large producers in 1983 was 56 times that for mini-producers.

Examination of the data for loans through individual branches of the Bank of Brazil (one for each municipio) brought out an inter- esting feature: the lack of a consistent pattern in the distribution of their credit. For example, while in 18 municipios no credit was extended to large producers, in another 13 these obtained 40 per cent or more of the loans, sometimes as much as 60 or 80 per cent. This appears to suggest a lack of consistent policy or clear directive from above, just as there is inconsistency between the overall policies adopted by the Bank of Brazil and the Bank of the Northeast.

This maldistribution of credit has been observed by others. Guimariies (1979: 308) stated that ‘between 75 and 90 per cent of the total value of rural credit is given to the medium and large-scale landowners, who comprise no more than 6 per cent of proprietors’.

482 I . Livingstone and M. Assunpjo

His estimate of credit allocation is incorporated into Table 8. Pinto observes similarly that 80 per cent of the farmers ‘are practically excluded from the national rural credit system’. However, the distri- bution of subsidised credit among the other 20 per cent is itself very unequal. One per cent of the group (about 10,OOO farmers) receive about 40 per cent of the total amount of credit received by the group.

Table 8 . Agrarian Structure and Subsidized Rural Credit in the Northeast of Brazil

Size of No of Total Planted Rural Subsidized farm farms area area employment credit* (ha) ( 7 0 ) (070) (070) (%) (To)

< 10 67.42 4.91 20.27 52.8s 0 10-100 26.31 22.41 35.57 31.24 10-25 > 100 6.10 12.62 44.16 15.91 75-90

Total 100 100 100 100 100

Source: FIBGE, Censo Agropecuario, 1980. * Guirnaraes (1979: 308).

All the Special Programmes give a prominent position among their objectives to the aim of assisting smallholders. Why this fails to be put into practical effect may be illustrated with respect to Sertanejo, one of the more egalitarian in its intent. The first stage is that, in addition to the aim of assisting smallholders with holdings smaller than 100 ha, there is the further aim of assisting also ‘medium-size’ producers with holdings of 100 up to 500 ha: allo- cated 41 per cent of the credit in 1983. Secondly, the objective ignores the fact that a large proportion of holdings within even the first category are concentrated at the lower end of it, and unlikely to have received any credit: 57 per cent of holdings in that category in 1980 were below 10 ha, and indeed were on average no more than 3 !h ha. The target population towards which Sertanejo was directed did ostensibly include ‘rural producers not working their own land, including tenants, sharecroppers and squatters as well as landless labourers’ but, in part again because of the hydrological emphasis, these were essentially untouched by the programme.

The effect of uneven distribution of credit is much increased by the major element of subsidy involved. Under Sertanejo investment credits were offered at a 5 per cent nominal rate of interest, with a

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertdo 483

6-year grace period and repayment over a further 20 or more years. Since, during the course of 1984 for instance, the dollar value of the cruzeiro fell by 69 per cent, the real rate of interest was negative, to the extent of 69 per cent, effectively converting the loan into a grant. Putting equity aside, from a purely practical point of view, negative rates of interest of 50 or 60 per cent mean that the loans fund will be rapidly run down, such rates having the same effect as low (real) repayment of capital, so that eventually no-one will have the benefit of credit.

To illustrate another way in which hyperinflation has distorted nominal objectives of a programme, Provarzeas, the National Pro- gramme for Rational Use of the Irrigable Lowlands, offered a regional differential, charging 35 per cent in the northeast and 60 per cent elsewhere, with 3 years’ grace and 6 years’ repayment peri- ods. However, even the nominal rate of interest of 60 per cent charged outside the northeast would have represented a negative real rate of interest of 50 per cent in 1983. Since the real rate for the northeast is only a negative 58 per cent, the difference in nominal rates is quite illusory, even if it would have served to make accept- able the major imbalance in the quantities of finance actually allo- cated between the two regions.

4. ECONOMICS OF THE SECOND PHASE: THE IRRIGATION PROGRAMME

The second phase of government policy may be said to combine the special programmes, which have exhibited a strong hydrological bias, with the irrigation programme itself, which may now be examined more closely.

