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GOVERNMENT 1540: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY STUDY GUIDE FOR FALL 2006

Editor: Teo Nicolais Contributors: Jason Borschow, Andrew Flynn, Tim Hagamen, Jeff Howard, Steven

Johnston, Michael Jones, Ross Lipstein, Brieana Marticorena, Alex McPhillips, Hanna Sankowska, Jon Sherman, Temilola Sobowale, Nicholas Traverse, Helen Weng,

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TABLE OF CONTENTS November 2: Taking the Reins - Presidential Transitions

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, chapter 11, pp. 230-268. 5

Roger B. Porter, "Of Hazards and Opportunities: Transitions and the Modern Presidency," Paper prepared for Presidential Power Revisited Conference, Woodrow Wilson Center, June 1996. 7 Martha Joynt Kumar, George C. Edwards III, James P. Pfiffner, and Terry Sullivan, “Meeting the Freight Train Head On: Planning for the Transition to Power,” in The White House World, edited by Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan (Texas A&M University Press, 2003), pp. 5-23. 9

November 7: Shaping the National Agenda

Roger B. Porter, "The President and the National Agenda," in James P. Pfiffner, ed., The Managerial Presidency, pp, 319-333. 10 James P. Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running, 2nd edition, chapter 6, pp. 111-127. 11

November 9: The President and the Congress: Who Leads?

John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment, chapter 2, pp. 21-52. 12 David E. Price, “House Democrats Under Republican Rule: Reflections on the Limits of Partisanship,” Miller Center Report, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2004), pp. 21-28. 13 Matthew Dickinson, "The President and Congress," in Michael Nelson, ed., The President and the Political System, pp. 455-480. 14

Marc J. Hetherington and Richard J. Ellis, “Resolved, the president is a more authentic representative of the American people than is Congress,” chapter 6 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 75-91. 16

November 14: The President and the Congress: Mutual Oversight

Louis Fisher, "Congress as Co-Manager of the Executive Branch," in James P. Pfiffner, ed., The Managerial Presidency, second edition, pp. 300-318. 17

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Nancy Kassop and Richard M. Pious, “Resolved, presidents have usurped the war power that rightfully belongs to Congress,” chapter 7 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 92-109. 18 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, chapter 12, pp. 269-294. 20

November 16: The President and the Courts

David A. Yalof, "The Presidency and the Judiciary," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 481-507. 21

David A. Yalof and John Anthony Maltese, “Resolved, the president has too much power in the selection of judges,” chapter 8 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 110-124. 23

November 21: Presidents, Parties, and Interest Groups

Daniel J. Tichenor, "The Presidency and Interest Groups: Allies, Adversaries, and Policy Leadership” in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 311-340. 24

Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (Little, Brown, 1997), chapter 10, pp. 194-224. 29 Sidney Milkis, "The Presidency and Political Parties," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 341-382. 32

November 28: The Presidency and the Public

Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, chapters 1-2, 4-5; pp. 1-64 and 104-178. 34 Marc Bodnick, "Going Public Reconsidered: Reagan's 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts," Congress and the Presidency, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 13-28. 38

November 30: The Presidency and the Press John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment, chapter 3, pp. 53-90. 39 Lawrence R. Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press: The Paradox of the White House Communications War," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 283-310. 44

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Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership 3rd edition, (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), chapter 3, pp. 65-103. 45 Matthew R. Kerbel and Bartholomew H. Sparrow, “Resolved, the media are too hard on presidents,” chapter 5 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 60-74. 49

December 5: Presidential Style and Character

Michael Nelson, "The Psychological Presidency," in Nelson, The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 170-194. 50

James David Barber, "Answering the Critics," in The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 3rd ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 521-528. 52

Stanley A. Renshon and Stephen Skrowronek, “Resolved, psychological character is a powerful predictor of presidential performance,” chapter 11 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 159-178. 54

December 7: Evaluating Presidents and the Presidency

Michael Nelson, "Evaluating the Presidency," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 1-27. 58

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Rating the Presidents: From Washington to Clinton," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112 (Summer 1997), pp. 179-190. 60 Marc Landy and Bruce Miroff, “Resolved, great presidents are agents of Democratic change,” chapter 12 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 179-197. 61

December 12: Presidential Leadership and the Vice Presidency

William E. Gienapp, “Abraham Lincoln and Presidential Leadership,” in James M. McPherson, ed., We Cannot Escape History (University of Illinois Press, 1995), pp. 63-85. 62 Paul Kengor, “Cheney and Vice Presidential Power,” in Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell, Considering the Bush Presidency (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 160-174. 64

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Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, chapter 11, pp. 230-268. Contributed by: Jon Sherman Neustadt Chapter 11 • Is the Presidency possible?

o Physically, it can take its toll, but it is possible. o Morally and emotionally, the responsibility for avoiding nuclear annihilation seems

inhuman, but someone has to do it and has done so since Eisenhower’s terms, so it must be possible.

o Intellectually, social and economic policy lacked clear direction, but no more than they did during the great depression, and major events like the end of Vietnam were no more significant than the two world wars.

o Operationally, it seems necessary only to remain “minimally effective.” The question is whether to compare effectiveness to the low standard of Truman (who often had approval ratings of between 20 and 30 percent), the best of each of the presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon, or somewhere in between.

• Defense of Carter because of atomization of government. o Congress became more dispersed, with increase in number of committees and sub-

committees decreasing committee chairmen’s power. o Fragmentation of the “Administration” of presidential appointees (700+) because of

shortness of terms (<2 years on average). Simultaneously, tasks of these officials, such as administering grants-in-aid and regulatory programs authorized by Congress, increased dramatically.

o Increase in lobbyists on both sides of issues. o Staffs increase for presidential and congressional administrations, fading the status of

elected officials into an indistinguishable crowd. In theory, the president could stand alone as the only consistent face to the public. However, Carter weakened his position because of factors including

A legislative program that pushed change in many areas such as energy, tax, and welfare policy that had entrenched interests, which Senator Long agglomerated.

Chief objectives that required implementation out of the scope of his powers (foreign countries, private sector, etc.).

Overall weak interest in his campaign, politics, initiatives, etc. “Transition hazards,” the result of being new “in and to the presidency.”

• In the narrow sense, the 11 weeks between election and inauguration gives little time to create an Administration and corresponding positions from the platform the candidate’s campaign ran on. Carter spent the time in his home in remote Plains, Georgia, while his staff grew bloated and full of in-fighting in Washington.

• In the broad sense, the first two years of governing are when the President sees most of what any President will see.

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• The broad transition hazards were exemplified by JFK’s experience with the Bay of Pigs. o JFK unknowingly cemented his position by strong declarations against Castro during

a T.V. debate with Nixon. o After being briefed on current plans to send Cuban revolutionaries with covert U.S.

support to south-central Cuba near Trinidad to hopefully insight a anti-Castro revolution, Kennedy gradually sought opinions, including from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (but without their staff, out of concerns for secrecy), SecDef Robert McNamara, SecState Dean Rusk, and CIA Director Allen Dulles. Compartmentalization resulted not only in incomplete briefings but decision-makers not knowing about this incompleteness.

o Everything that could go wrong did, and Kennedy was embarrassed, looking both Ignorant, of the relationships of his advisors with each other, and of

institutional policy (such as that of the CIA), policy which his demand for secrecy in turn caused to be crippling.

Hopeful, that a new administration has the ability to achieve what the past could not, and corresponding arrogance that their combined intelligence and luck thus far would be able to conquer all.

• Carter’s “pig,” the Lance affair, resulted in few of the lessons learned in Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs affair.

o Lance was a respected friend of Carter’s. When he went through the Senate approval process, his holdings in banks he owned came under question, and questionable business practices eventually led to his resignation. During this process, Carter has publicly supported Lance, which resulted in significant cost to both his prestige and reputation.

o The Lance affair was so detracting on Carter’s public image largely because of “piglets,” other public gaffes before the Lance affair that lowered public and press expectations and confidence in Carter.

• Neustadt proposes that maybe expectations for incoming presidents should be more realistic initially, as they learn their new roles. Alternatively, attention to fixing initial faults can effectively retake public opinion.

• Neustadt claims television is the primary method to gain public opinion on coming into office, but that the president faces three hurdles:

o He needs events that support his presence on television. o He needs to be able to break the mold that years of holding the office build up. o He needs a break from visual associations, so that viewers know how to react. o An example of these three coming together was the 1978 Israel-Egypt summit at

Camp David, the praise from which boosted Carter’s Gallup Poll ratings from 42 to 56%.

o Neustadt claims that the differences he drew between reputation and prestige no longer hold, that Washingtonians view of a president’s professional reputation is now driven by his public prestige because a president who can wield public prestige can coral local constituents to pressure their representatives to implement presidential initiatives.

• Finally, Neustadt comments on the risks a president who can capture public sentiment via televised appearances faces:

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o Neustadt proposes that only sustained fuel shortages, environmental risks, or terrorism will allow such a president to build a “crisis consensus;” he claims any other substantial innovation, liberal or conservative, will be divisive.

o There is the possibility, however, for a “contrived” consensus, consisting of agreements between Washingtonians looking out for their own interests in lieu of an actual crisis, which may be possible.

o The decisions whether and how to act upon actual or contrived crises to build consensus makes the job of a telegenic president even more complicated, as this type of individual is not as likely to be familiar with the complex negotiations necessary to build any of these coalitions.

Roger B. Porter, "Of Hazards and Opportunities: Transitions and the Modern Presidency," Paper prepared for Presidential Power Revisited Conference, Woodrow Wilson Center, June 1996. Contributed by: Jon Sherman • Transitions have increased in complexity and challenges since Neustadt first published

Presidential Power, with more party changes and inexperienced leaders coming into office. • Neustadt used Carter transition to show why 11 weeks are too short a period to transition into

public office (see above summary). Neustadt believed Reagan found solutions to many of the problems Carter faced, in particular establishing working relationships between key aides and the President, but that this formula was not accepted by all, as Clinton fell into many of Carter’s mistakes during his transition.

• Neustadt’s recommendations for transitions are little planning before election, spending time with staff before inauguration, and quickly organizing and insulating a staff after election.

• Risks during initial governing period from o Overburdened cabinet appointees. o Closer press coverage and public scrutiny. o Atomization.

• Expectations of new presidents have risen o Increased pressure to produce detailed proposals. o Unified federal budget. o Increased number of young, committed campaign staffers who prioritize campaign

promises. o Increase in formal post-election transition activities.

• Porter’s interpretation of Neustadt’s risks new presidents face: o Ignorance

Limited knowledge of Washington and its institutions and folkways. Of nuances of foreign policy

• Example – Carter’s misguided arms control proposal. Of executive branch capabilities, sensitivities, inclinations, routines, and

relationships.

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o Hubris/Arrogance. Failure to learn from those who came before. Failure to learn from those who remain. Asserting that

• Previous administrations ignored problems that require immediate attention

• The new administration must raise ethical standards. o Haste o Overreaching

Porter adds this as a risk to Neustadt’s original list. Carter advanced many proposals that required one committee’s approval. Carter failed to reveal any priorities between his proposals.

• Opportunities to be gained during transitions, on the new slate each president gets. o Symbolic actions.

JFK made amends after his bitter campaign with Nixon, reaching out to democrats and republicans alike.

Reagan reaches out likewise, and further to the press (not just politicians). Clinton reached out, but only to congressional democrats. Other signals are sent about intended relationships with the permanent

government, executive departments, and agencies over which they preside. Work habits are also established.

o Organizational arrangements and institutional innovations. Difficult to change after initially established because people take offense to a

change or demotion in responsibilities. Chance to develop good working relationships within executive branch policy

communities. o Legislative initiatives.

Congressional representatives want to make a good impression quickly, in particular because of the number appointments the president makes within his first few months of services.

This is in part because Congress tends to shift away from the president’s political party in midterm elections, numerically decreasing his leverage.

Reagan, Bush, and Clinton all had greatest success with legislation in early months (even though Bush faced democratic majorities throughout his administration).

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Martha Joynt Kumar, George C. Edwards III, James P. Pfiffner, and Terry Sullivan, “Meeting the Freight Train Head On: Planning for the Transition to Power,” in The White House World, edited by Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan (Texas A&M University Press, 2003), pp. 5-23. Contributed by: Jon Sherman Meeting the Freight Train Head On • Candidates must prepare early to be able to meet challenges of taking on the office of the

President. • Early Opportunities and Hazards

o Cabinet nominations that are snagged in committee risk the ability to achieve policy initiatives because they distract senior staffers.

• To be successful early on, White House staff members agree it is necessary to o Focus now on people and process

With 7000+ appointments and 1000+ requiring senate confirmations priorities must be set.

Cabinet, White House staff, and economic policy-makers are usually named first.

While it is clear when there is a party change that political appointees must vacate their posts, their can be more antagonism during a same-party transition.

It is necessary to gain confidence of all campaign members, or people will try to look out for their own interests by going to members of Congress for support.

o Avoid constraining commitments Such as decreasing White House staff size, increase staff ethics, increase staff

diversity, or high influence of a vice president or first lady. o Top White House Staff Comes First

Top 6 WH staff positions + national security advisor and director of the Office of Management and Budget.

First, Chief of Staff, who determines who and what the president sees and how decisions are implemented.

Personnel Director – in charge of recruitment, job descriptions, and appointment priorities, and must have total confidence of the president (and everyone else must know this) to avoid attempted circumvention of his decisions.

Assistant for Legislative Affairs – in charge of prepping nominees for confirmation hearings and establishing a Presidential-Congressional relationship that fosters initial legislation proposals.

Counsel to the President • Vetting procedures for nominees

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• Establishing any new ethical guidelines. • Provide opinion on Executive Orders – must be able to say no to the

President. Press Secretary – Set press expectations and establish Presidential-Press

relationship. • Must know president’s positions, because this person represents them

to the world. Office of Management and Administration – covers all non-policy issues that

can snag a transition. • Learning from Predecessors

o Outgoing team Chief of Staff is appointed early so they can communicate with their

predecessor on who would be capable candidates to fill lower positions. Help is often available but new team is often too arrogant to accept it.

o Bring in a team with WH experience. This does not necessarily exclude campaign members, as having someone

who knows why the president was elected and how to implement the mandates he was elected for is optimal.

o Retaining and Using WH Institutional Memory • Developing a strategic plan

o Because so many decisions must be made, it is essential to set priorities and stick to them.

