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Government and the state Development Politics week 3 Tom Hewitt, IDD 31 January 2012

Government and the state Development Politics week 3

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Government and the state Development Politics week 3. Tom Hewitt, IDD 31 January 2012. Seoul 1960 and 2000. Broad trends. Different types of states (authoritarian, democratic, one-party, multi-party, Federal, Westminster, military) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Government and the state

Development Politics week 3

Tom Hewitt, IDD31 January 2012

Page 2: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Seoul 1960 and 2000

Page 3: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Broad trends

Different types of states (authoritarian, democratic, one-party, multi-party, Federal, Westminster, military)

The changing role of the state from planner to problem to facilitator

Developmental states The role of the private and non-profit sectors Decentralization: bringing the state closer to the

people?

Page 4: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

What is the state?Classic definition (Weber) A political institution that monopolizes

sovereignty over a territory and the legitimate use of force within its boundaries, and claims authority over all the people in it

An abstract yet powerful notion that embraces a network of authoritative institutions that make and enforce top-level decisions throughout a territorially defined political entityChesterman et al 2005 Making states work, UNU Press

Page 5: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Early views in the 1950s and 60s Late development The state as planner Developmentalism and state intervention inseparable Near consensus that authoritarian regime necessary

for development success (e.g. the NICs) Military governments of Latin America Economic success of Asian Tigers

Crisis of the state

Page 6: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

2 solutions vying for supremacy

The minimal state The developmental state

Page 7: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

The problem state (Mackintosh)

Unresponsive but invasive Inefficient and restrictive Public vs private interest views of the state What to do with the state?

Squeeze it (cut, sell, contract out, charge = NPM) Split it (deregulation, decentralisation, cost

recovery, targeting) Devolve it (private and voluntary) Up-end it (in interests of less powerful: Chambers)

Page 8: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

The Asian Tigers confounded observers by going their own way

Page 9: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Developmental states: Context

Political purpose and institutional structures are developmentally driven

Developmental objectives are politically driven = shaped the urgency, thrust and pace of

development E.g.: pre WWII: Imperial Germany, Meiji Japan,

Tsarist Russia. Post WWII: France, Japan, S Korea, Singapore, China

Page 10: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

And …

Transitional, (urgent) catch-up arrangements (long history, back to List’s late-1800s analysis of Germany and Gerschenkron on FSU)

Strong economic and political nationalism Tendency to mixed capitalist economy May be democratic or non-democratic Adds up to ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans)

Page 11: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

“we understand a developmental state to exist when the state possesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about a positive transformation of society within a condensed period of time. To be judged developmental, a state does not need to be in control of everything and successful in all spheres. A transformation that is positive overall may be accompanied by a range of negative consequences, such as major environmental damage or greater social tension, which become problems that society and the state have to address in a subsequent phase”. (Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 533)

Page 12: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Key features of Asian DS

Dedicated developmental elite (but not immune from “corruption”)

Relative autonomy of the state apparatus (from the demands of special interests)

Competent and insulated economic bureaucracy (compare to predatory or high turnover of African or Latin American)

Weak, subordinated civil society Capacity to manage effectively local and foreign economic

interests Varying balance of repression, legitimacy and performance (not

a great HR record)

Page 13: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

The political form of DS (Wade 1990)

Authoritarian

+

Democratic

+

Corporatist Pluralist

= =

Taiwan and S Korea US and Europe

Page 14: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Lockwood adds for Africa

Clientalism muddies the neat picture by Wade Corporatist view can take two routes

Centralised and bureaucratic presidential power

Spoils economy

Page 15: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Is the DS a model?

Easy to spot with hindsight Strong on description, weak on explanation Weak on theory of change (e.g. Japan from

developmental to market state) Is the state best placed to pick winners and losers? Does size matter? (China vs Singapore) Is democrary a necessary condition for development?

Page 16: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

These make it hard to replicate

There are no blueprints

So is the idea of DS just history ?