References to the need for irrigation go back a long way. Arrojado Lisboa, director of IOCS (Inspectorate for Anti-Drought Works), the predecessor of DNOCS, from 1909 to 1912, stressed the need for irrigation. Further references to official statements refer- ring to the need to make use of the stored water for irrigation purposes were made in 1937 (Leittio, 1937: 38-41) and 1953 (Duque, 1953: 181-2) before the Furtado Mission of 1958.

Serious incorporation into on-the-ground plans, however, waited until 1971, when the Executive Group for Irrigation for Agricultural Development (GEIDA) published the Pluriannual Irrigation Pro- gramme (PPI), the first systematic irrigation plan for Brazil, with a

484 I . Livingstone and M . Assungdo

very optimistic target for the northeast of 195,000 ha by 1980. The hectarage associated with the 2,500 settled irrigators associated with public dams in the northern Sert9.o in 1980 would have been of the order of 17,000. The substantial implementation of that pro- gramme, as already noted, dates from 1975. To be precise, three- quarters of the financial resources used during the decade 197 1-80 were applied after 1975. The irrigation programme itself was established under the First National Development Plan (1 972-4), incorporating a target of 40,000 ha in the northeast, based on these public irrigation schemes. Responsibility for their development was entrusted to DNOCS and the S9o Francisco Valley Development Company (CODEVASF), both bodies supervised by the Ministry of the Interior (MINTER). The National Plan for Irrigation, 1982-6, allocated 90 per cent of the irrigation budget to large official schemes. Current proposals are for a major expansion of irrigated area, putting irrigation at the centre of development efforts in the northeast, as far as the allocation of financial resources to agricul- ture are concerned: even though already over the period 1978-83 irrigation was absorbing about 40 per cent of the total rural develop- ment budget in the northeast. It is vital, therefore, that experience so far be properly assessed, to discover whether (1) the schemes contributed substantially to net employment creation in the rural northeast; (2) the schemes have been technically and economically effective, with a high economic rate of return, and this contributed to the growth of output; and (3) the financial resources absorbed into the schemes have been used in an equitable way, so that benefits have been reasonably widely shared. The answers to these questions will imply an answer to a fourth: have they contributed significantly to protecting the rural population as a whole in the Sertgo from the more catastrophic effects of drought? The evidence available, some of which is now brought together here, is that the answer is no, in all cases.

As far as employment creation is concerned, Hall (1983: 11) notes that by mid-1981, after a decade of official spending, less than 10 per cent of the original target population had been incorporated into the DNOCS and CODEVASF schemes, reflecting the constraint of organization, as well as finance, involved in such schemes. More seriously, the schemes involved substantial displacement of farm- ers, with the rate of farmer displacement generally well in excess of the rate of farmer absorption, so that net employment creation has clearly been negative. Hall (1978) gives examples of three represen-

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertclo 485

tative DNOCS irrigation perimeters at which three to six times as many people were forced off the land in the valleys as were subse- quently absorbed by the projects established there. The percentage of displaced farmers absorbed as recruits could be as low as 5 per cent (Hall, 1978: 75-9). At one perimeter, Morada Nova, visited by the present authors in 1984, it was reported that at the time of expropriation it was not possible to use on the scheme all the people expropriated ‘because the population was so dense’ so that, indeed, there had been some emigration from the area in question, the opposite of officially stated objectives. Hall notes (1983: 12) that neither DNOCS nor CODEVASF makes provision for relocating dispossessed farmers on alternative land or supplying them with replacement housing.

The rate of net farmer displacement is still higher in CODEVASF schemes, as might be expected from the general priority given to medium and large-scale farmers and companies.

A direct reason why farmers displaced exceed farmers absorbed is that the area disappropriated for a scheme always exceeds by far the area subsequently cultivated by those settled. In the case of the DNOCS perimeters the area under production in 1982 was overall just 13 per cent of the area disappropriated, while for CODEVASF the figure was just 12 per cent.

Turning to the critical question of the rate of return on the resources invested in irrigation, one factor which will affect this (and the level of employment generated) is the high level of capital investment per settler. Sampaio et al. (1978) found that the cost per job created was US$14,000, about twice the maximum level pre- dicted originally by the GEIDA group. Another estimate (Noronha, 1980) was that it costs about US$13,000 per hectare to establish a scheme, including the cost of land, farm improvements and commu- nity infrastructure, but without counting central installations. Coelho (1975), referred to by Hall, gave a figure of US$34,000 to install one family on a DNOCS scheme.

