FUlL Compiled

8/12/2019 FUlL Compiled

1/12


2/12

friend, a friend who will be asked back, a friend of destiny whose destiny itself assuresthe eternal return as such.

Only an act to affirm of chance can affirm becoming and thus affirm beingConway, 98(Danie, Professor of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State, Tumbling Dice: Gilles Deleuze and The Economy of

Rptition, jmuse, synergy)

According to Deleuze, these two moments of affirmation correspond most closelyto the two moments that constitute the dicethrow: 1) the dice that are thrown;and 2) the dice that fall back to earth. The dice that are thrown represent theaffirmation of chance, while the combination they form upon falling back to earthrepresents the affirmation of necessity (Deleuze 1983, 26). Necessity thereforedoes not suppress or abolish chance; they are separated within the economy of

the dicethrow not by opposition, but by difference. Indeed, one can affirm thebeing of becoming only if one also affirms becoming itself:The thrown dice form the number which brings the dicethrow back. Bringing thedicethrow back the number puts chance back into the fire, it maintains the fire

which reheats chance. (Deleuze 1983, 29)The stakes of this seemingly trivial dicethrow are fatally high: to know how toplay this game is to know how to affirm chance itself. But the reign of thedialectic has enthroned probability rather than chance, urging diceplayers tohedge their bets over a potentially infinite series of throws. The fatal combinationdelivered by a single, chance-affirming dicethrow is thus displaced behind theiron law of probability distributions; the affirmation of becoming is subsumed bythe dialectic within the (metaphysical) affirmation of being. As the dialectic re-establishes the hegemony of metaphysical interpretations of chance, theuncharted lunar landscape of difference is summarily eclipsed by the inexorablysolar trajectory of binary opposition. The Apollonian statistician supplants theDionysian gambler at the gaming table, as empirical science tackles (andpretends to solve) the problem of affirmation.EXTEND NIEZSCHE 1873:The embracing of chance in the 1AC was a complete surrender of control,

which is the only way to lead to true self peace. Attempts at continuouscontrol fail at achieving piece and only our act of chance can give us truepeace IN THE REAL WORLD.

Line by line on NIEZSCHE 1873:Their answers arent specific to the fact that this act of the dicethrow

solves for attempts at control. They did not address the warrants(args)

EXTEND DELUZE 83:The solitary act of the dicethrow is the only way to effectively embracechance, as it means the acceptance of whatever chance has to offer.

Line by line

EXTEND CONWAY 98:


3/12

Conway proves indisputably that affirmations of chance affirm being. Heshows that the act of affirming chance is an affirmation of becoming. Thismeans that when we threw the die in the 1A, we affirmed the TRUE processof how things happen, chance. This is the only way of affirming life itself, asan affirmation of all processes in life is an overall affirmation of life as a

whole.

Their answers dont address Conways argument on the affirmation ofbecoming, so dont evaluate them

Line by line.

(FULL FILE: 5:50) FRAMEWORK:

Our interpretation is that the role of the ballot is to determine which side solves the

best real life impacts within the debate.

Ontology shapes thought processes and actionsit operates subconsciously as well

Campbell and Shapiro 96(eds., Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World PoliticsMinneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, pg. 96)

As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political-

never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamentaland inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without always already having

made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries

an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is tochallenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through the entire mode of

thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With

ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are

rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to

the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up theontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form,to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the

ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit,

how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in whichNietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the

fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whateverontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act.

Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the

problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some

arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes

not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political

decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an

understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This

applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be

technocrats of decision making. While Certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example,were prompted to interrogate or challenge the moderns claim to being distinctively modern, and others such as Adorno

questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or

rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The

violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining

theme of their work. Other, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche

and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come todistinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers

manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it,especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to

the secure self-grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of

reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of

modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitcally driven reappraisal of modern political thought.

This means that in order to effectively discuss policy, we need to talk about the

ontology behind it. Our Framework is the only way to effectively evaluate a plan.


4/12

We dont actually DO anything with this ballot. The only effective change that we

can make in this round is how we think about things. If we can affirm the lives of

everyone in this round through chance that is ACTUALLY the biggest impact in the

debate. Real affirmation of life beats pretend extinction any day.

