Gauthier Twenty Years On

7/27/2019 Gauthier Twenty Years On

1/25

Twenty-Five OnAuthor(s): David GauthierSource: Ethics, Vol. 123, No. 4, Symposium: David Gauthiers Morals by Agreement (July2013), pp. 601-624Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670246 .

Accessed: 13/08/2013 08:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toEthics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 143.107.252.82 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 08:47:26 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670246?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670246?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress


2/25

Twenty-Five On*

David Gauthier

This article updates Morals by Agreement. It distinguishes two opposed conceptionsof deliberative rationalitymaximization and Pareto-optimization. It defends thelatter. The constrained maximizers ofMorals by Agreement are replaced by rationalcooperators. They do not bargain but reach agreement on the principle of maxi-min proportionate gain, which is a relabeling of maximin relative benefit. Thecontractarian test, of the acceptability of social arrangements and norms, is intro-duced, and the Lockean proviso assumes an enhanced role as a cornerstone ofrational cooperation. But questions about the force and rationale of the provisoremain.

Morals by Agreement has reached and now passed the age of twenty-fiveand seems to have found a niche among some of those who remain un-persuaded by either Kantianism or utilitarianism. It takes morality, or atleast that part of it that concerns society and justice, to set out the rulesthat rational agents would agree to follow in their interactions one withanother. This is the approach taken by Thomas Hobbes in his account ofthe laws of nature as the true and only moral philosophy.1 Morals by Agree-ment attempts to present an up-to-date version of Hobbess approach. Inthe years since it was published, I have continued to reflect on this enter-prise and, aided by my critics, have realized the inadequacy of some of itsparts. In this article I sketch my reflections. But I should acknowledge at

* This article is revised from my talk at the conference celebrating the twenty-fifthanniversary of the publication ofMorals by Agreement, held in May 2011 at York University inToronto, and organized by Susan Dimock, to whom I am more than grateful. She helpededit the paper and also provided comments on it, as did Christopher Morris. My thanks tohim, and also to Claire Finkelstein, for her role in arranging three-way conversations amongChris, her, and myself. And my gratitude extends to all those who participated in the con-ference, making it philosophically and personally memorable.

1. David Gauthier, Morals by AgreementOxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; ThomasHobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin CurleyIndianapolis: Hackett, 1964, 100.

601

Ethics 123 ( July 2013): 601

624 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2013/12304-0002$10.00

This content downloaded from 143.107.252.82 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 08:47:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/25

the outset that, while this may be my last word, it will not be the last word onthe contractarian enterprise.

I. EVALUATION AND CHOICE

My point of departure is a widely held conception of rational agency: Oftwo alternatives which give rise to outcomes, a rational agent will choosethe one which yields the more preferred outcome, or, more precisely, interms of the utility function he will attempt to maximize expected utility.If you are familiar with Luce and Raiffas Games and Decisions, the classictext for those of us who have found that the theories of games andrational choice illuminate traditional philosophic concerns with ratio-nality and morality, you might take this to be quoted from page 50.2Andwith the exception of the words rational agent, it is. They speak onlyofa player which serves for an agent since they are presenting thetheory of games; they do not speak ofa rational player. And this makesan enormous difference. They are not characterizing rational agency but,rather, identifying choice and preference; preference is what is revealedin choice. Their account, called revealed preference theory, allows noconceptual space between preference and choice. If an agent chooses arather than b, then the agent prefers ato b. There can be no counterpref-erential choice.

I shall not discuss this position, although it is favored by many econ-omists, and I introduce it only to distinguish it from the view I shall dis-cuss. Much of what I want to say would make no sense if revealed prefer-ence theory were correct. Some of my critics, such as Ken Binmore, simplystate that modern utility theory . . . is now based, in principle, on thechoice behaviour of the decision-maker.3 And from that premise theyhave little difficulty in showing my ways to be in error. But what they needto show is that I am in error in departing from their identification ofchoice and preference, and that would be a quite different criticism, onethat to the best of my knowledge has not been made. And so I return to

the view in the pseudo-quote, which implies that counterpreferentialchoice is not impossible but is always irrational. Maximize is not a de-scription, but an injunction. Should we accept it?

I shall assume that there are two logically and conceptually distinctprocedures: evaluating possible outcomes, or more generally objects andstates of affairs, and choosing or deciding on an action. The view that Iwant to consider supposes that the former provide the grounds for the

2. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and DecisionsNew York: Wiley, 1957, 50.3. Ken Binmore, Bargaining and Morality, in Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract,

ed. David Gauthier and Robert Sugden Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993,13156; see 136.

602 Ethics July 2013




4/25

latter, so that one chooses in the light of ones evaluations. And this lighttakes a maximizing form; the rational agent seeks in her choices to max-

imize the utility that represents her evaluations.

II. ONE-PERSON CHOICE SITUATIONSMAXIMIZE!

Consider the formally simplest choice problemone agent, with severalpossible actions each yielding a determinate outcome. If the agent is ableto establish a complete, transitive preference ordering over the out-comes, then clearly he chooses rationally if and only if he selects an ac-tion with one of the most preferred outcomes. If we call an outcomemaximal if it is dispreferred to no other, then the rational choice is thatof an action whose outcome is maximal relative to the feasible set.

There is one complication. It may be that the cost of evaluatingall possible outcomes seems likely to exceed the benefit of determiningwhich one of them is maximal. It may then be rational for an agent, in thelight of his initial information about the outcomes, to set a threshold ofacceptability and choose thefirst action to come to his attention that meetsthe threshold. This is a satisficing procedure. Understood, as it should be,simply as a way of adapting a maximizing ideal to the circumstances ofreal-world decision, it poses no theoretical challenge to that ideal.

Suppose next that each possible action yields, not a determinate

outcome, but a probability distribution over the members of the set of allpossible outcomes. Given some mightily implausible assumptions aboutan agents capacity to form consistent preferences for all possible gamblesover all possible outcomes,4 we can define a real-valued function whichassigns an expected utility to each probability distribution, equal to thesum of the utilities of the outcomes each multiplied by its probability.Choosing an action correlated with the most preferred outcome is thenequated with choosing an action with greatest expected utility.

Expected utility is not utility. It is a construct from preferences, in-tended to provide a basis for choice when no action can be correlated

directly with the agents most preferred outcome. Expected utility, andprobability distributions over outcomes, are not the stuff from which ex-

periences are made. Outcomes are experienced. Possible outcomes canusually be at least partially anticipated in imagination, but not probabilitydistributions over outcomes, which have no phenomenal content. Thisdifference may cast some doubt on expected utility as the ground forrational choice. And at a practical level, expected utility surely makesmore demands of an agent than he can normally fulfill. But at a concep-tual level, is there a plausible alternative? In practice, we cope with the un-certainty of outcomes through many ad hoc deviceswe suppose that if

4. These assumptions are discussed sympathetically in Morals by Agreement, 3846.

Gauthier Twenty-Five On 603




5/25

some outcome is very unlikely, then it wont happen and we ignore it in ourcalculations. And we suppose the converse, that if some outcome does

happen, then it

s not very unlikely, so we may weigh it too heavily in ourcalculations. But this is at the level of practice. The best theory for one-person decision problems underwrites expected utility maximization.

