GLOBAL WAR TERRORIST FINANCE...THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORIST FINANCE Banks and the USA PATRIOT Act JOHN J. BYRNE, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVESECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

U.S. DEPARTMENT 0F STATE / BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

THEGLOBAL WAR

ONTERRORISTFINANCE

THEGLOBAL WAR

ONTERRORISTFINANCE

SEPTEMBER 2004SEPTEMBER 2004

Editor.........Jonathan SchafferManaging Editor.................Bruce Odessey

Contributing Editors .........Gretchen Christison ...........Berta Gomez

.................Linda Johnson.................Martin Manning

Cover Design..................Min Yao

Publisher..................Judith S. SiegelExecutive Editor......................Guy E. Olson

Production Manager.................Christian LarsonAssistant Production Manager.........................Sylvia Scott

Editorial Board

George Clack Kathleen R. Davis Francis B. Ward

The Bureau of International Information Programs of the U.S.Department of State publishes five electronic journals—EconomicPerspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda,and U.S. Society & Values—that examine major issues facing the UnitedStates and the international community as well as U.S. society, values,thought, and institutions. Each of the five is catalogued by volume (thenumber of years in publication) and by number (the number of issuesthat appear during the year).

One new journal is published monthly in English and is followed two tofour weeks later by versions in French, Portuguese, and Spanish. Selectededitions also appear in Arabic and Russian.

The opinions expressed in the journals do not necessarily reflect theviews or policies of the U.S. government. The U.S. Department of Stateassumes no responsibility for the content and continued accessibility ofInternet sites to which the journals link; such responsibility resides solelywith the publishers of those sites. Journal articles, photographs, andillustrations may be reproduced and translated outside the United Statesunless they carry explicit copyright restrictions, in which case permissionmust be sought from the copyright holders noted in the journal.

The Bureau of International Information Programs maintains currentand back issues in several electronic formats, as well as a list of upcomingjournals, at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm. Commentsare welcome at your local U.S. Embassy or at the editorial offices:

Editor, Economic PerspectivesIIP/T/ESU.S. Department of State301 4th St. S.W.Washington, D.C. 20547United States of AmericaE-mail: [email protected]

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / SEPTEMBER 2004eJOURNAL USA

Akey element of terrorist networksthat was largely undisturbed priorto 9/11 is the global financial

infrastructure that facilitates the rise ofgroups such as al-Qaida and funds attacksagainst the United States and our globalpartners.

The work to track and shut down thefinancial network of terror is one of themost critical efforts facing us today, and wehave achieved important successes in themission to bankrupt the financialunderpinnings of terrorism. Raising andmoving money is now harder, costlier, andriskier for al-Qaida and like-mindedterrorist groups. We have frozen andseized terrorist assets, exposed anddismantled known channels of funding,deterred donors, arrested key facilitators,and built higher hurdles in theinternational financial system to preventabuse by terrorists.

Freedom-loving people around the worldare targeted by the scourge of terrorism.From the railway bombings of Madrid andMoscow to the commercial center attacksin Istanbul and Casablanca, we have seenthat terrorism does not discriminateamong race, religion, and national origin.

A robust international coalition iscurrently working to combat terroristfinancing and to focus the world'sattention on previously unregulated, high-

risk sectors such as charities and hawalas.We have begun to focus our collectiveattention on our growing concern aboutthe use of cash couriers by terroristsgroups. In these efforts, we have enlistedthe private sector worldwide — banks,money service businesses, broker-dealers,and the charitable community — to serveas the frontline in this battle. These effortsare contributing to our success.

The drumbeat to disrupt and dismantleterrorist financing has been constant andwill continue. We will not relent in ourmission to root out and halt terroristfinanciers. This issue of EconomicPerspectives demonstrates how the UnitedStates and its allies around the worldcontinue to use all of our authorities,relationships, and expertise to attacksources, conduits, and proceeds of theunderwriters of terror.

ABOUT THIS ISSUE


John SnowU.S. Secretary of the Treasury

1

Bankrupting TerroristsJUAN CARLOS ZARATE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE

TREASURY FOR TERRORIST FINANCING

Sharing of financial information helps unearthterrorist cells and networks while freezing assets andother economic sanctions incapacitate terrorists'ability to carry out attacks.

Internationalizing the FightE. ANTHONY WAYNE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS

The United States and its international partners areworking on how to deal with informal financialsystems and non-governmental organizations throughwhich terrorists collect and move their funds.

Building a Counterterrorist Finance RegimeCELINA REALUYO, DIRECTOR OF COUNTERTERRORISM

FINANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The U.S. government helps foreign allies build theircapacity to prevent terrorists from using theinternational financial system to further their plots.

Response to Bali: An International SuccessStoryCELINA REALUYO AND SCOTT STAPLETON, U.S.DEPARTMENT OF STATE

After the terrorist bombings in Bali, the internationalcommunity came together to help Indonesia developthe capacity it needs to fight further terrorist activity.

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVESU.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE / SEPTEMBER 2004 / VOLUME 9 / NUMBER 3

http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm

CONTENTS

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORIST FINANCE

Banks and the USA PATRIOT ActJOHN J. BYRNE, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN BANKERS

ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

The PATRIOT Act includes several provisions longadvocated by the banking industry, but banks willneed additional government intelligence to effectivelydetect or prevent the financial transactions ofterrorists.

Hawala: Based on Trust, Subject to Abuse MOHAMMED EL-QORCHI, DEPUTY AREA CHIEF,INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Regulation should aim not to eliminate hawala, theinformal channel for transferring funds from onelocation to another, but to prevent its misuse.

Hizballah SmokescreenAn illustration of how illegal cigarette sales in theUnited States financed a terrorist organization inLebanon.

Roles and ResponsibilitesA table of U.S. government entities involved incombating terrorist finance.

Bibliography

Internet Resources

3

6

10

14

18

27

29


31

22

26

2

eJOURNAL USA

The campaign to keep money out of the hands of terroristshas become a centerpiece of the overall war againstterrorism. Using a targeted approach, the United Statesand its partners worldwide have pooled their lawenforcement, intelligence, and economic powers to isolateand disrupt the financial infrastructure of terroristnetworks. The benefits are multi-pronged. The sharing offinancial information helps unearth terrorist cells andnetworks while the freezing of assets and other economicsanctions incapacitates terrorists’ ability to carry outattacks, maintain their alliances, create infrastructuresaround the world, and develop deadly weapons. Theresults to date are encouraging and, over the long term,promise to strengthen the ability of countries to protect theinternational financial system against abuse by terroristgroups and their supporters.

Juan Carlos Zarate is assistant secretary of the Treasury for terrorist

financing. He is responsible for formulating and coordinating the

Treasury Department’s counterterrorist financing and anti-money

laundering efforts. He manages policy guidance and oversight of the

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Office of

Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and policy guidance for the Internal

Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation Division.

When al-Qaida operatives simultaneouslyattacked New York and Washington withunprecedented devastation on September 11,

2001, the U.S. and global perception of the threat posed byterrorism was forever altered. Today, just past the three-yearanniversary of that day, the world continues to face anevolving Islamist extremist terrorist threat of potentiallycatastrophic proportions. To counter this long-term scourgeeffectively, we must build upon the successes we haveachieved to help bankrupt terrorism.

This is especially true in our diplomatic engagements,which are crucial to building international cooperation inthe war on terror. As we have seen in attacks since 9/11,the threat of terrorism is not just an American problem,but one that affects our partners worldwide. It is essential,therefore, that we maintain global attention and politicalwill to attack the ever-evolving threats posed by themovements of tainted capital, as well as to deter anddissuade supporters of terrorist groups.

THE MONEY TRAIL

Focusing on and attacking terrorist money flows isimportant for several reasons. Financial records and auditsprovide blueprints to the architecture of terroristorganizations. By following the money trail throughfinancial information sharing worldwide, we can save livesby unearthing terrorist cells and networks. The maintenanceof terrorist networks and the acquisition and developmentof lethal weapons is expensive — even if a particular attackdoes not prove costly in isolation. Identifying and isolatingthe sources of funding for terrorist groups incapacitates notonly their execution of attacks, but also their ability tomaintain international alliances, create infrastructuresaround the world for recruitment and training, andpurchase or develop deadly weapons.

BANKRUPTING TERRORISTS

Juan Carlos Zarate

3ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / SEPTEMBER 2004

eJOURNAL USA

What we know is that global networks of terrorist groupslike al-Qaida and Hamas have used a variety of means toraise and move money. They have taken advantage ofcharities, front companies, deep-pocket donors, andcrime of all types to raise money. They have relied onbanks, informal remittance networks known as hawalas,wire remitters, currency exchangers, and couriers to movemoney or value across national borders.

A GLOBAL UNDERTAKING

The campaign against terrorist financing — born in partfrom the lessons of the war against internationalorganized crime and money laundering — has become acenterpiece of our global effort to address the short- andlong-term challenges posed by terrorism. In the simplestterms, our targeted approach focuses on attackingterrorist networks by using intelligence, law enforcement,and economic powers to identify and disrupt the financialsubstructure of terrorist groups. In the long term, oursystemic approach broadens and deepens the legal,financial, and regulatory infrastructure and capacity ofcountries around the world to better secure theinternational financial system against abuse by terroristgroups and their supporters. These efforts have provenrevolutionary in the preventive and proactive use of allelements of national power to stop terrorist financing.

There has been important success to date. We have madeit harder and costlier for al-Qaida and other terroristgroups to move money around the world and have builtmore stringent barriers in the international financialsystem to prevent its abuse. The success has resulted inpart from important international engagement andcooperation. International understanding, collaboration,and capability are clearly necessary in this effort given theglobal nature of both the financial system and terrorism.

