Gallipoli Magazine

7/28/2019 Gallipoli Magazine

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APRIL 25, 1915

GALLIPOLIGALLIPOLI

90th ANNIVERSARY TRIBUTE


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Lieutenant-General Peter LeahyChief of Army

Ninety years ago, Australian and NewZealand soldiers stormed the beachesat Gallipoli. They faced witheringgunfire, overwhelming odds and adetermined enemy. They faced thisordeal with courage, determinationand honour.Their efforts alongside soldiersfrom the United Kingdom and otherCommonwealth forces highlighted thesacrifice ADF personnel often make inthe service of their nation.They also showed the quality of ordi-

nary Australians and the patriotic spiritof this great country.Their example is one that has inspiredsoldiers, myself included, for the past90 years.There is no greater example of theArmys values of courage, initiativeand teamwork than the operation atGallipoli.I am proud to be an Australian soldierand to carry on the legacy of thosewho fought and died on those farawaybeaches in Turkey.As the nation pauses in solemn com-memoration on April 25, all soldiers,past and present, should hold theirheads high knowing that they arepart of one of this countrys greatestinstitutions.We will remember them.

Vice-Admiral Chris RitchieChief of Navy

This year I will travel to Turkey tocommemorate the 90th anniversaryof the Anzac landings at Gallipoli. Asit was the combined Allied navieswhich transported the Anzacs safely toGallipoli, sustained them while ashore,and then took the survivors safelyoff at the end of the operation, this isan ideal time to recall the manner inwhich maritime activities provided thefoundation for the wider Dardanellescampaign.The Australian submarine AE2 was

the first Allied warship to succeed in amission many considered impossible to penetrate the treacherous cur-rents, minefields and heavy fortifica-tions of the Dardanelles. At the conclu-sion of the operation, members of the1st RAN Bridging Train were the lastAustralians to leave Gallipoli.Todays Australian Navy still feelsproud of its contribution to the Anzaclegend.As part of this historic occasion, onApril 25 the aptly named frigate HMASAnzac will be at anchor off Anzac Cove.Her presence will provide a fittingbackground to our national commem-orations, and serve as an appropriatetribute to the professionalism andflexibility of our forebears at this veryearly stage in the RANs development.

Air Marshal Angus HoustonChief of Air Force

Anzac Day to me is symbolic of allthat it means to be an Australian. Thevaliant and fearless commitment of allthe young men who landed at Gallipoli90 years ago, and the values that theyinstilled, are a wonderful example ofthe Australian character.In the face of most terrifying adversityand a seemingly impossible mission,the camaraderie, team-work, mateship,selflessness, courage and dedicationof those young men is what I thinkabout when I think of the Anzacs.

The reputation of the Anzacs shouldmake us proud to be Australian. OurAllies, and even our foes, in that ter-rible war praised the heroic and com-passionate nature of Australian troops.The Anzac values guide us today. Themen and women of todays Air Forcecontinue to impress and succeed withdedication, skill, commitment, team-work and courage both in Australiaand overseas on operations. Theirguiding ethos is drawn from a traditionof service and sacrifice that startedwith the Anzacs.I am very proud of all Australians whohave served the nation in the RoyalAustralian Air Force over 84 years ofservice and sacrifice.Their service encapsulates the truesprit of the Anzacs.

General Peter CosgroveChief of Defence Force

This Anzac Day we will commemorate 90 years since the first landingson the Gallipoli pensinsula. Many believe that the Anzacs who servedat Gallipoli were instrumental in the formation of our national identitywhich still evolves today. The values they demonstrated of courage,mateship, self-sacrifice and integrity have become an illustration of thenations values.The men and women of the ADF continue to build on the values dem-onstrated by those original Anzacs. The pride we feel in the efforts of

those who have gone before us gives us courage in face of danger. Ournotion of Anzac reminds us to always put the welfare of our mates andthe team ahead of personal comfort and safety. And it summons up thebest elements of our character in the toughest situations.Anzac Day is a time for reflection and remembrance. It is a time topause and acknowledge the sacrifice and service of the original Anzacsin addition to all Australians who have served the nation. It is also atime to think of the men and women of the ADF who are currently onoperations around the world and who serve in the fine tradition of ear-lier generations of service men and women. Lest we forget.

Messages from the ChiefsContentsDIPLOMATIC FAILURE: HowAustralians who volunteered to fight theGermans ended up on unknown shoresfighting an unknown enemy.

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6FATAL SHORE: The Anzacs wereconfronted with steep slopes, thick scrub,

confusion and, of course, tenacious resist-ance organised by Mustapha Kemal.

VALOUR AND HORROR: While April25 is remembered as the day, the diggersendured another 239 days at Gallipoli, daysspent learning the grim business of war.

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FORGOTTEN FORCE: Many people areunaware of the integral role naval forcesplayed in transporting, supplying andevacuating the Anzacs.

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FACTS AND MYTHS: Every Australian

knows about Gallipoli, but that doesntmean we are well informed about thepeninsula war. 12

UP PERISCOPE: AE2s penetration of theDardanelles Strait the first Allied warshipto do so on Anzac Day is a feat that is ajustifiable source of pride to the Navy.

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THE AIR WAR: The presence of aircraftduring the iconic but ill-fated campaignreceives little attention, but they were therefrom the outset.

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HIGHER CALL: From their vantage pointin their trenches, some diggers cast theireyes on the skies and eventually made thetransition to airmen.

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TUNNEL VISION: After the heavy fight-ing associated with the August offensives,there was markedly less activity going onabove ground than below it.

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BROTHERS, WE LOVE YOU: QuinnsPost, perched on a cliff and as close as 10mfrom the Turkish lines, was the deadliestposition at Anzac.

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STUFF OF LEGENDS: The AustralianWar Memorial has created a special exhibi-tion, Dawn of the Legend, that highlightsthe events of April 25, 1915.

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REST IN PEACE: Thirty-one cemetriesand memorials are dotted around thepeninsula, testament to the dreadful toll ofthe Gallipoli campaign.

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The three Service chiefs, Lieutenant-General Peter Leahy, Vice-Admiral Chris Ritchie and Air Marshal Angus Houston, reflect onthe significance and symbolism of Anzac Day as they view a lifeboat used in the April 25, 1915, landings on display in theAustralian War Memorial.

ON THE COVERTroops from the 1st Divisional SignalCompany about to land at Anzac Cove at6am on April 25, 1915. Image AWM A02781


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What the day means

This publication has been producedby the Army, Navy and Air Forcenewspapers as a special insert forthe April 21 editions. Directorate ofDefence Newspapers, Russell Offices,ACT 2600. Tel: (02) 6266 7609.

EDITORS

David EdlingtonDavid Sibley

GALLIPOLI: 90TH ANNIVERSARY TRIBUTE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors would like to thank the Australian War Memorial and the history unitsof the Army, Navy and Air Force for their generous support of this publication.

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Peter StanleyPrincipal Historian, Australian WarMemorial.

Roger LeeHead, Army History Unit, and ArmyHistorian.

Dr David StevensDirector, Strategic and HistoricalStudies, Sea Power Centre.

Dr Chris ClarkRAAF Historian, Air PowerDevelopment Centre.

John PerrymanSenior Naval Historical Officer,Strategic and Historical Studies,SeaPower Centre.

Corporal Angela Erini1 Joint Public Affairs Unit.

Peter BurnessSenior Curator, exhibitions, AustralianWar Memorial.

GALLIPOLI: 90TH ANNIVERSARY TRIBUTEhas been printed by Capital Fine Print,Fyshwick ACT 2609

Lance CorporalMelissa ReidIt means marching with myPop at the dawn service. Ima pretty patriotic person andI respect those people whogave their lives for Australia.Im proud to uphold that tra-dition. My Pops proud [that

Im going to Iraq], but hesalso nervous about his grand-daughter going. Hes told meto keep safe and enjoy myself.

Wing Commander Sheldon KimberAs a result of working in Turkey fora number of months before AnzacDay, I gained a very good under-standing of the Gallipoli campaign

from both the Allied and the Turkishperspective. I found the experienceto be both humbling, in walking theground and gaining a sense of thesacrifice and commitment requiredof the Anzacs, and uplifting in thatknowing what they achieved in suchgrave circumstances has motivatedme to achieve more in life

Petty Officer Fiona BrashawI think it means time you spend time withyour mates that are in the Navy, and reflect onthings that have happened in the past, not justyears ago but in the recent times. Especiallywith the Sea King tragedy, you think about ita lot more. Marching is not compulsory any

more but its something I feel I should do. Eachyear there are a few less people but as long as Iam there, that is the main thing to me.

Able Seaman Karen CannIts commemorating andremembering all the peo-ple who have served andlost their lives. To com-memorate, I march.

Private Brodie KerrWhen I attended Anzac Day at Gallipoli last year, standingat the beach in the footsteps of those who created thespirit of the Aussie digger, was a very humbling experience.To look at how hard it was for those blokes, and to com-pare it to how we do it today they had it pretty hard.

Warrant Officer Gail FilkinThe Anzac tradition is aboutcomradeship, mateship andlooking after each other. Iguess an example whenthe tsunami hit, there weretears of grief but when theSea King went down I liter-ally sobbed and sobbedbecause they are part ofour family. I plan to com-memorate this special AnzacDay at a special ceremony atmy little ones school, afterwhich Im going to talk tothe kids in Kinder and Year 1.

Chief Petty Officer Mark PardoeIt means being a subma-

riner, it means AE1, it means theDardenelles, it means the sinking

of AE2 and all the submarinesthat came before the Oberon

class and the Collins class. Imarch with the submarine asso-

ciation every year.