Roger B. Porter, "The President and the National Agenda," in James P. Pfiffner, ed., The Managerial Presidency, pp, 319-333 Contributed by: Temilola Sobowale Heightened expectations – increase in size and complexity of government has put focus on President to develop a comprehensive and coherent agenda, campaign promises as a source for expectations, past success of presidents has caused us to expect success, revolution of communications has made it possible for him to influence more people 3 Kinds of Issues (possible IDS) Electoral Issues - campaign promises, these commitments play a powerful role, but over tie, the electoral mandate fades, and people forget, so a President must act fast if he wants any campaign commitments to see fruition ( as long as you don’t promise to not do something i.e. “read my lips no new taxes”) Maturing Issues – these are issues that are debated over an extended period of time, crucial to act on these once they hit the end of their “gestation periods” (possible ID), example Tax Reform Act 1986 that Porter negotiated for Reagan

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Crisis Issues – definition of crisis “crisis issues aer issues where advocates for change are able to demonstrate convincingly that failure to act immediately will result in a significant deterioration in the underlying situation” these issues are very few, especially domestically CONCLUSION– the central task of the president is less one of advancing fresh, imaginative approaches to problems, and more one involving definition timing and the building of coalitions

James P. Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running, 2nd edition, chapter 6, pp. 111-127. Contributed by: Temilola Sobowale Moving the President’s Legislative Agenda

presidential success is determined by factors not under the president’s control (such as partisan majorities in each house) and that presidents can exert very little influence on Congress as a result

early mistakes can hurt a president in Congress Reagan has shown that you can overcome a large partisan disadvantage in one house The importance of a fast start – blunders by Carter in legislative liaisons by Frank Moore

caused irreversible damage, whereas Reagan had a professional liaisons division Reagan included congress in pre-election and pre-inauguration activities highly specific and focused (he had rifle strategic choices, rather than the shotgun

approach of Carter which caused all his bills to get bottlenecked and nothing got done) legislative agenda, another thing Carter did not have

Must create an atmosphere of cooperation and service with favors to politicians Using public: must stick to your guns once you proclaim something publicly, also can use public support for a mandate, don’t use it as a threat before veto (delicate)

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John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment, chapter 2, pp. 21-52. Contributed by: Jason Borschow Actors: Staff members of the White House legislative liaison office are the ones who speak most directly for the president and who are most concerned with high priority legislation. The departmental legislative units cooperate with the White House Staff on administration legislative initiatives but are specifically responsible for legislation originating in their own department. The Office of Legislative Reference judges all legislation to determine whether or not it is in accord with the president’s overall program, and tracks it thereafter. This was started by FDR and it is called Legislative Clearance. Coordination between the president and congressional leaders is handled in meetings between these groups, while the president’s chief legislative assistant coordinates efforts between his staff and departmental units. Congressional Liaison Activities: Those working with the members make sure the administration is aware of the legislators’ proposals , channel their requests from projects (pork barrel stuff basically) and patronage (hiring their friends/family to the administration) to the decision makers in the administration, and to help members of congress to campaign, and to get their goodwill. This helps to smooth the way for legislation, The chances of success for a president in legislative initiatives, but changes are success are determined more by:

1. whether the president was elected by a large majority 2. whether he has a high approval rating 3. whether his party was able to gain seats in the same election 4. whether his party has majorities in both chambers 5. whether the issue groups have preferences that correspond to the president’s 6. whether the legislative leaders and the president have good leadership skills

Common Activities in a Congressional Environment: In this environment, info about whether legislators intend to support or oppose bills is the most important type. Having an efficient system for ascertaining head counts allows the president and his legislative aides to the leaders of Congress to decide what to do with a pending bill. Sometimes it is necessary to approach a member of Congress directly and sometimes indirectly to try and get them to support a bill. The Chief of Staff is very important in coordinating the different actors and agencies involved in establishing the merits of each piece of legislation and in helping to formulate the president’s opinions, responses, and initiatives vis-à-vis the bill in question.

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David E. Price, “House Democrats Under Republican Rule: Reflections on the Limits of Partisanship,” Miller Center Report, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2004), pp. 21-28. Contributed by: Tim Hagamen

• Subject: to study the growth of partisanship and the escalation of partisan tactics under

Republican rule. • Efforts to strengthen the parties began in the 1970s with the Democrats. Although the

original intent was to decentralize, the result was the opposite. Party leadership strengthens and younger members become more involved.

• Floor amending limited increasingly more often by Rules committee (closed rules). This allows the majority to push through more extreme legislation. For example, with the Clinton impeachment Delay prevented a vote on censure, betting that Republicans would rather vote to impeach than let Clinton off the hook.

• Democratic Speaker Jim Wright had few qualms about using his power to push through legislation. Gingrich further strengthened the parties.

• Although some thought that Bush would be a more centrist president who would work with the opposition (compassionate conservative), he actually governed from the “right-in’ as opposed to the “center-out”. This limited the role of Democrats and caused an increase in the level of polarization. Increase in party unity in voting patterns.

• Bush administration’s increase in partisanship was the result of several factors o Right wing agenda of White House o Narrow Republican majority in the house o Desire to counterweight the less conservative Senate

• Price argues that increasingly polarized politics are dangerous because it makes ‘dedistributive’ policies (those that are necessary but undesirable politically such as raising taxes or reducing benefits) less likely. Previously, these would have had bipartisan support, thereby spreading the blame between parties. However, with decreased cooperation, the political risk of dedistributive policies increases, making them less likely.

• There has recently been increased coercion within the Republican Party to get the votes needed to win. Winning with as little bipartisan accommodation as possible is considered ideal.

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Matthew Dickinson, "The President and Congress," in Michael Nelson, ed., The President and the Political System, pp. 455-480. Contributed by: Jason Borschow -Neustadt described American system of constitutional government as one of “separated institutions sharing powers.” This means it is is difficult for the president to accomplish much without the support or the acquiescence of Congress. Political parties developed as the bridge between these two brances. -Dickinson analyzes the Bush claim that in his 2004 reelection he gained “political capital” that he was going to be able to “spend.” (Cheney claimed mandate). Dickinson does not think so . . . looks at the historical tango between president and Congress.

- Neustadt says there should be sharing of responsibilities from fundamentally different vantage points because of different constituencies, terms of office, and responsibilities.

- This means political capital depends on what Congress thinks of the president and his policies

- Bush Jr.’s 1st term: used triangulation (use Republican-dominated House to stake out an initial negotiation position close to what he preferred. Then bargained as needed with moderate Senate Republicans and Democrats to build a winning coalition by agreeing to make compromises: example tax cuts.

- Even though Bush had high approval ratings after 9/11 he still had to compromise with Democrats in Congress on domestic issues (they gave him powers to go to War in Afghanistan pretty quickly—historically situations like this don’t require lots of fighting with Congress)

- Bush also became actively involved in the 2002 midterm election (through Karl Rove and his get out the vote strategies) in order to improve his party’s position in Congress—something that rarely happens during a midterm election (he did this by “nationalizing” the 2002 Congressional election).

- Bottom line, no “mandate” in 2004, it’s hard to pass stuff through Congress whether it is the same party or not (just wait til this Congress).

Congress, the President, and Political Parties, 1789-1960 -Constitution says that two branches of government must collaborate to fulfill their constitutional obligations, from legislating to conducting foreign policy. -Article 1, Section 1, “all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the US” -Article I, Section 7—president gets to veto bills -Article II, Section 3—president shall recommend to Congress “such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient” (presidents see this as their right/duty to submit legislation, with no guarantee, of course that it will be passed).

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-presidents, senators, and reps come to their shared constitutional tasks with different political needs and goals—this was the original intent expressed in Federalist 51 . . .this prevents any branch from abusing its authority, but still be effective -parties developed because they provided the presidency with a popular base of support and rescued the president from dependence on Congress. -parties also bridge the constitutional gap between president and Congress . . .allowing them to have allegiances and get things passed, also nationalizes Congressional elections more, allows for unified political front, parties did decline for a while though The Era of Incumbency and Insulation, 1960-1990 -Era when outcomes of presidential and Congressional elections became less unified (incumbents were often reelected to Congress due to electoral reforms such as direct primaries, financed reforms, and electronic media) -allowed those Congressmen who had helped people be reelected -peaked in 1980s, presidential landslides did not guarantee Congressional shifts -divided government does not necessarily mean gridlock (inability to get anything passed) Democratic conservatives and Republican Centrists frequently cross party lines to vote with the opposition, and presidents can cultivate bipartisan coalitions of support. Congress and the President in the Post-Reform Era: Toward More Responsible Party Government? -Turnabout in party influence came about because Republicans began making inroads among voters in areas that were once solidly Democratic (south), changed location of the party’s constituencies, civil rights legislation further alienated southern conservatives, lots of party switching (parties forcefully split on social issues like school busing, affirmative action, and crime and punishment), also national population shifts SW -redistricting of Congressional voting districts to make them minority-majority -changing nature of campaign finance (soft money allowed parties to build up their power until McCain-Feingold Act of 2002 ended this, although through 527 groups, parties got around this). -voter turnout declined due to dissatisfaction with parties Politics, Partisanship, and Presidential Influence in Congress -When President’s can’t get Congress to back them up, they tend to “go public” (see Kernell of course) with their agendas—need to meet four conditions:

1. president must already be in good standing with the public 2. public must pay attention to and understand the arguments the president is making 3. the president’s general popularity must be fungible, that is, it must translate into public

support for the president’s stance on specific issues 4. opposition members of Congress must not be equally able or willing to mobilize

countervailing support among their own constituencies -conditions were briefly met after 9/11 but they don’t last long . . .Bush needed support in Congress! -governing from the center can be risky for a President because he can alienate his extreme party base (like Bush’s Fanatic Right)

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-vetos are an important and oft forgotten form of power of Congress, especially one with a small majority -examples of second-term presidents who misread the elections returns and overreached (maybe even Bush II): FDR w/court packing scheme, LBJ sending more troops to Vietnam, Reagan Iran-Contra scandal.

Marc J. Hetherington and Richard J. Ellis, “Resolved, the president is a more authentic representative of the American people than is Congress,” chapter 6 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 75-91. Contributed by: Tim Hagamen

• Pro: Hetherington

o Although the American system was structured so that members of the House would be more responsive to the public than the president (term lengths), the result is the opposite: the House is the least representative branch. He cites the difference between the moderate character of most Americans and the extreme, ideologically driven voting patterns of Congressmen

o As a result, the president is the best representative of the public’s will, although an imperfect one. He must appeal to a broader cross section of voters and is thus more likely to represent more moderate view.

o In the last 20 years, parties have grown increasingly ideological and polarized. They are moving apart very quickly in terms of their views. The strength of the parties, in combination with the relatively extreme views of the leaders results in generally more extreme legislation

o Hetherington discusses some of the reasons for this change. South is no longer a Democratic stronghold and has moved clearly to the

right. The Southern members of the Democratic party tended to balance out the more liberal representatives from other areas.

Campaign finance reform shifted the goals of congressmen away from patronage (constituent service) towards policy making. Those who were most concerned with implementing policy were the ideologues and extremists.

Redistricting increased the advantage incumbents had, making it easier to get reelected. This tends to make members less concerned with public opinion and thus less representative. The only election the incumbent generally has to worry about is the primary, which tends to push positions further from the middle.

With many states virtually guaranteed to one party or another, presidential candidates must compete primarily over ‘battleground states’ which forces them towards the middle.

• Con: Ellis o Although the president is the only official selected by the entire American people, he

does not do a better job of representing the public than the political deliberations of

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the larger Congress. Ellis argues that voters do not vote based on the positions of presidential candidates (nor do they have a good sense of what those positions are). As a result, the president cannot be said to especially representative. The centrist positioning of candidates obscures their positions.

o In presidential elections, voters are more likely to consider factors like character, temperament and experience. These factors are not indications of representation.

o In addition, presidents are less likely to represent the will of the people because the voter must choose a single candidate (set of positions). Presidential candidates would have to create issue platforms that were ideologically consistent (similar to the way voters do). Instead, they put together platforms that are likely to win elections.

o Ellis takes issue with the claim that presidential elections push candidates towards the center. He points to Bush’s strategy of getting out his conservative base in battleground states rather than racing to the center.

o Democratic responsiveness (representation) is often not considered a virtue in presidents. Ideally, they have strong views which they are confident in independent of public opinion.

Louis Fisher, "Congress as Co-Manager of the Executive Branch," in James P. Pfiffner, ed., The Managerial Presidency, second edition, pp. 300-318. Contributed by: Tim Hagamen

o In this essay, Fisher argues that Congress should play a role in administrating the legislation

it passes. o Lessons from the Continental Congress which established the executive departments

Deliberative assembly not suited to detail oriented execution o How Congress can affect the execution of legislation

The president does not have the power to determine how all laws are carried out. If Congress gives power to an independent officer and that officer faithfully follows the law, the president does not need to be involved. Fisher cites an example from the Marbury v. Madison case that distinguished between ministerial and discretionary executive duties. The ministerial duties of a department cannot be dictated by the president, who only has discretionary duties.

Investigative duties are central to the ability of Congress to ensure accountability. Congress can subpoena witnesses and documents and is thereby entitled to punish those who refuse to comply with jail time.

Agencies sometimes consult with the appropriate committees before acting in particular areas. They will often defer to the committees judgment, further demonstrating how congress is involved with the executive powers.

As a result of the power of the purse, Congress exerts some control over the agencies as well. In return for granting agencies the ability to move money between programs, Congress (in the form of committees) must be consulted to approve of the ‘reprogramming’.

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o Legislative veto and the INS v. Chadha case Legislative veto is a power granted to Congress that enabled it to control executive

decisions without passing law. As a result, these ‘vetoes’ were not subject to presidential veto nor did they require his signature. They were given to the Congress in exchange for powers granted to the executive that gave it greater discretion.

In the INS v. Chadha case, the court decided that such legislative vetoes were unconstitutional because they were not within the powers of a legislative branch. Fisher takes issue with this ruling, citing the other ‘shortcuts’ that Congress uses to get legitimate extra-legislative powers.

In spite of the courts decision, the legislative veto survives. Fisher argues that this is because it was part of a bargain, the second part of which (greater discretion for the executive) was not struck down by the court. It’s also a practical matter: in cases where effective government it opposed by formalism, effective government wins. This was the case when the Reagan administration challenged the use of legislative vetoes by citing the Chadha case but ultimately gave in to Congress.

o Why does Congress intervene? Intervention is necessary to ensure that appropriated funds are used in the manner in

which they were directed. Congressmen also intervene on behalf of their constituents who are constitutionally

entitled to petition for a redress of grievances. Constituents may point out aspects of the law which are contradictory or ineffective.

Fisher argues that Congress intervenes when the executive fails to ensure that laws are properly enacted. He cites the Iran contra scandal as an example of Congress legitimately getting involved with the ‘micro-management’. Reagan allowed Congress to investigate the national security operations of his administration because he was unable to remain accountable for the activities in his administration. As a result, Congress got more oversight in national security policy (specifically with covert actions).

o Limits of Intervention Bribery and conflict of interest statutes are among the limitations on congressmen.

Legislative activities are protected by the law but political activities are generally not. For example, a congressman can say anything on the floor of the House but is still subject to law (such as libel laws) when sending publications to constituents.

Nancy Kassop and Richard M. Pious, “Resolved, presidents have usurped the war power that rightfully belongs to Congress,” chapter 7 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 92-109. Contributed by: Helen Weng

• Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the Atlantic Ocean kept America isolated, so that the

nation had no neighbors and no enemies. Thus, although the law allows the president to be strong, circumstances keep him weak.