AT: Education1.This is the most educational framework in the round. It allows for discussion of

philosophy as well as policy options, allowing us to access more facets of a complete

education than their framework

2. Political engagement is more than simple argument- the form of the message is

just as influential as the content, and no message can be understood withoutunderstanding its method.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci(Jessica, Performing Politics: Foucault,

Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-

346, accessed Jstor)

How to convincingly thematize an alternative to something that is taken for granted is the very

problem postmodernists have so often taken up. Habermas also recognizes this problem, as is

evident in some of the terminology he employs in describing the role of public discourses.

Discourses must not only identify, they must also thematize and dramatize.42 They can be

metaphorically described as "performances" and "presentations" that invoke not only

"forums" but also "stages" and "arenas."43 These are images that imply more than the careful

presentation of validity claims. Habermas's demand that public discourses be both "attentioncatching" and "innovative" as well as "convincing" and "justifiable" requires more than

rational argumentation. It requires a kind of political action that can effectively disrupt the

culturally common sensical and actually provide new and compelling alternatives todisciplinary constructionsof such things as gender difference. It is here that Habermas would

benefit from attending to the productive character of disciplinary power in creating distinctly and

authentically gendered beings in the first place.

3. At worst, evaluate the plan proposed after the coinflip.

AT: Fairness1.Education precedes fairness. Education is more important, and fairness isuneducational and utopian.

2.At worst reject the framework and only evaluate the plan.

3. Im a maverick, so any skew is outbalanced by the fact that I have no partner.


5/12

4. Unfairness inevitable. There will always be some skew to one side. Not a voter.

5. Err aff. Neg gets the block and off case strategy.

AT: Predictability1. Unpredictability is inevitableembracing this fact, however, allows us to livemeaningful lives.

Bleiker and Leet 6(Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland,

Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute,

Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 729-730)JMDramatic, sublime events can uproot entrenched habits, but so can a more mundane cultivation of wonder and curiosity.

Friedrich Nietzsche pursued such a line of enquiry when reflecting upon what he called the after effects of knowledge. He

considered how alternative waysof life openup througha simple awareness of the fallibility of

knowledge. We endurea series of non-dramatic learning experiences as we emerge fromthe illusions of

childhood. We are confronted with being uprooted from the safety of the house. At first, a plunge

into despair is likely, as one realises the contingent nature of the foundations on which we stand and the walls behind

which we hide and shiver in fear:Allhuman life is sunk deep in untruth; the individual cannot pull it

out of this well without growingprofoundlyannoyedwith his entire past, without finding his present motives

(like honour) senseless, and without opposing scorn anddisdain to the passions that urge one on to the

future and to the happiness in it.43 The sense of meaninglessness, the anger at this situation, represents a

reaction against the habits of ones upbringingand culture. One no longer feels certain, one no longer

feels in control. The sublime disruption of convention gives rise to the animosity of loss. The resentment may last a

whole lifetime. Nietzsche insists, however, that an alternativereaction is possible. Acompletely different after

effect of knowledge can emergeover time if weare prepared to free ourselves fromthe standardswe

continue to apply, even if we do no longer believe in them. To be sure, the: old motives of intense desire would

still be strong at first, due to old, inherited habit, but they would gradually grow weakerunder the

influence of cleansing knowledge.Finally one would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise,reproaches, overzealousness, delighting in many things as in a spectacle that one formerly had only to fear.44 The elements

of fear and defensiveness are displaced by delight if and when we become aware of our own role in constructing the scene

around us. The cleansing knowledgeof which Nietzsche speaks refers to exposing the entrenched habits

of representation of which we were ignorant. We realise, for example, that nature and culture are continuousrather than radically distinct. We may have expected culture to be chosen by us, to satisfy our needs, to be consistent andharmonious, in contrast to the strife, accident and instinct of nature. Butjust as we can neither predict a

thunderstorm striking nor prevent it, so we are unable ever to eliminate the chance of a

terrorist striking in our midst. We can better reconcile ourselves to the unpredictability and

irrationality of politicsand culture by overcomingour childhood and idealistic illusions. The cultivation ofthe subliminal, then, can dilute our obsession with control by questioning the assumptions about nature and culture in which

this obsession is embedded. Withoutthis work of cultivation, we arefar more vulnerableonce hit by the after

effects of knowledge. We find ourselvesin a place we never expected to be, overwhelmedby unexamined

habitsof fear and loathing. But if, as Nietzsche suggests, we experiment with the subliminal disruptions