Sergeant William GuthrieThe Anzac tradition to me is one of the most significant reasons I joined

the Air Force. Its a big event in the birth of our nation and, to a lesserdegree, the Guthrie family. To the best of my knowledge there has alwaysbeen a Guthrie in a defence force at some stage of their life. My grandfa-

ther served in World War I; my father in World War II, Malaya and Vietnam;and his brother served in World War II and Korea. My brother and I are

also serving. As a kid, every Anzac Day I helped veterans by holding theirbanners just so I could show my support in some small way.

Private David PalinkasAnzac Day is a time to rememberand pay respect to the servicemen and women who have sac-rificed so much and asked for solittle in return these men andwomen who selflessly always putduty first.


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SOLDIERS SEEM ALWAYS TO BE NEEDEDwhen diplomacy fails. This was certainly true inAsia Minor in 1914. According to popular his-tory, had the British diplomats in Constantinople(now Istanbul) been a little more in tune with

what was happening in Turkey, and the Germans less so,the campaign on Gallipoli may never have happened.

Unfortunately, the popular view, as is often the case, is toosimplistic.It wasnt just that British diplomats were incompetent

Britain faced a dilemma over Turkey. A Turkey allied toBritain protected British interests in India (ironically, fromRussian interference), Egypt and the Persian Gulf.

Neither Britain nor France particularly wanted a Russianpresence in the Balkans, and were concerned by the pros-pect of a Russian port in the Adriatic (a likely outcome ofRussian support for Serbia against Austria-Hungary).

On the other hand, it was going to be hard for the Britishto have both the Turks and the Russians as allies. Yet theRussians were one of the main players countering Germanaggression and came as a package deal with the French.Internal Turkish politics eventually made the decision forBritain.

Even three months later, probably few of those whosailed with the first Australian contingent in October 1914 tofight the Hun could have found Turkey on a map.

So why, within six months, were these same volunteersscrambling ashore on an unknown coast to fight an unknownenemy in what can only be described as an ill-conceivedoperation?

The answer to that question lies partly in the complexpolitical and military developments that shaped Turkey inthe pre-war years see facing page.

Siding with the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians,Turkey entered the war on October 29, 1914, announc-ing their decision by bombarding Russias Black Sea portof Odessa. The Entente Powers (the Allies) responded bydeclaring war on Turkey in early November.

TURKEYS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, ASTRIDE THEonly warm water sea route between Russia and her Alliesand also threateningly close to the Suez Canal, made it stra-tegically important.

Its entry into the war coincided with a high point ofGerman military success on both fronts. This thus severelylimited the range of military options available to the Ententeto respond with. Only the Allies sea power remained largelyunchallenged and it was to sea power initially that Britainlooked to respond.

Winston Churchill, influenced by the success the German

artillery had had in destroying fortifications in Belgium andFrance, believed the big guns on warships could be evenmore effective in destroying Turkish fortifications barringaccess to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

While the most favourable outcome sought was thedestruction of Turkish civil and political morale through thethreat (or indeed the reality) of destruction of Turkish cities,the main intention was to force open a warm water passageto Russia.

As is well known, it was the failure of naval firepowerto suppress both the fixed and mobile artillery defendingthe Straits that forced the Allies to resort to the use of landforces. And available reserves of land forces in early 1915were very small.

The Australians found themselves on Gallipoli almost byaccident. They were in the area and available. When war wasdeclared and the first AIF raised, the intention was it wouldsail to Britain, train in camps there and be sent forward toFrance as required.

FAILED DIPLWhy did Australians

who volunteered to fightthe Hun end up onunknown shores fightingan unknown enemy?Roger Lee explains.

Perhaps fortunately for the Australians and New

Zealanders, the rush of volunteers in Britain itself so over-

whelmed the available facilities that the War Office divertedthem to Egypt for training.

The entry of Turkey into the war and the Turkish attack

on the Suez Canal in February 1915 simply confirmed the

decision to leave the Anzacs in Egypt to train, as they aug-mented existing British troops in defence of the canal zone.

The Anzacs lack of training and experience was

The Australiansfound themselveson Gallipoli almost

by accident. Theywere in the area andavailable.

another factor. The War Office was never very keen onthe Dardanelles adventure, so when directed to providetroops, it actively resisted sending any of its battle experi-enced units from the Western Front.

It couldnt avoid the use of regulars all together. TheBritish regular 29th Division, offered up by Kitchener tosupport another politically inspired adventure into Salonikato support the Serbs was diverted to the Mediterranean.

The bulk of the fighting force, was supplied by the

British Royal Naval Division and the two Anzac divisions.Finally, even had the War Office tried to transport suf-

ficient numbers of experienced troops from France to theMediterranean, gathering sufficient numbers of transportsto carry them would have been an almost insurmountable

problem.As it was, logistics and logistics support was to be the

Achilles heel of the whole venture.Although it is true that soldiers seem needed when

diplomacy fails, using a mixed force of partially trained,inexperienced troops in a hastily planned operation designedto offset a failure of naval or gunboat diplomacy was a veryrisky solution.

Gallipoli was not the result of a cogent, well-developedstrategy. From the appointment of the Commander-in-Chiefdown, decisions were made in haste, on the basis of poor orincomplete information and against an ill-defined objective.

The surprise is not that the operation failed but that itachieved as much as it did.

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Four boatloads of Australian troops being towed towards Anzac Beaon the morning of the landing. AWM P02194.003

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

ROMANIASERBIA

BULGARIA

GREECE

RUSSIA

Area of map

Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea

AegeanSea

100 miles

BLOCKING THE WAY TO RUSS

Above: Turkish officers, at a concealedbattery on the Gallipoli peninsula, were well-trained by German military missions.Inset, right: Turkish Minister of War EnverPasha, left, was pro-German.

Sea ofMarmaraIstanbul

GraphicbyDavidSibley,DefenceNewspapers


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The sick manof EuropeTHE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN NOVEMBER 1914 WAS A SIZEABLEpiece of real estate. In addition to Thrace (and the GallipoliPeninsula) in Europe, Turkeys empire still included modern-day Iraq,Syria, Israel and Jordan plus much of Arabia.

Although Turkey didnt have troops in the Sinai Desert, those inPalestine were close enough to constitute a viable threat to the SuezCanal. The south-eastern part of the Empire included modern-dayKuwait and was close enough to threaten British oil interests in theTrucial States (modern-day UAE) and Oman. In the north-east, theEmpire bordered Russia in the Caucasus.

Despite attempts to modernise its military after the 1908 YoungTurk revolution, led by a group of young ethnic Turkish army offic-ers, Turkey had been soundly defeated in Libya in 1911-1912 andagain in the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913.

Between 1908 and 1914, the rule of the Ottoman empire had beenin constant turmoil with liberals and conservatives, led by the Sultan,Abdulhamitt II, battling for control over what was a fledgling parlia-mentary democracy. The country was heavily in debt, had acquired aninternational reputation for mistreating ethnic minorities and subjectpeoples and was forced to accept the European Powers meddling inits internal affairs. There was fears in the Ottoman Government thatthe European powers were planning to dismantle the whole country.

It was against this background that Turkey had to make a decisionas to which side to support in the coming war. Turkey, as a whole,was not committed to either side when the war broke out in August1914. Their final decision seems more based on which side they feltwas least likely to want to dismember the country, than for any strongstrategic reason. The Turkish Minister of War, Enver Pasha, and fourof his closest associates had signed a alliance with Germany in 1914but kept it secret from the rest of his colleagues in the Cabinet asthere was not general agreement about what to do.

The Turkish Government continued talking to the Allies but theAllies themselves offered the Turks little incentive either to join themor to stay neutral (the British seized two battleships being built inBritish shipyards.) And, of course, the biggest stumbling block wasthat one of the Turks major hereditary enemies, the Russians, was asenior partner in the Triple Entente.

Fear of Allied armament shipments to the Russians had alreadycaused the Turks to close the Bosphorus to foreign shipping. OngoingRussian bellicosity over the 1913 German military mission to Turkeydidnt help the Allied cause in Constantinople either. Russia eventhreatened to invade if Liman von Sanders wasnt removed. TheBritish Ambassador preferred to deal with the remnants of the oldgovernment and did not build up any meaningful relationship withEnver Pasha or the Young Turks and failed dismally to reassureTurkey of British goodwill.

The Turkish ambassador in Paris continued to advise that bothBritain and France would not hesitate to dismantle Ottoman Empireif it suited their aims. Ambassador Rifat Pasha also warned thatGermany was not as strong as Enver Pasha chose to believe. Headvised that Germany was just using Turkey as a pawn in its waraims. On the last two warnings, he was both correct but ignored.

Between August and October 1914, however, the Turks tenuouslyheld on to their neutral status. It was German military successes inFrance and, more particularly, in the east that finally swayed EnverPashas colleagues to formally opt for the Germans. Roger Lee

THE TURKISH ARMY WAS CLOSELY MODELLED ON THEGerman Army, with a well developed staff system and asound training system through an extensive school system.Doctrine, staff methods and tactics were all copied from the

Germans.Conscription provided the mass of recruits. Infantry

recruits served for two years in active service with a further23 years in the reserves. Artillery conscripts served an addi-tional year of active service. Discipline was notoriously harsh some have described it as draconian but the trainingstandard achieved appeared to observers to be high.

The major impediment to military efficiency was a chroniclack of resources. Recruits received only one uniform andfired only 20 to 30 rounds annually in training.

But the basic Turkish soldier was tough (he had to be tosurvive his training), tenacious and enduring. In defence, hewas famous for his ability to hold ground. He was supportedat the higher levels by a growing cadre of well-trained, capa-ble and aggressive generals.

If there was clear deficiency in the Turkish Army, it wasat the junior leader level. Unlike their German teachers, theTurks lacked that corps of hardened, experienced, profes-sional, long-service NCOs that made the German Army so

formidable. This lack would become a major problem for theTurks as the pool of talented young officers were killed andno leaders were waiting in the ranks to step up and replacethem.

In 1914, the regular Turkish Army comprised 36 field(admittedly small) divisions, divided into corps in the fourarmies. A standard Turkish corps comprised three infantr ydivisions, an artillery regiment and a cavalry regiment. Eachinfantry division had (in theory) three infantry regiments andan artillery regiment. In peace time, numbers were small. Theaverage strength of a Turkish infantry division in pre-mobili-sation 1914 was but 4000.

After mobilisation, this rose to 10,000 (still about half thestrength of a German or British Division.) To bring the Armyup to war strength, the Turks had to mobilise 477,868 menand 12,469 off icers. (The Germans believed, erroneously,that the Turks could mobilise more than a million men on theoutbreak of war.)

There were other forces also available. The Light ReserveCavalry Regiment force, which comprised seven brigades andthree independent regiments, were in 1912 formed into fourreserve cavalry divisions and placed under the wartime com-mand of Third Army.

The Turks may have had manpower but they sufferedfrom severe material shortages including artillery and(especially) machine guns. The estimate was they were 280field guns short of establishment and 200 machine guns

short (bearing in mind the machine gun establishment wasonly four guns a regiment). There were severe shortages ofammunition and shells as well.

The Turkish Army was even more under strength in theessential services area. Motorisation and aviation were basi-cally non-existent. Severe shortages of supply wagons andhorses to pull them affected every arm of the army. Medicalservices were chronically short of trained staff and supplieswere likewise almost impossible to obtain.

One thing the Turkish forces did have was experience.Their unfortunate experiences in the Balkans Wars (wherethey were soundly beaten) had taught them the benefit oftrenches for defensive operations.

By the time the Anzacs landed, the Turks had alreadyconducted major operations in the Caucasus (involving150,000 troops) against the Russians. They had also madeone (unsuccessful) attempt against the Suez Canal and, as isbetter known, they had already defeated the combined fleetsof the strongest naval powers in the world. Roger Lee

The Turkish soldier tough, tenacious and enduring

OMACY

5

Minefields

Fixed and mobilebatterieds

Forts

Towns

DEFENCES

ATTACKSAllied landing Feint

attackBeach number

A

BC

Z

Y

X

W

V

Asia Minor

GallipoliPeninsula

Dardan

elles

Ottoman Empire

Suvla BayDry SaltLake

Tekke Tepe

Sari TepeAchi Baba

Ari Burnu

Anzac CoveMal Tepe

Boghali

Sari Bair

Maidos Nagara

Cannakkale

Eren KeuiKum Kale

Yeni Shehr

Krithia

Sedd el Bahr

Kilid Bahr

Bulair

Gaba Tepe

Gallipoli

Gulf of Saros

Turkish 5th Division




Frenchfeint

Britishlandings:

29thDivision,

April 25

Second Britishlandings:

August 6-7

ANZAC landings,April 25

Royal NavalDivision feint

attack

S

Aegean Sea


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FATAL

SHORE

THE AUSTRALIANS WERE TO LEAD THE

Allied assault on the peninsula, with the 4000-strong 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade, the 1stField Company, Engineers, and the bearer sub-divisions of the 3rd Field Ambulance, landing

about 4.30am.This landing was to take place in silence before dawn,

while the British landings later in the morning would be cov-ered by the guns of the Royal Navy.

The covering force was landed from ships boats towedinitially by steamboats, then rowed to shore. Most of the troopswere still in their boats when the Turkish outposts fired thefirst shots. Men were killed and wounded in the boats or asthey splashed ashore.

It rapidly became apparent they had been landed 1.6km tothe north of the intended beach. The reason for this drift northhas never been adequately explained, but it resulted in the units

being thrown ashore inter-mixed and on a smaller front thanplanned.

Despite waterlogged uniforms, thick scrub, steep slopes,unfamiliar terrain, confusion and inter-mixing of units, enemy

bullets and, later, artillery fire, the 3rd Brigade stormed and

took the first slopes. While they fought their way inland, theVictorian 2nd Brigade and later the NSW 1st Brigade landedbehind them.

Unfortunately for the Australians, Lieutenant-ColonelMustapha Kemal was preparing to take his 19th Division for

The Anzacs wereconfronted withsteep slopes, thickscrub, confusion andtenacious resistance.

The planTHE ANZAC LANDING ON APRIL 25, 1915, WASone of two main assaults on the Gallipoli penin-sula. The 1st Australian Division and the NewZealand and Australian Division were to landnear the promontory of Gaba Tepe, near the cen-tre of the peninsula, while British forces landedat Cape Helles, at its southern tip. The two forceswere to converge on the central mass of the KilidBahr Plateau, which dominated the Dardanelles.

Commander-in-Chief:Gen Sir IanHamiltonChief of Staff: Maj-Gen W.P. BraithwaiteDeputy Adjutant-General: Brig-GenE.M. WoodwardDeputy Quartermaster-General: Brig-Gen S.H. Winter

29th DivisionMaj-Gen A.G. Hunter-Weston86th Brigade:2/Royal Fusiliers1/Lancashire Fusiliers1/R Munster Fusiliers1/R Dublin Fusiliers

87th Brigade:2/S Wales Borderers1/K.O.S.B1/R Inniskilling Fusiliers1/Border Regt

88th Brigade:4/Worcestershire Regt2/Hampshire Regt1/Essex Regt1/5th Royal Scots (TF)XV Bde RHA (B, L & Y Btys)

XVII Bde RFA (13th, 26th & 92nd Btys)CXLVII Bde RFA (10th, 97th, & 368th,Btys)460th (Highland) Bty RFA4th (Highland) Mountain Bde RGA (TF)(Argyllshire Bty and Ross & CromartyBty)90th Heavy Bty RGA

14th Siege Bty RGA1/2nd London, 1/2nd Lowland & 1/1st W.Riding Field Coys RE (TF)Divisional Cyclist Coy

Royal Naval DivisionMaj-Gen A. Paris

1st (Naval) Brigade:Drake BnNelson BnDeal Bn RMLI

2nd (Naval) Brigade:Howe BnHood BnAnson Bn

3rd (RM) Brigade:Chatham Bn RMLI

Portsmouth Bn RMLIPlymouth Bn RMLIMotor Maxim Squadron (RNAS)1st & 2nd Fd Coys EngineersDivisional Cyclist Coy

Australian and New

Zealand Army CorpsGOC: Lt-Gen Sir W. Birdwood

1st Australian Division:Maj-Gen W.T. Bridges

1st Australian Brigade:1st (NSW) Bn2nd (NSW) Bn3rd (NSW) Bn4th (NSW) Bn

2nd Australian Brigade:5th (Victoria) Bn6th (Victoria) Bn7th (Victoria) Bn8th (Victoria) Bn

3rd Australian Brigade:9th (QLD Bn

10th (SA) Bn11th (WA) Bn12th (SA, WA and Tasmania) BnI (NSW) FA Bde (1st, 2nd & 3rd Btys)II (Victoria) FA Bde (4th, 5th & 6th Btys)III (QLD) FA Bde (7th, 8th & 9th Btys)1st, 2nd & 3rd Field Coys Engineers

New Zealand &Australian Division:Maj-Gen Sir A.J. Godley

New Zealand Brigade:Auckland BnCanterbury BnOtago BnWellington Bn

4th Australian Brigade:13 (NSW) Bn14 (Victoria) Bn15 (QLD & Tasmania) Bn16 (WA &SA) BnNew Zealand FA Bde (1st, 2nd & 3rdBtys)New Zealand Field Howitzer BtyField Coy New Zealand Engineers

Corps Troops7th Indian Mountain Artillery Bde

[21st Kohat) Battery and 26th (Jacobs)

Battery]

Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps

Corps Expeditionnaire

DOrientCommander: Gen dAmade

1st Division

Gen Masnou

Metropolitan Brigade:175th Regiment

Regt de marche dAfrique (2 Bns

Senegalese, 1 Bn Colonial)

Colonial Brigade:4th Colonial Regt (2 Bns Senegalese, 1

Bn Colonial)

6th Colonial Regt (2 Bns Senegalese, 1

Bn Colonial)

6 Batteries of artillery (75-mm)

2 Batteries of artillery (65-mm)

provided by the Australian

War Memorial

ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE: FIRST LANDINGS

exercises on the high ground above the Anzac landing beacheswhen news of the landings reached him. He was ordered totake his regiment to intercept. Whereas General Liman vonSanders believed the Anzac landing to be a limited feint,Kemal correctly deduced the importance of the Australianattack on the high ground, and took the 19th Division to beatthe attackers to the crucial peaks.

Throughout the day Turkish forces rushed forward from thesurrounding area and forced back or annihilated the scatteredadvanced parties of Australians.

THE DEFENCE SETTLED ON WHAT WOULD BECOMEknown as Second Ridge and the high ground on its northernflank, particularly the hill known as Baby 700. Turkish coun-ter-attacks pushed aggressively against the Anzac perimeter,and as Australian and New Zealand troops arrived on the

beach, they were rushed inland to wherever they were mostneeded, with the result that units were broken up and scatteredas they came ashore.

Another problem was that the route to the high groundled up gullies that were flanked by the heavy fighting alongSecond Ridge and many of the troops despatched to particular

points, such as Baby 700, were re-directed en route and suckedinto the fighting elsewhere. The results were disorganisationand an inability to send troops where they were most needed.In addition, the Allies had virtually no artillery ashore.

A battery of small Indian mountain guns fought valiantlybut was forced out of action in the early afternoon, leaving >>

Throughout the dayTurkish forces rushed

forward from thesurrounding area.

Key figuresTHE OPERATION WAS UNDER OVERALL

command of General Sir Ian Hamilton,the British Commander-in-Chief of theMediterranean Expeditionary Force.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corpswas commanded by Lieutenant-General SirWilliam Birdwood, the 1st Australian Divisionby Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges,and the New Zealand and Australian Division byMajor-General Sir Alexander Godley.

The Australian first wave known as thecovering force was provided by the 3rdBrigade, commanded by Colonel Ewen Sinclair-MacLagan. A brigade of the period consisted offour battalions, each of about 1000 men. The3rd Brigade was recruited in Queensland, SouthAustralia, Western Australia and Tasmania.

The Commander of the Turkish forces in thearea, the Fifth Army, was the German officerGeneral Liman von Sanders.

The first troops the Australians met werefrom the 9th Division of this army. Lieutenant-

Colonel Mustapha Kemal commanded the FifthArmys 19th Division. Kemal later became thefirst president of Turkey, and changed his nameto Ataturk, Father of the Turks.

Sir Ian Hamilton Liman von Sanders


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Troops climb down rope ladders into lifeboats for the journey to Gallipoli and immortal fame.

>> the Turkish batteries free to shell the Anzacs almost asthey pleased. The fire of the Royal Navy was limited bythe flat trajectory of the shells and the difficulties of identi-fying targets in the confused fighting and tangled terrain.

BABY 700 REPUTEDLY CHANGED HANDS FIVEtimes that day. Attacks ebbed and flowed as the Australianand New Zealand line was all but annihilated, broke, wasreinforced, counter-attacked and re-took the hill. Dead andwounded littered the scrub, and many men disappearedforever. Eventually the line broke for the last time, and theTurks reclaimed the hill. They were not to lose it for theremainder of the campaign.

Second Ridge held throughout the day, but only bybeing constantly reinforced. Darkness meant an easingof the Turkish artillery fire, but their infantry continued

to attack throughout the night. Ultimately, Colonel EwenSinclair-MacLagan put down the success of the Anzacresistance of the first days to the determination of thestronger men to hold like grim death at all costs. Therewere enough strong men to do i t.

By days end, the Turks held the high ground, butthe Australians, now reinforced by members of the NewZealand and Australian Division, were determined to holdwhat they had captured. The Turks were equally determinedthat the Anzacs would advance no further, and both sides

began digging defensive works.

WHILE THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCCESSFULopposed amphibious landing in more than 100 years, stra-tegically it had been a failure. During the night, while thetroops in the hills fought back Turkish counter-attacks,Generals William Bridges and Alexander Godley argued forwithdrawal of the force; this was denied, and the Anzacswere told to hold their ground.

The reasons for the failure of the attacking troops to takeand hold all their objectives include: the confusion caused

by the units landing mixed and in the wrong place; thedifficult and tangled nature of the terrain; inadequate intel-ligence and preparation time; Colonel Sinclair-MacLagansearly decision to fight a defensive battle; and the aggressiveand prompt response of the Turks, which was due largelyto Kemals swift assessment of the situation and inspiredcounter-manoeuvres.

It is estimated that 16,000 Anzac troops were landed onthe first day, more than 2000 of whom became casualties.

This article was contributed by the Army History Unit

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS HISTORY TO ENTER INTOthe details of that long days fighting. Readers whowish to know precisely where each destroyers troopslanded some of them further south near the pointoriginally intended, to climb the second ridge there;how a battery at Gaba Tepe promontory ... openedup again and again on the crowded destroyers andboats moving in to the beach; how the British cruiserBacchante several times pushed forward till she wasalmost grounded, and smothered the neighbourhoodof the battery with the dust and smoke of her salvoes;and how the Turkish guns really sheltered by a quarry always opened up again when more boats came in,though in the whole day only one or two of their shellsburst over a boat; how the great Queen Elizabeth (withSir Ian Hamilton aboard, though none of the troopsknew of his presence) came in early among the war-ships for a look at things; how the balloon ship Manicaout near the transports sent up her big grub-like bal-loon to peer over the hills into the Narrows; and whatwere the experiences of the Australian scouts andother troops, some of whom, as planned, overran twoTurkish field batteries and reached the Third Ridge the one that the covering force had been intendedto seize and some of whom even looked out on theNarrows; how in this strange country, amid the sweet-smelling thyme on the uplands on that beautiful brightspring day, the fight, which, after the first rush, hadseemed almost over, gradually became intense againand swayed hour after hour on the Second Ridgeuntil the factor that wins or loses battles the strainupon nerves became almost unbearable so that tomany brave men the smell of thyme long afterwardsbrought a shudder for the intimate experiences ofthe Australians and of the Turks who faced them inthat famous fight the reader must be referred to theAustralian Official History, which devotes 200 pages tothat day.

From Anzac to Amiens, by C.E.W. Bean, publishedby the Australian War Memorial

An epic day


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THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN REMAINS AMONGthe most contentious episodes in Australian oreven World War I history.

Its visionary origins, its tragic course and dra-matic ending all give it the power to arouse con-flicting arguments. Gallipoli has always been inter-

preted in national terms, with British, Australianand Turkish versions of the story differing in whatthey choose to emphasise and conclude.

Among the most persistent arguments,especially among Australians, is the questionof whether the April 25 landing was directed atthe wrong place. Quoting the 1922 edition ofCharles Beans history, some will show that, as anofficer called out as he came ashore the damnedfools have landed us in the wrong place! Thisview has taken hold, but the reality was morecomplex, and our view of it should have changedover the years.

Bean himself revised this generalisation inlater editions of his official history. Like the care-ful historian he became, he corrected his accounton the basis of evidence which later emerged.But the damage had been done: generations ofAustralians believed that the Anzacs had beenlanded in the wrong place.

Later historians have re-examined that view.

Dennis Winter, in his 1994 book 25 April 1915:the Inevitable Tragedy, made a detailed study ofthe surviving orders and concluded that the focuswas changed verbally soon before the landing andthat this inclined the force towards Anzac Coverather than further south toward Gaba Tepe.

Tom Frame, a naval historian, was almost thefirst to ask detailed questions about what was,after all, a naval operation. He published TheShores of Gallipoliin 2000. From a study of thenavigational capabilities of the time, he concludedthat warships could not have made a more preciselandfall, and that the error was the result of una-voidable navigational imprecision.

Many other episodes of Gallipoli have arousedsimilar controversy and can be traced through theyears, with participants and later historians offer-ing new interpretations based on new questionsand fresh evidence. Nor is the process over. Therelease of records from Turkish archives untilnow closed is likely to change more of what

once seemed like accepted views of Gallipoli. Dr Peter Stanley

This article was first published in issue 30 of Wartime,the official magazine of the Australian War Memorial.

APRIL 25 WAS THE FIRST DAY OF A LONG,

bloody and unsuccessful campaign that draggedon until January 9, 1916 (when the last of theBritish forces evacuated Cape Helles). While the25th is remembered as The Day, the diggers

endured another 239 days at Gallipoli; days spent learning thebusiness of war the hard way.

As the Allied forces failed to achieve a single objective onthe first day on the peninsula, the campaign became a struggle

between the attackers trying to expand their beachhead andthe Turkish defenders trying to push them into the sea.

For the Anzacs, the days immediately after the landingwere taken up in consolidating their positions and beating offlimited Turkish counter attacks.

The failure to seize the high ground to the northeast ena-bled the Turks to fire on nearly all of the Anzacs positions.So, in addition to sorting out mixed-up units, receiving and

deploying reinforcements and setting up logistics supportfacilities on the beaches, the top priority was digging trenchesand establishing strong points in the most exposed areas.

On May 2, 4th Brigade attempted to recapture Baby 700and the Nek, which had been held briefly on the first day. The

240DAYSOF VALOURAND HORROR

attack, a bloody failure, gave grim warning to the difficultiesof mounting attacks in the precipitous terrain. Emphasis thenshifted south to the British sector where, between May 6-9, aseries of attacks was launched to capture Krithia.

The 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade sent south to aug-ment the attackers earned the respect of both sides for theferocity with which it fought. Once again, the attacks failedand the attackers, including the Australians, paid a heavy pricefor poor tactics, inadequate artillery support and underestimat-ing the enemy.

AT ANZAC, WHERE THE BEACHHEAD WAS NOdeeper than 1.5km, the defenders were always vulnerable toone massive attack that would fracture the defensive perimeterand roll up soldiers unable to manoeuvre to counter the break.

On May 19, the Turks launched multiple attacks alongthe perimeter with this objective, which eventually failed atthe cost of enormous casualties. The 10,000 Turkish casual-ties, including 3000 killed, were testimony to the power ofmachine guns and massed rifle fire; a lesson that was to bereaffirmed time and time again on the Western Front.

The three months that followed were relatively quiet atAnzac (it was a different story at Helles where a number ofattritional battles were fought). However, sniping, incessantartillery fire and sickness sapped the defenders strength.

BY JUNE, IT WAS CLEAR TO THE ALLIED HIGHcommand that something had to be tried to break the stale-mate. Reinforcements five additional divisions and muchmore artillery and ammunition were made available. The

problem was how best to apply the new resources, noting that

the Turks had been reinforcing at an even faster rate. It wasdecided to launch a major new attack in August.

Interestingly, the primary objective for the August offen-sive the high ground overlooking Anzac was not an objec-tive of the original landing. Clearly, four months exposure >>

1914October 29:Turkish fleet, under Germanys AdmiralSouchon, bombards Russian ports on the Black Sea.

November 2: Russia declares war on Turkey. Britainand France do the same three days later.

November 25: First Lord of the Admiralty WinstonChurchill proposes naval attack to force a passagethrough the Dardanelles.

1915January 13: Churchill convinces the War Council inLondon to prepare for a naval expedition in February

to bombard and t ake the Gallipoli peninsula, withConstantinople as its object.

February 19: Allied fleet under Vice-Admiral SackvilleCarden begins attack on Dardanellesforts.

March 12: Sir Ian Hamilton appointed to commandMediterranean Expeditionary Force.

March 18: Vice-Admiral John de Robeck launches finalAllied naval attack on the Dardanelles. Three battle-ships, Bouvet, Irresistible and Ocean, are sunk by minesand a further three ships are damaged.

March 22: Hamilton and de Robeck agree on the needfor a combined land-sea operation.

March 24: Liman von Sanders appointed to commandTurkish Fifth Army on Gallipoli.

April 25: Allied landings at Helles, Anzac and KumKale. AE2 passes through the Dardanelles.

April 28: First Battle of Krithia.

April 30: AE2 sunk in the Sea of Marmara.

May 1:Turkish attack at Helles.

May 6-8: Second Battle of Krithia.

May 19-20: Mass Turkish attacks at Anzac lead toheavy Turkish losses.

May 24:Truce at Anzac to bury dead.

May 25: Sinking of battleship Triumph by Germansubmarine.

June 4:Third Battle of Krithia.

July 12-13: Allied attacks at Helles.

August 4-6: Secret reinforcement to Anzac.

August 6-9: Diversionary attack at Lone Pine.

August 6-7: Diversionary attacks at Helles; mainAnzac offensive toward Sari Bair range commences;two Allied divisions land at Suvla.

August 7: Attack at the Nek; charge of 3 Light HorseBrigade, Russells Top.

Errors ofhistory

After the landings,the Anzacs dug in andlearned the grim artof war the hard way,

writes Roger Lee.

Divisional headquarters staff wade ashore.AWM

G00903

TIMELINE


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>> to the tactical advantage the Turks had in holding the heights hadcaused some re-evaluation.

There were to be two diversionary attacks outside the Anzac

area a small one at Helles and a very large one, involving all thenew forces, at Suvla Bay. Despite popular mythology, the SuvlaBay landing was not intended to win the campaign, it was only everintended to draw-off Turkish forces from the attack on the Sari BairRange.

There were also a number of (supposedly) minor feints or diver-sions also mounted from within the Anzac perimeter. The mostfamous was the Lone Pine attack on August 6. Unlike the mainattack, this feint succeeded in capturing and holding its objective.

The main attack was to be made by two composite forces, orcolumns comprising, on the right, the New Zealand Infantry Brigadeand, on the left, the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade and the 29thIndian Infantry Brigade.

The New Zealanders were to attack Chunuk Bair, while the rightcolumn was to occupy Hill Q. In another of the tragedies of the cam-

paign, the New Zealand attack was to be supported by a charge upthe feature called the Nek, towards Chunuk Bair.

DURING THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 6, THE TWO COLUMNSmoved north from Anzac, struggling to navigate through broken,thickly overgrown ground that sloped steeply at the end. They quick-ly became lost, disorganised and tired. Neither attack succeeded,although the New Zealanders did occupy the upper slopes of ChunukBair for a brief period. Further, the Light Horse charge at the Nekstill went ahead with more than 300 casualties.

Although the landing at Suvla Bay was intended as a diversion, itheld the only real prospect of success of all the attacks undertaken.Unfortunately, irresolute and indolent leadership by the British anddynamic leadership from the Turks enabled 1500 Turks to delay, thencontain, more than 20,000 British into a small perimeter around the

bay. The last chance of victory slipped away from the Allies.The failure of the August offensive cost Hamilton his command.

His replacement immediately recognised there was no option but towithdraw and evacuation planning began.

There was little interest in any more offensive actions and thetroops on both sides settled down to survive the appalling conditionsand the even more appalling weather until the Allies managed toslip away. Ironically, the withdrawal, completed by December 20 atAnzac, was the most successful operation conducted by the Allies onthe Gallipoli peninsula.

They were vulnerableto one massive attackthat would fracture thedefensive perimeter.

With the last raysof the sun, I was staring throughthe periscope for any sign of the living among the bodies.There are little khaki heaps of bodies, then twos and threes hereand there lying among the Turks. Some are only rotting khakiwithout either shape or form. The boots last the longest.Within a few yards of my periscope lay a tale telling how furious-ly both sides died. The Australians bayonet is sticking, rusty andblack, six inches through the Turks back. One hand is grippingthe Turks throat, while even now you can see the Turks teethfastened through what was the boys wrist. The Turks bayonetis jammed through the boys stomach and one hand is clenched,claw-like, across the Australians face. I wonder will they fight ifthere is an after world.

From The Desert Column, by Ion Idriess,published by Angus & Robertson.

8th Battalion soldier s in an abandoned Turkish position on Boltons Ridge: from back, Privates Ted Freeman, GeorgeClements, Jim Bryant, holding a Turkish shell case, Samuel Wilson (later killed in action) and Robert Hutchinson.

At right, corpses scattered near the trenches at Lone Pine.

August 8: New Zealand forces captureChunuk Bair.

August 9: Allied units, including Gurkhas,briefly capture part of Hill Q.

August 9: British forces at Suvla fail tocapture high ground due to earlier arrivalof Turkish forces.

August 12: British attack at Suvla; one ofHamiltons staff officers, Guy Dawnay, firstputs forward idea of partial evacuation.

August 12-13:Turkish counter-attack atHelles.

August 15: British attack at K iretch Tepe inSuvla area.

August 21: Large Allied attack at Suvla.

August 29: Partial Allied capture of Hill 60in Suvla area.

October 16: Hamilton and his chief-of-staff,Major-Gereral Walter Braithwaite, replaced.

October 28: Hamiltons replacement, SirCharles Monro, arrives at Gallipoli and three

days later recommends evacuation.

December 8: Monro ordered to evacuateSuvla and Anzac.

December 12:Troops at Suvla and Anzactold of plan to evacuate.

December 19-20: Evacuation of Anzacand Suvla.

1916January 7:Last Turkish attack at Helles.

January 8-9:Evacuation of Helles and end of campaign.


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FOR TODAYS AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE,and indeed all Australians, one aspect of theGallipoli campaign which demands better under-standing is the role played by Allied naval forces.After all, it was their ships that transported the

Anzacs safely to Gallipoli, sustained them while ashore, and

safely removed them at the end of the operation.At its peak, the campaign directly involved more than 250French and British warships ranging from battleships through totrawlers. Australia, too, maintained a naval presence, with HMASubmarine AE2 taking an active and important role at the outsetof the campaign and the 1st RAN Bridging Train later commit-ted in support of engineering operations on the peninsula.

The campaign was first planned as a purely naval effort,but the failure by the combined Allied fleet to force a passagepast the Turkish minefields in the Dardanelles forced a rethink.The Allies still considered that their warships would have topenetrate into the Sea of Marmara and bombard Constantinople(Istanbul] in order to compel Turkey to surrender, but soughtto first secure the Gallipoli peninsula through an amphibiousassault.

Success ashore would allow the enemys minefields to becleared without interference from Turkish shore batteries andfield artillery, and thereby permit the free passage of the fleet.

Only because of Allied naval supremacy could the jointexpedition even be contemplated. Thereafter and throughout thecampaign, sea-based forces mounted a complex succession of

direct and indirect support operations, which involved not onlyfire support, ferrying troops and supplies, but also interdictionat sea and ashore, naval air support, and blockade enforcement.

While the Allied leadership at the Gallipoli campaign isoften criticised for its organisational and cultural failings, theseshould not mask the successes that were achieved. Like manyaspects of military operations during World War I, the combat-ants at Gallipoli encountered a novel situation.

Despite Britains long history of joint operations, the scaleof the Gallipoli expedition was unprecedented. Planning for theclose integration of land, sea and air assets had not been under-taken before, and original solutions were needed.

Adaptation and innovation were the keys, and although sel-dom recalled, the level of joint service cooperation eventuallyattained at Gallipoli was far ahead of anything contemplatedbefore the war. With its structure and disposition continuouslytailored to meet developing circumstances, the inherent flexibil-ity of the fleet ensured that support for the troops never falteredduring the eight-month campaign.

THE FORGOT

GALLIPOLIFORCEMany people are not

aware of the integral roleof sailors at Anzac.Dr David Stevens putsthe failures and successesof the Allied naval forcesinto perspective.

As in every amphibious operation, control of the searemained critical throughout, allowing the Allied force to usethe sea for its own purposes, while preventing the Turkish force

from doing the same.The heavy guns of the British battleships were an effectivedeterrent to Turkish attempts to use their warships in support oftheir own troops or against Allied positions. Using aerial spot-ting to fire over the peninsula it would take only one or two biggun salvoes to force the enemys ships to withdraw back up theNarrows.

Everything required by the expedition came and went bysea; the men, mules, guns and ammunition, the wire and timbersupports for the construction of fortifications and trenches andof course the water and provisions. Most importantly, because itcould rely on sea control, the Allied command always retainedthe option of evacuating the force from the peninsula.

What might have happened should such control be lost wasbest illustrated by the fall of Singapore in February 1942, whenmore than 15,000 Australian troops marched into Japanesecaptivity.

Simultaneously, Allied sea power acted to disrupt Turkishcommunications and hamstrung their efforts to dislodge theAllies. There was no railway to Gallipoli and the nearest sta-tion was 50 miles [80km] from the northern end of the isthmus.

Allied battleships and monitors shelled the main road and singleaccess bridge to disrupt Turkish transport arrangements, whilenaval aircraft demonstrated their reach by attacking the enemysrailhead.

Meanwhile, the exploits of Allied submarines in the Sea ofMarmara a classic case of sea denial and one of the few undis-puted successes of the campaign practically stopped sea com-munications between Constantinople and Gallipoli.

BY JULY 1915, THE TURKS HAD ABANDONED THEsea route for the transport of troops, while by the end ofDecember only one large steamer was left operating in the Seaof Marmara. The lack of alternative routes forced the Turks tobring almost everything into Gallipoli by land at night; troopson foot and supplies by camels and ox carts.

Farther afield, Allied destroyers maintained patrols to pre-vent contraband reaching Turkey through Greek or Bulgarianports. Other warships escorted friendly transports, huntedfor enemy submarines in the lower Aegean and blocked theirpassage into the Sea of Crete. Rather than taking place on asmall Turkish peninsula, from the joint perspective the cam-

paign is better understood by looking at the entire EasternMediterranean.The lasting legacy of Gallipoli should not be seen in terms

of the slaughter between the trenches. Though ultimately a stra-tegic failure, the campaign provided a wealth of shared experi-ence. Joint operations techniques and procedures, ranging fromimproved command and control through to common terminol-ogy were learned the hard way in 1915, but the fundamentals ofmodern maritime power projection were established.

Informing the development of amphibious tactics and equip-ment between the wars, Gallipoli provided a wealth of invalu-able lessons.

We are far from being beaten, wrote the Allied naval com-mander, Admiral John de Roebeck, at the time of the evacua-tion, ... in fact we have learned a great deal and will know whatto do in the future.

The succession of successful amphibious assaults, whichbrought victory to the Allies in 1945, stand as a testament to deRoebecks words. Soldiers of A and C companies, 11th Battalion, 1st AIF, o


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Network-centricwarfare in 1915THE FOLLOWING DIAGRAMS ARE BASED ON PART OF THE AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIALScollection of original Anzac material (AWM 2S 367/26). Given Defences ongoing interest in net-work-centric warfare, enhanced situational awareness and better connectivity between diverse forceelements, they serve as a useful reminder that there is really little new in warfare. As the diagramsillustrate, attempts at broad area networking wereundertaken in 1915.

The first diagram describes the fire support planfor the initial Anzac landings at Gaba Tepe on April25. Assigned in support were the ships of the SecondSquadron of the combined Allied Fleet. The first waveof 1500 troops were to be towed behind the oldRoyal Navy battleships Prince of Wales, Queen andLondon (on the left flank, but not shown in the dia-gram). Offering direct fire support for the landings,wherever and whenever asked by the army, were thebattleships Majestic and Triumph and the cruiserBacchante (north of Gaba Tepe, but not in diagram).Positioned further out were the seaplane carrier ArkRoyal, and the balloon ship Manica. The latter twovessels are of particular interest, as they demon-strate the Allied intention to employ the latest indeveloping technology whenever possible. Aerialobservers first began spotting for the fire supportships from April 24, but unfortunately proceduresremained largely untested.

At the second stage, artillery observers havebeen established ashore. The cruiser, Baccahante,requiring less depth of water than the battleshipsand possessing faster firing guns, was able toclose the beach and provide rapid, direct fire on enemy posi-tions. Although wireless telegraphy provided the primary communications link,visual communications, using either semaphore signalling or flashing light, would always be availableas a backup. In the third and final phase of the plan, the divisional and higher headquarters have beenestablished ashore, and landline communications, using telephone cables, have been establishedbetween the forward observation positions and naval communication stations on the beach. Beach sta-

tions were established on each flank of the opera-tion, as well as in the centre, providing immediatecommunication with the supporting battleships.Not shown are the destroyers stationed on eachflank, which turned searchlights onto the shore atnight to prevent a surprise beach attack.

ALTHOUGH THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE ANDfire support networks detailed in these diagramslook efficient in theory, the results were found lesssuccessful in practice. For example, the unreliabili-ty and poor performance of early aircraft and wire-

less equipment, and a lack of practical experiencehindered spotting naval gunfire. Indeed, Manicastethered balloons were found to be generally morereliable than either Ark Royals seaplanes or thearmys shore based observers, simply becausethey used a less vulnerable telephone connection.The effectiveness of fire support was at timeslimited by a combination of the obsolete fire con-trol systems, unsuitable ammunition, and the flattrajectory of naval guns, particularly when direct-

ed against dug-in troops, reverse slopes and deep valleys.Despite these problems, naval gunfire remained an essential capability. With equipment priority

going to the British Army in France, the Dardanelles expedition was always seriously under-gunned,and only covering ships could provide adequate firepower. In the first critical days, naval gunfire wascredited with preventing many Turkish counter-attacks due to its devastating effect upon troopsin the open. A battleships 15-inch shrapnel shellcontained 15,000 bullets, and an Australian colonelnoted that one shell from HMS Queen Elizabethhad wiped out a whole Turkish regiment.

The German commander of the Turkish forces,

General Liman von Sanders, had no doubts aboutthe value of the naval covering force, writing laterthat, the artillery effect of the hostile battleshipsconstituted a support of extraordinary power forthe landing army. Through hard-won experience,joint procedures and communications improveduntil even the smaller-gunned warships were fullyintegrated and able to provide immediate respon-sive and accurate fire support. Commandersashore regularly called on this support to hinderthe movement of enemy reinforcements, sup-press enemy gun crews, and reduce the moraleof enemy troops. By contrast the mere presenceof the whole range of naval support vessels was of immensereassurance to the Anzacs. The loss of Triumph to a German U-boat on May 25 was regarded as beinglike an old friend gone and, according to one account, the troops were all for subscribing a monthspay towards salving her. Dr David Stevens

TEN

k of HMS London the day before the landings.

AWMA02465

3rdStageWhenalltheproposedsystemsareestablished

2ndStageWhenObservationOfficers

areabletoobservebutbeforespecial

Flankstationsareestablished

1stStageFromdaylighttillArtilleryObservationOfficersareinapositiontoobserveeffectually


12/23


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O

N APRIL 25 AS THE ANZAC TROOPSwere landing at Gallipoli, AE2 becamethe first Allied submarine to penetrate the

56.3km-long Dardanelles Strait and enterthe Sea of Marmara. Her commanding offic-

er, Lieutenant Commander Henry Hugh Gordon DacreStoker, described the passage as follows:

Having proceeded from the anchorage off Tenedos, I layat the entrance off the Dardanelles until moonset and about2.30am on April 25 entered the Straits at 8 knots. Weather calmand clear. As the order to run amok in the Narrows precludedall possibility of passing through unseen, I decided to travel onthe surface as far as possible.

Searchlights continually swept the Strait but AE2 con-tinued unmolested until 4.30am when batteries openedfire from the northern shore. The submarine dived andbegan her passage through the minefield. Wires continuallyscraped her sides for the next half hour. Twice she surfacedin the minefield for observation. At 6am, she was within3.2km of the Narrows, submerged to periscope depth.The sea was flat calm. Forts on both sides of the Narrowssighted her and immediately opened fire. Stoker watch-ing through his periscope observed a number of ships anddecided to attack a small cruiser:

At a range of three to four hundred yards [274 to 365m] Ifired a bow torpedo, ordering 70 feet [21m] to avoid a destroyerwhich was attempting to ram on the port side. As the vesseldived, the destroyer passed overhead close, and the torpedo washeard to hit.

After a brief interval underwater Stoker decided to lookaround:

As the vessel was rising, she hit bottom and slid up on thebank to a depth of 10 feet [3m], at which depth a considerableportion of the conning tower was above water. Through theperiscope I saw that the position was immediately under FortAnatoli Medjidieh.

The fort opened fire and for some minutes shells fell onall sides, until efforts to refloat her succeeded and she slidinto the safety of deep water. Relief, however, was shortlivedas soon AE2 was again stranded:

As my vessel was lying with inclination down by the bowsI went full speed ahead,. Shortly afterwards she began to movedown the bank, bumped, gathered way and then bumped very

heavily. She, however, continued to descend and at 80 feet[24.3m] I dived off the bank. The last bump was calculated toconsiderably injure the vessel, but as I considered my chiefduty was to prove the passage through the Straits possible, Idecided to continue.

An unknown crewmember penned this account o f AE2ssubsequent operations.

The next day [April 26] we spent slowly steaminground awaiting for any ships that might be coming fromConstantinople to Gallipoli but nothing was sighted all day. Inthe evening it came on to blow fresh and at dusk as we wereproceeding towards Gallipoli we sighted a ship coming towardsus.

We dived and prepared to attack when the ship came up.She was seen to be one of the old type of cruiser. We fired atorpedo, but missed it being rather too dusk for a good shot.The same evening some ship was seen to be making ournumber in the Morse code to try and get us to answer or elsecome up close to them, but we were not to be caught like that

as we knew there were no more English ships in the Sea ofMarmara.

This night we lay on the bottom as we did not want anymore experiences like we had on the previous night, so weselected a nice little bay on the European shore which we knewhad a good sandy bottom, and there we lay in peace.

The next morning the Captain decided to go down toGallipoli to see if there were any transports there which mayhave passed us during the night. This meant a very long dive, sowe charged our batteries up to all it would carry.

During the time we were charging the battery we were allthe time steaming towards Gallipoli. When we were just out ofrange of the forts we dived and proceeded towards the harbour.There was nothing there except a gunboat and a number ofsmall craft.

We spent an hour in trying to get a shot at the gunboat butwithout success. It was a beautifully fine day and not a rippleon the water, and, of course, every time we showed our peri-

scope we were seen and the gunboat had time to alter coursebefore we could get a shot in.

After putting in an hour, we decided to go back to the Seaof Marmara, but just as we were leaving the harbour a transportwas coming in escorted by destroyers. We fired our starboardtorpedo but missed.

We immediately turned a little and fired our stern torpedo.On firing this torpedo we had to immediately go down out ofsight, as the destroyers were attempting to ram us.

We showed our periscope five minutes later but there wasno transport to be seen, only the destroyers. We had to dive along way on this occasion, as we were followed by destroyerswho were trying to locate us. However, we got well clear ofthem and came to the surface (at this stage our battery was get-ting very low) and commenced to steam on the surface with ourgas engine, at the same time charging our batteries.

We had been under way about half-an-hour when we sight-ed four or five different jets of smoke on the horizon. At first itwas not certain whether these ships were going away from >>

UP PERISThe voyage of the AE2through to the Sea ofMarmara on Anzac Dayis a justifiable source ofpride to the Navy.

LATE IN THE EVENING OF APRIL 25, 1915, A COUNCILof war was taking place on the British flagship HMSQueen Elizabeth as it steamed off the coast of theGallipoli peninsula. The British Commander-in-Chief, SirIan Hamilton, was in conference with his senior staffdiscussing the progress of the Allied troops ashore.

Moments earlier Hamilton had received a message fromLieutenant General Sir William Birdwood who had reluc-tantly recommended an immediate evacuation. This wasbased on advice from Birdwoods two divisional command-ers ashore who feared the exhausted troops could not with-

stand a Turkish counter-attack the next day. The situationappeared grave and the matter of re-embarkation requiredimmediate consideration

Far away from this scene on the other side of Gallipoli,a small RAN submarine, AE2, under the command ofLieutenant Commander Henry Hugh Gordon DacreStoker, had completed a gruelling underwater passagethrough the Dardanelles Strait. In doing so, AE2 had madehistory as the first Allied submarine to successfully pen-etrate the heavily mined and fortified stretch of water. Inthe process, it had also carried out a torpedo attack againsta Turkish warship, and was now poised to enter the inlandSea of Marmara.

Stokers orders were to infiltrate theinland sea and run amok to prevent enemy

shipping from re-supplying their army on the peninsula.But, before Stoker proceeded, it was vital that he let thefleet know of his success so that other submarines couldfollow and join him. At 8.45pm, AE2 surfaced and Stoker

gave the order to make thesignal.

This duty fell to 22-year-old Victorian, Able SeamanWilliam Falconer. As AE2stelegraphist, his use of theMorse key was about to

John Perryman explainsthe role a signal fromunder the sea had on theAllied commanders.

The key message


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First in,last outTHE NAVY WAS THE FIRST IN AND LAST OUT OF THEAustralian forces at Gallipoli. The submarine AE2began her passage of the Dardanelles before the Anzaclandings commenced, while the departure of the RAN

Bridging Train from Suvla Bay took place after theevacuation from Anzac Cove.AE2 was equipped with four single torpedo tubes

at bow, stern, and on either beam. Only one sparetorpedo was carried for each tube, but the unusualarrangement allowed a weapon to be rapidly broughtto bear on a target appearing from any direction.

At one point during her passage through theDardanelles, AE2 remained submerged for 16 hours.The air inside became so foul that matches once struckrefused to burn.

The concern shown by Australian naval authoritiesfor the crew of AE2 while in Turkish captivity haddefinite limits. After requestioning the BritishAdmiralty, the RAN debited the prisoners pay for thecost of thick winter clothing. Food parcels, however,were granted as a free issue.

The evacuation of the Bridging Train did not seethe last of Australian sailors at Gallipoli. In January

1918, the British submarine E14 was sent to torpedo aTurkish battlecruiser, aground in the Dardanelles.Forced to the surface by enemy warships, E14 was

subsequently destroyed by shellfire. Only nine of thecrew of 31 survived. One of these was Able SeamanMitchell of Ballarat, the only Australian on board. Hehad been stationed on the conning tower passingorders below to the helmsman.

All the officers were killed and he was left alone.Although the enemy had the exact range and he wasthe only man visible he remained at his post and tookcharge of the doomed boat until she sank. When in thewater he rescued the wireless operator who had beenwounded and was unconscious.

There was no senior officer to recommend Mitchellfor distinction and his only reward for gallant conductwas in the self-evident fact that he had done his duty.

Naval History Section

COPE

>> us or coming towards us but it was not long before we sawthat they were coming towards us from Constantinople.

These were six destroyers escorting two or three smalltransports. At this stage we had only one torpedo left and asthese were only small transports, the Captain decided to keepour only torpedo for something larger, but just show ourselvesas much as possible so as to frighten them.

When they were about 2000 yards [1.8km] from us we wereall put to our diving stations so as to be ready to go under at amoments notice, but they refused to fire on us till they werewithin about 800 yards [730m] of us. One shot fell about 100yards [91m] off our starboard bow and one passed just over us.

We immediately dived and when we were down to a depthof 40 feet [12m], one destroyer rushed over us at full speedthinking that perhaps we had not got down far enough and thatshe might be able to ram us. After remaining down about 20minutes, we came to the surface; the destroyers were well clearof us so we started our engines and steamed towards MarmaraIsland.

We had not been under way 10 minutes before we sighted[the British submarine] E14. She, like ourselves, had just cometo the surface. This was indeed a delightful sight for us as itmeant company. We ran up close to her and exchanged greet-ings. She had come through two days after, April 27. It wasthen getting late so after making a rendezvous for the followingday we parted. We proceeded to a small bay on the Europeanshore to lay on the bottom for the night.

We got under way and rose to the surface about 8am.Nothing was in sight so we proceeded on our way to meet E14.On our way we sighted smoke on the horizon. This was soonseen to be a torpedo boat and a gunboat coming from Gallipoli.

When they were about two miles off [3.2km], we stoppedengines and stood by to dive at a moments notice. The tor-pedo boat soon sighted us and came full speed towards us. Weimmediately dived but it was soon seen that something waswrong with the boat; she appeared to be heavy by the bows andwhen the Captain looked round the boat a main ballast tank was

found to be full of water. The valves on this tank had not beentouched; how it became full is a mystery.

The only thing we could put this accident down to was thatthe water had leaked into this tank during the time we werelying on the bottom, for we had a hurried refit in Malta. In try-ing to rectify this we broke surface and the torpedo boat (whichwas up to within 100 yards [91.4m] of us) immediately fired onus, putting two shots through into the engine room.

This made it impossible for us to dive again as the waterwas pouring in, so we had to surrender. We had no means ofputting up a fight as we had no gun and we could not fire ourremaining torpedo.

During this time, we were laying on the surface before wesurrendered the torpedo boat fired two torpedoes at us and thegunboat one. All these torpedoes missed.

If we had been struck by one of these torpedos, we shouldhave been blown out of the water. When we came on deck tosurrender the gunboat and torpedo boat were still firing on us,but immediately we surrendered the torpedo boat stopped fir-ing and commenced steaming around at full speed blowing hersiren to try and make the gunboat stop firing.

As she was a greater distance away we were quite safe asall her shots were falling short. After about five minutes, shestopped firing and came up close to us. The submarine waslying at an angle down by the bows and sinking very slowly.Everybody had plenty of time to get on deck.

The torpedo boat ran up close to us and threw out life beltsand lowered a small dinghy. Our coxswain called out and toldall those who could swim to jump in and go towards the tor-pedo boat and those who could not swim so well were to getinto the dinghy.

Just as everybody was clear, submarine AE2 sank in about250 feet [76m] of water so that would make it impossible to

raise her again. compiled by Dr David Stevens

have a profound impact on the discussions taking >>>> place on the Queen Elizabeth, and forever cement AE2splace in the history of the Dardanelles campaign.

As Falconer tapped away at his wireless from within, thesubs damp external wire aerial was seen by Stoker to bethrowing off purple and blue sparks. The young telegraphisttried in vain to get an acknowledgement of his signal, andafter several attempts it was assumed that the radio equip-ment had been damaged and, therefore, the fleet wouldremain unaware of their achievement.

Unbeknown to Stoker and Falconer, the message had,in fact, been received in Queen Elizabeth at the crucialmoment when Hamilton was deliberating with his staffwhether or not to order a general evacuation. The councilof war was dramatically interrupted when one of Hamiltonsaides handed a copy of Stokers signal to CommanderRoger Keyes who announced, Tell them [the troops on

shore] this. It is an omen. An Australian submarine hasdone the finest feat in submarine history and is going totorpedo all the ships bringing reinforcements, supplies andammunition into Gallipoli.

This was a tremendous fillip and in his response toBirdwood, Hamilton wrote, Your news is indeed serious.But there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in andstick it out.

It would take at least two days to re-embark you, asAdmiral Thursby will explain to you.

Meanwhile, the Australian submarine has got upthrough the Narrows and has torpedoed a gunboat ...Hunter-Weston despite his heavy losses will be advancingtomorrow which should divert pressure from you. Make apersonal appeal to your men ... to make a supreme effort tohold their ground.

PS. You have got through the difficult business, nowyou have only to dig, dig, dig until you are safe.

If nothing else, AE2s signal certainly provided morale-boosting information at a time when it was most needed.Many believe that it directly influenced the decision madeby Hamilton that night, resulting in the Allied forces remain-ing on the peninsula.

It would be a further eight months before a generalevacuation was ordered and during that time the story of

Anzac was carved into Australian history. Unfortunately forthe 32-strong crew of the AE2, it would be more than threeyears before they learned of the impact their incredible feathad on the Dardanelles campaign.

On April 30 the submarines luck ran out when shewas forced to the surface out of control while avoidinga Turkish gunboat. With his submarine badly damaged,Stoker ordered his crew to abandon ship before scuttlinghis crippled craft. The crew was taken prisoner and spentthe remainder of the war in Turkish prison camps wherefour perished.

The wreck of AE2 was located in October 1998 on thebottom of the Sea of Marmara where it remains to this day.Decisions on the future management of the wreck are stillbeing negotiated.


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The aerial campaignat Gallipoli is oftenoverlooked. Dr ChrisClarkreveals howaircraft had a role fromthe beginning of combaton April 25.

THE PRESENCE OF AIRCRAFT AT THE

Gallipoli landing receives little attention inmost accounts of that iconic event. To an extentthis is understandable, since the achievementsof the airmen had not been initially very con-

spicuous, despite their involvement from the earliest stagesof the campaign.

On the first day of the landings at Anzac Cove, theAustralians and New Zealanders fighting inland were recipi-ents of some remarkable and relatively novel support. As

plans and diagrams of landing arrangements plainly show,included in the naval force covering the operation were twospecial vessels: a balloon ship, Manica, and an aircraft car-rier (more a seaplane tender), Ark Royal.

Ark Royal, and the machines of No. 3 Wing of the RoyalNaval Air Service that she carried, had been with the Anglo-French fleet from February 1915 when attempts to reducethe Turkish forts at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale began.

Ark Royal and Manicas role was to control from the airthe supporting gunfire that was meant to be provided by the

battleships Triumph and Majestic. Ark Royal was regardedas something of a wonder ship since being taken over by

the Royal Navy and converted during 1914 into her new car-rier role from her previous identity as a tramp steamer.

In the event, this early attempt to use aerial observationto maximise the effectiveness of naval gunfire was not par-ticularly successful.

The seaplanes, which were lowered over the side of ArkRoyal, and took off as soon as light permitted, experiencedgreat difficulty in locating the concealed Turkish batter-ies that from 11am began lashing the troops of the 2ndAustralian Brigade with shrapnel.

The aircrews were not helped by the large, primitive andunreliable wireless transmitters carried in their machineswhich were the primary means of notifying corrections tothe gunnery controller on board Majestic.

It was from these first moments, however, that the reli-ability of the aircraft came to be seen as questionable andthe observers who flew in them as so inexperienced that, inspite of the great gallantry and resolution of the pilots, theywere almost useless for reconnaissance purposes.

An attempt to force the Narrows with a display of Allied

naval might had ended disastrously on March 18. In part,this outcome was held to be due to the failure of the air-men to detect a minefield which the Turks had laid 10 daysearlier and which sank three battleships two British, oneFrench. Just the day before, a seaplane had reported the areaas clear, and it was believed that aircraft could detect minesas deep as 5.5m.

DESPITE THIS UNPROMISING BEGINNING, WITHINweeks of the initial landings, the Allies air resources were

proving their worth sometimes to the direct benefit of theAnzacs.

On May 18, the pilot of an aircraft employed in directingan unsuccessful artillery shoot on to positions behind LonePine noticed that two valleys behind the Turkish front lineswere packed with enemy troops.

After he reported his sighting on landing, a secondmachine was dispatched to confirm the observation. Whenit returned with fresh sightings of additional enemy forces

being landed on the Asiatic coast of the peninsula aboveMaidos (modern Eceabat), and in encampments in neigh-

bouring hills, the alarm bells began ringing.Acting on advice from headquarters, the commanders

of the two divisions holding the Anzac position preparedto meet a night attack and stood-to their troops earlier thanusual the next morning. Thus they were ready and waitingto repel a massive Turkish counter-attack that was launchedin the pre-dawn hours next day. The enemys assaults wereeverywhere beaten off, with casualties estimated at 10,000

before noon. But for the timely warning delivered by theprevious days aircraft, the Turkish attack might well haveresulted as its commander intended in the Allies beingpushed into the sea.

Later in the campaign, the navy planes came to playan even more extensive role, especially after a second car-rier, the former Isle of Man packet steamer Ben-my-Chree,arrived in May with a further mix of machines belongingto No. 2 Wing, RNAS. The French also sent an air unit(Escadrille M.F. 98T), which, together with many Britishaircraft, operated from land bases on the islands of Tenedosand Imbros.

By August, Allied aircraft were launching torpedoattacks against ships resupplying the opposing Turkishforces on the peninsula and bombing as far away asConstantinople (modern Istanbul) and the Black Sea coastof Bulgaria. >>

The pilot noticed thattwo valleys behind theTurkish front lines werepacked with troops.

THEAIR

WAR

A seaplane takes off in Mudros Harbour after being launched from HMS Ark Royal, a converted merchant ship.Top, left: A British airship comes into land after a flight over Gallipoli.


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BritishShort seaplanes (various types)Sopwith seaplanes (various types)Wight Type A 1 seaplaneSopwith TabloidBE.2CHenri Farman F.27Nieuport 10 ScoutNieuport 12 Two-Seater

VoisinBreguetBristol ScoutCaudron G.3Morane-Sauliner Type L

FrenchNieuport float planeMaurice-Farman

GermanAlbatros B.IGotha WD-2 seaplaneFokker E-II

>> Aircraft dropping parachute bombs even attempted tosink the heavy wire anti-submarine net which the Turks hadstretched on buoys across the Straits at Nagara.

EARLY IN THE CAMPAIGN, THE TURKS POSSESSEDno answer to Allied air power, having only two militaryaircraft one worn out, the other new but unarmed inthe whole country. The sole usable machine (an unarmedAlbatros B.I. flown by a German pilot) was nonetheless sentto Canakkale in time to play a part in reporting the Alliednaval thrust at the Narrows on March 18.

By July, the Ottoman Air Force had grown to more than20 aircraft, with eight of these based at Canakkale. Accounts

by Australians at Anzac contain many mentions of the occa-sional and usually fleeting visitations over the trenches byenemy machines.

Despite repeated raids made by the French against themain Turkish air base outside Canakkale, enemy air activ-ity came to represent a considerable problem for the Allies,necessitating the taking of significant precautions to conceal

preparations for the August offensives.After the Turks received a delivery of another 24

machines in October, Allied air supremacy over theGallipoli peninsula was under serious challenge.

A new seaplane station was established near Canakkale,from which Gotha WD-2s launched night bombing raids onAllied airfields. And the situation became even worse once afighter unit of Fokker Eindeckers arrived in the last monthsof the campaign.

So, although Gallipoli is traditionally seen as primarily aground battle, the reality is that there was a significant aerialdimension to the campaign.

Even with the relatively low technical capability of theaircraft available on both sides, virtually every role expectedof contemporary air power was utilised during the fighting.The war in the air was a significant adjunct to the way thatthe campaign was played out often well away from therestrictive zone of the trenches on the peninsula itself.

Aircraft types at GallipoliAircraft types at Gallipoli

Right: Improvisations to a field gun to provide sufficientelevation for it to be used in an anti-aircraft role.

Inset: A Royal Naval Air Service Voisin LA on Imbros.

Commander Charles Samson, of the Royal NavAir Service, beside his single-seat Nieuport 10


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WHEN THE FIRST TROOPS CAMEashore at Anzac Cove, the AustralianFlying Corps had yet to field a fullair unit, although a month later thefamous Half Flight began operations

in Iraq, then known as Mesopotamia.Within two years, Australian airmen were achiev-

ing distinction as aces (pilots with five or more aerialvictories) while serving with the AFC or the British airservices the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal NavalAir Service.

Many of these men had gained their first tasteof combat while serving on the ground at Gallipoli.Perhaps more than a few were influenced in making

the transfer by what they witnessed of the air campaignassociated with the Allied campaign waged at theDardanelles. Here are the brief stories of several of thesenotable figures.

Captain Alexander (Jerry) PentlandMC DFC AFC (1894-1983)

Jerry Pentland, of Terrigal, NSW, joined the AIF inMarch 1915, and in August went ashore at Gallipoli asa machine gunner with the 12th Light Horse Regiment.At Quinns Post, perilously close to the Turks, his unitcovered the bloody attacks on Lone Pine.

Like thousands of others, Pentland became a casualtyof the unsanitary conditions at Gallipoli by contractingenteric fever in September. He left in a hospital shipfor England, and was discharged in February 1916. Onrecovery he joined the RFC, flying SPADs and SopwithDolphins with 16, 19, 29 and 87 Squadrons. He endedthe war with 23 aerial victories.

After the war Pentland spent two years in the new

AS A BOMBARDIER, RAY BROWNELL HAD TWO STINTSon Gallipoli, the second time from July 19. From his sec-tion of the Anzac dugouts in Victoria Gully, he witnessed

the antics of aircraft and recorded these in a diary.Eleven days after his return, he noted that a hostile

plane (dubbed a Taube) flew over and dropped bombsand darts close to his unit.

Only a short distance from us they succeeded in kill-ing a mule belonging to the Indian Mounted Battery witha direct hit from a dart.

According to Brownells description, these darts weremade of steel and were about 17.5cm long, grooved inspiral fashion with a heavy arrowhead. They were tossedover the side of the plane and always kept upright whenfalling. The Turkish darts were apparently better than theequivalent British devices. Although it was claimed

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Gallipoli Magazine