God in exil, 03 IAM Fichte Schelling Hegel, by fabro

7/27/2019 God in exil, 03 IAM Fichte Schelling Hegel, by fabro

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2Chiaroscuro of the Atheism Controversy( Atheism usstreit") (Forberg-Fichte

The charge of atheism levelled by J acobi against Lessing and thereduction of Spinozism to atheism remained a private controversybetween Jacobi and Mendelssohn; but the case of Fichte was toburst fortlli into the external fornm and become a public scandal: tbe hlstorical details are well-lcnown,' and we shall here limit ourselves to tbestrictly theoretical dimension of the controversy. We contend that it is ofcrucial significance in our research, as showing tbe onward march of theprinciple of immanentism as it batters down, like a great juggernaut, tbefragile props of rationalistic and romantic theology. The fact that subsequently Jacobi was likewise, as we shall see, to take a direct part in thecontroversy and back up the atbeism charge 2 made by tbe politicalauthorities, albeit with great restraint and sincere admiration for Fichtethe man, confirms our suspicion tbat tbere was an inevitable "rhythm"in operation in modern philosophy, even tbough its protagonists foughtwitb all their power not to be caught up in it. Therefore, it is difficul toexaggerate tbe importance, in the public and cultural life of Germanyand later in tbe whole of European thought, of thls controversy whlchbegan to transfer onto the theoretical piane as well the message ofabsolute freedom proc aimed by the cogito and actualized by the 1789revolution: tbe most typical docmnents of the Atheismusstreit date from

1 Cf. J. H. Fichte, J G. Fichte s Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel, VoI. I(Sulzbach, 1830), pp. 350ff.; H. Lindan, Die Schriften zu Fichte s t h e i s m u s ~Streit (Munich, 1912); F. Medicus, "Fichtes Leben," as "Introduction" (Ein-leitung) to his edition of Fichte, VoI. I, (Leipzig, 1908), pp. ll1ff.;_W. Lutgert,Die Religion des deutschen ldealismus und ihr Ende, VoI. I (Giitersloh, 1923),especiaIly pp. 47f.; W. Steinbeck, Das Bild des Menschen in der Philosophie J G.Fichtes (Munich, 1938); K. Leese, Die Religionskrisis des Abendlandes und diereligiOse Lage der Gegenwart (Hamburg, 1948), especiaHy pp. 55ff.; E. Hirsch,Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, VoI. IV (Giitersloh, 1952), pp.337ft., where the author synthesizes the results of his pr.eceding monographs.

2 Especia11y n tbe Brief an Fichte of March 1799 (Jacobi, Werke, VoI. liI[Leipzig, 1816], pp. 3ff 9ff.).516

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Chiaroscuro 01 the Atheism Controversy Forberg-Fichte) 5 71798,' but Fichte had already by that date studied and welcomed theideas of the revolution and had laid tbe basis for bis own monisticmoralistic transformation of Kantianism.As ear y as 1790, Fichte's tbought is moving in tbe direction of thatsyntbesis of Spinozism and Kantianism that will constitute the centraiaxis of idealist speculation: 4 but it is no easy matter to effect an analytical diagnosis of tbis process because it presents, often pushed to a stateof drastic tension, the paradox of the most fervid and intense religiousfeeling combined witb the most explicit declaration of the dissolution ofGod into tbe active reality of hmnan freedom and action. In tbis tensionwe find tbe key to tbe innermost and crucial significance of Fichteanspeculation, as distinct from other subsequent idealist thought: the tension between the Spinozan cosmic infinite, wbich here becomes tbe infinite realm of the values of human action and history, and the assertionof Kantian freedom, which is the new landfall whereon man can safelyplant his feet, the beachhead here destined not to crumble beneath himbut to hur him forward witb the impetus of a youthful G1olmnbus,certain that there can no longer be any turning back. Not only Fichte'stypical y forceful and originai style but also his insistence on those fewbut crucial elements of speculative reflection, and hls very vagueness intbe matter of terms and even of basic concepts, combined witb histitanic wil to identify thought with action, speculative reflection withpolitical campaigning, conspire to make his work tbe flash-point of thewhole of modern idealism and to give his themes an aura of topicalityevery time that the question is posed concerning tbe quintessence ofmodern immanentismoFichte's atheism controversy has the further merit and interest ofhaving demonstrated the priority of tbe metaphysical element or assumption witbin idealism over the epistemological element and, at thesame time, the impossibility of bringing this assumption to ils termbecause of the immanentist prejudice, the constitutive priority of mindover being, as we shal be pointing out.The same controversy demonstrates furtber (and it is of capital importance for our purposes to note tbis most carefully) the collision inFichte, as later in Schelling and Regel, of the Brunonian-Spinozan prin-

a Cf. tbe list given by Fr. Meyer, Eine F i c h t e ~ S a m m l u n g (Leipzig, 1921),numbers 3 0 ~ 8 8 pp. 8fI.4 "Before 1790, when be was moved to embrace the Kantian philosopby,Fichte's philosophical stance was that of fatalism with a strong admixture ofSpinozism. He conceived of God as an eternally necessary being that thinks tbeworld and thereby posits it as it is, n virtue of an eternai necessity Tbequintessence of the Spinozan concept of the AH that is God recurs in Ficbte insomewhat intellectualized and spiritualized fonn (E. Hirsch, op. cit., Val. IV,p. 340).


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518 DISINTE GRATION,-OF IDEALISM INT ATHEISMciple of substance (the demand for tbe immediate presence of the All,for the resolution of tbe many and the different into the One and tbeSame), with the Kantian principle of active freedom which was supposed to transfigure tbat All and that Same or ratber to sublimate it as aprocess of itself which is at once act of itself and of tbe other. And hereagain tbere will be manifest the mutually nuIlifying effect of the twoopposing principles, the Spinozan principle tending to nullify tbeKantian- ane n order to enclose the truth in the l Ku 7rUV and theKantian principle, incapable, even in its transfiguration into tbe absolnteand creative Monad, of abandoning that area of generic human awareness, the human mind which it expresses in its essence and in itsfunction.

Thus there was in Fichte a combination of the atheistic panentheisticprinciple proper to Spinozism and the personalist principle derived fromtbe a priori of that practical reason which in Kant was supposed ratherto strengthen and consolidate the affirmation of transcendence. As hasalready been pointed out, tbe a priori of the Kantian practicai reasonas pure "ought" Sollen) is no Iess intrinsically and deliberately atheisticthan the theoretical l h denke: the reconciliation attempted by Kantbetween virtue-freedom and the bliss of an uItramundane immortality viathe justice and omnipotence of God implies a whole series of synthesesor schemata taken from tbe empiricai sphere of pious desires and wishespia desideria) which, far from jibing with tbe basic principle, thepracticai a priori, dissolve and fragment irreparably at the fust contactwitb that principle. And tbis totai fragmentation of the reconciliationis precisely what Fichte effected, thus exposing hlmself to a dual chargeof atheism, as Spinozan and as Kantian.The pretext tbat sparked the charge was an article by Fichte's coI[eagne, Forberg, conceming the "evolution of tbe concept of religion".This essay, entirely Kantian in its inspiration, had proceeded to voidreligion (God, tbe souI, tbe Iife to come) of al content and reduce it toa practicai belief in tbe morai govemment of tbe world or in its rationality; or, in other words, a living faith in the kingdom of God that willcome upon eartb. 5 This amounts virtually to a secularized millenarianism aIready proclaimed by Lessing and to be more explicitly developedin the sequel by Schelling and Hege . There can be no doubt, addsForberg, as to what is meant by a "moral government of the world"moralische Weltregierung): when tbings are occurring in the world in

5 "Religion is nothing but a practical belie in a moral-wo;Zd government,' or,to express tbe same notion in oue specific sanctified language, a living faith inthe ~ i n g o m 1 od - tha will come upon earth" (Forberg, Entwicklung desBegrifJs der Religion, ed. Lindau, op. cit., p. 37; also: Fichtes Werke, ed. Medicus,VoI. III, p. 137).

Chiaroscuro 1 the Atheism Controversy (Forberg-Fichte) 519such a way as to guarantee the final triumph of tbe good, tben there is amoral govemment of the world. If, on the other hand, virtue and viceare matters of total indifference so far as man's fate is concemed, thentbere is no moral govemmentof the world. There is here highlighted andposited at the center of tbe new bent of rnind tbe concept of man as"task" Aufgabe), which replaced, n virtue of the principle of immanentism, the notion of man as essence or content, typical of Platonic orcreationist conceptions. The principle that underwrites this "task", theexalted spirit tbat govems the world in accord with the morallaws, is tbedeity, and Forberg hastens lo assert that this is the only concept of Godof which religion has any need, or rather in tenns of which religion itselfbecomes possible in the first pIace. Thus all metaphysical notions ofGod as most real, infinite, absolutely necessary Being 6 are antomaticallycalled in questiono Notewortby is the substitution of the abstract deityGottheit) for tbe concrete God; this is a patent indication of thechange of course in tbe handling of the whole God-problem.Forberg makes short work of tbe problem of religion: i t is possible tobe religious eitber in polytbeism or in monotbeism, since botb are simplyantithetical conceptions, and thus religion as such is of no importance.When it is admitted, continues the Kantian Forberg, tbat morality aloneis the mIe of tbe govemment of tbe world, t becomes a matter of totalindifference whether tbe constitution of tbe world be thought of asmonarchical or aristocratic; and there wouId be no objection to thoseultramundane men whom tbe ancients conceived of as being gods, provided only they had acted morally. Thus in order to have a religiont suffices to admit that tbere exists a moral govemment of tbe worldand a deity goveming tbe world in accord witb morai laws: anyonebelieving this has a religion. But now tbere arises tbe question: onwhat is this belief founded?" worauf grundet sich dieser Glaube?)Forberg points to three sources of our convictions in this matter: experience, specuhition and conscience Erfahrung, Spekulation, Gewissen).