Within weeks of 9/11, the world community committedto fight terrorist financing at several levels, including thetimely freezing of terrorist-suspected assets, the arrest ofthose implicated in providing financial support toterrorist cells, and the international commitment to long-term legal and structural reforms to ensure the integrityof the international financial system. This was reflectedin the important adoption of U.N. Security CouncilResolution 1373 and the eight Special Recommendationson Terrorist Financing by the 33-member FinancialAction Task Force (FATF) on money laundering. Other

international bodies and regional organizations, like theInternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G7(Group of Seven), G8 (Group of Eight) and G20 (Groupof 20), and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperationforum), also played key roles in marshaling political willand addressing deficiencies in national systems to combatterrorism. The Egmont Group of Financial IntelligenceUnits, now numbering nearly 100 around the world,focused financial information sharing on terroristfinancing.

THE DESIGNATION PROCESS AT WORK

A crucial and public component of our approach hasbeen the application of targeted economic sanctionsagainst terrorists and their financiers. When PresidentBush signed Executive Order 13224 on September 24,2001, he called upon the secretary of the Treasury, as wellas the secretary of state in certain instances, to “designate”terrorists, their financiers, and facilitators. Thesedesignations financially isolate entities by blocking orfreezing their U.S. property interests and assets, as well aspreventing their use of the formal dollar-clearing financialsystem. The designations also prohibit U.S. persons fromdoing business or engaging in transactions with suchdesignees. To date 383 individuals and entities have beendesignated under this power, and well over $140 millionin terrorist-related assets have been frozen internationally.

In addition to financially isolating designees by“arresting” their access to the financial system, thedesignations often serve to deter like-minded supportersfrom continuing to facilitate terrorist financing as well asto prompt action — of varying kinds — by hostjurisdictions. Designation under E.O. 13224 does notnecessarily mean that criminal or civil laws have beenviolated; rather, it suggests, based upon a reasonable basisto believe, a suspected financial or otherwise supportiverelationship between the designee and individualterrorists, terrorist organizations, or terrorist activity.When used aggressively, this is an inherently preventivetool implemented to ensure that assets of the supportersor associates of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups arenot used to fuel terror. Though there have beenchallenges to such designations, all of them have beenupheld by U.S. federal courts.

Since 9/11, we have harnessed the internationalcommunity to drive this issue. The U.N. Security


Council has adopted a series of resolutions requiringmember states to apply targeted financial sanctionsagainst individuals and financial interests connected toterrorist groups or activity while the European Unionadopted a directive on December 27, 2001, allowing it todevelop its own list of terrorist-related entities whoseassets are subject to blocking by member countries. InOctober 2003, the FATF issued specific interpretiveguidance to terrorist-related asset-freezing obligations ofjurisdictions. Many countries, such as Italy and SaudiArabia, have notified the United Nations, jointly with theUnited States or unilaterally, in proposing terroristfinancing designations to the Security Council. Theseinternational efforts to apply financial sanctions to abroad range of terrorist-related targets represent afundamental component of the global campaign againstterrorist financing.

THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Over the longer term, our terrorist financing strategy callsfor a systemic approach to enhance the transparency andaccountability of the international financial system. Athome, we are advancing these interests throughimplementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. Treasury hasissued regulations that strengthen existing customeridentification, recordkeeping, reporting, and information-sharing obligations in various financial sectors and expandthese obligations to new financial sectors such as moneyservice businesses, which are vulnerable to abuse. We arealso promoting these systemic interests internationallythrough the work of the FATF, the FATF-style regionalbodies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) andWorld Bank, and other multilateral organizations.

We have enhanced those efforts with aggressive outreachto the financial community and the charitable sector. Wehave challenged these important front-line elements totake more proactive steps to build transparency andaccountability, as well as better practices and due

diligence, to help ensure they are not being abused byterrorists or criminals.

Better practices across the international financial systemhave raised higher institutional hurdles for terrorists tocircumvent. However, as we strengthen our systemicdefenses, terrorists and other criminals will resort toother, less formal mechanisms to raise, store, and movetheir money. Driving terrorists to move their wealth inless formal or agile ways heightens their risk of detection,but such changes require that we be flexible to adapt tothe changing face of terrorist financing.

MOVING FORWARD

To that end, President Bush and Treasury Secretary JohnSnow recently announced the creation of a new office inthe Treasury to bolster our long-term efforts to cut thefinancial ties of terrorists and better safeguard the U.S.financial system against criminal activity.

The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI)consolidates the policy, enforcement, regulatory,international, and analytical functions of the Treasury andadds to them critical intelligence components. Thischange will allow us to better develop and target ourintelligence analysis and financial data — such as banksecrecy data — so that we can detect how terrorists areexploiting financial systems and design methods to stopthem. It will also allow us to implement our sanctionsand regulatory enforcement programs more effectivelyand to work closely with embassies and the private sectoraround the world to strengthen the international coalitionagainst terrorist financing.

Indeed, sustained global cooperation and support is thesurest path to success as we drain the money supply thatterrorists need to stay in business. ■

5ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / SEPTEMBER 2004eJOURNAL USA

Terrorists move money through channels as diverse asmajor banks, charities, and alternative remittance systems.U.N. member states are obligated to apply sanctionsagainst designated terrorists and their financial supporters,including freezing assets, banning travel, and enforcingarms embargos. However, gaps in enforcing sanctionsexist, and the United States and its international partnersare working to address how to deal with informalfinancial systems and non-governmental organizationsthrough which terrorists collect and move their funds. TheUnited States is providing substantial assistance to othergovernments to help them attain the technical ability andskills to clamp down on terrorist financing activity.

E. Anthony Wayne is assistant secretary of state for economic and

business affairs. A career foreign service officer, he chairs a large

interagency group, the Coalition Building Group, which coordinates

plans and actions on terrorist finance with other countries and multilateral

organizations. In addition to terrorist finance, his responsibilities include

international development, energy, trade policy, telecommunications, and

transportation.

The international community is engaged in a long-term campaign against terrorism. One of thecritical fronts in this fight is the effort to disrupt

the financial networks that sustain terrorist organizationsand finance their operations.

This article examines how the U.S. government isorganized to fight terrorist financing, what theinternational community is doing, and what challenges lieahead as terrorist organizations find new ways to raise andtransfer money.

The main development in 2004 has been the genuineinternationalization of the effort to stop flows of moneyto terrorists. For example, Italy proposed more candidatesfor U.N. sanctions than any other country, followed bythe United States, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Germany.The European Union issued a major counterterrorismdeclaration on March 25, 2004, including very specificcommitments on counterterrorist finance. In mid-2004,Saudi Arabia placed all overseas charities headquartered inSaudi Arabia under a government-controlled umbrellaorganization. This action effectively closed the overseasbranch offices of the Al-Haramain Foundation, a majorinternational charity, several branches of which hadprovided support for al-Qaida. The decision also enabledSaudi government control of transactions between Saudicharities and their overseas affiliates. This action shouldplug a number of conduits for terrorist financing andprovides an example of close coordination amongresponsible nations working together to combat thefinancing of terrorism.

THE U.S. EFFORT

The tools to combat terrorist finance include intelligence,law enforcement, designation and asset freeze, and various

INTERNATIONALIZING THE FIGHT

E. Anthony Wayne


diplomatic initiatives. These tools are often mutuallyreinforcing.

One of the most important aspects of the U.S. effort isthe public designation of terrorists and their supportersand the freezing of their assets. So far, the United Stateshas designated some 384 individuals and entities.

Legal authority to freeze assets is contained in ExecutiveOrder 13224, signed September 23, 2001, derivingauthority from the International Emergency EconomicPowers Act and the United Nations Participation Act. TheExecutive Order, available at www.state.gov/e/eb, enablesthe executive branch to freeze assets administratively andpermits quick, flexible, and extensive action.

Equally important is a coordinated interagency processled by the National Security Council. It includes thedepartments of State, Treasury, Justice, HomelandSecurity, and Defense, as well as intelligence andenforcement agencies. Indeed, our interagency approachcould well be a model for other countries and regionalentities looking to restructure their counterterrorismefforts.

The process begins with analysis of money transfers bysuspected terrorists and their financial backers. Targets foraction are developed. The interagency group meets toexamine alternative options to disrupt these networks.Actions could include:

• the Department of the Treasury designating anindividual or group, freezing the assets located in theUnited States or in overseas branches of U.S.corporations or under the control of U.S. personsworldwide, and barring any transactions with U.S.persons or corporations

• the Department of Justice or Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) initiating an investigation and,possibly, prosecution

• the Department of State developing a strategy to wininternational support for our action, for example, byseeking U.N. sanctions

THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has stepped up its efforts to fightterrorist financing. It requires all countries:

• to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts(including U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373)

• to freeze the assets of individuals and entities linked toUsama bin Laden, the Taliban, or al-Qaida (UNSCR1267 and subsequent relevant resolutions, most recently,UNSCR 1526)

The United Nations has established a process forreviewing requests from member states to add the namesof individuals and entities subject to asset freezes to aconsolidated list maintained by its 1267 SanctionsCommittee. U.N. member states are obligated to takecertain measures against these names, including assetfreeze, arms embargo, and travel ban.

So far, the international community has frozenapproximately $142 million in assets from individualsand entities on the consolidated list. The U.N.mechanism is proving invaluable in internationalizingasset freezes and underscoring the global commitmentagainst terrorism. This is a U.N. list, and imposingspecified sanctions against the listed individuals andentities is an obligation of all U.N. members.

