Giles of Rome on Political Authority

Giles of Rome on Political AuthorityAuthor(s): Graham McAleerReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 21-36Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3653998 .Accessed: 23/10/2012 11:34

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toJournal of the History of Ideas.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upenn

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3653998?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

Giles of Rome on

Political Authority

Graham McAleer

Dabo tibi regem infurore meo "I will give you a king in my rage"'

It is a commonplace among historians of medieval political theory that two

great systems of thought dominate the period. Augustine's City of God held the field until Thomas Aquinas absorbedAristotle's political thought largely culled from the latter's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. Aquinas stands as a water- shed, a moment when both sources meet and a synthesis is worked out in which

Augustine loses ground to Aristotle. Indeed, Augustine's thought loses such a hold on the political theory of the age that R. A. Markus has spoken of a "com- fortable obliviousness" in the minds of theorists subsequent to Aquinas that "a

profound cleavage" had been wrought by Thomas in the tradition of Christian

political thought.2 Ptolemy of Lucca and Giles of Rome, both of whom were students of Thomas, are picked out by Markus as typical of those theorists who are oblivious to the definitive break that Aquinas makes with Augustine.

Although modem commentators of medieval political theory speak of an

Augustinian tradition after Aquinas they are only referring to a series of thinkers who defended papal authority over and above monarchical authority. This tradition is said to be Augustinian because the thinkers defending papal author-

ity, who included Giles, James of Viterbo and Augustinus Triumphus, were members of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine. Nevertheless, these

Augustinians are said to have absorbed Thomas's Aristotelianism: convinced

by his argument that since coercive power is intrinsic to political authority and since political authority is natural to the human condition, it must have been the case that coercive power existed in the state of innocence. TheseAugustinians,

'Hosea, XIII. 11 as cited by Giles. Aegidius Romanus, In Secundum librum sententiarum, pars 2, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5, 684, B.

2 R A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cam- bridge, 19882), 277.

21

Copyright 1999 by the Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.

Graham McAleer

modem scholarship maintains, did not then defend Augustine's thesis that coercive political authority is unnatural to human society and was only introduced (albeit necessarily) into post-lapsarian society so that the worst excesses of our sinful condition might be controlled. Markus is by no means alone in

identifying Giles as a follower of Thomas whose theory of dominium marks a radical break with Augustine.3 Recently, J. M. Blythe has cited Markus when

concurring with him that Giles simply adopts Thomas's position which, as he

puts it, "was to become ubiquitous in late medieval political discourse."4

Perhaps this consensus has its origin in a most peculiar fact about twenti-

eth-century scholarship on Giles's political thought: none of it is based on a wide reading of his philosophical and theological corpus. Admittedly, an ex- tensive reading of Giles is a daunting task. The editors-in-chief of the project to

provide critical editions of Giles's works catalogue sixty-seven titles and this vast array of writings match those of the other "greats" of the period in their

scope, variety, complexity, and influence.5 The hope of this essay is to show that a reading of Giles's Sentences-commentary reveals him to be far more

Augustinian than previously acknowledged this century. Although it is well recognized that Giles was one of the most original and

influential political theorists of the Middle Ages, the pages dedicated to his

political ideas amount to a few pages here and there, and sometimes as little as a few isolated comments, in the standard works on medieval political theory.6 Moreover, these works unanimously consider only Giles's explicitly political works. This limitation began with Otto Gierke, who single-handedly demon- strated the depth and richness of medieval political theory. At the beginning of his classic work, Political Theory of the Middle Age, Gierke provides a fifteen-

page list of sources. For Thomas's political thought Gierke directs us not only to Thomas's explicitly political treatises such as his commentary on Aristotle's Politics and the opusculum, De regimine principum, but also to the Summa

theologiae, Summa contra gentiles, Thomas's Disputed and Quodlibetal ques-

3 While it remains a common perception that Giles is a follower of Thomas there are subtle, but always far reaching, differences between them on many issues. For example, on their different uses of the category of res see my, "Disputing the Unity of the World: The

Importance of res and the Influence ofAverroes in Giles of Rome's Critique of Thomas Aquinas over the Unity of the World," Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming).

4 J. M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the MiddleAges (Princeton, 1992), 75.

5 See the list of works in Apologia, ed. R. Wielockx, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, III. 1

(Florence, 1985), IX-XI. 6 The influence of his De regimine principum in the later Middle Ages and beyond was

colossal and quite concrete. See J. Krynen, L'empire du roi (Paris, 1993), 179, for the number of translations into vernacular languages, printed editions, and copies owned by kings. For Giles's profound influence on subsequent Augustinian political theory see M. Wilks, The Prob- lem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1963). On his influence generally in

Augustinian thought throughout the centuries see H. de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern

Theology, tr. L. Sheppard (New York, 1969).