We Ieam tbat tbere does exist a moral govemment of tbe world-i.e.,we see with our own eyes in our experience that good does triumph intbe end and evil does fonnder. But anyone who seeks the deity outsideof hlmself in the fiux of things, will never find tbat deity. He will encounter on all sides tbe "works of the devii" Werke des Teufels) andonly rarely, and always timidly and doubtfully at tbat, will he beable losay: "Here is tbe finger of God" hier ist Gottes Finger).SpecuIation seems, or is held by some, to have better chances ofsuccess in proving tbe existence of God: it is considered capable ofaffording a convincing proof otthe existence of a moralgovemorof the

, 6 Forberg, op. ct. ed. Lindau, pp. 37ff.; ed. Medicus III, p. 137.


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52 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMworld. Forberg refers to the ontological proof which c1aims to concludefrom the very concept of tbe most perfect Being to his existence; to theproof from contingency which presupposes something absolutely necessary; and to the praof from the arder observable in tbe universe, whichwould not be possible in tbe absence of an ordering principle. But ali ofthese proofs, c1aims Forberg, faII short of the mark. The concept of themost perfect Being as such does not contain (and therefore does notprove) tbe existence of such a Being, inasmuch as being, Le. existence,is a de facto datum, not a quality or perfection. This is tbe famousKantian critique which has a certain similarity (though an equivocaione) witb St. Thomas' no less famous critique of tbe ontological proofof St. Anselm. 7Nor wiII speculation have any better luck, continues Forberg, with thepraof from contingency of the world) , which is c1aimed to presupposeand prove the existence of the necessary Being. Far what, in fact, is thecontingent das Zufiillige)? Is it to be understood as that which can betbought of as not being, i.e., not existing? In that case, there is noconcept of an absolutely necessary Being within the entire range of thehuman nnderstanding, far nothing can be found which it is impossibleto think of as not existing Is the contingent, then, to be understood asthat which has not always existed, which has begun at some point toexist, and which consequentJy presupposes a cause tbat has given itexistence? But, in that case, why was it that this cause which, as absoIntely necessary, musI have always existed, did not give existence to thecontingent sooner? Was it because it could not? In hat case, what waspreventing it? Or was it because it did not choose to do so? In that case,what made it change its mind later on? The whole drift of these questions is gradualiy transforming the absolutely necessary Being intosomething contingent. The cIear boundaries between tbe necessary andthe contingent are being effaced.FinaIIy, there is the proof drawn from tbe order of tbe universe: sucharder is impossible in tbe absence of an ardering principle. The conceptof arder is drawn from our own human understanding and it has nobeen proven tbat the Iimits of our knowing are likewise tbe limits of thepossible; nor has it been proven that tbe arder of tbe universe is soevident as to permit any certain conclusion from it to tbe existence of adeity. Are we here arguing from tbe arder observable in the physicalworId? WeII in that case, it must be said that a skilIed architect is not bythat very fact a moral governor, nor is a first c1ass craftsman the samething as a godi Or are we arguing from the arder observable in the moral

7 Cf. St. Thomas, S.T., I, q. Il, a. 2 and Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernuntt,Tranz. Logik, II Abt.. TI Buch. 3. Abschn. 34. A 584ff., B 612ff.

Chiaroscuro oj the Atheism Controversy (Forberg-Fichte) 521world? Then we are in stilI more perilous case, far the existence of evilwould compel us to conclude to tbe existence of an evil principle just ascogentJy as tbe existence of good would compel us to conclude. to theexistence of the good principle Il would indeed be a bizarre procedureto conclude from a perverse world to tbe existence of a holy God. Andso the deity is just as inaccessible to speculation as to experience.But we stilI have one method open to us and it seems at last to be tberight one: conscience. Religion, c1aims Forberg, is simply and solely thefruit of a "good heart", and Forberg recalis tbe words of the Gospel:"B1essed are the pure in hearl, far they shaII see God." 8 But why andhow does religion emerge in the heart of a moraliy good human beingand ouly in such a one? Here we are at the very heart of Forberg'stheory: religion takes its origin solely and simply from tbe desire or theirm conviction of tbe pious and good heart that good can and shouldgetthe upper hand aver evil in the universe" Faith in the decline and defeatof good in this world, faith in the kingdom and reign of Satan on earth,would be a hellish religion. And here Forberg presents a kind of blueprint far the idealistic religion without God, a religion simply of the"man of good hear ." 1 Il would consist in aiming at an accord of ali

men on aII points of moral judgment so as to bring about the advent ofthe "golden age far good minds" das goldne Zeitalter filr Kopfe .ClearIy, admits Forberg, this "reign of trutb" Reich der Wahrheit)represents an ideai that can never be completely realized: tbe assignment, therelore, is to set ali one's forces and powers against errar and tospread truth everywhere, Le., to behave as i als ob) errar could neverdie out entirely nor the absolute reign of truth ever come to passo Themen of good heart, banded together far the arduous struggle on behalfof truth and goodness against evil and errar, constitute the "church"Kirche) which is the true "Communion of Saints on earth" die

Gemeinde der Heiligen auf Erden).Forberg presents several precepts of tbe moral code that would govcern tbis "religion without God": to do good without wearying; to believein virtue as wiuning aut in the end; to hope manfuIIy that right willtriumph aver injustice and the cause of good aver that of evil; to workwhile tbe daylight lasts, missing no occasion lo kindle and plant firmlyaloft the torch of good according to your powers, ever mindful that afteryou may come a long night in which no one will desire or be able to willtbe good, and tbat the torch you have Iighted will be tbe only star of

8 Matt. S 8.9 Religion arises solely and simply frem the wish tha good might gel theupper hand ver eviI n the world" (Lindau, p. 42; Medicus III, p. 138 .lO We are here summarizing Forberg's vigorous peroration: Lindau, pp. 42-53;Medicus III, pp. 140-147.


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522 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMhope for "the upright m the Iand" die Redlichen im Lande); 11 to dowhat can to ensure thar there will be more goodness aud lucidityaud enIightenment and great-heartedness aud uprightness aud peace audjustce, so that your end Ausgang) may find you at peace; to believethat no tiniest or most msignificant good act or resolution of yours willgo to waste; to believe that the kmgdom of God, the reign of truth andright will come on earth aud to commit yourself unreservediy to bring itto passo

Here we have to do with a religion that is identified with duty Pfiicht) ,the duty not of believing that there exists a God who is moral governorof the universe, but rather simply of acting as i one believed this Pflichtzu handeln als ob man es glaubte). The thesm-atheism controversyhenceforth makes sense only to the man who still has confidence mspeculation.Forberg ends his essay with a brief catechism of this new religion ofthe atheist. This list of questions and answers on certain "msidiousquestions" sheds light on Forberg's entire theoretical position which isanythng but transcendentalist: ,.Q: Is there a God?-A: That is and always wII be uncertain (it isbut a conundrnm of the speculative sphere).Q: May a man believe m God?-A: No, for that would involve anIIicit transfer to the practical sphere of faith of au object of the theoretical sphere.Q Is religion a conviction of the mtellect or a precept of the

wII?-A: A precept of the will. Were l a conviction of the intellect, itwould be superstition.Q: How wII the religious mau act?-A: He wII never weary ofpromoting the cause of truth and goodness m the worId.Q: Can any and every man have religion?-A: Of course, just as auyaud every man can act in accord with conscience. Unbelief (despair ofthe cause of goodness without snfficient reason) is a lack of conscience.Q: How many articIes of faith are there in religion?-A: Two: faithm the immortality of virtue and faith in the kingdom of God on earth.Q: Is uprightness Rechtschaffenheit) possible m the absence of reli

?ion?-:-A: No, it would be an uprightness in the absence of any mterestm upnghtness, ]ust as religion without uprightness would not be religionbemg an mterest in uprightness without uprightness 'IL-The expression recal1s that -most famous of pietistic expressions: Die Stillem Lande (the quiet hush in the land , to which Kierkegaard likewise oftenalludes.

2 Forberg, IDc ~ i t . LincIau, 54ff.; Medicus ID, pp. 147ft Forberg is reportedto have confessed, m maturer years, that the questions were written in a spirit ofyouthful waggery ( in jugendlichem Mutwillen -Medicus I, p. 112).

