Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism

8/3/2019 Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism

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© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/156853108X298743

Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 271–291 www.brill.nl/ajss

Global Rise of Suicide errorism: An Overview *

Riaz Hassan

Flinders University

Abstract Suicide attacks are the targeted use of self-destructing humans against a perceived enemy forpolitical ends. After reviewing terrorism and suicide terrorism trends between 1980 and 2003the paper shows that suicide attacks have increased dramatically between 2004 and 2005 andhave become a global phenomenon. Tree main sites of suicide terrorism namely, Iraq, Israel andSri Lanka are examined in some detail including information about the main terrorist groups

responsible for sponsoring suicide attacks and some profiles of individuals involved. Te paperthen examines the main sociological explanations of suicide attacks, including a description of the strategic logic behind these atrocities, and the notion of life being a weapon. It concludes

with an overview of the recommendations emerging from studies that seek to prevent suicideterrorism.

Keywordsterrorism, suicide bombing, war on terror, asymmetrical conflicts, devotional sacrifice, insurgency

Introduction

Suicide attacks — the targeted use of self-destructing humans against a per-ceived enemy for political ends — have increased dramatically over the pastfew years. As indicated in Figure I below this rise in suicide attacks is remark-able, given that the total number of terrorist incidents worldwide fell from itspeak of 665 in 1986 to 208 in 2003, whereas the incidence of suicide bomb-ing increased from an annual average of 31 in the 1980s to 98 in 2003 (USDepartment of State, 2004). Tere were a total of 315 suicide attacks in the

* Tis is a revised version of the Keynote address delivered at the 2nd World Congress of MiddleEast Studies at Amman, Jordan in June 2006. Tis paper is part of a research project on ‘Suicideerrorism’ funded by Te Australian Research Council. I would like to thank Jessica Sutherland andCarolyn Corkindale for their valuable research assistance in this project and to Shoham Melamed

and Carol Merriman for their assistance. I am grateful to Flinders University for providing admin-istrative support for the project and to the Sociology Department, Yale University, for its supportduring my visiting appointment in 2006. I am alone responsible for the contents of this paper.

http://www.brill.nl/ajss

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272 R. Hassan / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 271–291

world between 1980 and 2003 (Pape, 2005, p. 3). Tere is growing evidence

that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are now directly contributing to theacceleration of suicide attacks in the past three years.

Te analysis of the Flinders University Suicide errorism Database (2007)shows that in 2004 and 2005 there were 489 suicide attacks globally. Tismeans that in 2004 and 2005 there were more suicide attacks than in the24 years between 1980 and 2003 (n=443). Almost 90 percent of these attackstook place in Iraq alone. Tere is also growing evidence that in Afghanistan,

aliban insurgents are turning to suicide bombings in their attacks against theUS forces and NAO peacekeepers, as well as the Afghan government. Accord-ing to a report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan inSeptember 2007, suicide attacks are being used by the aliban insurgents. Tereport shows that in Afghanistan there were 3 attacks in 2004 and 17 in 2005but in the 18 months between January 2006 and June 2007 there have been200 suicide attacks. Tis is a shift away from their traditional guerrilla tactics,and is a worrisome development because Afghans have traditionally con-demned the use of suicide bombers (UNAMA, 2007).

Figure 1: Comparison of Numbers of errorism and Suicide errorism Attacks1987–2003

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

01987 1990 1998

Yea r

2000 2003

Suicide errorist Attacks

errorism

Sources: Pape (2005); US Department of State (2004).



R. Hassan / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 271–291 273

Modern Method with Ancient Roots

Suicide attacks are a modern method with ancient roots. It was first known tohave been used by the Jewish sect of Zealots (Sicari) in Roman-occupied Judeaand then again in the Middle East during the early Christian Crusades in the12th and 13th centuries, when the Islamic Order of Assassins (also known asIsmailis-Nazari) was actively involved in similar activities (Stern, 2003; Lewis,1968). In the late 19th century, Russian anarchists and nationalist groups usedsuicide attacks as their preferred method to destroy and terrorize the enemy

because they regarded it as a source of legitimacy for their cause and a rallyingpoint for future recruits (Cronin, 2003).

Suicide attacks were employed by the Japanese when they used kamikazepilots to attack American forces in the Pacific during WW II. In April 1945during the Battle of Okinawa some 2000 kamikaze rammed their fully fuelledfighter planes into more than 300 ships, killing 5000 Americans in the mostcostly naval battle in U.S. history (Axell & Kase, 2002). In the mid-twentieth

century, with the development of better explosives and means of detonation,suicide attacks declined in popularity amongst terrorist groups and werereplaced by remotely detonated explosives, hostage taking and attacks on air-lines. As counter-terrorism methods began to improve in the latter half of the20th century, methods of terrorist attacks began to evolve as well.