III. TWO AND MORE PERSON CHOICE SITUATIONSMAXIMIZE?

Armed with this success, the theorist of rational choice moves on from theprovince of individual decision to that of interaction, traditionally if notaltogether perspicuously labeled the theory of games. And not surpris-ingly, he looks on interaction from a maximizing perspective. He seeksan account of rational choice in interaction parallel to that in decision,an account based on the thesis that rational choice maximizes expectedutility.

For my present purpose, which is to undermine the holdthestrangleholdon interaction that the maximizing perspective induces onrational choice, we need consider only one argument that applies to allsituations with finitely many agents and finitely many possible actionsavailable to each agent. The argument, found in Games and Decisions,yields an a priori demand to be met by any theory of strictly competitivegames, but as E. F. McClennen, who offers the clearest statement of the

argument, points out, the argument

can be applied to any game.

It hastherefore become central to a general theory of games.5

What is this master argument? Consider a game or interaction inwhich all relevant matters are and are known to be common knowledgethe rationality of each agent, the actions possible for each, the possibleoutcomes, the relation of the actions to the outcomes, and the value eachagent places on each possible outcome. Everyone knows, and knows thateveryone knows, the full strategic structure of the interaction. Now sup-pose that there is a theory of rational choice that selects as rational anaction for each agent. This theory is also common knowledge, so that

each agent, knowing the full strategic structure, knows what the theoryprescribes, not only for herself, but for everyone. Now it is surely a con-dition of any acceptable theory, that if an agent knows what it prescribesfor everyone else, she not have reason to reject its prescription for herself.But if we adopt a maximizing perspective, this entails that in the ideal caseof common knowledge of rationality and the strategic structure of the in-teraction, the theory prescribe that action that maximizes the agents ex-pected utility given the actions it prescribes for the other agents. If we callthat action the agents best reply, then the theory must prescribe each agents

5. Edward F. McClennen, Rethinking Rationality, in Reasons and Intentions, ed. BrunoVerbeekAldershot: Ashgate, 2008, 3765, 42.





6/25

best reply to the actions it prescribes for the others. A mutual best reply isan equilibrium outcome.

Among his other contributions to game theory, John F. Nash

6

proved that if there are finitely many agents each with finitely manyactions, then there must be at least one weak equilibrium outcomeweak in that the action prescribed for each must be a best reply, but neednot be a unique best replythere may be other actions equally good fromthe agents point of view. And of course there may be multiple equilibria,and these equilibria need have nothing in common, either in the actionsthey prescribe or in the values of the outcomes. So the requirement that atheory of rational choice prescribe in the ideal case a best reply strategy toeach agent can only be a necessary and not a sufficient condition on the

theory. But it is diffi

cult to see how, from a maximizing perspective, itcould fail to be a necessary condition. A maximizing theory cannot pre-scribe one action to an agent if in the circumstances a different actionwould afford her greater expected utility.

IV. A SUPERIOR PERSPECTIVE

We have examined and accepted the maximizing requirement for one-person decision problems, and we have now seen how it would affectproblems of interaction. But should we accept its effectshould we sup-

pose that rational agents are committed to equilibrium or best reply strat-egies in ideal cases? This is the first crucial point in my argument. I rejectthe maximizing perspective on interaction. I reject it because, as I shall nowargue, there is a superior perspective, though it is not always available to asingle agent.

When I began examining rationality in decision and choice, thephrase Prisoners Dilemma often met with a blank stare. It has now,rightly, become part of the accepted lexicon.

The simplest form of the Prisoners Dilemma is shown in this matrix:

Column

C1 C2

Row R1 Third best for both Row s best, Columns worst

R2 Row s worst, Columns best Second best for both

There are two agents Row and Column; each has two possible actionsor strategies. The matrix shows the payoff to the agents for each of thefour possible outcomes.

6. Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 106; John F. Nash, Non-cooperative Games,Annals of Mathematics54 1951: 28695.





7/25

There is surely nothing more to discover in the dilemmaexceptwhat is perhaps the most important thing of all. For what I find in the

dilemma is not what has generally been ascribed to it. Ifi

nd a clash be-tween two distinct conceptions of rationality and the beginning of anargument against the directly maximizing perspective.

In the dilemma, each agent has a strategy that maximizes his utilityagainst the strategy of the other, whatever strategy the other may choose.It is the agents best reply to every strategy of the other. In the matrix,Rows best reply is evidently R1, Columns is C1. In game theory, a strat-egy that is always best, whatever the others may be, is termed a stronglydominantstrategy. And when a strongly dominant strategy is available, ad-herence to it is both a necessary and sufficient condition of rationality from

a maximizing perspective.But in the dilemma, if each agent chooses his strongly dominantstrategy, both will find themselves worse off than if they had both selectedtheir alternative, dominated strategies. In the matrix, the dominant strat-egies of Row and Column yield each agent his or her third best outcomewhereas if both had chosen their dominated strategies they would haveattained their second best outcome. How much worse off each will be de-pends, of course, on the difference in the payoffs of each outcome, in rela-tion to the other payoffs the agent receives.

We introduce the concept of optimality to express precisely what is

involved here. An outcome is optimal for an agent just in case it affordshim the greatest payoff compatible with the payoffs it affords the otheragents. If an outcome is optimal for all agents, so that it affords each themaximum payoff possible given the payoffs it affords the other agents, thenwe call itPareto-optimal, after a word never used by the Italian economist Vil-fredo Pareto.7Another way of defining Pareto-optimality, which it will proveuseful to have in mind, is to say that one outcome is Pareto-superior to anotherjust in case it affords some agent a greater payoff, and no agent a lesser pay-off, than he is afforded by the other; an outcome is then Pareto-optimal ifand only if there is no outcome Pareto-superior to it.