22

Giles of Rome on Political Authority

tions, his exposition of the Psalms, and commentaries on Paul's Letters as well as his Sentences-commentary. Yet for Giles only his De regimine principum and De potestate ecclesiastica are cited.7 Gierke's selection is repeated by McIlwain, Lewis, Kantorowicz, Wilks, Ullmann, Morrall, Viroli, and the bibli-

ography of the The Cambridge History of Medieval Poltical Thought.8 Even the Carlyles and Lagarde, who wrote monumental five volume works on medieval political theory, only cite Giles's explicitly political works and not his

Sentences-commentary.9 Gierke's choice here is puzzling. Giles's corpus is as various as that of

Thomas and one might expect his political thought to be developed and nu- anced in different ways depending upon the demands of the philosophical or

theological genres and even political context in which he was writing. This is

surely especially true of the writings of Giles: he was no stranger to political contention and had a complex and ambiguous relationship to authority. His De

regimine principum was commissioned by Philip IV of France,'0 while his De

potestate ecclesiastica was written as an intervention in contemporary politics in defence of papal authority."I He wrote his Apologia as a defence of his writ-

ings against a condemnation handed down by the university authorities at Paris in 1277;12 yet his own writings became authoritative in 1287 for students in the schools of the Order, the Hermits of Saint Augustine, of which he would become General (1292).13 While commentators have wondered about the conti-

nuity in thought between Giles's De regimine principum of 1285 and his De

7 Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, tr. F. W. Maitland (Cambridge, 1938), lxvii.

8 C. H. McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York, 1932), 248-60 and 338-41; E. Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas (2 vols.; London, 1954), passim.; E. H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Body's: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957), 134-39; Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages, passim.; W. Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought (London, 1965), 124-27; J. B. Morall, Political Thought in Medieval Times (London, 1971), 86-90; Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State

(Cambridge, 1992), 36-44; The Cambridge History of Medieval Poltical Thought, ed. J. H. Burs (Cambridge, 1988).

9 R W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West (5 vols.; Edinburgh, 1938), V, 72-75; G. de Lagarde, La Naissance de l'esprit laique au declin du

moyen age (5 vols.; Louvain and Paris, 1956-63), passim. 10 J. Krynen, Ideal du prince et pouvoir royal en France a la fin du moyen dge (Paris,

1981), 41 and 55. " See McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West, 258-65. 12 See Giles's Apologia, ed. R Wielockx, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, III.1, and the

comments of John F. Wippel in his "Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277," Mod- ern Schoolman, 72 (1995), 270-72. Giles is still rebuking the commission in 1309. See his comments on the "articulus damnatus Parisiis" in his In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3, 471, D.

13 P. Nash, "Giles of Rome" New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, 1967), VI, 485. Cf. P. Mandonnet, O. P., "La carriere scolaire de Gilles de Rome," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 4 (1910).

23

Graham McAleer

potestate ecclesiastica written in 1301-2,14 almost no attention has been paid to the political thought found in his relatively late In Secundum librum sententiarum of 1309.'5 Giles died in 1316.

Consideration of Distinctions 21 and 22 of Giles's In Secundum librum sententiarum demonstrates that Augustine's theory of dominium was not swept away by Thomas's formulation of political authority.16 These distinctions show that Giles is largely faithful to Augustine, at least by 1309. Unlike Augustine, Giles argues that there was dominium before the Fall, but like Augustine he denies that coercive political authority existed in the state of innocence and his reason for doing so is extremely Augustinian in inspiration: the Fall has its origin in Adam's delight in, and desire for, coercive power. Part I of this essay concerns Distinctions 21 and 22 which describe the Fall while Part II examines Distinction 44 on government. This section shows that Distinction 44 cannot be rightly understood without attention to Giles's position in the earlier distinctions that human history and its institutions have been corrupted through the desire for coercive power. While this essay is a relatively narrow, detailed reading of some of the distinctions of Giles's In Secundum librum sententiarum, the implications for a century-long tradition of scholarship are perhaps dra- matic. If Giles's Sentences-commentary shows neither a fundamental option for Aristotle nor an obliviousness to Augustinian political thought, then the standard interpretation of the development of later medieval thought is put into question. If Giles does not abandon Augustine's theory of dominium, then perhaps other thinkers of the later medieval period, especially within the Augus- tinian school, do not do so either. Closer documentation of the resilience of Augustine's critique of power may in turn lead to a new appreciation of when exactly the claim that coercive power is natural to political life became ubiquitous.

Part I: The Desire to Coerce as the Origin of the Fall

I say almost no attention has been paid to Giles's Sentences-commentary, for there are two exceptions to Gierke's selection. However, the nature of these exceptions only reinforces the impression of how completely twentieth century

14 For a summary of the arguments made by those who see no real difference between these two works see McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West, 257-59. For claims that Giles's later work is a watered down Aristotelianism see Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, 61-62.

15 The dates of these works are drawn from P. Glorieux, Repertoire des maitres en theologie de Paris au XIIIe siecle (2 vols.; Paris, 1933-34), II, 293-308.

16 To make a point about Giles's political theory, I have accepted the standard interpretation of Thomas's theory of dominium. The evidence said to support Thomas's Aristotelianism is weak, in my opinion, and there are numerous passages which suggest a much deeper fidelity to Augustine than normally allowed. To determine the character of Thomas's theory of dominium is beyond the limitations of this essay.