Suicide Attacks: Te Main Sites

For a meaningful comparative analysis we need to define suicide attacks. Fol-lowing Schweitzer (2001), a suicide attack involves a bomber who carries theexplosives on his/her body or in a vehicle driven by him/herself and, by per-sonal choice and with full self-awareness, approaches a previously chosen tar-get and blows him/herself up. Te suicide bomber, in accordance withprevailing circumstances, chooses the time and place to execute the explosion

with the intention of causing maximum damage to the target. Te perpetratorknows in advance that the success of the attack will depend entirely on his/herdeath. Some analysts also distinguish between a terrorist attack and a guerrillaattack. A terrorist attack is aimed mainly at the civilian targets whereas a guer-rilla attack aims at military targets (Ricolfi, 2005; Ganor, 2000). In this paper,the term ‘suicide bombing’ is used to refer to attacks on both types of targets.wo common forms of devices used by suicide bombers are ‘improvised explo-sive devices’ (IED) which are carried on the bomber’s body and ‘vehicle borne

improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). In Iraq, 70 per cent of all coalitioncausalities have been caused by IEDs and 60 per cent of all Iraqi causalities




have been caused by VBIEDs. According to some estimates, 50 per cent of all

VBIEDs in Iraq were suicide attacks (Cordesman 2005). While a problem in the comparative analysis of suicide bombing is that

available data for different theatres are either incomplete or inconsistent dueto the lack of a clear and shared definition, most analysts agree that between1980 and 2005, a large majority of suicide bombings were confined to threesites: Sri Lanka, Palestine-Israel and Iraq. In fact, between 1980 and 2003,over 80 per cent of suicide attacks were concentrated in two tiny plots of land:

the island of Sri Lanka and the areas of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the1980s, amil igers, the elite militia of the Liberation igers of amil Eelam(LE) in Sri Lanka, have carried out about 92 suicide attacks. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at least 214 suicide attacks were launched by eight Pales-tinian organizations: Te Shiite groups Hezbollah and Amal, the Sunni groupsHamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), PFLP, SSNP, Lebanese Baath Party,and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades which are secular, Marxist and Arab nationalistorganizations.

Since 2004–2005, Iraq has become the main site of suicide attacks. Accord-ing to Flinders University Suicide errorism Database 429 suicide attacksoccurred in Iraq during this time. Tese attacks have been carried out by fiveSunni organizations: anzim Qaʾidat al-Jihad fi Balad al- Rafidayn (alsoknown as Al-Zarqawi Network, Monotheism and Holy Struggle in the coun-try of wo Rivers), Jamaat al-awid waʾal Jihad, Ansar al-Sunnah Army,Islamic Army in Iraq and Ansar al-Islam. Besides these there are only three

other areas around the world which recorded 10 or more attacks; and these were, Kurdistan (in 1996), Kashmir (since 1999), and Chechnya (since 2000). A smaller number of suicide attacks have occurred in the United States, Paki-stan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, urkey, Great Britain, anzania Kenya,Kuwait, Panama, Argentina, Croatia, India, Morocco, Yemen, unisia andIndonesia.

Since the 1980s, suicide attacks have become the weapon of choice among

terrorist groups. According to Pape (2005) the reason for that is theirlethality. He estimates that even if we omit the September 11, 2001 attacksin the United States, suicide attacks have had ten to fifteen times the destruc-tive power of ordinary attacks. If we rely on Pape’s partial reconstructionof incidents between 1980 to 2001, there were at least 2500 victims of sui-cide attacks, equal to 48 per cent of the total terror-death toll, even thoughsuicide attacks amounted to only three per cent of total terrorist attacks.Since almost 90 per cent of suicide attacks between 1980 and 2005 have

occurred in the Middle East and Sri Lanka the remainder of the paper willfocus on them.




