András Gerő

Anti-Semitic Discourse in Hungary Since the Fall of CommunismSurvey and Reflections

Az antiszemita közbeszéd Magyarországon a kommunizmus utánHelyzetkép és megfontolások

In Hungary, the Communist system collapsed in 1989-90. The country went from a state of subjugation to one of political freedom. The system was transformed from an increasingly soft dictatorship into a democracy. This new-found liberty had innumerable consequences, including the freedom of expression and a free press. Anything could be published and anything could receive publicity, including anti-Semitic statements, interpretations and narrative.

The legacy of the communist era

A kommunista korszak öröksége

In terms of its domestic policy, the official self-articulation of the Hungarian socialist system – in contrast to other socialist states – contained no anti-Semitic content or elements, coherent or sporadic. In its own way, the system outlawed alternative (read: diverging from the official) Jewish self-determination, Jewish samizdat, but this was only vaguely defined as activities related to the Jews. The state adhered to the same policy with respect to the alternative schools of fine art, or, for example, what were known as the base Catholic communities. And the official Jewish organisations were subject to multiple controls. State – party

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– control was exercised by the Bureau of Religious Affairs, while the task of undercover surveillance fell to the network of moles and the secret service.

However, the Hungarian system of communism – obviously under the influence of Soviet foreign policy – was explicitly anti-Semitic in one respect, although (in contrast to the Soviet Union) it never translated this into an element of its domestic policy: its anti-Israel stance.

In this respect, the system's perceived foreign-policy interests and its ideology met, and in the long term effectively “„made the bed””" for the brand of left-wing anti-Semitism that would also be readily accessible to the proponents of postcommunist anti-Semitism.

Soviet foreign policy – and its Hungarian counterpart, which toed the line in this particular respect – sided with the Arab world in the middle-east conflict. This mainly arose from the bipolar logic of the Cold War: If America supported Israel, then the Socialist nations had to back the Arabs.

However, this relatively primitive logic evolved to develop a very strong ideological content. Within this construct, the Jewish state took on the role of oppressor, while the Arab countries, notably Palestine, were viewed as the oppressed. And it was the communists' task to side with the oppressed, and support them, because “„ultimate justice””" could only be achieved through the liberation of those who were branded as “„oppressed.”.”." Thus, the phenomenon today known as terrorism also became irrelevant, as the stamp of “„ultimate truth””" vindicated every act committed by the “„oppressed,”,”," even the murder of unarmed innocent bystanders. (At that time Hungary supported, in a variety of ways, those terrorist organisations that were regarded as anti-imperialist, and who, without exception, considered their official ultimate purpose to be the destruction of the Jewish state.) The communist system never called this political-ideological structure by name – in other words it did notnotdidn't regard it as anti-Semitic – but it did classify itself as “„anti-Zionist.”.”." However, Hungarian communism – unlike the Soviet version –

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did not translate its “„anti-Zionist””" policy into the rhetoric of retribution against Jews living in the country.

The presence and functioning of the communist system in Hungary had a profound

effect on the identity of Jews living here.

Hungarian Jews had gone through far-reaching assimilation since the second half of

the 19th century. Assimilation meant no more than Jews in Hungary becoming Hungarian

Jews, or one might say Jewish Hungarians.

This process had several distinguishing marks. Firstly, an increasing number of Jews

became part of the reform Jewish movement (called “neology” in Hungary), which enabled,

within the religious identity, a more flexible practice of religion vis-à-vis the norms of

majority Christian society. Secondly, an increasing number and proportion of Jews used the

Hungarian language, and a changeover of language or language use is a well-known category

of identity expression. People of Jewish origin also actively contributed to the output of

Hungarian culture, many becoming writers and journalists. Many also abandoned the Jewish

religion because – like Heinrich Heine, Karl Marx and many other people of Jewish origin –

they saw abandonment of their religion and conversion to Christianity as an entrée into

European culture. The current of assimilation was so strong that, in a certain sense, it stifled

the expression of Jewishness in the terms of integration. Hungarian Jews thought that they

were just as much Hungarian as the rest except, in certain cases, for their religion. Many

thought of themselves as Hungarians who practised the Mosaic religion. The integrative

identity could have meant that they regarded themselves as a different kind of Hungarians

from the majority Hungarian nation, simply because they had a different history and partly

because they had different cultural traditions. But the anti-Semitic logic, a departure from

anti-Judaism, which was gaining ground in Hungary as it was all across Europe in the second

half of the 19th century, prompted the view that self-articulation in terms of integration would

play into the hands of the anti-Semites. They therefore redoubled their efforts to blend into

everything which society regarded as Hungarian.

When the independent Hungarian state introduced increasingly drastic discriminative

Jewish laws between the two wars, Hungarian Jewish organisations continually insisted that

they were just as much Hungarian as anybody else. When the logic of the Jewish laws,

following the Nazi occupation of the country, ran into the Holocaust, Hungarian Jews had a

relatively low level of resistance. One reason for this was that, having adopted an identity

which was so deeply Hungarian, they were intellectually defenceless against the racialist

world-view and the horrors it implied.