24


scholarship has limited its investigation into Giles's political thought. Giles's

Sentences-commentary makes it into a footnote'7 of Markus's Saeculum (the most philosophical of the books on medieval political philosophy),'8 and likewise Blythe cites the same Distinction 44, and to make the same point, in a footnote.19 Distinction 44 is cited by Markus in support of his claim that Giles follows Thomas in abandoning the Augustinian principle that there was no

political authority of one human over another in the state of innocence. Accord-

ing to Markus, the Augustinian critique of political power (dominium) rests on the principle that political authority is necessarily coercive and therefore in-

compatible with pre-lapsarian society. Markus contends that while Thomas cites Augustine on power, his concept of power is in fact thoroughly Aristote- lian. This is to say that Thomas acknowledges that since the human is a natu-

rally political animal and since political power is coercive, the state of innocence included such power exercised by some humans over others.20 The only portion of Augustine's critique of power that Thomas retains, he argues, is to

deny that one particular kind of coercive power existed before the Fall, namely, a dominium of despotic character with a correlate of slavery (servitus). Markus, and following him, Blythe, each comment in a footnote that a reading of Giles's Distinction 44, the last distinction of In Secundum librum sententiarum, shows that he adopts Thomas's formulation of dominium and thus that he too thought coercive political power present in the state of innocence.

Giles's analysis of the Fall is not consistent with this reading of his Dis- tinction 44. This inconsistency must cast doubt on the Markus-Blythe reading and therewith the constant assumption of scholarship that Augustine's theory of dominium was eclipsed by that ofAquinas. Unlike Bonaventure and Thomas

Aquinas, Giles links the Fall to sin understood in explicitly political terms.2' The Fall is described as a transition in the kind of power (dominium) held by Adam. Instituted as a ruler who exercised his rule in charity and love, Adam would come to desire and delight in the experience of ruling coercively over others; an experience denied him in the prohibition not to eat of the tree of the

knowledge of good and evil. To establish this account of the Fall, Giles first claims (with Thomas) that the concept of dominium does not necessarily include servitus-that there is no intrinsic connection between political authority

17 Markus directs us to Giles's In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 44, q. 1, aa. 2-3. See his Saeculum, 227, n. 5.

18 See the outstanding Appendix C in his Saeculum, 211-31. 19 Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, 75, n. 44. 20 Markus, Saeculum, 224. Cf. Carlyle and Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory

in the West, vol. 5, 13; J. Dunbabin, "Aristotle in the Schools," Trends in Medieval Political

Thought (Oxford, 1965); A. P. d'Entreves, "Thomas Aquinas," Essays in the History of Politi- cal Thought, ed. Isaac Kramnick (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1969), 105.

21 Contrast Distinctions 21 and 22 in their respective Sentences-commentaries.

25

Graham McAleer

and coercive power, as Augustine and Bonaventure had insisted.22 For Giles there is political rule and power (dominium) wherever there is any relationship of an inferior to a superior.23 Thus, as he conceives it, there would have been

political authority of man over woman in the state of innocence (and ultimately there would have been such rule of parents over children). Such dominium would not have been coercive (dominatio), however, if exercised in love. Speak- ing of Adam's rule, Giles says "the entire state of innocence was in a certain

subjection" (totus ille status erat in quadam subiectione) but under a rule exercised in love (in dilectione). Adam ought to have always ruled as a servant

(servus) obedient to God's precepts,24 and in particular obedient to Christ's

precept, "as you would like to be loved, so you must love others."25 Instituted in original justice, Adam had a perfect will full of charity.26 The generosity of his rule would have enabled those subject to that rule to attain their common

good (et quia amare idem est quod velle bonum)27 and elicited from them a

freely given obedience to that authority. As will be seen, for Giles rule ought always to be dedicated to the public good28 as this leads to the satisfaction of the desire for "the greatness of peace" (magnitudo pacis) that alone can give a rule its legitimacy. Conversely, failure to satisfy this desire, is the mark of a

despotic or tyrannical rule.29 The dominium instituted in the state of innocence-for there is no rule

without power30-included (would have included) political (principatus politicus), royal (principatus regius), and despotic rule (principatus despoticus): the first rule regarded Adam's rule over Eve, the second would concern his rule over his sons,31 and the last regarded the manner in which Adam ruled and

governed his own body (which serves him in obedience before the Fall and

22 Bonaventure is explicit on the connection in his definition of dominium: "Tertio modo

potestas dominandi, sive praesidendi, dicitur potestas coercendi subditos: et haec potestas dicit quamdam arctationem libertatis: et talis potestas dominandi proprie dicitur dominium, cui respondet servitus"; S. Bonaventure, In Secundum librum sententiarum, Opera Omnia (10 vols.; Turin, 1874), III, d. 44, a. 2, q. 2, 650. See n. 62 below for Giles's repetition of Bonaventure's definition for dominium understood in a narrow sense. Translations throughout are my own.

23 Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, 683, A. 24 Ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 1 lateralis, 208, A; d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, 685, A-C; d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, 687,

D. 25 "Ad quod dici potest quod totus ille status erat in subiectione quod inferiora essent

subiecta superioribus. Ideo dicit Augustinus 12 De civitate ... Et quia hoc est iustitia quod inferiora sint subiecta superioribus, ideo totus ille status erat in quadam tali iustitia sed iste status totus est in dilectione. Ideo ait dominus, 'Hoc est praeceptum meum, ut diligatis,' etc."