Suicide Attacks in the Middle East

Te history of suicide attacks in the Middle East can be divided into twophases for analytical purposes. Te first phase is related directly to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and covers a period of about 25 years starting in 1980.Te second phase relates mainly to the Iraq war and covers the period of aboutthree years starting in May 2003.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Suicide Attacks

Te advent of modern-era suicide terrorism arguably began with the attackson the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December 1981. In October 1983, Hezbol-lah used suicide attacks in Beirut killing nearly 300 American and Frenchservicemen. Tis led to the withdrawal of American and French multinationalpeacekeeping forces in Lebanon, proving that suicide attacks were an effectivestrategic political weapon. By 1985, the use of suicide attacks had succeededin forcing Israel to abandon most of southern Lebanon.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suicide attacks began with attacks by Hezbollah-trained members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)aimed at derailing the Oslo Peace Accord. In 1988, PIJ founder Fathi Shiqaqihad formulated the guidelines for ‘exceptional’ martyrdom operations involv-ing suicide attacks. Figure 2 shows that the frequency of suicide attacks hasvaried considerably. Te three-year moving average shows four waves, two dur-

ing the 1980s and the other two after the beginning of the 1990s. Te peaksreached during the 1980s coincide with the Lebanon war of 1982–5 and withthe beginning of the first Intifada from 1988–90. Te Lebanon war was a majorpeak compared with the first Intifada. Of the subsequent two peaks, the firstcoincides with the implementation of the Oslo Agreement and the institutionof the Palestinian Authority (1994–6) and the second with the central years of the second Intifada, or al-Aqsa Intifada of 2001–2002 (Ricolfi, 2005).

At least 12 organizations of various backgrounds and ideological originshave claimed responsibility for carrying out suicide attacks in the Israel-Pales-tinian conflict. Nine of them have claimed responsibility for four or moresuicide attacks. able 1 provides brief but essential information on each orga-nization. Some organizations make a sharp distinction between their politicaland military wings. Te secular nationalist group al-Fatah (the main party inthe Palestinian Authority until the Hamas election in January 2006) does notclaim the actions committed by its suicide wing, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.

Both Hamas and PIJ at times claim attacks in their own names, at others timesin the names of their respective armed wings, al-Qassam and al-Quds.






Te information in able 1 has to be viewed with extreme caution, given the

uncertainty of several attributions and the poor reliability of several sources.

Profile of Suicide Bombers

In recent years, many notable public figures including President George Bush,the Dalai Lama, Bishop Desmond utu and others, have described the suicide

bomber using terms like ‘evil coward’, driven by ‘poverty’ and ‘lack of educa-tion’. Te media and the American media in particular, often describe themas ‘craven homicidal lunatics’. Tese attributes would suggest that if the sui-cide bombers were educated, employable and rational, then they wouldnot participate in such acts and the problem would disappear. Such observa-tions on the profile of suicide bombers are based on simplistic analysis andunderstanding.

Tere are now several studies which now allow us to establish some basic

facts about the profile of suicide bombers. Tey include Krueger’s analysis(2003) of Hezbollah militants, Berrebi’s (2003) and al’s studies (2002), of Palestinian suicide bombers, Saleh’s analysis (2002) of Palestinian militants who have been killed and Barber’s study (2003) of Muslim adolescents duringGaza’s first Intifada. Te findings of these studies agree that suicide bombersshare a number of traits: the average age is around 25, the gender is predomi-nantly male and most are single and childless. Tese studies have found that

social background, income, and education are higher than the general refer-ence population. Teir analysis further shows that individual poverty does notinfluence an individual’s propensity to terrorism; however education is posi-tively related to involvement in terrorism. It is not clear, however, whether thiseffect also relates to the type of education imparted or if it is associated solely with the political radicalization induced by education — an association alsodocumented extensively in several Western countries.

Other findings suggest that militancy and involvement in suicide attacksmay be negatively related to the economic cycle and downward social mobility and positively related to personal traumatizing experiences such as the killingof friends and relatives, imprisonment and isolation due to emigration. Tis would suggest that the motivations which drive a person to engage in suicidebombings are likely to be found in a cocktail of feelings, which include thedesire for revenge, resentment, and a sense of obligation toward the victims.Perhaps one of the most important findings of these and other studies is that

there is no apparent link between violent militant activity and personality disorders, except in a very few exceptional cases. In short, the available social




and psychological profile data suggest that suicide bombers are normal per-

sons (Ricolfi, 2005; Atran, 2003; Hassan, 2001). A study based on interviews of 250 recruiters, trainers and would-be suicide

bombers and families of suicide bombers (Hassan, 2001), confirms the centralresults of the profile analysis:

None of the suicide bombers- they ranged in age from eighteen to thirty one- conformed tothe typical profile of the suicidal personality. None of them were uneducated, desperately

poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitive,had paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. wo were the sons of millionaires. Tey all seemed to be normal members of their families. Tey were polite and serious; and in their communities they were considered to be model youth. Most were bearded. All were deeply religious (Hassan, 2001).

Nasra Hassan’s other findings were that most were deeply resentful of theIsraeli occupation and had strong feelings of humiliation, anger, and revenge

resulting from life under the Israeli occupation. Tey were deeply involved inthe Palestinian cause and had an aversion to the moderate position of thePLO.