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In Hungary, it was Jews living outside Budapest who bore the brunt of the Holocaust.

Put another way, non-Budapest Jews were deported with the active assistance of Hungarian

state bodies, sent to concentration camps, and the vast majority ended their lives in the gas

chambers. Budapest Jews were not subjected to the deportations because – after the non-

Budapest Jews had been taken away – the governor of the occupied country revoked the

intention to liquidate them. That meant that the Hungarian Nazis, who came to power in

October 1944, could murder them in the traditional manner, by execution.

In demographic terms, the consequence of this was that a large section of the

Hungarian Jewish population perished, but a comparatively large group did survive the Nazi

occupation. This was the state of affairs when the end of the Second World War reached the

Hungarian Jews.

In terms of identity history, the Holocaust and the installation of the communist

system prompted many of the survivors to leave the country (emigrating to the new state of

Israel, the United States or Western Europe) and those who remained to try and forget that

they were associated with Jewishness in any way. For those who stayed, every aspect of

Jewishness was part of a culture of forgetting, an attempt to free themselves of the past and

bury themselves in a society whose ideology announced from on high that it had surpassed all

kinds of anti-Semitism and racial prejudice, because it was building a new world.

The generation of Hungarian Jews who survived the Holocaust proved capable of

passing on the culture of forgetting to their children and grandchildren.

The communist system itself played a part in fostering this culture of forgetting. Like

many other expressions, it made a taboo out of the word “Jew.” It paid little attention to the

Holocaust or the responsibility of the people and state of Hungary, and offered survivors no

prospect of compensation, because its approach to Hungarian history was that something

completely new had started, something that might have roots in the past, but of an utterly

different order, and so even tradition was subordinate to it. Hungarian history was not a

continuity to be elucidated, but a tradition that could be selected from.

The taboo status shows up in the fact that relatively few publications on the Holocaust

appeared during the communist period. Literary works on the subject (few, but of a high

standard) were only published with difficulty and in small print runs. (The struggle

surrounding Imre Kertész’ novel Fatelessness is perhaps the episode which is best known

internationally.)

The communist system thought that if it did not talk about something, or hardly did,

then it did not exist.

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The history of the Holocaust was thus in a double bind: the surviving Jews wanted to

forget, and the regime wanted to keep quiet. These two mutually reinforcing factors left the

questions Hungarian anti-Semitism, the Holocaust and the problem of Jewish identity almost

completely unexamined.

When the transition came, i.e. communism collapsed, nearly half a century after the

end of the Second World War, these issues were still intellectually unsettled.

The characteristics of the situation can in a certain be sense be measured statistically.

According to data gathered by the Alliance of the Jewish Communities of Hungary

(MAZSIHISZ) about twenty thousand of the country’s ten million population registered for

compensation when the post-transition Jewish compensation laws were discussed and

adopted. The same organisation found that no more than five thousand people attended

synagogues on the main Jewish feasts. Combining that number of 20,000 applicants for

compensation with the probable age distribution, MAZSIHISZ estimated the number of Jews

living in Hungary at 100-120,000. Taking into account the altered life strategies adopted by

Jews remaining in Hungary after 1945, and the workings of the culture of forgetting, the

number of people of partly Jewish origin may be put at about 300,000.

These figures are of no great significance in themselves, and in any case contain many

uncertain factors, but they do indicate that expression of Jewish identity in any sense among

the broad mass of Hungarian Jews is not a widespread phenomenon.

Of course this is only one side of the coin – the old side. In reaction to the culture of

forgetting and latter protests against communism, a process which may be termed “Jewish

renaissance” got under way after the political transition. The atmosphere of freedom fostered

community houses, journals, publishers, a Jewish university, Jewish organisations of various

longevities, a Jewish cultural festival, and debates on Jewish self-articulation. No matter how

spectacular, however, these phenomena do not, by a long way, embrace all people of Jewish

origin in the sociological sense, indeed to some extent they have been – and remain –

sporadic.

The – largely secular – mass of Hungarian Jews, with their wide spread of identities, is

linked together by only one thing of sociological significance: a rejection of the still-present

phenomenon of anti-Semitism.

A kommunista rendszer léte és tevékenysége erősen hatott az itt élő zsidóság

identitására is.

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A magyarországi zsidóság – lényegében a XIX. század második fele óta – erős

asszimilációs folyamaton ment át. Az asszimiláció annyit jelentett, hogy a magyarországi

zsidók magyar zsidókká váltak, vagy – mondhatnám úgy is – zsidó magyarok lettek.