Chiaroscuro oj the Atheism Controversy .(Forberg-Fichte) 523Q: Can a man be upright without believing m God?-A: Yes, because here it is merely a case of theoretical faith (as has been said

aIready above).Q: Can an atheist have religion?-A: Certaiuly. Of a virtuous atheistit can be said that he is recognizmg with his heart that God he denieswith his lips: thus practical faith and theoretical unbelief can very well

coexist.Q: In what relation does religion stand to virtue?-A: In the relationship of the part to the whole.Q: Can religion be learned?-A: Yes, like the other virlues: by the

practice of il.Q: s religion an aid to virtue?-A: Not to virtue as such but to thedisplay of virtueor t the phenomenon Erscheinung) of the virtuouscharacter.Q: Is religion a deterrent to vice?-A: True religion carmot be,although superstition may be. The fact that a person fears the deity is asign that that person has not yet found him. The bliss of virtue lies infinding a deity and the misery of vice in not findmg any deity.Q: WII the Kingdom of God as the reign of truth aud justice on earthone day come to pass?-A: That is uncertain and, if we base ourestimate on the experience of the past, the balance is m favor ofimprobability.Q: Could the kmgdom of Satan come instead of the kingdom of

God?-A: This likewise is just as uncertam.Q: Would the religion of the Satanist not then be just as well foundedas that of the good man on this earth?-A: So far as the littie we cangather from speculation is concerned, the one is no better founded thanthe other.Q: Is religion in any sense a worship of the deity?-A: In no sense.There can be no duty toward a bemg whose existence is and always willbe uncertain: auyone who would worship such a being is superstitious.Q Is the notion of religion expounded in this theory the true audexact notion?-Beyond a shadow of a doubt, l we are speaking of aconcept of religion as something rationaI and not as something irrational, on the order of an mcomprehensible mystery.And the final question: Is not this notion of a practicaI faith rather apointless concept than a serious philosophical concept?-The reply tothis "insidious" question Forberg says he is leaving gIadIy to the qualified reader, and with t the judgment as to whether the author of theessay has been simply playng with the reader ali alongThis essay, to which historians of thought may not have devoted thethorough study that is its due, insofar as its detailed content and main


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524 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMsources are conceroed, is indisputably of major theoretical and historicalinterest, despite its apparently rather tenuous speculative contento tsucceeds in summarizing quite adequately the main converging strearnsof modero atheism from Spinoza to Kant. It integrates into tms summary a vigorous restatement of Bayle's thesis on the relation betweenvirtue and atheism and sketches the blueprint of religion without God,i.e., that pure religion of the moral ideai, so cherished by moderolaicism.Forberg's atheism remained anchored to a basically skeptical anddecidedly pragmatic Kantianism. It anticipated by a century Vaihinger'sfamous as if theory.13Forberg's essay left Fichte in a state of puzzled and hesitant embarrassment and he resolved to preface his colleague's essay with an articleof ms own, with the carefully chosen title: On the Basis o Our Beliejin a Divine Government o the World . The aim of this article was toshow the points of agreement between mmself and Forberg, while at thesame time putting the entire problem on a more integrai and coherentfooting. Fichte likewise repudiated any claim that the existence of Godwas susceptible of proof (Beweis), whether by way of experience or byway of speculative deduction,'4 and asserted that the only certainty that

13 Cf. A. Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als ob (Leipzig, 1913 7-S , wberebe writes on the relation of Forberg to Kant: "Non e of the well-nigh innumerablecontemporary and subsequent Kant scholars had such a good basie grasp ofKant's ultimate purpose in bis philosophy of religion. This man [Forberg], withbis incisive understanding and bis intellectual courage, went to the heart of thematter" p. 736f. . Oue Fichte commentator, however, disagrees: "The KantForberg theory of the


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526 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMhas a purpose, that of "positing itself via itself". M y ego and my necessary purpose, that is what constitutes the world of the suprasensible; thisis the mainspring of Fichte's assertion that the constitutive of ali certainty is faith rather than logical deduction. Tbis is the proper arder ofprocedure: not starting from the possibility to arrive at the reality butvice versa. The proper phrasing is no : I ought, therefore I can; bu trather I can, therefore I oughl. The first and most i ediate principle isthat I ought and what I ought; this stands in no need of further explanation or justification, it is known as such and is tme as such; it is neithergrounded in nor determined by any other tmth; on the contrary, everyother tmth is gronnded in il. This is the world of moral action Moral-itiit), the content and purpose of freedom, to wbich we are borne by thetranscendental point of view.

The "world" Welt) is no longer being seen from the outside as areality that is simply given, set over against the mind and in a sensedoing violence to it; it is being seen from the inside as a reality arisingfrom that interior and in fnnction of our freedom: tbis is tha t realityconcerning which no man can doubt without thereby stifting and eliminating bis very self Tbis is the unifying and harmonizing focus ofthought and w ll in my essence; it is the node wherein I feel myself freeand open to the infinite, free in my phenomenal manifestations andcapable myself of setting my own limits via my will. Fai th is this primordia conviction of freedom, the persuasion that our own moral determination proceeds from our interior moral stampo And Fichte concludeswith Forberg: faith is the constitutive eiement of ali certitude.'6 Fromthe transcendental point of view of freedom, therefore, our world is themateria rendered sensible by our duty: tbis is the tme reality of things,the true eiement Grundstoff) of every phenomenon. The constraintwherewith faith binds us to the reality of such a phenomenon is a moralconstraint, the oniy constraint possibie for a free being. At this point,Fichte seems to be approaching Jacobi's concept of reveiation: the pr incipie of this faith in the reality of the sensibie world considered as theresult of a morai arder of the worid can weli be calied "revelation"Offenbarung). Our duty is what is reveaied in il.

16 "The conviction of our morai determination thus proceeds as such from amoraI frame of mind and disposition and is faith; and to tbis extent it is rightto say that the element of alI certainty is faith (Fichte, Ueber den Grund unseresGlaubens an eine gottliche Weltregierung, Lindau, p. 28; Medicus III, p. 126 . Aremark which seems obvious at fust reading but does not penetrate to the deeperlevel of the problem is that of Fischer: The difference between him and Forbergthe difference between a sceptical atheism and a religious pantheism (K.FIscher, J G. Fichte und seine Vorgiinger [Heidelberg, 18992], p. 285 . Foracobi and indeed for every theist, pantheism is in any event at rock bottomsimply atheism.

Chiaroscuro 01 the Atheism Controversy (Forberg-Fichte) 527Bnt then Fichte forthwith returns to the terminology of Forberg,going indeed even farther and using the semanticaliy stili vagner term,"the divine" das Gottliche) instead of Forberg's "the deity" die Gott-

heit . The divine that we accept is this moral order. t is bnilt np via theaetnation of justice. Tbis is the only profession of faith possible: tofulfili giadiy and simply what duty prescribes from case to case, withontdonbts or scrupies abont the consequences. Thereby the divine becomesliving and rea in us: every one of onr acts is accomplished on thefoundation of the divine, and only in it can ali the consequences of thesesame acts be preserved.'7 Tme atheism, genuine unbelief and godiessness, protests Fichte in self -justification, lies in mulling unduly aver theconsequences of our actions, in refnsing to obey the voiee of our ownconscience until we know we are betting on a sure thing, in putting ourown counsel above the connsel of God, in making ourseives God. Anyman willing to do evil that good may come of it is a godless manoNotbing good can come of evii in a moral government of the world, andouly the man who doubts the latter could for an instant believe theformer.' No man ought to lie, even to prevent the whole world fromgoing to pieces.

Fichte seems to us to develop loyaliy and consistently his own transcendenta activism in terms of tbis concept of faith which is the fulcmmof the mind's determination of the real. This faith is a derivative faithbnt it is faith in the fullest and truest sense of the word. God is simplythat very moral arder, vital and operative: we need no other God norwouid we even be in a position to comprehend him. There is no basis inreason for casting off that morai order: as soon as a man retires intobimself, this moral order is that absoiuteiy primary principle of ali objeetive knowledge, even as freedom and the moral determination of eachindividuaI is the absointeiy primary principle of ali subjeetive certitude.

17 'This is the true faith; tbis morai order is tbe divine tbat we accept. It isbullt up by tbe actuation of justice. This is tbe only possible profession of faith:gladly and ingenuously to fulfi11 on every occasion what duty dictates, withoutdoubts or scruples about tbe consequences. Thereby does tbe divine of whichwe have spoken become vital and real for us; every one of our acts is accom-plished on tbe presupposition of this divine reality and alI tbe consequences ofthese same acts are preserved in it alone (Ueber den Grund Lindau, pp.3lf.; Medicu, I I I p. 129).

18 "Rea atbeism, outright unhelief and godlessness consists in mulling undulyover tbe consequences of our actions, refusing to ohey tbe voice of onr consciencenntil we helieve we can espy a happy issue, and thus setting onr own counselahove tbe counsel of God and making ourselves God. The man who is willingto do eviI tbat good may come of it is a godless mano In a moraI govemmentof tbe world, good can never follow out of eviI, and as surely as you reaIly heIievein that moraI govemment, you will find it impossihle to believe that good evercouId follow from evil (ibid., Lindan, p. 32; Medicus m p. 129).


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528 DISINTEGRA TION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMEvery subsequent objective cognition must be grounded in and determined by that primary principle, but it cannot itself be determined byanything else because there is nothing more basic than it.

t this point, Fichte makes an extremely important specificationwhich expo,es the rea significance of all his speculations up to thlspoint: the moral order of the world, of which he is speaking, cannot, hesays, be conceived in the shape of a particular being ein besonderesWesen),19 endowed with personality and consciousness; these are actually predicates and attributes taken from our finite empirical life andwould therefore transform God into something finite, modelled on usmen, and thus God would no longer be God. He is in fact a God beyondany concept or comprehension: we are finite and the finite cannot conceive of the Infinite nor yet comprehend it. The immediately given is andremains, consequently, the immediate and unshakeable certitude: if thiswere to depend on concepts, it would become wavering and uncertainfar the concept of God is impossible and full of contradiction.

In the wake of such premises, anyone would expect a profession ofagnosticism much more radical than that of Forberg. On the contrary,Fichte presents us with an unreservediy theistic manifesto, perhaps in aneffort to soothe those minds exacerbated by the expressions of Forbergor, better still, to clarify his own new transcendenta concept of God. Ilwould, he writes, be a misunderstanding to say that it is doubtfulwhether there is a God or not: It is not in the least doubtful; it is themost certain fact of ali; indeed, it is the ground of ali other certitude,the single absolutely valid objective fact, that there is a moral arderof the universe, that every rational individuai has been assigned his specific piace in this arder and has had his task measured for him, that eachand every element of his destiny which is not caused by his own behavioris the result of this pian; that apart from it, not a hair falls from his headnor, within the sphere of infiuence of that pian, a single sparrow fallsfrom the roof." 20 Y et, Fichte forthwith retuffis to hls previous insistence that the "concept of God as a particular substance is impossible and contradictory" far anyone who allows himself a moment'sreflection. 21

19 In the conclusion God is identified with the divine (ibid., Lindau, p 31;Medicus III, p. 129).20Ibid., Lindau, pp. 34f.; Medicus III, p. 131. The la8t phrase is an allusionto the Gospel (Luke 21, 18). Cf. above Forberg's diametrically opposed statements (pp. 5221.).21Ibid. Lindau, p. 35; Medicus III, p. 132. The article ends with two quitesignificant quotations from the poetry of Goethe and Schiller. Thus Fichte dissociates himself not only from the Spinozan conception but from the Christianas well: There is no personality, no sell-awareness, apart fram that 01 a finiteindividuaI Ego (E. Hirsch, op. cit., VoI. IV, p. 352 .

