8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 1/31

From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories inContemporary Chile

Author(s): Indira Palacios-ValladaresSource: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 73-102Published by: Distributed by Wiley on behalf of the Center for Latin American Studies at theUniversity of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40660525 .

Accessed: 07/10/2014 12:27

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

 .

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

 .

Wiley and Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami are collaborating with JSTOR to

digitize, preserve and extend access to Latin American Politics and Society.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 2/31

From

Militancy

o

Clientelism:

Labor

Union

Strategies

nd

Membershiprajectories

in

Contemporary

hile

IndiraPalacios-Valladares

ABSTRACT

For the

past

30

years,

Chilean unionism has been

shrinking.

Through comparison f themembershiprajectoriesf26 unions

in

two

firms

etween

1990

and

2004,

this rticle

xplains

why

some

unions defied this trend and how

their success affected verall

union

density

n

their irms.

t

argues

that

the unions that

experi-

enced

the mostfavorable

membership

utcomes

were those

that,

t

key

junctures

f

firm

estructuring,

arliest or most

aggressively

established

partnership elationship

ith

management.

However,

in a context f

great

abor

weakness,

these cases

of union accom-

modation took the

form

of exclusive

patron-client

xchanges,

which exacerbated collective action

problems

and

furtherroded

union

density.

considered

ne of the

strongest

abor movements

n Latin

America,

hilean nionism

as,

n

the

past

three

ecades,

xperi-

enced sustained

membershiphrinkage.

he

largest rop

occurred

under

military

ule,

whenunion

density

eclined

y

almost

alf om-

pared

o the

arly

970s

Angeli

972,

5;

Radrigán

999,

5).

However,

thetrend

oward eunionizationontinued fter he return

o

democ-

racy

n

1990:

between

991

nd

2007,

nion

ensity ropped

y

a third

(Dirección

el

Trabajo

.d.,

).

Although

nion

membership

eclinewas

initially

elated o the

politicalrepression

hat

accompanied

he

1973

coup,

it became

entrenchedfter he

military

egime's mplementation

f

neoliberal

structural

eforms

n

the

1980s.

Unions' nitial

eactiono these eforms

fueledmass

opposition

o the

regime

nd

helped

reorganize

he abor

movement

Campero

nd Cortázar

986).

However,

y ncreasing

nion

fragmentation

nd

ob

precariousness,

nthe

ong

un,

he

1980s

eforms

weakened nion

apacity

o recruit embers. odest

hanges uring

the democratic

osttransition

id not

substantively

lter his ituation

(Cook

2007;

Frank

004;

Haagh

2002).1

Unionmembershipecline has significantmplicationseyond

unions.

All

things eing qual,

abormovements

hat

rganize large

proportion

f

theworkforcere

ikely

o

mpose

ignificant

roduction-

©

2010

University

fMiami

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 3/31

74

LATINAMERICAN OLITICS

AND SOCIETY

52:

2

stoppage ostson employers. arge abororganizationslso have a

strong otential

or lectoralmobilization.

his

xplainswhyhigh

nion

density

s

usually

ssociated

ith he

doption

f

abor-friendly

olicies,

low income

nequality,

nd the

early

xpansion

f

democracy

Rueda

and Pontusson

000;

Rueschemeyer

t al.

1992).

The

contemporary

iteraturen Chileanunionism

makes some

important

ontributionso the

topic

f union

membership

ecline,

ut

it s limited

n

two

ways.

For

one,

tfocuses

eavily

n

national

rgan-

izations

nd

dynamics

hile

devoting

ittle ttention

o thefirmevel.

This s an

importantap.

n

Chile,

irm-levelnions

rganize oughly

0

percentf all unionizedworkersDirección el Trabajon.d.).2Fewer

thanhalf f these

workers re

organized

n unions hat re

federated,

and

only

littlemore

han

quarter articipate

n unions hat

elong

to a national

onfederation

Arrieta

003,

12).

Sincethere s also

vari-

ance

in

union

membership

ecline

cross nd within ectors

Salinero

B.