Suicide Attacks in Iraq

After May 2003, the Iraq war has become a catalyst for escalating suicide

attacks in that country. As mentioned earlier, in the past two years there havebeen more suicide attacks in Iraq alone than in the whole of the Middle Eastin the past 25 years. Te Iraq situation, therefore, requires a separate examina-tion. When US troops entered an abandoned factory shed in Fallujah, duringtheir siege on April 11, 2004, they found a large cache of leather belts stuffed with explosives along with bomb making instructions. Tis is the first timesince the 13th century that suicide attacks have been employed as a weapon of

coercion in Iraq (Pape, 2003; Atran, 2003). Around fourteen groups lead the insurgency in Iraq, but only six appearto be most directly involved in suicide attacks (figures 3 and 4). Estimates of insurgent numbers range between 20,000 and 200,000, with estimates of a ‘core’ ranging from 3500 to 40,000. Te core includes about 1000 foreigninsurgents. About 10,000 insurgents are estimated to have been killed by the coalition forces between May 2003 and May 2005 (de Albuquerqueand O’Hanlon 2005). Most of the insurgents are drawn from Pro-Baathist

and ex-regime supporters, Sunni Iraqi Islamists and foreign Islamists andvolunteers. Te main aims of the insurgents are to, 1. Drive the US and




coalition forces out of Iraq, 2. Overthrow the new Iraqi government and

deprive it of popular legitimacy, 3. Keep Iraqi forces from becoming effective,and 4. Create a climate of general insecurity in the country (Cordesman,2005).

Figure 3: Te Iraqi insurgency groups

• anzim Qu’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn

• Sarya al-Shuhuada al-Jihadiyah fi al-Iraq• awid and Jihad• Ansar al-Islam• Ansar al-jihad• Ansar al-Sunnah army • Army of the Followers of Sunni Islam• Divine Wrath brigades• Islamic Army in Iraq

• Islamic Jihad brigades• Islamic Resistance brigades• Mahdi Army • Te Holders of the Black Banner• Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Fundamentalist brigades

Source: MIP errorism Knowledge base.

www.tkd.org/group.jsp

One of the most effective weapons used by insurgents is suicide bombing. Asable 2 below shows, the number of suicide attacks in Iraq has increasedsignificantly since the end of 2003. Te suicide missions are carried out throughIEDs and VBIEDS. According to a senior US commander, Lt. Gen James .Conway, 70 per cent of coalition casualties are caused by IEDs and about 60

per cent of Iraqi police casualties are caused by VBIEDs. Tere are severalreasons why suicide missions have become a weapon of choice among insur-gents groups. Tese include:

1. Major psychological impact and exceptional media coverage.2. Suicide missions serve as symbols of dedication, commitment and Islamic

martyrdom.3. Tey serve as sources of political and financial support from the commu-

nity and also aid in recruitment of potential suicide bombers (Cordesman,2005).

http://www.tkd.org/group.jsp

http://www.tkd.org/group.jsp




Figure 4: Main Iraqi Insurgent Groups

Name Aliases Objectives Allies ype $ Sources Attacks/injuries/fatalitiescaused

2004anzimQuʾidat

al-jihadfi Baladal-Rafidayn

Al-ZarqawiNetwork,monotheism

& holy struggle. Jihad Basein country of worivers

Overthrow Interim Govt.Islamic State

Ansaral-Islam,al-Sunnah,

al-awid,al-Quaeda

NationalistSeparatistReligious

Unknown 172/2231/1078

Late 1990s Jarmaatal-awid

waʾ

al-Jihad

awid and Jihad

Overthrow Interim Govt.Islamic State

Force US out

Ansaral-Islam,al-Quaeda,

anzim,Quʾidat


Unknown 30/219/200

May 2003 Ansaral-Sunnah

Army Sunni-Kurd

Islamic State Jihad DefeatCoalition

anzimQuʾidat,

Ansaral-Islam,Islamic

Army

ReligiousForeign

Al-QuaedaOperative

Unknown 48/892/472

2004 Islamic Army in Iraq

Al-Jaishal-Islamfi al-Iraq

Violence toforeigners &CollaboratorsDefeat Coalition


Unknown 23/40/53

Ansar al-Islam IslamicFundamentalism.Group HQ inKurdish area,N. Iraq

Al-Quaeda,Foreign

Jihadis

Religious Al-Quaedaand localsources

5/24/17

2003 Mahdi Army, Shiah,Followers of Moqtadaal-Sadr

Mehdi Army

Free Iraq of foreignoccupation


Unknown 4/-/-




able 2: Suicide attacks in Iraq: June 2003 to December 2005

Quarter No. of Attacks Method Deaths (min-max)