encountered in the process of growing up, we may become better prepared.We may followBachelardslead and recognise that the house not only offers us a space to withdraw from the world when in fear, but also ashelter in which to daydream, to let our minds wander and explore subliminal possibilities. That, Bachelard believes, is

indeed the chief benefit of the house: it protects the dreamer .45

2. Their predictability claims pervert educationUncertainty encourages

interrogation, not the other way around

McDonough 93(Kevin, U-Ill-Educ, http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/93_docs/MCDONOUG.HTM)The fact that individuals(and their aims) are necessarily embedded in power relationsalso structures the

educational taskin an interesting way. The Foucauldian educational task becomes notthe common sense one

of making the uncertain certain, the unfamiliar familiar.8 Thatis the logic of the examination, which assumes prior

fixed knowledgewhich individuals must acquire. Rather, Foucault would regard education as primarily a


6/12

matter of making the certain uncertain, the familiar unfamiliar, the given contingent. If nothing else, this

educational ideal embodies morethan a little of the spirit of Deweyan inquiry.

3. They give no standard of what makes an aff predictable

4. We are a predictable aff. People have been running Nietzche for a very long time.

It is an accepted part of the debate community

5. TURN: Unpredictability also helps education by allowing critical thinking and

thinking on the fly.

AT: Policymaking FW1.Extend the #4 on the FW flow from the 1AC. The judges ballot doesnt ACTUALLY

do anything. The only relevant thing that can come out of this debate is an

affirmation of live or another in-round impact.

2. At worst just evaluate the plan part of the round, and not the life-affirmation.

3. Their framework constrains meaningful discussionthis allows violence to

persist.Bleiker 1(Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane,Millennium: Journal of

International Studies, 30(3), p. 524)JM

Being aware of the problematic dimensions of representation, aesthetic approaches view academic

disciplines as powerful mechanisms thatdirect and control the productionand diffusion of

knowledge. Disciplines establish the rules of intellectual exchangeand define the methods,

techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. While

providing meaning, coherence and stability, these rulesalso delineate the limits of what can be

thought, talked, and written of in a normal way. Innovative solutions to existing problems

cannot be found if our efforts at understanding the international remain confined toa set of

rigidand well-entrenched disciplinary rules.

4. Their framework actually creates an INCENTIVE for not accessing good in-round

life affirmation. My life affirmation is a net benefit to our Framework.

AT: Limits1.Default to reasonability: the difference between their framework and our

framework is only a few affs. We dont explode limits.

2. TURN: we limit the debate more by restricting it to things that can help in real life.

Fewer things can be done in a debate round to help people than things that can be

done by the USFG to Latin America.

3.They cant access limits claims through a framework argument. We are discussing

how to evaluate the round, not claiming abuse.


7/12

AT: Roleplaying good1.Our FW accesses all benefits of roleplaying. We still roleplay policy, and get those

educational benefits through research and discussion, but it ALSO accounts for in

round impacts

2. Roleplay Inevitable. Even if we dont roleplay policy, weall still roleplay. I am adifferent person within this round than outside. Their roleplay good evidence is

irrelevant as roleplaying in debate is inevitable.

3.Role-Playing politics reduces debaters to nothing but spectators, forced to treat

what should be public advocacy into simple competition. Their agency is further

reduced as they retreat farther and farther from real politics

Mitchell 98(Gordon R., Associate Professor of Communication and Director of the William Pitt

Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh. Pedagogical possibilities forargumentative agency in academic debate. Argumentation and Advocacy, Volume 35,

Issue 2. Fall 1998. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6699/is_2_35/ai_n28720712/)SLS

As two prominent teachers of argumentation point out, "Many scholars and educators term

academic debate a laboratory for testing and developing approaches to argumentation" (Hill and

Leeman 1997, p. 6). This explanation of academic debate squares with descriptions of the

study of argumentation that highlight debate training as preparation for citizenship. As asafe space thatpermits the controlled "testing" of approaches to argumentation, the academic laboratory,on this account, constitutes a training groundfor "future" citizens and leaders to honetheir

critical thinking and advocacy skills. While an isolated academic space that affords students

an opportunity to learn in a protected environment has significant pedagogical value (see

e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory

carries with it some disturbing implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To theextent that the academic space begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating

such a space from other spheres of deliberationbeyond the school growtaller and lesspermeable. When such barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academicsetting unfolds on a purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in

strictly hypothetical thought-spaces.Although they may research and track public argument as

it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach,students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or

no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell

1995; 1998). The sense of detachment associated with the spectator postureis highlightedduring

episodesof alienationin which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead offocusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters

overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the

meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments.For

example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy upthe "uniqueness of a disadvantage"or

bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak).Murchland categorizescultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politicallydebilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more

grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude thatthe principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6699/is_2_35/ai_n28720712/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6699/is_2_35/ai_n28720712/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6699/is_2_35/ai_n28720712/