2006,

8),

a

stronger

ocus

n firm-levelnionswould

yield

better

understanding

f Chilean nionism.

The second imitation

f

contemporary

esearch

n Chilean nion

decline s its

trongmphasis

n

structuralauses.A number f

studies

examine he ffectsf he egal rameworkndeconomicestructuringn

uniondecline

Barrera

998;

Espinosa

996;

González antibáñez

998,

Montero

002).

Othersook at

thebroader

oliticalxplanations

ehind

the

nability

f unions o

change

his ontext

Cook

2007;

Frank

004;

Haagh

2002).

Fewer tudies xamine

nion

trategy.

ith

he

xception

of Frank 002 and

Rojas

nd

Aravena

999,

heworks

hat o discuss

union

trategy

rovide

ich

mpirical

escription

ut

do not

study

he

roots

r

mpact

f

trategic

ecisions

n a

systematic

anner.

n

contrast,

a numberf

contemporary

tudies

bout abor lsewhere

n Latin mer-

ica

put

strong

nalytical

ocus n union

trategies

oth

t the

firmnd

suprafirmevel Anner 003;Armbruster-Sandoval003;Burgess 004;

Frundt

002;

Levitsky

nd

Way

998;

Murillo

001;

Williams

003).

This article

eeks to advance

the

study

f

contemporary

abor

unions

y

examining

he ffectsf

firm-levelnion

trategy,articularly

union-managementartnership

trategies,

n the

ability

f

organized

labor o recruit

embers.

n

doing

o it eeks o

shedmore

ight

n sub-

national

ariation

n

Chilean

nionism,

nd to contributeo

a

growing

regional

iteraturen

firm-levelnion

dynamics.

hile offers

great

opportunity

n this

egard

ecause ts

high

egree

f union

bargaining

decentralization

as made

thefirm he

primary

ocus

of union

ctivity

inthat ountry.n addition,igh evels funion ompetitionndfrag-

mentation

akeChile

n

interesting

ase

for

nalyzing

herelativeuc-

cess

of different

nion

daptations

o neoliberal eform.

The

article

nvestigates

he ausesof ntrafirmariation

n themem-

bership

rajectories

f26 Chilean

nions

n

two

arge rivate

ector erv-

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 4/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

75

ice firms etween 990 nd2004. t answers woquestions:Whywere

someofthese nions ble to ncrease

membership?

id theirndividual

success

help

boost union

density

more

broadly

n

their irms? he

argument

his

tudy uts

forths thatdifferences

n

individual nion

strategy

ith

regard

o

management layed

a

key

role

in

shaping

intrafirmariation

n

union

membership

rajectories.

pecifically,

nions

that

grew

were those

that,

t critical

unctures

f firm

estructuring,

accommodated

management

emands arliest r most

aggressively,

effectivelystablishing

kind f

partnership

elationship.

n

doing

o,

these nions ecured

privilegedresence

n

the

irm,

monopoly

ver

firm-levelargainingrrangements,nd exclusivenputnto he lloca-

tion f

ob

lossesor other

mployment-relatedolicies.

Although

ome

outcomes ere ater xtended

o all workers

n

the

firm,

hey

everthe-

less demonstrated

heunions'

apacity

o deal

effectively

ith

manage-

ment.

his

gave

more

ccommodating

nions

recruitingdge.

In a context haracterized

y strong

irm

estructuring

nd

great

union tructural

eakness, owever,

he ame

trategies

hat

elped

ndi-

vidual nions

ain

membersended o undermineverall nion

trength

in thefirm.

solated,

moremilitantnions

ound hemselvesneffective

and thereforeulnerableo unionraiding.ortheir art,more ccom-

modating

nions,

enefiting

romhe utflowfmembers

romhemore

militant

nions,

id ittle

o reach ut o

unorganized

orkers.he result

was a decrease

n overall nion

density,long

with

reater

nion

fac-

tionalism,

hich immed he

prospects

or utureoordination.