It is worth noting that Pareto-optimality has no application to one-person decision problems. It also has no application to the interactionproblems that were the first concern of the founders of game theorytwo-person, zero-sum games. Since the payoffs in these games can alwaysbe represented as p and 2p, no outcome can be Pareto-superior to anyother. Pareto-optimality thus appears on the scene only after maximiza-tion has established itself. It has been thought of as a conception thatmust accommodate itself to maximizing ideas, rather than, as I now amproposing, an alternative candidate for what constitutes rational action.Instead of supposing that an action is rational only if it maximizes the

7. Or so I read in a source now lost.





8/25

agents payoff given the actions of the other agents, I am proposing that aset of actions, one for each agent, is fully rational only if it yields a Pareto-

optimal outcome.I hasten to emphasize that once again we have only a necessary, andnot a sufficient, condition for rationality. If we define the Pareto-frontieras the set of all the Pareto-optimal outcomes, then we seek a principleor procedure for selecting among outcomes on the frontier. And thiswill prove a more difficult matter than the mere insistence on Pareto-optimality. But before I turn to that issue, more needs to be said aboutthe role I believe Pareto-optimality should play in rational choice theory.To the maximizers charge that it cannot be rational for a person to takeless than he can get, the Pareto-optimizer replies that it cannot be ratio-

nal for each of a group of persons to take less than, acting together, eachcan get. The Prisoners Dilemma exemplifies a fundamental feature ofinteractionthat in many situations, every equilibrium outcome leavesthe agents with unrealized benefits that could be realized were they tocoordinate their actions in an appropriate way, a way that can be deter-mined by starting from a consideration of the payoff structure of the pos-sible outcomes and arguing back to the actions necessary to realize a mu-tually beneficial Pareto-optimal payoff. The agents are, after all, directlyconcerned with what they realize from interaction, and only indirectly withwhat actions they perform except in relation to what they realize. If it is

beneficial for them to join together and cooperate, then this is what, inso-far as they are rational, they will do.

The directives issued by what I am calling a Pareto-optimizing theoryof rational choice will differ in one significant respect from those issuedfrom a maximizing perspective. A maximizing account will prescribe anaction for an agent in any circumstances by invoking best reply con-siderations. If the other parties to interaction are known to be irrationalor uninformed in certain ways, then the directives issued from a maxi-mizing perspective will accommodate this. What each person should dois to maximize his expected utility in his actual circumstances, not to do

what would maximize his expected utility in circumstances that wouldbe ideal but do not actually obtain. A Pareto-optimizing theory, however,provides only a single set of directives to all the interacting agents, withthe directive to each premised on the acceptance by the others of thedirectives to them. If the others are not prepared to cooperate, then anindividual may have no way of reaching on his own an outcome that isoptimal or, if optimal, that offers an acceptable division of the payoffs. Ina Prisoners Dilemma, a Pareto-optimizing analysis prescribes the dom-inated strategy for each, but if one agent can be expected to follow maxi-mizing reasoning, were the other to attempt to optimize, he would have to

choose his cooperative strategy, which would leave him with his worst pos-sible outcome. It would be Pareto-optimal, because, being the other agents





9/25

best outcome, no alternative would be Pareto-superior to it. But it wouldclearly not provide an acceptable division of the payoffs. What a would-be

cooperator should do when others are unwilling to cooperate in an ac-ceptable way is a matter not directly addressed by a Pareto-optimizing ac-count of rational choice. It may seem that in such circumstances, a rationalagent can only fall back on individual maximization. But I shall arguepresently that this is not quite so.

A Pareto-optimizing account of rational choice ascribes to eachperson the capacity to coordinate her actions with those of her fellows,and to do so voluntarily, without coercion. It treats the exercise of thiscapacity as rational, when the person sees the outcome of coordination asreasonably efficient, so that no significant possible benefit is left unreal-

ized, and reasonably fair, in that no one can reasonably complain that herconcerns were not taken sufficiently into account, in determining theoutcome to be achieved by coordination. To be sure, reasonable, effi-cient,and fair are evaluative or normative terms that may seem question-begging. I shall have to defend my use of them. But at this point I wantonly to note that it is not the mere exercise of the capacity to coordinatethat is in itself rational. Coordination need not result in efficient and faircooperation. The point is rather that without the capacity to coordinatetheir actions with those of their fellows, agents would be unable to engagein rational cooperative interaction. The capacity to coordinate thus makes

possible behavior that does not reduce to maximization but may be nonethe less rational. What I want to do is to explicate this behaviorcoop-eration on terms of reasonable efficiency and fairness.

V. RATIONAL COOPERATION

First I must clear up some confusion in the approach of my prior self. Inmy previous study of rational choice, I introduced the phrase constrainedmaximizationto characterize thechoice procedures appropriate to rationalcooperation.8 My underlying supposition was that rational agents would

constrain their pursuit of their own greatest utility in order to bring aboutmutually advantageous Pareto-optimal outcomes, when straightforwardmaximization, calling for best reply strategies, would yield only nonopti-mal returns. But I now think the label of constrained maximization was amistake. Rational cooperators, as I now view them, do not interact on amaximizing basis. They cooperate, as I shall shortly argue, on an agreedbasis, and there is no maximal bottom line to ground their cooperation.Faced with an interaction, they take their reasons for acting from consid-erations of fair Pareto-optimality, rather than maximizationof course,always provided they may expect their fellows to do likewise. Recall that

8. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 16770.





10/25

on a Pareto-optimizing account a single directive is issued to all those in-teractingto us, as it were, and to me only as one of us. Considerations

that count as reasons for me as one of us would not count as reasons forme if I may not assume the us.When faced with the need to choose, cooperators are payoff ori-

ented rather than strategy oriented. They ask which of the feasible jointpayoffs it would be reasonable for them to accept and we shall have toconsider how this question may be answered. They do not ask which ofhis feasible strategies each should accept, given what he expects the oth-ers to do. A more informative if inelegant term for rational cooperatorswould be agreed Pareto-optimizers. And my claim is that if cooperation onagreed terms is to be had, then a rational agent will optimize; only if co-

operation is not to be had will he maximize.Note that rational cooperators need not seek a collective or sub-stantively common good. Each is concerned to realize his own good, asexpressed by his utility function. How his good relates to that of his fellowsis of course important in determining the possible extent of cooperation,but only if the conditions for realizing one persons good are strictlyincompatible with the conditions for realizing anothers is cooperationruled out. Thus rational cooperation yields mutual fulfillment; it neednot afford common or collective benefit.

But the cooperator manifests her concern with her good in a quite

different way than does the straightforward maximizer who is wedded tobest reply calculations about expected utility. In recognizing the otherparties to interaction as individuals like herself, she is aware that the termson which she considers it rational to act must be paralleled by the termsthat others consider rational. Thus her own good enters into the deter-mination of the appropriate Pareto-optimal state of affairs but in the sameway as does the good of each other person. We must now consider whatthat way is.

VI. MAXIMIN PROPORTIONATE GAIN

Rational cooperators must be agreed among themselves as to which ofthe usually many Pareto-optimal outcomes they will seek to realize. ThePrisoners Dilemma obscures this need, since the symmetry of the di-lemma in its usual form makes the answer evident. But usually theanswer is not evident. Myfirst thought was that the agents should selectthe outcome by bargaining, and I took my task to be to endorse one of theexisting proposals about rational bargaining or to find a better account. Iexamined the several views of bargaining discussed by Luce and Raiffa,9

9. Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 12152.





11/25

found them all implausible, and produced my own.10 Had I solved thebargaining problem?

