THINK TANK

TAORMINA FORUM

EVA

Position Paper

“Developing the Regions of Africa and Europe” Project Taormina Forum, October 6-7, 2011

The North African realignment has caused the emergence of new social-political

dynamics in an area that is strategic for Europe-Africa relations.

Europe can seize this opportunity to relaunch relations with Africa, while at the same

time regaining international influence.

Europe must overcome its areas of disagreement and propose to Africa a “European

Consensus” that is credible, mutually advantageous and an alternative to that of

other geopolitical players.

Action must be taken on three levels:

i. Political, by formalizing a “Common Europe-Africa Pact for Growth”.

ii. Economic, including Special Zones for European-African Economic-Industrial

Cooperation.

iii. Social, starting from a joint European policy for migration and mobility.

Prepared on the basis of the results of research carried out for the Fondazione Banco di Sicilia by The

European House-Ambrosetti, in collaboration with Prof. Vittorio Emanuele Parsi.

Europe and Africa: a

strategic pact for growth

The change triggered by North

Africa is a historic opportunity

1

The change currently under way in North Africa

is epoch-making. The emergence of new

social/political dynamics has revolutionized a

strategic geopolitical space forcing the re-

positioning of the region vis-à-vis Europe and the

African continent. This makes it a “historic” window of opportunity

for Europe to relaunch a mutually advantageous

bi-continental Euro-African strategy for growth. This document will examine the processes

currently in progress in North Africa, offer an

analysis of their impact on Europe-Africa

relations and propose recommendations for

guidelines for European policy towards Africa.

1. The uprisings in North Africa have

opened up new prospects in a

geopolitical space that is strategic

for relations with Africa

1. The protests and riots that began in

North Africa at the end of 2010 (and are still

on-going) have triggered processes of

historic/strategic importance.

2. The dynamics characterizing the “Arab

Spring” are:

i. Unpredictability: the uprisings generally

took by surprise intelligence forces,

governments and observers in the West

and elsewhere, demonstrating the

limited ability to grasp the “weak

signals” coming from the area.

ii. Speed: in the arc of just a few months,

the protests which began in Tunisia1

spread, leading to the fall of regimes

1 The event which catalyzed the protests leading to the

fall of President Ben Ali (on January 14, 2011), in

power for 24 years, occurred on December 17, 2010

when Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, set himself

on fire in protest against police confiscation of his

goods.

which, on average, had been in power

for more than 35 years.

iii. Broad scale: the systemic effects and

“contagious” aspects2 have involved

(and continue to involve) in differing

ways and intensity, the entirety of

North Africa and have also extended

into areas of the Middle East and Near

East, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 1 – Countries involved (to-date) in the "Arab

Spring” uprisings

3. From the events in North Africa some

fundamental new elements have emerged:

i. The element triggering the revolts was

an endogenous push from below (and

not directed from the outside) for

liberalization of the political regimes.

2 There are four structural characteristics common to

the societies involved in the revolts: 1) “Patrimonial”

states in which access to the economic circuit is

dependent upon privileged access to the political circuit

managed exclusively by those in power; 2) low

institutional performance which leads to a high level of

exposure to “external” factors/risks that can cause

broad-ranging negative systemic effects; 3) fragile

economic/demographic situation with economies that

are state-controlled with limited diversification,

redistribution policies that are either inefficient or

completely lacking, high unemployment levels

(especially for young people and women) and explosive

demographic trends; 4) very low median age with the

younger generations better-educated than their

parents' generations (the period during which the

power of the authoritarian regimes was consolidated)

and more oriented towards the use of new technologies

(which during the riots generated information that was

difficult to censure).

2

ii. The protests had an “internal”

perspective, rejecting the commonly-

used scapegoat of the outside “enemy”

(typically the “West” and its allies) as a

cover for the responsibilities of the local

political elite.3

4. These dynamics have modified the

structure of the political demand of the area

along norms and values that are not

divergent, or antagonistic, to those of the

“North of the world”.4 This is the first sign of

discontinuity in the last twenty years. 5. In North Africa – due to the complex

web of economic, social and political

dynamics found there – this is a key link in a

chain of strategic relationships on an intra-

and supra-regional level:

i. interrelationship and structural

interdependence of the North African

social/political and economic systems on

a local and supra-regional scale;

ii. competition between external

geopolitical players with primary

strategic interests, the most important

being energy;

iii. central geographic position in terms of

dynamics (e.g., migration) fundamental

to security and stability.