Chiaroscuro 01 the Atheisin Controversy (Forberg.;.Fichte) 529Compared with Forberg's forthright, univocal article, entirely devoidof ali dia ectical or transcendenta l subtleties, Fichte' s essay may beconsidered a faithful self -portrait and one of the most significant documents of hls genius at one of the most crucia moments in the culturaland political evolution of the German mind. Nothing more vigorous canbe imagined than the assertion of theism contained in tbis essay; yetnothing vaguer or more problematic can be imagined than the content ofthis theistic manifesto in which God is reduced to the laws or arderinherent and immanent in the practica reason. Notbing more decisivelyanti-Spinozan can be imagined than Fichte's proclamation of humanfreedom; yet nothing more deterministic can be imagined than the strictbonds of the law of this freedom as an interpolation into the universalarder whlch is valid in se and per se. Hence the controversy that eruptedalmost at once.The sequel to the publication of these essays is well-known: their authors were charged with atheism, the government confiscated the essaysthemselves and Fichte was dismissed from the University of Jena. ButFichte was not the man to bow meekly to disgrace, all the more so sincehe seems to have been persuaded that he had been the victim of aglaring error of fact, that his philosophy was not in fact atheistic butthat, on the contrary, it was furnishing religion with the only valid andcogent foundation possible, by removing it from the competency ofphilosophy and entrusting it to faith. The polemical writings 22 that followed do not, however, present anything substantially new, if we abstract from the bitter thrust of the peroration, which generates more heatthan light. These writings simply restate Fichte's main contentions. eshall here highlight only the main ones.1. The distinction of the theoretica sphere from the practica one;the former has as its object the sensible sphere of the finite; the latterhas as its object the suprasensible sphere of mora feeling sittlichesGefilhl), constituting the primary element, the absolutely immediate in

human experience. Morality and religion are absolutely identica : bothare expressive of a confrontation of the suprasensible and a seizure of it,22 Chief among these are the Appelation an das Publikum of 1799 and Rilckerinnerungen, Antworten Fragen, written that same year but not edited andpublished until 1845 in the complete edition of Fichte's works. Forberg for hispart replied at length to the charge of atheism levelled against bim with bisFriedrich Cari Forbergs Apologie seines angeblichen Atheismus (Gotha, 1799 ,a volume of 181 pages; cf. H. Vaihinger, op. cit., pp. 740ff., for a summary-ofthe principal points Forberg makes in this publication: he sustains point by pointhis previous position and especially his contention that the problem of God isextraneous to philosophy which is consequently intrinsically atheistic and thatthe essence of religion is faith actualized in the ought . Every fonn of naturaltheology comes down in the final analysis to mere anthropomorphism.


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530 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMthe former by action, the latter by faith. 23 There is a reiteration of theabsolute priority, especially in the noetic sense, of the suprasensible overthe sensible: far from being necessarily uncertain, the suprasensible isthe only thing that is certain and every other thing is certain only be-cause of it; far from the certainty of the suprasensible necessarily de-pending on the certainty of the sensible world, l is rather the theoreticalnecessity that follows from the necessity of the suprasensible, so as tomaintain this sensible world in existence and to sustain the mora obliga-tion of giving to that sensible world the respect due it as a means andmedium. The suprasensible world is our birthplace and our only solidfoundation: the sensible world is but a reflection (Widerschein) of thesuprasensible.2. I hold, writes Fichte, "that the relation of the deity to us, asmoral beings, is the inunediately given; a particular being of thls deitycomes to be conceived solely as a result of our finite imagining and inthls being lies nothing else than simply those immediately given rela-tions, .which are merely collated in the unity of the concept." 24 Hecharges hls opponents with insisting that these relations of the deity tous are supposed to derive and be deduced from a lmowledge of theessence of God in s and per se, lmown as independent of these rela-tions. And Fichte adduces a somewhat unexpected (but quite signifi-cant) example: he says that he himseif professes to know what heat andcold is inasmuch as he experiences hot and cold, whereas his opponentsapparently lmow heat and cold without once in their entire lifetimehaving had any sensation of this sort; they trust entirely and exclusivelyto the power of their syllogisms. And Fichte's own incapacity to concoctsyllogisms of this sort is what they call hls atheism3. Fichte readily admits that he has denied that God can be calledSubstance. He is also perfectly willing to concede that he has insistedthat God's existence cannot be proven from sensible things, that thisexistence cannot be designated as "being". But all this, he claims, hasbeen dane solely in order to preclude anthropomorphism and to safe-gnard the transcendence of God. Actually it wonld be contradictory locall God "substance": substance necessarily signifies an essence thatexists sensibly in space and time, and this is certainly inappropriate toassert of God. For the same reason, Fichte has denied that there can beproven from sensible things the existence of a God clothed in sensible

23 Cf. Appellation n das Publikum, Lindau, p. 112; Medicus III, p. 168f. Inthe Rilckerinnerungen, Antworten, Fragen 32), however, Fichte is at painsto draw a distinction between morality and religion, asserting that religious faithis linked to morai conscience and fulfills it (Undau, pp. 315ft'.; Medicus liI p.228).

4 Appellation n das Publikum, Lindau, p. 119; Medicus ID, p. 174.

Chiaroscuro of the Atheism Controversy Forberg-Fichte) 53qualities and service as principle and fountain of bliss and sensiblesatisfactions far man (eudaemonism). 5 But a God who is supposed loserve sense desires is a despicable being; any man of stature would beashamed to fullill such an office; such a God would be an evil being,sustaining and perpetuating human perdition and the debasement ofreason. Such a God is qnite simply the "Prince of thls world'',26 alreadyjudged and condemned long ago out of the mouth of truth. So Fichte'sopponents are the real atheists who have created perverse idols forthemselves.

My refusal to admit such idols in the placeof the true God, criesFichte-that is what they call atheism, that is what has triggered theirpersecution. And Fichte's style becomes stili more vehement: "Whatthey cali God is to me an idol. For me, God is a being entirely free of alisensibility and ali sensual admixture, to whom I therefore cannot evenascribe the attribute of existence, accessible to me only as a sensibleconcept. For me God is simply and solely the rnler of the snprasensibleworld. Their God I deny, and I wam all men of such a spawn of humancorruption; and this makes me in no sense an atheist but rather a de-fender of religion. My God they do not know nor are they capable ofrising to any concept of him. He is simply not there for them even todeny and in this sense they are not atheists." 74. Fichte writes one pungent sentence that virtually SUfiS up hls en-tire system: In the matter of true religion, its sole purpose and aim is towrest from man ali supports of his laziness and all pretexts he might useto whitewash hls own viciousness, to stop up ali access to any sources offalse consolation and to leave both man's understanding and his heartbut one bulwark, that of pnre duty and faith in . he suprasensibleworld." 28 Fichte then proceeds to push Kant's idealization of space andtime to ils ultimate metaphysical consequence and decIare himseif to bedenying the reality of ali that is temporal and transitory in order thebetter to reinstate the etemal and the immutable: and so Fichle finds itstrange that the charge of a denial of God shouId be levelled against thlsphllosophy which rather denies the existence of the world in the sense in

25 He alludes to the puny philosophy of his opponents, whose root5 go back torationalism Popularphilosophie); and he piles OD the insulting adjectives:". . . eudaemonic, superficial, belletristic, mealy-mouthed philosophy iMd.,Lindau, p. 130; Medicus III, p. 182. Cf. a18 Lindau, pp. 134f.; Medicus ID, pp.186f.).26This Biblical name for Satan John 12 31) is but one of Fichte's manyscriptural allusions in these essays.21 A Uttle later. Fichte writes: Our philosophy denies the existence of a s n ~suaI God who would be a mere pander Appellation Lindau, p. 131,Medicus III, p. 183).28 Ibid.


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53 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMwhlch that existence is asserted by dogmatismo And as far as Christianity is concerned, adds Fichte, it is not a philosophlcal system at all: 29 itaddresses itself not to speculation bnt to the mora sense of man andtherefore has the same aim and purpose as his own philosophy5. Fichte admits that it is no easy task to clarify and pinpoint thepoint of disagreement between the contending parties bnt he will nota low the controversy to turn upon an equivocation. Il is nothing butprattling nonsense, he observes disdainfully, to talk of a God of Fichte,of J acobi, of Spinoza and the like. Fichte, J acobi, Spinoza and the restare not identical with their philosophy. The philosopher has no God, norcan he have one: he has only a "concept of the concept" or the idea ofGod. God and religion exist only in life whereas tbe philosopher as suchis not the whole man but ouly that man in a state of abstraction; tbus itis impossible for a man to be only a philosopher. 30 This remark reminds one of the anti-Helegian polemic of Kierkegaard The cruciapoint therefore is to oppose to arid rationalism a "philosophy of life", avital philosophy but in a transcendental sense; and here the opposition isirreconcilable. Fichte insists on distinguishing the phllosophy of religionfrom religion itself in just the same way as he distinguishes philosophyfrom life. And so he finds the real point of disagreement witb his opponents in thls relation between thought and action, between philosophyand Iife: whereas they make cognition the principle of life, hls phllosophy, on the contrary, makes life, tbe vital system of feelings and aspiration, supreme and leaves to coguition merely tbe role of spectator. Thlssystem of feelings is therefore clear-cnt in the mind and contains animmediate awareness and coguition not dednced by argumentations andchains of reasoning.31 Fichte's position could be perfectly expressed inthe contradictory formula: it is tbe transcendent nature of feeling(Gefuhl) whlch serves as basis for the assertion of the existence and thetranscendence of the suprasensible and faith (Glaube) expresses theimmediate certainty of this.