It is important to point out that cooperation indesignating individuals and entities is a truly globalendeavor. Many countries, including Saudi Arabia,Algeria, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany, theUnited Kingdom, China, and Russia, continue to submital-Qaida-linked names to the Sanctions Committee to beadded to its consolidated list. Let me give two examples:

U.S.-Saudi Joint Designations: In March 2002, theUnited States and Saudi Arabia jointly requested theU.N. 1267 Sanctions Committee to add the names of theSomalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina branches of al-Haramain to its consolidated list. These two branches,now closed, were linked to al-Qaida. Subsequently, and asa result of joint U.S.-Saudi referrals, the name of Wa’elHamza Julaidan, an associate of Usama bin Laden, wasadded to the consolidated list in late 2002, and nineadditional branches of al-Haramain were added in 2004.

Jemaah Islamiya: In October 2002, 50 countries,including all the members of the Association of SoutheastAsians Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union,joined together in submitting the name of JemaahIslamiya to the 1267 Committee. Jemaah Islamiya is


responsible for perpetrating a number of deadly attacks,including on a Bali nightclub.

LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND STANDARDS

Since 9/11, more than 80 countries have adopted newlaws and regulations to fight terrorist financing or are inthe process of doing so. The number of FinancialIntelligence Units that have met the internationallyagreed standards and are able to share informationthrough membership of the Egmont Group (countrieswith operational financial intelligence units) increasedfrom 69 to 84 members. We have worked closely with theFinancial Action Task Force (FATF) on money launderingand its associate regional bodies in this effort.

FATF, an intergovernmental body of 33 countries, hasexpanded its mandate to include terrorist financing. Inaddition to its 40 original recommendations on moneylaundering, FATF has generated eight SpecialRecommendations on Terrorist Financing that havebecome the international operational standard onaddressing terrorist financing. These recommendationsprovide a blueprint for countries that need to modifytheir laws and financial systems to comport withinternational standards. FATF’s ability to publicly listcountries with poor anti-money laundering practicesencourages countries to put in place stronger moneylaundering regimes. As a result of this publicity, Nigeria,Ukraine, and the Philippines moved to implement vastlyimproved legal systems.

Countries have also worked to ensure that terrorists areunable to misuse charities or alternative remittancesystems, also known as “hawalas,” and money servicebusinesses. Until 9/11, the hawala system was completelyunregulated in many jurisdictions. While most hawalatransactions are legitimate remittances to families byexpatriate workers, terrorists have also used the informalremittance sector.

The Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)hosted an international conference in May 2002 wherenearly 40 countries recognized for the first time the needto regulate the hawala sector. A second internationalconference on hawala was held in the UAE in April 2004to acknowledge and reaffirm the important achievementsof the first conference and to establish a plan for

continued work. A number of countries, including theUAE and Pakistan, have taken steps to regulate theinformal sector, and we are encouraged by initial signs ofan increase in the use of banking channels to transferworkers' remittances from the Gulf and elsewhere to theirfamilies in South Asia. We will continue to work activelyto establish greater levels of transparency andaccountability for the informal sector.

Countries around the world have also addressed terrorists’raising and moving funds by masquerading their activitiesas charitable causes. Hamas fundraising, to take oneexample, is known to blend funds for both charitable andmilitant uses. Two very recent examples of countries’actions are European Union countries’ designation ofHamas for asset freeze, and, as noted earlier, SaudiArabia's umbrella organization to supervise allinternational charities and all overseas transactions bycharities.

CAPACITY BUILDING

Many countries do not have the technical ability andskills to take the actions required of them. The U.S.government has engaged in important capacity-buildinginitiatives with other governments to clamp down onterrorist financing activity. The State Department hasobligated more than $11.5 million for counterterroristfinance assistance since 2002. We have prioritizedcountries needing assistance and shaped programs basedon this prioritization. The FATF, G8 (Group of Eightindustrialized countries), United Nations Committee onCounterterrorism (CTC), International Monetary Fund,and World Bank are also pursuing and coordinating withus on efforts in this area.

In this context, I want to stress that our embassies aroundthe world have been essential in helping to develop andimplement all elements of this global strategy. This inputis invaluable as we craft objectives and we implementefforts to build our coalition and take effective actions.

RESULTS AND NEXT STEPS

Working with countries around the world, we have madeit more difficult for terrorists to collect and move funds.The European Union has designated for asset-freezingalmost all the names designated by the United States


under E.O. 13224. At the June 2004 U.S.-EU summit,the European Union committed to work actively with theUnited States to strengthen efforts against terroristfinancing. In the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America,and East Asia, states are working to deprive terrorists oftheir ability to raise funds in the region.

We have much work cut out for us, however. Terroristfinancing appears to be more decentralized thanpreviously, with money often sourced from charities,alternative remittance systems, and even crime, and themoney is often transported by courier. In the area of

training and technical assistance, international needsremain great.

Given that money is making its way into the hands ofterrorists around the world, the only way we will besuccessful in drying up their financial resources is throughcontinued, active international engagement withcountries around the globe. These efforts are succeeding,and they will continue to do so. ■


eJOURNAL USA

BUILDING A COUNTERTERRORISTFINANCE REGIME

The U.S. government helps foreign allies build theircapacity to prevent terrorists from using the internationalfinancial system to further their plots. The interagencyTerrorist Finance Working Group identifies those countriesmost needing such U.S. training and technical assistance.To fight terrorism successfully each country must developthe necessary legal framework, banking regulation,financial intelligence unit, law enforcement, and judicialprocess. The United States has provided capacity-buildinghelp to countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America,and the Middle East and has cooperated with regionalorganizations and international financial institutions.

Celina Realuyo serves as director of Counterterrorism Finance

Programs in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism. Her office is responsible for coordinating U.S.

counterterrorism policy and efforts with foreign governments to deter

terrorist financing.

In response to the 9/11, attacks, the U.S. governmentlaunched a global war on terrorism on five fronts:military, intelligence, law enforcement, financial, and

diplomatic. The United States developed acounterterrorism finance strategy based on three pillars todetect, dismantle, and deter terrorist financing networks.First, we conduct law enforcement and intelligenceoperations that bring terrorist financiers to justice.Second, we use public designations measures to name,shame, and block the assets of terrorist groups and theirsupporters. Third, we have developed capacity-buildingprograms to reinforce the institutions of our foreign alliesto proactively combat terrorist financing. While the firsttwo pillars are retrospective, investigating known fundingoperations after the fact, the third pillar of capacitybuilding focuses on enhancing countries’ capabilities tosafeguard international financial systems from abuse byterrorist financiers.

COORDINATING TRAINING AND

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the State Departmentspearheaded the creation of the Terrorist FinanceWorking Group (TFWG) to coordinate, develop, andprovide training and technical assistance to our foreignpartners deemed most vulnerable to terrorist financing.The TFWG, co-chaired by the State Department’s Officeof the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and theBureau for International Narcotics and Law EnforcementAffairs (INL), includes various U.S. government agenciesfrom the departments of State, Treasury, Justice, andHomeland Security and meets biweekly to receiveintelligence briefings, schedule assessment trips, reviewcountry reports, and discuss the development andimplementation of technical assistance and trainingprograms. This interagency group leveraged the U.S.government’s existing expertise in its efforts to combat

Celina Realuyo


eJOURNAL USA

money laundering and organized crime and was aimed ataddressing terrorist financing.

TARGETING ASSISTANCE

Inundated with requests for assistance from our foreignallies, the TFWG developed the following process toprioritize the use of our limited financial and humanresources to build comprehensive anti-money launderingand counterterrorist finance (AML/CTF) regimesthrough U.S. foreign assistance:

• Identify and prioritize countries needing the mostassistance to deal with terrorist financing with inputfrom the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

• Evaluate priority countries’ CTF regimes with a FinancialSystems Assessment Team (FSAT) comprising legal,financial, and law enforcement experts. The FSAT teamusually spends one week in country to meet with hostgovernment authorities from the ministries of justice,interior, and finance; law-enforcement authorities; thecentral bank, and the private sector to see how they addressmoney laundering and terrorist financing crimes.

• Prepare a formal assessment report on vulnerabilities toterrorist financing and make recommendations fortraining and technical assistance to addresses theseweaknesses. The team delivers its report in about amonth. The formal report is shared with the hostgovernment to gauge its receptivity to and coordinateU.S. offers of assistance.

• Develop a training implementation plan based on theserecommendations. Assistance programs from U.S.government experts may include legal drafting assistanceto ensure that the host nation’s legal regime meetsinternational standards, financial regulatory training,financial intelligence unit development, investigativetraining to “follow the money,” and judicial andprosecutorial training.

• Provide training and technical assistance to prioritycountries on establishing the legal framework tocriminalize money laundering and terrorist finance andthen train law-enforcement agents and prosecutors toapply the law. This assistance can be provided in thecountry, in the region, or in the United States.

• Encourage burden sharing in capacity building with ourallies, international financial institutions (InternationalMonetary Fund or IMF, World Bank, regionaldevelopment banks), and through internationalorganizations such as the U.N. Committee, FinancialAction Task Force (FATF) on money laundering, and G8.

BASIC TENETS OF AN EFFECTIVE REGIME

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its alliesquickly recognized the urgent need to detect, dismantle,and deter terrorist financing networks around the world.To this end, each country must develop the legal,financial regulatory, financial intelligence, law-enforcement, and prosecutorial capabilities andinstitutions to effectively combat terrorist financing andmoney laundering. The TFWG has organized anddeveloped U.S. training programs around these five basictenets of an effective counterterrorist finance regime.