A folyamatnak több jele volt. Először is a zsidók egyre nagyobb része vált a

reformzsidóság részévé (ezt Magyarországon neológiának hívták), ami a vallási identitáson

belül egy, a többségi keresztény társadalom normáival szemben rugalmasabb vallásosságot

tett lehetővé. Másrészt a zsidóság egyre nagyobb számban és arányban használta a magyar

nyelvet, s mint tudjuk, a nyelvváltás, illetve a nyelvhasználat mindig identitás-kifejező

kategória. De mindemellett a zsidó származású egyének aktívan hozzájárultak a magyar

kulturális termeléshez; közülük nagy számban kerültek ki írók, újságírók. Nem kevesen

elhagyták a zsidó vallást, mert - Heinrich Heinéhez, Karl Marxhoz és sok más zsidó

származású egyénhez hasonlóan - úgy gondolták, hogy a vallás elhagyása - illetve a

kikeresztelkedés - belépő az európai kultúrába. Az asszimilációs sodrás oly erős volt, hogy

bizonyos értelemben ellehetetlenült a zsidóság integrációban megfogalmazódó kifejeződése.

A magyar zsidók úgy gondolták, hogy ők éppolyan magyarok mint a többiek, csak – adott

esetben – a vallásuk különbözik. Sokan úgy tekintettek önmagukra, hogy ők Mózes-vallású

magyarok. Az integrációs identitás jelenthette volna azt, hogy a többségi magyar nemzethez

képest másfajta magyarnak tekintik magukat, egyszerűen azért, mert más a történetük és

részben mások a kulturális szokásaik. De éppen azért, mert a XIX. század második felében

nemcsak Magyarországon, hanem Európa-szerte teret nyert az antijudaizmustól eltérő, immár

antiszemita logika, úgy vélték, hogy az integrációs önartikulációval az antiszemiták kezére

játszanának. Így aztán egyre nagyobb erővel simultak bele mindabba, amit a társadalom

magyarnak tekintett.

Amikor a két háború között a független magyar állam egyre drasztikusabb

diszkriminatív zsidótörvényeket hozott, akkor a magyar zsidóság szervezetei folyamatosan azt

bizonygatták, hogy ők pontosan ugyanolyan magyarok, mint bárki más. Amikor a

zsidótörvények logikája az immár nácik által megszállt országban belefutott a holokausztba,

akkor a magyar zsidóság viszonylag alacsony rezisztencia-készséggel rendelkezett. S ennek

egyik oka az volt, hogy identitásukban annyira magyarnak tekintették magukat, hogy

eszmeileg is eszköztelenül álltak szembe a faji világképből következő szörnyűségekkel

szemben.

Magyarországon a holokauszt döntően a Budapesten kívüli vidéki zsidóságot érintette.

Másképp fogalmazva: a vidéki zsidóságot a magyar állam szerveinek aktív segítségével

deportálták, koncentrációs táborba küldték, és túlnyomó többségük a gázkamrákban végezte

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életét. A budapesti zsidóságot a deportálások nem érintették, mert – miután a vidékieket már

elvitték – a megszállt ország kormányzója leállíttatta a budapesti zsidóság likvidálására

irányuló szándékot. Így őket az 1944. októberében hatalomra került magyar nácik

hagyományos, azaz kivégzéses módszerrel helyben gyilkolhatták.

Demográfiai értelemben ennek az lett a következménye, hogy a magyar zsidóság

jelentős része elpusztult, de egy viszonylag nagy létszámú csoport túlélhette a náci

megszállást. A második világháború vége így érte tehát a magyar zsidóságot.

Identitástörténetileg a holokauszt, illetve utána a kommunista rendszer kiépülése arra

ösztönözte a megmaradtakat, hogy egy részük elhagyja az országot (az éppen megalakuló

Izraelbe, az Egyesült Államokba, vagy Nyugat-Európába emigráljon), másik részük viszont itt

maradt, és igyekezett elfeledkezni arról, hogy bármilyen értelemben kötődik a zsidósághoz.

Az itt maradtak számára a zsidóság bármely aspektusa a felejtés kultúrájának részévé vált,

amit nem csak az segített elő, hogy szabadulni akartak a múlttól, hanem az is, hogy bele

akartak feledkezni egy olyan társadalomba, amelyik ideológiájában fennen hirdette:

mindenfajta antiszemitizmuson, faji előítéleten túlkerült, mert egy új világot kíván létrehozni.

A felejtés kultúráját a holokausztot túlélt magyar zsidó nemzedék képes volt

továbbadni gyerekeinek, unokáinak.

Másfelől, a kommunista rendszer rá is játszott arra, hogy a felejtés-kultúra működni

tudjon. Oly sok más kifejezés mellett tabusította a „zsidó” szót is. Viszonylag kevéssé

foglalkozott a holokauszttal, illetve a magyar nemzet és állam felelősségével, a túlélőknek

semmifajta kárpótlást nem helyezett kilátásba, mert a magyar történelmet úgy fogta fel, hogy

vele valami vadonatúj kezdődött, aminek ugyan vannak előzményei a múltban, de ő, mármint

a rendszer egy új minőséget képvisel, s így tradícióit is maga választja ki. A magyar

történelmet nem feldolgozandó folytonosságban láttatták, hanem szelektálható tradícióként

értelmezték.