Sep 2003 2 Vehicle 25–28

Dec 2003 6 Vehicle 46–54

Mar 2004 9 5 vehicles 3 bag/belt1 other

308–402

June 2004 9 8 vehicles 1 bag/belt 90–112Sep 2004 20 19 vehicles 1 bag/belt 241–293

Dec 2004 28 28 vehicles 219–271

Mar 2005 55 39 vehicles 16 bag/belt

419–522

June 2005 69 54 vehicles 15 bag/belt

456–596

Sep 2005 63 50 vehicles 13 bag/belt

667–727

Dec 2005 41 34 vehicles 7 bag/belt 421–526

otal 320* 2892–3531

*Note: 109 attacks as well as the casualties related to them are not included due tomissing data on weapon used

Source: Flinders University Suicide errorism Database (2007)

Profiles of Suicide Bombers in Iraq

In an analysis based on an Arabic Internet document about ‘Iraq martyrs’Haqqani and Kimmage (2005) show that most of them were educated andhad good jobs with good future prospects, as the following sample biographies

indicate. Faysal Zayd Al Mutayri was from Kuwait and was an officer in theDefense Ministry, Sultan Al Hudhayl Al Qahtani was a restaurant owner, Fahd Abdullah Al Fayzi was the son of a Saudi real estate tycoon, Ahmad Said Ahmad Al Ghamidi left his medical studies to join jihad in Iraq. Most of the‘martyrs’ (175) in this document were Saudis, 50 came from Syria, 28 wereIraqis, 15 from Kuwait, 13 from Jordan and a smaller number from other Western and Arab countries.

According to another study by Paz (2005), which examined 154 Arabskilled in Iraq, thirty three died carrying out suicide missions and most of them




were Saudis who came from respected and well-known Saudi tribes with a

reputation for supporting Islamist/terrorist activities. Te next largest groupof five came from Syria and two from Kuwait. Te remaining three came fromLibya, Iraq and Morocco. Most of them were married and between the ages of 25 and 30. Tey came from wealthy and upper-middle-class backgrounds andmost of them were radicalized by the Iraq war and were exposed to Salafi- Jihadi Islam. One possible source of bias in Paz’s study may be because Saudisupporters of Global Jihad had compiled the documents analyzed by him and,

therefore, may have left out the non-Saudis and even non-Arabs who may have died in fighting in Iraq.Te inference that can be drawn from the existing studies of Iraqi insur-

gents involved in suicide bombings is that they were not social misfits, crimi-nally insane or professional losers. By and large they were normal, educatedyoung men with better than average economic prospects and were radicalizedby the Iraq war. If subsequent studies confirm the over-representation of vol-unteers from Saudi Arabia in the Iraqi insurgency, it would indicate that they there may be more Saudi volunteers in the pipeline willing to carry out suicidemissions in Iraq and may also explain the close cooperation between Zarqawiand Osama bin Laden in Iraq.

Suicide Attacks in Sri Lanka

Te Liberation igers of amil Eelam (LE) have been fighting for the lib-eration of Sri Lankan amils and for a amil National state in the north andeast of Sri Lanka since the early 1970s. It was originally one of several groupsinvolved in this national project but over the years has become the dominantplayer in this struggle. Tere are competing explanations as to how it hasbecome such a dominant military and political force of great tenacity, offeringvery strong resistance to the much stronger, larger and well-equipped national

army. An important part of the LE armed struggle has been the elite unitknown as the Black igers (including Black Sea igers). Tis unit consists of acarefully selected and highly trained and disciplined group of LE soldiers whose missions include suicide attacks. Te reputation of the Black igers issuch that under the current cease-fire arrangements, the Sri Lankan govern-ment explicitly asked the LE to disband the Black igers unit as a sign of its commitment to the peace process (Bloom 2005; Hopgood, 2005).

Since 1987, the Black igers have carried out numerous suicide missionssuccessfully against the Sri Lankan army, navy and air force. Te Black igersappear to operate in three distinct ways: conventional land and sea combat,guerrilla attacks, and targeted assassinations and bombings. Tere are no reli-




able estimates of the size of the LE army but it is estimated to be between

5000 and 10000. According to LE’s own admission, it has suffered nearly 18000 combat deaths and of these 241 were (male and female) Black igers.Te information posted on the LE website shows that in the five years upto the ceasefire in 2002, the LE lost 136 Black igers at an annual rate of more than 25. Robert Pape (2005) in his study places the number of attacksat 75, while other estimates place the numbers as high as 200 (Hopgood,2005). Te LE army is a highly structured, well-trained and highly disci-

plined force (see Figure 5). Tey carry a cyanide capsule on their bodies whichthey consume to kill themselves when captured by the Sri Lankan army.