I. Legal Framework to Criminalize TerroristFinancing. To comply with the U.N. Security CouncilResolution 1373 and the FATF eight SpecialRecommendations on Terrorist Financing, each state isrequired to criminalize terrorist financing and moneylaundering. Legislation should establish effective measuresto block and seize assets of terrorist financiers and theirsupporters. Each country should provide its lawenforcement agents and judicial branch with ampleauthority to pursue and prosecute terrorist financingcases. Every country should ratify the U.N. instrumentsrelated to terrorism at the earliest opportunity. Robustcounterterrorist financing and anti-money launderinglegislation provides a country with the requisite legalfoundation to combat money laundering and terroristfinancing.

The United States may provide technical assistance ondrafting legislation that criminalizes terrorism andterrorist financing to countries that request suchassistance through the Department of Justice and U.S.Agency for International Development. In certain cases,the United States can arrange for resident legal advisors toprovide assistance to judicial officials in their homecountry.

II. Financial Regulatory Supervision to ProtectIntegrity of the Banking System. Protecting thefinancial sector from terrorist financing and criminal


eJOURNAL USA

abuse is a key element in our CT Finance Training andTechnical Assistance strategy. Under internationalstandards, each country must determine which regulatoryagency will be responsible for banks’ and non-bankfinancial institutions’ compliance with measures tocombat terrorist financing. Governments should developstrict regulatory and anti-money laundering compliancemeasures and create a formal system for financialinstitutions to report suspicious activities to theregulatory agencies. Each country should establishpenalties such as monetary fines to ensure theeffectiveness of the compliance regime. The central bank,investment regulators, and other supervisory agenciesneed to educate the private sector as to possible abuse byterrorists.

The United States may provide assistance to strengthenthe financial regulatory regimes of countries that requestsuch assistance through our regulators including theFederal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Trainingincludes courses for bank examiners on reportingsuspicious activity reports and detecting terroristfinancing and money laundering schemes.

III. Financial Intelligence Unit as the Link Betweenthe Private and Public Sectors. Each country shouldestablish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) to collect,analyze, and disseminate financial intelligence and passlegislation to authorize such data collection. The FIUshould develop an efficient system for financialinstitutions and government regulatory agencies to reportsuspicious activities related to terrorist financing andmoney laundering to the FIU. The FIU should beresponsible for analyzing these suspicious activities reportsand refer cases to law-enforcement agencies forinvestigation. The FIU should establish appropriatechannels to share financial intelligence with its foreigncounterparts to assist with financial crime investigations.

The United States, through the Treasury DepartmentFinancial Crimes Enforcement Network, providestraining and technical assistance to foreign FIUs. Suchassistance includes provision of equipment, informationtechnology assessments, and specialized analyticalsoftware and analyst training for fledgling FIUs. TheUnited States is an active member of the Egmont Groupof FIUs and regularly sponsors aspiring members.

IV. Law Enforcement Investigations to Track DownTerrorist Financiers. Law enforcement agencies must begranted adequate legal authority to pursue financialcrimes including terrorist financing cases. Such authoritymay include the power to conduct undercover operationsand electronic surveillance to investigate financial crimes.Governments should establish specialized units andinteragency task forces to pursue terrorist financing cases.Law enforcement agencies should coordinateinvestigations and prosecutions of terrorist financing caseswith the judiciary branch.

The United States provides assistance programs in theform of financial investigative training to foreign law-enforcement agents who request such assistance. U.S.agencies — including the FBI, State Department’sDiplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programs,Internal Revenue Service Criminal InvestigationsDivision, and Bureau of Immigration and CustomsEnforcement — conduct training courses for their foreigncounterparts to develop the skills necessary to investigatefinancial crimes including terrorist financing.

V. Judicial/Prosecutorial Process to Bring TerroristFinanciers to Justice. Each government must determinewhich judicial unit will be responsible for prosecutingterrorist financing cases. Due to the complex technicalnature of terrorist financing cases, a well-trained team ofprosecutors familiar with financial crimes should beassembled to pursue these investigations. Judges andmagistrates need to familiarize themselves with terroristfinancing cases because they may not have tried suchcases in the past.

The United States may provide technical assistancethrough the Department of Justice to foreign allies’judicial authorities using case studies to demonstrate hownew counterterrorism finance legislation can be appliedand cases prosecuted successfully.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

Because globalization has facilitated the cross-bordermovement of people, products, and capital, the problemof terrorist financing must be addressed on a worldwidescale. The U.S. government sought early on to promoteinternational cooperation on the counterterrorismcapacity building front as a component of the global war


eJOURNAL USA

on terrorism. Accordingly, the Terrorist FinancingWorking Group recognized the financial and humanresource constraints on counterterrorism finance effortsand encouraged international burden sharing to delivertraining and technical assistance.

The United States has provided counterterrorism financeassistance to several countries in Africa, Asia, Europe,Latin America, and the Middle East on a bilateral andmultilateral basis. We have worked closely with the U.N.Counterterrorism Committee and U.N. Office of DrugControl Policy to coordinate requests and offers oftechnical assistance. The United States has supported keyinitiatives by FATF to strengthen anti-money launderingand counterterrorist finance regimes. Through the G8Counterterrorism Action Group, the United States iscoordinating its assistance to frontline states in variouscounterterrorism areas. The United States has also workedwith regional organizations such as the Organization ofAmerican States, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), and Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe to raise awareness of possible abuses byterrorist financiers. We are also cooperating with theinternational financial institutions, including the IMF,World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, oncounterterrorist finance projects that contribute to the

economic development and integrity of internationalmarkets. For example, at the Bangkok Leaders meeting inOctober 2003, APEC launched a counterterrorismcapacity-building initiative to secure the safe movementof people, goods, and money. The Regional Trade andFinancial Security Initiative was established under theauspices of the Asian Development Bank to providecapacity building in the areas of anti-money launderingand counterterrorist financing and aviation, port, andmaritime security.

CONCLUSION

To stem the flow of funds to terrorists, countries mustaddress the threat of terrorist financing domestically andinternationally to deny terrorist networks financing andsafe haven. Through capacity building, a country canreinforce its legal, financial regulatory, financialintelligence, law enforcement, and judicial capabilities tocombat terrorist financing. By leveraging its resources toassist countries with meeting the challenges posed byterrorist financing, the international community canbetter safeguard financial systems against abuse byterrorist financiers around the world. ■


eJOURNAL USA

After the terrorist bombings in Bali, the internationalcommunity came together to help Indonesia rapidlydevelop the capacity it needs to fight further terroristactivity. The United States, Japan, and Australia led amultilateral effort to provide law-enforcement trainingand bolster Indonesia's ability to combat terroristfinancing. The response by Indonesia and the donorcountries provides an example of how capacity buildingshould work.

Celina Realuyo serves as director of Counterterrorism Finance

Programs in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism. Her office is responsible for coordinating U.S.

counterterrorism policy Scott Stapleton, a State Department intern, is a

senior at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

The October 2002 Bali bombings and the responseby the Indonesian government and theinternational community to the attacks offer a

potent case study of counterterrorism financing strategy.This strategy has been transformed into action throughcomprehensive law enforcement, public designation, andcapacity building operations. On October 12, 2002,Indonesia experienced what was then the largest terroristattack since 9/11 the year before. The Bali bombingsabruptly woke Indonesia to the reality of internationalterrorism. In the aftermath of the bombings, Indonesiaworked tirelessly with its international partners tostrengthen its defenses against the threats of terror,including its efforts to stem the flow of funds toterrorists.

ARRESTING THOSE RESPONSIBLE

The Bali bombings began at 11:05 p.m. October 12,2002, when an explosive device was electronicallydetonated inside a crowded bar in the heart of the islandresort’s entertainment district. Seconds later, as victimsran from the site of the first explosion, a minivan packedwith explosives detonated nearby. Terrorists hadstrategically targeted young tourists at popular nightspots,leaving 202 people killed, including 88 Australians, 38Indonesians, and seven Americans. The devastatingattack on innocent civilians was compounded bydramatic economic consequences for Indonesia. Theterrorist operation, which cost about $35,000, shatteredBali’s tourist industry, leading to losses estimated in themillions of dollars. Indonesia, unprepared to counter thegrowing dangers posed by terrorist groups, eagerly met acoalition of countries willing and able to provideextensive guidance and assistance on counterterrorism.

With the aid of its international allies, Indonesia quicklylaunched a credible and professional law enforcementcampaign to investigate and capture the terrorists

RESPONSE TO BALI: ANINTERNATIONAL SUCCESS STORY

Celina Realuyo and Scott Stapleton


eJOURNAL USA

responsible for the attack. Australian and U.S. law-enforcement experts were deployed to Indonesia to assistwith the various aspects of the Bali bombinginvestigation, from identifying the victims to followingthe money trail. To date, 80 Jemaah Islamiya membershave been arrested in conjunction with the Balioperation. As a result of coordinated law enforcementefforts to prepare sound evidentiary packages, Indonesianjudicial authorities have successfully prosecuted the Balibombing perpetrators and delivered 33 convictions,including three death and numerous life sentences as ofJune 2004.

JEMAAH ISLAMIYA PUBLIC DESIGNATION

Jemaah Islamiya (JI), an al-Qaida-linked terrorist networkbased in Southeast Asia, was initially connected to theattack. JI is committed to the creation of an Islamiccaliphate in Southeast Asia. Though little is known aboutthe number of JI numbers, they receive substantialcontributions from Middle Eastern and Southeast Asiansupporters, including al-Qaida. JI recruited and trainedextremists throughout the 1990s, resulting in a series ofattacks that began in 2000.

In the wake of the bombings, international outrageresulted in an immediate response. On October 23,2002, a partnership of 52 countries requested orsupported the United Nations terrorist designation ofJemaah Islamiya. More than 150 jurisdictions have agreedto block the assets of JI-related targets. This designationrepresented the broadest and most conspicuous allianceagainst a terror group since the designation of al-Qaidaand the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks. U.N. memberswere mandated to freeze and capture assets linked to JI.International public designations serve as an effective toolof the “name and shame” strategy to limit JI’smaneuverability.