Some lessons have been learnt

Page 17: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

A short diversion to politics

Political context, dynamics and purposes of developmental state have been critical

Futures are open as a result Contradiction: development requires more

state not less (and more than the managerial focus of GG) but developmental state cannot be ordered from catalogue.

Page 18: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Political development

…the extent to which (a) states exercise legitimate authority within their territorial borders and in interactions with other states and extra-territorial authorities; and (b) that legitimate authority stems from the binding consultation with citizens and is exercised with regard for the preferences of citizens. (Moore 2001:6)

Page 19: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

And more than that

Rules of the game + Games within the rules Have implications for development / change We return to this in discussion

Page 20: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Political underdevelopment

Multiple causes Interactionist approach Sources of income We return to this too

Page 21: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Relevance of DS today

Agreement that they are important, disagreement on what they entail

Relation between state building and governance

The role of external actors The way forward

Page 22: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Developmental states or effective states?

Clientalism has created anti-developmental states (Lockwood on SSA)

Donors have created political underdevelopment (Moore)

CAR: Many do not even have the “C” Implications for aid, trade and policy coherence An end to ‘institutional mono-cropping’

Page 23: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

While development states are desirable, they are impossible to ‘manufacture’ and not susceptible to any of the more obvious forms of promotion. Domestic political-economy factors … as well as external influences … militate against their emergence in today’s developing countriesFritz and Menocal 2007: 533

Page 24: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

China goes its own way

Orthodox Unorthodox

Crony capitalism vs. Hand-in-hand relationships between government and business

government/politicians as a potential threat to investors that needs to be restrained vs.

a source of support that needs to be nurtured

Experimental, incrementalist vs. blueprint approaches to reform

state/politics as a single-level source of monolithic power vs.

a multi-level source of pluralism

The need for investors to have the formal legal system as a potential source of assurance vs.

politicians’ assurances about their property and other rights

(Moore and Schmitz, 2008)

Page 25: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

Leftwich, 2008

1. What is the significance for development, in Leftwich’s view, of the distinction between the two related levels at which politics occurs (i.e. ‘the rules of the game’ and ‘the games within the rules’). Do you think that this is a useful distinction? Why?

2. Identify the ‘contingent historical factors’ that have commonly been present in the emergence of developmental states and the characteristics to which they gave rise.

3. What are the implications for contemporary ‘developing countries’ of combining the implications of questions 1 and 2 above. That is, what implications does Leftwich discuss in the rest of this paper?(!)

Moore, 2001

1. Why is political development so contested (in ways that social and economic development are not)? How does Moore use the term “political development”?

2. And why does he choose an ‘interactionist’ approach (over other approaches) to explain the link between poverty and poor governance?

3. Do you find any (one or more) of Moore’s seven mechanisms more compelling than others? Why? Do you find any of them surprising? Why?

4. Why is tax so exciting?! What are the consequences of states’ living off unearned income and what are the resulting pressures towards political underdevelopment?

5. What practical advice does Moore give to counteract the causes of bad governance?

Page 26: Government and the state Development Politics week 3

References Evans, P. (1995) Embedded autonomy: States and industrial

transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fritz, V. and Mendez, E. (2007) Developmental States in the

New Millennium: Concepts and Challenges for a New Aid Agenda. Development Policy Review 25 (5): pp. 531-552.

Lockwood, M. (2006) The State They’re In: An Agenda for Internation Action on Poverty in Africa. 2nd Edition, Rugby, Practical Action Publishing

Mackintosh, M. (1992) "Questioning the Sate". In Wuyts, M.;Mackintosh, M. & Hewitt, T. (Eds.) Development Policy and Public Action. Oxford, Oxford University Press 61-89.

Moore, M. and Schmitz, H. (2008) "Idealism, Realism and the Investment Climate in Developing Countries". IDS Working Paper 307 Brighton, Institute of Development Studies.

Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.