8/12

into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life" (1991, p. 8)

AT: They flip coin1.They tried to exert control over the coin flip(explain)2. Their coin flip has less at stake than ours. We put more behind our coin flip than

them.

3. We also access the life-affirming impact of their coin flip. If we didnt do it in the

1A, they would NOT have done that. We gave them the idea, and it is a direct cause

and effect, so add the impact of that flip to the benefits of the aff.

No Predictions

The future cant be predicted

SHERDEN 1998 (William, business consultant, The Fortune Sellers, p. 7)

Current science is proving this deterministic view of the world to be nave. Thetheories of chaos and complexity are revealing the future as fundamentally

unpredictable. This applies to our economy, the stock market, commodity prices,

the weather, animal populations (humans included), and many other phenomena.

There are no clear historical patterns that carve well-marked trails into the future. History does not repeat itself. The future

remainsmostly unknowable.

Empirical evidence doesnt matterhistory does not predict the future

SHERDEN 1998(William, business consultant, The Fortune Sellers, p. 199)

History does not repeat itself. The evolution of society is continually new, novel, and

full of surprises, with no recurring cycles. Wars, revolutions, trends, andmovements are as different from one another as snowflakes. One must expect that

events of an intrinsically new character will emerge, wrote Popper. Every single event in

social life can be said to be new, in a certain sense. It may be classified with other events; it

may even resemble those events in certain aspects; but it will always be unique in a

very definite wayBelief in historical destiny is sheer superstition .

Chaotic interactions are the only possibility for a nuclear war

MILLIKEN 2001(Jennifer, The social construction of the Korean War: conflict and its possibilities, google books)

Schelling (1966: 55), commenting on the possibility of

a 'major nuclear war', claimed that It

could only result'from a process that is notentirely foreseen, from reactions that are notfully predictable,

from decisions that are notwholly deliberate, from events that are notfully under

control'. I have not been examining the prospect of a major nuclear war (which was not materially a possibility in 1950), but rather howthe Korean War could have become a more generalised war than it already was. The routes to general war that I have traced none the less show

that Schelling's comments also applied in this Cold War context. A general warwas then not fully predictable either it could

have resulted from decisions not to fight that type of conflict, but rather to do other

things.But - the point to my counterfactual scenarios - these processes were ' foreseeable', meaning here embedded in the conflictgrammars of participants in the Korean War and how they could have interacted with one another.


9/12


10/12

4. Unfairness inevitable. There will always be some skew to one side. Not a voter.

5. Err aff. Neg gets the block and off case strategy.

6.TURN: Punishment does not deter bad debate, it only encourages debaters to manipulatetheoretical arguments in more abusive ways.

Doug Sigel writes:[Doug Sigel, Northwestern University. Punishment: Does It Fit the Crime?1985; http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Sigel985Water.htm]

First, punishment arguments do not deter bad debate.It has already been argued thatsophisticated debaters who run "junk" arguments " will eagerly latch ontopunishment as another way to avoid research.Some elaboration seems in order.Suppose you and your partner plan on running a world government counterplan nearlyevery round. Your response to the threat of punishment will be to write detailed briefs )defending the legitimacy of your counterplan. When another [debater]team initiates a

punishment argument [debaters]you will "TURN" the argument and make it areverse voting issue. When the 1AR drops numbers 11, 21 and 26 because of timepressure [the negative]you will likely win the debate.It seems clear that for teamsthat systematically abuse the activity punishment isn't really a problem. At worstthey can muddle up the issue and at best they can win on reverse-punishment. Second, losing bad arguments is normally: an adequate disincentive. Mostcompetitive debaters stop using arguments that don't win. It is not at all clear thata ridiculous hypothetical counterplan, for example, deserves more than a fewintelligent presses to be defeated.

AT: Predictability1. Unpredictability is inevitableembracing this fact, however, allows us to livemeaningful lives.