To underscore the importance of internationalcooperation to combat terrorism and revive the localeconomy, Indonesia and Australia co-hosted a Conferenceon Combating Money Laundering and TerroristFinancing December 17-18, 2002, with participants from33 countries and 14 international organizations. Theconference applauded international action through theUnited Nations to designate Jemaah Islamiya and calledfor increased international cooperation through law

enforcement, intelligence, and capacity buildingoperations in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

COUNTERTERRORISM CAPACITY BUILDING

Law Enforcement Training. Immediately following theBali bombings, the United States, Japan, and Australia leda multilateral effort to assist Indonesia in counteringterror. Faced with a very real threat, Indonesia has workedhard to build the capacity to prevent future terroristattacks. In 2003, the State Department Office of theCoordinator for Counterterrorism planned and budgetedfor the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Securityto implement an $8 million anti-terrorism assistanceprogram to train, equip, and organize a counter-terrorismunit within the Indonesian National Police. Thespecialized unit is known as Special Detachment 88 (SD-88). Sixty-nine police officers have already been trainedby the United States, with additional programs expectedto instruct 279 officers by 2005. SD-88 has begun tointegrate with Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya Task Force,fortifying Indonesia’s defenses against Southeast Asia’sprimary terrorist threat. Furthermore, the Department ofDefense’s Regional Defense Counter-terrorism FellowshipProgram has spent $2.3 million training 78 Indonesianintelligence officers in English language, militaryprofessionalism, and counterterrorism-related courses.

Counterterrorism Finance Assistance. In addition tocapacity building in the law enforcement arena,multilateral assistance to Indonesia has included a broadeffort to help defend the financial system against abusesby terrorists. More than $820,000 has been obligated toU.S. agencies for counterterrorist financing/anti-moneylaundering (CTF/AML) technical assistance and trainingto Indonesia. In September 2002, a month before theBali bombings, the United States took initial stepstowards CTF/AML capacity building with a roughassessment of Indonesia’s financial counterterrorismregime. A second team of experts was sent onsite tofurther evaluate Indonesia’s capabilities in September2003. Indonesia has made significant progress inreinforcing its ability to combat terrorist financing in thefive key elements for an effective counterterroristfinancing regime.

1. Legal Framework: Successful prosecution of terroristsrelies on a strong legal framework, and the United Statesand its partners have assisted Indonesia in developing


strong AML/CT laws. Since July 2002, the United Stateshas been training Indonesian and other Southeast Asianjudicial authorities in drafting and amending legislationthat would enable them to adopt the U.N. conventionsrelated to terrorism and comply with U.N. SecurityCouncil Resolution 1373 to criminalize terroristfinancing and money laundering. The U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID) and its Australiancounterpart have been delivering legal drafting assistanceto the Indonesian Central Bank and its FinancialIntelligence Unit to promote economic and financialreforms. Indonesia had a weak track record in counteringfinancial crimes and was added to the Financial ActionTask Force (FATF) list of Non-Cooperating Countriesand Territories in 2001. However, in September 2003,technical assistance from a U.S. interagency team helpedIndonesia adequately amend its anti-money launderinglegislation to meet international standards and avoidfurther FATF countermeasures. As a result of thislegislative progress, FATF is now monitoring theimplementation of the AML law.

2. Financial/Regulatory: Central banks are instrumentalin monitoring and suspending money flows to terroristgroups. Indonesia has been working with the AsianDevelopment Bank and other international donors to

modernize its financial sector.In October 2003, Indonesiancentral bankers participatedin a financial regulatorycourse provided by the StateDepartment’s Bureau forInternational Narcotics andLaw Enforcement Affairs andthe U.S. Office of theComptroller of the Currency.This workshop for SoutheastAsian central bankersprovided technical assistanceto bank regulators on how tocombat terrorist financingand money laundering andhow to detect suspiciousactivities in private banks.This training led to BankIndonesia devising acompliance audit program for

AML/CTF and plans to conduct full onsite supervisionand examination of banks beginning later this year.

3. Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU): Bali’s remotelocation and inadequate preparedness for a large-scaleattack meant that national and international lawenforcement agents could not rely solely on crime sceneevidence to track and catch the responsible terrorists.One of the most powerful investigative tools in the Balibombings was the analysis of communication andfinancial transactions between JI members. In an effort tostrengthen this critical component of Indonesia’s war onterror, we have worked closely with our partners fromAustralia’s financial intelligence unit to develop theIndonesian FIU. The United States invited theIndonesian FIU to participate in a one-week trainingseminar entitled “Basic Analysis and SuspiciousTransaction Reporting” for FIU personnel and othergovernment officials responsible for combating moneylaundering and terrorist financing. Sponsored byMalaysia’s Southeast Asian Regional Centre forCounterterrorism in August 2003, the conference waspart of an ongoing regional effort to cooperate andcoordinate with neighboring governments oncounterterrorism. Through a grant from the USAID toprocure essential information technology equipment, theUnited States directly assisted Indonesia’s FIU in October2003 to bring its electronic reporting system online to

eJOURNAL USA

Aftermath of October 2002 terrorist bombing in Bali that killed 202.


AP/

Wid

e W

orld

Pho

tos

eJOURNAL USA

collect suspicious transaction reports from the privatesector. With this assistance from the United States andAustralia, Indonesia’s FIU hit a major milestone in June2004 when it officially became a member of the EgmontGroup of FIUs.

4. Law Enforcement: In January 2004, the FBI TerroristFinancing Operations Section conducted training courseson terrorist financing and money launderinginvestigations for 69 Indonesian National Police andother officials responsible for combating moneylaundering and terrorist financing. In an attempt to fosterinteragency cooperation in terrorist financing cases,participants included personnel from the IndonesianNational Police SD-88 counterterrorism unit, financialcrimes unit, and financial intelligence unit. As a result ofthis training, Indonesian law enforcement authoritieshave initiated 30 money laundering investigations, two-thirds of which have been referred to the AttorneyGeneral’s Office.

5. Prosecutorial/Judicial Process: The Department ofJustice’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistanceand Training division will assign a resident legal advisorin Jakarta to work with the host government in applying

the new counterterrorism and anti-money launderinglegislation. The resident legal advisor would assist withthe future passage and application of new mutual legalassistance legislation.

CONCLUSION

In the face of continued threat of attack by SoutheastAsian terror networks like Jemaah Islamiya, Indonesia hasworked with the United States, Australia, and Japan,among other allies, to reinforce its counterterrorismregime. Through law enforcement operations and publicdesignations, Indonesia responded quickly to the Balibombings and made significant strides in rooting out theJI cell responsible for those attacks. Training and capacitybuilding provided by the U.S. government and otherinternational donors has had a significant impact onIndonesia’s ability to prevent and respond to terroristfinancing and international terrorism in general. Fromlaw enforcement programs to a comprehensive overhaulof financial and legal structures, Indonesia has benefitedsignificantly from the continuing assistance of its alliesand serves as a positive example of international capacitybuilding efforts. ■


eJOURNAL USA

The American Bankers Association (ABA) supports thegoal of the USA PATRIOT Act to curb terrorist financingand is particularly pleased that it extends to all financialinstitutions anti-money laundering requirements thatpreviously applied only to banks. Implementing the lawhas revealed weaknesses, however, related to detecting thoseroutine and often small transactions that terroriststypically have employed. The ABA advocates moresharing of intelligence about terrorists with the financialcommunity.

John J. Byrne serves as director of the American Bankers Association’s

Center for Regulatory Compliance.

While the U.S. banking industry has a longhistory of supporting law enforcement inareas such as money laundering, Washington's

efforts to curb terrorist financing through stricter bankingrules are well intentioned but may miss the mark unlessthe government increases its commitment to providebanks with the intelligence they need.

The U.S. Congress responded to the tragic events of 9/11by passing the 300-page law known as the USAPATRIOT Act. Acting in three weeks’ time and withoverwhelming bipartisan support, Congress clearly wishedto enact useful and helpful legislation to address thescourge of terrorist financing. Most of the provisions,however, failed to address that particular crime.

Were these new laws necessary, or did we simply needmore government intelligence? The post-9/11 briefingsfrom law enforcement make it clear that, for the mostpart, the type of financial transactions that the hijackersutilized are not adequately addressed by the USAPATRIOT Act. The fact is that U.S. financialinstitutions, without additional government intelligence,cannot detect or prevent transactions related to terroristfinancing.

This article will examine how the challenges facing theU.S. financial sector have changed since the passage ofthe USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001 and what elsecan be done to stop the flow of the financial resources toterrorists.

THE PATRIOT ACT

It is clear that the lion’s share of the PATRIOT Actprovisions addressing the financial industry (title III) wereleft over from previous unsuccessful legislative vehiclescovering traditional money laundering. Despite lingeringquestions on how the law would be implemented and

John J. Byrne

BANKS AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT


eJOURNAL USA

whether it would effectively address terrorist financing,the American Bankers Association (ABA) activelysupported the PATRIOT Act because it covered a myriadof new financial service providers that previously did nothave anti-money laundering (AML) obligations, and itcontained several other new provisions long advocated bythe industry.

The key provisions of the act related to banking (andemphasized by the congressional committees responsiblefor authorship) include:

• making bulk cash smuggling a crime and requiringregistration of black market underground financialnetworks

• modernizing anti-counterfeiting laws to prohibit U.S.financial institutions from providing financial services toforeign "shell" banks

• expanding public-private partnerships to help lawenforcement identify, track, and stop terrorists’ financialactivities

• reporting “in real time” suspicious financial activity tolaw enforcement agencies

• requiring financial institutions to verify the identity oftheir new account holders, and

• requiring customers to provide financial institutionswith truthful information when opening accounts

Most important to the banking industry was theprovision that required all financial institutions toinstitute anti-money laundering compliance programs, abank requirement since 1987.