(Ibid., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, 485, D). 26 Ibid., 485, A-B. 27 Ibid., d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, 685, B. 28 Ibid., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, 481, D. 29 Ibid., d. 44, dubitatio 6 litteralis. 30 Ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 2 lateralis, 208, D. 31 Ibid., d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, 684, C-D.

26


later would rebel against him).32 This dominium was to be exercised through grace (dominari per gratiam).33 Indeed, Giles tells us that the whole sin (totum

peccatum) of Adam lay in his desire to rule through nature when he ought to have desired to rule through grace (appetiit habere per naturam quod debuit

appetere per gratiam).34 Any account of how Giles conceives of political au-

thority must explain in what way the character of power exercised by Adam

changed as he sought to rule independently of God's grace. Passages from Distinction 22 show that in desiring power per naturam Adam desired a coercive power, exercised selfishly and despotically. Such power is necessarily coercive because human desire, according to Giles, can have only one source of ultimate fulfillment, God. In abandoning God's rule, Adam can no longer sat-

isfy the desire of those subject to him but must constantly force their desire to be satisfied by the lesser goods his rule can provide. In denying his subjects their true happiness, he acts selfishly and rules them violently: he must des-

potically thwart and restructure their desire and happiness, and he must do this

again and again, for each effort is ultimately futile as it is opposed by the

deepest yearnings of the human. If the Markus-Blythe reading of Distinction 44 (that Adam's original do-

minium was coercive) is to be maintained, it remains to reconcile that distinction with Distinction 22. In the latter distinction Giles links the claim that Adam's whole sin lay in desiring to rule per naturam with the claim that his whole sin lay in desiring the prohibited tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He is explicit that Adam did not desire any old knowledge but a moral knowl-

edge necessary to the exercise ofgovernment with coercivepower.35 Giles writes:

The truth is that no one is a ruler without some power. If the first man desired a knowledge of good and evil so that from this he would have a certain government of things and a certain rule then this could not be

except by a certain power of coercing those subject to him. Directly it is seen that illumination or speculative knowledge was not desired but rather a knowledge of good and evil which is a knowledge of govern- ing and ruling with some annexed power.36

32 Ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 3 lateralis, 209, C-D. 33 Ibid., d. 21, q. 1, dub. 8 litteralis, 199, C; ibid., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, 484, D. 4 Ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 1 lateralis, 208, A.

35 "Sed homo appetiit scientiam non quamcunque sed scientiam boni et mali, quae videtur esse scientia moralis, quae requiritur in gubemante et principante" (ibid., 207, B).

36 "Verum quia nullus est principatus sine aliqua potentia. Si primus homo appetiit scientiam boni et mali ut ex hoc haberet quandam gubemationem rerum et quendam principatum quia hoc esse non poterat sine quadam potentia coercendi sibi subiecta. Directe non videtur

appetivisse illuminationem vel scientiam speculativam sed magis scientiam boni et mali quae est scientia guberandi et principandi cum aliqua potentia annexa" (ibid., C).

27

Graham McAleer

In the state of innocence Adam had political authority in virtue of which he ruled those subject to him but did not possess coercive power. Indeed, the prohibition was God's gift to Adam that he should not have to exert coercive rule,37 for as shall be seen, such rule corrupts the hearts of those in power. For Giles

explains that the evil of the Fall is not in breaking the prohibition but in the

eating of a fruit that is itself evil.38 The tree forbidden to Adam was precisely to rule by coercion, and yet, Giles tells us, Adam desired this rule because he

delighted in the experience of coercing others at the moment of eating the fruit of the tree. Contrasting the origin of the delight in sin for the Devil and Adam, Giles writes:

The Devil therefore seeing himself so beautiful, delighted in the eminence of his nature, and on account of that delight in his eminence he desired to rule others. Man, however, did not desire to rule others on account of the eminence of his own nature, which he would have been able to see within himself, but on account of eating of the forbidden tree.39

Adam falls then because he desires and delights in the tree of knowledge of good and evil and what attends it, coercive power. The power with which Adam rules after the Fall depends upon a usurped power (potentia annexa): his unjust rule4 robs his subjects of their capacity and freedom to desire, obey, and love God. The coercion in which Adam delights is a sin of the first magnitude because it is a delight in denying others the capacity and freedom to respond in obedience to the law of God. For Giles, to be able to give obedience to God is the mark of a love of God.4' Adam's rule per naturam replaces his rule per gratiam, thereby cutting off access to God's law and forcing others to desire in a manner unsuited to their deepest nature.

According to Giles, it is the desire to rule coercively which marks the political existence inherited by Adam's posterity as that of the City of the Devil. While Giles explains that there are a number of differences in the illegitimate rule sought by the Devil and by Adam, their falls have the same basic source and character. Both sought to rule per naturam instead of per gratiam, and as Giles explains in Distinction 21, such rule is always selfish. Taking the Devil as the model of what it is like to wish political power independently of the charity

37 Ibid., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, 484, C. 38 Ibid., d. 33, dubitatio 3 litteralis, 493, C. 39 "Diabolus ergo videns se ita pulchrum delectatus in sua natura sic excellenti propter

illam suam naturam sic excellentem appetiit aliis principari. Homo autem hoc non appetiit propter excellentiam suae naturae quam in se videret sed propter esum ligni vetiti" (ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 1 lateralis, 208, B).