No. I realized this listening to a talk by Ariel Rubinstein.

11

The bar-gaining problem, as understood by game theorists, assumes that the bar-gainers are rational maximizers. Being maximizers, they mustfind thatadherence to whatever agreement they make is their best reply to adher-ence by the other party or parties; how this is to be achieved is a problemto which I shall shortly return. But suppose it solved. Then we askwhatagreement would it be rational for these persons to make? An answer tothis question would show how bargaining, with its cooperative outcome,may be embedded into a maximizing framework. Rubinsteins achieve-ment was to show that the question could be answered and that the an-

swer is a generalization of an axiomatic proposal by our old friend JohnNash.12

Nashs most controversial axiom was an independence of irrelevantalternatives postulate that I found implausible. But Rubinstein, in takingthe argument to a deeper level, showing, as it were, the maximizing foun-dation of cooperation, presented an obstacle that I could neither dismissnor overcome. Myfirst reaction was to acquiesce and accept the Nash so-lution as setting out the distributive conditions of rational cooperation.13

But that proved a blind alley. What I had failed to recognize was thatthe bargaining problem, as traditionally conceived, belongs within the

scope of the maximizing perspective. Once I replaced that perspectivewith Pareto-optimality, my problem was to find the conditions for rationalvoluntary agreement among persons disposed to coordinate their actionswith those of their fellows, provided they judged that their own concernsreceived adequate consideration. Enter the principle of maximin relativebenefit or gain.

The principle is quite simple. Recall that utility functions, as I char-acterized them previously, are defined over a single agents preferences;they do not provide a common measure or any basis for interpersonalcomparisons. Both the unit and the zero point of each persons utility

scale may be selected arbitrarily, and so the scales of different personscannot be meaningfully compared. Thus a utilitarian, welfare-maximizingapproach founders immediately; there is no common utility to be maxi-

10. See David Gauthier, Bargaining and Justice, in the collection Moral Dealing:Contract, Ethics, and ReasonIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990, 187206, for a dis-cussion of these matters.

11. The talk, on noncooperative bargaining and the Nash solution, was presented tothe International Conference on Game Theory held in June 1991 in Fiesole. Rubinstein sargument is briefly sketched in Binmore, Bargaining and Morality, 14951.

12. John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica18 1950:15562, and Two-Person Cooperative Games, Econometrica21 1953: 128

40.

13. See David Gauthier, Uniting Separate Persons, in Gauthier and Sugden, Ratio-nality, Justice, and the Social Contract, 17692, 17779.





12/25

mized. But suppose we determine, for each interacting agent, a payoffwhich affords him none of the benefits that may be realized through co-

operative interaction; call this his cooperative minimum. Then let us deter-mine a payoff which affords him all of the possible benefits that he couldobtain from such interaction, assuming only that every other agent wouldreceive at least his own cooperative minimum; call this the first agents co-operative maximum. The agentspotential cooperative gainis then the differencebetween these payoffs. And for each possible outcome, his actual cooperativegain will be the difference between its payoff to him and his cooperativeminimum.

The cooperative minimum and maximum set the limits of rationalcooperation. It would not be rational for an agent voluntarily to coordi-

nate his actions with those of his fellows, unless he could expect to ben-efit thereby and thus gain more than his cooperative minimum. And itwould not be rational for other agents to cooperate rationally with him,unless they too could expect to benefit thereby and thus hold him to lessthan his cooperative maximum.

Now comes the crucial step. For each person and each possibleoutcome, divide the agents actual cooperative gain by her potential co-operative gain. This shows the actual gain from that outcome as a pro-portion of the agents potential gain; call it the agents proportionate gain.And it may easily be shown that this proportion is independent of the

zero point and unit of the agents utility function and, indeed, enables us

to compare the proportionate gains of different agents. For all agents,the cooperative minimum represents a proportionate gain of 0; the co-operative maximum represents a proportionate gain of 1, and all otheroutcomes have a proportionate gain between 0 and 1.

In Morals by Agreement I use the term relative benefit for what I amnow calling proportionate gain. But the punch line is unchanged. Eachoutcome may now be represented as a set of proportionate gains, one foreach agent. For each outcome we select the minimum proportionate gain,the smallest it affords to any agent. We then compare the minimum pro-

portionate gains afforded by the different outcomes and select that out-come affording the maximum minimum proportionate gain to any agent.This is the principle ofmaximin proportionate gain14 in Morals by Agreement,maximin relative benefit.15

14. In Morals by Agreementmaximin relative benefit is presented as the dual of minimaxrelative concession, which is introduced as a principle of rational bargaining. Here I treatmaximin relative benefit as directly grounded in the idea of rational cooperation.

15. I can now state the formal difference between my account of rational cooperationand Nashs treatment of the bargaining problem. My account is sensitive to both the coop-erative minimum and the cooperative maximum. Nash appeals to an equivalent of the for-mer, but the cooperative maximum would be just another irrelevant alternative in his argu-ment.





13/25

The principle of maximin proportionate gain ensures that eachperson may expect, ex ante, to gain from cooperative interaction. Because

we can act only in the light of expected payoffs, some persons may fail toreceive any actual gain, and others an excess, but this is unavoidable giventhe uncertainties in the relationship of actions and outcomes in choicesituations. But the principle does more than ensure every persons ex-pectation of gain. If we think of each persons expectation in terms of theproportion of potential cooperative gain she anticipates, then the leastexpectation is as great as possible. Were anyones expectation of gain in-creased, then some other person would find her expectation reduced to asmaller proportion of potential cooperative gain than any person needanticipate. In maximizing the minimum proportionate gain, the principle

affords the fullest possible consideration for the concerns of the personwho gains proportionately least from cooperation.The principle of maximin proportionate gain singles out a particular

Pareto-optimal outcome and deems it the rational outcome for co-operators. But may there not be alternative principles, arising from al-ternative ways of inducing interpersonal comparisons of the gains fromcooperation? Or may there not be principles arising from considerationsthat are not represented in utility functions? For example, may not thecontribution each agent makes to the gains from cooperation, could webut measure it, provide a basis for determining how the gains should be

shared? I leave these as questions. But I would insist that any proposedalternative to maximin proportionate gain must incorporate, as rationalrequirements, that the outcome it proposes be both relatively efficient, sothat it approaches Pareto-optimality, and relatively fair, so that it repre-sents an expected gain for each person comparable in whatever waycomparability can be induced to the gain of every other person. Theserequirements may fall short of providing a strict demonstration that theidea of proportionate gain offers the best way of assessing the rational-ity of cooperation. But they set out the conditions that any alternativemethod of assessment would have to meet.