WHAT CHANGED FOR BANKS?

As far as the practical effect of these new laws, most ofthe provisions simply expand obligations that were part ofthe AML regulatory oversight process. For example, thereare provisions that require due diligence for privatebanking activities or correspondent bank relationships.The federal banking agencies must review and criticizebanks that fail to cover those “risky” relationships withenhanced due diligence.

One of the new obligations under title III is section 326,which requires financial institutions to have account

opening procedures or a “customer identificationprogram.” Banks and some covered financial institutionssuch as securities firms, mutual funds, and commodityfutures traders (insurance companies are pending) have toobtain four pieces of information (name, address, date ofbirth, and government identifiers such as social securitynumbers) and attempt to verify that information.Because banks have been requesting identification ofcustomers since the beginning of banking, this newobligation is a formalization of business as usual.

What do the changes mean for the internationalcommunity?

What you may see is that a U.S. institution will want botha primary and a secondary form of identification of apotential foreign account holder. The problem with thatapproach is that, because many different forms ofidentification are unfamiliar to U.S. institutions, banks maybe reluctant to open certain accounts. In addition, there arecontinuing issues with remote account openings since thereare currently no public databases containing information toverify the identification of foreign individuals as there arefor U.S. individuals. Therefore, in order to maintainrelationships with U.S. financial institutions, potentialforeign account holders will have to work closely with theinstitutions to ensure continued relationships.

PATRIOT ACT COMPLIANCE

Given the increased attention to due diligence, whatexactly do U.S. regulators expect banks to do to performadequate compliance? One example is unless there is afinding by the secretary of the Treasury that certainjurisdictions cause money laundering concerns for thegovernment, as was the case with areas such as Nauru,Ukraine, and Burma, the industry must look to othersources of information to determine whether there is arisk involved when dealing with certain jurisdictions.

One such source is the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) and its list of non-cooperative countries(NCCT). An NCCT designation means that the countryhad weak or non-existent laws regarding moneylaundering prevention. Since 2000 there have been 24jurisdictions designated as non-cooperative. Since banksare required to carry out increased due diligence on thesecountries, it is important to stay abreast of thesedesignations.


eJOURNAL USA

It should be emphasized that financial institutions canstill do business with an entity in a non-cooperativecountry, but they will be criticized for not spending moretime reviewing the accounts in those institutions. So for arisk assessment to comply with the elements of this newlaw, regulators expect a bank to review publicly availableinformation. The problem with this is that it really doesnot assist a bank in preventing terrorist financing.

FINANCIAL PROFILE OF 9/11 CRIMINALS

Our association was briefed by federal law enforcementofficials on the various methods of how terrorists used thefinancial system prior to 9/11. One major theme shouldbe clear: it does not cost much to rent a car, stay at ahotel, or buy a plane ticket. Therefore, terrorist financingtransactions, by their very nature, are routine and are notthe same as the elements of traditional money laundering.

The recently completed 9/11 Commission concluded “thatthe 9/11 attacks cost somewhere between $400,000 and$500,000 to execute.” In addition, the 9/11 criminals’ useof financial institutions was described as follows:

• Accounts were checking accounts of around $3,000.

• Applications indicated that the accountholders were“students.”

• Identification used were visas issued by United ArabEmirates, Saudi Arabia, and Germany.

• Accounts were opened within 30 days of entering thecountry.

• Account holders checked their balances at ATMsseveral times a day.

According to the 9/11 Commission:

The conspiracy made extensive use of banks inthe United States, both branches of majorinternational banks and smaller regional banks.All of the operatives opened accounts in their ownnames, using passports and other identificationdocuments. There is no evidence that they ever used false social security numbers to open any bank accounts. Their transactions were unremarkable and essentially invisible amidst thebillions of dollars flowing around the world every day.

In short, we believe that financial institutions could nothave detected the 9/11 attackers’ criminal activitieswithout additional and specific government intelligence.Low dollar accounts cannot be effectively monitored, andcreating a system to assess how often someone engages ina “transaction inquiry” at an ATM is not practical. Inaddition, since the identification utilized by the terroristswas not false, improved identification procedures that arerequired under the PATRIOT Act, while useful toprevent identity theft, would not have prevented access toa financial institution. We have learned some importantlessons from the briefing mentioned above and ABA nowrecommends that banks not accept visas as a primaryform of identification.

PATRIOT ACT AS PREVENTION TOOL

One section of the USA PATRIOT Act that can addressthe amorphous concept of terrorist financing is Section314(a). The 314 process requires financial institutions tosearch accounts for potential matches to names ongovernment investigative lists. Under this provision:

• 314(a) requests are sent from the U.S. Treasury’sFinancial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) andbatched and issued every two weeks, unless otherwiseindicated in the request.


President Bush signs the anti-terrorism bill into law during an October

2002 ceremony in the White House East Room.

AP

Phot

o/D

oug

Mill

s

• After receiving a 314(a) request, financial institutionshave two weeks to complete their searches and respondwith any matches.

• Searches will be limited to specific records and, unlessotherwise noted, will be one-time searches.

• If a financial institution identifies a match for a namedsubject, the institution need only respond to FinCENthat it has a match and provide point-of-contactinformation for the requesting law enforcement agencyto follow up directly with the institution.

On the whole, these provisions are the most effectivemeans of detecting terrorist financing because theindustry is simply looking for names of individuals beinginvestigated by the government for terrorist activity. Forexample, according to FinCEN, between April 1, 2003,and April 26, 2004, the Internal Revenue Servicesubmitted 16 requests to FinCEN pertaining to 66individuals and 17 businesses. These requests generated646 positive matches with more than 1,274 financialinstitutions. Since Section 314(a)’s creation, the systemhas been used to send the names of 1,547 personssuspected of terrorism financing or money laundering tomore than 26,000 financial institutions and has produced10,560 matches that were passed on to law enforcement.

OTHER OPTIONS

As we grapple with how to prevent terrorist financingfrom entering the legitimate financial system, what isavailable beyond the section 314 process? Clearly, the newobligations under the USA PATRIOT Act do not directlyaddress the nature of how monies enter a system tosupport terrorism. The various sources for banks are theFATF “typologies” on terrorist financing and similarexamples provided by U.S. law enforcement agencies suchas FinCEN. What do they tell us? For example, a focuson charitable organizations or “non-profit organizations”(NPOs) is a constant theme.

According to FATF:

Most countries share the concern over the difficulties in detecting terrorist financing through misuse of NPOs. It is generally acknowledged that such organizations play a crucial social and financial support role in all societies, and obviously this role is not called into question. Nevertheless, the sheer volume of funds and other assets held by the NPO sector means that the diversion of even a very small percentage of these funds to support terrorism would constitute a grave problem. Therefore, the limited knowledge about the extent to which terrorists may be exploiting the sector should be considered a matter of serious concern for the internationalcommunity.

All this emphasizes that we are in a different world now,and the tracing or monitoring of monies for terroristactivities is not a simple task.

CONCLUSION

Much has been written about the PATRIOT Act and thenecessity of quickly enacting laws to address terrorism.Debate still rages on whether the legislative response wasappropriate to the attacks. On a positive note, it shouldbe emphasized that the ABA supported the PATRIOTAct because it accomplished what other proposals inprevious times could not — requiring non-bankinstitutions to have AML programs and procedures. Tostem the financing of terrorism, however, governmentmust commit to providing up-to-date intelligence to thefinancial sector. We have seen the beginning of thatprocess, but it must be increased. Any other strategy isdoomed to fail. ■

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views orpolicies of the U.S. government.


Hawala is one of a number of informal systems used inmany regions around the world to transfer moneydomestically or across borders, often in cash. Regulation ofhawala is complex and demands a practical understandingof the environment in each country where hawala dealerswork. Regulation should attempt not to eliminate hawalabut to prevent such misuse as financing terrorism.

Mohammed El-Qorchi is deputy area chief in the InternationalMonetary Fund’s Monetary and Financial Systems Department. Thetext presented here has been adapted from his article in the December2002 issue of Finance and Development, IMF’s quarterly magazine.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the UnitedStates, public interest in informal systems oftransferring money around the world, particularly

the hawala system, has increased. The reason is thehawala system’s alleged role in financing illegal andterrorist activities, along with its traditional role oftransferring money between individuals and families,often in different countries. Against this background,governments and international bodies have tried todevelop a better understanding of these systems, assesstheir economic and regulatory implications, and designthe most appropriate approach for dealing with them.

Informal funds transfer (IFT) systems are in use inmany regions for transferring funds, both domesticallyand internationally. The hawala system is one of theIFT systems that exist under different names in variousregions of the world. It is important, however, todistinguish the hawala system from the term hawala,which means “transfer” or “wire” in Arabic bankingjargon. The hawala system refers to an informalchannel for transferring funds from one location toanother through service providers — known ashawaladars — regardless of the nature of thetransaction and the countries involved. While hawalatransactions are mostly initiated by emigrant workersliving in a developed country, the hawala system canalso be used to send funds from a developing country,even though the purpose of the funds transfer is usuallydifferent (see box).