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• During the Civil War, the executive power increased but subsided into its general decentralized pattern of authority after

• The Cold War stopped this pattern of wartime centralization and peacetime reaction and this was replaced by the war on terror

• Anxiety about the nation’s safety has caused an increase in executive power

Pro: Nancy Kassop • Uses phrases from the Constitution: the framers declared that the decision to go to war

belongs to Congress, and only then does the president command the troops • Presidents can only act in cases of emergency- in defensive circumstances. Any offensive

military action must be authorized by Congress • Constitutional requirements have been violated by presidents. Ex: Truman sent troops to

Korea in 1950 without a declaration of war, not in response to an attack against the US, and did not base his decision with any participation from Congress among other breaches

• Truman set a precedent for a new interpretation of the commander in chief clause as a source of executive authority without the participation of Congress

• Although the world now is larger, this does not make the presidential power constitutional • Efforts by Congress to rein in president: National Commitments Resolution of 1969 passed

states that a national commitment by the US requires action taken by the executive and legislative branches of government

• Then passed over Nixon’s veto the War Powers Resolution in 1973 that imposed procedural requirements on presidents when they decide to send US military forces into hostilities

• Courts have proved to treat this issue as nonjusticiable and at worst, supported the presidents • As wars are even more consequential now, it is important that we make a commitment to

collective decision making in foreign affairs Con: Richard Pious • The power to “make” war is a concurrent responsibility but beyond this nothing is very clear

from the framers • Of the more than 200 times the US has committed forces abroad, Congress has only declared

war in 5 • Presidential war powers include “international police power”- extended by Cleveland and

Theodore Roosevelt • NATO, SEATO, and OAS treaties are self- executing and give the president the right to use

armed forces to protect allies • The judiciary has not ruled on war powers cases but by the end of Vietnam, the practical

effect of judicial rulings was to provide the executive with greater flexibility in the exercise of war powers

• Every president has declared the War Powers Resolution as unconstitutional and have sabotaged it by failing to consult with Congress before the introduction of forces (used briefings instead) and issuing 1-2 pg “reports” that say they are consistent with the WPR but not in compliance with it

• Congress has failed to insist that presidents follow the collaborative mechanisms of the WPR and judicial resolutions have made the president free to act on his own

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Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, chapter 12, pp. 269-294. Contributed by: Helen Weng • Reagan was the last Roosevelt Democrat we shall see as president- restored the public image

of the office to a place of popularity, influence, initiative, was a pacesetter and tonesetter • The combination of incuriosity and delegation and commitments and convictions framed

Reagan’s operating style • Examines Iran-Contra because a president only has himself and present choices to bear on his

prospects and often he judges wrong...but how? • Reagan had charm and was dependent on his people. He drew confidence from audience

reaction to his personal performance • His staff worked to develop “themes of the day” and “themes of the week” and he knew how

to read a script and follow on- was very successful on television news • Was ignorant about substantive detail. He just wanted happy endings on a few major story

lines. • Reagan recovered from the Iran Contra affair and it was a success story • Lt. North testified that William Casey, director of the CIA and Reagan’s campaign manager

in 1980 had directed him in all his activities, including arms sales to Iran, so public opinion assigned Reagan responsibility and knowledge

• His management style: choose targets and men, leave the details to them—except he was careless in his choice of words and casual in his choice of men. His wish to keep the Contras fighting and his determination to find private funds was not a secret.

• Commitment was substituted for detail. Decisiveness was reinforced by his self-confidence. • But Reagan was applauded for not following Carter’s style of micro management. However,

in this case his failure is from the textbook case of how he failed to guard prospective influence, probe his power stakes, and manage those things he must do himself

• “Backward mapping” can help sort out the contradictions between short and long-run risk. Think of the actual result at which one aims, then postulating the prerequisite last action from the appropriate arm of government, then thinking quickly of the actions in between.

• It is not a panacea however- Neustadt then turns to two examples of successes (ch. 13) before deciding what other aspects might help a President think more precisely and gauge prospects more accurately.

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David A. Yalof, "The Presidency and the Judiciary," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 481-507. Contributed by: Nicholas Traverse “The Presidency and the Judiciary”

- focus of essay: with this divided government (Presidency and Congress controlled by different parties), the politics of Supreme Court nominations has been affected:

o before 1968, when the same party often controlled the executive and legislative branches, nominees for the court often came from the political arena

o since 1968, almost all nominees have been sitting jurists o consequences: the depoliticized court has been less willing than previous courts to

defer to the Congress or the president on issues Evolving Relationship between the President and the Judiciary: 1800-1968

- before a president takes office, he must always address the way he hopes to shape the judiciary and how he stands on certain legal issues

- 1800 election: Jefferson defeated Adams largely by opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, a law that criminalized criticism of government officials and allowed Federalist, pro-Adams judges to rail against pro-Jefferson Republicans; in choosing Jefferson, the voters shot down the Federalist judiciary

- 1860 election: Lincoln accuses Democrats of attempting to nationalize slavery with Dred Scott decision, in which Supreme Court asserted a theory of the slave as personal property; in voting for Lincoln, the public again voted against the judiciary

- 20th century: Court was often not a factor in presidential elections, choosing instead to focus on being a national policymaking force; FDR was concerned with uncooperative Court during New Deal, but chose not to make his “court packing” plan an election issue; Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson also similarly ignored the Court during elections

- 1950s: Eisenhower as epitome of a president who picks justices from the political arena; chooses Earl Warren to pay back a campaign debt and John Harlan, a favorite of one of Ike’s close friends, for Court seats

The President and the Judiciary after 1968

- Nixon becomes first major party candidate in 20th century to make Supreme Court an election issue discouraged by the proactive Warren Court that played a powerful role in shaping laws around the country, Nixon promised to voters that he would appoint only “law and order” justices that would strictly interpret the Constitution; this was appealing to southern voters, who resented recent civil rights initiatives supported by the Warren Court

- 1980 election: Reagan criticizes Roe v. Wade, rulings against public school prayer, etc. in an attempt to attract conservative voters; this had a minor impact on the election, since the voters these moves attracted would have voted for Reagan anyway

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- 1984 election: Walter Mondale attacks the conservative leanings of the Court during his campaign; strategy ultimately doesn’t work as Reagan wins, citing his record of 4 years of peace and prosperity

- 1988 election: Michael Dukakis attacks Bush’s stance on social issues and the future composition of the Court; like Mondale, this strategy also fails as Republican Party succeeds with widespread post-Reagan support

- 1992: Clinton, not wishing to repeat the failures of Mondale and Dukakis, decides to not make the Court a campaign issue; concludes that Court-related rhetoric sways few voters and is worthless

- although some presidents may choose not to make the Supreme Court an election issue, they still fulfill campaign promises to choose jurists in support of their agenda

Presidential Appointments to the Federal Judiciary

- appointees to lower federal courts have largely been chosen through their connections to Senators from the party in power

- the process for choosing Supreme Court nominees has changed substantially - up until 20th century, a limited number of people were involved in choosing nominees,

mainly just the president and close advisors; now, choosing a nominee has become a complex process involving many people; factors that contributed to this change:

- 1. Justice Department has grown significantly, esp. w/ creation of Office of Legal Counsel (1930), an office developed to support the attorney general; OLC has become highly politicized and advises presidents on who to nominate for Court

- 2. Growth of White House staff, with addition of staff lawyers who assist the president on legal matters and in Court nominations

- 3. Growth of Federal Judiciary: 862 federal judgeships in existence; with this, president has ability to significantly shape judicial policymaking; thus, the process of choosing who fills those seats has taken on increased importance

- 4. Divided government: since 1968, Congress is often controlled by party in opposition to president, thus process of choosing a nominee that can get through hostile confirmation has become more involved

- 5. Increased participation by interest groups that can dramatically impact nomination process

- 6. Increased media attention given to Supreme Court nomination and confirmation: public can play a greater role in process with information given by media

- 7. Advances in legal research technology has given everyone easy access to all of a nominees past judicial opinions, scholarship, etc.; with this, their record faces heightened scrutiny

- these factors have prompted Presidents to choose professional judges with long, established records on the bench; this satisfies ideologues within the party, and critics in the opposing party are largely silenced by the nominee’s lack of political experience

Case Study: Reagan’s Supreme Court appointees (O’Connor, Rehnquist for Chief Justice, Bork, Douglas Ginsburg, and Kennedy) all had backgrounds as judges, not as political figures, although each had conservative political leanings Presidential Powers and the Supreme Court: Limited Checks and Tenuous Balances

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- throughout most of its history, the Court has rarely challenged the power of the president (exceptions: Truman and Youngstown Steel case, Nixon and Watergate)

- this has changed recently with the depoliticized Court justices feel no sense of political allegiance to a president; for example, Court has upheld statute requiring independent counsel in cases where president may have broken law in case of Morrison v. Olsen (1988)

Conclusion: Author argues that depoliticized Court has become arrogant and more far reaching in power, as evidenced in Bush v. Gore where they essentially decided a presidential election

David A. Yalof and John Anthony Maltese, “Resolved, the president has too much power in the selection of judges,” chapter 8 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 110-124. Contributed by: Nicholas Traverse “Resolved, the president has too much power in the selection of judges,” Pro argument:

- argues that presidential arrogance drives the current process; presidents simply choose who they want to nominate for a seat without consulting senators

- how did this happen?: generally because of the growth of presidential power during the 20th century

- sees a lack of lively dialogue and debate between the president and the senate as a problem for the nomination and confirmation process

- history: Constitutional framers originally sought a close partnership between the president and the senate in choosing and confirming nominees, not wishing to give the president or the senate too much power; this original intention has been lost

- Federalist 77: Hamilton calls for importance of senate check on president’s appointment power

- Senate has failed to seek a more active role recently in appointment process (case of Harriet Miers is an exception); this has given the president too much power

- Why senate has deferred to power of president: (1) increased media coverage of confirmation hearings has prompted nominees to remain silent on many issues, preventing senators from getting the clarification and information necessary to mount an opposition; (2) significant political costs for senators who oppose the president’s nominee, if they are in the same party

Con argument: - argues that framers actually wanted only the president to have a role in nomination

process; cites Article II, Section 2 of Constitution: “president shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint… judges of the supreme court.” Clearly states that president will nominate, while senate will only have role in actual confirmation and appointment

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- Federalist 76: Hamilton argues that one man is better suited than a large body to “analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices.” Argues this because one person cannot be distracted by the multiple views and special interests of a large group

- Madison and Hamilton argued that senate involvement is only to make sure that president hasn’t made an error or chosen out of partiality

- Argues that senate opposition has actually increased over past few decades; e.g. since 1968, 30% of Supreme Court nominees have been rejected or withdrawn; use of filibuster to block nominations has become more prevalent

- Contends that Senate has too much power in appointment process and that it has led to a messy confirmation process; increased media coverage has prompted senators to focus more on embarrassing a nominee by attacking their policy positions and details from their past rather than on legitimate legal issues; the result is a “bloodbath” for the nomination process

Daniel J. Tichenor, "The Presidency and Interest Groups: Allies, Adversaries, and Policy Leadership” in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 311-340. Contributed by: Hanna Sankowska A word of explanation: I will summarize each paragraph briefly, if you need to go back to any part, just count the paragraphs. This article shows the factors affecting the relationship between the president and interest groups:

- whether or not organized interests are affiliated or unaffiliated with the president’s political party

- whether the historical circumstances have granted the president a broad or narrow capacity to exercise political leadership

Tichenor explores the four possible combinations of these variables through historical evidence. 1. In the presidential election campaigns candidates are accused of being linked to interest groups, they distance themselves from them, example: 2004: John Kerry: liberal groups out of touch with the values of mainstream Americans Bush: “Big Oil, big drug companies, big HMOs, and Benedict Arnold CEOs 2. The interest groups are also important once the election is settled The ones that supported the winning candidate remind him of their agenda

The ones that supported the loosing candidate fundraise to fight the president’s agenda 3. Presidents distance themselves from interest groups Most Americans view organized interest with suspicion negative perception of a President who serves a special interest

eg. criticism of Bush, early in his first term: Arctic drilling, arsenic levels in drinking water, global warming

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4. Pros of appealing to Congress instead are in office for longer are easier to get through to, more specialized there is more of them! (535 v. 1) 5. Despite these disincentives they can rarely disregard one another President needs them for money, organizational support and votes in election

Interest groups can provide a means for expanding support of the President’s agenda 6. Incentives for interest groups

President’s enormous power in agenda setting, policy formation, budget making and details of implementation President’s can alter the prevailing interest groups they encounter

7. Focus of this paper: interaction in domestic policymaking 8. The relationship between presidents and interest groups is frustrating and full of tensions Friends, Foes, and Policy Leadership: A Framework of Presidential Interest Group Relations 9. Drastic rise in the # of interest groups in beginning of the XXth century 10. Roosevelt % Wilson were suspicious of IG, but couldn’t ignore ones that could help them govern 11. Progressive Era interest groups National Woman Suffrage Association Congressional Union 12. Introduces two variables (1) relationship or interest group to the President’s party (2) the varying opportunities for presidential leadership 13. Both parties are linked with interest groups. This relationship can be either collaborative or adversarial 14. Broad or narrow opportunities to advance domestic policy broad: Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan narrow: others: more challenging 15. There are four types of interactive politics. Collaborative breakthrough politics: White House sponsorship and co-optation of interest

Relationship of interest groups to the president’s party President’s capacity to exercise political leadership Affiliated (collaborative

strategies) Unaffiliated (adversarial strategies)

Broad (breakthrough politics) Collaborative breakthrough politics Roosevelt’s New Deal for labor Reagan and the Christian Right

Adversarial breakthrough politics Roosevelt and the Liberty League Reagan’s assault on liberal citizens groups

Narrow (politics-as-usual) Collaborative politics as usual George H. W. Bush and competitiveness council George W. Bush and air quality

Adversarial politics as usual Carter and energy reform Clinton and health care reform

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16. Adversarial breakthrough politics – interest group opponents are challenging presidents who have enormous political capital, but may inspire sympathy for a threatened cause and acquire new resources. 17. Collaborative politics as usual – can produce either weak or strong ties between presidents and the IG affiliated with their party: weak if presidents moves towards political center to secure policy achievements strong if presidents are eager to shore up pol. support from their ideological base 18. Adversarial politics as usual – allows oppositional IG to frustrate president’s policies FDR and industrial unionism: Collaborative Breakthrough politics I 19. FDR administration invite organized interests among them, labor groups, to participate in drafting of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1930s, United Mine Workers (UMW) membership swells from 150,000 to 500,000 20. FDR understood that organized labor was crucial for his electoral and governing coalitions but nonetheless asserted independence from labor interests. 21. Labor groups recognized that FDR did not support union radicalism but also appreciated his labor reforms such as Wagner Act and National Labor Relations Act helped reelect him 22. Landslide victory, Roosevelt expected organized labor to follow his lead and not the opposite, radical labor leaders, such as Lewis tried to oppose the president, but they were helpless – FDR reelected 23. FDR endorsed moderate labor statesman – Sidney Hillman 24. pearl harbor –labor unions make the “no strike” pledge to help war effort 25. Conclusion organized labor benefited from ties to the president FDR has enormous influence over the terms of alliance and nature of reform Reagan and the Christian Right: Collaborative Breakthrough Politics II 26. During 1970’s Christian right emerges as a new force in conservative politics: Moral Majority, Religious Roundtable, National Christian Action Council, Christian Voice 27. During election campaign of 1980, Reagan courted conservative Christian leaders and got a lot of support from them 28. Reagan appointed several Christian right activists to visible admin. positions and advocated constitutional amendments to prohibit abortion and restore school prayer 29. But Reagan did not extend the social reform agenda to the extent Christian right had hoped, focused on economic issues and defense buildup instead 30. Conclusion Reagan gave the Christian right enormous symbolic recognition started an alliance between conservative religious groups and Rep. Party