40 Ibid., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, 690, B. 41 See n. 52 below.

28


of grace, Giles describes the Devil as acting abAquilone. From the North comes the cold, an agent which, Giles tells us, naturally fetters and binds. He uses this

image of the restraining action of cold to depict the manner in which the Devil closes up upon himself, ending his relatedness to others and therewith all pos- sibility for generosity (cum charitas se extendat ad proximum)42 Once again describing the Fall in political terms, and a quite marvelous description it is, Giles speaks of this loss of charity:

And thence it is, as has been said, that from the North all evil is spread out because all evil has the same character: a person has bound himself

up as if frozen and both wishes to act on account of himself and for his own private happiness when he ought to wish to labour on account of the public good. For these are two loves according to Augustine On Genesis: The private and the public make two cities, one of the Devil and one of God. In the same place, according to him, "private love" is well named because with it the good of all is privated.43

The closing up of oneself which typifies selfishness and the acquisition of a private good at the expense of the public good is also the definition given by Giles of tyranny and despotism,44 the ruler who governs for his own good (propter bonum proprium).45 The Fall of the Devil, Giles makes clear, has the same character as the fall ofAdam's rule into tyranny and the use of his power for his own good instead of the public good: "Adam by sinning and desiring an eminence and rule for himself alone, which he ought not to have, lost the rule that he used to have."46 Bonaventure likewise identifies the desire for one's own

good as the root of all sin (desiderium boni proprii videtur esse principium

42 Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, 673, B. Giles continues a tradition in the Middle Ages that understands difference to be necessary for the exercise of charity. There are some interesting similarities between Giles's discussion of charity and that of Anselm. See Graham McAleer, "Saint Anselm: An Ethics of Caritas for a Relativist Age," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 70 (1996), 163-78.

43 "Et inde est, quod dictum est, quod ab Aquilone pandetur omne malum, quia omne malum contingit, quod quis quasi infigidatus se constrinxit, et vult propter seipsum, et propter privatum commodum agere, quae deberet velle propter bonum publicum operari. Nam isti sunt duo amores secundum Augustinum Super Genesim: Privatus et publicus qui faciunt duas civitates Diaboli et Dei et bene secundum eundem ibidem dicitur 'amor privatus' quia privatus est omni bono" (ibid., d. 21, q. 1, dub. 8 litteralis, 199, D).

44 Cf. S. Thomas Aquinas, In Secundum librum sententiarum, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), d. 44, q. 1, a. 3.

45 Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, 684, D. 4 "Adam ergo peccante et appetente propriam excellentiam et proprium dominium, quod

non debebat, perdidit dominium quod habebat" (ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 3, lateralis, 209, D); ibid., B.

29

Graham McAleer

omnis peccati), but by contrast he does not (and nor does Aquinas) describe Adam's desire at the time of the Fall in political terms.47

Coercive rule begins with the desire for such rule at the time of the Fall.

Subsequent political history is to some degree despotic in that kings and princes desire to rule so that they might enjoy coercive power and attain selfish wishes.48 Giles appears to be as pessimistic as Augustine regarding post-lapsarian rule. The selfishness of Adam's new rule entails that our political history is marked to some degree at least by a despotic or tyrannical character. Invoking the Au-

gustinian notion of saeculum, Giles argues that dominium today might aim to be a rule of charity, but (as will be seen in more detail in Part II) it cannot attain the same degree of purity as was exercised in the state of original justice (charitas pro illo statu non erat eiusdem rationis cum charitate quam habemus nunc).49 He insists that while there may still be charitable rule, it is always combined with the secular rule introduced by the sin of our first parents and that each of us lives in a bodily slavery to this secular rule. Baptism, says Giles, can cleanse our souls but cannot free us from the coercive dominium of secular authority (vinculum servitutis corporalis quo quis est ligatus et astrictus dominio laicali).50 Like Augustine, Giles never questions the need for secular power5' in our post- lapsarian state, but he is as frank as Augustine in thinking of secular rule as one of domination and thus despotic to some degree or other. Rule in the saeculum is necessarily coercive as the natural desires of those subjected to rule can only be realized in, and perfected by, a charitable rule, since all desire is ultimately a love for God, whose rule is one of love.52 This last kind of rule, Giles tells us, is compatible with freedom, while the former is not (quod proprie libertas

opponitur coactioni).53 Hence Giles frequently speaks about the general resur- rection as a moment when power will be purged (evacuare)54 and ultimately cease; that is, power will be purged of selfishness as all rule will be assumed

47 S. Bonaventure, In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 21, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3, 95. 48 Cf. R. A. Markus, Saeculum, 198; E. L. Fortin, "St. Augustine" in History of Political

Philosophy, ed. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey (Chicago, 1987), 182-83. 49 Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 33, q. 1, dub. 1 lateralis, 485, B. 50 Ibid., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3 & 4, 691, C-D; ibid., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, 480, D. When speaking

of coercive power, Lagarde only credits Giles with the view that coercion is intrinsic to human law but unfortunately does not address the nature of political authority prior to the Fall; see La naissance de I'esprit laique au declin du moyen age, III, 175.