Why Hawala Developed

In earlier times, IFT systems were used for tradefinancing. They were created because of the dangers oftraveling with gold and other forms of payment onroutes beset with bandits. Local systems were widelyused in China and other parts of East Asia andcontinue to be in use there. They go under various


HAWALA: BASED ON TRUST, SUBJECT TO ABUSE

Mohammed El-Qorchi

names — Fei-Ch’ien (China),Padala (Philippines), Hundi(India), Hui Kuan (Hong Kong),and Phei Kwan (Thailand). Thehawala (or hundi) system nowenjoys widespread use but ishistorically associated with SouthAsia and the Middle East. Atpresent, its primary users aremembers of expatriatecommunities who migrated toEurope, the Persian Gulf region,and North America and sendremittances to their relatives onthe Indian subcontinent, EastAsia, Africa, Eastern Europe, andelsewhere. These emigrantworkers have reinvigorated thesystem’s role and importance.While hawala is used for thelegitimate transfer of funds, itsanonymity and minimaldocumentation have also made itvulnerable to abuse by individualsand groups transferring funds tofinance illegal activities.

Economic and cultural factorsexplain the attractiveness of thehawala system. It is less expensive,swifter, more reliable, moreconvenient, and less bureaucraticthan the formal financial sector.Hawaldars charge fees orsometimes use the exchange ratespread to generate income. Thefees charged by hawaladars on thetransfer of funds are lower thanthose charged by banks and otherremitting companies, thanksmainly to minimal overheadexpenses and the absence ofregulatory costs to the hawaladars,who often operate other smallbusinesses. To encourage foreignexchange transfers through theirsystem, hawaladars sometimesexempt expatriates from paying

fees. In contrast, theyreportedly charge higher feesto those who use the systemto avoid exchange, capital, oradministrative controls. Thesehigher fees often cover all theexpenses of the hawaladars. The system is swifter thanformal financial transfersystems partly because of thelack of bureaucracy and thesimplicity of its operatingmechanism; instructions aregiven to correspondents byphone, facsimile, or e-mail;and funds are often delivereddoor to door within 24 hoursby a correspondent who hasquick access to villages even inremote areas. The minimaldocumentation andaccounting requirements, thesimple management, and thelack of bureaucraticprocedures help reduce thetime needed for transferoperations.

In addition to economicfactors, kinship, ethnic ties,and personal relationsbetween hawaladars andexpatriate workers make thissystem convenient and easy touse. The flexible hours andproximity of hawaladars areappreciated by expatriatecommunities. Toaccommodate their clients,hawaladars may instruct theircounterparts to deliver fundsto beneficiaries beforeexpatriate workers makepayments. Moreover, culturalconsiderations encourageexpatriate workers to remitfunds through the hawalasystem, and such


HOW DOES THE SYSTEM WORK?

Aperson in Country A wants to sendfunds to a person in country B. Heinitiates the transaction by giving the

money to a hawaladar in country A and receivesfrom the hawaladar an authentication code.The hawaladar in country A then instructs thehawaladar in country B to deliver an equivalentamount of funds in the local currency to theintended beneficiary. To receive the funds, thebeneficiary must disclose the authenticationcode given to the customer in country A.

The hawaladar in country A can becompensated by charging a fee or through anexchange rate spread (the difference betweenthe asking and buying price of a currency).After the remittance, the hawaladar in countryA has a liability to his country B counterpart,which is satisfied with a payment of money orwith goods and services.

The settlement of the liability also can be donethrough a “reverse hawala” or through importsof goods. A reverse hawala transaction is oftenused for investment purposes or to covertravel, medical, or education expenses from adeveloping country. In a country subject toforeign exchange and capital controls, acustomer in country B interested in paying hisson’s university tuition fees, for example,provides local currency to the hawaladar in hiscountry and requests that the equivalentamount be made available to the customer’sson in country A. The hawaladar in country Bmay transfer funds directly to his counterpartin country A or use this transaction to settlehis previous claims on the hawaladar incountry A. He may also instruct an indebtedhawaladar in country A to transfer funds toanother hawaladar in a third country to wherefunds are to be delivered to settle thistransaction. Furthermore, the settlement canalso take place through import transactions;the hawaladar in country A would settle hisdebt by financing exports to country B wherethe hawaladar in country B would be theimporter or an intermediary.

considerations also apply to family members in thehome country. Many expatriate communities areexclusively male because wives and other familymembers remain in the home country, where familytraditions prevail. These traditions may require familymembers, especially women, to maintain minimalcontacts with the outside world. A trusted hawaladar,known in the village and aware of the social codes,would be an acceptable intermediary, protectingwomen from having direct dealings with banks andother agents. Thus, a system based on national, ethnic,and village solidarity depends more on absolute trustbetween the participants than on legal documents.

On the receiving side, repressive financial policies andinefficient banking institutions, which have oftenlacked interest in the remittance business, havecontributed to the development of IFT systems. Inaddition to overly restrictive economic policies,unstable political situations have offered fertile groundfor the development of the hawala and other informalsystems. Most IFT systems have prospered in areascharacterized by unsophisticated official systems andduring times of instability. They continue to develop inregions where financial development has been slow orrepressed. Overall, financial development tends tocheck the spread of informal fund transfer systems,even though they exist in financially mature countriesas well.

Economic Implications

Despite its informality, the hawala system has directand indirect macroeconomic implications — forfinancial activity as well as for fiscal performance. Oneaspect is its potential impact on the monetary accountsof countries on either end of the hawala transaction.Because these transactions are not reflected in officialstatistics, the remittance of funds from one country toanother is not recorded as an increase in the recipientcountry’s foreign assets or in the remitting country’sliabilities, unlike funds transferred through the formalsector. As a consequence, value changes hands, but thebroad measure of money is unaltered. However, hawalatransactions may affect the composition of broadmoney in a recipient country. In the remittancebusiness, such transactions are conducted mainly incash, even though hawaladars may use the banking

system for other purposes. Individuals from developingcountries who transfer funds abroad through thehawala system for investment or other purposes areusually members of wealthy groups. They supply localhawaladars with cash by making withdrawals fromtheir bank accounts. As a consequence, hawala-typetransactions tend to increase the amount of cash incirculation. Furthermore, IFT systems have fiscalimplications for both remitting and receiving countriesbecause no direct or indirect tax is paid on hawalatransactions. The negative impact on governmentrevenue applies equally to both legitimate andillegitimate activities that involve the hawala system.

Hawala transactions cannot be reliably quantifiedbecause records are virtually inaccessible, especially forstatistical or balance of payments purposes. This holdstrue for both the remitting and, especially, the receivingsides of the transactions. Hawala transactions fromdeveloping countries are sometimes driven by capitalflight motivations; they may also be driven by a desireto circumvent exchange control regulations and thelike, leaving no traceable records. Nevertheless, theauthorities of some countries have sporadically madeestimates of hawala activity based on their expatriatepopulations and balance of payments data. In any case,all crude estimates should take into account bothhawala and reverse hawala transactions (see box) as wellas transactions driven by illicit activities. Although itwould be impossible to provide a precise figure, theamounts involved in hawala transactions are likely toentail billions of dollars.

DIFFICULTIES FOR REGULATORS

There is also a consensus that, in the wake ofheightened international efforts to combat moneylaundering and terrorist financing, more should bedone to keep an eye on IFT systems to avoid theirmisuse by illicit groups. Policymakers believe that thepotential anonymity afforded by these systems presentsrisks of money laundering and terrorist financing thatneed to be addressed. Yet selecting the appropriateregulatory and supervisory response requires a realisticand practical assessment and an understanding of thespecific country environment in which the IFT dealersoperate.


Regulation of IFT systems in various jurisdictions willbe a complex endeavor. The variety of legal systems andeconomic circumstances across countries make auniform approach technically and legally impractical.In a number of countries, the hawala system isprohibited. Any attempt to regulate this system in thesecountries would, therefore, be at odds with existinglaws and regulations and would be seen as legitimizingparallel foreign exchange operations and capital flight.

Where IFT regulations are conceivable, there isagreement that overregulation and coercive measureswill not be effective because they might push IFTbusinesses, including legitimate ones, furtherunderground. The purpose of any approach is not toeliminate these systems but to avoid their misuse.Against this background, policymakers tend to favortwo options, which are already in force in somecountries: registration or licensing of IFT systems.

While these measures could deter illegal activities, theywill not, in isolation, succeed in reducing theattractiveness of the hawala system. As a matter of fact,as long as there are reasons for people to prefer suchsystems, they will continue to exist and even expand. Ifthe formal banking sector intends to compete with theinformal remittance business, it should focus onimproving the quality of its service and reducing thefees charged. Therefore, a longer-term and sustainedeffort should be aimed at modernizing and liberalizingthe formal financial sector, with a view to addressing itsinefficiencies and weaknesses. ■

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views orpolicies of the U.S. government.



HIZBALLAH SMOKESCREENMoney from bootlegged cigarettes went into the pockets of terrorists

Between 1996 and 2000, a group ofindividuals affiliated with Hizballahused bulk cash to purchase about $8million in cigarettes in NorthCarolina, where the cigarette tax is 5cents per pack.

They then traveled to sell thecigarettes in Michigan, where thecigarette tax is 75 cents per pack.The group was able to avoid payingthe tax to the state of Michigan,pocketing the difference in pricesbetween the two states.

Estimated Profit: $1.5 million.A portion was sent to Hizballah inLebanon as cash and goods.

Source: Reprinted from Government Accountability Office report “Terrorist Financing” (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf).

Tax is 5 centsper pack

A portion of theestimated $1.5 million profit

Tax is 75 centsper pack

LEBANON

Bayrut (Beirut)

MICHIGAN

NORTHCAROLINA

Department Bureau/division/office Role

eJOURNAL USA

Central Intelligence

Agency

Homeland

Security

Justice

National Security

Council

State

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection

Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE - formerly part of the

Treasury’s U.S. Customs Service)

U.S. Secret Service

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and

Explosives (ATF)

Civil Division

Criminal Division

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

Leads gathering, analyzing, and disseminating

intelligence on foreign terrorist organizations and their

financing mechanisms; charged with promoting

coordination and information-sharing between all

intelligence community agencies.