High costs of administration have swollen costs per hectare and per family settled. In a sample of 10 DNOCS perimeters the ratio of settlers to scheme employees in 1983 varied between 0.7 (employees actually exceeding settlers in number) to 2.7. The total number of settlers on the 10 schemes in 1983, 911, compared with a total for employees of 567, a ratio of only 1.6. In an earlier year, DNOCS and CODEVASF together were said to have over 10,OOO employees servicing just 4,275 families, a settler/employee ratio of 0.43

486 I. Livingstone and M. AssuncBo

(Coelho, 1982, referred to in Hall, 1983). This does not only mean inflated salary costs for employees: nearly half of DNOCS scheme investments is for assets which are not directly productive, such as newly built staff houses, schools, roads, and household electrifica- tion. The payroll alone is huge, however: in 1979 Cr. 817 million compared with total gross farm output on the schemes of Cr. 304 million and net farm income above production costs of Cr. 103 million (Hall, 1983: 17) Ex-ante rate-of-return calculations carried out by DNOCS for individual perimeters are generally not based on very meaningful figures.2 They do not include the costs of dam construction; therefore even if they were able to justify adding an irrigation scheme, given the existence already of a dam, they could not be used to justify the main investment involved. Considering only the schemes themselves, an early investigation by Cline (1972) of 47 schemes approved by GEIDA suggested that only 17 would have a favourable cost-benefit ratio. As Hall points out (1983: 19) no calculations have been made on the basis of actual performance and costs of operating schemes.

Low rates of return can also be inferred from the incomes accruing to farmers. Although these were planned to secure incomes four or five times as great as previously, only a small proportion have actually done so. About 20-50 per cent are said to be generally in debt to the project, with most of the rest just ‘making ends meet’ (Hall, 1978: 82-5). Also indicative of earnings actually being made are the inability of settlers to consider the purchase of their plots from DNOCS (Noronha, 1980) in a substantial proportion of cases, the frequent need by DNOCS to subsidize running costs ‘quite sig- nificantly’ and a high rate of farmer turnover, of perhaps 20-50 per cent (Coelho;1982, quoted by Hall in his 1983 review).

If we ask why incomes obtained in the schemes are low for the bulk of farmers, we need to go beyond the factor of scheme over- manning, which would affect the economic (social) rate return to the scheme but not farmers’ incomes, unless these costs were retrieved from farmers. One can identify organizational factors, technical factors and market factors. On the organizational side, despite the number of scheme bureaucrats and other personnel, the level of farmer training and extension offered is not adequate. As Hall notes (1983: 17):

the new colonist receives a short training course of two weeks consisting of lectures and practical demonstration. There is often a long delay, possibly a year

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertcio 487

or more, between this training and the time that a farmer takes up his plot, during which such training may be rendered useless.

Among the technical factors involved is a major problem of salinity, quite serious in major projects. This was estimated by one writer to affect about 30 per cent of all irrigated lands in the region (Coelho, 1975, quoted by Hall). If this was an overestimate, the problem is certainly great on some schemes. Soil quality is variable, affecting individual farmers’ yields, but also often requiring long transmission distances necessitating expensive investment in canals and involving substantial transmission losses. Only 1-2 per cent of land area in the northeast has been assessed as containing better than moderate or worse soils, with about 60 per cent as unsuitable for cultivation at all (Ministerio da Agricultura/SUPLAN, 1975). As an F A 0 report notes (FAO, 1983: 32) ‘the predominantly poor resource base of the Northeast limits the number of locations where sufficient water can be brought to land of adequate fertility for profitable irrigation to be possible’. Thus, as a consequence, among schemes visited by the authors the main canal at the Morada Nova scheme measures 24 km, and that at Ibimirim as much as 33 km.

Given the heavy capital investment costs per hectare, therefore, even leaving out of account the capital costs of the dams, and the problems of soil fertility and salinity, for irrigation to be very eco- nomic it would be essential to have high-valued crops. The GEIDA group, in its original Pluriannual Irrigation Programme, based its projected high farmer incomes on the cultivation and export of high-value fruits and vegetables. The bulk of actual production has proved to be of traditional crops consumed throughout the region, such as beans, rice and maize, though sugar has been grown on CODEVASF schemes.