6. For historic and geo-economic reasons,

three strategic vectors continue to occupy the

North African social/political space.

3 The attempt by some governments (e.g., Syria and

Iran) to divert the protest towards (or unite it with)

other more chronic motives for Arab discontent (for

example, the Arab-Israeli conflict or the imperialist

and neo-colonialist West) do not seem, to-date, to have

been successful. 4 Requests for freedom, dignity, equality of economic

opportunity and transparency in the decision-making

process are seen in a range of forms and to varying

extent.

Figure 2 – Strategic vectors in North Africa

7. A) Euro-Mediterranean vector

(“Gateway” to Europe). The millennia-long

(the “mare nostrum” of Ancient Rome)

mutual attraction between North Africa and

Europe can be seen today in major

economic/financial relations and a significant

flow of goods and people between the shores

of the Mediterranean: Europe is North Africa’s no. 1 trading

partner (154 billion dollars, 53% of trade)

and no.1 investor with 76 billion dollars

(40% of foreign investment;5)

there are (an estimated) additional 15,000

European companies (large corporations

and small- and medium-sized companies)

that operate in North Africa in the

telecommunications, energy, agrifood,

construction and textile sectors; North Africa is the no. 2 supplier of oil to

Europe (13.3%) and no. 3 of natural gas

(16.7%) with a strategic presence of

European energy multinationals;6

5 North African exports towards Europe are 59.4% of

the total (69% are fossil fuels and the rest semi-

processed goods); North African imports from Europe

are 48.5% of the total (40% machinery and vehicles,

20% consumer goods). Source: Uncomtrade and World

Bank; UNCTAD; 2010 figures. 6 Eighty-five percent of oil production in Algeria and

Libya is controlled by Total, Royal Dutch Shell, ENI

and BP; ENI is the largest foreign investor in Libya.

3

North Africa is a key intersection of

migratory routes towards Europe,7 and

regulates them.8

8. B) Islamic vector (latitudinal push).

Arab-Islamic penetration – a process that

began in ancient times – is the differentiating

aspect, including in terms of identity, from

Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Along this

line of thrust, North Africa has resisted

considering itself the northern-most offspring

of Africa, preferring to see itself, within the

political space, as the extreme west of the

Arab world. Within the renewed interest for

Africa,9 in recent years North Africa has seen

a strengthening in its relations with the Gulf

States who are increasingly interested in

diversifying their investments,10 in the

promotion of new trading relationships and

implementation of security and “good

neighbor” cooperation strategies11 that are

fundamental for guaranteeing the protection

of the oil resources on which their economies

are based. At the same time, Turkey has

promoted renewed activism, reinforced by

the “appeal” of its model of democratic

Islam. 9. C) African vector (longitudinal push).

The push of “Africanness” which has

7 To-date, there have been 8 million African

immigrants into Europe, found primarily in France,

the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany,

Belgium and the Netherlands. 8 Following the Italian-Libyan Friendship Treaty, the

immigrants landing in Italy dropped from 36,951 in

2008 to 4,406 in 2010. Source: Italian Ministry of the

Interior. 9 Trade with Africa rose from 2.7 billion dollars in 1990

to “peak” at 26 billion dollars in 2008. Source: Gulf

Research Center, October 2010. 10 The sectors of primary interest are energy, minerals,

metals and agricultural products which are extremely

important for the Gulf States. 11 Including aid for development and fighting poverty,

thanks above all to funds from the Islamic

Development Bank. The Gulf States also founded the

Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa

(ABEDA) which is to manage funds earmarked for the

continent.

partially resisted Arab penetration, tends to

bring together the Maghreb and Sub-

Saharan Africa to create a mixture of

cultural, religious, economic and political

elements. Today, compared with Sub-

Saharan Africa, North Africa has an

economic12 and political influence (for

example, Egypt and Libya) and is a hub for

migration with the dual function of a transit

area and destination for intra-African

flows.13 10. The simultaneous presence of these

impulses, sometimes in competition with

each other, make the stability of North

Africa fundamental for Europe, Sub-Saharan

Africa and the Gulf States, with direct

"chain-reaction" impacts.

11. Strategic interests of other geopolitical

players – the United States, China, Russia,

India and Brazil – also continue in this

region, countries that over varying lengths of

time and in different ways have consolidated

their presence within a more general strategy

of strengthening their relations with the

African continent.