The two points of view were absolutely irreconcilable. Fichte adrnir-29Ibid. Cf. also Rilckerinnerungen, Antworten, Fragen, 16, Lindau, p. 296f.;Medicus III, pp. 213 .SQ Ruckerinnerungen, Antworten, Fragen, 15, Lindau, p. 295; Medicus III,p. 212. Fichte is stili more explicit in a letter to Reinhold, dated ApriI 22, 1799:The attempt to identify a mentality and attitude n philosophy makes no sense

to me. Such a question as: Is philosophy as such atheistic or not?' is simply un-inteIIigible to me, O a par with the question: 'Is a triangle red or green, sweetor bitter?''' (1. G. Fichte s Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel, VoI. n pp.2731.).

31 The opposing systems make cognition the vita} principle Our philoso-phy, on the contrary, makes the vital system of feelings and aspiration supremeand aIlows cognition merely the role of spectator (Rilckerinnerungen, Ant-worten, Fragen, 20, Lindau, pp. 299f.; Medicus III, pp. 215f.).

I Chiaroscuro 01 the Atheism Controversy Forberg-Fichte) 533ingly cites 011 hls behalf the authority of Pastor Spalding, author of theessay entitled The Definition of Man (Bestimmung des Menschen,1748),32 a title soon to be appropriated by Fichte hlmself; of the courtchaplain Reinhard, who was also hls judge in thls scandal; and above allof Jacobi, for whom Fichte evinced the deepest respect and devotion,despite their differences in the area of pure theory, and whose strikingphrase about religious knowledge Fichte cites approvingly."Fichte's good faith in this whole controversy is attested not only byhls ardor but preeminently by his own notion of the method and contentof his own transcendenta philosophy: hence, his recourse to faitb(Glaube), not only as a new source of knowledge, but especially as aprimordial source of value calculated to break the clased circle of thefinite. J acobi had in fact proceeded in much the same way; and Fichtewas not without justifcation in invoking J acobi to whom we must nowagain return.

r--':'The Implicit Atheism of the Theory of KnowledgeJacobi's fust remark about Fichte's position concerns the obviouscontradictions into which he falls by positiolling the God-problem in tbefield of knowing, instead of leaving it, as did Kant, in the area of ignorance. Thus J acobi feels that Fichte himself is responsible for the chargeof atheism brought against him. J acobi agrees with Fichte t hat tbecharge is unfounded: transcendental philosophy is neither atheist northeist, inasmuch as it is reflection upon the finite. Indeed, were such aphllosophy to pretend to be theistic, it would by that very fact branditself as atheistic, inasmuch as Gad would become rea for the mind onlyinsofar as he was conditioned by "argumentative" philosophy, or inother words, insofar as God would be seized "in the act of not-existingas-such" (auf der That des 'an sich nicht Daseyns'). Jacobi is quite fum

on this point which involves fidelity to Kant and to the transcendentalmethod: he insists that no sane and honest man could possibly reproachtranscendental philosophy for knowing nothing of God, for it is universally admitted that God cannot be the object of knowledge but only offaith. A God who could be known would no longer be God.Going straight to the heart of the controversy, Jacobi centers Fichte's

32 Cf. H. Stephan, Spaldings Bestimmung des Menschen und Wert del Andacht,Studien zur Geschichte des neuern Protestantismus 1 (Giessen, 1908).33 A godly life leads to the awareness and perception of God (Jacobi, Ueberdie Lehre Spinozas; Fichte cites the 2nd ed., pp. 234ff.).34 . . . that God cannot be known but only believed. A God who could beconsciously known would not be God at alI (Letter of Jacobi to Fichte 1799,Preface; C W. VoI. III, p. 7).


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534 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMposition in tbe direct tradition of modern philosophy, remarking tbat itcombines the two main components of tbis philosophy, Spinozism andidealismo it is an idealist or "inverted" Spinozism (umgekehrte Spinozismus as compared with Enlightenrnent materialism, a syntbesis of materialism and idealism; and,so Jacobi dubs il "tbe King of tbe Jews ofspeculative reason . Jacobi goes on to adrnit freely that science , i.e. ,the pure philosophy of Fichte, is an interior action, productive of itsown object in tbe form of thoughts springing from tbe pritnordial formof the Ego, which is tbus tbe principle and analytical base of everyobject of knowledge. And this is tbe parting of tbe ways between Fichteand hitnself, specifies J acobi: whereas Fich te is set on proving tba t tbebasis for ali truth is to be found within tbe science of knowing, Jacobihimself aims al showing tbat this basis, i.e., trutb itself, is necessarilylocated outside the ambit of that science" 5 This is far J acobi the realpoint of tension, of identity and difference of opinion, between hitnselfand Fichte. Fichte's philosophy is a pure philosophy, i.e., an absolutelyimmanent philosophy, a true system of reason, wherein everything mustbe given solely in and by means of reason, in tbe Ego as such, in thispure "selfhood", and must be contained within il; hence tbe reasonalone must deduce everything from itself alone. Obviously Jacobi's critique is aiming straight for the heart witbont any detoursJacobi presents a masterly exposure of tbe new Fichtean method ofsheer operationalism and of tbe new "principle of active negation" asconstitutive act of tbe being of tbe mind; and he shows how theseprinciples elIected that breakaway, in tbe philosophy presented inFichte's "tbeories of knowledge" (Wissenschaftslehren) , from bothdualism and realism, and initiated that new intellectual Odyssey whichwas lo bring man, step by step, to tbe positive or constructive atbeism ofthe philosophy of our own century. Jacobi does not stop at the comparatively superficial level of the atbeism controversy as such nor does herefer explicitly to tbe works of Fichte that had been condemned. Helooks mnch deeper, going back to the systematic philosophy tbat Fichtehad been elaborating and expounding since 1790, in order to assessFichte's full responsibility. Fichle's philosophy is monistic from tbe outset: it is based on pure reason, whose act is a perceptual grasping(Vernehmen) which perceives or grasps only itself. We are tbereforedealing witb a "productive process" wherein reality is constituted in thereason via tbe reason. "This philosophizing of tbe pure reason must

85 And so we are both desirous that the science of knowing which is one andthe same in a sciences, the very universal som of the cognitional world-shallbe perfect. The only difference is that y ur reason for so desiring is that theground of all truth shall be c early shown to lie within the science of knowing,whereas mine is that this grouud be seen manifest1y to lie outside that science(ibid . Lindau, p. 165; Jacobi, C. W VoI. III, p. 17 .

Chiaroscuro oi the Atheism Controversy Forberg-Fichte) 535tberefore needs be a chemical process, whereby everything outside of tbepure reason is transmuled into nothing and the pure reason alone leftover, such a pure spirit tbat it cannot itself be in this rarified state butcan on y bring forth everything; but again it can elIect this production inso sheer a fashion tban tbe product likewise cannot be but on y becontemplated as present in tbe productive act of the mind: tbe wholeprocess and its content is a sheer act of an act (Tat-Tat). 36 Thus, inFichte's tbeory, cognition is indeed a production and a construction, butpredicted upon a previous destruction: in arde r for any being to become for us an object completely understood by us, we must in tboughldestroy and anuihilate it as objeet. as a reality subsisting in itself, inarder to transform it into something subjeclive, into a creation of ourown, into a sheer design, something thal resolves itself in our action(Handlung) at this present moment (jetzt) into a sheer manifestationand phenomenon of our creative itnagination. The consequence is inevitable: tbe human mind becomes tbe creator of tbe world (Weltschopfe,) and tbus the creator of itself. But it can be its own creator on y oncondition of annihilating itself in its own essence in order to come intobeing and to possess itself in the concept alone, in tbe concept of a sheerabsolute radical procession and ingression-out of nothing, towardnothing, far nothing, into nothing,7 an osci1lation (Pendel-Bewegung)having in tbe law of its own motion its own unconceptualizable andincomprehensible 1itnilation (eine unbegreifliehe Einschriinkung).We know already that for Jacobi philosophy as a science is selfenclosed and tbus intrinsically atheistic. Now Fichte has precisely shownthat philosophy is a science in itself inasmuch as it has as object tbemiud itself, the Ego. Thus tbe Ego is a science in itself, a self-containedscience, and it is the on y real knowledge there is; it knows itself andcontradict. ils own concept, that it does not of itself know or apprehendanything, etc. Thus the Ego is necessarily tbe principle of all the otbersciences and an infallible measuring-rod and solvent, witb which alithings can be resolved and dissolved into the Ego without leaving behindeven a corpus delieti, the non-Ego Philosophical reflection is accom-

Il Ibid., Lindau, p 167; Jacobi, op. cit., p 20.37 The relevant passage in Jacobi is extremely tight1y-packed and penetrating:Inasmuch as the philosophical understanding of the human mind positively cannot transcend its own production, that mind must become a world-creatoT andthe creator of its own self, in order to penetrate mto the realm of beings andconquer it by,the instrumentality of thought. Only to the extent to which it succeeds in so becoming a creator will it experience any progress in this conquest.But the mind can be its own creator only on the mandatory condition that itannihilate itself in its own essence nd being in order to arise again in the conceptalone and to possess itself in this concept of a sheer absolute radical processionand ingression, out of nothing, toward nothing, far nothing, into nothing. ibid.,Lindau, p. 168; Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 21f.).