As far as these staple crops are concerned, the 1983 F A 0 Mission concluded (p. 33) on the basis of its own analyses:

firstly that staple food crops will remain among the least attractive alternatives to the commercially-motivated irrigator, and secondly that - under present world market conditions at least - there may be no economic advantage in growing them under irrigation in the region as compared with importing them.

If we turn, thirdly, to the equity aspect, it follows from the high capital costs per farmer, and the small numbers of families actually settled, that the programme is directed towards a privileged minor- ity of farmers, even if not all of these have found it beneficial. It

488 I . Livingstone and M . Assun@o

could not possibly achieve much coverage of the target group who are in greater need of support. However, as Hall (1983: 14) points out, those absorbed on to the schemes are not the most vulnerable to drought, viz. the sharecroppers from the caatinga, the drier areas away from the valley floors ‘who are strongly underrepresented on projects’ compared with those from the more densely settled valley floors where administrative costs of selection are lower.

If irrigation is adopted with a view to protecting as many people as possible from the worst effects of drought, the sizes of irrigable land allocated to each household have been excessive. Given the number of families in need of crop ‘insurance’, 1-2 ha each, complemented by a basic dryland cropping area, which is what is exclusively culti- vated by most farmers at the moment, would have sufficed: in fact the average area developed and allocated per family has been about 7 ha on both DNOCS and CODEVASF schemes, with about 5 ha in operation.

Given its conflict with considerations of economics, equity, man- agement and, not discussed here, health, it seems unwise to be planning a major emphasis on a strategy of irrigation for the future development of the dry northeast.

Surprisingly, it appears that the area so far developed is just the beginning. Plans were for a 169 per cent increase in hectarage from 1980 to 1985 and a further 92 per cent increase from 1985 to 1990. The planned area for 1995 would be more than nine times that for 1980. Economics as such apart, the proposed rate of new develop- ment of over 100,OOO ha a year over 1990-5 and 145,000 ha a year over the period 1995-2000 flies in the face of an obvious managerial constraint.

5. COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE POLICY FOR DROUGHT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHEAST

The professed objectives of water investment policy and rural devel- opment policy in general in the northeast have been to cushion the effects of drought for those most affected, to raise the general standard of living and eliminate the widespread rural poverty which exists, and to substantially reduce the extent of rural-urban migra- tion within and outside the region.

The effectiveness of policies directed towards these ends depends entirely on their reaching the relevant target groups comprising the

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sert@o 489

most vulnerable. These groups are well-known in general terms, but more precision can be obtained simply by examining the composi- tion of those who are forced to supplement their incomes in drought by joining a work front. In 1979 no more than 20 per cent owned any land at all: and out of this 20 per cent only 8 per cent owned more than 20 ha (Pessoa, 1983). It becomes fairly evident that the main programmes which have been adopted largely passed by this basic target population. This is true of both the early large public dam construction policy and the more recent and current irrigation development policy, as well as the various special programmes which have been closely tied to the latter.

As regards effectiveness in preventing rural-urban drift, we may simply quote estimates given to the authors for one area, the Caico municipio, for which the rural population in 1984 was put at some 10,000-12,000, compared with a pre-drought figure for 1979 of 43,000. Movement was said to have been to Caico, in the first place, and in a proportion of cases onward to Sgo Paulo. Drought is clearly an important factor, due to the strong discouragement imparted and the loss of physical assets tying a family to the area. It is usually the case that a substantial proportion of displaced persons return to their rural locations at the end of the drought, but a fraction may not return, particularly younger people, droughts having a ‘ratchet effect’ operating at each drought to abstract population from the Sertgo.

The solution to drought which has been adopted has always been the ‘hydrological’ one, originally of large public dams and subse- quently of irrigation. Water-related works have also formed a large and probably disproportionate part of Emergency activity. The large public dams, we have seen, have been relatively little used, particularly in relation to their colossal costs, which historically have involved a major opportunity cost.

The demand for water in the Sertgo may be divided into consump- tion water and production water. As far as consumption water is concerned, one may make a distinction between urban demand and the requirements of dispersed rural households, since these may well need to be catered for differently. It turns out that the large DNOCS dams have not been of much utility for either purpose. The urban population within the Sertgo is generally located in a fairly large number of small, scattered towns. The DNOCS dams have the dis- advantage here of offering concentrated sources of supply of water. As a result they are not much used by the townships, which do not

490 I . Livingstone and M . Assunpjo

depend particularly on dams of any kind, using also tubewells and other sources, often in combination. The DNOCS dams are even less relevant to the needs of dispersed rural households.