Christian right had to accept the terms of this relationship, though they were not completely satisfied

Roosevelt and American Liberty League: Adversarial Breakthrough Politics I: 31. American Liberty League, opposition IG, had no option but to challenge FDR with an aggressive publicity campaign

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32. Big business launched opposition to New Deal by forming American Lib. League, ties with General Motors and Du Pont family’s financial empire 33. League officers hoped to gather support of 2-4 million, only managed to enlist 75,000 members, aggressive opposition, accusing FDR of being socialist 34. FDR was proud to have “earned the hatred to entrenched greed” 35. FDR used the links of Republican party with the Liberty League to win second term 36. Conclusion: FDR wins landslide victory, Liberty League shuts down Reagan’s Assault on Liberal Citizen Groups: Adversarial Breakthrough Politics II 37. Reagan declared a war on liberal advocacy groups concerned with the environment, consumer protection, civil rights, poverty etc., wanted to decrease groups resources, size and influence 38. Devastating for some groups

1981 welfare cuts destroyed some antipoverty organizations: spared the funds for the elderly but took their toll on the poor people groups, these groups shifted their energies from politics to providing services instead homeless movement arose, confrontational anti-Reagan protests, shantytowns labeled Reaganvilles

his fight with antipoverty groups opened the door for other groups to challenge the President

39. Beyond some examples, the White House plan failed, example: environmental groups flourished, became more aggressive and effective with private funding and more publicity Gearge H. W. Bush, Centrist Reform and the Competitiveness Council: Collaborative Politics as usual 40. George H. W. Bush had narrow opportunities, thus an incentive to embrace centrist reforms; can be observed in his approach towards environment and civil rights 41. Limited opportunities Rep. Party had only 175 seats in House of Representatives wanted to launch some popular environmental reforms to foster support 42. Sent to Congress an ambitious clean air bill marginalized traditional Rep. interest group allies in industry and business 43. Americans with Disabilities Act – adding disabled to the list of groups protected against discrimination, a dread to the business world, because of high costs of compliance, but immense public support for the initiative 44. Bush created Council on Competitiveness to limit the scope of these reforms by regulation and to appease the traditional allied interest groups of the Rep. party 45. Closed door meetings, less burdensome regulations to the benefit of businesses and industries 46. Conclusion: great success of the business groups to achieve incremental policy gains in a difficult political environment, closed door, no TV lights is a good strategy in such conditions Clinton and Health Care Reform: Adversarial Politics-as-Usual 47. Truman tried to introduce an ambitious health proposal and failed 48. Clinton ran his 1992 election on this campaign, receiving a warm reception of the voters, Health Security Act

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49. By 1994 the reform proposal was dead, in part because of some IGs who were Clinton’s adversaries 50. Two biggest interest group opponents: Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) and the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), represented small and mid-sized insurance companies that would go out of business if Clinton’s reform was adopted, joined also by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PRMA), got the Republican party to oppose it, to prevent reviving of the Dem. Party’s appeal as a protector of middle class interest 51. Adversaries spent a lot of money opposing Clinton’s reform, showing it as reducing the quality of health care, eliminating indiv. choice of health providers, encouraging bloated govt., increasing taxes to fund universal coverage 52. Policy was never put to vote in Congress as public support decreased from 67% to 44%, shows possibility for interest groups adversaries to block the pragmatic ambitions of modern presidents in periods of pol. as usual George W. Bush First Term: Mastering Collaborative Politics as Usual 53. Narrow opportunities of Bush: narrow majority in Congress, narrow margin in elections but September 11 changed this situation – gave him more support 54. Wanted to change regulation, away from public and media attention 55. Air quality: Bush pledged to impose carbon dioxide restriction, but after one of the main pro-energy lobbyists intervened, he backed down. 56. Edison Electric Institute and Electric Reliability Coordinating Council soon pressed the White House for even more regulatory changes 57. Also, Bush’s EPA proved less vigorous in cracking down companies that violate these laws 58. New regulations adopted during Bush’s first term revised also health rules, work safety standards, product safety disclosure requirements, energy regulations and other measures in a manner that usually favored business and industry allies 59. Conclusion: unilateral, low-profile character of regulatory change makes this strategy attractive to presidents whose policies are frustrated because of limited opportunities Conclusion 60. Intrinsic feature of contemporary American politics, we can recognize patterns across time, like Skowronek’s regime cycles; except for rare moments where presidents have broad political opportunities, interest groups can orchestrate effective strategic politics of their own 61. Presidents with transformational policy aspirations but ordinary leadership opportunities find interest group relations trying. 62. When president has limited leadership opportunities, the groups that oppose him have more tangible benefits than the ones that are with him and can exercise more influence (Clinton’s adversaries) 63. It’s great to be the President’s buddy during breakthrough politics, but such relationships are no guarantee of pragmatic achievement (Reagan and Christian right) 64. As American Liberty League saw, it’s difficult to oppose a popular president 65. George W. Bush was extremely adept to reward his interest group allies and confound his opponents by mastering the regulatory methods of collaborative politics as usual “As this investigation of presidential interest group relation suggests, the most significant and enduring bias of the American political system is its hostility toward nonincremental reform

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Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (Little, Brown, 1997), chapter 10, pp. 194-210. Contributed by: Hanna Sankowska 1. Justice Black condemns lobbies as a threat to democracy and an effective government and thought their evilness would lead to “the death they deserve” 2. Ironically, lobbies have extended their reach and power since then 3. Health care reform may be the most expensive lobbying battle in history: estimates of the total amount spent range from $100mln to $300mln. 4. The opponents won not because of financial advantages, but because of other factors. 5. “It’s not money, it’s votes” Gephard, the majority leader of Democrats said after defeat 6. In this struggle, interest groups showed they could manipulate public opinion and mobilize Main Street supporters, they used similar strategies as they used to get Bush Sr. and Reagan elected: fund-raising, field organizing, advertising, PR, speed of electronic communication 7. This operations illuminate how The System operates today and why many citizens believe the govt. no longer represents them 8. Our picture of lobbying process in out-of-date 9. There was a true war for the Health Care Reform, the Democrats were taken by an intense political assault by surprise 10. Groups that mobilized against the reform: HIAA, Healthcare Leadership Council, the Business Roundtable, NFIB, but also some that belonged to the Christian right 11. Lobbies met with opposition to create an effective strategy to kill the bill 12. Sarah Steelman (major player among the lobbyists): Extraordinary set of circumstances that combined to make this victory possible 13. Steelman: unity of Republican coalition combined of social conservatives, the deficit hawks, the business groups 14. Steeleman: her point is documented and she spoke form practice 15. Clinton knew it was going to be a difficult project: (1) change always seems complicated, easier to oppose it, (2) its easier to get people frightened than to live on their hopes 16. As opposition grew stronger the supporters were always thinking hwo to get a better deal 17. HIAA and NFIB especially active in the war 18. Change of leadership in company: Bill Gradison and Charles N. (Chip) Kahn III enter, Gradison is perceived as “soft spoken” 19. HIAA represented 270 small and medium sized firms that sold health policies to businesses, groups and individuals 20. Five largest insurers from that group severed their ties with HIAA because they saw more advantage for themselves if the reform was introduced 21. HIAA endorsed the goal of universal coverage and the employer mandate as a way of financing it 22. Seemingly it seemed to be “an industry offer to cooperate” but in reality they were opposed

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23. Everyone thought that being a wartime consigliere was not in Gradison’s style 24. Discussion between Gradison and the Clinton’s get off to a rocky start and then go downhill 25. Differences of opinion: (1) whether all insurance companies could continue on the market place or just the certified ones 26. (2) Cost controls (premium caps) were another issue 27. (3) “Pure community rating” – Gradison supported the system now in place that made the sicker pay more for their insurance 28. These issues were irreconcilable with Clinton’s reform 29. Gradison writes a letter to the First Lady to voice his support for the reform, but also show some of his reservations toward it 30. Person who hired Gradison was actually a loyal Democrat and a Clinton supporter 31. Any talks with Gradison fail 32. HIAA gets very angry at an attack memo produced by the Democrats to counter an HIAA advertising campaign 33. Garison was playing a double game: wanted to be seen as accommodating, but knew that the differences were to large to be bridged 34. HIAA also had two able Washington pollsters, Hamilton and McInturff 35. HIAA launches a $3.5mln advertising campaign right when Clinton was bound to originally submit his reform plan 36. The men in the street ads are modestly effective but draw little media attention 37. Reason: public distrusts the insurance industry (apart from their own agent) 38. Gradison launches a major TV campaign 39. But HIAA’s CEOs were supportive of a TV campaign 40. Young middle-class couple campaign 41. HIAA avoids being blatantly negative – wants to retain a seat at the bargaining table 42. “Harry and Louise” ads 43. Pollsters identify an issue: people support the reform, but “people don’t believe the federal government can get anything done” 44. HIAA intensifies public distrust of government as their main strategy 45. Even before, negative attitude of the public towards the government was growing 46. Reasons: assassination of Martin Luther King and Kennedy, ruin of reputation of Johnson and Nixon, Vietnam, Watergate, CIA conspiracy theories, hostility to government regulators and tax collectors, deficit spending 47. Presidents of both parties (Reagan and Clinton) were elected by running “against Washington,” didn’t exploit the successes of the government 48. Successes: expansion of basic civil rights, cleaner and safer environment, improvement in health and well-being of senior citizens, economy growth 49. Yet these successes remained unseen by the “public mind” 50. Operating in such negative climate, opponents of activist government thrived 51. According to pollsters, HIAA could exploit these skepticism in their campaigns 52. Kahn and Gradison were both initially scepticapl about such an approach 53. But they changed their minds 54. McInturff was amazed by the influence their TV campaign was making 55. HIAA became a major player in the debate by moving early, aggressively and publicly 56. “We ran the ads and all hell broke loose” – Kahn 57. Democrats tried to threaten the actress who was starring as Louise, didn’t succeed

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58. White House was well aware of the damage done by the ads 59. The First Lady responded with a furious attack against insurance companies 60. The First Lady’s attack was spontaneous and was seen by most as too aggressive

Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (Little, Brown, 1997), chapter 10, pp. 210-224. Contributed by: Jeff Howard

• Special Interest Groups and Washington (specially during Clinton’s administration)

The article primarily uses the defeat of Clinton Healthcare plan as example of the how much influence special interest groups can have on government policies.

Players:

Bill Clinton – President – proponent for Healthcare Reform

Hillary Clinton – First Lady – proponent for Healthcare Reform

Bill Gradison – President of the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) – against Healthcare Reform, former House Representative

Chip Khah – Gradison’s side-kick

Ira Magaziner – spokesman for Clinton, assigned to speak with Gradison to reach a compromise on the Reform

Harry and Louise – names of the characters who acted as a middle-age couple against the Healthcare reform in television ads, this was financed through the HIAA

John Motley – chief lobbyist for the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) – against Healthcare Reform

Jack Faris – President of NFIB

Johnson and Broder introduce the chapter by discussing how sophisticated special interests had become and the power they brought to Washington. They use the war on Clinton’s Healthcare Reform to demonstrate how powerful special interest groups were. Up to the time of the article the lobbying against healthcare cost was the most ever spent on the part of special interest groups, estimated between $100 million and $300 million. And this money was not only spent on

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buying politicians’ time but on grassroots efforts to get the American public to support their war against universal healthcare. The organizations most against it were the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) because they didn’t want to lose control over the market. And the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) didn’t want it because they didn’t want to have it to be mandatory for small business owners to provide health insurance to their employees.

HIAA at first tried to speak with Hillary to see how they could work out a plan together, but she refused to meet with them. So they began ad campaigns to get the public to stand behind them and against universal healthcare. They used two characters, Harry and Louise, to depict middle-class Americans who questioned the actual benefits of the Healthcare policy. This in turn left questions in the mind of American television watchers who didn’t want the government to take something over it may not do well. Hillary was extremely upset about these commercials and openly attacked HIAA for telling lies to the public. This only got HIAA even more upset and determined to win their battle.

Another large special interest group involved in defeating Healthcare was NFIB. They didn’t like universal healthcare mandates because it would mean hurting small business owners who would not be able to afford it. Clinton was more open to speak with members of NFIB and gained the opportunity when Faris asked him to speak. But the members were unimpressed. Furthermore, Motley initiated a successful movement of small business owners in Montana, a state with a large percentage of small business owners to back him up. Then he carried this into Louisiana, Washington, Georgia, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Florida.

With the strong support of special interest groups against Health Care Reform (Clintoncare), Clinton and Hillary lost their battle.

Sidney Milkis, "The Presidency and Political Parties," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 341-382. Contributed by: Jeff Howard

Thesis: The modern presidency has led to a weakening of political parties beginning with FDR and continuing with Nixon and Johnson, while Reagan and Bush have tried to revamp parties to give them more strength, with limited success.

FDR: While Wilson suggested that the parties would lose influence with a stronger president, he didn't put this into action very well, however FDR did. FDR filled the positions around him with "New Deal" people versus strictly Democrats and never organization Democrats. He also let a wide scale campaign to unseat Conservative Democrats in 12 states. However, he was only successful in 2 of those 12 states and had difficulty fighting the party establishment. By being a strong president he weakened party control and destroyed party unity. The administrative reform

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bill of 1939 (a compromise of the failed version of the bill in 1938) "represents the genesis of the institutional presidency" by creating the Executive Office of the President including the White House Office and strengthening the Bureau of the Budget.

LBJ: There was fear in the Johnson White House that the Democratic Party could not be trusted to convey the message of the Great Society to the American people. Humphrey thought they weren't intellectually equipped to handle the explanations. Johnson attempted to de-emphasize the traditional role of the party and severely attacked the Democratic National Convention, slashing its budget and eliminating several of its important programs. He even left an ineffective leader but put the White House liaison in control of the new, scaled-back activities. Johnson also increased the power of the presidency by creating task forces made up of academics outside of politics in virtually all areas of public policy. These reports later made up the majority of the Great Society.

Nixon: Continued separating the presidency from party politics though with a conservative bent but especially through the Watergate scandal disassociating the party from the president.

Reagan: Brought the party back to the presidency by playing a large role as the leader of the party. He fund-raised and reversed much of the institutional legacy of the New Deal. He was so popular that he used that to rally support for the Republicans and get them seats in Congress and funds. His conservative movement was a forceful political movement that became part of the Republican Party due to the institution already set up versus anything Reagan really tried to do.