Figure 5: LE military structure

National Leader - Prabhakaran

LE Milit a ry StructureEEZ B.L.S.U

'Leopard'

Commandos

'Charles Anthony'

Special Forces

Military WingLeader - Balraj

Air igersLeader – "X" (?)

K P Dept

'Black igers'

Body guard Unit

eeth / Service ArmsLeaders

Unit CommandersUnit Commanders

Unit Commanders

Sea igersLeader - Soosai

Source: Gunawardena (2004)

Tere are few details about the profile of Black igers, their training and moti-vation. Some insights regarding these issues can be gleaned from an account by Schalk (1997) of a film produced by the LE television station in 1993,called tayakkanavu or the ‘dream of the motherland (homeland)’, about a Black




iger (karuppulli). Tis is how Schalk describes the process of establishing the

character and motivation of a young Black iger recruit depicted in the film:

It starts by showing a happy family consisting of parents, a daughter and a son, the tiyaki (martyr) to be. Tey are all happy sitting in the garden celebrating a birthday. Tey feed each other with hands as signs of intimacy. Tey also have good relations with their neigh-bors. Te son takes the neighbor’s daughter to school on his motorbike. One day the Lankanair force drops bombs on the school, and the boy can only take the body of his young friend to her parents. In his vision, he anticipates that this could have happened to his own

younger sister. He decides he will enter the squad of Black igers. Having obtained his father’s permission, the film shows the hard training given to a Black iger and spends much time in describing the comradeship that develops within the group, especially betweenour hero and a comrade .

Other accounts of motivations for joining the LE and becoming a Black iger identify the following factors: devotion to the cause of a separate home-land for Sri Lankan amils, devotion to the leader of LE, martyrdom and

hero worship, peer pressure, economic and social dispossession and depriva-tion, experience of personal and collective humiliation and oppression by SLA, and hopelessness (Gunawardena, 2004, Somosundram, 2005). Black igers also represent a symbolic power. Te personal examples set by individ-ual Black igers has come to embody the notion of self-sacrifice for the causeof amil Eelam as captured in the LE’s chanting refrain: ‘Te task or thirstof the igers is to achieve Motherland amil ilam’ (Schalk, 1997:64). Religion

appears to play no or little role in LE ideology although the igers killedare widely recognized as Martyrs and Heroes and are given special burials.

Sociological ‘theories’ on the Nature and Causes of Suicide Bombings

Why are suicide attacks becoming so frequent and what motivates the perpe-trators of such attacks? Tere is now an excellent study which addresses this

question in great detail and with rigorous social science analysis. Tis andrelated theories will be examined in the following section.

Te Strategic Logic of Suicide Attacks

In a groundbreaking study, University of Chicago political scientist Robert

Pape has shown that there is little connection between religious fundamental-ism (and for that matter, religion) and suicide attacks. Te leading instigatorof suicide attacks between 1980 and 2001 were the amil igers in Sri Lanka,a radical nationalist group whose members are from Hindu families but who




are adamantly opposed to religion. Religion is used effectively by the Palestin-

ian radical groups Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the al ʾAqsa MartyrsBrigades to recruit suicide attackers and to raise operational funds. But theleadership of these organizations has a secular goal: to coerce the Israeli gov-ernment to change its policies and to leave the Palestinian territories. Tepoint here is that even if some suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, theleadership of the groups that recruit and direct them is not (Pape, 2005).

Pape’s study offers the theory that suicide attacks follow a strategic logic

specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant polit-ical and territorial concessions. According to Pape, the reason for the rise of suicide attacks over the past two decades is that ‘terrorists have learned that itpays’. Suicide attacks by members of Hezbollah and Hamas have been since1983 highly successful in compelling American and French troops to leaveLebanon and in forcing Israeli troops to quit Lebanon in 1985 and the GazaStrip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995. Te amil igers succeeded in winning major political and territorial concessions from the Sri Lankan gov-ernment from 1990 onwards using this tactic. In the 1990s, suicide attacks by the Kurdistan Peoples Party succeeded in winning partial cultural and politicalconcessions from the urkish government. Te withdrawal of the Americantroops from Saudi Arabia in 1996, under terrorist attacks from Al Qaeda sup-porters, also fits in with this pattern. Te data in able 3 offers further empir-ical evidence in support of Pape’s theory.