‘Production water’ may be applied to crops or to livestock. A major portion of rural development funds have been applied by the government to crops, through irrigation. It has been said, in fact, that ‘the government is interested in irrigation, and the farmers in livestock’. The problem of crop losses could never be solved through the provision of irrigation water, however, because a preponderant part of the land area in the Sert%o is unsuitable for irrigation. The supply of some of the public schemes which utilize suitable patches of land involve the construction of lengthy irrigation canals. Costs of irrigation are high, associated with the costs also of storing water from one year to another in a semi-arid climate with high rates of evaporation loss. Productivity is not uniformly high, with great variations between farmers, many farmers not making adequate incomes, and general profitability being seriously affected by dis- tance from markets and a lack of suitable high-valued crops.

The high costs and limited land suitability for irrigation mean that relatively few small producers can be so established, so that irriga- tion tends to serve the favoured few. Little employment is created and, indeed, irrigation has involved substantial farmer displace- ment and net loss of employment rather than contributing to labour absorption.

On the surface the DNOCS dams would be expected to make a more positive contribution through the regulation of rivers down- stream, because of the large number of users potentially benefiting. In practice many of the regulated rivers pass through tracts of land owned by large landowners, generally poorly utilized. Those parts of the rivers which have been regulated have not been inten- sively used, in fact, and where they are used this has involved pump- ing, increasing costs and limiting the number of farmers who are able to profit from the opportunity. This is not to say that poten- tial does not exist to be exploited, and the possibilities certainly need much more systematic attention than they appear to have received.

As regards production water for livestock, the interesting point of contrast is between the very limited usage of large public dams for this purpose, and the rather critical role played by smaller private dams of all types. For livestock what is required is distributed supplies of water within reasonable proximity of the household,

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertdo 49 1

suitable for watering of small stock and the few cattle which may be in the possession of the poorer households, rather than a few concen- trated sources. Because of the distance factor, there are in effect diseconomies of scale in relation to the size of dam, as well as, because of the likelihood of drying up, economies of scale. More investigation is needed of the most useful size of dam, in relation to cost.

We may treat credit separately from dams and irrigation, the two major components of policy so far discussed, because rural credit has been an important element in itself. In fact, however, many of the loans offered have been for hydrological purposes, whether for wells or dams or for irrigation, and the special programmes have in turn been centred to some extent on this credit. The credit pro- gramme therefore reflects the deficiencies of the hydrological works carried out. It has seriously aggravated the aspect of inequity, how- ever, first because of the directing of substantial fractions of the loans to relatively well-off farmers and secondly because of the large unintended grant element produced by inflation on the real rates of interest charged.

What would be the components of a positive programme? The first thing would be to ensure that the measures adopted satisfy certain essential criteria:

1. They need to be directed towards the mass of the rural popula- tion in the rural Sertlo;

2. They should be directed towards labour absorption, and not be capital-using or involve substantial capital assets beyond the reach of most farmers;

3. Taking into account ‘the ratchet effect’ of droughts in persua- ding people to leave, or not to return to, the rural areas, they should include specific measures to increase the capacity to withstand drought;

4. This should not be the only focus, however, and the measures adopted should help to move households in the direction of long-run viability;

5 . Despite the acknowledged effects of drought, the willingness to stay in the rural areas is likely to be a function of the acceptability of life there over a period, and the willingness to return there after drought a function of overall conditions, incomes realized over a period and, for youth especially, future prospects. This therefore includes income in good years as well as bad, and would be affected

492 I . Livingstone and M . Assuncdo

by the availability of social amenities and services, including domes- tic water supply.

Specific recommendations may be discussed under the head of (a) land tenure; (b) water provision; (c) crops; and (d) livestock.

Land Tenure

A large majority of rural households are caught in a vicious circle, cultivating small farms in marginal areas with low productivity, allowing neither own savings nor eligibility for credit with which to improve water supplies or develop whatever livestock holdings they have; subject, moreover, to periodic loss of whatever assets have been accumulated. While large-scale land reform is needed, if this is not practicable it may still be possible to make piecemeal progress in this direction by acquiring small areas of more suitable land over time for settlement.