Figure 3 – Major interests in North Africa

12 North Africa generates 35.3% of African GDP and

40% of FDIs to Africa, despite the fact it represents

only 16% of the population. North Africa is also a net

investor in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2006, Libya created

a 5 billion dollar sovereign fund through the Libya

Arab Africa Investment Company. Egyptian

companies invest in Algeria, Nigeria, Tunisia and

Zimbabwe, and Moroccan companies invest in Senegal,

Congo, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali and

Equatorial Guinea. 13 In North Africa, there are between 3 and 4 million

African immigrants. Source: Migration and

Remittances Factbook 2011, World Bank.

4

12. These interests (with concerted

acceleration of emerging powers since the

1990s) have taken their place alongside the

former European colonial powers, reducing

the space traditionally held by them.

Figure 4 – Foreign Direct Investment in North Africa;

2009 figures (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti)

2. The potential impact of the

realignment of North Africa could

be supra-continental in scale

13. The events in North Africa are “game

changers” of the traditional alliances and

relations in the area. 14. They open a window of opportunity to

reconfigure the political, economic and

strategic relationships of international

players with North Africa and, through this,

with the continent of Africa which, in turn, is

increasingly relevant to global balances of

power.

15. From the transition from the bi-polar

world of the Cold War in which it was an

area of "low-intensity" conflict between the

super-powers, to the multi-polar world

currently taking shape, Africa has become a

central component14 in the political/economic

14 For example, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in

Africa rose from 16 billion dollars in 2002 to 72 billion

dollars in 2008. Despite the International crisis, FDIs

strategies of the traditional and emerging

global players with which Europe must

compete:

Within the grand strategy for global

primacy of the “Washington Consensus”,15

the US has relaunched16 its African

policy. The Obama administration has

also focused special attention on Africa

(even if difficult to decipher in its

entirety), while avoiding any involvement

that is too direct or excessively marked

exposure, as the North Africa crisis

showed. China, through major economic and

political investment, is aiming at

becoming Africa's partner and

"Amphitryon",17 thus strengthening its

international influence (promotion of the

“Beijing Consensus”18 as an alternative to

have remained high (55 billion in 2010). Source:

UNCTAD. 15 The US geopolitical proposal involves a number of

basic principles in three areas: economic (less

government/more market, rapid liberalization,

universal nature of the development model);

political/institutional (reduced central government,

democracy as the best political "recipe" for

development, interference in state affairs with

"exportation" of good governance and democracy);

cultural/formative – “soft power” (democracy and

Western lifestyle as a reference model, strong cultural

relations, although these are currently in relative

decline). 16 The return to a policy for Africa is connected to the

successful attempt to promote a non-francophile

solution in the final phase of the Congo civil war. 17 Over the period 2000 to 2008, Chinese-African trade

grew by 96 billion dollars; in 2009 alone, Chinese

exports to African countries doubled, while imports

increased by 81%. At this pace, in five years, China will

be Africa’s no. 1 trading partner. 18 The geopolitical proposal from the emerging power,

China, that wants to play a leading role on an

international level. It proposes an alternative to the

Western model (see footnote 15) in three main areas:

economic (strong government presence, gradualism,

experimentalism and localization);

political/institutional (strong central government,

democracy not a mandatory pre-requisite for

development, “5 principles of peaceful coexistence”:

5

Washington’s) and ensuring the resources

needed for its development.19 India is attempting to insert itself into the

trend of potential competition between

the BRICSs on African soil, offering a

model of “post-colonial democracy”. Also

thanks to the grass-roots presence of large

Indian communities, it can offer itself as

an alternative trading partner and

political player to China while aiming at

building a common Afro-Indian identity. Following its failed attempt to be

recognized as the leader among Latin

American countries, Brazil has adopted a

policy with a global perspective

(capitalizing on its shoreline) along the

relationship axes with the BRICSs and

South of the world;20 within this context,

relations with Africa have intensified

since the mid-1990s along an “anti-

Chinese” strategy.21 respect for political territorial sovereignty, non-

aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual

benefits, peaceful co-existence); cultural/formative

(China as the "champion" of developing countries,

promotion of cultural relations key to economic

relations). 19 China imports oil from Angola (which supplies 50%

of the crude oil that goes from Africa to China), Sudan

(in which for the last four years it has a monopoly of

the wells in Darfour, providing them with 40% of crude

oil exports) and Nigeria (from which it receives 30,000

barrels a day thanks to an agreement signed in 2005).