Bush: Continued to try and get Republican support and strengthen the party. Put his chief advisor as RNC chair instead of in the White House and led aggressive party political campaigns. However, the difficulty he had in rallying support showed how hard it is to have a President as a strong party figure.

Clinton: Perot's showing of 19% showed how much the Pres was separated form the party system. Clinton tried to bring the party back and get support of the party-president relationship but had some trouble early on getting support for his programs and made it a bitter partisan fight over some issues. However as time progressed he did a better job of getting strength for the party and shifted the Democratic Party toward the middle with moderate programs aimed at making parts of both parties happy.

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Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, chapters 1-2, 4-5; pp. 1-64 and 104-178. Contributed by: Temilola Sobowale Chapters 1-2: Kernell’s thesis: a change in the degree of going public and inferring a change in the character of leadership. Going public: strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the Amer. people for support Strategy: (1) place president and his messages before the Amer. people in a way that enhances his chances of success in Washington. (2) force compliance from Washingtonians by going over their heads to appeal to their constituency. (eg) televised press conference, address to the nation, speech, visit, White House ceremony. RARE pre-1960: Teddy Roosevelt’s “bully pulpit,” Woodrow Wilson’s whistle stop tour of the country on behalf of his League of Nations Treaty, FDR’s radio “fireside chats.” Going public violates Neustadt’s president “power to bargain.”

superficial compared with substance of traditional political exchange. fails to extend benefits for compliance, but freely imposes costs for noncompliance. to the extent that it fixes the president’s bargaining position, public posturing makes

subsequent compromises with other politicians more difficult. “undermines the legitimacy of other politicians.

Explanation for the rise of going public:

technology: advances in transportation and communication reformed system of nominating candidates through primaries produces presidents with

tremendous campaigning/public relations experience, BUT weak party ties and little Washington experience.

rather than negotiate with Congress, post McGovern-Frasier pres. will go public as he did to get elected.

in recent era of divided government, going public offers better prospect of success more difficult to bargain when party controlling Congress opposes the pres.

ID -- “institutionalized pluralism” (Kernell) Stable bargaining state of Washington institutionalizes informal rules (such as reciprocity) that regulate behavior and reduce uncertainty. Within framework of institutionalized pluralism, the president is in a uniquely well-suited position to construct coalitions across the broad institutional landscape of Congress, the bureaucracy, interest groups, courts, and state

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governments. President within framework of “separated institutions sharing power” (Neustadt) checks and is checked by relationships of “mutual dependence.” (Neustadt) The ideal president is one who seizes the center of the Washington bazaar and actively barters with fellow politicians to build winning coalitions. Institutionalized pluralism decayed because of the decline of political parties inside and outside of Washington, which meant the erosion of friendly relations among political elites within and across institutions that made bargaining easier and occasionally unnecessary. Decline of parties, president must depend on looser, more individualistic political relations—go public. Presidents from Carter through Clinton have all had White House pollsters taking continuous—weekly, even daily—readings of public opinion. Before recommending a policy course, they assess its costs in public support. Neustadt’s importance of public prestige: Because most members of the Washington community depend on the public to support them or their interests, Washingtonians anticipated reactions of how the public views the President influences their willingness to give the President what he wants. Reforms changed Presidential Nominations. 1972 Democratic convention adopted the proposed reforms of the McGovern Frasier Commission. Effect of the reforms has been to transfer the nomination of the party’s candidate from the party leaders at the convention to the mass electorate in primary elections and caucuses. Erode parties’ presence: From 1960 to 1980, the percentage of Democratic senators attending their party’s convention fell from 68 to 17 percent, and for representatives, from 45 to 11 percent. Chapter 4: I. Intro

The more recent the president, the more often he goes public. Often presidents will go public to solicit support for a legislative program stalled in Congress or to define US position in an international crisis. “public relations”- the routines by which presidents go public; public relations perform the homeostatic function of maintaining public support for the President.

Examples of public relations include: public speaking, political travel, & appearances before special constituencies outside Washington.

II. Trends in going public

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A. Public Addresses Appeals for support to constituencies outside Washington are the core activities of going

public. 2 types of public addresses: major and minor; major- when president speaks directly to

national audience over radio or television; minor-when president speaks to a special audience either in person or via some broadcast medium.

B. Public Appearances

At times visual images can convey messages more effectively than talk Appearances can be distinguished by locale-the number of public appearances outside

DC generally reflects the president’s non-Washington origins and divided party control of government.

C. Political Travel

Travel abroad to appear presidential more and more common. Ex. Nixon’s visit to China-networks broadcast over 41 hours of the 7 day trip

III. Incremental Growth in Going Public A. “Rise of going public has proceeded more or less incrementally w/ each president taking advantage of the precedents & extensions of the public activity offered by his predecessors.” Reasons for this growth:

1. Technology: Continuous technological advances in transportation & mass communication during past 6 decades

2. Growth as a function of politics: decline of party & institutional leadership in Congress & the rise of divided gov’t have made the DC community more susceptible to public opinion & forced presidents to go public.

3. Resistance to Innovation in Going Public: has led to incremental versus dramatic increase because in DC people like stability & presidents must be cautious in the way they choose to use new methods of going public.

IV. Conclusion The style of leadership in the White House is changing. Modern presidents rely upon public opinion for their leadership in Washington. Every President since Teddy Roosevelt had used public opinion & drawn on the precedents and departed only marginally from the public acts of his predecessors. During the past half century trends in presidents going public-from political travel to public addresses and appearances have moved steadily upward. CHAPTER 5: President Reagan and His First Three Budgets: A Classic Case of Going Public in Action

As president, “when presented at critical moments with the choice to deal or to go public, he preferred to go public-sometimes exclusively, other times in combination with bargaining.”

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“Ronald Reagan’s first three years contained all the variation in prestige and legislative accomplishment necessary to study the downside as well as the upside of public leadership. Success came early and in heaping portions, but it did not last. By the beginning of his third year, with his popularity spent, the president struggled to preserve the earlier budgetary achievements of real growth in defense expenditures, reductions in social programs and, and a 25 percent cut in income taxes…The politics that ensued in each of his first three budget seasons differed greatly, however. And yet they did so in a manner altogether consistent with the theory of individualized pluralism”

Reagan as an Outsider

Previous career in movies, television and public affairs Spokesman for General Electric traveled across the country giving speeches and

personally meeting with employees. 1967 starts career in politics as governor of California “He skipped those formative experiences that take place mainly in legislatures- city

councils, state assemblies, and Congress-and that expose a politician to bargaining and to Compromise.”

Extensive campaign experience as a presidential candidate Political ideology further distanced him from Washington-Republican conservatism

The Great Communicator: Reporter Lou Cannon described Reagan using this term. He wrote, “with the forum of national television available to the President, Reagan was certain that his own communicative skills were sufficient to persuade Congress and the country to do whatever it was that was asked of them.” Reagan’s Three Budgets

Initially Reagan found great success pushing planks of his campaign platform: budget reductions, increased military spending, and a massive three-year tax cut.

1981, Reagan faced low approval ratings after unveiling his package of tax cuts and spending reductions. However, after the assassination attempt in March approval ratings rose and Reagan took advantage of the opportunity and strategically conducted his economic program as a national political campaign.

Sent party officials to the South to stimulate grass-roots pressure on Democratic representatives whose districts had gone heavily for Reagan in the November election –grass-roots campaign.

Increased popularity within Congress and with the public-legislative successes Dramatic public appeals within a week of House votes In order to push the Kemp-Roth Bill (Massive tax reductions which would cause huge

decline in government expenditures) Reagan went public, giving a speech that caused wavering representatives to side with the president.

By 1982, however his standing in Washington and in the country had weakened and after his Social Security and budget-cutting proposals received criticism inside and outside of Washington, his popularity began a descent that would continue through 1982.

“When the president unveiled his economic program in the spring of 1982 before the lawmakers who had the previous year given him a rousing greeting, it was clear to everyone in the audience…that contrary forces of political economy were at work…The president’s budget found few takers”

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He set off on another public appeal, scheduling himself for major television addresses and live radio broadcasts, and sent his lieutenants to engage in budget negotiations with the House Democratic and Senate Republican leadership and used their failure to try and provoke public support… “For a president who goes public, failure at the bargaining table may be rewarded with success in the public arena”

However, President Reagan exerted far less influence over the budget in 1982-both its substance and politics- than over the preceding year…”In large part this change in fortune must be credited to his reduced political capital with Congress. The further he cut domestic spending, the fewer the number of natural allies that remained. Budget politics in 1982 reflected the president’s decline in public opinion. High interest rates and unemployment rates and swelling projected deficits had sapped his popularity.”

By 1983, even after again trying to use public appeals to influence Congress, Reagan failed to sway the 98th Congress and “for the first time since Ronald Reagan had entered office, the Democrats would take to conference a budget of their own making”

“By the close of the 1983 budget season, President Reagan had assumed a defensive posture, threatening vetoes and promising public appeals at least on those issues where even an unpopular president might be able to elicit a favorable public response.”

The Lessons of Reagan’s Budgets

Radically altered the strategic routines of presidential leadership Preferred going public to bargaining, but occasionally bargained on the side When he remained popular, going public rewarded Reagan (97th Congress), but his

second budget in 1982 was not nearly as successful as unemployment and the deficit both increased, and by 1983, partly because of his diminished popularity, his rallies for public support failed to help him in dealing with Congress.

Conduct of office resembled a campaign-heavy political travel, numerous appearances before organized constituencies, and extensive use of television.

Policy questions become overly simplified and stylized to satisfy the cognitive requirements of a largely inattentive national audience.

He established presence with the 97th Congress in 1981, exhausted his popular support by 1982, and yet still in 1983 he went on to win his reelection campaign.

Volatility of a marketplace driven by public opinion

Marc Bodnick, "Going Public Reconsidered: Reagan's 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts," Congress and the Presidency, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 13-28. Contributed by: Temilola Sobowale “This paper examines the thesis of the public presidency. In light of the success of Ronald Reagan, many revisionist scholars have criticized traditional models of presidential politics. Whereas traditional views emphasized the bargaining presidency, these recent scholars now argue that, today, the politics of rhetoric dominate the politics of bargaining. This paper examines the central case study of the going public model, Reagan's 1981 tax and budget cuts, a

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critical case because it represents Reagan’s central legislative success and because many scholars and pundits have credited this success to Reagan’s frequent televised public appeals. The case reveals that a strong bargaining dynamic played a part in the 1981 process, and that going public strategies were not as dominant as previously thought.” This article directly attacks the arguments presented by Jeffery Tulis (Rhetorical Presidency) and Kernell (Going Public) and specifically counter-argues their theories. He argues that going public was simply not as important to the passage of the 1981 tax and budget cuts, as revisionist view would believe. Rather, traditional bargaining was almost always the primary tool, and going public largely a secondary tool, used principally to reinforce preexisting coalitions. This agrees with Neustadt in that nothing replaces bargaining, and this bill and all legislation are formed through a process of bargaining.

John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment, chapter 3, pp. 53-90. Contributed by: Michael Jones Kessel’s summary is superb and I recommend reading it first. In case you don’t own the book, I have copied it below. “Actors. The press secretary has the core responsibility of briefing the press. He or she is assisted by the deputy and assistant press secretaries (and their staffs) in the upper level press office and the lower level press office, and by still others who work in the photo office and handle press advance. The responsibilities of the communications director are more plastic, but they include long-term planning and focusing on relatively specialized communication channels. All try to present their president in a positive light, but the means of doing so vary from one communication to the next. Speechwriters have their own organizational home somewhere in this communications complex, but the location varies from administration to administration. Coordination is carried out through senior staff meetings, and in many administrations encompasses a “line of the day.” The Chief of staff is now heavily involved in coordination, and often personally plays a major communications role. Media Liaison Activities. The media relations activities include daily press briefings, presidential press conferences, and preparing speeches for the president. Each of these activities involves an enormous amount of work. The day-to-day activities are punctuated by press crisis triggered by unexpected events that have major news consequences. Common Activities in a Media Environment. Information gathering requires reading as widely as possible, listening to questions raised by the president senior aides, and the journalists themselves, sitting in on morning staff meetings and attending as many other White House

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meetings as time permits. High standing with the president and other senior aides eases the press secretary’s information gathering tasks considerably. Decision making revolves around what information to release, when and under what circumstances. Such decisions are difficult to make when lives are at stake, when delicate negotiations are under way when medical information is involved, and when presidential policies are still being shaped. Since the government and the media control different resources, exercising influence is not a matter of persuasion per se but instead of what Timothy Cook has called “the negotiation of newsworthiness.” Those briefing the press want to use governmental resources to focus on stories important to the White House while maintaining their own reputations for integrity.” Working with the Media I. The Press Secretary A. Origins of the Office 1. Contact with press became regularized in the late 1800s 2. By turn of the century, reporters had work space in the White House

3. 1929 – Akerson, working under Hoover, first person to be referred to as Press Secretary

4. 1933 – Stephen T. Early; first person to be formally appointed as PS 5. 1953 – Ike appoints Hagerty as PS; responsibilities of the office are

“well defined”. B. What it takes to succeed as PS (Hagerty possessed both) 1. Long prior experience

a. Experience teaches PS to be fully aware of the needs of reporters which earns the PS respect.

2. Absolute Confidence of the President a. Vital in order to know all the information. C. Office of PS drastically changed – Vietnam and Watergate 1. Pentagon Papers revealed to reporters the numerous lies.

2. As incriminating info emerged surrounding the Nixon Administration, the press turned nasty and became very skeptical

3. Result – WH Press Corps became much less trustworthy D. Growth of the press corps

1. About 22 just before Vietnam, post Watergate number had mushroomed to 60, and eventually 100 during Carter’s Administration. 2. Other Reasons for huge growth of press corps: a. rise of television b. increasing importance of the federal government to Americans c. Foreign media’s interest in receiving US news. d. Individual reporters using job as a stepping stone.

E. The Modern Press Office 1. Upper Press Office a. PS and 2 deputy PS 2. Lower Press Office a. 2 deputy PS, 2 assistant PS

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3. News Summary – Began by Nixon, staffed by about 5, prepared report with relevant news articles from previous day.

4. Press Advance Office – functions are primarily logistical 5. Photo Office – supplies photographers. II The Office of Communications

A. Created at outset of Nixon Admin. 1. With increased responsibility for WH Press Corps, better coordination

needed. 2. Function of Communications Director is more plastic than PS, and it depends

on the skills of the individual and the power structure of WH III Coordination

A. Degrees of Control: 1. Very Controlling- All reporters routed through PS (Hagerty, Ike’s PS)

a. facilitated coordination, but other presidential assistants never become well-know to public.

2. Very little control – Reporters call pres. assistants directly (Salinger, JFK’s PS)

a. Problems – reporters attributed staffer’s view to Kennedy, and stories about staff conflict appeared when conflicting opinions were expressed.

B. Line of the Day: 1. Nixon began, and the idea was to control the media by giving them a single theme. 2. Theme decided upon in meeting run by Chief of Staff, and then disseminated to WH staffers, cabinet members, and executive branch personnel.