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536 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMplished via a total abstraction whcreby every being is resolved intoknowing; and Jacobi speaks of a process of "progressive annihilation"progressive V ernichtung). But, asks J acobi, iu view of tbe fact that alIof this is nothing but a work or play ) of tbe imagination, how can atrue and real being be distiuguished from au imaginary oue, how canwaking life be distiuguished from dreams? He says that he has himselffollowed the apposite path, as we have already seen, i.e., the one whichposits God as being outside of man and of tbe world and as beingprimary object of rcason: In this sense, if you will, says Jacobi, he is"godless" Gottlose) and an atbeist, but after the fashion of Desdemona, Pylades, Epaminondas, Jan de Witt (Spinoza's murderedfriend), i.c., aut of loyalty to the true God, and he scorns the (pantheistic) philosophy that declares him an atbeis .Therefore, Jacobi has an answer and justification against tbe chargeof atheism levelled against him by transcendental philosophy, but thisphilosophy has no avenue of escape from the hermetically closed circleof the Ego: If tbe highest reality tbat I can contemplate, tbat I cauregard, is my sheer and simple, naked and empty, Ego, witb its autonomy and freedom, then self-intuition and rationality is a curse to me and

execrate my very existence." 38With tbis, Jacobi realizes he has said enough: courteously, certain ofbeing understood by a correspondent of such intelligence, he introducesan explicit reference to Spinozism, that system which idealism andFichte himself ) had hoped would lead beyond Kant. While J acobi cannot approve the teaching, he seeks to save tbe man: "And even tbough Iwoulcj have to cali his theory atbeistic, even as that of Spinoza, I personally could not consider him an atheist nor yet a godless man." 3J acobi's alarm about the new philosophy stems from a horror of tbevoid, a dreadful horror of nothingness, of the absolutely indeterminate.He confesses that in scrutinizing the mechanism of nature, whether fromthe point of view oftbe Ego or of the non-Ego (in the fashion ofFichte's theory of knowledge, the Wissenschaftslehre), he ends up with asheer notbing-as-such which stretches beckoning, grasping, seductive handstoward his own transcendental being, so tbat in arder to void tbe Infinite,he must fili il as an infinite void, a sheer-and-simple-in-se-and per se 4And so J acobi poses to Fichte, Spinoza and every sort of pure philosophy, the alternative tbat embraces tbat of Fnelon: eitber God or nothingness and the void. f man chooses nothingness and tbe void, hemalees himself God and reduces God to a specter, for it is impossible, inthe absence of a God, for man and everything tbat surrounds him to be

38 Ibid., Lindau, p. 181; Jacobi, op. cit., p. 41.39Ibid., Lindau, pp. 184f.; Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 45f.40lbid. Lindau, pp. 182f.; Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 43f.

Chia:roscuro oj the Atheism Controversy Forberg-Fichte) 537more tban a mere specter or phantasm. Fichte had indeed himself likewise posited the foundation of truth in the assertion of the reality ofGod, as we have already seen 41 and to tbis end had denied to the worldtbe attribute of reality; but Jacobi is here attacking tbe internai logic ofFichte's principles and so seems to neglect the writings of the Atheismusstreit to concentrate on tbe tbeory of the Wissenschaftslehre. 42 Thatis why he equates transcendence and God. His own position is embracedin tbe dual assertion: (pur e) philosophy leads on principle to atheismbecause it dares to debase God into tbe categories of finitude; the immanentist philosopher, however, who cultivates an immaterial idolatryby positing a concept, a mental fact, a universal far instance, Fichte'smoral arder of tbe universe) in the pIace of the living God, is notthereby denying morality and the true interior religion inseparablylinked to such a morality. The living God can be and is here beingdenied "onJy with tbe lips" nur mit den Lippen).

Among tbe unedited papers of Fichte, published by his son, there is afragment devoted to the philosophy of J acabi; in il, Fichte declareshimself in agreement with Kant in declaring an irredeemable failure anymetaphysic conceived as a system of rea knowledge deduced from purethought. He goes on to pinpoint the opposition between life and speculation in the sense tbat ]ife constitutes the aim and purpose while thoughtis but the means and the instrument far knowing ]ife. Thus there is aperfect antithesis and no point of contact between tbe two elements.43Fichte is known to have planned a reply to the J acobi Letter which wasto be rather a sort of compendium of his own philosophy as contrasted41 By choosing the void and nothingness, he makes himself God, whieh meansbe makes a specter God; for it is impossibIe, in the absenee of God, for man andalI that surrounds him to be more than a specter. I repeat: God is and is outsideoj me, a living Being, existing on his own, or else I am God. There is no thirdpossibiIity" ibid., Lindau, p. 189, Jaeobi, op. cit., p. 49 .42 There is one fieeting quotation in passing from the Appellation ibid.,Lindau, p. 190. Jacobi, op. cit., p. 61 . .43 Fichtes Leben und Brielwechsel, VoI. II, pp. 187ff., Medicus III, pp. 203ff.Fichte's faithful adherence to the principle of Kantianism even in his effort to gobeyond Kant into a metaphysieal realm is clearly pointed out by Rickert: "Thenthe vaIidity and reeognition of an absolute 'Ought' is likewise the foundation ofpurely theoretical knowledge, and a way is opened to the reconciliation of knowledge and faith by an insight into the nature and essence 1 thinking itsell. Religion considered as faith in a principle of good objectively operative in the worldean be deduced as neeessary precise1y beeause the absolutely neeessary categoricaimperative and the equally necessary subjeetive volitional response to it, both ofwhich demand the possibility of their realization with precisely the necessity theythemselves possess, are aceepted as being the basis of every eertitude, even forthe theoretician. And this is precisely Fichte's stando This is the reason why thereean be a Kantian, i.e. critieally grounded and operationally efficient philosophy

of religion, on Fichte's interpretation or developrnent of Kant. (H. Rickert,Fichtes Atheismusstreit und die kantische Philosophie, Kant-Studien IV [Berlin,19001 p. 151).


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538 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMwith that of JacobL Fichte's key assertion is that "the Ego begins withfreedom", that "absolute freedom is the absolute phenomenon", that"the freedom of freedom is aud remains in a l things simply a seIfsurrender to the real in the absolute intuition which is seized upon" and"what is given is no whit of an independent truth; it is located excIusively in intuition and not in itseIf". Man must therefore ascend forthwith via his understauding to the tme reaIity, to the divine life, whichoffers the supreme primordial synthesis as the uuity that is at oncetotalty aud infinity. God is the moral arder of the uuiverse--ordoordinans absolute, eoque ipso creans (the absolute ordering principle ofarder, and by that very faet creating)-and exists only in the phenomenon Erscheinung) of nature and in the system of the Ego: our happiness lies in being faithful foIlowers of the divine in US.44

SO Fichte does not seem to have been very appreciative of this intervention of ms old friend; yet not only the extreme courtesy of J aeobi'sstyle but also the relevanee of his reasoning imposed upon Fichte notmerely au invitation but even a moral duty te take account of whatJ acobi had written aud return his courtesy by a re-exarniuation in depthand an updating of the entire controversy: but Fichte must be adrnittednot to have known how to profit from the lesson he had been given by atme gentlemau. This does not meau that Fichte's stand was entirelyinexcusable: Jacobi himseIf had tried to save the mau while condemuingthe theoretical position. And we must further bear in rnind the ambiguityof Kant's position aud of the theoretical atruosphere he had radiated, inwmch it was no longer possible to speak of a creator God and perhapsscarcely even of a God who woiIld be a supreme Principle, tree andpersonal-and this was, as J acobi had pointed aut, the cr ux of thewhole controversy. And a final weighty consideration is the ambiguousstate of Protestant theology which had suffered, in the person of PastorGoeze of Hamburg, a slashing attack on the part of Lessing, whose AntiGoeze is known to have molded the young Fichte's attitude, in thematter of religion,45 to a greater extent perhaps even thau the writingsof Kant.

II-Fichte s Selt-DetenseMore elaborate and oficiaIly phrased is the defense or justificationaddressed by Fichte to the Pro-Rector of the University of Iena in44 Zu /acob i an Fichte ; C. W., ed. Medicus, VoI. V. pp. 359-363.45 Fichte himself refers and appeals to Lessing n the course of his Atheismusstreil (cf. Lindau, pp. 202ff., 326, especiaIly p. 203.).

Chiaroscuro oj the Atheism Controversy (Forberg-Fichte) 5391799.46 In regard to the question of fact, Fichte adrnits to havingwritten the first of the denounced essays aud to having published thesecond that of Forberg) in his capacity as editor of the PhilosophischesJournal.

n regard to the question of law, or the perrnissibility of the publication of the two essays, he poses two questions:1 ls there a blanket prohibition against the printing ot irreligious oreven atheistic articles which combat the Christian religion or even thenatural religion? An afirmative reply to this question could come eitherfrom the principles of reason, or from the accord of all the experts, orfrom a positive law. Now, in arder for the afirmative reply to befounded on the principles of reason, it would be necessary to supposethat the constitutive essence of the single true immutable aud perfectreligion is beyond discussion and consequently likewise what goesagainst this religion.

a) Il is not easy to answer in the concrete: perhaps a greater scandal would be given to the one who was in error, aud Fichte cites thewitness of TertuIIian and Luther. But can even this assumption be madeunconditionaIly, Le., cau the tme religion be estabIished with absolutecertainty? And Fichte replies that two religions cau be spoken of, onetaught by God in scripture aud one founded on the princpiles of reason;and these two religions can have differing principles. Jesus in ms ownday also taught against religion-against the religion of his contemporaries-and was cmcified. Luther likewise taught and inveighed audwrote against religion-again, the religion of his contemporaries-andwas not cmcified because he was protected by princely patronage, eventhough there are those 47 who find it a rniscarriage of justice that he wasnot at least burned at the stake. Furtherrnore, to go no further than therecent history of the Protestant worId, in the controversy between Goezeand Lessing, it was Pastor Goeze himseIf who adrnitted that it wasperrnissible to raise objections against religion, and Lessing was in factneither punished nor even subjected to any riai far writings that explicitly attacked religion. Thus, Lessing was aIlowed to publish booksagainst religion and yet Fichte himseIf is not being aIlowed lo do thesame.