51 M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages, 269. 52 "Ideo ait Gregorius loquens de isto statu quod omne mandatum de sola dilectione est,

quia quicquid praecipitur in sola charitate solidatur. Igitur quia illa status totus erat in quadam subiectione et in quandam iustitia ideo tunc dilectio ex tali subiectione et ex tali iustitia oriebatur:

quia qui vult esse Deo subiectus et ex hoc iustus, oportet ut Deum diligat, cui debet esse subiectus et a quo habet omnia bona" (Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 33, q. 1, dub. 2 laterialis, 486, A-B).

53 Ibid., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, 681, D. 54 "Et ideo cum perventum erit ad Deum, vel cum perveniemus nos electi ad ipsum,

evacuabitur omnis principatus et omnis potestas et omnis virtus" (ibid., a. 2, 683, D).

30


completely by God;55 and all power will cease except that power exercised

directly by God in justice and charity.56 It is because secular rule is coercive that it must be purged. Giles tells us

that there is something in the exercise of coercive power that hardens the heart and makes it incapable of charity. Any knowledge uninformed by charity in-

flates, states Giles, and this is especially true of knowledge derived from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Giles writes:

For although knowledge uninformed by charity inflates above all that

knowledge inflates which is joined to power. Hence Kings and Princes, and those having civil power, above all have prideful hearts: such pride can be seen to have its origin more from power than any other source and such a thing it was that the first parents desired. Desiring that pride was the first sin of theirs and what first blinded their hearts.57

The first sin of Adam and Eve lay in the pride they felt as they experienced coercive power for the first time upon eating the fruit of the forbidden tree of

knowledge of good and evil. He is explicit that the first sin was not the disobe- dience they exhibited through eating the fruit of the tree in the first place. Once more, the contrast with Bonaventure is illuminating: without recourse to Giles's

explicitly political interpretation of the Fall, Bonaventure concentrates on dis- obedience and ingratitude as the origins of the first sin rather than delight in the

experience of coercive power.58 In this passage we see that the pride our first

parents felt is the same as that felt by kings and princes and that the common

experience of coercive power is that it corrupts and leads to the blinding of the heart; that is, the heart can no longer exercise power in the love of charity. Without charity, secular power pursues a private good that cannot command a free obedience but must resort to coercion as it thwarts the natural desire of those it subjects.

Indeed, matters are worse. Giles, in a quite fascinating if dark addition to the character of the power sought by Adam, adds that an aspect of the coercion lies in deceiving his subjects about the fact that his rule does not serve their

55 Cf. S. Thomas Aquinas, In Secundum librum sententiarum, ed. Mandonnet, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3; ibid., d. 11, q. 2, a. 6.

56 "Ideo totus ordo principantium qui reducitur in unum principantem et unum principem, specialiter est a Deo ad hunc finem ut omnia tanquam in finem ultimum reducantur in Deum"

(Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, 683, A; ibid., q. 2, a. 2, 690, D).

57 "Nam et si scientia non informata charitate inflat, potissime tamen illa scientia inflat

quae est coniuncta potentiae. Unde Reges et Principes, et habentes civilem potentiam, potissime habent cor elatum: ut talis elatio magis videatur oriri ex potentia quam ex alio et tale quid fuit

quod appetierunt primi Parentes quod appetentes elatio fuit primum eorum peccatum et quod primo excaecavit corda eorum" (ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 2 lateralis, 208-9, D-A).

58 S. Bonaventure, In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 22, a. 1, q. 2, 122.

31

Graham McAleer

common good. Giles not only conceives of secular rule as coercive but claims that its character as power of such a kind is hidden from view. This conception of coercive power occurs in a passage explaining that the Devil and Adam sinned because both desired an eminence, which is always to want to rule over others, though in different ways. Giles criticizes Thomas's view that the Devil desired to rule by power (per modum potentiae), while Adam only desired to rule by knowledge (per modum scientiae).59 Rather, he argues, the Devil desired mastery through knowledge alone while Adam desired mastery through knowledge linked to power. He writes:

But no one must doubt that to desire eminence is to desire to be above others or to desire some rule and some mastery over others. And that is able to be either through the way of power or through the way of knowl-

edge. Through the way of power is to rule just as a Prince or King. Through the way of knowledge it is to rule as do the wise, because the wise servant will be master of the stupid heir.... It must be said then that the Devil must have desired to rule through knowledge as such and man through knowledge with power.0

Adam wanted a new kind of political authority, a knowledge of good and evil with power (per scientia cum potentia). That is, he desired to rule as does a king but also to wield that power surreptitiously. Adam desired to have his

kingly rule while maintaining the outward form of still being the servant to the master: he wanted the coercive power that comes with the office of kingship but wished to mask this authority in the office of service. In other words the structure of power inherited from Adam has the appearance of service to others whilst nevertheless pursuing a private good. The falsity of coercive rule, which

hopes to mask from its subjects that their common good is not being served, contrasts sharply with charitable rule which is said by Giles to rule and direct

truthfully.6' Such, to some degree or other, is our political life since the Fall: Dabo tibi regem in furore meo. Could Giles be more Augustinian?