Jól jelzi a tabusítás folyamatát, hogy a kommunizmus idején viszonylag kevés

publikáció jelent meg a holokausztról. Azokat az irodalmi műveket, amelyek a témával

foglalkoztak (kis számú, de minőségi munkákról van szó) nehezen, és kis példányszámban

adták ki. (Talán nemzetközileg a legismertebb a 2002-ben Nobel díjat kapott Kertész Imre

Sorstalanság című művének kommunizmusbeli kálváriája.)

A kommunista rendszer úgy gondolta, hogy ha valamiről nem, vagy alig beszél, akkor

az nincs.

Mint jeleztem, itt tehát egy kétirányú folyamatról volt szó: a túlélő zsidók felejteni

akartak, a rezsim meg hallgatni kívánt. A két tényező egymást erősítette. Így peresze

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tökéletesen feldolgozatlan maradt mind a magyarországi antiszemitizmus, mind a holokauszt,

mind a zsidó identitás problémája.

A rendszerváltás, azaz a kommunizmus összeomlása Magyarországot úgy érte, hogy

ezek a kérdések majd fél évszázaddal a második világháború vége után is eszmeileg

rendezetlenek voltak.

A helyzet jellegzetességei bizonyos értelemben statisztikailag is mérhetőek. A

Magyarországi Zsidó Hitközségek Szövetségének adatai szerint, amikor a rendszerváltás után

szóba kerültek a zsidók kárpótlásáról szóló törvények, illetve elfogadták azokat, akkor

kerekített számokkal a 10 milliós lakosságú országban körülbelül 20 ezren jelentkeztek

kárpótlásért. Mindeközben ugyancsak a fenti szervezet adatai szerint a jelentősebb zsidó

ünnepekkor maximum 5 ezer ember látogatja a zsinagógákat. A húszezres kárpótlási szám

alapján – figyelembe véve a lehetséges korcsoport eloszlást - a magyarországi zsidóság

létszámát a MAZSIHISZ 100-120 ezerre becsüli, s figyelembe véve azt is, hogy 1945 után a

Magyarországon maradt zsidók életstratégiái is módosultak, továbbá azt is, hogy a felejtés

kultúrája működött, a részlegesen zsidó származásúak arányát nagyjából 300 ezerre tartják.

Az adatoknak önmagukban nincs nagy jelentőségük, s különösen azért nincs, mert

jónéhány bizonytalansági tényezőt is tartalmaznak. De azt mindenesetre jelzik, hogy a

bármilyen értelemben vett zsidó identitás kifejeződése a magyar zsidóságra a maga

tömegességében nem vált jellemzővé.

Persze ez csak az érem egyik – régi – oldala. Éppenhogy a felejtés kultúrája és a

kommunizmus elleni kései tiltakozás reakciójaként a rendszerváltás után megindult egy olyan

folyamat is, amit - bizonyos értelemben – „zsidó reneszánsznak” hívhatunk. A szabadság

légkörében létrejött közösségi ház, folyóirat, könyvkiadó, zsidó egyetem, különféle hosszabb-

rövidebb életű zsidó önszerveződések, zsidó kulturális fesztivál, illetve keletkeztek a zsidó

önartikulációt érintő viták. Mindezek a jelenségek azonban – noha látványosak – szociológiai

értelemben messze nem fogják át a zsidó származású egyéneket; bizonyos értelemben

sporadikusnak bizonyultak és bizonyulnak.

A nagyon eltérő identitású, s alapvetően szekuláris magyar zsidóságot tömegében,

szociológiailag értelmezhető minőségben egyetlen egy dolog köti össze: az egykor

zsidótörvényeken át a holokausztba torkolló, és ma is élő antiszemitizmus elutasítása.

Arriving at a state of freedom, Hungarian society was accustomed to the idea that the Jewish state was some kind of devil, or at least to the fact it appeared in a demonised context. As for Hungarian

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Jews, they did not talk about themselves or formulate their own history, and this was regarded by others as correct and acceptable.., a zsidók pedig nem beszélnek magukról, nem fogalmazzák meg saját, külön történetüket, s ezt mások is így tartják illendőnek, elfogadottnak. But everyone it had become unaccustomed to overt anti-Semitism.

A point of principle

Egy elvi megjegyzés

We should be clear on the fact that while the Hungarian socialist regime was notnotwasn't anti-Semitic, it was still a dictatorship. And even the worst quality of freedom is better that the best form of dictatorship. Racism and anti-Semitism are not the essence of liberty, but simply a by-product of it. On the other hand, a disregard for human dignity is the essence of

dictatorship.

Anti-Semitism in the free world

Antiszemitizmus a szabadságban

The anti-Semitic discourse emerged almost immediately after the change of regime. First it appeared sporadically, then in the form of a coherent narrative, shaped into a world view. First it appeared in a series of isolation manifestations, later evolving into a branch of institutionalised politics.