These

findingsuggest

hat ven

in

a context f structuralnion

weakness

ike hat f

Chile,

ndividualnion

trategies ayplay

key

role

n

shaping

avorablendividual

membership

utcomes.

owever,

they

lso

suggest

hat he characternd

implications

f collaboration

with

management

re

highly ependent

n

the broader

nstitutional,

political,nd economic ontextnwhich hey ccur.

This article

will

proceed

o

discuss

he main

xplanations

ehind

union

decline

n

Chile nd to situatetsown

arguments

n therelevant

literature.

t then iscusses he

ogic

ftheresearch

esign

nd the

rep-

resentativeness

f thecases.

A narrativeccount f union

membership

trajectories

n each of hefirmsnder

tudy

s followed

y

n

analysis

f

the

variables hat nfluencedndividual nion

membership

rajectories.

The

concluding

ection iscusses hebroader

mplications

f he

indings

for

uestions

f ncome istributionnd union evitalization

n

Chile.

Theoretical Perspectives on Contemporary

Union

Membership

Decline

A

number

f scholars ave

pointed

ut that

he

elite-accommodating

characterf he

1990

Chilean emocraticransition

oosened

nions'

ies

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 5/31

76

LATINAMERICAN OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

topolitical artiesndthe tatewhile trengtheninghepoliticalnflu-

ence of business

Frank

2004;

Garretón

994;

Moulián

1997;

Silva

1997).3

hus,

lthough

he democraticransition

pened opportunities

for

rganized

abor,

eak

aborunions ike heCentral

nitaria e Tra-

bajadores

CUT)

had

difficultyhaping

hebroader conomic nd nsti-

tutional

ontext f union

ctivity.

n

particular,

hismeant hat

ubstan-

tial abor eform

tayed

ff he

politicalgenda

Cook

2007;

Frank

004;

Haagh

2002).

As a

result,

uring

he democratic

osttransition,

hileanunions

have continued

o

operate

n

a laborrelationsrameworkhat ends o

weaken hemCook2007;Haagh2002).For nstance,he aw allows n

unlimited umber f unionand

paraunion

rganizations

ithin ach

firm nd makes

uprafirmegotiationsxclusively

oluntary.

n addi-

tion,

mployers

an substitutend fireworkers

uring

trikesnd can

declare

ockouts,

nd workers an

drop

out of strikes.

esearch as

shown that hese nstitutions

inder nion

monopoly ower,

nvite

effective

mployerpposition,

ncrease nion

ivalry

nd

fragmentation,

and are

generally

ssociated

with

union

membership hrinkage

(Ebbinghaus

nd Visser

999, 44-45, 51-54;

cruggs

nd

Lange

002,

138;Western995, 86).

The

political

nd institutional

ontext f unionisms

important

or

understandingeneral

rends

n

labor

relationsn

Chile,

ut ince t s

relatively

onstant

t the

ubnational

evel,

tdoes not

xplain

hevari-

ation his

tudy

s concerned

with.Two other

xplanations

f union

decline an

potentiallyxplain

ubnational

ariationn unionmember-

ship:

abor

estructuring

nd union

trategy.

Chilean tudies

mphasizing

abor

restructuringighlight

he

nega-

tive

mpact

f

layoffs

nd

job

precariousness

n

union

membership.4

The

general rgument

uilds n the dea that eindustrialization

nd the

growthfthe ervice ector ave eroded nions' raditionalonstituen-

cies

while

ncreasing

he ize of

groups

with ess tradition

f unioniza-

tion

Barrera

998;

De la Maza

1999, 385-87;

Escobar

1999, 23-39;

González antibáñez

998,

1;

Radrigan

999,

1).

More

pecifically,

t

is

argued

hat

mployeresponses

o thefinancialrises fthemid- nd

late

1990s

riggered

assive

ayoffs,

hich,

y decreasing

he size of

firms,

eftworkers

morevulnerableo

employer

ntimidationr

pater-

nalism nd thereforeess

prone

to unionize

Espinosa

1996,48-49;

Montero

002, 108;

Rojas

and Aravena

999,

140-46).