Psychosocial Factors

Some contemporary commentators have argued that suicide attackers arementally deranged and crazed cowards who thrive in poverty and ignorance(Sprinzak, 2000; Merari, 1990; Post, 1990). Such generalizations about thepsychological profiles and motivation of suicide attackers unfortunately donot help us to either explain the phenomenon or to better understand it. ra-

ditional studies regard suicide attacks as one of the many tactics terrorists useand thus do not explain the recent rise of this phenomenon. Te few studies which have addressed suicide attacks explicitly have tended to focus on thesuicide attacker’s individual motives such as religious indoctrination, espe-cially Islamic fundamentalism, and on their psychopathologies, poverty, andlack of education. Tese explanations have been found to be seriously flawed.

After reviewing psychological studies of suicide attackers, University of

Michigan psychologist Scott Atran has concluded that suicide attackers haveno appreciable psychological pathologies and are as educated and economically well-off as the surrounding population. o understand why non-pathological individuals volunteer to become suicide attackers one must look at situational




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c u l t u r a l / p o l i t i c a l

c o n c e s s i o n s

5 . C h

e c h n y a

2 0 0 0 –

R u s s i a m i l i t a

r y

p r e s e n c e

C h e c h n y a

R e b e l s

R u s

s i a n

w i t h d r a w a l

1 9

3 3 2

Y e s

B D

6 . K a

s h m i r

2 0 0 0 –

I n d i a n m i l i t a

r y

p r e s e n c e

K a s h m i r

R e b e l s

I n d i a n

w i t h d r a w a l

3

4 5

Y e s

B D

7 . S a u d i A r a b / U S

1 9 9 6 –

U . S . m i l i t a r y

p r e s e n c e

A l Q a e d a

U . S

.

w i t h d r a w a l

2 1

3 6 6 1

Y e s

B D

S o u r c e :

P a p e ( 2 0 0 5 ) , U S D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e ( 2 0 0 2 ) . F = F r a n c e ; I D F = I s r a e l i D e f e n s e F o r c e ; S L

= S r i L a n k a ; P P K = K u r d i s t a n

P e o p l e s P a r t y . T i s d a t a d o e s

n o t

i n c l u d e s u i c i d e c a m p a i g n s i n I r a q a n d A f g h a n i s t a n b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e

o c c u r r e d a f t e r 2 0 0 3 .




factors which are largely sociological in nature. In the context of the Middle East,

these include a collective sense of historical injustice, political subservience, and a pervasive sense of social humiliation vis-à-vis global powers and their allies. Onecan have some reservations about the origin and causes of these perceptions.Ignoring the causes of these perceptions, however, risks failing to identify thereal ways of preventing suicide bombings (Atran, 2003).

Suicide Bombing: Te use of Life as a WeaponIf suicide attackers exhibit no psychologically and socially dysfunctionalattributes or suicidal symptoms, then why do they choose to participate insuch attacks? Part of the answer to this question lies in what drives humans tosuicide. In modern psychiatry and sociology, suicide is regarded as an end , anexit from adverse social conditions in which the individual feels hopelessly powerless. In studies of suicide over the past thirty years, I have questioned

this characterization (Hassan, 1995, 1983). My studies demonstrated that sui-cidal behavior in a variety of settings may be used as a means to achieve multiple ends, including self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption in the

face of damnation, and honor in the face of humiliations. Te achievement of these multiple ends acts as a powerful motivator in many suicides and in my opinion is central to a fuller and more meaningful understanding and expla-nation of contemporary suicide attacks in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Nasra Hassan, a United Nations relief worker in Gaza, interviewed 250aspiring suicide bombers and their recruiters. She found that none were unedu-cated, desperately poor, simple-minded, suicidal, or depressed. But their socialcontexts displayed the dynamics of their actions. Potential suicide bombersempowered themselves in the face of powerlessness. According to her respond-ents, “If our wives and children are not safe from Israeli tanks and rockets, theirs will not be safe from our human bombs” . In an interview in his small house on anunpaved lane in a crowded quarter of Gaza, the late spiritual leader of Hamas,

Sheikh Yassin told her that martyrdom was a way of redemption: “Love of mar-tyrdom is something deep inside the heart, but these rewards are not in themselves the goal of the martyr. Te only aim is to win Allah’s satisfaction. Tat can be done in the simplest and speediest of manner by dying in the cause of Allah. And it is