Maximizers are of course not unmindful of the benefits coopera-tion can bring. I have mentioned Rubinsteins account of bargaining,in which cooperation is grounded in a noncooperative framework. Butas I noted, orthodox game theorists must assume that agents are ableto make binding agreements with each other, in order to consider whatagreements would be rational to make. But agreements can be bindingon maximizers only if each agent can expect keeping the agreement toafford him greater utility than breaking it. And since the agreed outcomemay not be in itself an equilibrium, the would-be cooperators must haverecourse to some enforcement device. But any such device, as Ned Mc-

Clennen has argued, comes at a cost, and so leaves the agents in a posi-tion Pareto-inferior to what would result from voluntary compliance with





14/25

the agreement.16 Cooperation among persons who are motivated only bybest reply considerations, will rest on covenants which without the

sword are but words,17

and the sword must be paid for. From the per-spective of genuine cooperators, the cooperation generated among max-imizers must fall short of the ideal.18

But we should now ask, of what use is our principle? On the face ofit, maximin proportionate gain would seem to have rather limited appli-cation in our practical reasoning. If a number of persons join in somedeterminate cooperative enterprise, where they can identify an initial po-sition for each of them, and a set of possible outcomes for the enterprise,they could appeal to maximin proportionate gain in selecting the outcomeon which they should coordinate. But most of everyday life is not made up

of such determinate undertakings.Of greater significance is the potential role of the principle in as-sessing basic elements, institutions and practices, in the structure of so-ciety. The principle requires benefits for all, and while it does not seek toequalize these benefits in absolute termsindeed, it does not provide anyway to make interpersonal comparisons of the magnitude of benefitsitdoes ensure that no person expects a smaller proportion of his possiblebenefit than need be. And this principle would not judge most humansocieties favorably. Almost universally, an elite group of males organizesociety so that they take the lions share of the benefits it provides. Of

course, they do not pretend that their society is a cooperative endeavormeeting standards of efficiency and fairness. But if it is not such anendeavor, then why should most persons consider themselves to have anyreason voluntarily to adhere to its edicts, to follow its practices, or toaccept its constraints?

This is not a rhetorical question; I shall have to defend the idea that asociety that claims that its practices and edicts give its members reason toact must satisfy the principle of maximin proportionate gain. This willtake us deeper into the principles underpinning, from which we shalldraw out the consequences for rational deliberation. But before pro-

ceeding with this, it may be useful to recapitulate my argument aboutcooperation. First of all, maximizing reasoning in interaction leads, inthe ideal case, to best-reply choices and equilibrium outcomes. Second, in

16. McClennen, Rethinking Rationality, 4344.17. Hobbes, Leviathan, 106.18. Orthodox maximizers have another approach to cooperation, arguing that it can

emerge in repeated interactions. In each interaction considered alone maximizers wouldfind cooperation irrational. But in a sequence of similar interactions, if some slight per-turbation in the assumption of perfect information about the rationality of all agents enters,then it could prove rational for agents to cooperate as long as the sequence continuedindefinitely into the future. I cannot assess this approach here, except to flag the admissionthat it depends on the agents lacking perfect information about one anothers rationality.





15/25

many situations, no equilibrium outcome is Pareto-optimal, so that max-imizers fail to realize all of the benefits that interaction can yield. Third,

rational persons will seek to obtain these benefi

ts, and to do so they mustcooperate, each choosing in accordance with a single set of directivesthat, if followed by all, yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. Fourth, the stan-dard for such directives is provided by the demands of reasonable effi-ciency and fairness, which I argue are best captured by the principle ofmaximin proportionate gain, which compares outcomes in terms of theproportion of potential cooperative gain obtained by each person, andmakes the least proportion of potential gain as great as possible. Butfifth,the principle of maximin proportionate gain has little direct relevanceto our deliberations, an issue that we have yet to explore. And sixth, we do

not treat persons engaged in cooperation as maximizers who constraintheir choices to yield an optimal result, but as cooperators, who seek tobring about a Pareto-optimal result whose payoffs are acceptable to all.They view cooperation as directly rational, and go on to establish the ra-tional mode of cooperation.

VII. RATIONAL DELIBERATION: REASONS AND GOOD REASONS

I have developed the argument of this article from the perspective ofrational choice theory. However great my departures from orthodoxy

may be, I have treated an agent

s reasons for acting as based on herconsidered preferences, as manifested in her utility function. But I couldhave written this article from another perspectivecall it that of rationaldeliberation. That is the perspective of what I had expected to be myfinalcontribution to the study of practical reasonFriends, Reasons andMorals.19 In returning to the rational choice perspective for this presentarticle I have tried to relate my current position as closely as possible tothat ofMorals by Agreement so that the two can most readily be compared.But I think that either perspective will lead to what I consider the finalfruits of my philosophical endeavorsthe contractarian test, and the Lock-

ean proviso.If we examine real-life instances offirst person deliberation or sec-ond person advice, we shall find that those considerations that personstake to be reasons often seem to have little relation to maximal or Pareto-optimal utility. Instead we find ample reference to considerations relatingto rights, roles, rules, and relationshipsconsiderations that on the faceof it have nothing to connect them directly to either a maximizing or aPareto-optimizing act. We also find normative expectationsFacultymembers are expected to attend the departmental colloquium on a

19. David Gauthier, Friends, Reasons, Morals, in Verbeek, Reasons and Intentions,1736.





16/25

regular basisas ubiquitous sources of purported reasons for actions.But to be responsive to expectations is not, I think, plausibly modeled by

locating the outcome of the expectation in an evaluative ordering. Thelimitations of rational choice theory begin to appear when we considerthe normative context of our deliberations. That context is far richer andmore varied than is provided by the agents evaluation of outcomes. Itembraces the full social setting in which agents find themselves. Andfind is the right word here; people do not choose the normative struc-tures that embrace them.

This is not the occasion to explore in depth how appeals to socialroles and practices and to expectations are supposed to provide reasonsfor action.20What concerns me here is one fundamental question: what if

anything gives such considerations their rational authority? Persons canand do refer to what is required or expected of them both as explanationof and justification for what they do. But what weight do these con-siderations really carry? Not every expectation is warranted, not everysocial practice is desirable. A consideration that an agent takes as a rea-son, so that it weighs in his deliberations, and takes to be a reason, so thathe supposes himself justified in giving it weight, may fail to be a justifyingconsideration.

Can we say anything about good reasons, reasons that provide bothexplanation and justification? The theory of rational choice, interpreted

as treating preferences as rational grounds of action and not simply asrevealed in choice offers to do just this. And my quarrel with it in simplemaximizing form does not close the door on treating good reasons asthose considerations that relate an agents preferences to her choices.Indeed, I suppose that an agents preferences are, in many circumstances,grounds for good reasons. I disagree with orthodox choice in taking otherconsiderations as also providing good reasons for action and in denyingthat the role played by preferential reasons requires defining utility asa measure of preference that the rational agent must seek to maximize.These are large differences but I cannot discuss them further here. What

I shall discuss is the role of standards of reasonable efficiency and fair-ness, and more precisely the principle of maximin proportionate gain invalidatingor invalidatingthe taking of social expectations and rolesas providing reasons for actions.