In addition, it imports cotton from Benin, Mali, Togo

and Cameroon, lumber from Equatorial Guinea, Gabon

and Liberia, cobalt and coltan from Congo and Zambia,

uranium from Niger, and iron, coal, nickel and

aluminum from a number of countries. A similar trend

is seen with land and agricultural products. From 1996

to 2009, China lost 8 million hectares of arable land due

to industrialization, while Africa has 733 million (6

times that of China). 20 Brazil is presenting itself as the lynchpin for a new

way of conceiving international relations that could

also push aside the relationship with the North of the

world.

21 Brazil promotes policies of employing African

workers in the infrastructure projects it finances, as

well as trade cooperation policies aimed at providing an

South Africa is faced with a strategic

alternative (“exit or voice”) to either

continue along the line of South-South

integration outside Africa with other

BRICs, or become the

coalescing/stabilizing pole for Africa. How

the situation will evolve is uncertain for

the moment in light of the country’s

interest/ability to follow one or other of

the two alternatives and the potential

resistance of the other countries to accept

the prospect of Pretoria’s leadership (just

as happened with Brazil).

Israele

Australia

Iran

Medio

Oriente

Giappone

India

Africa

Centrale

Africa

Mediterranea

Est

Europa

Asia

Centrale

Europa

Cina

U.R.S.S.

Africa del

Sud

Terzo

Mondo

America

Latina

U.S.A.

BalcaniSud Est

AsiaticoTurchia

Figure 5 – The Cold War world: major players and

relationships

Israele

Sudafrica

Sud Est

Asiatico

Stati

Uniti

Arabia

Saudita

UE

27

Medio

Oriente

Area

Balcanica

Africa

Mediterranea

Africa

Centrale

Asia

Centrale

Giappone

Brasile

America

Latina

Australia

Repubbliche

Indipendenti

Iran

India

Russia

Turchia

Cina

Figure 6 – The multi-polar world (tendency): major

players and relationships

impulse for African industrial development, in clear

contradiction to the Chinese approach.

6

16. Despite uncertainty regarding the

outcome of the dynamics underway in North

Africa, there are three scenarios about how

they could evolve, with a chain-reaction of

effects for North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa

and international players.

Figure 7 – Potential scenarios of how the situation in

North Africa could evolve and the geopolitical impacts

17. SCENARIO A) Instability in North

Africa and Africa as a “failing continent”.

This is the absolutely worst scenario with

protracted instability in North Africa and

worst practices of the African and

international elite. In it, North Africa would

be a potential “continental detonator” with a

domino effect seen in crises of local major

players (e.g., Congo, Nigeria and Egypt),

failure of the South African attempt to build

a workable catalyzer not directed from the

outside for stabilization of African regions

and, in the worst case, the cementing of a

belt of political instability and humanitarian

crises that would cut the continent in two.

With its development process interrupted,

Africa would run the risk of becoming an

"agglomeration of hinterlands" with negative

effects that would transcend the confines of

the continent itself: institutions unable to withstand the

impact of the changes;

failure to control migratory flows;

negative economic/employment

repercussions on a vast scale;

penetration of extremists and radicals

into new areas in the north and south.

From the European standpoint, the effects of

this scenario (political instability in the

Mediterranean and Sub-Sahara area,

migratory pressures, loss of potential

markets, etc.) would bring about a worsening

of the tension and disagreements within the

European Union, with the resulting risk of a

weakening of its political identity.

18. SCENARIO B) Stabilization of North

Africa and reinforcement of the continent’s

development circle If the transition in North

Africa were to be managed in such a way as

to channel and exploit the new demands

emerging from the “Arab Spring”, it would

create further stimulus for the development

of the continent with advantages (alliances,

special relationships, etc.) for those able to

act as partners of reference in this process.