46 t is entitled: Der Herausgeber des philosophischen Journals gerichtlicheVerantwortungsschriften gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, pubI. J. G. Fichte,1799; Lindau. pp. 196fI. This work is not included n the Medicus edition. t isdirected chie:fiy against Fichte s colleague Gruner (cf. Lindau. p. XI ; the secondpart refers to the anonymous documents: Schreiben eines Vaters an seinens/udierenden Sohn ilber den Fichtischen und Forbergischen Atheismus 1798),which Fichte attributes to the theologian Glaber.47 Kierkegaard among them (cf. Diario, under Luther ; Italian tr. C. Fabro,VoI. II [Brescia, 1962 2J pp. 926ff.).


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540 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMb) But even tbough the publication of writings against religion cannot be condemned on the basis of the naturallaw, does there not exist atleast a positive law against such publication? Of course tbere does,replies Fichte: but this law applies not to the author but to the government offidals. t is a eonstitutional not a civil law. And while Fichteadmits tbat every writer as such is subject to government censorship, hecontests the right of the State to judge of the compatibility of a chain of

reasoning with a decree: 48 tbe State cannot say "these expressions areatheistic , it simply decrees.2 But are the denounced writings really atheistie? Fichte notes thatthe accusers have not taken the trouble to specify what atheism is andwhat they understand by il, whereas he himself has given a very definitenotion of il. t appears especially from the writing of his head-on accuser (Gruner) tbat it is precisely his own concept of God that isequivalent to atheism and idolatry; 49 but, adds Fichte, since both areinterested parties, neitber should be allowed to speak the last word onthe ather. Fichte then proceeds to propound several "Iogical axioms" inorder to prove tbat the theory expounded by himself and Forberg cannotbe denounced as atheistic:Axiom I: The man who in a eoneept) denies eertain spedfieationsof a thing, does not thereby neeessarily abolish the thing the eoneept)itself Now in these writings of Fichte there are certainly denied certainspecifications in tbe concept of the deity, but tbis does not imply that tbedeity as such is being denied in such a way that the writings can be he dto be atheistic. Fichte amazingly enough considers the major premiss inthis statement to be self evident and goes on to prove the minor.50 nthose writings, there has been denied:a) The extension af God in space die Ausgedehntheit Gottes im

Raum , or his "corporeity", and Fichte has no trouble in proving by anappeal to the very principle auf das Innere) of the transcendentalphilosophy-an appeal we shall make ourselves in the conclusion ofthis chapter-that God cannot be conceived within the compass ofcorporeity; rather, he belongs to the suprasensible world dasUebersinnliehe) .

b) The comprehensibility Begreifiiehkeit) of God: in fact, wereGod to be comprehensible, he would by that very fact be somethingfinite, because to comprehend is to define bestimmen) and to define is48 Cf. Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschrift, Lindau, pp 205ff.49 Fichte refers tbe reader to all that he has written on this poiot in Appellationan das Publikum.50 We have onIy to discuss the minor premiss of our syllogism (Lindau,p. 217).

Chiaroscuro o the Atheism Controversy Forberg-Fichte) 541to delimit besehriinken) with a delimitation effected by tbe understanding within the compass of finite experience. Thus, wcre God to be comprehended, he would no longer be God; he would be an idol.Axiom II: The man who denies eertain proofs of a thing does notneeessarily deny the thing ilself. Now, declares Fichte, we do denycertain proofs of tbe existence of God; but it does not follow from thistbat we are denying the existence of God himself. Here again Fichteproceeds to prove the minor only: his proof actually comes down to arepelition of the assertion already made in the denounced articIe, to tbeeffect that the existence of the suprasensible world is not an object ofproof but ratber of faitb Glaube) in tbe sense of immediate awarenessvia the "internaI sense" which can grasp the "in-itself" An-sieh) whilethe external senses only present the "phenomena" Erscheinungen). A"proof" Beweis) of tbe existence of God makes no sense because everyproof of existence is based on the connection of something stable and inrepose with something accidental and mobile. But this certainly cannotbe the world of the suprasensible; nor can the causaI argument possiblybe used to prove tbe existence of God from the existence of the sensibleworld, because tbe existence in question cannot be said to be somethingtbat begins. Tbe charge of atheism is thus nothing but a conspiracy ofthe "obscurantists" Obskuranten) against the "friends of light"Freunde des Liehts) who are the glory of the great University of JenaThe conc1uding section of the essay, which even evokes the specter ofVanini,51 represents an effort on Fichte's part to attribute the wholeuproar to political motives, to an attack triggered by the animosity ofthe conservatives and reactionaries against Fichte's own J acobin anddemocratic ideas. Fichte's self-defense must be adjudged on balance tobe a mere repetition of previous statements, weak and feeble on thetbeoretical side, and so full of skittish lamentations as to arause tbesuspicion that the author is afraid he may indeed be on very thin ice.Fichte's last apologetic piece is somewhat more serene in tane andreally comes to close grips witb tbe centraI point of tbe controversy,Fichte's identification of God with tbe moral order.'2 The objection hadbeen tbis: supposing that alI of us are the members constituting thismoral arder and that our mutuaI relations constitute the arder of thisworld, then either we are ourselves God or we are the ones who makehim day by day, and that leaves nothing even faintly resembling God,excep ourselves.This was a cogent objection, buI Fichte makes short work of it by

5 Lindau, p. 264.52 Auf einem Privatschreiben published in 1800 in tbc Philosophisches o u r ~nal, IX; Lindau, pp. 318ff.: Medicus III, pp. 319ff.


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542 DISINTEGRATION OF JDEALISM INTO ATHEISMsimply denying that he is conceiving God in anthropomorphic fashion asliving, active, powerful, etc., or, indeed, that his God is an "out-and-outconcept" Durch-und-durch-BegrifJ).The order of which Fichte is speaking is, says he, an "active ordering" tiitiges Ordnen), an ordo ordinans, and thus it is an order thatdoes not belong to the world of nature and finite reality but rathersubsists outside of that world, in the intelligible world. And Fichteclinches his point: "Any and every belief in a divine that contains morethan this concept of the morai order is to that extent fiction and superstition, which may be harmless but is nevertheless a ways unworthy of arationa being and suspect in the extreme." 53 But a I this is mere rhetoric:neither here nor eIsewhere does Fichte ever reply to the obiectionthat a God reduced to the mora order and thus to the compass of therationality of human actions is not and cannot be God. In such a contextGod could not be without man and this is certainly what Fichte thoughtand Hegei was Iater to asserto But Fichte was right in insisting that hisaccusers iudge the controversy from the inside of his own system and hisown terminology: for this would have given the proper emphasis to theserious charge of atheism Ievelled against him and better brought aut thetrue meaning of that charge.t is the whole drift and the animating spirit of Fichte's new philosophy which should have caused alarm, more than the denounced writingsthemselves. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre represents a more radicai banishment of theistic notions than did Spinoza's philosophy; and Fichte'scritique of Spinoza is but a sign of Fichte's own theologico-philosophicalradicalism. Fichte utterly reiects the God of religion, the Absolute conceived as subsistent and transcendent Being, creator of the world and ofman; he likewise reiects the God of Christianity who created the worldin time and saved and is saving man from sin in time for eternity.54

The "systematic" significance of this critique of Fichte againstSpinoza lies in the identification of the Kantian pure Ego with the AbsoIute, the substitution of the Ich denke ilberhaupt for substance asSpinoza conceived substance. Then there is the further detachment ofthe Kantian Denken (thinking) from any reference to the thing-in-itself;and finally the transformation of the Kantian denken into pure spontaneity, into act Tat) as such and in itself. In simpler terms, Fichte'scontribution to the Odyssey of modern philosophy consists in the transition from the functional Ego to the constitutive Ego, via a reconstitutionof a higher or "purified" Spinozism geliiuterte Spinozismus), in which

53 Lindau, p. 352; Medicus III pp 248f.54 The transcendental deduction of the pure Ego is expounded systematicallyin ten points in the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, of 1794 M e d i ~cus I, pp. 286fl.).