The anti-Semitic world view – because the audience was unaccustomed to it – sounded innovative, although there was nothing original in either its theme or its structure.

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A crucial structural element of anti-Semitic discourse, originating from the antecedents of 19th-century Europe – already present before the Second World War – and reconstituted in post-communist Hungary, is the distinction between “„us””" and “„them.”.”." The differentiation is based on the premise that “„we””" (the Hungarians) are very different from “„them””" (the Jews). The difference is not without import, because “„they””" are intent on harming “„us.”.”."

Who are “„they”?”?"? Naturally, they are the communists, they are the capitalists, they are the liberals, “„they””" are “„our””" enemies. “„They””" want to force all kinds of alien ideologies upon “„us,”,”," and destroy our untainted and unique national characteristics. “„They””" are not members of “„our””" nation. Their assimilation is bogus, a sham. “„They””" are members of a world conspiracy, more loyal to each other than to the Hungarian people. “„They””" can even make a profit out of their own suffering.

These structural themes contain no originality whatsoever In intellectual terms they are not even worthy of contempt, since they have no rational interpretation, a fact which has been reiterated in the European culture by a great many people a great many times.

Nonetheless, the anti-Semitic discourse that emerged in the post-communist period still represented an innovation in three respects.

One new development was the slightly different linguistic medium through which the old content was delivered.

The second comprised the specific events with which the old content was associated, thus giving it new currency.

The third was inherent in the discourse regarding the possible means of dealing with the narrative, which serves as a vehicle for the old content.

Today's participants in anti-Semitic discourse – unlike their pre-World War II counterparts – do not regard themselves as anti-Semites. One

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reason for this is that the means of expressing the traditional anti-Semitic content has been linguistically overhauled to a certain extent, or assimilated into a different ideological framework.

I have already referred to the fierce anti-Israeli stance of the political left, and the smuggling of the “„oppressor-oppressed””" dichotomy into the discourse on Israel. First of all, this linguistic and ideological artifice of communist anti- Semitism enabled people with left-wing views to also make use of the anti- Semitic content, without having to actually regard themselves as anti-Semites. Secondly, it had a rejuvenating effect on the traditional language of traditional anti-Semitism. Naturally, this was also prompted by the fact that the Holocaust had compromised the existing anti-Semitic terminology, making it unacceptable to assume an anti-Semitic identity.

The upshot of all this was that the unreconstructed anti-Semitic content received a linguistic framework that had been reconstructed – or partially reconstructed – in a certain sense, thus giving birth to the code language of traditional anti-Semitism. In Hungarian, expressions such as “„Foreign-hearted,” “foreign-souled”, “," „foreignsouled", „Galician carpetbagger””" and other similar expressions have become euphemisms for the former derogative epithets aimed at Jews, removing the need to even utter the “„J-word.”.”." Once in place, this code language can be utilised in a context that packages the traditional content with new elements, enabling everybody to translate the expressions thus used and contextualised back to the original in their heads.

The second innovation lies in the old-new events, updated in the code language. The basic content is old, the event is current and the problem associated with it new, but its novelty is precisely what warns us that the traditional content is still alive; the language is a code. This is how the “„classic””" anti-Semitic themes are presented. Let's take an example.

The “„Jewish world conspiracy””" is a traditional anti-Semitic theme, which also takes the form of the “„Protocols of the Elders of Zion,”,”,"

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which was inspired by the propaganda of the Tsarist secret police. (This collection of lies was also published in democratic Hungary, since the emergence of a new version does not preclude keeping the old one alive.) The current variant focuses on George Soros, the American-Hungarian Jewish billionaire philanthropist, who has set up a number of foundations in Central-Eastern Europe. Specific persons, rendered symbolic and demonised in the anti-Semitic narrative, can be linked simultaneously to the traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes, those of nationalistically-motivated anti-Americanism, the anti-capital stance based on left-wing values and the relatively new anti-globalism movement, and this can be done in a way that makes it compatible with the terminology of all the ideologies. Tongue in cheek, you could say that if Soros did not exist then the anti-Semites would have to invent him. (A similar issue, invoking a combination of the various prejudices and terminologies of Hungarian anti-Semitic discourse, was that of Israeli investors in Budapest shopping mall construction projects) To the anti-Semites Soros embodied the “„New York-Budapest-Tel Aviv axis,”,”," through which the focus of anti-Semitism has shifted partly towards anti-Americanism.

When differentiating between “„us””" and “„them,”,”," it is traditionally very important for “„them””" to be anti-national. This could be given currency, for example, by the recent case in which what was regarded as a national football team came under Jewish ownership. The anti-Semitic discourse that was sparked off here demonstrated dramatically just how close to the surface the classic theme really remains, but at the same time the narrative also appeared to be conducted at a “„football””" level, which, despite the obvious anti-Semitic content, enabled the Justice Minister of the time to state that she “does not„doesn't follow the game.”.”."