With

egard

o

labor

lexibility,

he

rgument

s thatmore

typical

ormsf

mployment

have led to a loweringn thequality f employmentrrangements,

greater

abor

turnover,

nd an increase

n

subcontracting

Sehnbruch

2006).

Workers'ear f

unemployment

nd the

precariousness

f

obs

have made it moredifficultorunions o overcome ollective ction

problems

Aravena

999;

Montero

002,

103-6).

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 6/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

77

The literatureuggestshat here s subnationalariationn firm-

level abor

restructuring.

or

nstance,

tchemendy

nd Collier

2007)

contend

hat abor ationalization

includingayoffs

nd abor

lexibility)

in

Argentina

arieswithinectors.

ccording

o these

uthors,

his

ari-

ation

artly

xplains

ifferences

n

union

trength.

n

theChilean

ase,

Herrera

1995,

90)

finds ntrasectornd intrafirmariation

n

labor

restructuring.

herefore,

ithin nd across

firms,

e should

expect

unions

organizing ccupational roups

of workerswho are more

affected

y

these rends

o

experience ighermembership

osses.

Another et of

explanations

eals withunion

strategy.ampero

(1998),Frias1998), nd Frank2002)argue, or xample,hat erious

divisions ver

trategy

nd

rigid rganizational

tructures ade t

diffi-

cult or

eak

aborunions o

pursue

n

agenda

that

was coherentnd

relevant

o

contemporary

conomic ealities.

he

implication

f this

argument

s that irm-levelnions

ad to come

up

with heir wn

ways

of

coping

with

hanges.

Given he

high

fragmentation

f the Chilean

labor

movement,

e should

xpect

ignificant

ariation

n

union trat-

egy

at

the subnationalevel. No

systematic

tudy

f firm-levelnion

strategies

as been

published,

owever.

n

contrast,

utside f

Chile

there s a wealth f tudieshat ocus n firm-levelnion trategy.his

literature

as contributed

mportant

nsights

o

our

understanding

f he

relative

uccess f

particular

nion

trategies,specially

nion

rganiz-

ing,

coalition

uilding,

nternal

estructuring,

nd

partnership

ith

management.

Studies funion

rganizing

how hat ndividualnions

hat evote

significant

esources

o

largegrassrootsampaigns

re better

ble to

reverse

r contain eclines

n

membership

Bronfenbrenner

nd

Hickey

2004;

Heery

nd Adler

004,

64).

However,

uch studies lso

suggest

that

many

ndividual

nions lack sufficientconomic and

human

resources orun arge nd sustained ffortstorganizingnorganized

workers

Heery

nd Adler

004, 4;

Milkmannd Voss

2004,

)

and

that

successful

rganizing

fnew constituencies

equiresignificant

hanges

in

decisionmaking

tructures,

hich

many

nion

eaders esist

Sharpe

2004;

Yates

2003,

236).

Therefore,

t s notuncommon

hat ndividual

union

organizing

ampaigns arget lready

nionized

workers,

phe-

nomenon

nown s union

aiding

Milkman

nd Voss

2004,

).

Other tudies

ave examined nion fforts

t

forming

ommunity

and cross-national

llianceswith ther nions

r socialmovements.

n

developed

ountries,

nions hat avedonethis

avemade nroadsnto

new constituenciesKochan t al. 2004). n theLatin mericanontext,

studies onfirm

hat oalition

uilding

llowsunions o makeconflicts

visible,

ain

short-term

oncessions,

nd increase

ffiliation,

ut

they

also indicate hat

n the

ong

run,

many

f

these

ampaigns

nd

n

fac-

tory

elocation,

ack of enforcementf

bargaining

greements,

nd

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 7/31

78

LATINAMERICAN OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

workerayoffsAnner 003;Armbruster-Sandoval003;Frundt002;

Jessup

nd Gordon

000;

Williams

003).

A

third et of studieshas examined

nion

efforts

o restructure

union

rganization.

hree orms

f

nternal

rganizational

estructuring

seemto havea

positive

ffectn union

membership: ergers

Behrens

et al.