Chiaroscuro oi the Athei sm Controver sy Forberg-Fichte) 543the Kantiau Ego emerges freed of every limitation both in the speculative and in the practical sphere.Consequently, for Fichte and Iater far the whole idealist school and, itmight be said, for ali the subsequent articulations or variants of theprinciple of immanentism, the Ego is the "in-itself" and the Ego-in-itselfIch an sich) is the first principle. The Ego-in-itself is not some hiddenoccult quality but rather the rea , sheer and simple, and the rea that ispresented effectively to the mind in refiection or as a development ofself-awareness. The Ego-in-itself is therefore immediate self-awarenessSelbstbewusstsein) ; it is given in an "intel lectualin tuition" intellektuelleAnschauung), which posits itself in producing itself.This self-awareness or Ego-in-itself takes the pIace of the Kantiannoumenon; intellectuai intuition breaks down th barrier between thephenomenon and the noumenon: self-awareness becomes the absalutesubiect: "That whase being consists simply in this, that it posits itself asbeing and the Ego as absalute subiect", which sustains every act ofknowing and makes possible knowledge as such; it is that from whicheverything is deduced and which cannot itself be deduced from anyother thing, and it is by definition removed from ali multiplicity, diversity and variation. Self -awareness, self -consciousness or the pure Ego isthus identified with transcendenta apperception, but freed from thedrawbacks that trammelled this transcendentai apperception in Kantianism and identified with the freedom of the Ego, or better still with theEgo as freedom in act, which is always the "positing" and thereforealways presupposed, however the mind is moved in theory or in practice. Fichte is thus proclaiming the overcoming of ali dualism in theassertion of the identity of intnition and reason, of subiect-obiect, offinite and Infinite, of parts and Whole. The revolutionary element inFichte's philosophy is not merely the elevation Erhebung) of the Egoto the status of a noumenan, but preeminently the definitive abrogationAufhebung) of truth as contemplation and its transfer into action, intoaspiration Streben), into the operationa freedom af the Ego, with theconsequence that the practicai Reason is attributed a constitutive priority over the theoreticai Reason. This is the heart and the crux of theWissenschaftslehre 55 throughout all its tortured reformulations.56

55 In a note that seems to me to be an addition, in the Iater editions, to theAtheismusstreit, Fichte sets bis own conception aver against the Stoic conception:in Fichte's conception absalute Being ahsolutes Seyn is carefully distinguishedfrom real existence wirkliches Daseyn) , whereas in the Stoic conception theinfinite Idea of the Ego and the reai Ego coincide, making this Stoic conceptionan atheistic Olle ibid., P III, 5; Medicus I, p. 470; ed. Lauth-Jakob I, 2, 410 .56 The theory of knowledge arises, to the extent that it is supposed to be asystematic science, n exact1y the same way as do n possible sciences, to tbeextent that they are supposed to be systematic, through a functional definition of


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544 DISINTEGRATION OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMFrom this we can clearly see, let it be noted forthwith, how Fichte couldhave conceived God as "the mora order of the universe", reducing himto moral rationality or rational morality in its self-actuation and thuseliminating God as a metaphysical Absolute. t is true that Fichte doesposit God as the conditioning Unconditioned, but it is no less true thatbis God is not God, is not even conceivable, without man, without theworld of freedom. Thus God can no longer exist without mano Withoutthe Ego, God is not God. This formulation is our own but it is the clearcut expression of Fichte's teaching.

III--Structural Pattern of Fichtean Atheis mReturning to the Wissenschaftslehre, we mnst note that the Ego ischaracterized not ouly by priority and centrality of position but also by"totality" (Ganzheit), not in the quantitative but father in the qualitative sense, inasmuch as the Ego proceeds to the "construction" of thereal via the positing of the non-Ego. Fichte explains this reduplication ofthe identical with itself in terms of a "fall", in terms of that negative

element or that negative pull inherent in mind which will be the mainspring of the idealist dialectic. Actually the positing of the self via theEgo is synonymous with positing something within the Ego. But by thispositing, it is setting over against itself something which is not, andtherefore is limiting itself. The absolnte Ego has therefore lowered itself,in and via its infinite and immediate activity, to the status of understanding and its determined and finite activity; we have here to do not with anascen{ (HERAUFsteigen) bnt rather with a descent (HERABsteigen). By lowering itself to the status of understanding, as that whichcan be delimited and, as something finite, can have something set overagainst it, the Absolute Ego is positing a reciprocal opposilion of Egoand non-Ego, in terms of which the Ego posits the negation in itself bypositing tbe reality of the non-Ego and vice versa. Hence, the dualformula, each part of which must always be taken in conjunction withthe other: a) the Ego posils the non-Ego as limited by the Ego, andb) the Ego posils itself as limited by the non-Ego."

freedom which is also a determination on the part cf that freedom itseIf; andhere the definition and determination is quite specific, geared to promote theoperation of the intelligence generical1y; and the theory of knowledge is onIydistinguished from other sciences by the fact that the object of these othersciences is a free operation, whereas the object of the theory of knowIedge isnecessary operations Ueher den BegrifJ der Wissenschaftslehre. II Abschn., 7;Medicus I p. 202).7 GrundJage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, 3, p. 313.58 [bid. 4, pp. 3201.

Chiaroscuro o the Atheis m Controversy Forberg-Ficht e) 5 5The ultimate issue of Ibis transcendental deduction is that the humanreason is derived from the infinite by an internaI process of delimitingopposition; the human reason can therefore be called a limited divinereason, distinguished from that divine intellect only by a difference ofdegree.59 This is the new "dynamic Spinozism" introduced by Fichteinto modern thought via the self-positing and self-determination of theEgo, which is subsequently a process of active positing negation, as wehave said. Throughout this whole operation, Fichte is couceiving of theEgo not as in "being" (Sein) but rather as in "becoming" (Werden), asa process of self -determination. "The sta tement tha t 'the Ego becomesdetermined' means that reality becomes abrogated in il. When the Egoposits in itself only a part of the reality of an absolute totality, it removes the rest of that totality from ilself and posits it in the non-EgoThus, the Ego posits negation in itself to the extent that it projectsreality into the non-Ego, and reality in itself to the extent that itprojectsnegation into the non-Ego. The Ego thus posils itself as self-determininginasmuch as it is becoming determined, and as becoming determinedinasmuch as it is determining itself." 60 In other words, in this selfnegation and self-limitation into the particular of the non-Ego there is

accomplished the relating of the Ego to the empirical realm of experience and of history which is no longer a reality external to the Ego, as inKant, but is rather conceived of likewise as a self-producing negationwithin the Ego itself when that Ego is at the debased level of nnderstanding (V erstand). Here we are obviously dealing with a relativenegation that refers ns back to the presupposes the "total negation"which is God himself, posited (or postulated) by the reason (Vernunft)in the act proper to it, the act of "faith" (Glaube).For Fichte and for us, this is the real crux of the controversy. In theWissenschaftslehre nova metodo , which dates from 1798, and so iscontemporary with the Atheismusstreit, Fichte already explicitly reducesknowledge to willing and action; knowing, truth, becomes an acting and

a tending: willing is the transcendental element of the mind which positsitself as a determination (Bestimmtheit), partly in terms of its very formwhich we can consider as a tendency whereby something is demandedoutside the willing subject, partly as a being (Sein), as a quality of myselfinasmuch as I am a willing subject. And in this context the will is theobject of a possible intuition which we must assume simply in order tobe able to think anything whatever. Il is by this willing tbat I am what Iam; this pure willing is my being and my being is my willing:

59 In a letter of May 25, 1789, to M Herz, Kant protested vigorollsly againsttbis reduction, already attempted by Maimonides C. W., ed. Cassirer, VoI. IX,p.416).6 Grundlagen der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, II Teil, 4, pp 324f.


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546 DISINTEGRATlON OF IDEALISM INTO ATHEISMthls is the primordia reality (root ) of the Ego; and actnally it isonly this pure willing that is capable of becoming the immediate objectof the mind.Even thongh willing relates to something that is external and seeksthat something and indeed demands and requires it, pure willing as suchhas no object to whlch it can relate: the obiect, as we have said already,is found via feeling. Thus a discrete apprehending (and that is whatimmediate experience is ) is called feeling Gefiihl).61 And the Wholedas Ganze) in this context is the Synthesis of willing and being. Fichtesums up thus: "My tme being is determination of willing. Thls is mywhole being. Thls is comprehended in time and thereby I become although I am even previously to this. The whole is a being determined bywilling; this is my whole state. But only parts thereof can be andare comprehended, and this compreheuded is thus only somethinglimited." 62

Fichte immediately adds that thls is not a limitation that is empiricalin origino No, we must probe more deeply, going back to the very originof the activity in questiono With the awareness of willing is primordiallyconnected a consciousness of a being. Thc will as such is to be considered as a quality of my Ego, my whole state Zustand). I will, thereforeI am a willing principle. Thus with my refiection on a willing there isconnected the refiection on a being. But a being is something obiective.Therefore an obiect is the nexus of the two: willing and beng are thesame, distinguished only by their relation to different powers of knowledge of the mind, pure willing and pure thinking; being, on the otherhand, is related lo an intuition connected with a thinking, but not with asheer and simple thinking, rather with an objective thinking, and sobeing is related to an obiec . Pure thought and intuiting are uuited andthls necessarily initiates the unification of willing and being. Yet willingand being are different. When something is simply thought, it is a willing; but i it be intu/ed, then it becomes an obiect, a being. And thisbeing is then the w ll itself whlch is an empirica w ll inasmuch as it isintuited and to which is connected an empirica being and we havearrived at empirica intuition.63

61 But how can feeling apprehend the rea which is its "material"? Via intuition(Anschauung). And Fichte specifies stili further that feeling (Gefilhl) is an"affection" of aur very selves and is determined by our "action" (Handeln) whichis intrinsically limited I. G. Fichte, WissenschaftslehTe 'nova metodo', 13;Nachgelassene Schriften, ed. Jakob, VoI. II, p 483).62 Ibid.63 It is beyond our present scope to follow through the further evolution ofFichte's thought In the Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre vom 1801, we findthe following passage: "The Absolute is neither Knowing nor yet Being, nor is itthe identity of the t Vo, nor t both indifferentty; rather it is quite simply and

Chiaroscuro oj the Atheism Controversy (Forberg-Fichte) 5 7We thus have in Fichte an instance of radica idealism, a tracing backof everything to the Ego and a positing of its activity as pure willing asthe source and fountainhead of being and of its determinations. But tbesource of these determinations is taken from empirica intnition and sobeing is linked with particularity and exteriority whlch is subiect loempirical space and time. The sphere of empirica intuition, of the immediate "givenness" of sense-contents, constitutes Being Sein): "Allbeing is for it necessarily a sensible being, for it deduces the entireconcept from the forro of sensibllity in the first piace; and so the problem of a bridge to the sensible simply does not arise for this approach.Intellectual intnition in the Kantian sense is a monstrosity, a mirage thatvauishes when we try to think it, an insubstantiai figment not worthy ofbeing assigucd a name. The intellectual intnition of which the Wissen-schaftslehre is speaking, focuses not On a being b

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