C. Meetings and the Chief of Staff 1. Reagan and Clinton both utilized meetings in order to build a cohesive

communications strategy. In the meetings, the Chief of Staff often made the overall decision, and then either the PS or CD would implement the strategy.

IV Media Liaison Activities A. Press Briefings 1. Principle means of disseminating information, conducted by PS. 2. Kessel asserts that they are effective, but he uses quotes from PSs

(Powell and Fitzwater) to support his opinion that PSs are needed to brief the press, and to design a broader communications strategy for the P, but only have time for the former.

a. “The difficulty with this one-job-or-the-other approach is that linkage to the press and communications planning are both vital, and the person most trusted by the president is in the best position to do both.”

B. Press Conferences 1. Pres. Press Conferences began during the Wilson Admin. 2. By 1955, printed stories were supplemented by television pieces. 3. JFK introduced live television coverage

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a. Pro: speak directly to the American people. b. Con: President addresses multiple audiences – he could be misinterpreted or make a misstatement.

c. Held bi-weekly conferences, none of successors followed 4. How frequently did/should Ps hold press conferences?

a. IKE, JFK, LBJ two per month, however, after 1969 the frequency dropped to only 1 per month b. Argument against press conf.: Too time demanding! In Nixon era preparation took 48 hours, and Reagan would begin preparing 5 day in advance. c. Argument for press conference: Kessel asserts, “President becomes more knowledgeable about a range of things, and what he learns can improve his performance across the board.” Kessel is in favor of more press conferences.

C. Speeches 1. Presidents strategically time their major addresses. They speak when their approval rating has changed (either moved up or down), when military threats are receding, or following a major crisis. Presidents avoid speaking when the unemployment rate or the inflation rate is going up, and prefer not to be identified with bad news. 2. The number of people who will contribute to a speech depends largely on 2 factors: Has the fundamental policy decision been made? If not, then interested parties will work for an angle that favors their preferences. How complex does the speech need to be? Simple speeches require the input from only one agency, but the State of the Union Message requires input from several agencies. 3. Kessel warns about the danger of including language in a speech that may provoke foreign adversaries, or stake out permanent positions. In Kennedy’s first State of the Union Message he added provocative language about Soviet intentions without consulting any foreign policy aides. In Bush’s 1988 acceptance speech he said “Read my lips: No New Taxes,” and in 1990 he had to raise taxes. Clinton said, “I want you to listen to me… I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky”.

D Coping with Crisis 1. Three elements that affect the ease with which press crisis can be handled:

a. Press secretary’s access to the decision makers. Larry Speakes, PS for Reagan, was uninformed about the invasion of Grenada in 1983 (he was at two removes from the decision makers), and when he found out he only had 2 hours to prepare before he presented to the press. Salinger, on the other hand, was close to JFK and as a result had 34 hours to prepare before he presented on the Cuban Missile Crisis. b. Whether the relevant facts are known. The facts were not known regarding the 1975 assassination attempt on Ford and the emergency hospitalization of President Bush after he collapsed. c. The need for secrecy. Crises that involve terrorists must be kept secret. When it was discovered that the Soviets had missiles in Cuba, extreme measures were taken to keep the info secret.

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V. Information Gathering in Media Relations

A. The routine of the PS, more or less: 1. PSs gather information before their early afternoon daily press briefing by reading several newspapers on their way into work, making calls once they arrive, meeting with the president (individually), and contacting WH staff members.

B. Key to being effective at information gathering 1. Must have good standing among staff members, especially when secret matters are being discussed. When terrorists hijacked TWA flight 847 in1985, Speakes was not included on the crisis management group. As a result, he was uninformed about the decisions and ill-equipped to report to the press.

C. Contemporary method for gathering information. 1. Began by Reagan, and continued by Clinton, PS was given access to all meetings in the administration. Of course, implementing this shadow method depends on the relationship between the P and the PS.

VI Decision Making in Media Relations

A. PS must walk a tightrope; keep a fragile balance. “If he leans too far in one direction, he reveals information that can be damaging to the president. If he leans too far to the other, he sacrifices the credibility that is essential if reporters are to trust him.

B. Two motivating questions are: “Who shall draw the line?” (if the press and the WH disagree about what should be withheld, who gets to decide?) and “Where shall the line be drawn?” (how much information can be withheld?).

C. Must make a myriad of very difficult decisions regarding what to withhold. “What to say when lives are at stake, negotiations are under way with foreign governments, when allegations might defame an innocent person, when medical information is involved, when presidents and their associates have doubts about policies.” Kessel expresses his own uncertainty with regard to “what to say” because he never makes a judgment call on a PS decision, instead he only asks rhetorical questions. Also, he never asserts his own opinion as to which way is the safer way “to lean” for the PS.

D. Examples of difficult decisions the PS had to make: In 1985 Reagan was diagnosed with Cancer and it was operated on immediately. All was reported to press in a timely fashion. However, shortly after a scab on his nose was diagnosed as cancerous, and this time Mrs. Reagan refused to allow Larry Speakes to disclose the information. He complied, and later Reagan acknowledged to the press that the scab was cancerous. Speakes was accused of misleading the press. To what degree should the President’s personal life be protected? To what degree does the public deserve to know about a problem that could impede the President’s ability to carry out his duty? Example 2. LBJ had concerns about Vietnam, but an admission of his doubts may doom the policy. Should he admit his doubts to the press and present a more realistic portrayal of the decision making process, but risk the passage of his policy? Or should he keep his concerns hidden from the public in order to increase the likelihood that his policy will pass?

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VII Exercising Influence in Media Relations A. Aides to the President are skilled in using resources, but they can’t control the press. B. The president is most influential in shaping media relations (anything he says is

news), and then the PS - he is the most visible contact between the president and the press. However, the network of relationships is very complicated

C. The WH asserts influence through visual content for television (setting and staging), and the press has more control over the verbal content because they choose how much critical comment to add.

D. President’s own reputation for honesty will have a large affect on how it is received. E. WH targets certain newspapers that are widely read in Washington (Washington Post,

New York Times, Wall Street Journal), and the television networks because of their national audiences.

F. The WH releases unfavorable stories when coverage is low (late Friday), and tries to divert attention from such a story by releasing a catchy story at the same time.

Lawrence R. Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press: The Paradox of the White House Communications War," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 283-310. Contributed by: Alex McPhillips o Summary: “Going Public” somewhat of a two-edged sword; “pounding the press” in

“communications war[s]” invites both good and bad press. The media covers independent and critical sources just as much Payoffs to “less adversarial” and “more cooperative” strategies

o Costs of Communications Warfare White House almost invariably underestimates costs Has “an unrealistic confidence” in the its ability to “get away with anything” Benefits are ambiguous

o Belligerence and Détente Bill Clinton and Health Care reform W and Social Security

o Conclusion: “Cooperative presidential leadership means sharing the national spotlight, rather than

scheming to smother critics and their viewpoints…” Compromise needed A more “cooperative leadership” can help presidents use the media more effectively

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Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership 3rd edition, (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), chapter 3, pp. 65-103. Contributed by: Brieana Marticorena Chapter 3: The President and the Press

• Institutionalized pluralism requires continuous face-to-face negotiations among partisan participants and inculcates strong norms of propriety

• FDR enjoyed a more productive relationship with the press corps than anyone before or since

The Bargaining President and the Press

• The “law pf anticipated reactions” dictates that politicians in Washington will pay attention to their public in deciding what stance to take with the president

• Bargaining President can use press coverage to improve his position o By making an issue newsworthy, he can force others to deal with it o Selectively release information to enhance his position and diminish others o Stake out a negotiating stance that is recognized to be hard to abandon o Float a trial balloon from which to identify coalition partners and test potential

avenues of compromise • Conspicuous absence of professional good will between modern presidents and the

Washington press • Roosevelt excelled in recognizing correspondents’ professional stake in a particular kind

of news conveyed in a particular way, whereas his successors did not Emergence of the Washington Press as an Institution

• Growth contributed to the professionalization of the Washington press corps • Needed stability in membership for professionalization • Promote stability

o Veteran correspondents were valued for their contacts with officials o Early 1900s. Washington became an attractive, career advancing assignment o Practice of writing for more than one paper

Diversification and establishment of client relationships Promoted neutrality rather than partisanship on the part of the reporter Promoted the formation of a creed

• 1920s through 1950s, objective journalism reigned as dominant ideology

• Informal expression of professional collegiality

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o Blacksheeting: reporters would informally divide up coverage of Washington events and share the carbon copies of their articles for others to rewrite for their home papers

• Formal expression of professional collegiality were professional associations such as the National Press Club

Early Presidential-Press Relations

• Private interview was the precursor for the presidential press conference o Andrew Johnson

• Theodore Roosevelt was probably the first president to appreciate the value of public opinion in leading Washington

o First to cultivate close ties with Washington correspondents o Gave the press unprecedented access to the White House while giving himself a

large degree of control over what was printed o Roosevelt could dictate the rules because he was working with a still poorly

professionalized press • Woodrow Wilson

o Continued Roosevelt’s practice of frequent meetings but opened them up to all correspondents

o The White House Correspondents Associations was formed Assumed full responsibility for policing the president’s news conference Mandate to establish standards of professional behavior and to regulate Assumed collective responsibility and gained control over its members

and superseded White House regulation • Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover were demonstration cases of the implications for a

president’s options of the developing professionalism of the press o Asked that all questions be written and submitted in advance o No follow-ups were allowed o President could not be quoted directly without permission o When began favoring sympathetic journalists with choice stories, the press

retaliated and refrained from not only printing good things about the president, but also print hurtful things

Early Competition and Collective Interests

• Correspondents’ growing independence from home editors increased their dependence on news sources – presidents included

o Competed for choice stories • Collective interests of Washington press corps favored open news conferences over

private presidential interviews o No reporter had an undue advantage over another o The president could not divide and conquer the press o Within the first 3 decades of the 1900s, the collective interests of the group took

precedent over the individual interests of its members – a mark of professionalism The FDR System: Hard News, Openly Conveyed

• Dispensed with written questions

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• Identified four classes of information that would be presented in these “delightful family conferences”: 1. occasional direct quotations permitted only through written authorization from the

White House 2. press conference comments attributed to the president “without direct quotations” 3. background information to be used in stories without a reference to the White House 4. “off the record” remarks not to be repeated to absent reporters

• Appointed Stephen Early as the White House’s first press secretary to administer the policy of authorized direct quotations and other relations with the press

• Gave the press corps what they had sought for more than a decade: assurance of hard news, openly conveyed

• Strengthened the press conference in other ways o Met with the press openly and routinely (Tuesdays and Fridays) o By the time of his death in April 1945, he had invited correspondents into the

Oval Office on 998 occasions o Used the conferences to make significant announcements

Never sent reporters away empty-handed Reporters often praised his “timing” and packaging in ways that enhanced

an item’s newsworthiness o Relied upon the press conference almost exclusively

• Only gave one private interview ever o The next press conference was an angry one o The reporters accused Roosevelt of favoritism, which was made more

unacceptable by extending it to a bureau chief rather than a member of the working press

• Roosevelt succeeded in splitting off Washington correspondents from the editorial stance of their papers

Transition from the FDR System

• FDR system rooted in the professional development of the Washington press • Deterioration set in shortly after his departure because the needs of the participants

changed due to advancements in communications and transportation • Radio, television, and air travel introduced the opportunity for the president to engage in

frequent, direct communication with the American public Press Relations Under Truman and Eisenhower

• Both made very few changes to FDR’s format • Neither regularly went beyond the news conference to woo reporters with private

interviews • Midway through his second term, Truman permitted radio broadcasts of recorded

excerpts of his news conferences o Meant would normally speak for the record o Made it matter little when he allowed the press to publish a paraphrased

transcript of his remarks o Moved the press conferences from the Oval Office to a larger room in the State

Department and reduced them to once a week

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o Many felt that they had become a more formal affair • Eisenhower held press conference on average about twice a month • Admitted television crews in 1955

o Mostly altered presidential-press relations by creating a precedent The Kennedy System: Press Relations in an Era of Direct Communication

• Break with the FDR system • The Kennedy Press Conference

o Live, nationwide televising of press conferences o Kennedy favored “direct communication” because he was aware of its value if he

were ever to lose favor with the press o Also required very little innovation on the part of the White House as television

cameras were already in place o Complaints from reporters on the declining quality of questions o Gave way to presidential position-taking and evasion o Whatever fresh news came out of a press conference was stale by the time it was

printed due to television o Press conferences became relatively infrequent o More to inform the public than the press o Reporters began to look elsewhere in the White House and in the agencies for

stories • The Local Press and the Private Interview

o Innovations to give the president greater control over the content of information the press received

Special, informal news conferences with publishers and reporters of papers from a particular state or region

Frequent use of the private interview • In summary: routine use of the exclusive interview, cultivation of the press outside

Washington, and live telecasts of news conferences • Kennedy system depreciated the status of the news conference

The Kennedy System as a Model for Presidents who Go Public

• Kenney system has remained a working model for presidential-press relations • Development of satellite communications permitting instantaneous transmissions from

the White House to local news stations around the country has created a booming market for White House communications beyond Washington

• Local news coverage advantages o Allows the White House to “narrowcast its message to a very specific audience” o These newscasters are interested in presidential activities that the networks and

even local press pay little attention to – medals commendations, and salutations that invariably cast the president in a sympathetic light

o Journalists for these bureaus, as new arrivals with few prerogatives and an uncertain mandate, abide by White House instructions

• Currently an adversarial aspect to presidential-press relationships George Bush’s Adaptation of the Kennedy System

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• Bush did not perform well on television • Called brief, impromptu morning sessions in which networks were allowed a few minutes

to assemble the cameras if they were interested in covering the conference • Little time for correspondents to prepare difficult questions • Could not complain that the precedent was inaccessible • President rarely used these conferences to make newsworthy remarks • Revamped format was viewed not as a restoration of the press conference but rather as a

means of pacifying the press The Modern Trajectory of Presidential-Press Relations

• Presidents and reporters still jointly produce news, but it is no longer a collaborative undertaking

• Each side anticipates and responds to the distant actions of the other • Modern network news bureaus have developed techniques to resist presidential influence

and assert their own control over the content of presidential communications o Network news executives appear to emphasize a president’s failures over their

successes A modern president who garners a 40-60 ratio of favorable to unfavorable

news is doing pretty well according to the Center for Media and Public Affairs

o Editors and reporters severely edit presidential statements and editorialize about their purposes

o Currently the president gets about 9 seconds on the evening news • Contention over control will remain a fixture in the modern system with a more assertive

press and presidents going public more often

Matthew R. Kerbel and Bartholomew H. Sparrow, “Resolved, the media are too hard on presidents,” chapter 5 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 60-74. Contributed by: Alex McPhillips

• Pro: Matthew R. Kerbel o Summary: “Harshness of media has provoked presidents to act in ways that do not

serve the national interest” o Kerbel: Constitutional design sets up presidents to fail in a complex political

system Media scrutiny adds to the problem

o Nature of the media Television requires politics to be “problematic”