2004, 131),

the ntroductionf

participatory

orms f decision-

making

Saint-Pierre

993, 80;

Wells

993, 06),

nd shifts

n

theunion

agenda

to include he needs of new

constituencies

Carmichael

004;

Hébert

993,103;

Milkman

993;

Strachannd

Burgess

004).

These

studies

ndicate,however,

hat few unions

adopt

these

strategies

becausethey ntail ramatichangesnunionpower tructures.

Students

f

union

trategy

ave also

paid

attentiono the ffectsf

union

bargainingtrategies

n union

membership.

ebate has focused

on thebenefits

r

pitfalls

f

engaging

n

cooperative artnership

ela-

tionships

ith

management

t the

firm

evel.5 ome cholars iew

part-

nershiptrategies

s

positive

or nions. ckers

nd

Payne

1998)

argue,

for

xample,

hat

partnership

s a form f

accommodation

n which

unions re active

articipants

n

the

crafting

f firmnd

national

oli-

cies

affecting

hem. ichternd Greer

2004)

and

Terry

2004)

argue

hat

in a contextfdecentralizedargaining,artnership ayboostunion

membership

hen

ccompanied y

autonomous

ources f

egitimacy

in

the

workplace.

ther cholars

rgue,

n

contrast,

hat

nion-manage-

ment

artnership

mounts o union

o-optationKelly

996).

Although

abor

restructuring

ould

potentially

xplain

ariation

n

union

membership,

his

tudy

inds hat

trategic

hoicesmade

by

union

leaders t crucialmoments f firm

estructuring

erethe

major

eter-

minants f ntrafirmariationn union

membership

rajectories

n the

cases examined.

his

finding

nderscoreshe

utility

f

union-manage-

ment

artnershippproaches

or

ndividualnions.Unions hat

njoyed

themost uccess nrecruitingembersnthe amplewerethose hat,

at

certain

key

moments,

ursued

an

assertive

artnershiptrategy

toward

management.

Atthe ame

time, owever,

his

tudy ighlights

he imitationsf

partnershiptrategies

n

contextsharacterized

y high

nion

ragmen-

tation nd

weak

abor

bargaining

ower.

n

such

settings,

artnership,

even if

successful

or

ome individual

nions,

xpresses

he overall

weakness funions

ompared

o

employers

nd tends o

perpetuate

r

even

deepen

hatweakness

ydiminishing

he

fficacy

f

militancy,

et-

ting

one

union

against

nother,

nd

hampering

he

development

f

morecomprehensivend innovativetrategicpproaches o union

recruitment.

n

this

ontext,

orkers

maymigrate

rom ne unionto

another,

ut

organized

abor

s a

wholedoes not

grow tronger.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 8/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

79

Research Design

This

tudy dopts

most imilarases

comparative

esearch

trategy.

This

trategy

onsists f

electing

ases that

resentignificant

ariation

on the

dependent

ariable ut

similar

alues on all but one

or two

explanatory

ariables

George

nd Bennett

005,

0).

Itsvalue s that t

allows heresearchero establishmore ontrols

n

situations

n

which

multiple

ariables re at work nd to isolate

ariables

f

special

heo-

reticalnterest.he

research

esign

f

this

tudy

ontrols or

national,

sectoral,

nd some

potentiallyompeting

irm-levelariables

includingskill f the

workforce,

abor

flexibility,

evel nd

type

f collective ar-

gaining,

nion

bility

o

provide

members ith ubstantive

enefits,

ize

of

the

firm,

nd,

o a certain

xtent,

abor

estructuring),

hile

llowing

variationn one

key

variable:

nion

trategy.

The

findings

re

basedon

a

total f

30

open-ended

nd

n-depth

nter-

viewswith nion eaders nd

firm

fficers,

s well s

ethnographic

ield-

work,

ll conducted

uring

004.

The research

overs

13

unions

n a

Chilean ank nd n

equal

number

n

telecommunicationsirm.ecause

the nterviewsere ecured ith

promise

f

nonymity,

his

tudy

oes

not dentifyhenames fthefirms,heunions,r the nterviewees.