First, a word on the evident connection between belief and reason.An agent may decide rationally, given his beliefs, but insofar as his beliefsare false, they do not have the justificatory force that he ascribes to them.But the agent may not behave irrationally in acting as he does. The Aztecssacrificed thousands of prisoners of war to satisfy their hungry gods. Didthey have good reason to do this? Neither a simple yes nor a simple no

20. Obvious title for paper doing this: Great Expectations.





17/25

offers a correct picture of their situation. They could explain their be-havior in terms of their beliefs and justify it relative to those beliefsthey

may have the same subjective landscape as we suppose for our own ex-planations and justifications.Of course we might insist that even given their beliefs, they had

insufficient reason to sacrifice thousands of captives. But I think we wouldbe mistaken to suppose this. The belief that the gods demanded humanblood was not peculiar to them, but part of the shared system of beliefscommon to the various native peoples of Mexico. And the demands ofthe gods are not easily put to one side. I am inclined to think that it is ourunderstandable inability really to think ourselves into their situation thatexplains our reluctance to accept their behavior as rational given their

beliefs. And of course it would be clearly mistaken to suppose that falsebeliefs excuse whatever is alleged to be based on them. The Nazis basedtheir anti-Semitism on their largely false beliefs, but that doesnt maketheir genocidal conduct any less horrendous. That they took their beliefsto justify genocide is the horror. And with these inadequate remarks, I putaside the relation of belief to practical reasons.

VIII. A COOPERATIVE VENTURE

In many of my inquiries, I have quoted, favorably, John Rawlss claim that

a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.21

I want to makeone amendment; advantage is not the right word here, suggesting botha competitive or positional orientation22 only partially offset bymutual,and a focus on goods rather than on good. So let us say that a society is acooperative venture for mutual fulfillment. Rawls intends this claim to bedescriptive of some actual societies, which it may be, but it is primarilynormative, setting a standard, indeed the primary standard, that humansocieties should meet.

Rawlss claim is not uncontroversial. But its very great merit is that itneither postulates nor requires that society has any ends other than en-

abling its members to seek to fulfill their own values or ends, in con-junction with the ends of their fellows. No doubt humans, being socialcreatures, will share substantive ends with some of their fellows, butsharing particular concerns will arise voluntarily and not be required bytheir society. Marriages are not arranged; the partners choose each other.

I do not propose here to defend the liberal view that values andends, rights and objectives, are at base individual, and that cooperationis the core of human sociability. That would far exceed the scope of thispresent article. I shall simply suppose that we accept the normative idea

21. John Rawls, A Theory of JusticeCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, 4.22. Advantage, Ms. S. Williams, in the words of the tennis umpire.





18/25

of society as a cooperative venture for mutual fulfillment. The expecta-tions, the rights and roles, that constitute the fabric of society, must prop-

erly be grounded in the conditions required for fulfi

llment. And togetherwith this idea of society, I shall suppose that we think of a person as an au-tonomous cooperator who may demand of society that it defend the nor-mative claims it makes upon him, that it show him he must rationally ac-cept them.

IX. THE CONTRACTARIAN TEST

How may it do this? Persons are born into a society, with its rules androles, its expectations, and it seems plausible to suppose that in humanhistory all of this normative structure is not initially differentiated fromthe natural environment. The same explanations, the same rationales,would apply to both. The world order may have required human actionsto sustain it, but it was not for humans to challenge this order. The ideathat individuals might accept or reject the given norms had no place inearly thought.

The recognition that norms are not found in or fixed by nature, andthat social norms do not reveal an invariant order, opens the door to thepossibility of norms different from those in place, and thereby introducesthe need for a justification of existing norms not previously envisaged

why these norms, these requirements and expectations, rather than oth-ers? There are of course a host of proposed answers to this questionincluding an appeal to the gods. But I find no gods, and the answer that Ishall defend rests on the individual evaluations with which I began, andintroduces only onefictionthe social contract. We shall need thatfictionto distinguish the norms that should be accepted, whether or not they infact are.

The varied normative structures of societyfind their rationale in theoverarching idea of a cooperative venture for mutual fulfillment. Weshould not suppose that there is a unique set of norms thatfit together to

constitute such a venture. But I shall pass by the complications this cre-ates, and focus on eligibility; a normative consideration is eligible just incase it could reasonably be accepted as part of some cooperative society.When would it be accepted? To take any moment within society wouldprivilege the persons present in that moment, and the path by which theyreached it. And of course, there is usually no act by which persons signalacceptance or rejection of the normative structure of their society, andno reason to believe that if an attempt were made to introduce such anact, it would be successful. Americans are always pledging allegiance totheir flag and the union for which and so forth but that is not to show

that the values and norms of American society are appropriate for a co-operative venture for mutual fulfillment.





19/25

The expectations and requirements that form much of the fabric ofour social lifeand humans are not solitary creaturesand the institu-

tions and practices that underpin them, are not to be decided by overtagreement. Another story is needed, and that is the story of the social con-tract, the hypothetical agreement that does ground the norms and valuesthat we as rational cooperators mustnormatively make the object of ouragreement and consequent acceptance.

The key idea is that the best justification we can offer for any expec-tation or requirement is that it could be agreed to, or follow from whatcould be agreed to, by the persons subject to it, were they to be choosing,ex ante, together with their fellows, the terms of their subsequent coop-eration. The hypothetical nature of the justification is clearif, per im-

possibile, you were to be choosing, together with your fellow humans, the terms onwhich you would interact with them, then what terms would you accept? Thoseare the terms of rational acceptance, the terms that you, as a cooperator,have good reason to accept given that others have like reason.

This is the weak contractarian test.23 Take a proposed normative re-quirement or expectationany one. Ask whether it could be included aspart of the normative structure of a society to which you could reasonablyagree were you, together with your fellows, able by everyones agreementto choose that structure. Now extend this to everyoneask whether therequirement or expectation could be included as part of the structure to

which everyone could reasonably agree were they able by universal agree-ment to choose that structure. If we can answer the questions affirma-tively, then the proposed practical consideration passes the contractariantest and is eligible for inclusion in an actual society that constitutes acooperative venture for mutual fulfillment. A person in such a society whofailed to fulfill the requirement or expectation would be rightly open tocriticism and perhaps sanctions, although the case for sanctioning non-cooperators is not one that I can try to make here.

The weak contractarian test does not provide a full justification forany requirement or expectation that passes it. That a consideration could

pass the test does not show that it must be part of every acceptable set ofpractices and expectations, but only that it is eligible for membershipin some such set. Fully to justify the consideration in the real world, weshould need to show that it passes the test and is part of our actual set ofnorms and values. The test, like best reply and Pareto-optimality in theirdifferent contexts, functions only as a necessary condition.