Bleiker and Leet 6(Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland,

Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute,

Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 729-730)JMDramatic, sublime events can uproot entrenched habits, but so can a more mundane cultivation of wonder and curiosity.

Friedrich Nietzsche pursued such a line of enquiry when reflecting upon what he called the after effects of knowledge. He

considered how alternative waysof life openup througha simple awareness of the fallibility of

knowledge. We endurea series of non-dramatic learning experiences as we emerge fromthe illusions of

childhood. We are confronted with being uprooted from the safety of the house. At first, a plunge

into despair is likely, as one realises the contingent nature of the foundations on which we stand and the walls behind

which we hide and shiver in fear:Allhuman life is sunk deep in untruth; the individual cannot pull it

out of this well without growingprofoundlyannoyedwith his entire past, without finding his present motives(like honour) senseless, and without opposing scorn anddisdain to the passions that urge one on to the

future and to the happiness in it.43 The sense of meaninglessness, the anger at this situation, represents a

reaction against the habits of ones upbringingand culture. One no longer feels certain, one no longer

feels in control. The sublime disruption of convention gives rise to the animosity of loss. The resentment may last a

whole lifetime. Nietzsche insists, however, that an alternativereaction is possible. Acompletely different after

effect of knowledge can emergeover time if weare prepared to free ourselves fromthe standardswe

continue to apply, even if we do no longer believe in them. To be sure, the: old motives of intense desire would

still be strong at first, due to old, inherited habit, but they would gradually grow weakerunder the


11/12

influence of cleansing knowledge.Finally one would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise,reproaches, overzealousness, delighting in many things as in a spectacle that one formerly had only to fear.44 The elementsof fear and defensiveness are displaced by delight if and when we become aware of our own role in constructing the scene

around us. The cleansing knowledgeof which Nietzsche speaks refers to exposing the entrenched habits

of representation of which we were ignorant. We realise, for example, that nature and culture are continuousrather than radically distinct. We may have expected culture to be chosen by us, to satisfy our needs, to be consistent and

harmonious, in contrast to the strife, accident and instinct of nature. Butjust as we can neither predict a

thunderstorm striking nor prevent it, so we are unable ever to eliminate the chance of aterrorist striking in our midst. We can better reconcile ourselves to the unpredictability and

irrationality of politicsand culture by overcomingour childhood and idealistic illusions. The cultivation ofthe subliminal, then, can dilute our obsession with control by questioning the assumptions about nature and culture in which

this obsession is embedded. Withoutthis work of cultivation, we arefar more vulnerableonce hit by the after

effects of knowledge. We find ourselvesin a place we never expected to be, overwhelmedby unexamined

habitsof fear and loathing. But if, as Nietzsche suggests, we experiment with the subliminal disruptions

encountered in the process of growing up, we may become better prepared.We may followBachelards lead and recognise that the house not only offers us a space to withdraw from the world when in fear, but also ashelter in which to daydream, to let our minds wander and explore subliminal possibilities. That, Bachelard believes, is

indeed the chief benefit of the house: it protects the dreamer .45

2. Their predictability claims pervert educationUncertainty encourages

interrogation, not the other way around

McDonough 93(Kevin, U-Ill-Educ, http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/93_docs/MCDONOUG.HTM)The fact that individuals(and their aims) are necessarily embedded in power relationsalso structures the

educational taskin an interesting way. The Foucauldian educational task becomes notthe common sense one

of making the uncertain certain, the unfamiliar familiar.8 Thatis the logic of the examination, which assumes prior

fixed knowledgewhich individuals must acquire. Rather, Foucault would regard education as primarily a

matter of making the certain uncertain, the familiar unfamiliar, the given contingent. If nothing else, this

educational ideal embodies morethan a little of the spirit of Deweyan inquiry.

3. They give no standard of what makes an aff predictable

4. We are a predictable aff. People have been running Nietzche for a very long time.

It is an accepted part of the debate community.

5. TURN: Unpredictability also helps education by allowing critical thinking and

thinking on the fly.

AT: Limits1.Default to reasonability: the difference between their framework and our

framework is only a few affs. We dont explode limits.

2. TURN: we limit the debate more by restricting it to things that can help in real life.Fewer things can be done in a debate round to help people than things that can be

done by the USFG to Latin America.

3. Nietzsche arguments are pretty common. For them to say that we explode limits

with the works of a common philosopher is not logical


12/12

Documents

FUlL Compiled