Allah who selects martyrs”. Humiliation acted as a powerful magnet for recruit-ing suicide bombers. A senior recruiter told her, “ After every massacre, every massive violation of our rights and defilement of our holy places, it is easy for us to

sweep the streets for boys who want to do a martyrdom operation” (Hassan, 2001).Since Muslims professing religious motives have perpetrated most suicideattacks over the past two years, including those on September 11th, 2001, itmay seem obvious to conclude that Islamic fundamentalism is the root cause




of this phenomenon. Tis assumption has fueled the belief that future Septem-

ber 11th attacks can only be prevented through the liberalization and democ-ratization of Muslim societies. Tis was a key rationale used by the UnitedStates government to mobilize public support for the war in Iraq. Policies basedon such an assumption may be fostering the development of domestic andforeign policies in the United States which are likely to worsen, not improvethe situation. One indication that this may be happening is reflected in theresults of the March 2004, Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which showed that in

several Muslim countries (Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan), a majority of respond-ents thought that the American government was over-reacting to terrorism.Te majority of respondents in Jordan, Morocco and urkey also supportedsuicide bombings by Palestinians against Israel and against Americans andother Westerners in Iraq. Te level of support in Pakistan for these actions wasclose to 50 per cent (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2004). Te InternationalInstitute of Strategic Studies in London has also reported that the war in Iraqhas led to an increase in global recruitment for anti-American jihad.

A recently published book on suicide missions offers the following generalobservations about the varying and uniform features of suicide missions(Gambetta, 2005). Tese are listed below in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Varying and uniform features of suicide missions

Varying Features

ype of organization (armies, guerrillas, militias)ype of target (military, political, civilian, symbolic)Lethality (from 1 to 3000)Different religious and political affiliationsPurposes and aims

Uniform features

Organized by groups, not by individualsGroups with radical or no constituency By weaker groups in high-asymmetry conflicts All groups using suicide missions also use other tacticsUsed only against democraciesUsed mostly in conflicts among non co-religionistsIf religion is involved at all, it is Islam

All modern suicide missions grew out of Lebanon, 1973–90No overlap between suicide missions and self-immolations




Stemming the ide: Prevention Strategies

Te most effective way to counter the challenge of suicide terrorism is toreduce terrorists’ confidence in their ability to carry out attacks on the targetsociety, through creating better border defences and homeland security. Sui-cide attacks are carried out by community-based organizations. Strategiesaimed at finding ways to induce the communities to abandon such supportmay isolate terrorist organizations and curtail their activities. But ultimately,strategies that address and lessen the grievances and humiliation of popula-

tions that give rise to suicide attacks are required for the elimination of suicideterrorism. Support for suicide attacks is unlikely to diminish without tangibleprogress in achieving at least some of the fundamental goals that suicideattackers and those supporting them share (see able 4).

able 4: Iraq Insurgency: Intensity of Insurgency, Suicide Bombings and Level of Public Support of Foreign Occupying Forces

May 2003 June 2004 May 2005

Coalition roopsUS/other

150,000/23,000 138,000/23000 138,000/23000

Average Daily Insurgent attacks

10 52 70

Estimated numbers

Iraqi/foreignfighters

3000/100 15,000/300 16,000/1000

2005: high estimate 200,000/15,000–4000 corelow estimate 20,000/3,500 core

US aid disbursal 0 $2.5 billion $7.7 billion

% Iraqi wantingnear-term US withdrawal

30%(July 03–Jan 04)

65%(July 04)

82%(Jan 05)

Suicide Bombings 27(2003) 154(2004) 275(2005)

Sources: Cordesman (2005); De Albuquerque and O’Hanlon (2005). FlindersUniversity Suicide errorism Database (2007).

In October 2004, the US Department of Homeland Security convened aninternational seminar on suicide terrorism. After reviewing over 41 studies on

the subject its staff prepared a list of recommendations suggested by various




studies. Tese recommendations are listed below. Te numbers in parentheses

refer to the number of studies analyzed making each recommendation:

• Address grievances in the terrorist group’s community regarding civil liber-ties, quality of life, etc (8)

• Empower moderates in the terrorist group’s society (7)• ake into account how potential supporters of terrorism view aggressive

counter-measures (6)

• Weaken terrorist groups by targeting leaders (6)• Realize that attacking groups may lead them to become more adaptive and/or ruthless (5)

• Develop informants to infiltrate terrorist groups (5)• Strip away the terrorist group’s supporters by engaging them in dialogue (5)• Monitor and/or put pressure on the terrorist group’s supporters, including

the family and friends of suicide bombers (4)• Put pressure on political and religious leaders who promote martyrdom (4)• Harden targets (4)• Cut off funding to terrorist groups (3)• Modify foreign policy so as not to be at high risk of terrorism (3)• Increase the population’s psychological resilience to terrorism (2)• Build international support for efforts to combat terrorism (2)

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