It should be recognized, secondly, that even within the category of very small farms it makes a considerable difference whether a household has 5 , 10 or 15 ha, and increases in access to land even over this range are worth pursuing. Provision for the landless is equally important, even if this is sufficient only for a contribution towards subsistence and household viability.

The granting of land titles to small farmers should be pursued as a means of discouraging migration through providing a sense of ownership and strengthening attachment to the land.

Attention to the promotion of small farms can be justified by the available evidence in northeast Brazil and elsewhere of an inverse relationship between farm size and gross output per hectare.

Water Provision

The provision of water should nor have as a major aim the develop- ment of irrigation, but should emphasize particularly domestic use and livestock rather than crops. Where flooded areas or areas around tubewells can be developed, this should be divided into gardens to provide some security alongside their rain-fed plots for the maximum number of farm families. Identification of possibilities for small-scale irrigation at the local level should form

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertdo 493

part of integrated rural development planning. At the same time as expensive public irrigation schemes are played down, special pro- grammes should be reoriented towards dry farming and livestock.

The emphasis must be on distributed water provision through a multiplicity of sources, geared towards household requirements and the watering of small stock and scattered smallholdings of cattle. A rural water development programme would build on the wide range of methods of obtaining water which are currently found useful: cisterns, barreios, small dams, amazonas and tubewells. The optimum mix adopted, however, should be based on a calculation of relative costs and benefits in each area. Once this optimum mix is identified, the best way of organizing a comprehensive assault on water needs at the average farm household level should be considered.

In calculating benefits, attention should not be limited to the capacity to cope in extreme years, though this is important, but extended to stabilizing water availability within years and extending its availability into the dry season. Due to the existence of certain scale economies in water provision, whether via small dams or tube- wells, the emphasis should be on shared facilities serving groups of families or small communities. Possibilities of appropriate tech- nology such as windmills should be explored.

A progressive expansion in the number of households equipped with cisterns should be aimed at, to provide the basis for wider delivery of emergency supplies during drought.

Crops

As indicated above, there should be reorientation of attention towards dry farming, the majority of farmers depending upon rain- fed crops. At the same time measures to marginally increase yields per hectare, or even to introduce more resistant varieties of crops, may not be effective in dealing with extreme drought years when adequate rainfall fails to materialize. One problem facing poor farmers is to obtain a further supply of seed after crop failure. Institutional arrangements should be made to cover provision on credit of such seed as is required following crop failure.

494 I . Livingstone and M. Assunpio

Livestock

There are two reasons why a major focus of attention should be on livestock, and particularly goats and sheep. Sheep and goats are relatively widely owned (although not exclusively so) by the poorer farm families, so that they constitute an obvious potential means of assisting the target group. Compared with cattle or irrigation infra- structure they are readily divisible among a large number of house- holds, and do not represent substantial capital assets which can be made available only to a small minority of households. They do, on the other hand, multiply quickly, so that they represent readily augmentable capital in the hands of poor households and a means of achieving relatively rapid recovery following a drought. They are hardy, being able to browse on whatever foliage is available, and contribute to subsistence as well as being a potential source of cash.

Secondly, although we have indicated the need to expand the very small holdings of land in the possession of the smallest farmers, a feature of rain-fed agriculture in the SertSlo is that whether the holding is of 20 or 100 ha, nil output is likely to be secured in a major rains failure. If, therefore, nil income is secured in a drought year, by what means can a poor household survive? The answer lies in assets which may be sold off for income: and the most obvious assets which could be available to poor rural households are goats. This is indeed the observable practice. During the last drought the sale of goats by poor families was a widespread phenomenon. These assets became exhausted in many cases, however, after consecutive years of drought, eventually forcing the abandonment of the homestead in many instances. It is towards prevention of this abandonment that efforts need to be directed.

While much of the actual rural development resources and effort over the past decade or so has been directed towards irrigation, it may be seen that the observable difference between large and small producers’ capacity to survive a drought is not the involvement of the farmer in irrigation. The most direct reason is that they have more substantial assets in the form of cattle, which they are able to sell off in order to maintain a flow of cash income; but also have the means to maintain this capital intact more effectively, through access to private dams in many cases (which also means access to natural pastures outside the range which would be available to poor households) and to fodder, sometimes from limited irrigated areas.