• Focusing on competition • The ‘personal presidency’

o Presidents pushed back

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“Governance morphed into marketing” o The Horserace

Detracts from real policy; distracts from government; bogs down the government

• Con: Bartholomew H. Sparrow o Two-way street: media and president are “mutually dependent” o Presidents use the media to exercise their dominion

Contested issues Agenda setting News framing

Michael Nelson, "The Psychological Presidency," in Nelson, The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 170-194. Contributed by: Ross Lipstein Examines the two seminal works on the Psychological Presidency by James David Barber. First is The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (1972) and the second is The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age (1980). Made famous for predicting that Nixon (active-negative) would experience failure, possibly at the hands of a scandal that he would stubbornly try to hide. TIME magazine likes him and posts columns about him every election after that for a while. Psychological presidency: presidency as an institution shaped largely by the psychological mix between the personalities of individual presidents and the public’s deep feeling about the office. Also provides methods of predicting what those personalities and feelings are likely to be in particular circumstances. Character – the way the President orients himself toward life – not for the moment, but enduringly. It grows out of the childhood experience. Personality also includes worldview and style, but Barber points to character as main determinant since childhood-shaped character affects development of adolescence- and early adulthood-shaped worldview and style. Presidential Character : 2 dimensions

- active/passive – How much energy does he invest in his presidency - positive/negative – Relatively speaking, does he seem to experience his political life

as happy or sad, enjoyable or discouraging, positive or negative in its main effect. 4 character types:

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- active-positive – preferable type – consistency between much activity and the enjoyment of it, indicating relatively high self-esteem and relative success in relating to the environment . . . shows an orientation to productiveness as a value and an ability to use his styles flexibly, adaptively - ie Jefferson, FDR, Truman, JFK, Ford, Carter, Bush, Clinton - active-negative – activity has a compulsive quality, as if the man were trying to make up for something or escape from anxiety into hard work . . . seems ambitious, striving upward, power-seeking . . . stance toward the environment is aggressive and has a problem in managing aggressive feelings - ie Adams, Wilson, Hoover, LBJ, Nixon - all tend to persist in disastrous courses of action (Alien and Sedition Acts, League of Nations, depression policy, Vietnam, Watergate) - passive-positive – receptive, compliant, other-directed character whose life is a search for affection as a reward for being agreeable and cooperative . . . low self-esteem (on grounds of being unlovable) - ie Madison, Taft, Harding, Reagan - passive-negative – low self-esteem based on a sense of uselessness . . . in politics because they think they ought to be . . .tendency is to withdraw, to escape from the conflict and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing vague principles and procedural arrangements Criticisms – 1) no foundations in previous psychological work 2) wrong about some (according to Greenstein) - Clinton – may have turned out to be active-negative - Eisenhower – may have actually been active behind the scenes

3) How informative is personality schema that lumps FDR and Carter, Harding and Reagan, Eisenhower and Coolidge, Nixon and Lincoln?

- no account for great differences in political skill or psychological bases for those differences

The Pulse of Politics: The public’s election moods come in 3 vaireties:

- conflict – adventure, bllod-and-guts political contest - conscience – call for revival of social conscience, restore constitutional covenant - conciliation – public yearns for solace and domestic tranquility

Claims to apply to humankind for all time in various ways, relates it to American politics after 1900 with emergence of mass media, first newspaper than radio and television

- reason for the pulse – after a conflict election, a reaction sets in. Conscience calls for a cleansing of the temple of democracy. But the troubles do not go away, and four years later the public yearns for solace or conciliation. After another four years, Barber, claims, the time for a fight will come around again, and so on.

Claims that 1904 was conscience, partly due to progressive mass media of muckrakers, then conciliation in 1908, conflict in 1912, and so on.

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Criticism – what about recent elections? Was placid election of 96 really conflict? Was mean-spirited Gore/Bush in 00 really conscience, and conciliation the equally disdainful 04 election? Does not seem to fit. In chapter added to The Presidential Character in 1992, Barber adds a fit between the two books. Conciliation is conducive to election of passive-positives, conflict to active-negatives, conscience to passive-negatives, and active-positives can win at any time because of their energy and high self-esteem. Although Barber doesn’t go on to test the accuracy of the prediction, Nelson does, and finds it successful in predicting 16 of 23 elections from 1904 to 1996, but with 10 active-positive presidents, leaving a track record of 6 of 13 for the ones that he took a risk on. Still, if he had gone further to suggest that campaigns can hide the actual character of candidates, and that the ones that didn’t accord with the theory would reveal their characters later and be rebuked for them, he would have been right for all but three instances. Barber’s goal – avoid psychopathologies in presidents and help encourage election of active-positives – involve greater sensitivity on the part of the presidents and citizens to the ideas of the other Main solution is journalism – he understands the need of journalists to make stories that engage interest, but he claims that stories about the histories and personalities of the candidates would engage further interest

- avoid the pulse by being sensitive to own psychological states and those of the candidates

- encourage knowledge of actual candidate characters to facilitate electing active-positives and avoid rigidities, compulsions, and other dangerous attributes of active-negatives

James David Barber, "Answering the Critics," in The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 3rd ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 521-528. Contributed by: Ross Lipstein Chapter at end of Barber’s The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, a book that emphasizes President’s personality and style from a psychological point of view (as viewed over a lifetime and not just while campaigning or in office) as the best way to predict a president’s performance once in office. The personality styles are active-positive, passive-positive, active-negative, and passive-negative. In this chapter, he responds to 10 criticisms that he has heard about his book:

1) Bias – idea that his evidence s skewed to support his point and partisan politics. His response is that the evidence is out there for all to use, and his thesis tests well against the

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facts. He encourages critics to test alternative theories to the facts and see if they work as well.

2) Personalism – idea that the book puts too much emphasis on the psychology of an individual and not enough on the institution of the Presidency, historical events and situations, other forces. His response is that a lot does actually boil down to the single individual that is the President and that the bureaucracy and press must respond to or cater to that person and personality. President takes events and interprets and acts on them – still a personal thing.

3) Citizen shrinks? – book is written in accessible everyday English rather than academic jargon. He responds that public already makes personality judgments on politicians, and this book should participate in that discourse, not ignore it.

4) Psychoanalytic mumbo jumbo? – Psychoanalysis is a questionably effective science even in the psychological realm – isn’t it imprecise and foolish to use in the political realm. No, he responds – psychoanalysis is fundamentally about noticing patterns in behavior over extended periods of time. This is not about Freudian slips or psychoanalytic speculation – just noticing patterns of behavior and thought reported over the years that seem to emerge in different forms from different individuals.

5) The Iron Box – Some say the book focuses too much on specific people, and other critics say the book makes too many general categorizations, like lumping Ford and Roosevelt together. Barber responds that both criticisms apply to the book, and that he finds an importance in the specificity and the generality of his arguments. He notes that broad patterns help characterize similarities in the personalities and actions of various presidents, and that ideosyncraces help fill in the brushstrokes with unique manifestations of these personality traits that are valuable in keeping the patterns realistic and heterogeneous.

6) Fake active-positives? – Here, he notes that his analysis of personality types was NOT confined to what the president’s campaign was like or how he acted once he was in his first term as Pres. He uses analysis from the whole life to characterize a personality. Examples: “Reagan was riding horses back when he was still an FDR democrat,” while Eisenhower pasted up smiles just for the campaign.

7) The Mechanists – Don’t think the book was just about models that can be immediately applied to realities. There are important subtleties in each experience and predictive power does not entail strict adherence to a simplification. He emphasizes to remember that no models are perfect and future scrutiny, research, and modifications are always necessary.

8) Change in adulthood – Notes the concern that personality and style may change between early adulthood and late adulthood when the campaign and Presidency happens. Barber responds that this is often not so much the case, and that looking from biographies to presidencies, there is certainly much more continuity than change. He also mentions that further research into the predictive power of midlife changes on politicians would be helpful.

9) Downplaying worldview – Critics argue that worldview and ideology and beliefs of the president are downplayed in an account of the person of the president that emphasizes personality and style. Barber responds that worldview has shown to be much more malleable in the White House than has personality, that pragmatism often removes much a President’s idealism and ideology from affecting all decisions, and presidents often

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operate in conjunction with current political winds, however they interpret it. Example: liberal/conservative divide has not been a powerful predictor of Pres. performance.

10) Inside my head - most trivial criticism, he writes. Just the idea that critics have speculated that he got his idea from others or from professors or from some other source. This is a silly criticism, but his main response is that he can’t sort out all the influence of his various mentors and readings, but that’s not the point. “Newton may or may not have been beaned by someone else’s apple, but what is interesting is what, in a lifetime of labor, he made of the event.”

Conclusion – while other branches may become more predominant in the future than they currently are, this is for now a Presidential era, and it is up to the people who are Presidents to shape our country and world.

Stanley A. Renshon and Stephen Skrowronek, “Resolved, psychological character is a powerful predictor of presidential performance,” chapter 11 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 159-178. Contributed by: Ross Lipstein Introduction: There is much discussion of the degree of influence of the President’s character on his performance in the White House. On of most influential accounts is Baraber’s Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (1972).

- Barbers defn. of character – the way the President orients himself to life o 2 key dimensions

The president’s activity level in office Whether the president gives the impression that he enjoys his political

life - leads to 4 characters: active/passive – positive/negative - active-positives tend to be most successful, active-negatives are most prone to big failures and to persevering rigidly in a failed policy, which he predicted of Nixon and that made him famous

- In debate, Renshon defends Barber’s view but not with the 4 character types – instead, offers specific examples of character affecting policy, especially W. Bush - In debate, Skowronek takes the opposing point of view - character is not as influential and that given a president’s place in political time, performance is relatively similar regardless of differences in character Pro; Renshon:

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Qualifier – character doesn’t explain it all. There are other political actors and instituational limits that keep the President from entirely shaping the govt. But the influence is rather substantial. Character – the foundation of a person’s psychology.

- psychoanalytic framework – 4 core elements o existence and operation of unconscious motives o view that a person’s internal and interpersonal psychology develops and

becomes consolidated over time o understanding that those consolidated internal structures result in patterns of

choice that are discernible over time o the knowledge that these patterns of internal and interpersonal psychology

develop in relation to each other and together form a package that is best understood as a person’s psychological character

In thinking about relationship between presidential performance and character, there are 2 core elements of performance

- judgment – capacity to understand the essential nature of the problem at hand and devise appropriate solutions

- leadership – ability to mobilize followers and resources in pursuit of those solutions and three core elements of character

- ambition – range of political and policy aspirations and his level of desire to achieve his purposes – all presidents have lots of it – do their strong ambitions serve the ideals and values that can anchor them? Question of character.

- Integrity – ideals and values by which a president says he lives, and his fidelity to them.

- Relatedness – basic nature of the candidate’s interpersonal relations – how does he relate to others?

Presidents will consolidate a leadership style that is cognitive (smart – ie Kennedy and Carter), interpersonal (charming – ie Reagan and Clinton), and characterological (depend on character traits like resolve and perseverance – ie W. Bush), and different presidents exhibit a different blend of traits that display their character - Clinton was articulate but lacking in personal integrity, while W. is opposite Uses example of W. Bush’s character integrity (having convictions and being able to follow through with them) to show that character is critical for presidential performance.

- There was more than one way to respond to 9/11 o Localized attack on Afghanistan or Al-Quaeda o Legal issue of finding people immediately responsible for that particular

attack and punishing them o Diplomatic issue requiring UN support before action o Unilateral War on Terror that involves larger scale attacks and restructuring of

global alliances if necessary – this is what W. does

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His unique framing of this event based on his character, and further demonstration of character in sticking to his guns, will change the course of history and clearly affect his performance in the White House

Thus, character matters (you think this argument has to have more to it, but it doesn’t – it’s a really bad argument)

Con; Skowronek: US history can be divided into regimes:

- Federalist nationalism (1789-1800) - Jeffersonian democracy (1800-1828) - Jacksonian democracy (1828-1860) - Republican nationalism (1860-1932) - New Deal liberalism (1932-1980)

Thesis: We should try to understand the political demands and challenges of presidential leadership as variables mediated by the generation and degeneration of these political orderings, and we can often hold character constant and see performances in the White House as patterned based on their context in political time. 2 dimensions in analysis of presidential leadership stand out: - president’s affiliation with political complex of interests, institutions, and ideas that dominated state/society relations before he came to office (is the president affiliated with the political party that has defined the government’s basic commitments of ideology and interest?) - current standing of these governmental arrangements in the nation at large (are the governmental commitments of that party vulnerable to direct repudiation as failed and irrelevant responses to the problems of the day?) Result in 4 political situations that display similarities in “character” perceived in performance over time

- politics of reconstruction – the basic governmental commitments of the previously dominant political party are vulnerable to direct repudiation, and the president is associated with the opposition to them

o ie Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan o All known as great communicators – partly because they all had the same

basic message to communicate o Identify leadership with a new beginning – innovative o All great party builders

- politics of disjunction – the basic governmental commitments of the previously dominant political party are again on the line, but this time the president is politically affiliated with them

o ie Adams, Quincy Adams, Pierce, Buchanan, Hoover, and Carter o Promises to repair and rehabilitate the old order o Become leading symbols of systemic political failure and regime bankruptcy o Recurrent coupling of dismal failure (disjunction) with towering success

(reconstruction) suggests that the contingent political relationship between the

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Presidency and political system is more telling of leadership prospects than the contingencies of personality and skill

- politics of preemption – governmental commitments of the previously dominant political party still appear timely and politically resilient, but the president is linked with the political opposition to them

o ie Tyler, Andrew Johnson, Cleveland, Wilson, Nixon, Clinton o Enjoys independence by virtue of opposition stance o Offer hybrid solutions and disavow orthodoxies of all kinds o Play upon latent interest cleavages and factional discontent within the ranks of

the regime’s traditional supporters o Historically unique in its tendency to produce impeachment hearing and/or

character criticisms Partly because regime supporters portray the need to compromise and

reject orthodoxy as unprincipled and self-indulgent - politics of articulation – governmental commitments of the previously dominant

political party again appear to hold out robust solutions to the problems of the day, and the president is affiliated with them

o ie Bush and W Bush o president is minister to the faithful o service coalition interests, relative orthodoxy o need to reconcile old party commitments with current political possibilities

Thus, presidential success is determined at least as much by systemic factors as by presidential character, decision-making styles, or political skills.

- commonalities over time o Clinton vulnerable to similar character attacks as A Johnson and Nixon o W Bush faces same challenges as Monroe, Polk, TR, and LBJ in moving

agenda forward without shattering the political foundations on which policy accomplishments rest.

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Michael Nelson, “Evaluating the Presidency,” in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp. 1-27. Contributed by: Steven Johnston -Main presidential assessors: scholars, journalists, citizens, Congressmen, bureaucrats. Presidents must be viewed favorably by these groups to gain favorable view by history. -Scholars: Confusion. Schlesinger Sr., who frequently polled historians on their view of the presidents, said presidents are viewed favorably if they leave the office stronger, more influential than it was when they entered. Strength and activeness are important in historians’ evaluations of greatness; idealism and flexibility are not. -Cronin examined the president as “Superman,” finding most political scientists of the 50s and 60s saw the president as omnipotent and benevolent. This view is referred to as the “Savior” model of the presidency: president is guardian of national interest in foreign policy and domestic policy, where he can speak against special interests. Presidential strength/ambition serves national interest. -However, the flaws of Johnson and Nixon spawned new model: “Satan” model. Schlesinger wrote of the “imperial presidency.” Scholars explored why strength in the office would hurt the nation, focusing on the person and the office. Barber explored personality, developing the “active-negative” character type, who, when challenged, act aggressively, a potentially dangerous trait. -In light of the weak presidents Ford and Carter, scholars found this “Samson” model to expose gap between expectations for presidential action and the reality of what can be done. This model traces incapacity to: 1) the constitutional dependence on other institutions and 2) the decline in those institutions’ willingness to provide that support. Parties were weaker, Congress was decentralized, bureaucracy was fragmented, and the media was adversarial. In the public, single-issue groups proliferated, making the president work harder to maintain popularity in light of their criticisms. -As his ability to meet demands declined, demands becoming even greater, according to Hodgson. It was believed no individual could meet them. However, Reagan came into office and proved this was incorrect. Overall, scholars still value those presidents who are strong. The rankings of president appear to be fairly constant over time. -Journalists: Cynicism. Journalists covering the president are impressed by presidential strength. Despite their high social and professional status, the job itself is “degrading”: they are constantly following the president, waiting for an important event, and making do with what limited access the president’s staff will grant them. Despite this cynicism, reporting on presidents is largely favorable. A number of stories portray presidential strength: 1) appearing decisive—military leadership; 2) appearing decisive—firing contrary subordinates; 3) being in command—the president as expert; 4) being in command—the president as effective intellectual; and 5) being recognized as a leader—foreign travel.

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-Journalists, despite their being cynical of the president, often give him favorable coverage due to occupational necessity. The need for reporters to file several stories each day means presidents or their press aides get to set the agenda with the information they supply reporters. Another reason is the use of spin by presidents and their press aides to give meaning to stories in a way that will give a positive appearance of the president. -Additionally, journalists tend to view the executive as the center of government; by reporting on his victories or defeats versus other institutions, the connection between a strong president and a good president is reinforced. -Citizens: Contradiction. People have many contradictions in the way they view presidents. They want a chief of government who will unite them and a chief of state who will lead them (and, thus, divide them). They expect much of the president, yet they also want Congress to dominate the president in policymaking. This makes the people philosophical congressionalists: they tend to side with the Congress in cases of institutional relations, yet they want a strong president. They are also operational presidentialists: they like presidents who lead and Congresses who follow. Likewise, Americans are emotional presidentialists: their political heroes from the past are presidents. People have a strong emotional attachment to presidents: their beginnings in office are marked by a “honeymoon” effect, times of foreign policy importance stimulate a “rally around the flag” effect, and feelings are once again stirred once a president passes away. The presidency is endowed with symbolic and political importance by the people. -Congressmen: Constituency Centeredness: Congressmen are chiefly concerned with winning reelection. However, this constituency centeredness enhances presidential strength in three areas: 1) the power to initiate (Congress is often distracted from lawmaking by its pursuit of re-election, so it often wants the president to initiate legislative action and speed the process along); 2) the power of popularity (when president’s have high support among voters, Congressmen are likelier to follow presidential leadership); and 3) power in foreign policy (the president usually dominates in this domain, leading Congress to follow his lead). -Bureaucrats: Careerism: They are motivated by self-interest: they want to keep their jobs, and this entails a strong president whom they feel loyal to. Regardless of their party, civil servants loyal to a president’s policies will receive special favors. Presidents can curry favor with civil servant by expanding their ranks (Carter) or eliminate those civil servants who unfavorably view their policies by downsizing or replacement with partisans (Reagan). Regardless of their genuine loyalty to presidents or their desire to move ahead in their job, civil servants tend to look favorably on strong presidents. -Conclusion: Views of the presidency come from different groups and are largely superficial: scholars base their assessments on overreactions to the latest president, journalists (post-Watergate and Vietnam) view him cynically, citizens want “chief-of-state-like symbolic leadership and chief-of-government-like political leadership,” Congressmen view him through their constituency, and civil servants view him through their own careers. -Scholars and journalists view those presidents who institute significant policy changes as strong, while citizens want strong and unifying presidential action. Congressmen and civil servants see their careers furthered by strong presidential action. -However, what people define as strength varies person to person. Scholars see administrative duties as a distraction from moral and political leadership, but bureaucrats only see strong action when decisions affect their own careers. People see strength where there is unity, while journalists see strength in defying opposition.

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-Also, emphasis on strength and machinations of modern presidents to appear as strong may lead presidents to take more credit than they deserve and become distracted from serving the best interests of the country. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Rating the Presidents: From Washington to Clinton,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, (Summer 1997), pp. 179-190. Contributed by: Steven Johnston -In 1948, Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. polled 55 leading histories for a poll in order to rank the presidents’ performances in the White House as follows: “great,” “near great,” “average,” “below average,” and “failure.” The results ran in Life magazine, and in the 1990s, the New York Times Magazine asked his son, Arthur Jr., to replicate the rest of his father. -It is accepted by many people that historians tend to have a liberal bias. -Presidents who served during wartime tend to be regarded as greater presidents. -Methodologies of ranking presidents have varied over the years. -Scholars tend to consistently regard nine Great and Near Greats: Lincoln, Washington, FDR; Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, T. Roosevelt, Wilson, and Truman. Occasionally John Adams, Cleveland, and Eisenhower join the top nine. -Grant and Harding are consistent Failures. They are always joined at the bottom by Buchanan, Pierce, Filmore, Taylor, and Coolidge. -People with political views opposed to some of the Great/Near Great presidents tend to oppose their high placement on the list. -There is much more fluctuation of rankings for the middle presidents. -Eisenhower has increased in the rankings, as more of his personality has become visible and as he has been compared to later presidents. -Most presidents fall into the Average category. -There is not much correlation between height or education and presidential greatness. Youth appears to be a comparative advantage. -Henry Adams notes that great presidents are like captains: they possess a vision of an ideal America, which helps them steer the ship of state. -They must convince Congress and the electorate that their vision is correct. Crises are no guarantee for greatness; only those who utilize the bully pulpit and react can be considered great. -Those who were involved in wars before or during their presidencies tend to fare well. -Great presidents tend to not be “middle-roaders;” they must take risks, be decisive, and divide the nation before uniting it.

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Marc Landy and Bruce Miroff, “Resolved, great presidents are agents of democratic change,” chapter 12 in Ellis and Nelson, eds., Debating the Presidency, pp. 179-197. Contributed by: Steven Johnston -Pro (Landy): Great presidents create “conservative revolutions” that fundamentally alter the political landscape and align the political system with our constitutional principles. They were great agents for change because they’re great teachers that did not coerce Americans to make these democratic changes. To make these changes, presidents utilize rhetoric and party leadership. -Examples: Jefferson brought the nation together after a divisive election (1800). His “revolution” had elements of style and substance: he made the presidency more democratic. Jackson helped to institute a party system that encouraged more participation in democracy. He also defended the Constitution with his Nullification Proclamation (1832). Lincoln defended the Constitution by freeing the slaves and holding the Union together. Franklin Roosevelt achieved his New Deal conservative revolution through his “fireside chats” that spoke to people about the need restore economic rights. The actions of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson helped increase the protection of civil rights and promote equality, principles consistent with the Constitution. -Con (Miroff): Thinking these changes are caused by great presidents makes a more passive citizenry. In some cases, presidential action has hurt our democracy. Certainly presidents played in role in bringing about these democratic changes, but presidents were not the agents of these changes. Rather, these changes were initiated by other people, and presidents only later helped bring about these changes. In many cases, presidents were initially reluctant to bring these changes. -Jackson rode the democratic wave, rather than creating it. Lincoln needed the abolitionist educators to pave his way. Theodore Roosevelt needed the muckrackers before he could start trust-busting. FDR reacted to the small farmers and workers in need. Kennedy and Johnson needed protestors to speak up against injustices before they would finally act. The “first movers,” who were regular citizens, did the groundwork which allowed presidents to act. Presidents would not have acted in these ways without these changes being initiated from the bottom up, rather than from the top to the bottom. The risk in believing these changes came from the presidents themselves is that citizens will become apathetic or turn a blind eye to the damage presidents have done while in office. -Jackson had his prejudices. Lincoln curtailed some civil liberties. Theodore Roosevelt was cozy with some powerful capitalists. Franklin Roosevelt abused the FBI and interned Japanese Americans. Kennedy and Johnson ordered the monitoring of Martin Luther King, Jr. and some civil rights groups. Presidential ambition can quickly lead to presidential arrogance. Democratic change depends on citizens more than the greatness of presidents.

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William E. Gienapp, “Abraham Lincoln and Presidential Leadership,” in James M. McPherson, ed., We Cannot Escape History (University of Illinois Press, 1995), pp. 63-85. Contributed by: Teo Nicolais Intro… • Being President is difficult. Evaluating presidents is also difficult. • Problems with evaluating presidents:

o Similar actions in different contexts can lead to strikingly dissimilar results o Predicting presidential success: nearly impossible o Qualities that made a president unpopular at the time may make them look great in

retrospect (ex: arry Truman) • ***Five categories in evaluating presidential leadership***

o President as leader of his party o President as Chief Executive Officer (administrator, bureaucracy) o President as head of Government (relations with congress) o President as conductor of diplomatic relations and military affairs o President as leader of the American people

With regard to Lincoln…. • Very unpopular during is time. Loved today. • Surprisingly inexperienced when elected (career: one US Rep term, then two unsuccessful

senate bids, then President) • Pre-presidential career showed strength in maintaining unity

o Evidence: highly fractionalized Illinois party, observed Polk’s mistakes, effective standard bearer for Republican Party in failed 1858 senate bid)

• Faced unprecedented challenges during his term. Had to make up rules as he went. • Greatest Accomplishment: saving Union without destroying democracy With regard to Lincon’s Cabinet • Many acquaintances, few friends, no confidants. Made crucial decisions alone. • Appointed his rivals to his cabinet – didn’t give them policy making ability • Ruled Cabinet with “tyrannous authority”…

o Relied entirely on his own judgment (really important point!) o Cabinet = vehicle for administering his policies

Few votes during cabinet meetings. o Listened to advice, but never told anyone what he was thinking until he acted. o Evidence: (1) decision to defend Ft. Sumter, (2) issuance of emancipation

proclamation (he advised his cabinet right before he was going to issue it) o Cabinet members relied on newspapers for finding out what Lincoln and other cabinet

members were up to.

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With regard to Lincoln’s Leadership of the Military: • Left legislation to congress. Lincoln: “I ma in an emergency do things on military grounds

which cannot be done constitutionally by Congress.” • Only exception: 13th Amendment (abolition of slavery) • Example of his deft handling of congress: Cabinet Crisis in December 1862 (details not

important. Main point: Lincoln maintained control over his cabinet even when challenged) • Not active in legislation or diplomacy. Very active in military strategy.

o As with his cabinet, he listened to advice of experts but made his own decisions. o Devised war plans himself. o Evidence: Realized that south had tactical superiority on the battle field, so he used

the fact that the union army was so much larger to keep pressure on multiple fronts. o Handled his personal relationships with his generals well. o Bottom line: he sometimes miscalled the shots, but there was no doubt he was calling

them. o

With regard to Lincoln’s Leadership of the American People… • Displayed uncanny ability to read the public. Nonetheless, gave very few speeches. • Eloquent in his public remarks (written and verbal) • Evidence: Emancipation decision…

o Lincoln waited until the public sentiment behind it before he announced it. o Actually reversed several attempts by others to do it early on o Frederick Douglas (the black abolitionist leader!) even agreed that had Lincoln

announced it too early, he would have lost the support he needed to make it happen… Conclusion… • Tremendous self-confidence and ability to motivate people were his key assets • Author asks: Why didn’t his contemporaries recognize his greatness?

o Lacked presidential stature when he entered the Qhite House o Negatives: limited education, backwood stories, strange accent, etc. o Negative: faced a LOT of divisive issues o His conciliatory attitude may have been viewed as weakness

• Interesting point: had Lincoln been defeated in his bid for a second term (right as the war was turning) history would have marked him as a failure…

• Unlike modner historians, his contemporaries couldn’t see the big picture with regard to the war (how monumental an undertaking it was)

• Basically, contemporaries can’t see the forest through the trees. We should all mediate on this….

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Paul Kengor, “Cheney and Vice Presidential Power,” in Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell, Considering the Bush Presidency (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 160-174. Contributed by: Teo Nicolais • September 11th dramatically changed Cheney’s role as VP. Very active.

o Close advisor to President Bush About past vice presidents… • Pre-WWII, vice president’s role in foreign policy was non-existent • Active VPs started with Truman (replaced FDR upon his death) • FDR communicated essentially NOTHING to Truman. Examples:

o Yalta (the conference in which the end of WWII was planned) • Made Truman’s task of picking up negotiations where FDR left off

ridiculously difficult. o Manhattan Project (the Bomb) o Author: FDR’s failure to keep Truman in the loop was “shocking historical

irresponsibility by a president” • Truman’s added VP as a statutory member of the National Security Council • Jimmy Carter brought VP Mondale’s office inside the West Wing • Reagan had VP Bush chair various taskforces (big step) • “The rise in VP influence and responsibility in foreign policy is a historically new

phenomenon, unique to the post-WWII era and particularly salient since 1977.” Cheney’s backround… • Cheney’s defense and foreign policy background is unprecedented for VPs.

o Extensive experience in congress and working for former Presidents o First VP who previously served as a secretary of defense

Successfully orchestrated first gulf war o Cheney at gravitas – a certain respectability and seriousness that George W. Bush

lacked • Author: Cheney was tailor-made for challenges the administration would face

o In addition to foreign policy and defense expertise, he worked for Halliburton (oil / energy company) – which gave him insight on the ramifications of Middle East turmoil on the US Economy.

Cheney’s Role in Bush Administration • Cheney not just president’s understudy • Attends lots of national security meetings, meets with foreign heads of state, delivers

speeches on administrative agenda items. o Take home point: he’s been very present on the political scene

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“September 11th VP” • Cheney mobilized the White House (until Bush was contacted, he was running the show) • Remaining in the White House, he dispatched all those in the line of presidential succession

(including the president) to different parts of the country to ensure succession if the White House / Capital was targeted

• Advised president on decision to shoot down commercial jets if they didn’t land • Cheney announced Bush Doctrine of not distinguishing between terrorists and the countries

that harbor them as well as other policies: o US was preparing for long war o War was NOT against Islam

• Cheney recommended the creation of the Department of Homeland Security • Then, Cheney disappeared….

o Shadow government days • Also, Cheney was the tip of the spear on the public relations campaign to sell the American

people on invading Iraq Conclusion • Haha, best line of this book: “Cheney is not a wreath layer; he’s a policy player.”

o Wartime vice president