This scenario could unfold with or without

Europe, thus creating two sub-scenarios

which, from a European perspective would

see: B1) A Europe which, failing to connect with

Africa, would favor “others”: a) its role

would be increasingly marginal and

peripheral in a world in which the center

of gravity is moving along other

longitudes; b) it would suffer from direct

conflict of interest with the Chinese area

of influence, consolidated in Africa and,

therefore, too close. These aspects would

have negative effects on the internal

cohesion of the EU.22 B2) A Europe which, offering a shore for the

new demand from the Maghreb and

“hooking” Africa – thus consolidating

growth, stability, liberalization and

modernization – could face the

structural emergencies (migration,

rebalancing of population/employment

22 Given current dynamics, including division on the

European front, this is the most probable scenario.

7

gaps,23 and economic decline), to create

opportunities for joint development and

business, and regain political

subjectivity and international “clout”.

3. Europe has the opportunity to

relaunch relations with Africa (as

well as its own development and

global “clout”)

19. The world is changing with a gradual

shifting of the political/economic center of

gravity away from the West. In 2010:

the emerging economies contributed the

same amount as developed countries to

world GDP and 3/4 of the growth;

“South-South” trade was 38% of the

world total, establishing an alternate axis

to that of the “North”.

20. Europe is in relative decline in its

relations with Africa and, more generally, in

the international system as a whole:

Figure 8 – World trade in 2000; billions of dollars

(Source: The European House-Ambrosetti)

Figure 9 – World trade in 2010; billions of dollars

(Source: The European House-Ambrosetti)

23 By 2050, Europe will be short 48 million workers

with destabilizing effects on the economy and welfare

state. Source: European Commission.

between 1993 and 2010, the level of

European contribution to world GDP

(purchasing power being equal) decreased

from 26% to 21%, against an increase in

the Chinese contribution from 5% to

13%;24

the European population, which was

22% of the world total in 1950, is now

(2010) 11%; in 2050 it will be 8%;25

between 1990 and 2008, Europe-Africa

trade declined from 57% to 38% of the

total, while trade between Africa and the

“South” of the world grew, from 17% to

39%.26

21. It is the general opinion that this trend

will continue in the near future, if all remains

equal.

Figure 10 – Distribution of global power; 100 = overall

world power (Source: US National Intelligence Council,

2011)

22. The North African crisis found Europe

unprepared (it was thinking “only” of the

immigration problem) and it caused a crisis

of legitimacy within the EU, putting the

spotlight on its differences. While the Arab

world is shaken by new political demands,

Europe seems incapable of taking the

initiative (as a unified body) and taking on

the role its position and history would ask of

it. This represents a potential strategic “own

goal”.

24 Source: World Bank. 25 Source: World Population Prospect, 2011. 26 Source: World Trade Organization, Chatham House.

8

23. Management of the North African

transition is an opportunity for Europe to

reaffirm its proposal for partnership to the

Mediterranean and Africa. These two aspects

cannot be separated given the

interrelationship between the economic and

social dynamics of the two areas, both

between each other and with Europe. 24. In implementing the geopolitical plan,

starting from the contingent events in North

Africa, there are two opposed negative

results Europe should avoid:

i. “Convergence” between the Maghreb

and Sub-Saharan Africa and its

separation from Europe, in other words,

the prevailing of the “Islam vector”

(including radical elements) which

would feed programmatic separation

from Western “corruption” and would

facilitate penetration of other political

and economic players into the African

continent.

ii. “Convergence” of the Maghreb with

Europe and a distancing of Africa, in

other words the prevailing of the “Euro-

Mediterranean vector” that would

accentuate the ungluing of Africa from

Europe through the gradual inclusion of

the Maghreb within it (economically and

through trade rather than political or

institutional means). This way, Europe

would lose Africa under the illusion that

greater integration and enhanced

coordination of the policies of Europe

and the Maghreb would be sufficient to

revitalize and put in order the prospects

for development of both areas. 25. With the alternative being a bi-

continental dialogue consisting of bilateral

relationships which often perpetuate the old

colonial ties, Europe must avoid the sticky

problem of national interests and internal

interests that have emerged forcefully from

events in North Africa:

France relaunched its strategy of power

(also as a way of counter-balancing the

weight of Germany within the EU),

offering itself to Africa as a provider of

peace and security and taking an

increasingly independent position in

international gatherings, with unilateral

actions that exploit the privileged

relations it has with its former colonies.

Driven by predominantly commercial

interests, since 2000 in particular,

Germany has re-defined the strategic

concept of its relations with Africa,

focusing in particular on multilateralism

and the adoption of an African strategy

within the context of the Common

Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP (also

to thwart the autonomous ambitions of

France).