59 S. Thomas Aquinas, In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 22, q. 1, a. 2; Summa

Theologiae, IIaIIae (Turin, 1952), q. 158, a. 1, ad 3. 60 "Sed nulli dubium est quod appetere excellere est appetere esse super alios vel est

appetere aliquem principatum et aliquod dominium super alios. Et istud potest esse vel per modum potentiae vel per modum scientiae. Per modum quidem potentiae est sicut dominatur

Princeps vel Rex. Per modum scientiae est sicut dominatur sapiens: quia servus sapiens dominabitur heris stultis... esse dicendum ut qubd Diabolus appetierit principari per scientiam secundum se, homo vero per scientiam cum potentia" (Aeg. Rom., In Secundum librum sententiarum, d. 22, q. 1, dub. 1 lateralis, 207, A).

61 Ibid., d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, 686, D.

32


Part II: Political Authority in Giles's Distinction 44

Distinction 44 is consistent with the arguments of Distinctions 21 and 22 on the political description of the Fall and the coercive character of political authority where charity is not exercised. Giles is clear in both articles 1 and 2 of this distinction that the exercise of power need not always be one of domination and coercion. Dominari, he tells us, taken in its broad sense, is present wherever there is command, and only when the term is used in a narrow sense is coercion to be understood.62 Thus, Giles explains that obedience of the inferior to the superior supposes the rule of the superior, but this need not be one of domination (dominatio). He writes:

On account of the first it must be known that obedience is of the inferior to the superior or of the servant to the master. The relation of the inferior to the superior is to be understood in a broad sense because not all superiority properly speaking is domination. For a prelate ought not to regard himself as dominating by power but dominating by virtue or charity and by serving happiness.63

Thus, when Giles writes in Distinction 44, q. 1, a. 2 that the human is naturaliter a social and political animal and that where there is society there is going to be naturaliter some one of that society who will rule,64 these passages cannot also be read to claim that in natura integra political life and rule is necessarily coercive. It is to be stressed that nowhere in Distinction 44 does Giles say that there was coercive power in the state of innocence. Readers of Distinction 44, q. 1, a. 2 appear to have read Giles as typically Aristotelian because (unlike Bonaventure) he speaks there of the city as providing all of the needs (sufficientiae) for human life. Yet these same passages ought to have warned these readers that perhaps Giles has in mind life after the Fall, for he writes that the city satisfies our needs in part through mercantile trade (per mercationem).65 Now unless Giles of Rome is Adam Smith avant la lettre, his

62 "Dominari enim potest accipi large et proprie. Si accipiatur large sic potest accipi pro quocunque praeesse. Sed proprie loquendo dominus refertur ad servum et dominari est principatus servorum, qui naturaliter non est ad homines sed ad irrationalia" (ibid., 685, A); ibid., ad 2, 686, A.

63 "Propter primum sciendum quod obedientia est inferioris ad superiorem vel servi ad dominum. Magis tamen large accipitur, ut est inferioris ad superiorem, quia non omnis superioritas, proprie loquendo, dicitur dominatio. Nam praelatus non debet existimare se potestate dominantem, sed virtute vel charitate, et serviente felicem" (ibid., d. 44, q. 2, a. 3, 687, C).

64 Ibid., q. 1, a. 2, 683, C. 65 Ibid., 683, B.

33

Graham McAleer

comments on the state of agriculture in the state of innocence,66 the ease with which the fields respond to human hands, suggest that the city before the Fall had no anxieties about the requirements of life and certainly none that might demand that Adam and Eve trade with their neighbours-to-be. Moreover, amidst these Aristotelian-flavored passages of article 2, Giles explains that his comments concern rule and power in via. Even though Adam and Eve were in via during the state of innocence,67 it is safe to assume that Giles does not think that our viator status, which does include trade, would be similar to that of our first parents prelapsus; after all, their needs would be fundamentally different from ours given that death was alien to them.68 Given the ordered structure of the Sentences, it is at least a question whether discussions after Distinctions 21 and 22 should not be taken as assuming the condition of sin unless clearly stated otherwise. It is only in the third article of Distinction 44 that Giles says he is addressing political authority in the state of innocence. Thus, even if an argument could be made that despite the absence of the term, Giles does dis- cuss coercive power in Distinction 44, q. 1, a. 2, still an argument would be necessary showing why in fact article 2 is about the state of innocence before anything could be inferred about political relations in this state.

If, as Giles argues in Distinction 22, selfishness and deceit are intrinsic to coercive power, then such power could not have been exercised in the state of innocence. Political authority was originally established to serve the public good, and as is explained in Distinction 44, q. 2, a. 2, rule can only be legiti- mate insofar as it does so. This condition for legitimacy can be derived from Giles's description of how an unjust rule can become just. The utopian terms of this description reveal Giles's Augustinian assumptions about political authority after the Fall. Taking an example from Augustine, the passage reads:

Provinces subjugated to the Romans see the benefit to themselves to be ruled by the Romans on these conditions: all rejoice in their goods and no one is wrongfully burdened by another, and all delight in the greatness of the peace converting instruments of war into ploughshares and sickles. Then the rule has begun to be voluntary and just which before had been involuntary and unjust.69

66 Ibid., d. 22, q. 1, dub. 3, lateralis, 209, B-C. Cf. S. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 96, a. 1, ad 3.

67 Ibid., d. 33, q. 1, dub. 1 lateralis, 486, B-C. 68 Ibid., d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, 683, B-C. On the differences in agriculture and increased in-

equalities amongst persons after the Fall see respectively, d. 22, q. 1, dub. 3 lateralis, 209 and d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, 685, B-D.