Of course, some considerations will pass a stronger test. We couldask, not whether the requirement could be included as part or derivedfrom a mutually acceptable social structure, but whether it must be in-

23. I introduce the contractarian test in Political Contractarianism, Journal of PoliticalPhilosophy5 1997: 13248; see 132.





20/25

cluded in any acceptable social structure. No alternative to such a con-sideration could be reasonably agreed to by individuals choosing their

social structure from an ex ante perspective.The contractarian test will not yield assessments of norms that areinvariant over time. For what could be reasonably agreed to will to someextent depend on the possible alternatives, and these change with theadvance of technology and understanding. New ways of living introducenew paths to mutual fulfillment and new forms of fulfillment, but theyalso close off older paths and in some cases older forms of fulfillment.The life of a Victorian railway stationmaster is not open to us today.

The contractarian test links the roles, rights, responsibilities, andexpectations that govern much of our social interaction with the terms of

cooperation for mutual fulfi

llment. It licenses us to speak of the socialcontract, as setting out these agreed terms, to which we, as cooperators,are all bound. But the contract is, as I have said, a fiction. It is the agree-ment we would make, could we but choose together the terms of inter-action among us. And this gives rise to an obvious objection to our argu-ment. I have claimed that passing the contractarian test provides the bestjustification we can provide for social institutions and expectations. But acritic will reply that an actual contract or agreement provides some mea-sure of support for taking ourselves to be bound by it. But a hypotheti-cal contract only binds hypothetically, and this is no binding at all. If you

had approached me yesterday, I would have sold you the painting storedin the attic for $50. But now that it has been identified as a sketch byLawren Harris,24 I would want $50,000 for it. The contract that I wouldhave made yesterday has no power to bind me today.

I have no objection to the claim that only real contracts bind, as ageneral thesis about contractual justification. But the force of the socialcontract is not found simply in its being an agreement. Rather its forcelies in its being the nearest approximation to an agreement in a contextin which literal agreement is not possible but would be desirable. Wecannot literally choose the terms of our interaction, but we can deter-

mine what terms we would rationally choose, from an ex antestandpointthat does not privilege the actual course that our interaction has taken. Inthis way we bring society as close as is possible to the status of a voluntaryassociation. The objection that the test involves only hypothetical agree-ment has matters the wrong way round. Actual agreement would notshow that the terms agreed to were rational, since it privileges existingcircumstances. The contractarian test, in taking the ex ante perspective,removes that privilege.

A quite different objection is that the appeal to agreement is re-dundant. If it is rational to act in a certain way, then of course it is rational

24. A member of Canadas most renowned school of painters, the Group of Seven.





21/25

to agree so to act. And if it is not rational to act in a certain way, then it isirrational to agree so to act. This objection simply misses the point of the

contractarian enterprise. For the contractarian supposes that the ratio-nality of acting in certain ways is established by showing that it would berational to agree so to act, under suitably constrained circumstances. Andshowing it to be rational to agree is not to show that the act would beindependently rational. Agreement does no work in the objectors view,whereas from the contractarian perspective it provides the key to rationalcooperation.

A third objection is that the appeal to ex ante agreement does notyield a sufficiently determinate result. What would be determinate? I havesuggested that there will be more than one way of structuring a society so

that it offers mutual fulfi

llment. But from a given technology and un-derstanding of social phenomena, the differences may be relatively mi-nor. In my paper Political Contractarianism, I sketch some of the fea-tures of any society that I argue would in our circumstances not merelypass the contractarian test, but be required in that their absence wouldfail the test.25 These features concern the availability of a range of produc-tive activities open to each individual that would be rewarded sufficientlyto enable her to choose and follow a fulfilling life plan. I put particularemphasis on the availability to each of the opportunity to develop her ca-pacities and educate her affections. We are of course far from realizing

a society that would pass the contractarian test, but we can survey the gapbetween the actual world and the ideal and recognize the steps that havebeen taken to close it, as well as some of the steps that need to be taken.

I note in Political Contractarianism that the contractarian testmay be read as an interpretation of the principle of maximin relativebenefiti.e., proportional gain appropriate to political agreement on termsof interaction.26 Rational choice gives us an outcome in utility space thatrational persons would seek to reach, applying the principle of maximinproportional gain. Deliberative rationality gives us the way in which rationalcooperators would interact, applying the contractarian test. I do not at-

tempt to prove that the two perspectives harmonize but, rather, I assumethat the same rationality must be manifest in each perspective, so that theresults of applying them are necessarily harmonious. To defend the univ-ocity of rationality would be a task for another occasion.

X. THE LOCKEAN PROVISO

The final topic I want to consider begins from the recognition that co-operation is not always possible, either because the situation affords no

25. Gauthier, Political Contractarianism, 138

39.26. Ibid., 139n.





22/25

benefit to cooperators, or because there is no will to cooperate on the partof some of the agents. How should the would-be cooperator respond? I

noted earlier that what she should do when others are unwilling to coop-erate in an acceptable way is a matter not directly addressed by a Pareto-optimizing account of rational choice. I want now to argue that it is indi-rectly addressed.

In the absence of cooperation, one might suppose that agents wouldfall back on maximization. But Pareto-optimizers are not maximizers, andI have rejected the view that maximization underlies Pareto-optimization.They are alternative procedures for decision or choice, and what underlieboth are the valuations, the utilities of the agents. How the would-be co-operator should act when cooperation is not to be had need not be deter-

mined by what noncooperators would consider rational. Instead, we mayask whether there are ways of acting antithetical to cooperation which mayenter in to noncooperative situations, as options to be avoided. Whatmight these options be? Cooperators seek mutual fulfillment. Anticoop-erators, as one might call them, seek benefit to one person at the expenseof another.

We may now introduce the Lockean proviso. The proviso, in the gen-eralized form that I shall consider, provides a constraint on noncoopera-tive actions by would-be cooperators. Locke defended the appropriationof commons as private property, provided the appropriator leftenough,

and as good

for others.27

If this condition, the Lockean proviso, is notmet, then the appropriation would better the situation of the appropri-ator by worsening the situation of the others. Instead of the win/winorientation of cooperation, violators of the proviso adopt a win/losestance. In interaction, theyseek to win, at the expense of others who lose.The would-be cooperator, although he may be frustrated in his attempt toachieve the win/win of agreed Pareto-optimization, will signal his readi-ness to cooperate by avoiding the win/lose stance. Thus he differs fromthe maximizer even in the absence of actual cooperation. But equally, hewill do all he can to avoid being the victim in a lose/win outcome. He will,

as Hobbes argues, seek peace, and follow it, while by all the means hecan, . . . defend himself.28

In Morals by Agreement I brought the proviso into play in establishingthe value of the cooperative minimum, the utility an agent could expectwithout any cooperative benefits. I argued that any utility gained fromviolations of the proviso must be excluded from this minimum. Thereare large issues here which I must bypass. And I have come to think ofthe proviso as playing a broader role, as providing a constraint, both ra-

27. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government, ed.Peter LaslettCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 291.