Also in order to defend its bilateral trade

interests,27 Great Britain is only

marginally involved in the intricate

French-German footwork in their

disagreement over African policies, while

generally aligning itself with the view

from across the Atlantic tied to the US

desire to oppose Chinese expansion into

Africa.

Italy, which has traditionally aimed at

maintaining its privileged relationship

with its former colonies28 and supply of

strategic commodities at competitive

prices, today suffers the effects of the

lack of broad-ranging, incisive policies

that is only partially counter-balanced

by the actions of industrial and other

private parties.

26. Reconfiguration of relations between the

two shores of the Mediterranean cannot be

limited to merely putting a brake on

27 Over 20 billion pounds starting in 2009. Source:

Corporate Africa, “UK-Africa trade accelerates”, 2010. 28 Somalia, Eritrea through Ethiopia and Libya.

9

migration. Common, broad-ranging and

long-term strategies are needed on a number

of related levels: political, economic and

cultural. This transcends the context of

bilateral relations between individual

countries. 27. Individual European states do not have

the “critical mass” (economic resources,

political influence, global “reach”, etc.) to

undertake incisive action with Africa and

other competitors outside Europe. In our

global world, competition plays out on the

level of continental systems. Action towards

Africa must necessarily be European-wide. 28. The geopolitical interests of Europe

(consolidate itself as an entity and acquire

the ability to maneuver as a primary player)

and Africa (stabilize and integrate itself in

order to develop and acquire political and

economic independence) could find a winning

and mutually advantageous synthesis in a

North-South integration model that is an

alternative to the South-South one.

29. For Africa, Europe is:

a “next-door neighbor” as a destination

point and cultural “humus”;

a potential political-institutional partner

not interested in seeing Africa

fragmented29 and as a possible point-of-

reference for the new political demand

emerging in North Africa (see paragraph

4);

a more “accessible” economic/industrial

partner with a synergic

economic/production model (integration

of supply chains and orientation towards

SMEs, economic/customs agreements and

support for economic regionalization).

30. For Europe, Africa is: 29 The process of pan-African integration does not form

a part of the interests of other international players

(Chinese, Brazilian, Indian, etc.).

a “next-door neighbor” and natural

partner in the defense against impending

risks (radical Islam, waves of migration,

political instability, etc.);

a market for exports and commodity and

energy supplies, consumer goods and

investment;

an opportunity to get back into the

geopolitical game because of the

“withdrawal” of the United States and to

oppose China.

4. Europe must make Africa a

winning geopolitical offer

31. Europe’s strategy towards Africa has

evolved over time30, but the efficacy of its

action has run up against structural limits:

30 Three phases: 1) 1960-1989 (the era of

“development”) with the Yaoundé I (1961) and II

(1975), Lomé I (1975), II (1979) and III (1984)

conventions. The focus of the action was the launching

of the North-South cooperation model with a system of

preferential trade and initial development funding,

application of liberal economic models for Africa (no

political strings and “development” as a weapon

against Communism) and the first separation of policies

for the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa; 2)

1989/90-2000 (the era of “democratization”), marked

by the Lomé IV convention (1989), the Barcelona

Process (1995) and the Cotonou agreement (2000), the

primary innovations being the introduction of social

and cultural cooperation and protection of human

rights as a central element for stability and

development, adoption of a system of conditional aid,

and separation of policies for the Maghreb and Africa;

3) 2000/1-present (era of "partnership") as seen in the

Cairo Summit (2000), European Neighbourhood

Policy-ENP (2004), Africa-EU Joint Strategy-AEJS

(2006) and the Lisbon (2006) and Sirte (2010) summits.

Among the characteristic elements: good governance

and resolution of political aspects at the center of the

new Africa-EU Joint Strategy, on-going aid on the

basis of country performance, push for African

regionalism (AU/NEPAD), and the principle of “Treat

Africa as one” (ENP countries inserted into the AEJS

negotiating process).

10

i. Lack of “European” leadership (“one

voice”), with fragmentation of initiatives,

policies and strategies and existing

relations managed primarily on a bilateral

basis (see paragraph 25).

ii. Lack of a real “African” policy, that has

hardened the dichotomy of the structure

of Europe-Maghreb and Europe-Sub-

Saharan Africa relations,31 failing to grasp

the strategic dimension of Africa as a

continent (while necessarily recognizing

the structural diversities of the two areas)

and missing the opportunity for

convergence of African and European

economic structures.

iii. Implementation problems, with

coordination difficulties between the

different governance levels (member

states, EU commissions, society at-large)

lack of integration between levels of

action and funds not channeled

effectively.