In some

ways,

heunions n this

tudy

re

atypical

n Chile.

They

operate

n

firmsnwhich nion ffiliations

relativelyigh.

n

both

irms,

average

net union

density

etween

990

and

2004

almost

ripled

he

national

verage

or he

period

14.4

percent).

hey

lso

operate

n con-

texts n which

large

number f unions

ompete.6

n the

bank,

where

unions ross

ccupational

ines,

ll unions

ompete

or

he

ame

mem-

bers.

n the telecommunications

irm,

hereunions

rganize

workers

exclusivelylong ccupational

ines,

nion

ompetition

ends obe

lower

among

white-collarnions ut

very

igh mong

lue-collarnions.

The cases are nonethelessairlyypicalf the trongernionismn

Chile,

which s concentratedn

large

firms.

arge

irms

epresentnly

4.7

percent

f Chilean

usinesses,

ut

they

ccount

or

6.5

percent

f

total

mployment

Dirección

el

Trabajo

007,

7-20).

Thesefirmsend

to be muchmoreunionized han he

average

irm.n

fact,

lmost alf

of

arge

irms

aveat east ne

union,

ompared

o

3-9

percent

f mall

firms;

he

arger

he

firm,

he

arger

he

number

f

unions

n

it

Direc-

cióndel

Trabajo

007,

9).

As is often he case

among

unions n

large

firms,

he ones under

study

erehave a traditionf abor

rganization,

skilled

onstituency,

membership

enefits,

nd

professional

nion eaderswith

olitical

on-

nections

o

center-left

arties.7

imilaro other

elativelytrong

nions,

those n thefirmsovered n this

rticle

egotiated

onvenios

voluntary

but

egally indinggreements

etween orkersnd

employers),

nstead

ofthe raditionalormalollective

ontracts,

hich re more

widely

sed

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 9/31

80

LATIN

AMERICAN OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

byunionsnChile.8urthermore,heunions nthis tudyace hallenges

that re familiar

o

many

workers

n

both

arge

nd medium-sized

irms,

such s

increasing

ob

instability;

he

mushrooming

f

parallel,

ore

re-

carious ormsf

employment;

abor

ationalization;

nd shiftso

systems

of

ob

compensation

hat

revariable nd tied o

performance.

The

sectors

nalyzed

ere re

important

nd

growing

reas of the

Chilean

conomy.

ombined,

he

financialnd telecommunications

nd

transportation

ectors

make

up

almost18

percent

f

the workforce

(Banco

Central

.d.).

Between

1990

and

2008,

employment

n the

telecommunicationsubsectoraw an ncrease f bout

8

percent,

hile

employmentnthe inancialubsectorripledBancoCentral.d.).There-

fore,

nions

n these

ubsectors

ave

future

pportunities

or

rowth.

Union

Membership

Trajectories:

The

Bank

Between

990

nd

2004,

verall nion

density

eclined

y

a littlemore

than

quarter

n this irm. ix

unions,

esignated

n

table

1 as Unions

1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

and

8,

exhibited

positive

rajectory

f

growth.

ome of

these

Unions

, 3, 4,

and

5)

shared he ame

steady rowth

n

mem-

bership ince 1990;othersUnions2 and 8) experienced ramatic

growth

etween

000

and

2002.

The

remaining

nionshad

an overall

trajectory

f decline.

ome,

ike Unions and

7,

experienced

most f

theirosses

n

the

arly

nd

mid-1990s.

thers,

ikeUnions

, 10,11,12,

and

13,

experienced

major

membership

osses

after

003.

All unions

were

cross-occupationalrganizations

hat

competed

for the same

members.

In

1990

hebankhad six unions

1,

3,

4,

5, 6,

and

13).

All

of them

belonged

o one

federation,

hich ereafter

ill

be

designated

edera-

tion 1. At the

time,

hisfederation

egotiated ages

and benefits

n

behalf f all unionizedworkers.

The

1990

bargaininggenda

was driven

y

management's

ove o

make

part

f workers'

arnings ontingent

n individual

erformance.