A general point may be made here. The official response to

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertdo 495

drought has been to undertake major expenditures for storing water. Water may be much more expensive to store, however (because it evaporates), than livestock. Whether these are cattle or small stock, the amounts of water they require for drinking pur- poses are minute and can be provided easily, for example, by a tubewell.

Two measures which are called for are: (a) breeding programmes for the improvement of native races of goat and the adaptation of foreign ones, and (b) a credit programme for the distribution of goats in kind, available on a continuing basis for the purpose of building up small mixed-farm units and available specifically fol- lowing a drought to assist in the reconstitution of livestock assets following forced sale.

Some experience already exists in both these directions. Revista ACP (1984, No. 3, News Section. p. 32) reports on a goat project initiated in 1980 by the Pernambuco State Secretary for Agriculture. This included supply of technical and financial assistance to goat- raisers, incentives for growing fodder, and research into improving genetic standards. In 1984 the Pernambuco Department of Animal Production maintained in two farms in Sertania, a Sertso municipio, ‘the largest and more selected stock of goats of the Bhuj (Indian) and Anglonubian (British) races in the country’, but also maintained other races at other farms, at Bom Jardim, Toggenburg (a milk breed); at Garanhuns, Saanen (a milk breed); in Flores, Mambrina (a meat and milk breed); and in Iguaraci, Moxoto (a breed which provides the best-quality skin). Technical assistance given by the Department of Animal Production consisted of sani- tary control (vaccination, vermifumigation), guidance on feeding and management, and on commercialization of milk and skins production.

The credit programme was based on the farmer receiving either one ram and five ewes or two rams and three ewes, with the obliga- tion to return the identical loan in kind 2 years later. Credit schemes in kind along these lines have been successful elsewhere, for example for the distribution of merino sheep under Kenya’s Special Rural Development Programme in the mid-1970s. In the first 3 years of the project, 1980-2, 1,800 individual projects were approved and in 1983 another 800, resources coming mainly from the State Bank of Pernambuco (2 billion cruzeiros in the 4-year period 1980-3) but also from the Bank of Brazil. Credit was also issued to permit the planting of 160,000 mudas of afgaroba and 455 ha ofpalma (cactus)

496 I . Livingstone and M. Assuncdo

as fodder, and some buffel grass. Goat-raisers also received assis- tance for silo construction and production of hay.

A possible weakness is that the projects benefited both small and medium farms indiscriminately. Nevertheless the Revista A CP reports a significant impact from the project throughout the State of Pernambuco and a reversal of the trend in the number of goats, which had been in decline up to 1979. Our recommendation would be to confine the credit to sheep and goats, rather than cattle, except in areas unsuited to the former, as a means of effectively targeting assistance widely and to those most in need. Successful raising of a goat herd can provide the means subsequently to acquire cattle if desired. At present relatively little credit is offered for sheep and goat production in the northeast. A sample survey of the utilization of bank credit among keepers of sheep and goats carried out in Bahia in 1974 found that in a sample of 780 the percentage using credit was just 6.9 (Govern0 do Estado da Bahia, 1974).

As noted above, cattle-raisers have found it much easier to survive droughts, due to superior access to fodder. In the last drought large numbers of goats are reported to have died for lack of fodder, while poor families made substantial capital losses through forced sales at low prices in a buyers’ market. Measures to ensure fodder avail- ability to poor farm households are an essential adjunct to the recommended policy.

Silos for fodder, as well as for human food crops, are an obvious possibility, and the fact that large owners devote major areas of irrigated land to buffel grass for use as fodder, despite the costs of irrigation, is suggestive of a high rate of return in combination with livestock-raising. If goats are a potential vehicle for survival through a drought period, access to even a small area of vazantes or other irrigated plot could be critical to a small producer. We reiter- ate the need, therefore, to ‘ration’ access to such plots as far as is practicable.