Detects movement of bulk cash across U.S. borders and

maintains data about movement of commodities into and

out of the United States.

Participates in investigations of terrorist financing cases

involving U.S. border activities and the movement of

trade, currency, or commodities.

Participates in investigations of terrorist financing cases,

including those involving counterfeiting.


involving alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives.

Defends challenges to terrorist designations.

Develops, coordinates, and prosecutes terrorist financing

cases; participates in financial analysis and develops

relevant financial tools; promotes international efforts and

delivers training to other nations.


involving narcotics and other illicit drugs.

Leads all terrorist financing investigations and operations;

primary responsibility for collecting foreign intelligence

and counterintelligence information within the United

States.

Manages the overall interagency framework for combating

terrorism.

Chairs coalition subgroup of a National Security Council

Policy Coordinating Committee, which leads U.S

government efforts to develop strategies and activities to

obtain international cooperation.


ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIESKey U.S. government players in the fight against terrorist finance

Department Bureau/division/office Role

eJOURNAL USA

Treasury

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs

Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism

Executive Office for Terrorist Financing

and Financial Crime

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

(FinCEN)

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal

Investigation

IRS Tax Exempt and Government Entities

Office of Foreign Assets Control

Office of the General Counsel

Office of International Affairs

Implements U.S. technical assistance and training to

foreign governments on terrorist financing.

Coordinates U.S. counterterrorism policy and efforts with

foreign governments to deter terrorist financing.

Develops U.S. strategies and policies to deter terrorist

financing, domestically and internationally; develops and

implements the National Money Laundering Strategy as

well as other policies and programs to prevent financial

crimes.

Supports law enforcement investigations to prevent and

detect money laundering, terrorist financing, and other

financial crime through use of analytical tools and

information-sharing mechanisms; administers the Bank

Secrecy Act.


with an emphasis on charitable organizations.

Administers the eligibility requirements and other IRS tax

law that apply to charitable and other organizations that

claim exemption from federal income tax.

Develops and implements U.S. strategies and policies to

deter terrorist financing; imposes controls on transactions;

and freezes foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction.

Chairs Policy Coordination Committee for Terrorist

Financing, which coordinates U.S. government efforts to

identify and deter terrorist financing; coordinates U.S.

government actions regarding implementation of, and

imposition of, economic sanctions under Executive Order

13224 with respect to the freezing of terrorist-related

assets.

Provides advice, training, and technical assistance to

nations on issues including terrorist financing deterrence.

Source: Reprinted from Government Accountability Office report “Terrorist Financing” (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf).


Bantekas, Ilias. “The International Law of Terrorist Financing,”American Journal of International Law, vol. 97, no. 2, April2003, pp. 315-333.

Council on Foreign Relations. Terrorist Financing; Report of anIndependent Task Force, Sponsored by the Council on ForeignRelations. New York: CFR, 2002. http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Terrorist_Financing_TF.pdf

Council on Foreign Relations. Update on the Global CampaignAgainst Terrorist Financing; Second Report of an IndependentTask Force on Terrorist Financing. New York: CFR, 2004. http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Revised_Terrorist_Financing.pdf

El-Qorchi, Muhammed. “Hawala: How Does This InformalFunds Transfer System Work, and Should It Be Regulated?,”Finance & Development, December 2002, pp. 31-33.

Farah, Douglas. Blood From Stones: The Secret FinancialNetwork of Terror. New York: Broadway Books, 2004.

Francis, David R. “The War on Terror Money,” ChristianScience Monitor, April 8, 2004, p.14.

Jackson, James K. The Financial Action Task Force: AnOverview. Washington, DC: Library of Congress,Congressional Research Service, 6 August 2004. 6 p.

Levitt, Matthew. “Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing:Practical and Conceptual Challenges,” Fletcher Forum of WorldAffairs, vol. 27, no. 1, Winter-Spring, 2003, pp. 59-70.

Masciandaro, Donato, ed. Global Financial Crime: Terrorism,Money Laundering and Offshore Centers. Aldershoy [UK] andBurlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004.

Meyer, Josh. “Cutting Money Flow to Terrorists Proves Difficult,”Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2003, A1.p.

Napoleoni, Loretta. Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behindthe Terror Networks. London, UK and Sterling, VA: Pluto,2003.

Norgren, Chris. “The Control of Risks Associated with Crime,Terror and Subversion,” Journal of Money Laundering Control,vol. 7, no. 3, Winter 2004, pp. 201-205.

Pieth, Mark, ed. Financing Terrorism. Dordrecht [Neth] andBoston [MA]: Kluwer Academic, 2002.

Prados, Alfred B. and Christopher M. Blanchard. Saudi Arabia:Terrorist Financing Issues, Washington, DC: Library ofCongress, Congressional Research Service, 5 August 2004. 20 p.

Roth, John, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille. NationalCommision on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to theCommission, by John Roth, Washington, DC: The Commission,[2004].http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf

Sanderson, Thomas M. “Transnational Terror and OrganizedCrime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter2004, pp. 49-61.

Taylor, Robert M. “Anti-Money and Anti-Terrorist FinancingRequirements Applicable to Financial Institutions,” Banking LawJournal, vol. 120, no. 6, June 2003, pp. 497-504.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Strategy forCombating Terrorism. Washington, DC: CIA, 2003. http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/publications/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. The9/11 Commission Report: Identifying and Preventing TerroristFinancing; hearing, 108th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington,DC: Government Printing Office, 2004.http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=329

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs.Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization, and Prevention;hearing, 108th Congress, 1st Session.

eJOURNAL USA

BIBLIOGRAPHYAdditional readings on terrorist financing


Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004.http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:89039.wais [Text version]http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:89039.pdf[PDF version]

U.S. Department of State. 2003 International Narcotics ControlStrategy Report: Part II: Money Laundering and FinancialCrimes. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of State, 2004.http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/index.htm

U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003.Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004.http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003

U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2003 National MoneyLaundering Strategy, published jointly with the U.S. Dept. ofJustice. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,2003.http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/publications/ml2003.pdf

U.S. Department of the Treasury. Terrorists Assets Report,Calendar Year 2003. [Washington, DC: Office of ForeignAssets Control, Dept. of the Treasury, 2004. http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/reports/tar2003.pdf

“U.S. Efforts in the Financial War on Terrorism,” Foreign PressCenter Briefing , Washington DC, August 24, 2004http://fpc.state.gov/35688pf.htm U.S. Government Accountability Office [formerly GeneralAccounting Office]. Investigating Money Laundering andTerrorist Financing: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies FaceCoordination Challenges. Washington, DC: GAO, 2003. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03813.pdf

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Terrorist Financing:U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use ofAlternative Financing Mechanisms. Washington, DC: GAO,2003.http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf

Vistica, Gregory L. “Frozen Assets Going to Legal Bills,”Washington Post, November 1, 2003, A06.p.

Weiss, Martin A. Terrorist Financing: The 9/11 CommissionRecommendation. Washington, DC: Library of Congress,Congressional Research Service, 5 August 2004. 6 p.

The U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content andavailability of the resources from other agencies and organizations listed above. AllInternet sites are active as of September 2004.

eJOURNAL USA 30ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES / SEPTEMBER 2004

eJOURNAL USA

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityImmigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)Operation Cornerstonehttp://www.ice.gov/graphics/cornerstone/index.htm

U.S. Department of JusticeCriminal DivisionAsset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS)http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/afmls.html

U.S. Department of StateBureau of Economic and Business AffairsEnergy, Sanctions and CommoditiesOffice of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policyhttp://www.state.gov/e/eb/c9997.htmCounterterrorism OfficeCounterterrorism Finance and Designation Unithttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/terfin

U.S. Department of the TreasuryOffice of Terrorism and Financial Intelligencehttp://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/index.htmlOffice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/index.htmlExecutive Office for Asset Forfeiturehttp://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/teoaf/Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN)http://www.fincen.govUSA Patriot Act Informationhttp://www.fincen.gov/pa_main.html

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Asia Pacific Group on Money Launderinghttp://www.apgml.org/

Caribbean Financial Action Task Forcehttp://www.cfatf.org/

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)http://www.fatf-gafi.org/

Financial Services AuthorityTerrorist Financing and Sanctions Informationhttp://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/us_events/

Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre ofCanada (FINTRAC)http://www.fintrac.gc.ca/

LAWS AND REGULATIONS

Executive Order 13315 on Blocking Property of the FormerIraqi Regime, August 28, 2003.http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/legal/eo/13315.pdf

Executive Order 13224 on Terrorist Financing With updates to annex of persons and of organizations thatcommit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism,September 24, 2001.http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/t11ter.pdf

Financial Crimes Enforcement NetworkAmendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/sar.pdf

Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) and BlockedPersons August 10, 2004http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdfTerrorist Exclusion List, November 15, 2002.http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/15222.htm

USA PATRIOT Act, October 26, 2001.http://www.fincen.gov/hr3162.pdf

Financial Action Task Force on Money LaunderingSpecial Recommendations on Terrorist FinancingOctober 2001http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/SRecsTF_en.htm

The U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content andavailability of the resources from the other agencies and organizations listed above.Links to all were active as of September 2004.

INTERNET RESOURCESOnline sources for information about terrorist financing


http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm


THEGLOBAL WAR

ONTERRORISTFINANCE

THEGLOBAL WAR

ONTERRORISTFINANCE

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVESECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES


SEPTEMBER 2004SEPTEMBER 2004

Documents

GLOBAL WAR TERRORIST FINANCE...THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORIST FINANCE Banks and the USA PATRIOT Act JOHN J. BYRNE, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE