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Governance by contract?The dimensions of the legalization of labour
standards in World Bank private sector development finance
Conor Cradden & Jean-Christophe Graz
The IFC’s ‘performance standards’ system
PS system is IFC’s firm-level social &
environmental conditionality
system, introduced in 2006. Applies in
the same form across multiple
states and industry sectors
IFC client businesses required to comply with the
standards as a contractual condition of investment
One standard is about labour and
working conditions; includes provisions
on workers’ organizations drawn from
international law on FoA & CB rights,
notably ILO core conventions
“where national law is silent, the client will not discourage workers from electing worker
representatives, forming or joining workers’ organizations of their choosing, or from
bargaining collectively, and will not discriminate or retaliate against workers who
participate, or seek to participate, in such organizations and collective bargaining. The
client will engage with such workers’ representatives and workers’ organizations,
and provide them with information needed for meaningful negotiation in a timely manner”
Reasons for optimism
Language of PS is precise and appears to
establish that actively resisting
independent worker
organization and collective action is
not acceptable under any
circumstances.
IFC remains in close contact with clients. E&S staff
visit businesses at least every two years & usually
more frequently. 3rd party
compliance monitoring also
carried out in highest risk cases.
Compliance obligations written
into investment contract. IFC has the right to delay disbursement of
funds or to withdraw from the investment in the
case of non-compliance
Disappointing reality
Conformity with PS2:
71 workers (24%) working in 22
businesses (40%) report some kind of FoA violation
Internal change – direct effects:
70% of IFC ‘mitigation measures’
concern only contents of
written HR policy or establishment
of grievance procedures
Internal change – indirect effects:
Very low awareness that
performance standards exist
(6% workers, 30% union reps);
equal numbers of workers report
+ve change as -ve
The dimensions of legalization
The degree to which actors “are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is
subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international
law, and often of domestic law as well”
Obligation
IFC Client business IFC
Workers
Empl
oym
ent
rela
tions
hip
Commercial contract
“we have to say up front that [getting to what would be normally be an acceptable level of compliance] isn’t going to work and then we decide: do we recognise it and say we’ll take the risk, or at least be transparent that this
won’t meet the requirement but that hopefully we’re pushing the envelope in other
aspects of our engagement” (Senior IFC E&S staff member)
Precision
The degree to which “rules unambiguously describe the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe”
Precision
Application of FoA &
CB rights in practice
Core conventions (87 & 98)
Jurisprudential acquis of ILO supervisory
systemILO as external
point of reference for private compliance
initatives
Delegation
The degree to which “third parties have been granted authority to
implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and
(possibly) to make further rules.”
Delegation
E&S Staff Independence
IOs decide on sanctions
Some 3rd party monitoring
Monitors only report findings
Internal oversight office
(CAO) exists
Does not rule on the substance of
complaints
IFC Client business IFC
Workers
Empl
oym
ent
rela
tions
hip
Commercial contract
Spaces for power
ObligationPrecise compliance
obligations depend on negotiation between IFC and client, hence obligation is not legal
but a question of power and interests.
Workers excluded from that negotiation, although limited
consultation undertaken in some
cases
PrecisionMissing international institutional context means that FoA & CB rights are whatever
regulators say they are. Workers can influence
that definition in individual cases, but
IFC privileging of national law means that PS system adds little to the picture
DelegationEnforcement of PS
regulation is almost entirely non-delegated.
Complaints of violations are more
likely to be entertained if workers have some leverage over IFC via
political and campaigning action