It was also possible to apply the similarly well-established tenets of “„Jewish greed””" and “„amorality””" in the anti-Semitic interpretation of the debate surrounding compensation of Hungarian Jews from the Second World War. Here the use of the term “„the Holocaust business””" was used

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to stigmatise, and to invoke thought structures that implied a collective stigma. And naturally, the Jews' cosmopolitanism, traditionally a negative trait in the anti-Semitic reading, was also brought up-to-date: the communist fathers had liberal sons, and thus the two internationally inspired tendencies, embodied in the Jewish form, became the enemy of the “„nation.”."

Another point of principleEgy másik elvi megjegyzés

Of course, the classic anti-Semitic system of prejudices was always metaphorical. Therefore it can be applied not only to the Jews, but to all things that the anti- Semites believe to be Jewish. This is how a liberal author – despite being descended from the Hungarian aristocracy – can be stigmatised as an embodiment of the “„corrupting Jewish spirit.”.”." The “„Jewish””" label is every bit as symbolic as it is specific. Indeed, the more anti-Semitic a mindset, the more symbolic it is.

What can we do about it?

Mit kezdjünk vele?

The emergence of anti-Semitic discourse gave rise to the question of how it should be approached, the mode and means of responding to it. This – historically speaking – counted as a new problem in Hungary.

In the first period of press freedom – after 1867 – there were no legal obstacles to publishing anti-Semitic content. It was permitted to be openly and avowedly anti-Semitic, although the liberal Hungarian state that existed between 1867 and 1918 did not promote or support anti-Semitism at the political level.

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What had only been permitted up until the First World War gained approval in the inter-war period. The anti-Semitism of public discourse was explicitly supported – to varying degrees – by government policy, and from the end of the 1930s even took the form of racially-based laws. What had been simply tolerated became state policy.

The escalation of anti-Semitic discourse into the Holocaust created a new situation after

the war. It became clear that there was no longer any such thing as “„harmless””" anti-

Semitism. Prejudiced speech become more than simply irresponsible; the words had turned to

blood and the gestures to mass homicide, ethnic cleansing. Word and deed had become one

and the same.

There were still anti-Semitic pogroms immediately after the war, but state policy was no longer anti-Semitic. Anti-Semitic discourse lived on more at a social than a political level.

The Stalinist-Communist dictatorship – by its nature – only permitted one mode of speech. This narrative, directed from above, was not anti-Semitic, but it just as well could have been. The “„Zionist doctor trials””" initiated by the Soviet Union also increased the receptiveness to anti-Semitism in Hungary. Stalin's death – in Hungary at least – marked an end to the further escalation of this process.

During the uprising of 1956, anti-Semitism emerged once again. Its presence was only tangible at the social level, and there was no trace of it in the conduct and self-articulation of the uprising's leaders. But a great many Jews still took advantage of the temporary opening of the borders, and fled the country. After all, only twelve years had passed since 1944.

I have already mentioned the communist regime that followed, under János Kádár, which had no articulated anti-Semitic policies The presence of anti-Semitic discourse, which emerged after the regime change to develop into a coherent world view, took society, and a great many of the political elite who dominated the system of democracy, by surprise.

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Many believed that something needed to be done. Many were of the opinion that it need not be taken too seriously. And many believed that the freedom of speech, the press and opinion is too important for us to restrict our self-expression, however racist its content.

The differing views generated disputes, as well as attempts to deal with the problem, partly motivated by the fact that while quite a few of the grossly anti- Semitic outbursts resulted in lawsuits, in some cases the articulators of the anti-Semitic statements were exonerated by the court. For the first time in Hungary's history, it was planned to restrict hate speech by law.

Of course, the definition of hate speech did not only include anti-Semitic discourse, but in the light of the country's history, it was certainly a key element. The question gave rise to serious political debate, and a parliamentary bill set off on its course through the legislature. In the end it came to nothing, as the proposals were screened out by the Constitutional Court. Naturally, this did not bring an end to the debate, and even today opinions are divided as to whether freedom of speech should take priority over a life without fear.

With regard to anti-Semitic discourse, the situation we are left with is similar to that of

the Age of Dualism that followed the 1867 compromise: some speak it, others protest against

it, and successive governments distance themselves from it with varying degrees of

emphasis.egyesek mondják, mások tiltakoznak ellene, a változó kormányok pedig hol

nagyobb, hol kisebb nyomatékkal elhatárolják magukat tőle..

Political positioning

A politikai pozicionáltság

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Hungarian Anti-Semitic discourse also has a political orientation. The expression

“„discourse””" presupposes a public element. And, by its nature, public narrative takes a

political stance.

The Hungarian anti-Semites – as I have already indicated – consider neither themselves

nor their statements to be anti-Semitic. The communist regime never classified left-wing anti-

Semitism as anti-Jewish, labelling it only as anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli, or – through a process of

sublimation – anti-nationalist or anti-imperialist.