69 "Nam provinciae subiugatae Romanis videntes utile esse eis dominium Romanorum, et

quia ex hos quilibet gaudebat bonis suis et nullus iniuriose opprimebatur ab alio, quilibet delectabatur in magnitudine pacis convertens arma bellica in vomeres et in falces, incipiebat esse voluntarium et esse iustum quod prius fuerat involuntarium et iniustum" (ibid., q. 2, a. 2, 690, A).

34


All our desire is ultimately only to be satisfied by the charitable rule of God, and Giles here in effect describes the transition from the City of the Devil to the City of God. Unjust rule begins either when ajust rule is used unjustly or when rule has been usurped and violently imposed. As has been seen, Adam usurped power at the time of the Fall when he sought apotentia annexa. In his despotic rule Adam unjustly and violently ruled Eve (to whom a political rule is appropriate) and later his sons (to whom a royal rule is appropriate). In this

passage Giles lays out a strong condition for legitimacy, namely, that a just rule is restored when a ruler gains the approbation of the subjected. Significantly, this approbation is not merely a cognitive recognition of the benefit of this rule. Those subjected must experience an emotional approbation of joy and delight in the benefits of the peace established by the rule. The emotional approbation, signified by Giles's emphasis on delight and joy in the rule, demonstrates that it is not intrinsic to government that it be coercive. Rather, when read alongside this passage, Giles's statement that no oppressors existed in the state of inno- cence70 must imply that government was not then coercive but now it is neces-

sary that it be so. The plainly utopian vision of armaments becoming agricul- tural implements reveals his Augustinian assumption that secular political au-

thority needs to exercise coercive rule since it cannot reorder our desire away from a love of God. True legitimacy can only be secured when government provides for the universal satisfaction of our deepest desire: when secular government is transformed into the City of God. That this passage does indeed describe the return to the City of God is confirmed by a passage in Distinction 33, which describes the transition from just to unjust rule at the time of the Fall. The same themes are found in this passage as in the one above describing the opposite transition:

For respecting the joy of those wayfarers [our first parents] bringing about the good how much more a preferable virtue is justice by which to reign, for there was then no rebellion of the powers and the body. On account of how much that state of life permitted, there was in that

primitive state the peace and delight of all, but now in the moder state that justice does not rule. Rather, a grace and charity reigns but amidst these are torture and pains. However, through these we are still able to

participate in the highest good and we are still in hope of having the

society of Angels.71

70 Ibid., q. 1, a. 3, 686, D. 71 "Nam in via quantum ad delectationem perficientis boni potior virtus est iustitia qua

regnante, nulla erat rebellio virium, nulla rebellio corporis: propter quod quantum patitur status viae erat in illo primitivo omnis pax, omnis delectatio, sed nunc in statu moderno non regnat illa iustitia. Sed regnat gratiam et charitas cum quibus stant cruciatus et tribulationes. Tamen per eas sumus magis in participatione summi boni et sumus magis in spe habendi Angelorum societatem" (ibid., d. 33, q. 1, dub. 1 lateralis, 486, C).

35

Graham McAleer

Reign that began justly has since the Fall become the saeculum, a reign in which charity, if present at all, is always linked with coercive rule. Such a reign does not leave us without hope that we might come to have a society like that of the Angels, a society where there is a dominium72 exercised in love. To return to a reign ofjustice with a rule exercised by a perfect will in charity would restore a society in which all would have peace and delight. The Fall is once more characterized by Giles as the beginning of an unjust reign in which the peace and delight of all is forsaken and as we know from Distinctions 21 and 22, forsaken for the private good of the king or prince.

Conclusion

Giles is certainly not oblivious to the Augustinian theory of dominium but in fact largely adopts Augustine. Although Augustine would not recognize the refusal to see any intrinsic relationship between coercion and political author-

ity, he would recognize as his own Giles's claim that post-lapsarian rule is coercive and despotic, if nevertheless inevitable. Moreover, Giles is very Au-

gustinian in the claim that the Fall has its origin in Adam being "dominated by the lust for domination itself."73 It certainly is not claimed here that there are no Thomistic-Aristotelian elements in Giles's Sentences-commentary. Neverthe- less, there is a much greater continuity between Giles and Augustine in their

conception of political authority than has been acknowledged to date. Both

argue that coercive power, definitive of the king, the prince, and those with civil power, destroys the freedom to give loving obedience to God because it seeks a private good. This secular rule, Giles adds, was introduced by Adam when he sought and delighted in the experience of coercing others.

Having identified Giles's fidelity to Augustine, the standard interpretation of the development of medieval political thought after Aquinas is in need of

scrutiny. Further study of individual thinkers is required in order to assess the-

perhaps underestimated- resilience of Augustine's analysis of political au-

thority. A rich source for these studies is furnished by the tradition of Sen-

tences-commentary. Certainly, the Sentences-commentary of Giles of Rome does not support the thesis that Augustine's political thought waned after Tho- mas Aquinas.

Loyola College in Maryland.

72 Ibid., d. 44, q. 1, a. A, sed contra. 73 J. M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge, 1994), 219.

36

Documents

Giles of Rome on Political Authority