The major focus, however, should be on cactus. The authors themselves encountered one medium-sized farmer who had success- fully seen his cattle through the drought by feeding them forms of cactus, which may be boiled to provide palatable fodder. Palma cactus, it may be noted, is composed of 90 per cent water, and itself comprises an alternative means of storing water. Coelho (1984) recommends research into the improvement of the cuutinga, the natural vegetation of the SertPo, including specifically palma forrageira, facheiro and mandacaru, and suggests the interplanting

Drought and Development in the Brazilian Sertcio 497

of palma, algaroba, and cotton. Coelho also comments, inter- estingly, on the limited number of goat projects and complete lack of sheep projects. While algaroba has been criticized as an ‘invader crop’ it has been a major source of food for cattle during drought, and it is doubtful whether one can afford not to promote it. Macambira is described as a highly nutritive fodder crop of some potential in Agropecuaria Tropical (No. 31, Recife, June 1983, ‘A Macambira, uma riqueza do Nordeste’). It should be checked what inhibits more widespread planting of these fodder sources, but it would seem that measures to encourage their systematic planting and use should constitute an important immediate element in agri- cultural extension programmes. Development of improved and appropriate varieties of these and of the caatinga generally should be made an important element in research programmes.

To summarize, what is recommended here is a totally different emphasis, on livestock rather than on irrigation, and within livestock on small stock, combined with the establishment of forage, centred on appropriate cacti and other plants. Distributed water supplies at the farm household level would be supportive. As compared with palliative action adopted under emergency situa- tions this would raise productivity in the small mixed farm in the good or average year, not merely the bad; it would endow the small farm with ‘assets’ needed to negotiate years of zero crop output; and would thus provide a degree of insurance against crop failure, per- haps encouraging also a more positive approach with respect to crops.

Unlike the policy centred on irrigation, this approach is one more closely guided by knowledge of the agricultural economy of the Sertiio and the resources available to the average farm household, and may be described as a ‘bottom-up’ policy compared with the ‘top-down’ policy being pursued. It is a failure to take cognizance of the nature of the Sertiio economy and the precise ways in which it is affected by drought which has led to a misspecification of policy.

As compared with existing Emergency programmes, the set of policies above would include: (a) anticipatory action, such as the installation of distributed water supplies closer to the level of the farm household, fodder supplies, and the building-up of disposable farm household assets to help carry the household through the droughts; (b) post-drought recuperative action through the distribu- tion of seed for re-planting on credit, and credit for the reconstitu- tion of livestock holdings; and (c) permanent improvement in the

498 I . Livingstone and M. Assuncdo

level of farm household incomes in normal years and the possibility of progressive development of the small mixed farm.

Finally, the programme described would constitute a more genuine form of integrated rural development planning: (a) it would be focused on the main target groups, including the landless if the land policies suggested were seriously pursued; (b) it would combine a set of mutually supportive actions by different agencies covering ‘the whole farm’ and dealing with social welfare as well as economic activities; and (c) effective implementation would require a substan- tial degree of decentralization to the local level, this kind of detailed programme simply not being implementable by remote control from above. The components described could give substantive content to Projeto Nordeste for tile futdre as an integrated rural development programme tailored to the needs and potential of the Sertiio.

NOTES

The authors are grateful lor financial support for the research on which this article is based provided by ODA’s Economic and Social Committee on Research, and in Brazil by the Superintendency for the Development of the North-East (SUDENE) and the CoordinaqBo de Aperfeicoarnento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior (CAPES). Advice on technical issues was provided by Dr Michael Stocking.

1. What must obviously be treated as minor supplementary uses of reservoirs are for stocking fish (compare the productivity of fish farming) and tourism (tourism is minimal in the north east, despite the number of reservoirs created). In 1983 nearly 100 DNOCS dams (out of some 250) were stocked with fish, yielding almost 15,000 tons of fish. If we relate the value of the catch to the size of dams using reservoir capacity as an index of size the latter figure is not so impressive. The value of output per million cubic metres of reservoir capacity was on average only some 400 dollars. This level of earnings would not make any significant difference to the rate of return on investment in reservoir capacity.

2. For example, as calculated in Ministerio d o Interior, DNOCS, 3rd Regional Directorate, Projeto Sumk, Paraiba, Hydro-agricultural Exploitation of Sumd Public Dam, Recife.

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Ian Livingstone is Professor of Development Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, England. He has written and edited a number of books in the field of development economics and rural development, including, with Arthur Hazlewood, Irrigation Economics in Poor Countries.

MBrcio Assunqiio is researching problems of drought in the Brazilian northeast with the School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia. More permanently he is a faculty member in the Department of Economics of the State University of Pernambuco, Brazil, and is an economist of some years standing with the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE).