fying PoliceManagement ofMass Demonstrations · War era, American law enforcement was tested time and again on how to best manage mass protest demonstrations. Often the police suc-ceeded

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Police Managementof MassDemonstrations:Identifying Issues andSuccessful Approaches

Tony NarrJessica ToliverJerry Murphy

Malcolm McFarlandJoshua Ederheimer

CH I E F CONCERNS

Police Management ofMass Demonstrations:

Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches



This publication was supported by Motorola, Incorporated. The points of view expressedherein are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Motorola, Inc.,or individual Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, butauthors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other informationon the websites.

Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C. 20036

© Copyright 2006 by Police Executive Research Forum

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 1-878734-95-4

Cover and interior design by Dave Williams.

Cover photograph by Robert Kaufmann, courtesy of the United States Federal EmergencyManagement Agency. Photograph altered by Dave Williams.

Contents

1Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1The Meaning of Mass Demonstration . . . . . . . . 3The Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Key Mass Demonstration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2Planning and Preparation . . . .7Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7The Process of Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8ARTICLE: National Special Security Events . . . . . . 9

Tony Narr

Mutual Aid and Multi-AgencyCoordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16ARTICLE: Planning for the DNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Mary Jo Harris

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Training To Make Plans Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Incident Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Training as a Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Training with Partner Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Consistent Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Practitioner Perspectives onMass Demonstration Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

4Intelligence and InformationManagement . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Intelligence Gathering and Assessment . . . . . . 32Managing Information During an Event. . . . . 34Post-Event Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36After-Action Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36ARTICLE: After-Action Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

John GallagherConclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5Roles and Responsibilities . . .41Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Strategic Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Operational Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Tactical Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Practitioner Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Command Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Crime Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Specialized Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Policies and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Citizen Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48ARTICLE: Communication DuringMass Demonstration Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Malcolm McFarland

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

6Crowd Control andUse-of-Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53Crowd Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Mass Arrests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Use-of-Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Pre-Event Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Equipment and Tools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Protective Equipment Considerations . . . . . . . 58Less-Lethal Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

7Media Relations . . . . . . . . . . .63Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Media Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Public Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Joint Information Centers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Press Conferences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Post-Event Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68ARTICLE: Media Embedding in Miami . . . . . . . . 69

Tony Narr

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

8Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

Foreword..............................i

Acknowledgments .............iii

Appendix A: Links toDocuments on theWorld Wide Web ..............77

Appendix B: SeattlePolice DepartmentPlanning Checklist forSpecial Events ...................79

Appendix C: PresidentialInauguration TaskForce MOU.......................83

References .........................89

About the Authors............91

About the PoliceExecutive ResearchForum ...............................95

About the PERFCenter on Force andAccountability...................96

About Motorola................97

Foreword — i

Foreword

erhaps there is no greater challenge for po-lice officers in a democracy than that of manag-ing mass demonstrations. It is here, after all,where the competing goals of maintaining orderand protecting the freedoms of speech and as-sembly meet. Police in the United States have along history of handling mass demonstrations.During the 1960s and throughout the VietnamWar era, American law enforcement was testedtime and again on how to best manage massprotest demonstrations. Often the police suc-ceeded brilliantly in peacefully managing hun-dreds of thousands of demonstrators. At othertimes, the actions of the police became the unin-tended focus of protesters and the centerpiece ofmedia coverage of the event. Tough lessons werelearned during this period. In the relative calmthat followed for almost twenty years, police at-tention to preparedness for mass demonstrationevents assumed a lower priority than it had inprevious decades.

The 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization(WTO) protest changed all that, sending shockwaves felt by police agencies around the world. Byall accounts, the events that took place in Seattleand the reactions of the police became a vital les-son for police everywhere—learn from this expe-rience or risk repeating it. In fact, then-Chief ofPolice Norm Stamper came to a Police ExecutiveResearch Forum (PERF) meeting shortly after theWTO demonstration and shared the lessons that

grew out of Seattle. I recall Chuck Ramsey, Chiefof Police in Washington, D.C., and John Timo-ney, then-commissioner of the PhiladelphiaPolice Department (and who later became Chiefof Police in Miami), listening carefully to thoselessons. Both chiefs would later be tested bymajor mass demonstration events in their owncities.

Since the events in Seattle, we have enduredthe events of September 11, 2001. These, too,have had an impact on how police handle massdemonstrations. If our concern before focusedprimarily on out-of-control demonstrators oranarchists, today police executives must be mind-ful that large-scale events may represent an op-portunity for terrorists to carry out their ownagenda in a very public and dangerous way.

As such, the challenge of policing massdemonstrations highlights a number of issues fortoday’s police executive, including

n How to effectively manage police resourcesto deal with large numbers of people whomay be either expressing their fundamentalconstitutional right to protest or who sim-ply are gathering spontaneously after amajor sports victory;

n How to work with business/communitymembers who are not involved in thedemonstration/celebration but who havean expectation that the police will protect

P

ii — Foreword

them and their property from unlawful ordestructive behavior;

n How to effectively gather information for aplanned or spontaneous mass demonstration;

n How to integrate local, state and federal re-sources—and maintain accountability;

n How to identify the policy issues and whatprocedures and safeguards should be inplace for mass arrests;

n Determining what level of force should beused when demonstrators become unrulyand who gives the command to use it; and

n Clarifying the role of the agency’s chief exec-utive before, during and after an event. Whois in charge of managing the demonstration?

These questions and many more are thefocus of this publication. This report is not somuch a detailed, operational guide as it is anoverview of the major issues to consider whenplanning the police role in managing a massdemonstration. While most police chiefs will beaware of a great many of the issues raised, this re-port sheds light on a number of issues that are notas easily recognized for their potential to derailthe efforts of police. Our hope is to offer policeexecutives and operational commanders a snap-shot of lessons already learned and a roadmapthrough the steps they will take in preparation forfuture major mass demonstration events. This re-port is part of the PERF Critical Issues publica-tion series, and we are very grateful for Motorola,Inc.’s, support of this effort. We are especiallygrateful to the police chiefs and their staffs whocontributed their time and ideas to this project.

Executive DirectorPolice Executive Research Forum

Acknowledgments — iii

Acknowledgments

e thank the many people who haveworked so hard on this report. It has been a col-laborative effort, made possible by the collectiveexperience and insight offered by all those in-volved. We enjoyed working with police execu-tives, subject matter experts, and others commit-ted to improving police services throughout theUnited States and around the globe. It is our hopethat this book will aid police leaders and theirstaffs in making informed decisions when devel-oping and executing plans that govern the policeresponse to mass demonstration events.

Thanks are due to our partners at Motorolafor their support of the Critical Issues in PolicingSeries. Motorola has been a steadfast supporter ofPERF for many years. We are grateful to Mr. GregBrown, CEO and President of Government & En-terprise Mobility Solutions; James A. Sarallo, Se-nior Vice President, Government & EnterpriseMobility Solutions; Richard P. Neal, Vice Presi-dent, and General Manager; and Mark Moon,Vice President and General Manager.

We also thank the police professionals fromaround the United States, as well as Britain,Canada, Israel and Northern Ireland, who gath-ered in Chicago and provided critical guidanceand focus for this project. They were Major Gen-eral Shachar Ayalom, Israel National Police;Commander Linda Barrone, Pittsburgh Bureauof Police; Deputy Chief Michael Berkow, Los An-geles Police Department; Chief William Bratton,

Los Angeles Police Department; Alfred Broad-bent, Director of Security, Amtrak; Captain JohnBrooks, Broward County Sheriff 's Office; Cap-tain Steve Carter, Denver Police Department; Su-perintendent Philip Cline, Chicago Police De-partment; Commander David Commins,London Metropolitan Police Department; ChiefRichard Easley (retired), Kansas City (MO) Po-lice Department; Lieutenant Eladio Estrada, NewYork City Police Department; Chief Julian Fanti-no (retired), Toronto Police Service; the lateDeputy Commissioner James Fyfe, New YorkCity Police Department; Assistant United StatesAttorney John Gallagher, U.S. Attorney's Office,Eastern District of Pennsylvania; SuperintendentTerry Hillard (retired), Chicago Police Depart-ment; Assistant Chief James Pugel, Seattle PoliceDepartment; Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle PoliceDepartment; Chief William Lansdowne, SanDiego Police Department; Chief Edward Lohn,Cleveland Police Department; Assistant Chief BillMaheu, San Diego Police Department; ChiefRobert McNeilly, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police;Chief Constable Hugh Orde, Police Service ofNorthern Ireland; Chief Charles Ramsey, Metro-politan Police Department of the District of Co-lumbia; Major Cyril Ritter, Kansas City (MO) Po-lice Department; Staff Inspector Wes Ryan,Toronto Police Service; First Deputy DanielStarks, Chicago Police Department; AssistantChief Philip Turner, Louisville Metro Police

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iv — Acknowledgments

Department; Chief Robert White, LouisvilleMetro Police Department; and Chief GeraldWhitman, Denver Police Department.

Additionally, subject matter experts fromaround the United States, as well as from theUnited Kingdom and Canada assembled at PERFheadquarters in Washington, D.C., to provide ad-ditional insight into the topic of mass demon-strations. Among these were SuperintendentMalcolm McFarland, Police Service of NorthernIreland; Major Thomas Cannon, Miami PoliceDepartment; Captain Mike Stanford, Seattle Po-lice Department; Lieutenant John Incontro, LosAngeles Police Department; Inspector BarryClark, Calgary Police Service, Canada; CaptainVictor Brito, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Po-lice Department; Assistant U.S. Attorney JohnGallagher, U.S. Attorney's Office—Philadelphia;retired Deputy Superintendent Robert O'Toole,Boston Police Department; and Stewart Richard-son, CENTREX, United Kingdom.

Superintendent Malcolm McFarland, PoliceService of Northern Ireland, as a PERF Fellow,oversaw and guided the initial development ofthis publication. Superintendent McFarland pro-vided invaluable research and support while tak-ing a lead role in writing the content for thisbook. We are grateful to Chief Constable HughOrde from Northern Ireland for allowing Super-intendent McFarland to work on this project atthe PERF office in Washington, D.C.

In addition, the articles by the followingcontributing writers have helped provide valu-able perspectives and are essential elements ofthis book: Tony Narr, PERF Director of Manage-ment Education; Bryce Kolpack, Assistant Direc-tor of Management Services; Terry Chowanec,Senior Associate, Management Services; Cliff Di-amond, then Senior Associate, Management Ser-vices; and Captain Brett Patterson, then PERFFellow, of the West Palm Beach, FL, Police De-partment. Also playing a critical role were many

individuals who were interviewed or who re-viewed various sections of the book. Their con-tributions and insights are greatly appreciated.

An international forum in San Diego al-lowed PERF to highlight promising approachesfrom around the world. Many thanks to our con-ference speakers: Assistant Chief Constable IanArundale, West Mercia Police, United Kingdom;Deputy Chief Michael Berkow, Los Angeles Po-lice Department; Chief William Bratton, Los An-geles Police Department; Chief Michael Butler,Longmont (CO) Police Department; PresidentChris Fox, Association of Chief Police Officers,UK; Reverend Reginald G. Holmes, Pastor, NewCovenant Christian Church, Denver; Major SteveIjames, Springfield (MO) Police Department;Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Depart-ment; Chief Stanley Knee, Austin (TX) Police De-partment; Commander Cathy Lanier, Metropoli-tan Police Department, D.C.; Major GeneralMickey Levy, Former Commander, JerusalemPolice District, Israel; Superintendent MalcolmMcFarland, Police Service of Northern Ireland;Chief Robert McNeilly, Pittsburgh Bureau of Po-lice; Chief Bernard Melekian, Pasadena (CA) Po-lice Department; Chief Inspector Richard Prior,Metropolitan Police Department, United King-dom; Chief Thomas Streicher, Cincinnati PoliceDepartment; Deputy Superintendent AssanThompson, Jamaica Constabulary Force; ChiefJohn Timoney, Miami Police Department; ChiefGerry Whitman, Denver Police Department;David Wilkinson, United Kingdom Home Office,Police Scientific Development Branch; and Exec-utive Director David Wood, Police Ombudsman,Northern Ireland.

Special thanks to Commissioner KathleenO’Toole, Boston Police Department; Chief JohnTimoney, Miami Police Department; Chief Syl-vester Johnson, Philadelphia Police Department;Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department;and Chief Charles Ramsey, Metropolitan Police

Acknowledgments — v

Department of the District of Columbia for shar-ing their experiences and lessons learned in man-aging and handling mass demonstrations.

Of course, this book could not have beenproduced without the incredible efforts of ourtalented and dedicated PERF staff and supportpersonnel. Executive Director Chuck Wexler

guided this project from start to finish, providinginsights and resources. Thanks for editing andorganizational help to Jim Cronin, MarthaPlotkin, Kevin Greene, Leif Picoult and AnnaBerke. And thanks to Jennifer Brooks, AndreaHarris, Ken Hartwick, Ismaila Kane and RaquelRodriguez for excellent administrative support.

vi

PHOTO BY JEFF LEUNG

Introduction

1

Chapter 1. Introduction — 1

he 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO)protest in Seattle was a defining moment in howlocal law enforcement manages mass demonstra-tions. Even the most memorable demonstrations,including the 1968 Democratic National Con-vention (DNC) in Chicago and the anti-warprotest at Kent State University, were not organ-ized or carried out with the intent to cause injuryor large-scale destruction. However, in Seattle,clearly organized anti-globalization groups andanarchist protestors conducted a determinedprogram of property destruction and violenceagainst law enforcement officers. City residents,media and civil liberty groups heavily criticizedthe Seattle Police Department for its manage-ment of the demonstration, which included

nearly 500 arrests, implementation of curfews,and the use of pepper spray and tear gas on pro-testors and residents alike (CNN.com 1999).Seemingly, the actions of the protestors were notas highly criticized as the department’s responseto them.

More recently, the World Trade Center attackin New York has dramatically heightened policeawareness of the potential for terrorist activity, in-cluding at major demonstrations. Balancing theconcern for adequate security against the respon-sibility of police to ensure the rights of individualsto assemble and express their points of view is aformidable challenge for police executives.

This report examines recent mass demon-stration events that have taken place in the United

T

States, starting with the 1999 WTO demonstra-tion. It provides an overview of the experiences oflaw enforcement agencies that have weatheredmajor mass demonstration events, specifically ex-amining their planning, training, intelligence,communications and information-sharing, eventmanagement and media relations practices. Itshares the lessons learned and practices adoptedby law enforcement agencies to create betterprocesses to anticipate and plan for large-scaleevents—events that could potentially consumetheir every resource.

Since the Seattle WTO demonstration,other mass events have resulted in disorder thatrequired tactful management and necessitated alarge and coordinated police response. Examplesof such events include

n Mardi Gras disorder in Seattle in 2001, aswell as similar violence in Philadelphia,Austin and Fresno. In Seattle, the Mardi Grasactivity led to rioting, vandalism and as-saults. One media outlet headline describedit as “Chaos Consumed Pioneer Square on‘Fat Tuesday’ and One Man Was MortallyWounded Before Police Dispelled theCrowds” (Seattle Post-Intelligencer 2001).

n In Washington, D.C., in 2002 mass arresttactics during the International MonetaryFund (IMF) and World Bank demonstra-tions became the cause of criticism afternumerous people were arrested, includingnon-violent protestors and bystanders.1

n Rioting during an international meetingproposing a Free Trade Area of the Americ-as (FTAA) in Miami in 2003 led to arrestsand injuries to both demonstrators and

police in the Bayfront Park Amphitheater(CNN.com 2003).

In addition, spontaneous disorder incidentserupted after several sporting events in a numberof cities. Disorder events, often fueled by alcohol,followed Super Bowl and Major League Baseballvictories in Boston in 2004 and 2005, as well asafter wins and losses by college teams in VirginiaBeach, Virginia; La Crosse, Wisconsin; Chicago,Illinois; College Park, Maryland, and both Boul-der and Denver, Colorado, where celebrations es-calated into violence and attacks on property andpolice.

At the same time, there have been othermass events that were relatively calm. The June2004 G8 Summit of world government leaders inSea Island, Georgia, and the July 2004 Democra-tic National Convention (DNC) in Boston tookplace without serious criminal misconduct.Protests at the Republican National Convention(RNC) in New York in August 2004—while larg-er than those during the G8 Summit or theDNC—were more peaceful than expected. How-ever, a mass-arrest decision by police was criti-cized and led to one State Supreme Court Justiceordering the release of nearly 500 protestors andimposing a $1,000 fine against the city for everyprotestor held after a set deadline (New YorkTimes 2004).

World political gatherings and summitshave become targets for protesters in Americaand abroad. Serious disturbances have occurredin Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, France and Italy inrecent years. Within the United Kingdom, envi-ronmental protests have produced a plethora ofboth violent and non-violent protester tactics

2 — Chapter 1. Introduction

1. For more information see Council of the District of Columbia Draft Report, “Report on Investigation ofthe Metropolitan Police Department’s Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the District ofColumbia.” Available at: http://www.dcwatch.com/police/040311.htm.

that challenge law enforcement agencies. Otherextremely violent demonstrations and protests inNorthern Ireland have reached the lethal stage,with firearms and improvised explosive devicesbeing directed against law enforcement agenciestrying to restore and rebuild peace. Though thefocus of this examination is recent mass demon-stration events in the United States, eventsaround the world have contributed to the body ofknowledge from which American police agencieshave developed policies and practices.

Accordingly, this report will provide practi-tioner perspectives from those police depart-ments in the United States that have had exten-sive experiences managing and handling massdemonstration events: Boston, Miami, New York,Philadelphia, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. It ishoped that by sharing their experiences and les-sons learned, and by reviewing successful indus-try approaches, that law enforcement leaders willbe better equipped to protect the public whilealso protecting citizens’ rights.

THE MEANING OFMASS DEMONSTRATION

The dictionary defines a demonstration as a pub-lic display of feeling toward a person or cause. Thisdescription applies to a wide array of occasions onwhich large numbers of people come together fora common purpose (e.g., a political convention; alabor dispute; or even a major sporting or socialevent). Even when demonstrations are peaceful,managing the large numbers of people attendingcreates a unique law enforcement challenge.Protest, on the other hand, is defined as an organ-ized public demonstration objecting to a policy orcourse of action. Protests commonly occur whenpersons assemble to express opposition in re-sponse to local or world events, particularly polit-ical events or government actions. Sometimes,there is a perception that a protest is the antithesis

of a demonstration of support. This may be be-cause some groups, including extremist or anar-chist groups, have instigated violence at organ-ized protests in an attempt to gain publicity or tofurther their political aims. Such organizedprotests often create an inherent risk to publicsafety and civil liberties and pose particular chal-lenges to law enforcement agencies tasked withprotecting life and preserving the peace.

The protest definition therefore—with anegative connotation—is possibly the commonperception of the term demonstration, though thedefinition is much wider and does not assumebreaches of the peace. For the purposes of thisdocument, we will focus on those mass demon-stration events for which there is an expectation,through specific intelligence or other sources,that the normal rule of law will be significantlychallenged, or that violent action is likely.

THE PROJECT

Recognizing that police executives from Los An-geles to New York need to gain more perspectivesabout ways to better protect their communitiesand departments, the Police Executive ResearchForum (PERF) began a project to explore criticalissues facing today’s law enforcement agencies.This research was supported through a partner-ship with Motorola, Inc. In March 2004, a groupof police chiefs from selected areas were invitedto Chicago, Illinois, to discuss critical issues fac-ing law enforcement. Two issues were identifiedfor further study: the use-of-force, and managingmass demonstrations. A 2005 PERF publicationentitled Chief Concerns: Exploring the Challengesof Police Use of Force addressed use-of-force is-sues. This report addresses mass demonstrations.

This report is based, in part, on a PERF-convened consortium of police executives fromnumerous agencies who met at PERF headquar-ters in Washington, D.C., to help frame the most


salient issues regarding mass demonstrations andpolice response.2 Police practitioners includedrepresentatives from Britain, Boston, Miami, Cal-gary, Los Angeles, Northern Ireland and Seattle.Furthermore, PERF gathered more than 100 in-vited practitioners and stakeholders at an inter-national forum in San Diego in December 2004to highlight issues related to mass demonstra-tions and use-of-force. At this event, Los AngelesPolice Chief William J. Bratton set the scene for alively interaction as he discussed the changingnature of protests and mass demonstrationevents. He recalled that in the 1960s the issuesleading to demonstration events tended to bemore community-centered and that the policefocus was largely tactical. He noted that today,demonstrations are sometimes orchestrated byfar-reaching national and international organiza-tions, coalitions and informal groups subscribingto anarchistic methods. To be effective, the policeresponse must go beyond operational matters toinclude establishing community ties and sup-port, and maintaining open lines of communica-tion with the media and the public.

In compiling this report, PERF reviewedmass demonstration events that have occurredsince 1999 in the United States. High-profiledemonstrations in which the responding police de-partments produced after-action reports were par-ticularly useful. The project team carefully studiedthese reports to identify common themes and les-sons learned. This report highlights many of thecritical issues that departments should consider

when planning for and managing mass demon-strations. Moreover, it identifies the key issuesmanagers and planners should consider as theyprepare for mass events. While this report shouldnot be viewed as a comprehensive manual on massdemonstrations, it does provide valuable addition-al information and perspectives, thus serving as aroadmap to other detailed information.

KEY MASS DEMONSTRATION ISSUES

During a panel discussion on mass demonstra-tions at the December 2004 forum,3 ExecutiveDirector Chuck Wexler moderated a discussionin which participants shared myriad lessons andnew response tactics. In addition to the issuesidentified by meeting participants, PERF’s exam-ination of recent mass demonstration events hashighlighted several key elements noted below:

n Mass demonstrations remain a major chal-lenge to law enforcement agencies and willcontinue to raise significant concerns in thepost-9/11 world;

n The reality that large events cannot be han-dled by any single agency makes coopera-tion and effective communications themost essential aspects of mass demonstra-tion event management;

n Critical planning issues and processes mustbe addressed by all agencies prior to anevent;

4 — Chapter 1. Introduction

2. Particular thanks are due to Major Thomas Cannon, Miami Police Department; Inspector Barry Clark,Calgary Police Service Lieutenant; John Gallagher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Philadelphia;Lieutenant John Incontro, Los Angeles Police Department; Deputy Superintendent Robert O’Toole,Retired, Boston Police Department; Chief Inspector Stewart Richardson, Centrex, United Kingdom; andCaptain Mike Sanford, Seattle Police Department.

3. Mass demonstration panel members: Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department; CommanderCathy Lanier, Metropolitan Police Department, D.C.; Major General Mickey Levy, Former CommanderJerusalem Police District, Israel; and Superintendent Malcolm McFarland, Police Service of Northern Ireland.


n “What ifs,” worst-case scenarios and plansfor mid-course corrections must be includ-ed in the planning and training processes;

n There is a balance to be struck between, onthe one hand, First Amendment rights andother civil liberties, and on the other hand,the interventions required to protect publicsafety and property;

n Recognizing the serious potential risk to of-ficers’ safety, policies must be in place toguide officers on the degree of force thatmay be used in response to perceived risks;

n Operating procedures should address theissue of when it is appropriate or necessaryto utilize full body armor or to issue specialweapons, recognizing the possible negativeeffect their appearance can have on a crowd;

n The agency must make the best use of real-time and strategic intelligence, managing itboth internally and via the media; and

n The agency must determine how to best ed-ucate and reassure citizens about police pro-fessionalism and proportionate responses.

6

PHOTO BY ANDRES BALCAZAR

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 7

Planning and Preparation

“There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation,hard work, and learning from failure.”

C O L I N P O W E L L U . S . S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E , 2 0 0 1 – 2 0 0 4

2

VERVIEW

The key to effectively managing mass demonstra-tions and other major events is planning andpreparation. Certainly there is a vast differencebetween planning for a demonstration that willoccur months in the future and reacting to aspontaneous event. Agencies must continuallyassess their ability to handle demonstrations ofall manners and sizes. Contingency plans, trainedofficers and mutual aid agreements are essential

for an agency to respond quickly to unexpectedevents. For those events that are anticipated wellin advance, agencies have the opportunity to de-velop in-depth operational plans, but will stillrely upon standing plans as a foundation. Thefollowing pages contain some of the critical stepsdepartments need to take to increase their pre-paredness. The section begins with a discussionof the planning process, provides a detailed plan-ning checklist and concludes with a discussion of

O

8 — Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation

the importance of planning for multi-agency co-ordination and logistics support.

THE PROCESS OF PLANNING

Agencies with recent experience managing massdemonstrations strongly emphasize the need forearly and effective planning. A thorough planningprocess lays the foundation for informed andcompetent decision making. Those agencies rec-ognized for their successful management of ademonstration all credited careful planning fortheir success, but also emphasized that additionalplanning would have been helpful. Conversely,agencies that experienced difficulty managing ademonstration all agreed that better planningcould have avoided some major problems. TheSeattle Police Department has managed some ofthe most widely publicized mass demonstrationsin recent years. The following excerpt, from theirWorld Trade Organization Ministerial ConferenceAfter-Action Report, highlights their findings:

Although the WTO Planning Unit did a re-markable job with the time and resources avail-able, logging some 11,600 hours on planningwith a very small team, insufficient depth anddetailing of contingency plans represents a seri-ous flaw the responsibility for which must ulti-mately be borne by senior commanders. Thisafter action report recommends preparation ofdetailed contingency plans to support futureoperations. In addition, the establishment of apermanent Major Event Planning Unit in thenew Special Operations Bureau of SPD is in-tended to provide an ongoing source of institu-tional memory and organizational expertise forfuture undertakings of this kind (Seattle PoliceDepartment 2000).

A properly executed planning process helpsan agency to prepare its internal resources for avariety of contingencies, and to secure coopera-tion among partner agencies that will be sharingresources and knowledge during the event. Theplanning process is recognized as the key to

greater safety and security for both officers andthe public. The process should operate in an en-vironment where information becomes a keycommodity as planners and organizers seek waysto justify and marshal adequate resources.

For large-scale events, some agencies havecommitted up to one year or more to the plan-ning process, depending on the nature, complex-ity and size of the event. Planning for the 2005UK G8 summit in Scotland began more than ayear in advance, and preparation for the policingof the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver wasalready underway in 2005.

Good working relationships—at a multi-tude of levels—are essential to facilitating a pro-ficient process to acquire, analyze and interpretvital information that must be woven into theever-evolving planning process. The federal gov-ernment emphasizes such partnerships for spe-cially designated events (see box on NationalSpecial Security Events, on page 9). A lack of in-formation, or significant misinformation, cannegate the value of otherwise well-thought-outplans. Information and intelligence manage-ment—a topic addressed in greater detail later inthis document—must be ongoing and must co-incide with the earliest stages of the planningprocess, continuing even after the event hasended.

Planners must recognize that a certainamount of unpredictability will accompany anyevent. An effective planning process will expresslyrecognize the need for plans to be flexible in theface of rapidly changing circumstances. The plan-ning process should employ a discipline of contin-ually challenging assumptions—considering allthe “what ifs” and worst-case scenarios. Officialsand planners should be cautioned not to underes-timate the level of coordinated effort that someprotest groups are capable of putting forth. Evenafter contemplating extreme potential scenarios,some police officials have been left reporting that


National Special Security Eventsbox 2.1

by Tony Narr

In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presiden-tial Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62), which in partincluded a classified document dealing with thecoordination of federal counterterrorism assetsfor events of national interest that are deemedNational Special Security Events (NSSEs). Thedesignation of an NSSE allows the U.S. SecretService (USSS), the lead agency for designing andimplementing the operational security plan, to ac-cess ample resources and ensure public safety byforming partnerships with other federal, state andlocal law enforcement and other security and pub-lic safety agencies.

There are only a few events that the Depart-ment of Homeland Security (DHS) designates asNSSEs each year. Recent designated events in-clude the 2004 Democratic National and Repub-lication National Conventions and the G8 Sea Is-land Summit. These events were good examplesof effective coordination and cooperation amongfederal, state and local homeland security and lawenforcement resources. The DHS and its manycomponent agencies have provided tremendoussupport to local law enforcement charged withensuring the safety of the masses who gather forthese types of large events in their cities. Forevents that do not meet NSSE standards, DHS’sOperations Integration Staff (I-STAFF) estab-lished an Interagency Special Events WorkingGroup (SEWG) to develop federal consolidatedsecurity plans. This new system categorizes

events into Levels I, II, III and IV, correspondingwith the internal FBI Special Events ReadinessList (SERL). The factors that contribute to thelevel designation include federal participation, lo-cation of event, available threat assessment andstate and local resources available. At this writing,DHS is expected to publish a Special Event Stan-dard Operation Procedure in the near future.

Local law enforcement agencies must workwith their governors to request an NSSE designa-tion. A governor can ask that an event be consid-ered an NSSE by formal request to the Secretaryof DHS. The request is reviewed by the NSSEworking group, composed of representativesfrom the USSS, FBI and FEMA. These representa-tives gather facts and make a recommendationto the Secretary, who makes the final decision.A number of factors are considered when desig-nating an NSSE. First, the USSS determines howmany dignitaries are expected to attend the event.Any event that may be attended by governmentofficials or foreign dignitaries may create an inde-pendent federal interest in ensuring safety andincreasing resources. Second, the size of theevent may increase the need for additional securi-ty measures. Large events may draw the attentionof terrorists or other criminals, increasing theattractiveness of the forum as a target for employ-ing weapons of mass destruction. Third, thesignificance of the event may be historical, politi-cal and/or symbolic, which may also heightenconcern about terrorist acts or other criminalactivity.1

1. More information on National Special Security Events can be found at the U.S. Secret Service website:http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml, and at the DHS fact sheet website: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0207.xml.


demonstrations, even celebrations, resulted inunprecedented brazen violence for which theywere not prepared.

The 2001 Mardi Gras celebrations in Seattlecaused the police to evaluate their responsethrough a detailed and insightful post-event cri-tique. Most markedly, their Mardi Gras 2001After-Action Report identified a key distinctionbetween “Pre-planned” and “Emergency” plan-ning styles (Seattle Police Department, 2001). Atits basic level, the distinction noted in Seattle wasthat pre-planning permits the opportunity to testand validate responses to a variety of scenarios,whereas, in the emergency-planning scenario,testing and validation of tactics do not occur. Asits name implies, emergency planning is predom-inantly responsive to situations under ad hoccommand conditions. In Seattle, the police de-partment identified a need to develop a series ofstanding plans, which will henceforth provide a

blueprint for a rapid mobilization capabilitywhen policing spontaneous events. When there isno time to develop a plan, they provide a basiclevel of guidance and operational consistency. Ithas been said that a workable plan within theavailable timescale is preferable to a perfect plantoo late (Richardson 2002).

Those with experience in handling demon-strations agree that effective planning not onlyprepares the agency for the pre-event and eventphases, but also, and equally important, for thepost-event phase. The following outline serves asan overview of the particular considerations, is-sues and tasks that should be addressed in eachphase of a comprehensive planning process.Many of these issues will be expanded upon insubsequent chapters. It is useful to refer to thisoutline throughout the planning process to con-firm that all of these critical and necessary issuesand steps have been addressed.

n Hold formal meetings with event organizersas early as possible before the event;

n Identify potential protest groups. Attempt tomeet with them and advocacy groups such asthe American Civil Liberties Union and theNational Lawyer’s Guild. (Consider the bene-fits of inviting such representatives as part ofthe police planning team);

n Consider NSSE applicability;

n Identify partner law enforcement agencies(local, state, federal and others that may beapplicable) and meet to discuss mutual aid,the possible roles for each agency and Memo-randa of Understanding (MOU) issues. Con-sider cross-jurisdictional issues;

n Specify equipment and uniform MOU so thatcommanders are aware of the abilities of mu-tual aid agencies and how they will be de-ployed in the field;

n Hold formal meetings with all stakeholderswho can provide support; including

o Local leaders and elected officials

o Business/private sector individuals

o Public transportation personnel

o Public utility officials

o Medical facilities and the local Red Cross

o Venue managers (hotels, meeting halls, con-vention centers);

n Contact police agencies that have prior expe-rience with similar events and with the sameorganizers. Send observers to other similarevents. In return, plan for visiting police ob-servers to use your agency for the same learn-ing purpose for future events;

n Establish a media strategy for managingmedia representatives, maintaining commu-nity contact and disseminating information;

n Develop MOU with partner and/or assistingagencies; and

n Secure a commitment to provide uniformpre-event training for all support agencies andat all levels—command to supervisors andfront-line officers.


Pre-Event Planning (External)

n Determine command and control;

o Appoint operational and tactical com-manders

o Outline the circumstances in which com-mand and control transfer to another level

o Determine when the organization will relyon a team approach to decision making ver-sus sole responsibility for decisions

o Review the rules of engagement for a hostileresponse, i.e., rules of conduct, force op-tions, level of authorization required, levelsof force to be engaged, etc.

o Consider who will be authorized to deviatefrom the pre-determined rules of engage-ment and under what circumstances

o Review parameters for declaring an “unlaw-ful” assembly

n Plan for media contact;

o Establish procedures for information dissem-ination (routine, press releases, inquiries)

o Affix primary responsibility for informa-tion dissemination, and identify Public In-formation Officers for each agency in-volved. Determine who will speak onparticular issues

o Establish procedures for media credential-ing and preferential access

o Meet with the media (local and nationalwhen appropriate). Outline the overallmedia policy and how it will be managed

n Monitor the demonstration permit procedure;

o Meet with the agency responsible to deter-mine the details and status of event approval.

n Outline crime investigation protocols;

o Determine how the department will re-spond to the investigation of event-relatedcrimes

o Familiarize appropriate personnel withunique aspects of arrest of foreign nation-als, if likely

n Address intelligence issues;

o Establish an intelligence component or“task force” consisting of intelligence offi-cers from each participating agency

o Develop overall parameters and guidelinesfor event intelligence gathering, such as – Responsibility for gathering and processing in-

formation

– Impact, if applicable, of laws limiting intelli-gence collection/maintenance

– Acceptable information-gathering methodsand tactics

– Developing productive sources

– Reliability analysis

– Community-sentiment assessments

– Dissemination/sharing of intelligence

– Information retention

n Assess resources;

o Identify and arrange for special support(canine, mounted, bicycles, other specialvehicles, air or marine support)

o Plan for sufficient resources to be at theready for the “what ifs” and the worst-casescenarios

o Determine whether provisions of the appli-cable labor contracts or agreements will im-pact the availability/flexibility of the officersneeded to properly manage the event(scheduling, overtime and relief issues)


Pre-Event Planning (Internal)


o Ensure adequate specialized training of po-lice officers before the event

o Arrange for adequate administrative/support personnel for stepped-up opera-tional activities (communications, trans-portation, booking, records, detention)

o Identify and confer with other city/county/state agencies that can contribute to pre-eventplanning for logistical support; including – Fire department

– EMS/ambulances

– Public works

– Sanitation

– Coroner

– Prosecutor

– Courts

– Legal affairs

– Corrections

– Parks and recreation

– Finance/procurement

n Maintain service continuity;

o Develop protocols for responding to non-event related calls for service

o Establish call response alternatives (telephonereporting, delayed responses by appointment)

n Support police operations;

o Set up logistical support for officers (nutri-tion, water, replacement uniform articles,weapons and ammunition, other weaponryand force alternatives, mass arrest supplies,spare vehicles and fuel, property/evidencecontrol)

o Consider interoperability issues (individualcommunications—radios, cell phones)

o Identify available translators when needed

o Arrange for other equipment (barriers,fencing, containment alternatives)

o Arrange for heavy equipment and opera-tors, and vehicle removal/towing capability

n Establish evaluative responsibility, including

o A system to record decisions and informationflow in order to maximize effective eventmanagement, support the department’s abil-ity to review events for after-action reportingand respond to legal challenges

o Guidelines for the department’s photo/video journal of events

n Follow MOU for equipment standardizationamong supporting police agencies.


n Develop procedures for a post-event stand-down system to return to normal operationalstatus;

n Identify a method for post-event debriefing, toinclude the solicited input of event organizers;

n Undertake citizen/public surveys to rate theeffectiveness of police and overall handling ofthe event;

n Confirm the commitment from all necessaryparties to produce a written after-action re-port outlining lessons learned, next-eventplanning and additional training opportuni-ties; and

n Review standing plans in light of their effec-tiveness during the demonstration event.

Post-Event Planning


MUTUAL AID ANDMULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION

Mass demonstrations—because of their size, po-tential for violence, and the sheer demands theycan place on an agency—often require the hostagency to call upon neighboring law enforcementagencies for assistance. A significant challengefacing the lead department is the coordination,training and deployment of a multi-agency forcein a crowd management situation. For example,the Boston Police Department; the Federal Bu-reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo-sives (ATF); and other agencies involved in theplanning and handling of the 2004 DemocraticNational Convention recognized they could nothandle the event without collaboration. Under-standing that shared responsibility and unprece-dented cooperation would be essential to a suc-cessful police operation, the Boston PoliceDepartment sought and received the assistance ofscores of outside agencies to manage the event.(See article by Boston Police Department legaladvisor Mary Jo Harris, later in this section.)

As mentioned earlier, because large-scaleevents often take place in a variety of venues thatspan jurisdictional lines, multi-agency coopera-tion is a key factor. As such, one initial goal of theexternal planning process should be to developwritten agreements that outline the roles andrules for each of the agencies involved in the jointendeavor. The general content of Memoranda ofUnderstanding (MOU) between public safety or-ganizations can be thought out and structured inadvance, but experience has shown that there areoften unanticipated last-minute issues. In orderto mitigate such issues, several topic areas should

be addressed through stipulations prior to amulti-organization event agreement. They in-clude the following:

n Mission

n Direction—joint philosophical framework

n Supervision

n Assignment of personnel

n Authority (deputation)

n Joint organizational structure

n Equipment

n Funding, payment and financial processes

n Joint facilities agreements

n Internal and external communication plan

n Liability and legal services

n Documentation and tracking systemagreement

n Operational plans

n Use-of-force policy

n Duration

An example of a comprehensive MOU wascreated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police(RCMP) and the Calgary Police Service (CPS),and can be found in the 2002 G-8 Summit After-Action Report produced by the Calgary PoliceService (Perry and Kerr, 2002). Another exampleis an MOU defining relationships between theMetropolitan Police in Washington, D.C.(MPDC), and several federal and local agencies.


LOGISTICS

Basic logistics also are an essential part of massdemonstration management and must be inte-grated into the planning process. The lessonslearned from Hurricane Katrina highlight theneed for effective logistics planning. Experiencedlogistics experts stress the importance of planningfor a longer-than-anticipated event. Field unitswill need food and drink, access to lavatory facili-ties, replacement vehicles, fuel, replacement

ammunition, chemicals and munitions, andmore. The ability to manage such supplies—including storage, transportation and distributionin the field—is just as important as procuring thenecessary supplies for an event. Communicationis essential, and some experts recommend allocat-ing a radio channel exclusively for logistics. Thisallows supervisors and managers ready access tothose who can meet their needs, while reducingunnecessary traffic on operational frequencies.

Logistics Teamsbox 2.2

During the FTAA meetings in Florida, theMiami Police Department appointed a logisticsteam to coordinate ordering, acquisition anddelivery of approximately 3,000 meals for offi-cers per day. In addition, the team obtained25 pallets of water, 10 pallets of Gatorade® and10,000 PowerBars®. Six mobile logistic vansper shift were used to deliver food and water,with ten golf carts rented for the same purposein case traffic congestion prevented the use oflarger vehicles. For those who could leave theirposts, the team set up two de-escalation posts,where officers could go to “cool down, physical-ly from the heat and emotionally from the in-cessant taunting and provocation” (Timoney2004).


Planning for the Democratic National Conventionbox 2.3

by Mary Jo Harris

Municipalities are permitted to regulate the time,place and manner of speech in public fora, pro-vided those regulations are content neutral (i.e.,imposed without regard to the message of thespeaker), are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-cant governmental interest and leave open amplealternative means of communication. The key tomanaging mass demonstrations successfully—including protecting the plan from legal chal-lenge—is to be fully aware of the successes (andfailures) other agencies have experienced, and tointegrate those lessons learned into your agency’smass demonstration response.

The City of Boston hosted the Democratic Na-tional Convention (DNC) in July 2004. This was thefirst major political party convention held in theUnited States since the attacks of September 11,2001. The public safety challenges of protecting thedelegates, former presidents, members of Con-gress and the public at large were unprecedented.Numerous law enforcement agencies—state, fed-eral and local—were involved in developing thepublic safety plan for this event. However, the pri-mary agency responsible for anticipating and re-sponding to public protests and mass demonstra-tions was the Boston Police Department.

Boston’s officials reviewed the after-actionreports of the cities that had most recently host-ed the political conventions. They learned thatin Los Angeles, host of the 2000 DNC, the feder-al district court threw out the public safety planafter a number of protest groups challenged it on

free-speech grounds. This decision forced L.A.officials and federal agencies to dramatically re-vise the plans for the demonstration just weeksbefore the event was scheduled to begin.

Boston’s hope was to create a public demon-stration plan that would both withstand the in-evitable First Amendment challenges and providesufficient access and protection for protestorsand delegates alike. We did so. A preliminary in-junction brought by a coalition of protestors inthe days before the DNC began was rejected bythe United States District Court of the District ofMassachusetts. The First Circuit affirmed that de-cision. See Bl (A)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston,378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).

This success can be attributed to several keyactions taken by the Boston Police Department.First, Boston officials explored the relevant expe-riences of sister cities. By reviewing the events inL.A. (and in cities like Philadelphia, Chicago andSeattle), Boston knew that asking groups like theAmerican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Na-tional Lawyers Guild (NLG) to give feedback onthe pros and cons of the mass demonstrationplans would minimize the chances of surprise lit-igation on the eve of the convention. Therefore,Boston included these likely challengers in theplanning process. A full year before the event wasscheduled to begin, the ACLU and NLG were in-vited to review and offer suggestions about pro-posed planning. The city’s final demarcation ofa “demonstration zone” was then based, in largepart, on the critiques of the ACLU and NLG. Thismade it possible for Boston to argue, without


rebuttal, that there were no possible alternativesites for the demonstration zone to be located.Although the district court found that the ACLUand NLG brought their suits within a reasonableperiod of time (a mere five days before the eventbegan), the First Circuit Court of Appeals seemedto weigh the timing factor against the plaintiffs(especially in light of the ample advance noticegiven by the city).

Traditionally, police departments have beenunwilling to engage with advocacy groups such asthe ACLU in the creation of public safety plan-ning. I suggest that this reluctance is misplaced.In the best scenarios, advocacy groups can bringfresh perspective to policing decision making.Even when they do not, an agency that can showit invited advocacy groups to weigh-in on the de-cision making is more likely to successfully prove

that its regulations are narrowly tailored to thechallenge it faces, and, thus, may be viewed morefavorably by the court. In either case, the agencyis taking proactive steps to successfully protect it-self and its decision makers from legal challenge.

Since 1998, Mary Jo Harris has been the Legal Advi-sor to the Boston Police Department, where she ad-vises the Police Commissioner and Command Staffin all aspects of legal issues affecting policing. Shewas co-chair of the Legal Subcommittee for theDNC Planning Group. The subcommittee includedcounsel for the FBI, Department of Homeland Secu-rity, Secret Service, Democratic National Conven-tion Committee, as well as a host of state and locallaw enforcement agencies. She was lead counsel forthe City of Boston in Bl (A)ck Tea Society v. City ofBoston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.2004).


CONCLUSION

Of all the issues identified by those with experi-ence managing mass demonstrations, planningand preparation were cited as the most important.Every practitioner emphasized the need forplans—standing, operational, tactical and contin-gency—and a flexible planning process. Practi-tioners agree that time and effort at the planningstage results in better police service and protectionof the public, as well as reduced time spent on

post-event damage control. When agencies haveadvance knowledge of demonstrations, theyshould begin planning as early as possible. But notall demonstrations are announced in advance.Many occur spontaneously or with little notice.For that reason, it is essential that agencies developplans, make preparations and train officers on anongoing basis so they can respond as effectively aspossible to changing conditions.

20

PHOTO BY SEAN GRAHAM

Chapter 3. Training — 21

Training

3

VERVIEW

Training is an ongoing process in every law en-forcement agency throughout the nation. Fromentry-level academy training, through in-serviceand career development training, police officerstrain throughout their entire careers. Multi-agency training for large-scale demonstrations,however, is a fairly new, yet critical component ofsuccessful demonstration management. Com-manders, supervisors and officers alike must beproficient at carrying out their role in the varioustactical and contingency plans that may be putinto operation during a mass demonstrationevent. Moreover, when a multi-agency operationis initiated, everyone involved must be able toperform in concert and up to expectations.

Training together is what makes this happen.Mass demonstration training should approxi-mate the conditions associated with the event. Ef-fective police training should be linked to thehost agencies’ core values and should always rein-force ethical policing practices, particularly thecommitment to respect and uphold civil liberties.

This chapter discusses the importance oftraining in preparing an agency to manage a massdemonstration, including the importance of de-veloping training programs that are consistentwith plans. The chapter addresses issues such asincident management systems, training in teams,training with partner agencies and using consis-tent terminology. The chapter concludes with ex-amples of how agencies have used training to en-hance preparedness.

O

22 — Chapter 3. Training

TRAINING TO MAKE PLANS WORK

The most carefully crafted plans to address awide range of contingencies, “what ifs” andworst-case scenarios are effective only if the po-lice are proficient at carrying them out as intend-ed. From the top command to the officers on theground, everyone should be trained to a commonstandard. This does not mean that commandersand officers should receive the same training(they should not since their roles will be quitedifferent), but their training should reflect thesame mission, strategy and terminology. Eventcommanders must be in agreement on their mis-sion and the overall approach behind the plansthey are charged to carry out.

Pre-event training can be in the form ofclassroom lectures, classroom-based simulationsor practical exercises in the field. Classroom lec-tures are ideal for bringing personnel up to dateon issues that can be expected to surface duringan event. Demonstration management train-ing—for personnel at all levels—should includethe following:

n A review and reinforcement of applicablefederal laws, state statutes and departmentpolicies;

n A review of civil liberties issues inherent inmass demonstration events;

n A uniform understanding of rules of en-gagement, use-of-force policies and massarrest procedures;

n Clear instruction on the need for self-control,teamwork and adherence to commands;

n Stated expectations for highly disciplinedbehavior, self-control and restraint;

n A strong statement that any officer’s failureto comply could result not only in failed po-lice tactics, but also employee discipline;and

n Instruction on de-escalation techniques.

As vital as classroom training is, onlythrough practical training, tabletop exercises andother simulation efforts does the agency create anopportunity to actually test its contingency plans.Tabletop Incident Management System (IMS)training exercises are an excellent and inexpensivetraining tool for mass demonstration prepared-ness. The scenarios can be designed to includepersonnel from communications, jails, fire/EMSand emergency management departments, publicworks, and other government agencies. All arelikely to be involved in a real event and shouldparticipate in the pre-event practice.

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

All levels of the organization should have a work-ing knowledge of Incident Command Systems(ICS) or Incident Management Systems (IMS)that will be used during the demonstration. Theterms are utilized somewhat interchangeably;however, IMS is the emerging national model andis tied to federal funding for events. IMS are uti-lized to plan, track and manage resources at a crit-ical event. The techniques are easily taught andapplicable to everyday police responses. IMStraining instructions are available on the Internetthrough the Department of Homeland Security,Federal Emergency Management Agency.1 IMSclassroom training should be supplemented bytabletop exercises to ensure understanding and

1. For more information on IMS training go to: http://www.fema.gov/nims/nims_training.shtm.

proficiency and to build officer and commanderconfidence.

TRAINING AS A TEAM

Unlike typical training programs in which offi-cers are randomly scheduled so as not to depleteunit strength, demonstration management train-ing should be conducted in a group setting,preferably with officers assembled in thesquads/teams in which they would likely be de-ployed. This “team-practice” approach facilitatesproficiency in tactical skills, establishes individ-ual and team expectations, helps promote use-of-force awareness and promotes teamwork overpotentially counter-productive individual ac-tions. This is especially important, as most policeofficers are accustomed to working alone or inpairs, not in squads and larger platoons.

Team leaders/supervisors and commandersmust be knowledgeable about the skills and re-sources that are available to them, and about thelimitations of both. They should train and drill information with their squads to ensure familiaritywith overall team tactics, such as commands andhand signals, tactical rescue and arrest techniques.Field scenarios should be developed to demon-strate readiness and proficiency. Teams should beexposed to situations that require them to practicesquad formations, mobile response techniques,mass movement exercises, protestor extractionmethods and other field exercises.2 Training spe-cific to team leaders and commanders should in-clude all of the following points, with added dis-cussion and training emphasizing the supervisoryrole and its responsibilities.

n Taking control of the situation;

n Evaluating the situation and available intel-ligence to choose appropriate options;

n Making decisions based upon the currentsituation, intelligence, the overall strategy,department policies and legal constraints;

n Implementing the decisions through a for-mal plan;

n Maintaining an audit trail of those deci-sions for the after-action report; and

n Understanding the legitimate objectives ofthe media.

Law enforcement agencies should builddemonstration management training into theirregular training schedule. Then, when the de-partment learns of an upcoming event, the focuscan turn to refresher and “dry-run” trainingrather than to starting from scratch.

TRAINING WITH PARTNER AGENCIES

Consideration also should be given to conduct-ing joint exercises with neighboring and overlap-ping police jurisdictions to familiarize each otherwith common protocols and ensure consistentmethodologies. Preparations for recent massdemonstrations show this training is invaluablein preparing officers for the event. It provides anearly opportunity for familiarity with a “singlerulebook” as to use-of-force and making arrests.Moreover, well in advance of civil unrest, it allowsvarious processes to be worked out, including thedetails of command and control authority, thepassing of command and control in multiple ju-risdiction environments, and the authority andprocessing of arrests in other jurisdictions.


2. The Office of Domestic Preparedness Basic Course Manual for Managing Civil Actions in ThreatIncidents offers a full lesson plan.


CONSISTENT TERMINOLOGY

There is considerable disparity in terminologyacross the many operational plans developed bypolice agencies, thus increasing the potential formisunderstanding when a multi-agency responseis required. In such circumstances, the hostagency must ensure that all supporting agenciesknow and understand in advance the terminolo-gy to be used. For example, there are several in-terpretations of the use-of-force continuum inagency policies nationwide. Each interpretationholds significant implications for the applicationof force. If a support agency and host agency donot have a common understanding, communica-tion breakdowns are possible, with potentiallycatastrophic results.

Standardizing oral commands and termi-nology throughout pre-event training ensures di-rectives will be understood by all respondingagencies. In addition, it is recommended that oralcommands be given in two parts: a preparatorycommand, which directs what is to be carried outand mentally prepares line officers for executionof the order, and a command of execution, whichis given when it is time to carry out the directive.Hand signals can be used in conjunction withverbal commands to overcome crowd or othernoise issues.

PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES ONMASS DEMONSTRATION TRAINING

In order to provide additional perspectives forpolice leaders, PERF examined mass demonstra-tion training experiences from several cities:

Miami

The Miami Police Department reported that itstraining initiatives for the 2003 Free Trade Areaof America (FTAA) meetings commenced nearlya year before the event. In addition to a 40-hourManaging Civil Actions in Threat Incidentscourse3 that the Miami police department pro-vided to its commanders, tabletop exercises wereheld regularly to test various plans. These exercis-es pointed out areas of concern and, in some in-stances, led to plan modifications. Furthermore,two weeks before the event, the departmentbrought together 167 representatives from all ofthe agencies that would be participating in themanagement of the actual event for a compre-hensive tabletop exercise. Led by trainers fromthe Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) andthe Miami police designated FTAA training com-mander, this exercise tested the multi-agency ca-pability to address threat incidents. Once again,plan modifications resulted. Miami’s trainingregimen did not focus only on plan testing at thecommand level. Legal training and instructionon “Rules of Engagement” were formally present-ed to all Miami officers and participating agen-cies to provide a uniform understanding of legaland illegal protestor conduct and to ensure con-sistency among officers in abiding by strict, self-imposed use-of-force guidelines. Training wasdelivered to the department’s lieutenants, ser-geants and officers as well as to those from sur-rounding agencies that would collectively formpatrol response platoons during the demonstra-tion. A preliminary ten-hour lesson plan, withprimary emphasis on team tactics, was followedby ten more hours of drill and practice with their

3. For more information go to: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/CDP072005.pdf.


commanders to further bolster team and man-agement confidence. The lesson plan was derivedfrom the ODP 40-hour course previously men-tioned, and included the following:

n Discipline;

n Group action;

n Demonstrator tactics;

n Protection of First Amendment rights;

n Rapid deployment;

n Line formations;

n Verbal and hand commands;

n Squad movements;

n Equipment familiarity;

n Arrest techniques; and

n Use of baton.

Specialized training, drilling and practicewere mandated for groups of officers with specialresponsibilities and their commanders to furtherbuild endurance and stress the importance ofteam tactics. Bicycle, extraction, SWAT, aviationand marine teams were all provided with trainingunique to the functions they would undertakeduring the event. A required training program on“safe positioning,” and what they might expect toencounter, was prepared for representatives ofthe media who would be embedded with policeunits. Once all of the command, specialized andgeneric training had been delivered, the depart-ment orchestrated a massive, nighttime practicaltraining exercise in three venues around the city.Several scenarios were posed to various responseteams. Each commander and team was requiredto rely on the previously delivered training andpractice to meet their challenges under realisticconditions. This was the ultimate pre-event test

of both the planning and the training processes.After-action lessons learned by the departmentincluded the following:

n Resist donning riot gear unless officer safetyis in jeopardy. Media images of officers in fullgear can appear intimidating. All agenciesparticipating in a demonstration eventshould be required to agree to this condition.

n Multiple agencies can operate as one team,one entity, especially in the application offorce.

In 1980, Miami was the site of civil unrestthat resulted in eighteen deaths, several hundredinjuries and millions of dollars in destroyedproperty. From that experience, the police de-partment developed what is now known as the“Mobile Field Force Concept,” which provides arapid and organized response to crowd controland civil disturbances in urban settings. The con-cept emphasizes team movement rather than in-dividual actions. Actions taken by a field force areunder the direct command, control and respon-sibility of the field force leader. A field force canbe deployed to restore order, move crowds, rescuevictims and isolate problem areas. Recognizingthat this runs counter to the typical police cul-ture, where officer individuality and discretionare the accepted norm, thorough training andpractice are essential to the success of a field forcedeployment. The mobile field force has been suc-cessfully adopted by many agencies worldwide.

Seattle

The Seattle Police Department, in its early prepa-ration for the 1999 World Trade Organization(WTO) Ministerial Conference, established sev-eral subcommittees with specific responsibilityfor event activities. Each subcommittee was


charged with the responsibility for identifyingtraining needs. The Demonstration Managementsubcommittee assumed responsibility for train-ing needs related to crowd control the policeuse-of-force. The training agenda ultimatelyadopted included the following:

n Crowd management techniques—initialtraining, weekly squad-level practice andperiodic platoon-level and multi-platoonformation practice;

n Basic commands, formations and tactics.Scheduled twice a week for one month.Officers and supervisors participated;

n Chemical agent protective mask and person-al protective gear training for 900 officers;

n Crisis-incident decision making for super-visors and commanders;

n Weapons of mass destruction training and in-cident command training for SWAT officers;

n Dignitary protection, escort training, andarea orientation training for motorcycleofficers from Seattle and neighboringjurisdictions; and

n Two intensive tabletop exercises for Inter-jurisdictional Public Safety Committee rep-resentatives, held by the Secret Service andthe FBI.

In total, the Seattle Police Department de-livered almost 20,000 personnel-hours of massdemonstration-related training, using in-houseand guest instructors. Despite this significanttraining effort, training lessons and issues wereprominent in the after-action training recom-mendations. They included the following:

n Coordinated, multi-agency traffic manage-ment training proved valuable and shouldbe continued;

n Demonstration management training wasvital to officers “holding the line, exercisinggreat restraint, and using only the mini-mum force necessary to accomplish objec-tives.” It was recommended this training beinstituted as an annual refresher for all Op-erations Bureau officers;

n Chemical agent response team trainingproved to be effective in controlled deliveryof irritants, thereby lessening injuries. Itwas recommended this training be expand-ed to operational personnel;

n With too few exceptions, outside agencieswere not included in demonstration man-agement training. It was recommended thatjoint annual training be conducted to pro-vide a standardized regional approach todemonstration management; and

n Demonstration management training wascommendable and of high caliber, but alsodisjointed, hurried and short. It was recom-mended that departmental and regionaltraining goals be enhanced—by means of atraining subcommittee led by a high-rankingofficial—and that training of sufficientlength and depth, with periodic refreshers,include a progressive approach to buildingskill and competency over time.

Some two years after the WTO conference,the Seattle Police Department was again challengedwith a mass demonstration event. This time it wasa Mardi Gras celebration that escalated beyond ex-pectations. Previous years’ celebrations had result-ed in little more than a few disorderly conductarrests and some small-scale property damage. But,in 2001 crowds became unruly, turning to violentbehavior and destruction of property. In the end,there was one death as well as many injuries. Thisoccurrence provided an opportunity for learning


that can benefit other law enforcement agencies.The police department’s after-action report offersthe following three training recommendations:

n Exercise standing contingency plans andorders—including a worst-case scenario—for all unusual occurrences;

n Continue squad-based crowd control train-ing and expand to include large unit forma-tions and special tactics for crowd entry andvictim evaluation; and

n Establish a specialized Anti-Violence Teamto perform high-risk insertion and extrac-tion operations and to serve as an experttraining resource in these tactics.

Boston

The Boston Police Department began planningand training some eighteen months before theDemocratic National Convention. The depart-ment readily recognized that the DNC was ofsuch a large scale that, even with a year and a halfof advanced planning and training, it could nothandle the event alone while continuing to policethe city. Based on the anticipated size of the event,it was determined that between six and eight pub-lic order platoons of 100–150 officers should be atthe ready. Recognizing that calls for service andeveryday police activity would continue to con-sume the bulk of the patrol force, the departmentsought creative ways to assemble the necessaryplatoons. Internally, two smaller public order pla-toons were assembled from non-patrol units. Thebulk of the department’s convention-dedicatedfield strength consisted of those public order pla-toons along with two motorcycle platoons, theSWAT team, a bicycle unit, and a mobile fieldforce comprised largely of academy recruits.

Outside assistance would be called upon toaddress the remaining need. A number of lawenforcement agencies were responsible for key

aspects of the event. The Secret Service was re-sponsible for the interior of the Fleet Centerwhere the DNC convention was actually held.The U.S. Capitol Police assisted with dignitaryprotection. The Massachusetts Bay Transit Au-thority Police provided security at key locationsand throughout the transit system. Others pro-tected innumerable venues around the city. TheMassachusetts State Police agreed to provide twopublic order platoons and one mobile field force.The final two public order platoons came in theform of two regional response teams already or-ganized in the Boston area: the Metro Law En-forcement Council (Metro-LEC), and the North-eastern Metropolitan Law Enforcement Council(NEMLEC). Years earlier, police chiefs who rec-ognized that their departments individuallycould not effectively deploy response teams forany significant event formed these consortia,comprised of representatives from Boston-areapolice departments and including 40 memberdepartments. The regional response teams pro-vided stand-by SWAT and mobile responseteams, as well as canine and crisis negotiationteam services. Each consortium provided twopublic order platoons (a combined 240 officers)to the overall effort. With this contribution, thedesired eight public order platoons had beenreached.

A year before the convention, Boston Policemet with the leaders of NEMLEC and Metro-LEC, inviting them to play a vital role in the de-partment’s contingency plan. The Boston PoliceDepartment included the State Police, NEMLEC,and Metro-LEC in their operational plans, butthey did not hold regular joint training. Eachgroup was large enough to serve as a self-suffi-cient, independent public order platoon. Bostonofficials found them to be already well-trainedand well-disciplined teams. Each had significantexperience responding to events in the region,and NEMLEC had been called to Washington,


D.C., on three occasions to assist with massdemonstrations and presidential inauguralevents. Boston police commanders and somesupport staff were assigned liaison roles to ensuremaximum coordination between the departmentand the consortia. During the actual event, NEM-LEC and Metro-LEC liaisons would be posi-tioned in the Boston Tactical Operation Center tofurther ensure coordination. Boston officials at-tended all demonstration-related training thattook place. The training requirement for consor-tium membership already called for an eight-hour commitment each month. Since their mis-sion was to be available for major incidentresponse, their ongoing training agenda was inline with their potential DNC responsibilities.Once the groups were alerted to their upcomingrole in the DNC, their training curriculum wasenhanced to include topics like Boston’s Rules ofEngagement as well as working with mountedpolice and fire department tactical units. Threemonths before the event, training was increasedto 16 hours per month.

Training for Boston’s own officers took twopaths. Training for the two Boston police publicorder platoons started a year before the eventwith a five-day block of instruction on mission,strategy and expectations. Over the followingmonths, training increased from one day amonth to two days a month, with increased em-phasis on formation deployment, crowd control,team tactics and “blackboard sessions.” Everyother month, platoon-level practical exerciseswere staged to bring realism to the training. At thesame time, the department recognized the poten-tial for patrol officers—who had not been previ-ously trained or considered for platoon deploy-ment—to be called upon in the event of a“worst-case scenario.” Therefore, some 800 patrolofficers were exposed to introductory massdemonstration training.

In the end, this event went well, with only afew arrests and no significant problems. Publicorder platoon deployment was rare, and much ofthe training did not come into play. However,there is no doubt that this scenario is preferable tobeing under-trained when the worst-case scenarioactually develops. The following recommenda-tions surfaced after the DNC:

n Look at available resources realistically. Donot underestimate the number of officersneeded for non-demonstration activities(e.g., to continue the operation of routinepolice services);

n Establish a clear understanding about thenumber of officers actually on restrictedduty; and

n Throughout the deployment plan, look forgaps that will consume officers.

CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of any plan depends on the abil-ity of field commanders and officers to execute itproperly. That ability demands that officers knowwhat to do under a variety of circumstances. Inaddition to that knowledge, they also need to beproficient in their respective roles. Officers needto hone their individual skills, but equally impor-tant is their performance as members of ateam—officers and supervisors together. Offi-cers, supervisors and commanders all need toknow what to expect from each other and to beconfident in their performance as a cohesive unit.The same requirements apply to multi-agencyplans. The key to these performance expectationsis training and practice.


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PHOTO BY MUGUR GEANA

Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management — 31

Intelligence andInformation Management

4

VERVIEW

Information processing is another component ofeffective planning. Mass demonstration manage-ment demands careful attention to managing in-formation before, during and after the event.Gathering and thoroughly analyzing informationor intelligence about the activities of demonstra-tors can dramatically strengthen a police depart-ment’s demonstration management plan. Howev-er, for a variety of reasons, accomplishing this isnot always easy. Reasons include limited experi-ence gathering intelligence, secretive preparationsby demonstrators, or a lack of incorporation ofgathered information into the planning process.Nonetheless, most agencies are already adept atgathering useful intelligence and information.

Among the easiest pieces of information tocollect are routine data; declassified information;and accounts from dispatch, operational com-manders, various governmental departments,other law enforcement agencies and the public.Despite the ease of gathering such information, itcan be critical to directing the event and to com-municating with the media. The term “intelli-gence” conjures up visions of undercover opera-tives and covert information gathering.Sometimes this is accurate, but intelligence alsomeans countless hours poring over websites, un-derground newspapers and any other potentialsources of information. This chapter addressesthe need for and process of gathering and assess-ing intelligence and information before, during

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32 — Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management

and after an event. The section stresses that veri-fication, assessment and timely introduction tothe planning process—not the ease or difficultyof gathering—are what make such intelligenceand information valuable.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ANDASSESSMENT

The process of intelligence gathering is a con-tentious one. To gain a strategic perspective of anupcoming event, credible sources with links tothe information sought should be identified andtasked to provide information. On rare occa-sions, usually during the height of an event, rawinformation may be so compelling that it must beconsidered for deployment and other tactical de-cisions. However, it remains vitally important toanalyze all information in the context of theevent, the organizers and the environment as wellas political, economic and social issues to permitplanning personnel to develop the most appro-priate response or modification to existing plans.

The importance of committing to a com-plete and thorough intelligence process cannotbe overstated. A process to produce meaningfuland useful intelligence requires holding regularmeetings at which information is shared andcompared in hopes of cross-confirmation of de-tails and sources. This helps analysts to distin-guish rumor from corroborated accounts, and toseparate criminal intent from legal acts ofprotest. Recognizing these differences is crucialwhen translating intelligence for consideration.However, some intelligence is difficult to put intoperspective. The Seattle Police Department re-ported after the WTO Conference,

“In August and September, the frequency andvirulence of rumors and reports of planned andspontaneous disruptive acts increased, princi-pally via the Internet and other media. Most ofthese reports were alarming and many were

preposterous. Events like the WTO invariablyattract doomsayers and extremist rhetoric. Thechallenge is to separate disinformation and fal-lacious reports from potentially authentic data.In hindsight, it is clear that fragments of infor-mation gathered during this period were accu-rate and predictive.”

Intelligence gathering can be overt andcombined with other pre-event planning initia-tives. For example, it is recommended that, asearly as practical in the police planning processfor a mass demonstration event, protest leadersbe contacted (via letter, email, telephone or in-person) to solicit their support in ensuring a safe,violence-free protest. Though some groups maynot respond, many others, whose groups have le-gitimate objectives, will be interested in cooper-ating and appreciative of the offer to help facili-tate a lawful, peaceful protest. This outreacheffort not only creates the possibility of a positiveand cooperative relationship, but also serves toinform protest leaders of police expectations andobjectives. Furthermore, it can provide police of-ficials with new information useful to developingan appropriate response. Police efforts to workwith protestors toward a violence-free event, andall information obtained as a result, should bedocumented for future reference.

Of all the methods utilized to obtain infor-mation, the use of covert means, either the de-ployment of undercover officers or the use oftechnological (audio or video) equipment, willbe most likely to attract scrutiny and criticism.The overwhelming concern is that police are col-lecting, maintaining and sharing with other lawenforcement groups intelligence files on personsconducting lawful and peaceful protest activitiesprotected by the First Amendment. For example,the ACLU report on the 2002 WTO protest inWashington, D.C., criticized the use of undercov-er police intelligence sources and pre-emptiveoperations against protest groups based on such

intelligence.1 The ACLU cited a number of con-cerns: specifically, that police should limit intelli-gence operations to a legitimate law enforcementpurpose. There should be a reasonable suspicionthat the targeted group is planning or about toengage in criminal activity, not just civil disobe-dience, based on explicit intelligence and notsimply on the content of their political speech orideology. There is a recognized need for clearpolicies outlining operational limitations to in-telligence collection, adequate training for intelli-gence officers and an oversight mechanism to re-view ongoing activity for continued justification.

Some jurisdictions are governed by very re-strictive legislation or ordinances designed toprotect privacy. In these instances, law enforce-ment agencies may be impeded in their efforts togathering helpful intelligence. In jurisdictionswhere such intelligence gathering is legally re-stricted, police departments, being aware of theapplicable limitations, must consider these rami-fications early in the planning process. Otherstates have transparency laws that consider mostpolice policies and manuals as public records.However, in Florida, for example, where this isthe case, there also are exemptions for certain tac-tical and operational policies and for intelligenceof an open investigative nature.2 Agencies facedwith these issues report that it sometimes delays,but rarely thwarts legitimate intelligence collec-tion. Whether collected during an early stage ofthe planning process or after the event has com-menced, new intelligence is often responsible forboth small and large adjustments to the execu-tion of the plan. Therefore, considerations relat-ing to intelligence should include the following:

n Systems to communicate intelligence in atimely manner;

n Assessment to separate truth and accuracyfrom rumors, rhetoric, exaggerations andhalf-truths; and

n Systems to record and retain the assessmentsarising out of the intelligence function.

There is a continuum of intelligence gather-ing, from nonintrusive public sources of informa-tion to more-intrusive and less-clear areas of policeauthority. Some proven sources of information,and their limitations, include the following:

n Internet searches: many advocacy organiza-tions either have their own websites or sharea talk site with affinity groups. There areseveral problems with information gleanedfrom websites. Protest groups in their zealto generate interest may overstate expecta-tions. More sophisticated protestors mayeven post disinformation. While the Inter-net can suffer from reliability issues, it also isa valuable resource to groups needing to getout their message—and tactics—to theirfollowers and should not be overlooked;

n Public postings and publications: informa-tion on planned events, the tone of the de-bate, a list of participants and preparatorygatherings can be collected from thesesources. Each represents an “intelligencelead”;

n Assigning plainclothes officers to mingleamong the crowds: this is commonly done,but it poses a potential risk to officers. Offi-cers should have a mechanism to reportdevelopments back to the agency in a time-ly fashion; an electronic monitoring devicemay help address these safety concerns.


1. For more information go to: http://www.dcwatch.com/police/040311.htm.2. The Miami Police Department successfully blocked the public dissemination of the FTAA OperationalPlan. The court agreed that such tactical information was exempt under existing “Sunshine Laws.”


However, care must be taken to assure thatthe operative is in a place where electronicmonitoring, without a court order, does notviolate a legal expectation of privacy; and

n Undercover activity within an organization:this is extremely controversial. An under-cover officer can be pulled into the work ofan organization and become a trusted fel-low traveler. Once an undercover officer be-comes a group member, there is a risk thathe or she may be asked to engage in groupactivities of questionable legality. Officersmust be extremely careful not to initiate orencourage illegal behavior from within thegroup. Police managers must also under-stand the importance of recognizing when agroup is not a threat to public safety andwhen the operation should be curtailed. Be-fore undertaking this type of activity, ap-proval should be obtained from the depart-ment’s legal advisor or the jurisdiction’soffice of law.

MANAGING INFORMATIONDURING AN EVENT

The operational aspects of the demonstrationmanagement plan have gone into effect at thispoint. All resources are presumably in place, andthe event should be managed according to plan. Aswith the pre-event stage, interagency cooperationand a continuous flow of information are critical-ly important and will determine the event man-agement’s success. The planning process shouldremain active and flexible as new informationinforms the scope and nature of adjustments to

the existing plan. Planners should remain in a con-stant state of evaluation to ensure the plan remainsan appropriate response, consistent with the cir-cumstances. The intelligence function at this stagetransitions to a more tactical approach, where in-formation received is quickly assessed to offertimely input to commanders and other decisionmakers. Though there is still a strong focus ongathering intelligence, there is now also a need tomanage a wide range of information. A formalinformation/data collection system should cap-ture and record critical information during theevent. Key events, decisions and actions (includingtheir rationale) should be documented to create ahistorical record of all that took place. Some of theimportant elements for command-level personnelto consider in this stage include

n Chronology of the event—maintaining arunning account of occurrences;

n Information tracking mechanisms—record-ing the source of information and the timeobtained and relayed to command;3

n Command decision recording processes—a chronology of decisions, to include when,by whom and the rationale; and

n Active deployment of personnel—mappingand recording time when deployments weredirected, and other related observations/outcomes, such aso Crowd behaviors;o All pre-arrest warnings;o All arrests and detention times of detainees;

ando Use of tools, less-lethal munitions or

other weapons.

3. Source information should not identify confidential sources, but rather officers who have obtained suchconfidential information.


The department’s use-of-force reportingcriteria must be followed during mass demonstra-tion events. It may not be reasonable to expect anofficer to abandon ongoing, front-line, opera-tional tasks to complete a use-of-force report;however, after-action reports should include

n A detailed account of why force was necessary;

n The type of force used;

n The tools utilized;

n Whom the force was directed against;

n The resultant response of the crowd orindividual;

n Any arrests;

n Any injuries observed (to officers, demon-strators or bystanders);

n Communications (internal and external)—transmitted and recorded; and

n Risk management systems activated whereneeded.4

These details will become critical in prepar-ing after-action reports, developing lessonslearned and defending the agency against any al-legations of police misconduct.

Police in the United Kingdom recommend apractice they have found to be useful and effec-tive: each field team designates an officer to doc-ument, as circumstances permit, a chronologicallog of events, orders and decisions affecting theteam. The documentation can be either written orrecorded via a handheld audio recording device.

It is desirable to have the documentation support-ed by video where available. This allows the teamto maintain an audit of its actions and provide arationale for responding to circumstances in aparticular way. This practice is especially effectivewhere officers are deployed for an extended peri-od of time under pressure, when recollection be-comes compressed and when incident overloadleads to memory fatigue.

Documentation, however, need not be lim-ited to handwritten or audio notes. Other accept-able methods of documentation include the fol-lowing (from the California Commission onPeace Officer Standards and Training 2003):

n Still photography

n Audio recording

n Video recording

n Written/log journal

n Reports (including after-action reports)

n Media reports/footage

n Communication and dispatch tapes/printouts

These documentation methods also aresuitable for documenting the following:

n Public disruption

n Property damage

n Injuries (public and police)

n Collective and individual behavior

n Individual arrests

n Physical evidence

4. Risk management in this sense refers to the systems and personnel required to respond to issueswhere use-of-force has occurred. The systems include the accountability measures that were addressedin the plan, investigative functions, health and safety functions and legal support.


POST-EVENT INTELLIGENCE

Even after a mass demonstration event has con-cluded and the participants have departed, thereis an abundance of information that needs to becollected. Some is intelligence related: verifyingreliable sources for future use; identifying intelli-gence shortfalls; and identifying ongoing activity.Other information includes costs of providingpolice services (pre-established accounting pro-cedures to isolate event costs) and damages in-curred (procedures to estimate event-relateddamage). Details such as these will be critical toan effective after-action critique of the plan andof the department’s management of the event. Italso may prove vital in preparing for the litiga-tion that is likely to follow such events.

AFTER-ACTION REPORTING

The importance of early preparation for theafter-action report cannot be overemphasized. Aprocess to record key events, decisions and ac-tions should be developed and implemented inthe early stages of event planning, and followedthroughout each event-management phase.Event managers will benefit from maintainingcertain core documents to assist in counteringpost-event criticism or litigation. Two effectivemethods of recording event decision making arethe “decision log” and “event file.” The decisionlog is a record of the process for arriving at keydecisions during the event. An Event File con-taining all relevant documents, emails, corre-spondence and media information will assist indescribing the unfolding events in detail. Accessto these records will facilitate the speedy produc-tion of the report and give a clear rationale as towhy police responded in a particular style. It alsowill provide a clear audit trail of the rationale be-hind decision making for any post-event litiga-tion that could occur several years down the line.

After-Action Reportingbox 4

by John Gallagher

The marchers have come and gone. The chanting,the speeches and even the cleanup are all behindyou. But this mass demonstration event is notover just because the protestors have left yourtown. Now begins a coordinated effort by someindividuals and groups to shape the history of theprevious days. From the moment your police de-partment begins to plan for a mass demonstra-tion event, you should also begin developing your“post-game” plan. The best event preparation,the best efforts at protestor accommodation andthe best plan implementation will be forgotten ifyou claim victory too quickly and move on toother ever-present crises demanding your atten-tion. From your first planning sessions, manymonths prior to a mass demonstration event, youshould begin your after-action report.

In recent years, the police departments ofPhiladelphia and the City of Miami have managedmass demonstration events. In 2000, Philadel-phia was host to the Republican National Con-vention. In 2003, the City of Miami was host tothe conference of the Summit on the Free TradeArea of the Americas. In each city, the planningfor these events was initiated more than a fullyear in advance. In each city, the events them-selves lasted approximately one week. In eachcity, the initial response, from the public and themedia alike, consisted of overwhelming praise forthe efforts of the police department. And, in eachcity, informational campaigns, lawsuits and otherpost-event efforts to change that positive impres-sion will keep those cities busy for years to come.

When your department first learns it will bepolicing a mass demonstration event, a person orgroup should immediately be tasked with trackingthe history of the event. Start at the initial plan-ning meeting. Throughout the planning process,your department will undoubtedly engage in aconcerted effort to create a forum that respectsand encourages lawful protest. Intensive policeplanning and training for the event will focus onrestraint, professionalism and the respect of civilliberties. Your department will spend monthsmeeting with protest groups, negotiating withtheir lawyers and offering countless accommoda-tions to those seeking to express their FirstAmendments rights. Your department leadershipwill take numerous steps to calm the concerns ofresidents, protestors and even police officers whowill be bombarded with media images of chaos atprevious protest events in other cities. However,like a tree falling in the forest, the enormous ef-forts undertaken by the police department to pro-vide a venue that is safe and inviting will go unno-ticed in the face of an organized campaign torewrite the story of the event.

In both Philadelphia and the City of Miami,the police departments prepared for the after-math of the events while simultaneously prepar-ing for the events themselves. Those who laterclaimed that the police showed “deliberate indif-ference” to constitutional rights had a tough selldue to the fact that the departments had a com-prehensive record of all the planning undertakenand all the accommodations provided. InPhiladelphia, for example, the police departmentarranged visits to the holding cells by leading civil



rights attorneys during the Republican NationalConvention. Documented records of those visits,summarized in the after-action report, immedi-ately deflated the manufactured claims of somewho sought to project an image of inhumane jailconditions. In the City of Miami, an after-actionreport was completed within 60 days followingthe close of the Summit on the Free Trade Area ofthe Americas. The rapid publication of the reporthas inserted the police department’s record intothe informational vacuum that follows the closeof such an event—a vacuum that is often filled bythose with an interest in portraying the police re-sponse in an unfavorable light.

Your after-action report must not be an after-thought. The vast majority of protestors at massdemonstration events are seeking to exercise theircherished constitutional right to free expression

in a meaningful and lawful manner. The enormousefforts to accommodate and protect such protes-tors must be documented in a timely after-actionreport. An honest, critical self-assessment in yourafter-action report will help your department andothers avoid repeating mistakes at future events.At the same time, the rapid documentation of po-lice efforts and activities in an after-action reportshall provide a balance to those who undertake acampaign of myth and distortion to mold the his-tory of the event.

John Gallagher is a federal prosecutor and formerWhite House Fellow. He also has served as a policeofficer in the NYPD, as legal counsel to the Philadel-phia Police Commissioner and as an Assistant Chiefin the Miami Police Department.


CONCLUSION

Information is crucial to managing mass demon-strations. Gathering intelligence from myriadsources prior to the event can help an agency pre-pare for a host of possible scenarios. Stayingaware of developments and breaking events dur-ing the demonstration and communicating thatinformation to those who need it can contributegreatly to effective management of the demon-stration event. After-action assessments may helpagencies examine what worked and what needs tobe improved. However, effective informationmanagement requires that the agency considerthese issues well before a mass demonstration be-gins, when they can still make a difference in theoutcome.

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Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities — 41

Roles and Responsibilities

5

VERVIEW

In mass demonstrations, as in other law enforce-ment activities, it is important to clearly delineatethe roles and responsibilities of officials, includ-ing the incident commander, operational com-mander, tactical commander and others. Whenroles and responsibilities are not clear, an agencydramatically reduces its chances of effectivelymanaging the demonstration. Orders may be in-consistent, contrary or not followed. The recentexperiences of agencies that have managed massdemonstrations highlight how imperative it isthat everyone knows the “what,” “when” and“where” of the expectations placed on them.

The Seattle Police Department, in its MardiGras after-action report, noted that a breakdownof a centralized command and control function

was a major impediment to maintaining andrestoring order. In Boston, the management ofmass demonstrations after the Red Sox AmericanLeague Championship Series victory over theNew York Yankees was significantly impeded be-cause of uncertainty over roles and responsibili-ties and the absence of a central command center.Indeed, it was concluded that this played a role inthe death of a young celebrant who was killed bya projectile fired from a police less-lethal weapon(Stern et al. 2005).

This chapter focuses on the importance ofdetermining and adhering to roles and responsi-bilities during a mass demonstration. A signifi-cant part of the chapter addresses command andcontrol, while other portions address the rolesand responsibilities of specialized units.

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42 — Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Practitioners agree a well-defined, minimal chainof command is essential when dealing with massdemonstrations. The benefits include better un-derstanding of responsibilities, clarity of decisionmaking and, ultimately, timely actions in re-sponse to developing events. A unified commandstructure consisting of three levels—strategic,operational and tactical—has proven effective inthe field.

The strategic level, involving the incidentcommander (e.g., the police chief), is ultimatelyresponsible for the event. The operational level,involving the operational commander, refers tothe person responsible for managing the actualdeployment and response to the event. The tacti-cal level, involving the field commander, managesthe application of resources according to the op-erational commander’s plan. This minimal com-mand chain also is endorsed in the United King-dom’s Association of Chief Police Officer’s(ACPO) guide, Manual of Guidance on Keepingthe Peace, as an effective practice in protest man-agement.1 Department plans may have differentnames for these levels of command; however, themain emphasis is on a clear understanding of therole, rather than the name. It is useful to use theterm commander or command only in these threeroles to ensure clarity as to who the decisionmakers are. Supporting units or groups shouldnot have the term command in their title to avoidany misunderstanding or encroachment into theactual command function. This terminologyshould be introduced and reinforced in pre-eventplanning, training and briefings to ensure thatthe role of support agencies is clearly understood.

STRATEGIC COMMAND

The strategic commander, typically the chief ofpolice, establishes the strategic goals for the man-agement of the event. It is imperative that the chiefhave an in-depth understanding of the critical is-sues that will arise at the strategic, tactical and op-erational levels to ensure that all strategic decisionmaking is based upon informed judgment. Thestrategic commander or chief executive also mustbe able to develop, plan and implement, throughappointed managers, a coordinated multi-agencyoperation. By approving the operational orders forthe event, the chief executive formally acknowl-edges overall ownership of the event.

Mass demonstration events can provide achallenge for the agency chief executive. The chiefis ultimately responsible for events, officer behav-iors and crowd conduct, even though there isusually minimal front-line, direct control overstreet-level events. The chief executive is operat-ing at a strategic command level, with command-ers and team leaders responsible for controllingand redirecting officers in ways that can influencecrowd behavior. It is thus important that the chiefexecutive be involved at the earliest of planningstages. The chief executive also should be keenlyaware of the training that has taken place; theavailable tactics, tools and other resources; andthe capabilities and deficiencies of field personnel.

Many believe the chief executive also shouldlead the pre-event media strategy, providing thefocus for public inquiry and information. Thisrole in factual communication and reassurance isvital in maintaining a sense of security whereuncertainty exists and in preparing for the post-event stage of the media strategy.

1. For more information go to: http://www.acpo.police.uk/policies.asp.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND

At the operational level, guidance and directionin accordance with established policy helps en-sure that the operational plan reflects overallstrategic objectives, while setting the operationaland tactical parameters for the police response.At this level, the operational commander is re-sponsible for reinforcing existing policy or devel-oping new policy to guide how the police re-sponse is managed. During the event, it is theoperational commander’s responsibility to assessthe situation, consider new intelligence, assessavailable resources and balance competing de-mands to best achieve the desired outcome.

TACTICAL COMMAND

Tactical issues relate directly to the application offront-line measures that are employed to imple-ment the operational plan. In most instances, thedirection and guidance here will be adequatelycovered in strategic objectives and operationalpolicy. On occasion, however, specific tacticalpolicy is needed to support front-line decisionmaking and tactic application. The operationalcommander—in response to unfolding events—will usually direct general tactical policy. Onother occasions, usually at short notice, the tacti-cal commander (field officer or other superviso-ry designee) will be called upon to decide on spe-cific actions or deployments. When short-noticedecisions or changes to policy are in order, the di-rection is more often verbal than written. This initself adds another dimension and poses chal-lenges to post-event analysis of police response.

PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVESON MASS DEMONSTRATIONROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Miami Police Department and the other lawenforcement agencies preparing for the FTAA feltthe establishment of a single command centerwas an absolute necessity. To ensure clear lines ofauthority and communication, and to providereal time information for decision making, theyfollowed the Incident Command System (ICS)model. They established an incident commanderwho was supported by the operations, planning,logistics, and finance sections. As the event grewnearer and specific needs and roles became moredefined, other support functions (intelligenceand hard perimeter) were added.

Event management included some 40 agen-cies that were represented at the Joint Law En-forcement Operations Command (JLEOC). TheJLEOC became the operational “nerve center,”staffed by a command team 24 hours a day withthe authority to make tactical decisions in re-sponse to unfolding events. In addition to thecommand team, there was a JLEOC SupportRoom where stand-alone work areas offered ac-cess to phones and computers to the representa-tives of the law enforcement agencies participat-ing in the FTAA operation. The presence of theserepresentatives and the opportunity for constantcommunication ensured that decisions wouldnot be delayed due to the inability to contact aparticular agency. Agencies were tasked with du-ties that best fit their ability to contribute (e.g.,marine, air or traffic assignments were relegatedto those with such capabilities). The primaryvenue, downtown Miami, was then divided intothree tactical commands.



The Boston Police Department and all of itsfederal, state and local law enforcement partnersprepared for the 2004 DNC using a multilayeredcommand structure. The Multi-Agency Commu-nications Center (MACC) was established toserve as a Strategic Center staffed by top or veryhigh-level personnel from the representativeagencies. This was the “big picture” command,where overall event management was centered.Critical decisions such as requesting major exter-nal resources or approval to deploy chemicals, forexample, would be addressed by the MACC.

The Joint Operations Center (JOC), whereanother command-level group of representativesfrom participating agencies was housed, was re-sponsible for executing and modifying the re-sponse and contingency plans. All field reports,intelligence and other information were coordi-nated there. Using all sources of input, the JOCdetermined if course corrections were in orderand communicated those orders to the tacticallevel.

The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) iswhere those directions from the JOC are translat-ed to actions in the field. While keeping both theMACC and JOC informed and carrying out theirdesignated roles, the TOC commanders were re-sponsible for directing field units.

COMMAND PROTOCOLS

Command protocols are necessary to inform anddirect decision making so that strategic, opera-tional and tactical commanders know what theyare expected to achieve and how they will do it.Command protocols also must address potential-ly competing demands. For example, the seniorinvestigating officer may require time to investi-gate a crime scene during an incident, and thesedemands might conflict with the operationalcommander’s ability to protect the scene. These

conflicting demands often compete for availablepersonnel and equipment as well. The key princi-ple for any command protocol policy is that eachcommander involved knows the following:

n His/her role, responsibilities and objectives;

n What resources are allocated to meet thoseresponsibilities and objectives;

n His/her geographical or functional area ofoperation; and

n The contingency plans for transfer of com-mand when there is:o Federal intervention, if a major/terrorist

incident occurso Specialist team deployment (e.g., a

firearms or hostage incident within themain operation).

In an operation involving mutual aid withother police or support agencies, there must bean agreement that this command protocol willextend to those additional agencies.

CRIME INVESTIGATION

Studies on recent mass event disorders show thatin many well-publicized events, protesters seek-ing to direct negative media attention toward theevent or the police have developed deliberateprograms intended to force confrontations withlaw enforcement agencies or other protestinggroups. Operational plans, therefore, should em-phasize the potential need for a proactive crimi-nal investigation to detect and address suspicionsor signs of unlawful activity aimed at physicalconfrontation. The early assignment of a seniorinvestigator to manage the investigation is valu-able. Likewise, personnel dedicated to gatheringinformation and intelligence must be in place tosupport the strategy. A detailed policy guide to


general investigative policing can be found in theU.S. Department of Justice publication, The At-torney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes,Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism EnterpriseInvestigations.2

SPECIALIZED UNITS

Specialized units can fill critical roles duringmass demonstrations. Some agencies havelearned that the careful deployment of special-ized units can have a significant positive effect onmanaging the demonstration. They are often bet-ter able to move among the crowds, allowingthem to collect intelligence and even dissuadecriminal activity. Below are examples related tothe use of specialized units during mass demon-stration events.

Bicycle Patrols

The Miami Police Department opted to organizea bicycle patrol to escort all major parades andrallies during the FTAA meeting week. Theyworked in two teams or platoons, each with radioaccess to high-level supervisory personnel. Bicy-cle officers could not only provide a rapid re-sponse (unlike cars or vans that would be imped-ed by heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic), butalso present a nonthreatening image to protestorsand the media.

CART Teams

The Seattle Police Department deployed fourChemical Agent Response Teams (CART) to sup-port demonstration management platoons at theWTO. CART teams were deployed—under the

control of the incident commander—during thosehours in which the largest crowds were expected.Hoping to maximize their former training and ex-isting experience, all the CART team memberswere current or former SWAT officers. Each teamconsisted of a sergeant and three or four officerswith specific experience in the use of chemical ir-ritants or other less-lethal impact munitions.

Cut Teams

At recent events protestors have been known toemploy “sleeping dragons” to disrupt traffic or tocreate a diversion. Protestors link themselves to-gether by placing their hands into hollow pipingwith metal or cement fortification on the outsideof the pipe. In order to separate or remove theprotestors, the pipes must be cut. The Miami Po-lice Department staffed, trained and fielded four“cut teams” to handle such actions. They werestaged and scheduled in staggered shifts to pro-vide maximum coverage throughout the event,but were instructed to remove these individualsonly if they posed a threat to health or safety. For-tunately, the cut teams were never called to ac-tion. The FTAA after-action report notes thatprotestors may have decided against the use ofsleeping dragons “due to media coverage of theexpertise developed by those officers chargedwith removing such devices (Timoney 2004).”

Mounted Teams

Both the Boston Police Department and the MiamiPolice Department deployed mounted units forcrowd control. The elevated position of the mount-ed officers provides a better vantage point fromwhich to observe crowd size, movement and

2. For more information see: http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.


actions, and establishes a highly visible, imposingpolice presence. Though there have been timeswhen demonstrators have attempted to harm po-lice mounts, crowds are usually quick to movewhen horses are employed to direct them to a spe-cific area. With the help of the Metro-Dade PoliceMounted Unit, Miami deployed a team of a dozenmounts as a single task force to monitor the down-town area. At the DNC in Boston, mounted unitstrained with and prepared to deploy with PublicOrder Platoons, including those from other partic-ipating agencies.

SWAT Teams

For most police departments, Special Weaponsand Tactics (SWAT) teams represent a ready forceof expertly trained specialists. As such, their de-ployment during mass demonstration events is aforegone conclusion. For the DNC in Boston,SWAT teams from the city and neighboring re-gional teams were deployed at the Fleet Center,the primary event venue, essentially for dignitaryprotection. During the Seattle WTO conference,the SWAT team’s role evolved from demonstra-tion management to readiness for Weapons ofMass Destruction response. The Miami FTAAplan included two internal and seven mutual-aidSWAT Teams at the ready. The two Miami teamswere deployed in 12-hour shifts to maintainaround-the-clock, stand-by status at police stag-ing areas where they could quickly respond toany critical event, while the other teams were ge-ographically deployed at key locations aroundthe city.

Violence Abatement Teams

These are special-purpose teams that can be de-ployed as particular circumstances arise. In Seattle,they were created prior to the WTO conference

expressly for the purpose of identifying and arrest-ing protestors who would turn to violence, lootingor property destruction. Thirty members strong,the team included both plainclothes and uni-formed officers who were responsive to observedacts of criminal misconduct as well as leads devel-oped through intelligence and confidentialsources.

Arrest (Transport/Booking) Teams

The arrest and processing of persons taken intocustody at mass demonstrations and protests candiffer from agency to agency just as they do foreveryday arrest situations. Some departmentshave the luxury of central booking facilities thatfocus on getting the arresting officer back on thestreet, while others require the arresting officer tohandle all arrest and processing tasks. However,for mass arrest situations, agencies share the pri-ority of keeping arresting officers on the front-line. This typically translates to the creation oftransport teams that take control of prisoners andtheir property and relocate them to processinglocations where booking teams complete finger-prints, photographs and charging documents.

COMMUNICATIONS

Maintaining effective radio communications dur-ing a major event is always challenging. The capac-ity of communications systems and personnel inmany departments is stretched on a daily basisby routine police operations. Add the complexityof a multijurisdictional mass demonstrationevent, and it can be overwhelming. During theevent there will be two systems operating; onedealing with nonevent calls for service; the otherdealing with tactical units and support units work-ing the event. In either a multiagency or single-host event operation, access and technology


strategies should be designed to address the fol-lowing considerations:

n The need for a dedicated communicationschannel for strategic, operational and tacti-cal commanders;

n One or more channels for field officers;

n A separate channel for “normal” policeservice continuity;

n A separate channel for logistics;

n Common terms and procedures acrossunits and agencies. (This should be resolvedat pre-event training, or in regular majorincident training among partner agencies);and

n The use of clear, concise English in place ofradio codes.

Coordinating resources effectively to re-spond to crisis situations is especially dauntingwhen disparate radio systems are used by partici-pating agencies. Recent events—from Columbineto 9/11 to Hurricane Katrina—have demonstrat-ed how incompatible radio systems can crippleoperations. Those in law enforcement are fullyaware of the need for interoperable communica-tions systems, but funding constraints and an in-formal territorialism impede such progress inmany jurisdictions. A limited and fragmentedradio spectrum serves as an additional impedi-ment. At the WTO in Seattle, the FTAA in Miami,the G8 Summit in Savannah, the DNC in Boston,and nearly every other multi-agency operation, ithas been highlighted repeatedly that a single com-munications system, compatible to all, does notexist. The implications of this fact become readilyapparent early in event-management planning.

There are several options to help mitigate theproblem. These options range from purchasingadditional radios for support agencies to technicalpatches for managing otherwise non-compatiblesystems.

The Miami Police Department, in prepara-tion for the 2003 FTAA, recognized the difficultythat 40 different radio systems/frequencies wouldpose for effective tactical operations. They as-sessed each participating agency’s radio systemfor compatibility well in advance of the event. Adozen participating agencies used systems thatcould interface with the Miami radio system.Through a series of MOU supported agreements,these agencies were able to share their confiden-tial Motorola key codes, thereby allowing them tooperate on the Miami police radio system. An-other six agencies were able to install “patches”allowing them also to access the Miami policesystem. These actions gave radio access to nearlyhalf of the agencies participating in the manage-ment of the event. The remaining 22 agencieswere operating on radio systems that were simplynot compatible. The Miami Police Departmentwas able to assemble some 191 spare radios thatwere distributed to the operational personnelfrom those agencies. Through effective planningand cooperative agreement, an unusually highpercentage of participating officers were affordedunified radio communications during the event.The newly created radio network was vastly en-larged, thus demanding greater airtime disci-pline. To establish better order, eight talk groupswere created along functional lines, and trans-missions were limited to command and controland emergency situations. Fearing the potentialthat verbal codes vary from agency to agency,codes were abandoned in favor of simple every-day language.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Whenever a multi-agency operation relies on of-ficers from different police departments to per-form in situations that may include containment,order maintenance and arrest duties, use-of-forceand rules of engagement, there is a risk that thepolicies and procedures governing officers willvary. Much of this concern can be addressedthrough MOUs and unified training, but thereshould be a clear understanding by all involvedthat the operational policies of the host agencyprovide the primary direction to the variouswork teams. These policies should be clearly un-derstood by all participating agencies.

CITIZEN COMPLAINTS

A formal process and investigative protocolshould be established to handle complaints fromthe public. The public and all participating agen-cies should be advised of the process, and all theparticipating agencies should agree to hold theirofficers accountable for their actions. Each agencycan investigate only allegations brought againstmembers of its own department. So, after estab-lishing the complaint protocol, participatingagencies also should agree to submit their find-ings to the internal affairs division or civilian re-view panel of the host jurisdiction for a final tally.



Communication During Mass Demonstration Eventsbox 5

by Malcolm McFarland

During June 6–10, 2004, PERF staff visited the G8summit in Sea Island, Georgia, as part of our on-going Motorola-sponsored research to developstate-of-the-art responses to critical issues facinglaw enforcement.

Previous G8 summits (composed of the lead-ers of the United States, United Kingdom, Cana-da, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia) andWorld Trade Organization (WTO) conferenceshave been the target of organized protest by envi-ronmental and anti-globalization groups. Many ofthe protestors were committed to peacefulprotest. However, past G8 and WTO protests alsohave attracted violent protests. The last WTOsummit to be held in the United States was inSeattle in 1999. The scenes of violent protest re-main vivid in our memory. Protestors caused inexcess of $3 million dollars in damages, and 600arrests were made. G8 summits in Europe alsohave experienced organized violence. In 2001, vi-olence in Genoa, Italy, resulted in a fatal policeshooting and 300 arrests.

With this history in mind, security prepara-tions for the Sea Island, Georgia, G8 summitbegan twelve months before the July 2003 event,with an intensive planning operation and securityprogram involving 62 law enforcement agencies.The lead agency for the Georgia Governor’s Officewas the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

Focusing specifically on interagency commu-nications, the management of the event was coor-dinated from a number of command centers in

the region. The Federal Joint Operations Center(JOC) was situated close to Sea Island and wason standby to take control of any critical or terror-ist incident. Representatives of the FBI, U.S. Se-cret Service, and many other federal agencies withcounterterrorism and mass-destruction responsi-bilities staffed the JOC. The JOC complex alsohoused the agencies that had “consequence man-agement” responsibilities (e.g., U.S. Federal Emer-gency Management Agency, U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services, U.S. Department ofEnergy).

The day-to-day operations for most state andlocal agencies were coordinated in the Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC) at HunterArmy Airfield in Brunswick. Staffing mirrored thatat the JOC and also included federal agency per-sonnel. Direct communications with the JOCallowed timely information and intelligence flowbetween the two command centers. Of particularinterest was the on-screen display of concurrentincident management at both venues, allowingfor a speeding up the information process. Thesoftware program allowed all participants to seethe particular events requiring their attention aswell as the specific agency tasked with respond-ing to that event. The JOC and the MACC hadlarge-screen displays that could be viewed fromany desk in the building. Both centers had im-pressive logistic support, including continuousfood and beverage service.

The respective sheriff’s departments coordi-nated the policing deployment and protest re-sponse activity in Brunswick and Savannah. These


departments also were linked to the MACC to en-sure uninterrupted information and intelligencetransfer. In all, more than 2,700 local, state andfederal officers, as well as more than 5,000 mili-tary personnel, were engaged in the operation.

The build-up to the event was closely coveredin the local and international media. A Joint Infor-mation Center was established where public in-formation officers assembled in a one-stop shopfor G8 security information.

In Savannah, protestors were permitted togather in Forsyth Park, a short walk from the centerof town, and a four-mile protest route was author-ized. As it turned out, the number of protestorsnever exceeded 100; there were much fewer pro-testers on most occasions. They were inevitablyoutnumbered by the media and even more so bysecurity personnel. Only on one occasion was

there a determined protest along the route byapproximately 80 protestors. No incidents were re-ported, and police deployment was not significant.

In Brunswick, police officers easily marshaleda small number of protestors. It is fair to say thatthe extensive and thorough security plans werenever seriously tested during the G8 summit peri-od and that the highly trained and skilled immedi-ate response teams and field reaction force unitswere not significantly deployed. Brad Brown, theMayor of Brunswick, best summed up the G8event with this statement, “We prepared for theworst and we got the best.”

Malcolm McFarland is the Superintendent of thePolice Service of Northern Ireland. In 2004 Malcolmwas a PERF Fellow, bringing his considerable experi-ence in demonstration management to this project.

CONCLUSION

During mass demonstrations, law enforcementpersonnel from chiefs to officers need to under-stand their roles and responsibilities and adhereto them. Determining these roles ahead of timewill help individuals better understand what isexpected of them during the event. To the extentpossible, roles should not be changed mid-event,and every person should have one role to assume,thus avoiding various, and sometimes conflict-ing, duties.


52

PHOTO BY GAVIN MACVICAR

Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force — 53

Crowd Control and Use-of-Force

6

VERVIEW

Crowds can vary dramatically in size, composi-tion, intentions and behaviors. Crowds can besmall, large or larger than expected. They can becomposed of one group with one goal or multi-ple groups whose goals can be similar or in oppo-sition. Crowds can be completely peaceful or law-abiding, or they can contain disruptive anddestructive elements. The possible combinationsare almost limitless, thus creating an enormousnumber of contingencies law enforcement agen-cies must identify and handle effectively. Whatev-er the contingencies, agencies must carefully con-sider three issues: crowd control, mass arrests anduse-of-force. This chapter discusses the critical

nature of these three issues, including the needsto develop clear policies and procedures, aswell as to specify the equipment and tools thatwill enhance the agency’s ability to controlcrowds, makes mass arrests and use force, ifnecessary.

CROWD CONTROL

The following key principles should be consid-ered during the planning, briefing and deploy-ment stages of any policing operation involvingthe management of crowds:

n Intelligence. Prior to any event, the policeshould identify groups who might be

O

54 — Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force

involved—their intentions, tactics, notionsof acceptable behavior and views of othergroups. Intelligence also may indicate theproportion of activists within a crowd andhow homogenous that crowd might be inits intention, or the balance of those proneto violence and those who are peaceful;

n Facilitation. The police should seek to facil-itate any lawful and legitimate aims ofgroups who are present—especially whenconflict breaks out. The aim should be topermit the pursuit of lawful actions whiledealing with groups acting illegally;

n Communication. The police should com-municate to the crowd how they are seekingto facilitate the crowd’s legitimate aims andhow the illegitimate actions of some in thecrowd may serve to impede those aims.Communication should be through indi-viduals respected by crowd members. Meet-ing and establishing communication withprotest groups at an early stage in the plan-ning process should help; and

n Recognition. Officers must be mindful thata crowd can consist of a variety of persons,present for a range of reasons. When vio-lence starts, there is the risk of dealing withall those present as if they are hostile protes-tors. However, especially in such situations,it is crucial to treat people with respect andwin them to law enforcement’s side, not theside of those already promoting conflict. Itmay be necessary to facilitate the desires ofthe many, such as the wish to peacefullyprotest, so that the demonstrators may as-sist the police with their overall intention,which is to prevent disorder.

FORMATIONS

Police formations—such as columns, skirmishlines, wedges, half-step movements, and con-trolled rushes—when properly employed againsta large gathering are among the most practicalmethods of crowd control. Formations may beemployed to disperse, contain, move or blocklarge numbers of people. The use of formations isparticularly effective when attempting to dispersecrowds in urban areas because they enable thepolice to split a crowd into smaller segments.Though smaller crowds may be easier to dealwith, it cannot be assumed they have been capit-ulated. The resultant smaller mobs are entirelycapable of initiating riotous acts such as sniping,looting and burning. Commanders must realizeboth the value and the limitations of formations.In the Seattle Mardi Gras demonstration, for ex-ample, police found that the growing size of thecrowd, accompanied by increasing violence, con-stituted sufficient cause for officers to retreat fortheir own safety. However, it was not possible toreinsert these officers later.

Once the determination has been made todeploy police in formations, appropriate supportmust be in place to provide a suitable measure ofofficer safety. Since officers in the formation willbe focused on the crowd before them, other offi-cers must be in place to protect the formationline from an attack on a blind side. Rooftopsmust be secured to help prevent assault fromthese vantage points. Helicopter observation isone method of visually securing rooftops. De-ploying officers as spotters on rooftops is another.However, when officers are stationed in highbuildings or on rooftops, all other officers must beinformed of this to avoid the possibility of controlforce members being mistaken for hostile actors.In the 2004 American League Championship

Series demonstration, Boston police were unableto place observers on rooftops. This greatly hin-dered their efforts to control the crowds that sub-sequently did gain the high ground and used it tofrustrate police efforts.

When the use of formations is no longer aneffective control option and a crowd refuses tocomply with the lawful and necessary orders ofthe police, other techniques such as mass arrestsor controlled use-of-force (e.g., chemical agents)may be needed. If the decision is made to arrestcrowd members, formations may be useful tocontrol further movement of the crowd. Arrestteams can then escort arrestees back and outthrough the formation.

MASS ARRESTS

We have seen from police after-action reports andthird-party reviews of police practices that themass detention of protestors not actively engagedin violence can create significant problems for lawenforcement agencies (New York Civil LibertiesUnion 2004). Mass arrests during demonstrationsin Washington, D.C., New York City and othermajor locales have been criticized. In some cases,the protest activity, while unlawful, was not neces-sarily violent. Complaints included that law-abid-ing protestors and passersby were rounded up anddetained along with violators in overly broadsweeps. The negative impact of these media im-ages damages the public perception of the policeoperation, as it draws into question the reason-ableness and proportionality of the police re-sponse. Subsequent litigation has proven to beparticularly costly. In most instances only a tinynumber of those arrested actually appear in courtand most of those are charged with offenses thatwould not normally attract an arrest or detention(Temple 2003). Law enforcement agencies need toensure that operational commanders have a clearand uniform understanding of the mass-arrestpolicy to be followed.

Litigation has included criticism of under-staffed prisoner processing operations that, whenoverwhelmed, led to inordinate detention with-out charge. This occurred at the Republican Na-tional Convention in 2004 and led to court in-structions and fines for inordinate delay inprocessing detained persons (New York Times2004). Research into recent mass-arrest opera-tions shows that arrests are easily accomplished.The areas where problems arise with sudden, butnow predictable, regularity are

n The quality of evidence available to pursueprosecution against each individual;

n The logistics of transporting and handlinglarge numbers of prisoners;

n Allowing legal and medical access;

n An inordinate delay in arranging for releaseor bringing persons to court;

n Not enough police on duty to cope with theabove—process centers are frequently over-whelmed at an early stage due to lack of re-sources; and

n In some cases, the courts have ruled that toppolice officials can be held personally liablefor damages or actions.

Mass arrests are generally advisable onlywhen all alternative tactics have either been triedunsuccessfully or are unlikely to be effectiveunder specific circumstances. When mass-arresttactics are used, evidence against each individualprisoner must be available to support thecharges. Arrest tactics training is a critical com-ponent of mission success. The training must ad-dress the spectrum of event types: non-violentprotest, non-violent civil disobedience, passiveresistance (including the use of chains, sleevesand other devices to impede arrest) and violent



confrontation. Training must recognize the dif-ference between two arrest scenarios:

n Arrest tactics where police are in control ofthe environment and have time to plan andimplement the arrests or dispersal in a con-trolled manner, (e.g., at a sit-down protest);and

n Arrest tactics where police do not controlthe environment (e.g., when police are try-ing to re-establish control of the environ-ment by arresting violent demonstrators).

Pressure point techniques, in conjunctionwith empty hand control, efficient handcuffing,and arrestee escort methods should be includedto remove protesters humanely while minimizingrisk of injury to protestors and police. Such tacticsshould be part of ongoing and regular refreshertraining to ensure officers maintain efficiency.

Tactical commanders present at many ofthe demonstration events reviewed by PERFagreed that unless the actions of certain protes-tors necessitate their removal, the better course ofaction is not to expend resources on arrests. Forexample, in instances where sleeping dragons aresituated so as to disrupt traffic, it may be less of adrain on already-thin operational resources tosimply monitor them and reroute traffic. More-over, protest organizers have on occasion sched-uled “officer intensive” diversions just before theyundertake more violent or destructive actionselsewhere, calculating that the police would betoo busy handling the mass arrest to respond tofurther actions.

USE-OF-FORCE

The use-of-force by police against the public,no matter the need or justification, usually con-veys a disturbing appearance. The prospect of cap-turing such confrontations is part of the reason

the media covers mass demonstration events.Needless to say, it is the goal of some protestingfactions to provoke the official use-of-force, know-ing full well that the incident will be broadcastaround the world.

Every police agency is governed by policiesregulating use-of-force. The agency’s use-of-forcecontinuum or model should not be adjusted ormodified for mass demonstration events. Therules of engagement need to be consistent amongparticipating agencies. The theory of a graduateduse-of-force in response to escalating disorder isbased on what is both reasonable and propor-tionate to the threat. An appropriate responsemust be stressed at all times, especially given theamount of media attention that focuses on policewhen disorder erupts during mass demonstra-tions, and how this attention affects the publicperception of the department. Chief executivesshould review department policies governing theuse of less-lethal munitions to ensure consistencyin application in mass demonstration events. Inparticular, the appropriate level of authority toapprove deployment and use of these weaponsshould be agreed on by all participating agenciesat an early stage. It is incredibly difficult to de-fend conflicting levels of force application.

For the FTAA demonstration, the MiamiPolice Department chose the pepper ball roundas the less-lethal method to be deployed againstindividuals disturbing the peace. The pepper ballis designed to strike the target and deliver an irri-tating blast of pepper spray that temporarilyhampers the target’s breathing and vision with-out causing long-term negative effects. However,the tool was found to be less effective than ex-pected. SWAT members reported that five ormore rounds had to be fired at an individual be-fore it achieved a deterrent effect. In their after-action report, the Miami Police Department in-dicated a need to evaluate other methods forfuture operations to determine if the desired


effect can be achieved more efficiently. TheBoston Police Department conducted a criticalreview of its training and use of less-lethalweapons after police fired a plastic, pepper-spray-filled projectile that killed a young woman in2005. The FN303 firing device is often used be-cause it was designed to avoid causing bodily in-jury. However, instructions indicate that it shouldnot be aimed above the waist. The young womanwho was killed was unintentionally struck in theeye. Police professionals should not necessarilyabandon the use of this type of device, but shouldbe aware of incidents such as this and provideproper training in order to avoid similartragedies.

After the experience of managing majormass demonstration events in Washington, D.C.,Metropolitan Police Department managers in2003 recognized that the reporting, documenta-tion and investigative aspects of existing use-of-force policies were not fully practical for civildisturbance situations. Factors that presentedunique obstacles to force investigations during acivil disturbance included safety concerns forforce investigators; logistical challenges relating tosecuring the scene; challenges to collecting evi-dence in a fluid situation; and the documentationof events in a hostile environment. As a result, thedepartment developed a new, more-responsivepolicy to be implemented only when the chief ofpolice declares a civil disturbance condition. Inthose instances, the Civil Disturbance Use-of-Force Reporting and Investigation Protocol ap-plies not only to the Metropolitan Police Depart-ment, but also to all officers from agenciesworking under contract with them during the de-clared condition. The policy clearly spells out theresponsibility to preserve the peace and to arrestthose who engage in criminal misconduct, all thewhile protecting demonstrators’ rights to peacefulassembly and free speech. Officers are instructed

that non-arrest methods of crowd control are tobe the first and preferred options. In fact, the pol-icy specifies that, absent safety concerns, arrestsand applications of force should be carried outand documented by units at the specific directionof a Metropolitan Police Department assistantchief. Moreover, any use of chemical agents mustbe authorized by the chief of police or his de-signee. The policy establishes a specific reportingrequirement to ensure that all use-of-force inci-dents are promptly reported by the ranking com-mand officer to the department’s Joint OperationsCommand Center (JOCC), where they are for-mally documented and initially reviewed. Subse-quent review will take place in the official after-action report. The department clearly establishesand defines various levels of force and the use-of-force continuum that is applicable only to crowdcontrol situations. Additionally, the departmentidentifies the various circumstances in which forcemay be necessary during crowd control situations.

As in all use-of-force investigations, the de-partment’s office of professional responsibility ischarged with conducting a thorough investigationof force incidents that take place during massdemonstration events. Within the limitations of anongoing demonstration event, a force investigationteam, headed by a captain, is tasked with maintain-ing a rapid-response capability to allow them togather as much information as possible (on-siteevidence, video footage, medical reports, etc.). Amember of that team is assigned to the JOCC tocoordinate the flow of force-related informationnecessary to conduct a full investigation.

PRE-EVENT BRIEFINGS

Pre-event briefings of personnel should includea discussion of the rules of engagement; the use-of-force policy; and the authority to direct theuse-of-force, specialized tools and weapons. It


is recommended that potential scenarios bediscussed and practiced in advance of each oper-ation to ensure a uniform understanding of thelevel of force to be used at the outset. This mustthen be communicated to all officers likely to beinvolved in the response to a particular scenario.For example, if a sit-down protest is encountered,officers should be pre-briefed that the initial re-moval tactic will be a verbal warning followedby a specifically identified use-of-force action.Additional use-of-force, if necessary, would thenbe applied at the discretion of the field officer inaccordance with existing departmental policy.This practice reduces some of the last-minuteplanning and communication that can easily leadto less-effective event management.

EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS

The list of the tools and equipment available forproactive crowd management and officer protec-tion is extensive. The focus of this section will beon those items and issues that are most relevant torecent situations or that have been identified asparticularly useful or controversial. Some of thetools fall into both categories, in which case em-phasis is on the appropriate use of such equipmentto maximize effect and minimize the possibility ofnegative outcomes and criticism. The issues high-lighted are protective equipment, less-lethal op-tions and barriers.

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENTCONSIDERATIONS

Officer safety is an inherent goal of any massdemonstration event, particularly where disorderis expected or anticipated. Protective equipmentfor officers comes in a variety of forms. Whenchoosing gear, it is important to balance flexibil-ity of movement against level of protection.A review of recent mass demonstration events

reveals that special consideration should be givento two additional equipment-related issues:

n Image. Experience shows that the appear-ance of heavily protected “Robocop” offi-cers sends a clear message to assembledprotestors. Its use has had a deterrent effecton most persons and has assisted in main-taining public confidence that police are incontrol. However, this image also can have anegative effect on the public. Media accountsof protected officers facing off against peacefuldemonstrators can lead to a public perceptionthat the police are being heavy handed andoverreacting, thus generating criticism of thedepartment; and

n Deployment. The deployment of protectedofficers needs careful thought. They are anecessary part of the police response, butthe timing and nature of their deploymentshould be carefully balanced against the po-tential negative effect of such action. It isrecommended that any decision to deployprotected officers be fully recorded in anevent log for reference in the after-actionreport.

The use of standard-issue equipment, suchas straight- or side-handle batons, hand-heldpepper spray and conducted-energy devices(tasers, stunguns, etc.) should be reviewed for ap-plicability, proper utilization (both techniqueand placement within the use-of-force continu-um) and officer proficiency. Training shouldinclude both a review of the use-of-force policyand a hands-on demonstration of officer profi-ciency. Specialized tools such as long batons andriot shields will require regular training to ensureofficer proficiency, even as the value of such toolsis debated. Some view them as necessary to pro-tect front-line officers from debris and missiles;others view them as a hindrance, as they can limit


an officer’s ability to make an arrest or maneuverquickly to avoid injury.

LESS-LETHAL DEVICES

The deployment and use of less-lethal equipmentis normally a response to escalating disorder andviolence. Less-lethal methods for restoring orderare always contentious, whether referring to en-gaging in physical contact; discharging projec-tiles, gases and chemicals; or using conducted-energy devices.1

There are two critical questions police offi-cials must ask themselves before deploying suchequipment: Is the equipment best suited to re-move the threat to front-line officers and enablethem to maintain or regain their objectives? Is itsuse reasonable, balanced and proportionate inlight of the above?

A review of recent mass demonstrationevents provides numerous positive examples ofthe appropriate use of less-lethal equipment incrowd control. The public, media and judicialsystem, it has been shown, will readily supportthe proper application of force under such cir-cumstances. However, the same review also re-veals that when inappropriately used, such op-tions have, at best, led to severe criticism and, atworst, to loss of life and injury, considerabledamage to the department’s reputation and sig-nificant litigation. The following guidelines arebased on lessons learned and best practicesknown to exist when determining deploymentand use of less-lethal options:

n The use must be balanced against the threatfaced by front-line officers and the goal

officers are attempting to accomplish (e.g.,contain, make arrests, quell disorder);

n The option should be used only until thedesired effect is achieved;

n Use should be frequently reassessed to en-sure continued need for deployment;

n The deployment and use should be author-ized at the agreed supervisory/commandlevel;

n The decision and the circumstances leadingto the use should be documented to sup-port after-action reporting and any subse-quent inquiry or litigation;

n The incident commander, operational com-mander, tactical commander, and public in-formation officer must be kept accuratelyinformed on use to allow them to updatemedia spokespersons and to maintain themedia initiative;

n The incident commander, operational com-mander, tactical commander, field officersand supervisors must have detailed knowl-edge of the effect and limitations of eachoption to assist in authorizing use; and

n Officers deployed in the field with less-lethal options must, without exception:o Be fully trained in their use, including

regular refresher trainingo Be fully aware of the capabilities of the

optiono Be fully aware of the limitations of the

optiono Be empowered to make the final decision

to use, or not to use, the option as cir-cumstances dictate.

1. Additional equipment currently used to support law enforcement initiatives are listed in: “Department ofDefense on Non-lethal Weapons and Equipment Review: A Research Guide for Civil Law Enforcement andCorrections.” Available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200516.pdf#search=’Department%20of%20Defense%20on%20Nonlethal%20Equipment%20and%20Weapons%20Review%3A%20A%20Research%20Guide%20for%20Civil%20Law%20enforcement%20and%20Corrections%E2%80%99’.

Police managers must ensure, through asystem of checks and balances, that any use ofless-lethal options are necessary and proportion-ate, and can be supported in after-action inquirythrough sufficiently detailed records. Whenproperly applied, less-lethal weapons can be ef-fective tools in accomplishing the police mission.In mass demonstration events, absent a specificand immediate need for self-defense, less-lethaluse-of-force directed at a crowd should occuronly at the direction of a supervisor.

BARRIERS

Physical barriers are commonly used to assist incrowd management and can take many forms.Barriers can extend police resources when de-mand is high, but should be considered a supportoption and not a substitute for personnel. Theprimary purposes of barrier use are to

n Control crowd movement (e.g., in the caseof enclosing/defining legal protest areas);

n Prevent street/building access to restrictedor vulnerable areas; and

n Channel or guide protestors along a partic-ular route.

Barrier type should reflect the intended use.One excellent example of an effective, flexibleand positive image barrier involves the use of po-lice bicycles to screen crowds and control access.However, barriers to prevent determined accessshould be more substantial. Three such barriersalready have proved effective at mass events inSavannah, Boston and New York: thirty-six-inchperimeter fencing (bike-rack style); 6’-8’ fencingto prohibit access to areas; and K-rail cement di-viders. A crucial consideration when placing bar-riers, particularly those that are more robust andstatic, is that sufficient exits and gates must be

included to allow police to cross barriers in re-sponse to crowd dynamics, or to allow crowds tocross barriers for safety reasons (e.g., to escape amajor catastrophe). Though barriers must bestaffed, their use is highly recommended to allowa smaller number of officers to control a muchlarger area.

Multi-agency operations frequently raise anissue of equipment parity. This was particularlyevident during the 2004 G8 Summit in Savannahand the DNC in Boston. On both occasions, dif-ferences in equipment type and deployment poli-cies were identified at an early stage, with plan-ners quickly realizing that these differences couldhave a detrimental effect during the operation.Effective management and pre-event training al-lowed the hosts to specify exactly what equip-ment would be carried by participating agenciesand how and at what level it would be authorizedfor use. In the event an equipment variance couldnot be unified, the command levels recognizedthe nature of the variance and deployed the re-sources with full knowledge of their exact capa-bilities, thus avoiding potential for conflict withevent policy and command.

The Miami Police Department, a day beforethe FTAA conference, erected a fixed barrier tocontain a “restricted area” that could be accessedonly with the appropriate credentials. A securityfence, rented at a cost of approximately $200,000,was installed (Timoney 2004). This patented de-sign fence is constructed of interlocking steelpanels with tight mesh to prevent protestors fromgaining a handgrip to climb or pull on the fence.It also has a metal plate attached at the bottomthat extends approximately three feet toward thecrowd. This was found to be a very effective fea-ture because in order to get close enough to thefence to attempt to tear it down, protestors had tostand on the plate, thereby making it impossibleto lift.


CONCLUSION

Law enforcement agencies should be aware of thevarious types of behaviors associated withdemonstrations, and determine the law enforce-ment response appropriate for each behavior.The ability of law enforcement to maintain or re-store order is highly dependent upon a thoroughunderstanding of the factors surrounding thepurpose of the gathering, the type of crowd andits potential behaviors.


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Chapter 7. Media Relations — 63

Media Relations

7

VERVIEW

Recent experiences clearly demonstrate themedia’s increasing attention to mass demonstra-tions. Contributing to this heightened news cov-erage is the fact that well-organized demonstra-tors often tip media sources as to the locationsand timeframes of their activities in order tomaximize publicity. Media saturation means thatlaw enforcement operations are increasingly inthe spotlight and that police chiefs are subject tocriticism for their actions, or lack thereof. As aresult, event management must include a mediastrategy.

An integrated media strategy seeks to man-age and harness the media attention in order tohelp achieve the overall policing objectives. By

partnering with the media, the potential increas-es for all parties to win, public confidence to bemaintained and the reputation of the law en-forcement agencies to be enhanced. In short, it isabout getting the right message out at the righttime, in the right place and by the right person.Police can work with media outlets to dissemi-nate planning information, and the media can beassured they will receive timely and factual infor-mation as the demonstration progresses. It is im-portant that the police take a proactive stance;without a clear media strategy, police operationswill likely be forced onto a reactive footing.Under such a scenario, the police would forfeittheir ability to manage the release of informationand the opportunity to provide accurate details.

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64 — Chapter 7. Media Relations

This chapter focuses on the need to developa comprehensive media relations policy for massdemonstrations. This includes working withmedia representatives before, during and after anevent. Particular attention is devoted tospokespersons, joint information centers andpress conferences.

MEDIA STRATEGY

Prior to the event, the police should prepare apress release, or even a press briefing, to assurethe public they are adequately staffed and haveproperly prepared to maintain public order andkeep the community safe. The information pre-sented should outline the following:

n Anticipated protest activities;

n Efforts undertaken to ensure a peacefuloutcome;

n A commitment to uphold civil liberties forall, commensurate with the challenges to befaced;

n Specific parade or protest routes;

n Locations subject to disruption of normalbusiness or traffic;

n The extent of disruption expected; and

n Alternative routes and/or mass transitalternatives.

Also, leaders should reiterate that the policeare well prepared, and call for the public to re-main calm. Whenever possible, hard copies out-lining specific details should be prepared for dis-tribution to the media to help ensure accuratereporting later. Recognizing that the media, ide-ally, needs current photos and video footage toaccompany their stories, the police should makethe department’s chief executive, event com-mander, mounted units, canine teams and special

equipment available to the media’s photogra-phers and film crews. The more the police cananticipate and address the media’s needs in ad-vance, the more accurate and thorough the re-ports will likely be.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, thepolice department’s standing media policies aswell as special procedures relating to a specificevent need to be disseminated to and discussedwith media representatives well in advance. Theaim of such polices should, at a minimum, in-clude the following:

n Promote police integrity and professionalism;

n Reassure citizens that the law will be en-forced and that their safety is paramount tothe police;

n Deter criminals by reinforcing the depart-ment’s resolve to arrest those who commitcrimes;

n Minimize disruption of the routine of thepublic; and

n Ensure a timely flow of accurate informa-tion to the public about the event.

On-scene supervisors and managers willlikely be too busy to grant interviews, but shouldbe well versed in the department’s media policiesand practices. They should be able to refer newsoutlets to an appropriate source for timely com-mentary. As has been stressed throughout theseguidelines, agencies must begin planning as earlyas practical. In preparation for the 2004 DNC, theBoston Police Department initiated the planningprocess more than a year in advance of the actualevent. A media subcommittee was establishedearly in the process. It was determined that theBoston Police would be sharing event responsibil-ity with the Secret Service, which would be re-sponsible for security and operations inside theFleet Center (the actual event venue). Therefore,

these two agencies spearheaded the media sub-committee. The group held monthly meetings,which were attended by representatives of the 14agencies thought to be best suited to address an-ticipated media inquires. In Miami, home to the2003 FTAA conference, the police department’splanning process also preceded the event by ayear and involved input from as many as 40 agen-cies (including surrounding police departments)that would supply public information officersduring the event.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

Some feel the release of information concerningan event is deemed more reliable and seamlesswhen a single public information officer (PIO),guided by advisors, is selected for this role. Otherdepartments have been successful, however, intraining a larger number of officers to serve as thedepartment’s on-camera representative. In eithercase, the person(s) chosen for this role should bequalified (by rank or experience), well informedand comfortable in media interview situations.There is no set or minimum rank or level of ex-perience for a PIO, but persons recognized fortheir expertise or supervisory/command levelamong members of the department can offer thepublic a considerable degree of confidence.

Many departments believe the public—andthe media—have greater confidence in the accu-racy of information when it comes from the “faceof the department” they have come to know andtrust. This familiarity and trust is developed overtime. In Washington, D.C., for example, SergeantJoe Gentile has been the police department’s on-camera representative for over three decades andhas earned an enormous amount of respect andtrust from the media.

The police in Seattle categorize press releasesaccording to the importance of their content.A Level 1 release is routine information that is

usually handled by the PIO. A Level 2 release is ofan unusual nature, such as mass arrests or opera-tions resulting in injury. Operational commandersmost often handle these releases. The most seriousare Level 3 releases, which could inform of deathsor a major impact to the city and are handled bythe chief of police and sometimes the mayor. Re-gardless of the press-release strategy determinedby the police, it is imperative that all staff membersunderstand who is authorized to speak on varioustopics. Additional points to remember when en-gaged in media interviews include

n Focus on key messages;

n Never criticize partner agencies;

n Always protect intelligence sources; and

n There is no such thing as “off the record.”

JOINT INFORMATION CENTERS

A Joint Information Center (JIC) is a commonfeature among police departments that have suc-cessfully prepared for large-scale events. The pur-pose of the JIC is to provide a single point of con-tact that the media and public can call to receiveroutine information and seek the answers to spe-cific questions they may have. The operationalformat of the JIC varies from agency to agency,but most agree that the JIC should be in a securelocation that is not physically accessible to themedia during the event.

In Boston, the JIC was set up in a securearea within the Boston Police Headquarters,apart from the everyday public information of-fice. Representatives of the 14 agencies were avail-able from 8:00 a.m. to midnight throughout theevent. By having a member from every involvedpolice agency (and other appropriate govern-mental entities) in the JIC, there was an expecta-tion that the most appropriate agency representa-tive could quickly research any inquiry. Realizing



that the bulk of activity and media investigationwould not take place after midnight, overnightstaffing was limited to the Boston Police, theMassachusetts State Police and the Secret Service.Also, a large-screen monitor was positioned inthe JIC for all participants to view transcribedtext of incoming calls for service related to theevent. This monitor included important infor-mation concerning threats, suspicious packagesand general data such as the number of arrests.Each member of the JIC staff also was outfittedwith a telephone and a home agency-linked com-puter. In Miami, officers from every participatingagency were present in the JIC and were connect-ed by radio and telephone to their respectiveagencies. There, field information was further en-hanced by means of an ongoing flow of commu-nications from roving public information teamsdeployed in the streets.

In Miami during the FTAA meetings, ratherthan centralizing all of public information re-sources in the JIC, three multi-agency teams,each consisting of three specifically trained pub-lic information officers, were deployed to theareas of activity to provide immediate informa-tion release and control as events unfolded. Theseteams monitored police radio traffic to deter-mine hot spots and where they might be needed.Operational commanders had the option offielding questions and conducting interviews, orthey could call in a public information team.

In addition to the public information staffassigned to the JIC and placed in roving fieldteams, departments agreed on the vital impor-tance of tasking a PIO with disseminating re-leasable information in a timely manner. It alsohas been suggested that the PIO should haveready access to the department’s legal advisor. Be-fore personnel assigned to the JIC can release in-formation, they must have access to the informa-tion of interest. This implies the need for an openand accurate flow of information among and

between field units and operational command-ers, the communications/dispatch centers andtop departmental officials. JIC managers unani-mously agreed that their most vital link to accu-rate information was with the operational and/ortactical centers. This provided real-time access toinformation “from the street” or other hub of ac-tivity. Typically, these centers also are the recep-tion points of live feeds from aerial support andstationary cameras. In Boston, for example, sometwenty cameras were positioned around theevent area to monitor key points relative to theDemocratic National Convention. Operationalcommanders also benefited from a live feed fromthe Massachusetts State Police helicopter. The JICalso should be outfitted with televisions tuned tothe local and national news channels covering theevent. Monitoring media outlets permits an op-portunity for prompt correction or rebuttalwhen the media supplies erroneous information.Failure to respond quickly and accurately whenthe department’s actions are criticized has provento be costly to police departments and their chiefexecutives. It is vital that the department be fullyaware of what is being reported, and by whom. Inthe event the department itself has released mis-information, a prompt correction is vital.

When Seattle activates a JIC, at least two in-dividuals are assigned exclusively to monitoringmedia reports. Major news services and localprint media websites also should be monitored.This level of monitoring—around the clock dur-ing the event—is vital to ensuring that the de-partment’s public information officials and topadministrators are aware of what is being report-ed, both accurately and inaccurately. JIC opera-tions in Seattle also include a formal briefing atshift change to communicate relevant informa-tion to the incoming staff.

In keeping with the primary objective of theJIC—to collect and disseminate accurate and time-ly information—it is critical to develop procedures


to facilitate the release of information and tomake sure the media understands these proce-dures. Well in advance of the event, the mediamust be informed of what type of informationto expect and what methods for accessing thatinformation to use.

To address reporters’ specific questionsabout the DNC, the Boston Police Departmentreleased “media only” telephone numbers for theJIC. The numbers were released only to pre-iden-tified media and only a few days before the event.The Boston Police Department employed thismethod because once the JIC becomes active, thetelephone number provided to the media shouldbe staffed around the clock. Additionally, depart-ments have found it valuable to have each mediaagency provide one point of contact (for the po-lice) at their news desk during the event. Finally,it is agreed that every telephone transaction thatoccurs within the JIC must be documented. De-tails of every inquiry and answer provided shouldbe fully captured and retrievable. Not only is thisimportant in the event of future litigation, butalso it can be useful in identifying lessonslearned.

PRESS CONFERENCES

PIOs and media professionals agree that when“pushing information,” the police departmenthas the opportunity to include details and per-spectives it feels are worthy of the public interest.Though the media can, and will, edit what thepolice release, it is far better for the departmentto put out information rather than simply re-spond to inquiries. In the interest of furtheringthis goal, the Seattle Police Department policy,for example, requires the PIO to schedule pressconferences at regular intervals throughout large-scale events.

Regular updates and specific releases aretypically handled by means of broadcast fax

transmissions, mass email and website postings.During the FTAA, the Miami Police Departmentmaintained a requirement to release an update ofinformation every three hours. They arrangedwith the U.S. Coast Guard to be given access to acomputer program through which they couldpost news updates on the Coast Guard website.By continually posting and updating informationabout the number of protestors, arrest numbersand locations, fire and rescue calls, traffic issuesand commuter information (subway or road clo-sures), and answers to frequently asked ques-tions, many general inquiry calls from the mediawere precluded.

In addition to the ongoing flow of informa-tion, news agencies need sound bites, photos andvideo footage. To meet this need, and to demon-strate openness and accessibility, the police de-partment may wish to establish a daily briefingand question-and-answer opportunity with thechief executive and other appropriate representa-tives. If the event and the police response becomemore newsworthy, it may be necessary to hostmultiple briefings each day. Miami officials feltthe pre-arranged press conferences, as well asMiami’s PIO teams in the field, provided the de-partment an opportunity to show its officials andofficers in “soft” and familiar uniforms, whichhelped balance the sometimes heavily armoredimages often shown in media reports.

Press conferences need not be exclusivelyreactive and focused on the police response to in-cidents. They also can serve as a vehicle for thedepartment to push good news. A thorough pub-lic information staff working through a large-scale event can uncover human-interest storiesthat humanize the police and highlight their ef-forts. Understandably, the media is on the huntfor action stories, but there also are opportunitiesto air or print “lighter” news. These opportunitiesshould be maximized. Most importantly, don’tchange the rules. Once the media is prepared to


work with the department’s policies, change canbe viewed as indecisiveness and, in some in-stances, as favoritism. If something is not work-ing and change is necessary, it is vital that every-one be informed before the change takes place.

POST-EVENT ACTIVITIES

Without question, the media will focus on thehappenings they find most newsworthy. Howev-er, their reporting can serve to restore calm. Forexample, as things begin to return to normal, thereporting and imagery of roadblocks being takendown, streets being reopened and buses depart-ing the event area can calm the public and furtherhelp to restore normalcy. There surely will beconsiderable ongoing media attention well afterany mass demonstration event. The actions of thepolice, demonstrators and the public will be ex-amined, critiqued and criticized, sometimes forweeks and months afterward. The police shouldutilize the brief opportunity they will have tosummarize their perspective immediately after

the event; the chief executive and key spokesper-sons should be prepared with an initial assess-ment and a media exit strategy. This requires thespokespersons to be fully informed of summaryinformation (i.e., facts related to injuries ordeaths, numbers of arrests, ongoing conditions,and the like). This is an excellent opportunity forthe department to demonstrate its awareness andcontrol throughout the event.

In the post-event phase, the policy directionwill be the benchmark against which police activ-ity will be assessed. Commanders can clearlyaudit why they took particular action, and theirdecisions can be measured against the statedstrategic and operational objectives establishedunder the same policies. From a public perspec-tive, displaying a high professional standard willenhance the community’s confidence in the po-lice’s ability to manage mass events. Lookingahead to successfully contesting potential post-event litigation, significant factors include clearpolicies, reasoned decision making, thoughtfulimplementation and a clear audit record.

Media Embedding in Miamibox 7

by Tony Narr

The positive response by the American public tomedia embedded with military units in Iraq—andwith police on “ride-along” television programs—has filtered its way to mass demonstration opera-tions. Prior to the FTAA, the Miami Police Depart-ment developed a policy to address theembedding of recognized media representativeswith certain operational units (Timoney 2004).The policy specifically permitted the local televi-sion and print media, national news services andminority news outlets to travel with the units onthese frontline units: the bicycle squad, responseteams and cut teams. They even went aboard theU.S. Coast Guard Cutter docked at the MiamiHarbor.

The opportunity was specifically extended topre-identified news organizations, not individualreporters. Actual assignments were made on a ro-tating basis via a lottery system administered bythe PIO. Embedded reporters were required to re-lease the department from liability and were heldto strict uniform dress code and safety gear re-quirements (helmets and gas masks), which wereto be provided by the news outlets. The embed-ded reporters also were required to attend a train-ing session on what to expect, what officers weretrained to do and how various circumstanceswould be addressed.

The intent of embedded reporter programs isto provide the media—and ultimately the public—with timely and interesting first-hand informa-tion. It also is noteworthy that camera shots from

the police side of a confrontation can capture amore comprehensive view than if the cameras areonly on the protestors’ side. Nevertheless, em-bedding demands that reporters and the policehave a clear agreement on the nature of informa-tion that is deemed too sensitive for release. Gen-erally, restricted information should be limited tothat which could compromise police operationsor endanger the safety of the public or officers. InMiami, restricted information was identified as

n Specific numbers of officers in a unit;

n Specific numbers of units participating inan event;

n Specific numbers regarding equipment ofcritical supplies;

n Specific geographic location of units duringan event (including identifiable imageryvideo);

n Information relative to future operations;

n Information relative to protective measures;

n Information relative to rules of engagement;

n Information relative to intelligence collec-tion activities, compromising tactics, tech-niques or procedures; and

n Operational information (e.g., entry pointsor estimated response times).

Unit commanders should be encouraged tofacilitate opportunities for embedded media toobserve and report on events and operations.



Those same commanders, however, must be au-thorized to temporarily hold the transmission ofrestricted information, or terminate a reporter’sassignment when necessary. It also is importantto remember there will be freelance and othernews agency reporters covering the event who are

not embedded. Though they may not be affordedthe same access as embedded reporters, theyhave a legitimate right to undertake their work;alienating them or over-restricting their accesscan prove counter-productive.

CONCLUSION

The new relationship between law enforcementand the media is complex, and in the case of massdemonstrations, it can prove especially challeng-ing. Police executives should understand that therelationship deserves an investment—in buildingtrust, ground rules and expertise to make themost of a positive arrangement with the media.The media can be an ally and can tell the police’sside of the story, too, provided they are engagedearly in the event preparations.


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PHOTO BY DOUG NELSON

Chapter 8. Conclusion — 73

Conclusion

“It’s not the plan that is important, it’s the planning.”G E N E R A L D W I G H T D . E I S E N H O W E R

8

ver the past fifteen years, mass demon-strations have created significant challenges forlaw enforcement agencies. From spontaneousdisorder after athletic events to highly organizedprotests against international monetary policies,local law enforcement agencies have encountereddemonstrations that require seemingly everyavailable resource to contain. In addition, policeactions seem to be the subject of increased mon-itoring by third parties, including news agencies,amateur reporters, and civil rights organizations,

all of whom are armed with video cameras. Thesedevelopments exert sustained pressure on law en-forcement to “get it right.”

Agencies must balance a number of con-flicting demands when managing demonstra-tions. These include allowing legitimate groupsto express their First Amendment rights; protect-ing innocent bystanders; safeguarding municipaland private property; ensuring unimpeded com-merce and traffic; containing unruly protestorswith the appropriate type and amount of force;

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74 — Chapter 8. Conclusion

preventing injuries to officers; and, all the while,projecting professionalism and proficiency.

This report has drawn on the experiences ofseveral agencies that have had experiences—goodand bad—managing mass demonstrations. Theprominent message that emerged from the re-search, discussions and interviews conducted forthis project is the importance of early and com-prehensive planning for mass demonstrationevents. Planning a police response is not limitedto organized demonstrations, but is possible formany spontaneous ones, such as those associatedwith sporting events. The planning does not stopwith the “plan.” It is a live process designed toavoid a potential crisis, while allowing com-manders the flexibility to meet unforeseen cir-cumstances. The true measure of the planningwill be seen in the post-event period, duringwhich critical reviews from both internal and ex-ternal sources may occur, either as investigations,media reports or law suits (or any combinationthereof). It is, therefore, necessary to invest timeand effort early in the planning process. It also isvital to build relationships and to maximizetraining and preparation to ensure the police re-sponse will be effective on the day of the event.

Agencies also should pay particular attentionto several measures that can significantly impactthe successful management of demonstrations.Training for managing a mass demonstration isessential to success. Commanders, supervisors andofficers alike must be proficient at carrying outtheir respective roles. Training should begin in theclassroom and expand to tabletop and simula-tions. Mass demonstration management trainingshould be conducted in a group setting, preferablywith officers assembled in their assigned squads orteams. This “team practice” approach facilitatesproficiency in tactical skills, establishes individualand team expectations, helps promote use-of-force awareness and promotes teamwork over po-tentially counterproductive individual actions.

Information management also is a compo-nent of effectively controlling a demonstration.Mass demonstration management calls for care-ful attention to managing information before,during and after an event. Both gathering andthoroughly analyzing information and intelli-gence about demonstrators’ activities dramatical-ly strengthen a police department’s plan. A for-mal information/data collection methodologyshould be put into place to record critical infor-mation during the event. Documentation of keyevents, decisions and actions (including their ra-tionale) allows the agency to create an historicalrecord of all that took place. A process to recordkey events, decisions and actions should be devel-oped and implemented in the early stages ofevent planning, and followed throughout eachevent management phase. It is especially impor-tant to stress the necessity of strictly following thedepartment’s use-of-force reporting criteria dur-ing mass demonstration events.

The recent experiences of agencies that havemanaged mass demonstrations highlight the ne-cessity of making certain that everyone knowsthe “what,” “when” and “where” of expectationsassigned to them. Roles and responsibilities mustbe clear, or an agency will dramatically reduce itschances of effectively managing the demonstra-tion. Practitioners agree that a well-defined, min-imal chain of command—consisting of strategic,operational and tactical levels—is effective whenmanaging mass demonstrations. Agencies alsomust consider the responsibilities of units thatwill support the larger effort to manage thedemonstration, including criminal investigationunits and specialized units, such as SWAT,mounted units and bicycle patrols.

Because crowds at mass demonstrationscan vary dramatically in their size, composition,intentions and behaviors, crowd-control policiesand tactics are essential. Closely related to crowdcontrol are the use-of-force and mass arrests. All

Chapter 8. Conclusion — 75

three issues are critical to keeping a demonstra-tion under control. If mishandled, they can en-danger officers, innocent bystanders and demon-strators. Third parties are especially sensitive tohow law enforcement agencies handle these is-sues. If an agency mismanages them, it can dam-age the agency’s reputation and even result inlitigation. Agencies must maintain clearly articu-lated policies, and ensure that every officer isfamiliar with them prior to a demonstration.

Recent experiences clearly demonstrate thatmedia attention has increased and will continueto do so. Media saturation means that law en-forcement operations are increasingly in thespotlight and that police chiefs are all the moresubject to criticism for their actions, or lackthereof. To maintain and increase public confi-dence, as well as to manage the reputation of thelaw enforcement agencies involved, agenciesmust develop an integrated media strategy thatwill help achieve overall policing objectives. Im-portant aspects to consider include developingmedia messages before, during and after the

event, working with the media covering theevent, designating agency spokespersons, estab-lishing joint information centers and holdingpress conferences.

Mass demonstrations create significantchallenges for law enforcement leaders and offi-cers. They can lead to injuries, loss of life and ru-ined careers. This report has identified many ofthe critical issues that departments should con-sider when planning for and actually managingmass demonstrations. The experiences detailedherein are significant because they involve agen-cies that have managed some of the nation’s mostrecent high-profile demonstrations. Still, there areother examples, lessons learned and manuals toguide agencies as they prepare for mass demon-strations. By investing time and effort early in theplanning process, building relationships andmaximizing both training and preparation, lawenforcement agencies can position themselves tomanage mass demonstrations successfully.

76

Appendix A. Links to Documents on the World Wide Web — 77

Appendix A.Links to Documents on the World Wide Web*

Association of Chief Police Officers. “Manual ofGuidance on Keeping the Peace.” Available at:http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/keeping_the_peace.pdf.

CNN.com article. “24-hour Seattle Curfew NearWTO site.” Available at: http://www.cnn.com/1999/US/12/02/wto.03/.

CNN.com article. “Police, Protesters Clash NearMiami Trade Talks.” Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/South/11/20/miami.protests/.

Council of the District of Columbia Draft Report.“Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan PoliceDepartment’s Policy and Practice in HandlingDemonstrations in the District of Columbia.” Avail-able at: http://www.dcwatch.com/police/040311.htm.

National Security Research, Inc. “Department ofDefense on Non-lethal Weapons and EquipmentReview: A Research Guide for Civil Law Enforce-ment and Corrections.” Available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200516.pdf#search=’Depar tment%20of%20Defense%20on%20Nonlethal%20Equipment%20and%20Weapons%20Review%3A%20A%20Research%20Guide%20for%20Civil%20Law%20enforcement%20and%20Corrections%E2%80%99’.

New York Civil Liberties Union. “NYCLU SupportsCouncil Hearing On Police Practices During TheRNC.” Available at: http://www.nyclu.org/rnc_police_hearing_pr_091404.html.

Police Assessment Resource Center. CommissionInvestigating The Death of Victoria Snelgrove.Available at: http://www.parc.info/.

The New York Times. “Judge Keeps City on NoticeOver Convention Protest Arrests.” Available at:http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/nyregion/10detain.html?ex=1252468800&en=288572afb358a3ba&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center forDomestic Preparedness. Available at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/CDP072005.pdf.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FederalEmergency Management Agency. “National Inci-dent Management System Training.” Available at:http://www.fema.gov/nims/nims_training.shtm.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “NationalSpecial Security Events Fact Sheet.” Available at:http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0207.xml.

U.S. Department of Justice. “The Attorney Gener-al’s Guidelines on General Crimes, RacketeeringEnterprises and Terrorism Enterprise Investiga-tions.” Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.

U.S. Secret Service. “National Special SecurityEvents.” Available at: http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml.

* All resources were available at the indicated links as of 10 January 2006.

78

SAMPLE

Appendix B. Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events — 79

Appendix B.Seattle Police Department

Planning Checklist for Special Events

Planning Checklist for Special Events

Event Name ___________________________________ Special Event #________

Event Date ____________________________________

COMMAND

q Event Commander _______________________________ notified by _____________________

q Field Commander _______________________________ notified by _____________________

q SPOC Activated ________ Commander ______________ notified by _____________________

q Lead Planner ___________________________________________________________________

q Planning meetings scheduled __________ weekly – bi-weekly – monthly________

Dates: _______ ____________ ______________ _________________

q Ops Plan written by _____________________________________________________________

q Required attendance by ___________________________________________________________

q Fire __________________________________________________________________________

q Sea Tran _______________________________________________________________________

q Public Health ___________________________________________________________________

q Event Promoter _________________________________________________________________

q S.P.U. _________________________________________________________________________

q City Light _____________________________________________________________________

q School Security _________________________________________________________________

q Warning Order – Yes No Information _____________________________________________

Frequency ________________________________________ monitored _____________________

SAMPLE

INTELLIGENCE / PLANNING notified by ______________________________________________

q Commander ___________________________________________________________________

Situation Report ___________________________________________________________________

q Threat Analysis Received __________________________________________________________

q Contingency Plans _______________________________________________________________

PERSONNEL / FINANCE / ADMINISTRATION

On Duty Resources notified by ________________________________________________

utilized _______________________ available__________________________

q Task Force Commander __________________________________________________________

o First Watch __________________________________

o Second Watch ________________________________

o Third Watch _________________________________

o Precinct _____________________________________

o Bikes ______ N ______ S _____ E ______ W _______

o Footbeat ____________________________________

q Demobilization Plan _____________________________________________________________

OPERATIONS

Precinct Resources Utilized

o CPT_______ N ______ S _____ E ______ W ______

o ACT - Days N _____ W _____

Nights N _____ S ______ E _____ W _______

Special Resources Anticipated Tasks

q PORT One notified by _______________ _____________________________________

q PORT Two notified by _______________ _____________________________________

q PORT Three notified by _______________ _____________________________________

q PORT Four notified by _______________ _____________________________________

q Long Rifles notified by _______________ _____________________________________

q EMT’s notified by _______________ _____________________________________

q Traffic notified by _______________ _____________________________________

o AM ________________________________________

o Motors ______________________________________

o PM _________________________________________

q Prisoner Processing notified by __________ _____________________________________

q ART – T1, T2 notified by _________ _____________________________________

80 — Appendix B: Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events

SAMPLE

OPERATIONS continued

Special Resources Anticipated Tasks

q SWAT – D, N notified by __________ _______________________________

q SAT notified by __________ _______________________________

q Mutual Aid-see Logistics notified by __________ _______________________________

q ABS notified by __________ _______________________________

q Radio Crisis Response Team notified by __________ _______________________________

LOGISTICS

q Commander _________________ notified by __________ Tasks _______________________

q Support Staff ___________________________________________________________________

q Vehicle Rentals _________________________________________________________________

q Feeding Plan ___________________________________________________________________

o SPD ________________________________________

o Mutual Aid ___________________________________

q Determine / Assign Radio Frequencies / Call Signs ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Anticipated Needs for Event

q Vehicles _______________________________________________________________________

q Mobile Precincts _________ CV _________ N ___-_____ S ________ E ________ SW _______

q Demo Van _____________________________________________________________________

q 40’ buses ______________________________________________________________________

q Dart Vans ______________________________________________________________________

q Chemical Agents ________________________________________________________________

q Barrier tape ____________________________________________________________________

q Fencing _______________________________________________________________________

q Parking _________________________________ Staging Area __________________________

Anticipated Communications Needs for the Event

q Communications needs _____________________ Freqs. ________________________________

q Other needs ____________________________________________________________________

Special Logistical Needs

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Appendix B. Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events — 81

SAMPLE

MUTUAL AID

*The Logistics Section Chief should handle notification of Mutual Aid resourcesand provide Staging location for response during the event.

q Washington State Patrol notified by _____________________________________________

o Uniform notified by_____________________________________

o CDAT notified by_____________________________________

o WSP SWAT notified by_____________________________________

q King County Sheriff notified by ____________________________________________

o CDU notified by_____________________________________

o KC SWAT notified by_____________________________________

q Snohomish County notified by ____________________________________________

q Snohomish County ALERT notified by ____________________________________________

q Valley Crowd Control notified by ____________________________________________

q Valley SWAT notified by ____________________________________________

q Bellevue Police notified by ____________________________________________

q Bellevue SWAT notified by ____________________________________________

q Kirkland Police notified by ____________________________________________

o CDU notified by_____________________________________

q Redmond Police notified by ____________________________________________

o CDU notified by_____________________________________

q Everett Police notified by ____________________________________________

o CDU notified by_____________________________________

NOTES: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

82 — Appendix B: Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events

SAMPLE

Appendix C. Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU — 83

Appendix C.Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is executed by the United States Attorney for the

District of Columbia, the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C. (MPD) and the (Outside

Agency Name).

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of the MOU is to outline the mission of the Presidential Inauguration Task Force

(PITF) in the Washington, D.C. area from January 19, 2005 to January 21, 2005. Additionally, this MOU will

define relationships between the U.S. Marshal Service, MPD and the (Agency Name), as well as other par-

ticipating agencies with regard to policy, guidance, utilization of resources, planning, training, public rela-

tions and media in order to maximize interagency cooperation, during this period.

II. MISSION

The mission of the PITF is to achieve maximum coordination and cooperation in bringing to bear

combined resources to effectively implement measures to ensure the safety of the President of the United

States, inaugural participants, the public, visitors and residents while allowing individuals and groups to ex-

ercise their rights.

Additionally, all units that are participating agencies will coordinate their activities and be consid-

ered a member of the PITF, sharing information and coordinating investigative and law enforcement efforts

which result from apprehensions originating from the PITF.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. Direction

The (Agency Name) acknowledges that the PITF is a joint operation in which all agencies, includ-

ing the Metropolitan Police Department of District of Columbia, Office of the United States Attorney for

District of Columbia, United States Marshals Service, United States Secret Service, United States Federal Bu-

reau of Investigation, National Park Service, (Agency Name) Police Department and other agencies, act as

partners in the operation of the PITF. The Command Center for the operations will be located at the Met-

ropolitan Police Department (MPD) Headquarters and will be staffed by members from United States

SAMPLE

Marshals Service, MPD, U.S. Park Police, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These officers will serve

as the Executive Council for this operation.

B. Supervision

The day-to-day operation and administrative control of the PITF will be the responsibility of a Tac-

tical Team Commander selected from one of the participating agencies. The Tactical Team Commander will

coordinate with supervisory personnel of the United States Marshals Service as the sponsoring agency for

Special Deputation (federal) and with MPD as the lead agency for the operation. The daily management of

the PITF will be closely monitored by the MPD.

Responsibility for the conduct of the PITF members, both personally and professionally, shall re-

main with the respective agency directors subject to the provisions in Section IX (Liability).

C. Unilateral Law Enforcement Action

There shall be no unilateral action taken on the part of any participating agency relating to PITF

activities. All law enforcement action will be coordinated and conducted in a cooperative manner under the

direction of the Executive Council and the MPD.

IV. PROCEDURES

A. Personnel

Continued assignment of personnel to the PITF will be based upon performance and will be at the

discretion of the respective agency. Each participating agency will be provided with reports as necessary re-

garding the program, direction, and accomplishment of the PITF.

B. Deputation

All local and state law enforcement personnel designated to the PITF will be subject to background

inquiry and will be federally deputized, with the United States Marshals Service securing the required depu-

tation authorization. These deputations will remain in effect throughout the tenure of each officer’s assign-

ment to the PITF or until termination of the PITF, whichever occurs first. Each individual deputized as a Spe-

cial U.S. Marshal will have all necessary law enforcement authority as provided by 28 U.S.C. 566(c) and (d);

28 U.S.C. 564, 18 U.S.C. 3053, 28 C.F.R. 0.112, and the deputation authority of the Deputy Attorney Gener-

al. The Special Deputy U.S. Marshals will be responsible for 1) performing necessary law enforcement steps

to keep the peace of the United States; 2) enforcing federal law (e.g., 18 U.S.C. 112, 1116, and 878, as well as

other provisions of that title); 3) protecting visiting foreign officials, official guests, and internationally pro-

tected persons; 4) taking necessary law enforcement steps to prevent violations of federal law, and; 5) enforc-

ing District of Columbia law as a result of the deputation (see D.C. Code and 28 U.S.C. 564).

Individuals deputized as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals pursuant to this MOU who suffer a disabil-

ity or die as a result of personal injury sustained while in the performance of his or her duty during the

assignment shall be treated as a federal employee as defined by Title 5 U.S.C. Section 8101. Any such indi-

viduals who apply to the U.S. Department of Labor for federal workers’ compensation under Section 3374

must submit a copy of this MOU with his or her application. All applicants will be processed by the U.S.

Department of Labor on a case by case basis in accordance with applicable law and regulation.

84 — Appendix C: Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU

SAMPLE

C. Law Enforcement Activities

Since it is anticipated that almost all cases originating from PITF arrests will be prosecuted at the

state or local level, the law enforcement methods employed by all participating law enforcement agencies

shall conform to the requirements of such statutory or common law pending a decision as to a change of

venue for prosecution.

D. Prosecution

The criteria for determining whether to prosecute a particular violation in federal or state court will

focus upon achieving the greatest overall benefit to law enforcement and the community. Any question that

arises pertaining to prosecutorial jurisdiction will be resolved through the Executive Council. The U.S. At-

torney’s Office for the District of Columbia has agreed to formally participate in the PITF and will adopt

policies and seek sentences that meet the needs of justice.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE

A. Records and Reports

All records and reports generated by PITF members shall be routed through the Tactical Team

Commander who shall be responsible for maintaining custody and proper dissemination of said records as

he or she deems appropriate.

B. Staff Briefings

Periodic briefings on the PITF law enforcement actions will be provided to the Directors of the par-

ticipating agencies or their designees. Statistics regarding accomplishments will also be provided to the par-

ticipating agencies as available.

VI. MEDIA

All media releases pertaining to the PITF law enforcement activity and/or arrests will be coordinat-

ed by all participants of this MOU. No unilateral press releases will be made by any participating agency

without the prior approval of the Executive Council. No information pertaining to the PITF itself will be

released to the media without mutual approval of all participants.

VII. EQUIPMENT

A. PITF Vehicles

Each participating agency, pending availability and individual agency policy, agrees and authorizes

PITF members to use vehicles, when available, owned or leased by those participating agencies, in connec-

tion with PITF law enforcement operations. In turn, each participating agency agrees to be responsible for

any negligent act or omission on the part of its agency or its employees, and for any liability resulting from

the misuse of said vehicles, as well as any damage incurred to those vehicles as a result of any such negligent

act or omission on the part of the participating agency or its employees, subject to the provisions of Sec-

tion IX (Liability).

Participating agency vehicles assigned to the PITF are subject to funding availability, are provided

at the discretion of the supervisor of the providing agency and will be utilized only by the PITF members.

Vehicles provided by participating agencies will be used only during working hours and will not be used for


SAMPLE

transportation to and from work by task force members or used for any other purpose. Participating agen-

cies will provide maintenance and upkeep of their vehicles consistent with each agency’s policy. Vehicles

provided as pool vehicles for PITF use will be parked at the end of each shift at a location determined by

the Tactical Team Commander or his/her designee.

B. Other Equipment

Other equipment furnished by any agency for use by other agencies’ participating personnel shall

be returned to the originating agency upon termination of the PITF or this MOU.

VIII. FUNDING

The (Agency Name) agrees to provide the full-time services of its respective personnel for the du-

ration of this operation, and to assume all personnel costs for their PITF representatives, including salaries,

overtime payments, and fringe benefits consistent with their respective agency policies and procedures. Re-

imbursement for the cost of such personnel will be made by the District of Columbia, with funds provid-

ed by the United States and from general revenue.

IX. LIABILITY

Unless specifically addressed by the terms of this MOU, the parties agree to be responsible for the

negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of their respective employees. Legal representation by the United

States is determined by the Department of Justice on a case-by-case basis. There is no guarantee that the

United States will provide legal representation to any federal, state or local law enforcement officer. Congress

has provided that the exclusive remedy for the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

United States government, acting within the scope of employment, shall be an action against the United

States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2).

For the limited purpose of defending claims arising out of PITF activity, state or local law enforce-

ment officers who have been specially deputized as U.S. Marshals and who are acting within the course and

scope of their official duties and assignments pursuant to this MOU, may be considered an “employee” of

the United States government as defined in 28 U.S.C. 2671. It is the position of the Department of Justice

Civil Division Torts Branch that such individuals are federal employees for these purposes.

Under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (commonly

known as the Westfall Act), 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1), the Attorney General or his designee may certify that an

individual defendant acted within the scope of employment at the time of the incident giving rise to the

suit. ID., 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2). The United States can then be substituted for the employee as the sole de-

fendant with respect to any tort claims. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2). If the United States is substituted as defen-

dant, the individual employee is thereby protected from suits in his official capacity.

If the Attorney General declines to certify that an employee was acting within the scope of employ-

ment, “the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find and certify that the employee

was acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(3).

Liability for any negligent or willful acts of PITF employees, undertaken outside the terms of this

MOU, will be the sole responsibility of the respective employee and agency involved.

Liability for violations of federal constitutional law rests with the individual federal agent or offi-

cer pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or pur-

suant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 for state and local officers or cross-deputized federal officers.


SAMPLE

Both state and federal officers enjoy qualified immunity from suit for constitutional torts insofar as

their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

PITF officers may request representation by the U.S. Department of Justice for civil suits against

them in their individual capacities for actions taken within the scope of employment. 28 C.F.R. 50.15, 50.16.

An employee may be provided representation when the actions for which representation is request-

ed reasonably appear to have been preformed within the scope of the employee’s employment and the At-

torney General or his designee determines that providing representation would otherwise be in the interest

of the United States. 28 C.F.R. 50.15(a). A PITF officer’s written request for representation should be direct-

ed to the Attorney General and provided to the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District

of Columbia, which will then forward the representation request to the Civil Division of the United States

Department of Justice together with a recommendation concerning scope of employment and Department

representation. 28 C.F.R. 50.15(a)(3).

If a PITF officer is found to be liable for a constitutional tort, he/she may request indemnification

from the Department of Justice to satisfy an adverse judgment rendered against the employee in his/her in-

dividual capacity. 28 C.F.R. 50.15(c)(4). The criteria for payment are substantially similar to those used to

determine whether a federal employee is entitled to Department of Justice representation under 28 C.F.R.

50.15(a).

X. DURATION

This MOU shall remain in effect until terminated as specified above, unless that date is modified as

set forth in Section XI. Continuation of the MOU shall be subject to the availability of necessary funding.

This agreement may be terminated at any time by any of the participating agencies. The (Agency Name)

may withdraw from this MOU at any time by providing a seven-day written notice of its intent to withdraw

to the MPD. Upon the termination of the MOU, all equipment will be returned to the supplying agencies.

XI. MODIFICATIONS

The terms of this MOU may be modified at any time by written consent of all parties. Modifica-tions to this MOU shall have no force and effect unless such modifications are reduced to writing andsigned by an authorized representative of each participating agency.

XII. LIMITATION

Nothing in this MOU is intended to, or shall be construed to, create enforceable rights in thirdparties.


SAMPLE

(AGENCY NAME)

______________________________________City Manager/Authorized Designee

WASHINGTON, D.C. METROPOLITANPOLICE DEPARTMENT

______________________________________Chief of Police

UNITED STATES ATTORNEYFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____________________________________U.S. Attorney


References — 89

References

California Commission on Peace Officer Stan-dards and Training. 2003. “Crowd Managementand Civil Disobedience Guidelines.” March 15.

CNN.com. 1999. “24- hour Seattle Curfew NearWTO Site.” Rusty Dornin. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/1999/US/12/02/wto.03/.

CNN.com. 2003. “Police, Protesters Clash NearMiami Trade Talks.” Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/South/11/20/miami.protests/.

New York Civil Liberties Union. 2004. “NYCLUSupports Council Hearing On Police PracticesDuring The RNC.” Available at: http://www.nyclu.org/rnc_police_hearing_pr_091404.html.

The New York Times. 2004. “Judge Keeps City onNotice Over Convention Protest Arrests.” Avail-able at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/nyregion/10detain.html?ex=1252468800&en=288572afb358a3ba&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland.

Perry, Debi and Guy Kerr. 2002. “G-8 Summit:After-Action Report.” Calgary Police Service.

Richardson, Stewart. 2002. “Senior CommandCourse 2002—Managing Operations: Interna-tional Students’ Handbook.” Centrex (CentralPolice Training and Development Authority), 57.

Seattle Police Department. 2000. “Seattle PoliceDepartment After-Action Report: World Trade

Organization Ministerial Conference, Novem-ber 29–December 3, 1999.” Seattle, Washington.April 4.

Seattle Police Department. 2001. “Seattle PoliceDepartment After Action Report: Mardi Gras2001.” August 1.

Seattle Post-Intelligencer. 2001. “Mardi Gras taskforce says more events need city supervision, per-mits.” Available at: http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/specials/mardigras/.

Stern, Donald; Raymond Downs; Robert P. Git-tens; Janice W. Howe; Steve Ijames; Patrick J.King; and Christopher E. Stone. 2005. “Report ofthe Commission Investigating The Death of Vic-toria Snelgrove.” Boston, Massachusetts. May 25.Available at: http://www.parc.info/.

Temple, Ralph. 2003. American Civil LibertiesUnion of the National Capital Area. “The Polic-ing of Demonstrations in the Nation’s Capital: AMisconception Of The Mission And A Failure OfLeadership.” Available at: http://www.aclu-nca.org/pdf/PoliceDemoReport.pdf.

Timoney, John F. 2004.“F.T.A.A. 2003 After-ActionReport.” Miami Police Department. January 30.

90

About the Authors/Contributors — 91

About the Authors/Contributors

Tony Narr

Tony Narr is PERF’s Director of Management Ed-ucation. He administers the Senior ManagementInstitute for Police and is responsible for othermanagement services programs, research andspecial projects. He has headed a variety of majorPERF projects, including Police Response to theHomeless; the Development of Model Policesand an Investigative Protocol for Domestic ElderAbuse; the Americans with Disabilities Act proj-ect; and The PERF Report—Violent Crime andMurder Reduction in Kingston, Jamaica. Since1986, when he was selected as PERF’s first Man-agement Services Fellow, Mr. Narr has participat-ed in over 100 PERF management studies of lawenforcement agencies.

Prior to joining PERF’s full-time staff in1992, Mr. Narr served as a Captain with the PrinceGeorge’s County, Maryland, Police Department.He was the department’s accreditation manager,responsible for national accreditation in 1991. Healso has served as an accreditation assessor for theCommission on Accreditation for Law Enforce-ment Agencies, Inc. (CALEA). Prior to this role,he served as commander of the department’s per-sonnel division; sector commander (overseeingpatrol and investigative functions); executive offi-cer; assistant to the chief of police; and crime pre-vention coordinator. Prior to entering police serv-ice, Mr. Narr spent five years as a member of the

Prince George’s County Fire Department. Heholds an undergraduate degree from the Univer-sity of Maryland in technology and managementand a master’s degree from Central MichiganUniversity in personnel administration.

Jessica Toliver

Jessica Ingenito Toliver joined PERF as a ResearchAssociate in April 2005. Ms. Toliver’s work focus-es on criminal justice and homeland security re-search, analysis and technical assistance. Prior tojoining PERF, she served as a policy analyst in theHomeland Security & Technology Division at theNational Governors Association. There, she de-veloped, executed and publicized the AnniversarySurvey project; managed homeland securitygrant programs; and organized policy academiesto provide technical assistance to state teams.

During a 2003 fellowship in the office ofMichigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm, Ms.Toliver conducted a cost/benefit analysis of theMichigan State Police’s DNA forensic labs and is-sued a report recommending organizational andfunding changes to enhance efficiency. She holdsa bachelor’s degree in political science and jour-nalism from the University of Richmond and amaster’s degree in public policy from the GeraldR. Ford School of Public Policy at the Universityof Michigan.

Jerry Murphy

Jerry Murphy is the Director of Homeland Secu-rity and Development for PERF. In this capacity,he manages a variety of research, managementand technical assistance projects focusing on lawenforcement and homeland security. He alsooversees the development of new project ideasfor PERF.

Previously, Mr. Murphy was Director of theHomeland Security and Technology Division atthe National Governors Association, where heprovided assistance and resources to governors,their policy advisors and homeland security di-rectors. There, he covered issues such as emer-gency response to terrorism and natural disasters,bioterrorism, critical infrastructure protection,information technology and information analysisand sharing.

In his 12 years at PERF, Mr. Murphy hasheld a number of positions, including deputy di-rector of research, senior research associate andresearch associate. He has authored and co-au-thored numerous PERF publications. His mostrecent publication is Managing a Multijurisdic-tional Case: Identifying the Lessons Learned fromthe Sniper Investigation. Mr. Murphy also spent12 years with the Baltimore County Police De-partment as both director of planning and re-search and assistant to the chief. During histenure at the department, he also served as exec-utive director of the Baltimore County PoliceFoundation. Mr. Murphy holds a master’s degreein policy sciences, has completed extensive worktowards his doctorate in policy sciences and is agraduate of the Federal Executive Institute.

Malcolm McFarland

Malcolm McFarland is a serving police officerwith the Police Service of Northern Ireland. With27 years of service, he is currently the operations

superintendent for the PSNI Urban Region(Belfast and its surrounding suburbs). He is anhonors graduate of the University of Ulster inpublic policy and management. His operationalpolice service covers policing in Belfast, CountyAntrim and the city of Londonderry. Other serv-ice includes command of Tactical Support forRural Region and co-coordination of joint Police/Army operations.

Mr. McFarland’s additional experience in-volves a period as a police trainer in tactical supportskills, Public Order, Search and Security response.During that time, he researched and jointly devel-oped the present PSNI Command and Controlsystem for managing public order and othermajor incidents. His service as an investigator,and later as a staff officer in the Complaints andDiscipline Department, provided valuable insightand experience into the management of qualityservice delivery and the maintenance of profes-sional policing ethical standards. He is currentlytrained in disaster and civil emergency manage-ment and in management of chemical, biological,radiological and nuclear incidents.

Joshua Ederheimer

Joshua Ederheimer is director of PERF’s Centerfor Force & Accountability (CFA) in Washington,D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004 as a seniorassociate after a successful career with the Metro-politan Police Department (MPD) of the Districtof Columbia.

In May 2005, Mr. Ederheimer was tasked byPERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler with de-veloping and leading the CFA. The CFA’s primarygoal is to be the premiere resource on police use-of-force and accountability issues domesticallyand internationally. The CFA identifies emergingtrends, seeks out cutting-edge strategies, con-ducts research, provides high-quality technical

92 — About the Authors/Contributors

assistance to agencies and acts as a central repos-itory for information regarding use-of-force andpolice accountability issues.

While serving as a member of the MPD, Mr.Ederheimer attained the rank of inspector andwas named Director of the Civil Rights and ForceInvestigations Division. During his tenure, heacquired expertise as a commanding officer inseveral areas, including internal affairs, use-of-force, equal employment opportunity and civilrights. Mr. Ederheimer reengineered numerousprocesses, and developed and led several opera-tional units that emerged as national models insuch areas as internal and force investigations,consent decree implementation, police accounta-bility, policing in public housing and environ-mental crimes investigations. He specializes inpolice leadership, management reform and busi-ness process reengineering. He holds a bachelor’sdegree in justice from American University and amaster’s degree in management from Johns Hop-kins University.

Mary Jo Harris

Mary Jo Harris is an attorney with the Boston lawfirm Morgan, Brown & Joy LLP, with a practiceconcentrating on employment and civil rights lit-igation and representation of managers in boththe public and private sectors. Ms. Harris beganher legal career as an assistant corporation coun-sel for the City of Boston Law Department, whereshe was a trial attorney practicing in state andfederal court. From 1998 to 2005, she was thelegal advisor to the Boston Police Department. Inthis capacity, Ms. Harris was involved in all as-pects of police management, including workingwith internal affairs and anti-corruption investi-gators reviewing police activity, and advising thepolice commissioner and command staff on thedevelopment and implementation of policies,rules and regulations.

In 2004, Ms. Harris headed the multi-agency legal team assigned to review and adviselocal, state and federal law enforcement agencieson issues of crowd control and arrest proceduresdeveloped for the Democratic National Conven-tion held in Boston that year. She successfully de-fended against a last-minute, federal suit filed byadvocacy groups challenging the methods bywhich the Boston Police, Federal Bureau of Inves-tigation and Secret Service planned to addressdemonstrations and protests. Ms. Harris graduat-ed from Kenyon College and received her law de-gree from Northeastern University. She is a mem-ber of the Massachusetts bar, and is admitted topractice before the First Circuit Court of Appeals.She serves on the executive boards of the BostonInn of Court and the Federal Bar Association.

John Gallagher

John Gallagher is an Assistant United States Attor-ney in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As apresidentially appointed White House Fellow from2000 to 2001, Mr. Gallagher served on the person-al staffs of Attorneys General Janet Reno and JohnAshcroft at the Department of Justice. During thisassignment, he worked on law enforcement issuesof national priority, including police integrity,racial profiling and federal firearms prosecutions.He also worked with the Civil Rights Division oninvestigations to determine whether particular po-lice agencies engage in “patterns or practices” ofunconstitutional misconduct. After leaving Wash-ington, D.C., Mr. Gallagher worked as a federalprosecutor handling civil rights violations in theDistrict of New Mexico.

Mr. Gallagher also has served as legal counselto Philadelphia Police Commissioner John F.Timoney, and as an assistant chief in the Miami(FL) Police Department under Chief Timoney.He developed and implemented policies and train-ing that were instrumental to Chief Timoney’s

About the Authors/Contributors — 93

reform of the police departments of Philadelphiaand Miami and to the resulting historic reductionsin crime and police misconduct in these cities.

Mr. Gallagher began his professional careeras a police officer in the New York City Police De-partment, where he was assigned for five years to

a Harlem precinct at the height of the crack epi-demic and during the worst period of crime inAmerican history. He earned his undergraduatedegree at Long Island University at Southhamp-ton and his law degree from New York LawSchool.

94 — About the Authors/Contributors

About PERF — 95

About PERF

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is anational organization of progressive law enforce-ment chief executives from city, county and stateagencies who collectively serve more than half ofthe country’s population. Established in 1976 byten prominent police chiefs, PERF has evolvedinto one of the leading police think tanks. Withmembership from many of the larger police de-partments in the country and around the globe,PERF has pioneered studies in such fields as com-munity and problem-oriented policing, raciallybiased policing, multijurisdictional investiga-tions, domestic violence, the police response topeople with mental illnesses, homeland security,management concerns, use-of-force and crime-reduction approaches.

PERF’s success is built on the active involve-ment of its members: police chiefs, superintend-ents, sheriffs and other law enforcement leaders.The organization also has types of membershipthat allow the organization to benefit from thediverse views of criminal justice researchers, lawenforcement of all ranks and others committedto advancing policing services to all communi-ties. As a nonprofit organization, PERF is com-mitted to the application of research in policingand to promoting innovation that will enhancethe quality of life in our communities. PERF’sobjective is to improve the delivery of police

services and the effectiveness of crime controlthrough the exercise of strong national leader-ship, the public debate of criminal justice issues,the development of a body of research aboutpolicing and the provision of vital managementservices to all police agencies.

In addition to PERF’s cutting-edge policeand criminal justice research, the organizationprovides a wide variety of management and tech-nical assistance programs to police agenciesthroughout the world. The organization alsocontinues to work toward increased professional-ism and excellence in the field through its train-ing, leadership and publications programs. Forexample, PERF sponsors the Senior ManagementInstitute for Police (SMIP), conducts executivesearches for communities seeking police chiefs,and publishes some of the leading literature inthe law enforcement field that addresses the diffi-cult issues that challenge today’s police leaders.PERF publications are used for training, promo-tion exams and to inform police professionalsabout innovative approaches to communityproblems. The hallmark of the program is trans-lating the latest research and thinking about atopic into police practices that can be tailored tothe unique needs of a jurisdiction.

To learn more about PERF visitwww.policeforum.org.

96 — About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability

About thePERF Center on Force and Accountability

Created in April 2005, the PERF Center on Forceand Accountability is designed to be a significantresource for PERF members and others in law en-forcement, and to serve as the principal clearing-house for ideas, strategies, and data that will ad-dress problems related to police use-of-force andaccountability. Ultimately, the Center provideslaw enforcement executives with information andstrategies that will help them make more in-formed decisions as they serve their communities.

The PERF Center on Force and Account-ability has four primary objectives:

n Identify emerging trends and seek out effec-tive new strategies;

n Conduct groundbreaking research;

n Provide high quality technical assistance tolaw enforcement agencies;

n Create a central resource for informationregarding use-of-force and police accounta-bility issues.

To that end, the CFA is continually develop-ing competencies in several specific areas. Foruse-of-force, CFA competencies include commu-nity outreach and accountability; equipment andweapons; investigations; police canines; policydevelopment; review boards; tactics; technology;training; trends and identification of promising

approaches; statistics, tracking, and analysis;vehicle pursuits; and violence against law en-forcement officers. As it relates to police account-ability, CFA competencies include communityinvolvement; consent decrees/memoranda of ac-countability; discipline and conduct review; earlyintervention systems and processes; equal em-ployment opportunities; internal investigations;law enforcement ethics; misconduct statistics,tracking, and analysis; policy development; tech-nology; training; and trends and identification ofpromising approaches.

The CFA recently released national guide-lines for conducted energy devices that have beenembraced by law enforcement agencies through-out the country. Further, the CFA completed twoguides on early intervention systems to helpagencies better manage their human resources.The CFA also provided technical assistance tomunicipalities seeking to assess their use-of-forceand disciplinary systems within their police de-partments. The CFA also examined critical use-of-force issues in a 2005 publication entitledChief Concerns: Exploring the Challenges of PoliceUse of Force. A second book on use-of-force isscheduled for release in 2006.

To learn more about PERF and theCenter on Force and Accountability visitwww.policeforum.org.

About Motorola — 97

About Motorola

Motorola is a Fortune 100 global communica-tions leader that provides seamless mobilityproducts and solutions across broadband, em-bedded systems and wireless networks. Seamlessmobility means you can reach the people, thingsand information you need in your home, auto,workplace and all spaces in between. Seamlessmobility harnesses the power of technology con-vergence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effec-tive and flexible communication. Motorola hadsales of US $31.3 billion in 2004.

Today, Motorola is comprised of four busi-nesses: Connected Home Solutions, Government& Enterprise Mobility Solutions, Mobile Devicesand Networks.

Connected Home Solutions provides a scal-able, integrated end-to-end system for the deliv-ery of broadband services that keeps consumersinformed, entertained and connected. Its tech-nology enables network operators and retailers tocreate and execute on new business opportunitiesby providing innovative products and services tothe home.

Government and Enterprise Mobility Solu-tions is a leading provider of integrated radiocommunications and information solutions, withmore than 65 years of experience in meeting themission-critical requirements of public safety,government and enterprise customers worldwide.

It also designs, manufactures and sells automo-tive and industrial electronics systems and telem-atics systems that enable automated roadside as-sistance, navigation and advanced safety featuresfor automobiles.

Mobile Devices offers market-changingicons of personal technology—transforming thedevice formerly known as the cell phone into auniversal remote control for life. A leader inmulti-mode, multi-band communications prod-ucts and technologies, Mobile Devices designs,manufactures, sells and services wireless sub-scriber and server equipment for cellular systems,portable energy storage products and systems,servers and software solutions and related soft-ware and accessory products.

Networks delivers proven capabilities in cel-lular, wireless broadband and wireline accesstechnologies, with recognized leadership in inte-grating core networks through wireless IP, wire-less softswitch and IP multimedia subsystems.The Networks group is advancing seamless mo-bility with innovative technology solutions, aswell as a billion dollar services business with anexpanded portfolio delivering support, integra-tion, applications and management.

For more information go tohttp://www.motorola.com.

We are grateful to Motorola for its support of this project.

Police Executive Research Forum1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930Washington, DC 20036202-466-7820202-466-7826 faxwww.PoliceForum.org

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Police Managementof MassDemonstrations:Identifying Issues andSuccessful Approaches



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