32. The increased penetration of Africa by

non-European players challenges the

(European) conviction that the cornerstone

of African development must necessarily lie

in relations with Europe. 33. Europe must convince Africa by offering

a political formula – a “European

Consensus” – that is an alternative to the

proposals of other geopolitical players. This

formula must:

i. be credible and advantageous for Africa

(as well as for Europe);

ii. exploit bilateral relationships;

31 Starting from the process of independence, Europe

made a conceptual and strategic differentiation

between the two sub-regions of North Africa and Sub-

Saharan Africa, placing the former within the context

of Mediterranean policies and the latter in a long

process which, starting from the Treaty of Rome,

included Africa with the context of a common strategy

for Pacific and Caribbean countries (ACP).

iii. mark a definitive break with the colonial

stereotype.

Figure 11 – The “race” for Africa: primary non-

European players and lines of penetration

34. The final objectives of the European

action to benefit the win-win relationships

with Africa must be to:

i. Stabilize Africa and its institutions.

ii. Allow Africa to gain “critical mass” (by

initiating integration processes) to

oppose the interests of non-European

countries and fragment these interests.

iii. Position Europe as the political-

institutional partner of Africa.

iv. Create a bi-continental integrated

economic area.

35. To meet these objectives, Europe must

focus on (guidelines):

i. Providing help in creating states and

institutions (state-building) irrespective32

of the political system of the partner

countries (low institutional performance

32 The tendency to “impose” European values as-is

without taking into consideration the actual African

demand should be avoided. This is an attitude which,

over time, has not shown itself to be effective.

11

of African states is one of the main

impediments to development).

ii. Promoting regionalism (and the

prospect of “continentalization”) in

Africa33 (the regionalization of their

economies is not just a trend, it is the

only real way to compete in the global

international economic system). iii. Economic integration of Europe and

Africa to create a co-development area. iv. Taking strategic advantage of migratory

flows. v. Strategic management of cultural

relations. 36. These guidelines are coherent with the

goals and lines of action of the African Union

(created in 2002) and the New Partnership

for Africa’s Development – NEPAD

(launched in 2001).34

37. Europe must act on three levels:

i. Political, by formalizing a “Common

Europe-Africa Pact for Growth” that

calls for providing Africa a number of

great projects in four areas of

intervention key for the EU: transport,

telecommunications, energy and youth. ii. Economic, including through promotion

in Africa (by negotiating with individual

countries) of special-status Zones for

Euro-African Economic-Industrial

33 The main obstacles for Africa in the process of

regional integration are: 1) differences in the economic

structures of the various countries; 2) lack of

diversification in exports that almost exclusively

consist of agricultural products, minerals and

commodities ("resource curse"); 3) lack of

infrastructure; and 4) political instability, corruption

and wars. 34 Both operate around a central goal – unity – and two

principles: democratization and good governance

conceived as basic pre-conditions for the launching of

stable, long-term development. The African Union has

the additional goal of the economic integration of

Africa.

Cooperation,35 designed to create an

environment favorable to the promotion

of European investments, experimental

industrialization pilot projects and

stimulus for local business (private

initiative and SMEs as a driver for

growth and employment). iii. Social, starting from a European

migration policy (currently managed

primarily on a national basis with

fragmentation of the legal-

administrative systems and political

differences between member states) and

the creation of a European Migration

Agency to promote regular strategic

management of mobility (and the

benefits this entails), thus defusing the

political/humanitarian “bomb” and

triggering a positive circle for Europe

and Africa, while building a Euro-

African identity.36 38. Policy determines geography: it can

create opportunities, just as it can create

problems. It is up to decision-makers to seize

the moments offered by history.

35 Among the proposals are: a) legal independence; .b)

observation of law and promotion of legality and

transparency including in supra-national control

authorities; c) incentives and guarantees of financial

return for companies through providing funds and

financing. 36 The agency would be a further evolution of

FRONTEX, until now the EU’s operational arm for

migration with the task of “defending” its borders

according to a “passive” approach. See The European

House-Ambrosetti position paper “Migrazioni e

mobilità: una gestione strategica comune tra Europa e

Africa”, 2011.