In its political self-articulation the political left wing – albeit, in terms of its thinking,

not in every case – fundamentally abandoned this latent anti-Semitic narrative.

The narrative drifted to the extreme right, where it merged with traditional anti-Semitic

content.

In the political sense, in Hungary today the unabridged anti-Semitic world view is

concentrated to the extreme right of the political spectrum. Naturally, this statement applies

not to individual persons, but to the politically institutionalised organisations, movements and

parties. Even as an anti-Semite, a given person could be a left-wing or moderately right-wing

voter, since the political preferences of the individual result from a combination of factors.

The political institutionalisation of the extreme right and the emergence of the anti-

Semitic world view developed in parallel, reinforcing each other. The first political force to

become visible to the naked eye and to openly generate anti-Semitic discourse while not

regarding itself as anti-Semitic, was the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). In the

course of its history to date, it has once, between 1998 and 2002, it has once succeeded in

gathering the 5% of votes necessary to win a seat in parliament. One component of the party

infrastructure is the periodical entitled “„Magyar Fórum,”,”," which propagates explicitly

anti-Semitic views. At one time a radio station affiliated with the party also operated in

Budapest. More recently, no longer in parliament, they regrouped to form an extreme right-

wing youth movement called “„Jobbik””" (a play on words that simultaneously means

“„better””" and “„to the right”),”),"), and struggled in 2006 to make political headway under

the name of “„Harmadik út””" (Third Way). They call themselves national radicals, but –

based on their public statements and peculiar brand of anti-capitalism – they are closer to the

national socialism which many refer to by the former German acronym of Nazi. At the same

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time the political infrastructure of anti-Semitic discourse – precisely as a result of the marked

presence of the language employed by MIÉP – also came to include Hungarian public service

radio, through its programme “program „Vasárnapi Újság”,”,", a good many internet sites associated with Jobbik have also become incorporated into the infrastructure. In 2007, Jobbik set up its own paramilitary organisation, the “Hungarian Guard” using symbols similar to those of the former Hungarian Nazis, the Arrow Cross movementA Jobbik 2007-ben létrehozta saját, az egykori magyar nácik – a nyilasok – jelképrendszeréhez hasonló szimbolikával működő pareamilitáris szervezetét, az úgynevezett “Magyar Gárdát”.

Establishing the political orientation of anti-Semitic discourse is straightforward in the case of the extreme right. Of course, this does not notdoesn't mean that anti-Semitic content does notnotdoesn't appear elsewhere.

In terms of political leanings, the field closer to the centre of the spectrum represents a far more complicated problem. The problem mainly arises from what can be termed the code-language of anti-Semitism. This is because the use of the code words is not the exclusive preserve of the extreme right, but also crops up in the dialogue of other political entities, although the given topic does not fit into a comprehensive anti-Semitic narrative, since it conceals no coherent anti-Semitic content. This only further complicates the reactions of people sensitive to anti-Semitism, as the use of such a code word can be attributed a greater significance than is justified. The stigmatic interpretation of a given code word can make its sporadic user appear to be an avowed anti-Semite. This is only one step away from political hysteria, or hype.

Besides this hyped-up perception, a new factor clouding our vision is the fact that non-

right wing politicians occasionally use code words with anti-Semitic content. Of course, it is

possible that they do not know what they are saying. It ItYes, this is possible, and certainly

true sometimes, but is still not a satisfactory explanation. FarFarIt is far more likely is that by

deliberately using one or two code words, they wish to reach voters whose thinking

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incorporates anti-Semitic prejudice. They do this in the hope that the code word is only a

subtle reference, and will notnotwon't detract from their legitimacy in the political centre.

(The ferocity of the reaction often causes centrist voters, who do not like radicalism, to

become scared that the given politician is more extreme in his or her views than he or she

shows him/herself to be.) Research shows that in Hungary there are more people who hold

anti-Semitic prejudices than there are extreme right-wing voters. According to credible

surveys, approximately 5% of the population are “„hardcore””" anti-Semites, while around

25% are “„soft””" – people who are passively anti-Jewish in their thinking. (Incidentally,

these figures are roughly the same as in western Europe.) However, it does not take special

research for a politician to sense that there are more individuals with an anti-Semitic mindset

than there are extreme right-wing voters. Presumably this is why, in certain cases, certain anti-

Semitic code words crop up in the language used by politicians who otherwise have no anti-

Semitic tendencies or world view. Another consequence is that these same politicians fail to

distance themselves from the extreme right, giving rise to the suspicion that there is some

overlap. (An example of this is where a newspaper with extreme right-wing views

recommends a moderately right-wing newspaper to its readers.)

The political centre of the anti-Semitic discourse in Hungary can be clearly identified.

However, the edges are not so clearly defined

How to address it

Az elutasítás módja

In the absence of laws that prohibit engaging in anti-Semitic discourse, two courses of

action remain open: one is indifference, and the other is protest of one sort or another. The

latter is detectable and visible, because it is tangible.