28. Hobbes, Leviathan, 80.





23/25

tional and moral, on the justifiability of all interaction. The proviso is notthe whole of morality or even the last word, but it is, I believe, the first

word. It provides a default condition that may be appealed to set a base-line for social interaction. It can be overridden in many contexts whenthere is good reason to think that the override would be mutually bene-ficial and part of a practice that would pass the contractarian test. I can-not defend these large claims beyond the essential first step of notingthe prima facie incompatibility of proviso violations and cooperation. Ishall only clarify what the proviso allows and what it rejects.

The Lockean proviso, in its generalized form, prohibits actions thatbetter one persons situation by worsening that of another. There arethree contexts to consider:

1. Two-party situations: The proviso prohibits an agent A, fromacting to better his situation from what it would be in the absenceof the other person or group B, by worseningBs situation fromwhat it would be in the absence of A. Suppose a group of raiderscarry off the sheep raised by a community of pastoralists. Then theraiders violate the proviso. They are better off than were there nopastoralists to steal from, and the pastoralists are worse off thanwere there no raiders to steal from them.

2. Three-party situations, type 1 violations: The proviso prohibitsan agentA, from acting to better the situation of another agent orgroup B from what it would be in the absence of a third person orgroup C, byworsening the situation ofCfrom what it would havebeen in the absence ofB. Robin Hood A steals the harvest fromthe estates of the Sheriff of Nottingham C, in order to distributeit among the poor inhabitants of Sherwood ForestB. Had therebeen no poor, Robin would have left the harvest alone; had therebeen no Sheriff, Robin would have had nothing to steal.

3. Three-party situations, type 2 violations: The proviso prohibits anagent A, from acting to better the situation of another agent orgroup B from what it would be in the absence ofA, byworseningthe situation of a third person or group C from what it would havebeen in the absence ofA. As before, we have Robin A, the forestpoor B, the SheriffCabsent Robin, the Sheriff would havekept his harvest and the poor their poverty.

We can add to our brief stories further details that will affect oursympathiesthe Sheriff and his men were hardworking farmers and theforest poor a bunch of lazy layaboutsor the Sheriff had enclosed theNottingham commons for his estates, and the forest poor were the dis-possessed commoners. But eliciting sympathy is not my concern. Robin

Hood is a proviso violator whatever our sympathies, although we may of





24/25

course think that in some circumstances the proviso should be overrid-den.

I have yet to comment on the importance of

by

. The gain for oneperson is achieved by the loss for another. Omit the loss and there is nogain. The worsening is not incidental, not collateral damage. The provisois not concerned with collateral damage. To be sure, we do not want toignore such damage in deciding what we may do. But how we assess it isnot my present concern.

What should be my present concern is the insightful discussion ofthe Lockean proviso in Gijs van Donselaars excellent book, The Right toExploit.29 I would hope that the proviso can be sharpened as a weapon ofreason against parasitism, but someone with a fresher mind is needed to

pursue this.

XI. HERE COMES THE TROLLEY!?

I shall instead conclude by applying the proviso to the trolley problem.30 Ishall assume familiarity with the problem and set out only the salientdetails. A trolley car is starting down a long incline when its brakes fail.The motorman throws the motors into reverse but to no avail; the carcontinues to gain speed. At the end of the long incline is a narrow cuttingwhere, oblivious to the oncoming car, five people are walking on the

track. If the trolley hits them, their death is all but certain.However, just before the cutting, a sidetrack diverges from the main.I am standing there and could throw the switch sending the car off on thesidetrack. But standing on the sidetrack, back to me and the trolley, is adeaf man. If I divert the trolley, it will save the five, but kill him. May Ithrow the switch? Most people sayYes.

Now a variant. Just before the cutting, there is an overpass, where Iam standing. Beside me is a very obese individual, who is leaning over,somewhat off balance, trying to tie his shoelace. I realize that were a suf-ficiently heavy object to fall from the overpass in front of the trolley, the

collision would in all likelihood derail it and bring it to a stop before ithit the five. The obese man is, I am quite sure, sufficiently heavy. If I pushhim he will fall onto the track, and while the collision will kill him, it will

29. Gijs van Donselaar, The Right to Exploit: Parasitism, Scarcity, Basic Income Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2009. How could I not love a book that contains the sentenceGauthier is right 83 even if its scope is restricted to a rather central point in interpret-ing Locke?

30. Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,reprinted from the Oxford Review1967 in Virtues and VicesOxford: Blackwell, 1976, 1932;see esp. 23, 28; Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, Monist

59 1976: 204

17, and The Trolley Problem, Yale Law Journal 94 1985: 1395

1415.





25/25

save the five. May I push him? Most people say No. But in each case,either one dies or five die. What is the difference that gives rise to these

opposing responses?In the first case, if I throw the switch, I better the situation of the fivefrom what it would be in my absence, and worsen the situation of the onefrom what it would be in my absence, but I do not do the one by doing theother. The death of the one is collateral damage, not a necessary partof my rescue action but an unwelcome accompaniment. So there is notype 2 violation of the proviso. And since I do not better the situation ofthe five from what it would be in the absence of the one, there clearly isno type 1 violation.

Contrast this with the second case. If I push the obese man, I better

the situation of thefive from what it would be in my absence. And I dothis by worsening his situation from what it would be in my absence. So

there is a type 2 violation. And I better the situation of the five from whatit would be in the obese mans absence, while worsening his from whatit would be in their absence. So there is also a type 1 violation.

Invoking the proviso seems to me quite satisfying in the classic trolleyproblem. It cant be the whole story; in particular, as I noted, the provisois silent on collateral damage. Suppose there were four persons on thesidetrack. . . . But again I must leave these matters to fresher minds.

AND IN CONCLUSION

I must also leave discussion of the full role of the proviso. For it brings arejection of parasitic behaviorfor example, that exhibited by the raidersin relation to the pastoralistsinto our account of practical rationality. AndI realizeI cant help but realize after Van Donselaars critique31thatthere are flawsto put it mildlyin the argument in Morals by Agreementthat purports to link rationality to the proviso. We may have better successif we consider rational agents to be agreed Pareto-optimizers rather thanconstrained maximizers. But I have not examined this. The prohibition on

betteringbyworsening seems to me to lie at the core of any adequate socialmorality. If I knew more precisely how to tie the proviso to rationality, Imightfinally have shown what has long been my goalthat social moralityis part of rational choice, or at least, integral to rational cooperation. I shouldlike to think that the position I have advanced here brings me closer to thatgoal though not yet reaching it than does Morals by Agreement.

31. Van Donselaar, The Right to Exploit, chap. 2, esp. 4251.


Documents

Gauthier Twenty Years On