The mode of speech used to protest against anti-Semitism is multi-layered, and conceals

a variety of identities.

Sometimes spectacular, sometimes less vociferous protests are made against the various

forms and instances of anti-Semitic discourse

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One level of the discourse is the anti-racism mode of speech, articulated in the name of

human equality. This can branch out along the lines of religious – i.e. Christian – principles,

or can take a secular approach, one that stems from the Age of Enlightenment. Then there is

the logic that arises from an emphatically Jewish perspective, which places less emphasis on

general principles and concentrates only on Jewish considerations. And finally, there is a

tendency that can be referred to as the level of historical discourse. The latter is usually voiced

in matters related to symbolism. For example, an initiative to erect a statue of an anti-Semitic

former prime minister, or the publishing of a historical narrative that is apologetic to the anti-

Semites. In such cases the discursive logic of “„possessing the past””" tends to dominate.

Often, these differing logics and modes of speech are intermingled. But they all share,

as a common element, the premise that anti-Semites are bad people, anti-Semitism is a crime,

and therefore something to be ashamed of.

***

The power of anti-Semitic discourse should not be over- or underestimated.

It has developed into a complete, coherent narrative. A commodity for which latent

demand outstrips the current level of supply. The consumer base can be expanded, the market

for anti-Semitism has plenty of growth potential.

On the other hand, there are not as many people prepared to peddle it as there people

with the means to do so.

This appears to contradict the logic of the local market, but not that of the global one.

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N o t e s

J e g y z e t

In writing this article, I made use of A szöveg elkészítéséhez felhasználtam a Zsidóság,

identitás, történelem [Jewishness, Identity, History] (ed..(szerk. Kovács M. Mária Kovács,

Yitzhak M. Kashti, Erős Ferenc Erős) T-Twins Kiadó, Budapest 1992, Zsidóság a

dualizmuskori Magyarországon. Siker és válság [The Jews in Dualism-Era Hungary. Success

and crisis.] (ed..(szerk. Varga László Varga) Institute of) Habsburg HistoryHistoryTörténeti

Intézet – Pannonica Kiadó, Budapest 2005, and my own book. című köteteket, továbbá saját

könyvemet: András Gerő: The Jewish Criterion in Hungary. Boulder Colorado, Center for

Hungarian Studies and Publications Inc. – Wayne, New Jersey, Columbia University Press –

New York, 2007. I also used as references the collection of anti-Semitic statements and

reactions to them in the Jewish Documentation Centre attached to B’nai B’rith Budapest

Lodge. I used the bilingual (Hungarian and English) series which analyses, based on

collection, of the intersections of anti-Semitic speech over various time perspectives. My co-

editors (Tibor Szeszlér, László Varga, János Dési, Mátyás Vince, Áron Monori) and I have

published essays taking an analytic approach to the subjects and give the Internet names of

anti-Semitic speech. So far there have been four volumesAlapanyagként hasznosítottam a

B’nai B’rith Budapest Páholy mellett működő Zsidó Dokumentációs Központnak az

antiszemita megnyilvánulásokat, illetve az ezekre adott reakciókat tartalmazó gyűjteményét.

Használtam azt a kétnyelvű (magyar és angol) kiadványsorozatot is, ami – a gyűjtésre

alapozva – az antiszemita közbeszéd különféle idősíkokban érvényesülő csomópontjait

elemzi. Szerkesztőtársaimmal (Szeszlér Tibor, Varga László, Dési János, Vince Mátyás,

Monori Áron) olyan tanulmányokat közöltünk, amelyek elemző módon viszonyulnak adott

tárgyukhoz, illetve jelzik az antiszemita közbeszéd internetes neveit is. Eddig négy kötet

jelent meg: Anti-Semitic Discourse in Hungary 2000; 2001; 2002-2003 and; 2004-2005. All

of these have been published by címekkel. Mindegyik kötet kiadója a B’nai B’rith Budapest

Lodge.

For the sociological character of today’s Hungarian anti-Semitism, I have used András

Kovács: A kéznél levő idegen. A mai magyar antiszemitizmus szociológiai természetéhez

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felhasználtam Kovács András: A kéznél levő idegen. Az Antiszemita előítéletek a mai

Magyarországon [The alien at hand. Anti-Semitic prejudices in Hungary today], PolgArt

Kiadó, Budapest 2005. című munkáját.

The first, shorter, version of this article appeared in the bilingual (Hungarian-Russian)

book Holokauszt és Történelem [Holocaust and History], Hungarian Institute of Russian

Studies, Budapest 2006 and A szöveg első rövid változata megjelent a Holokauszt és

Történelem (magyar-orosz kétnyelvű kiadvány, Magyar Russzisztikai Intézet, Budapest

2006.) című, illetve az Antiszemita Közbeszéd Magyarországon 2004-2005 [Anti-Semitic

Discourse in Hungary], . kötetben (Budapest, 2007).

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