Federation

's initial

esponse

was to

reject

management's

roposal

nd

demand

higherwage

readjustments.

egotiations

talled,

nd

the

unions

taged

massive trike

interviews

.5,

1.14).

Althoughnitially

the unions eemedto be

gaining

oncessions,

fter he sixth

ay

the

firm

ardenedts

position.

ederation

rapidly

ecided o accommo-

date

management

emands

nd calledoff

he trike.Workersxtracted

a generousashbonus nd a higher ageandbenefiteadjustmenthan

theone

originallyroposed

y

the

firm,

utthe

changes

n

the truc-

ture f

compensationroposedby management

eld. The

agreement

was

signed

or our

ears

nstead fthe raditionalwo.This ettlement

establishedhefoundationf a

partnershipelationship

n whichFed-

eration

participated

n

most

firm

ecisions

nvolving

abor

and,

in

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 10/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES:

CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

81

Table1. LaborUnionMembershiprajectoriesn theBank,

c.

1990-2004

Workers nionized Share of the Workforce

%)

Union

1990

2004 Difference

1990a

2004

Difference

1

200

738 538

2

10

7.5

2

70

707

637

1

9.60

8.7

3

175

300

125

2

4.10

1.9

4

100

115 15

1

1.60 0.4

5

66 68

2 1

0.90 0.3

6 800 180 -620 10 2.40 -7.6

7

300

150

-150

4 2

-1.7

8

650

810 160 8

11

2.9

9

150

130

-20

2

1.80 -0.1

10

150

110 -40

2

1.50

-0.4

11

1,400

267

-1,133

17

3.70 -13.7

12

1,500

130

-1,370

19

1.80

-16.9

13

250

211

-39 3 2.90

-.02

Total

5,811 3,916

-1,895

72

53.5

-18.5

aThis olumn s calculated ver the combinedworkforcef all the banks n which

theunions

perated

t thetime.

Sources:

Membership

ata

provided y

union

eaders.

The

number f workers

er

firms

based

on

unpublished

ata

from he

Superintendencia

e Bancos e Institu-

ciones.The

figures

nclude ull-timeorkers

irectlymployed y

thefirmnd some

subcontracted orkers.

exchange,

elivered nion

estraintnd collaboration

n firm

estructur-

ing

interviews

.1,

1.5,

1.14).

Union

,

previously

he

argest

nd most

ominant

nion n Fed-

eration and theone that adbeen thevisible eader fworkermobi-

lization

uring

he

trike,

ejected

he

greement

nd eft hefederation.

Isolated,

nion found tdifficulto

extractoncessions rom

manage-

ment

nd,

during

henext hree

ears,

ost

lose to

half

tsmemberso

themore

ccommodating

nions

interview.5).

Unions and

3

cap-

turedmost fthese osses

interviews

.11,1.12,

1.13,

1.15).

In

1994

hebankunderwent

merger.

s a

result,

t nheritedwo

more nions

Unions

and

12).

Bothwere olid

organizations,

nd one

(Union12)

was

very

militant

interview.1).

n

1994,

Union

12

oined

Federation

,

whileUnion

,

whose eaders ad

somewhat istant

ela-

tionswith he eaders f Union12,chose not o do so. Union 's deci-

sion not to

join

Federation involved

igorous

nternal ebate.Out-

numbered,

orkers ho

supported

heunion's

nclusion

n

Federation

1 left or nions hatwere

part

fthat

ederation

interview.7).

The

merger

oincided

with

new

bargaining

ound.

Management's

goals

for hat

ear

wereto control

pward ressures

n thecollective

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 11/31

82 LATIN

AMERICAN

OLITICS AND SOCIETY

52:

2

bargainingettlement,xtend tfor nother our ears,rimome abor

redundancies

esulting

romhe

merger,

nd

expand

ubcontracting

nd

other orms f abor

lexibility,

uch s

temporary

ontractsnd

contin-

gent

ompensation

interview

.1).

By

then,

ederation had

established close and

highly

nstitu-

tionalized

artnershipelationship

ith

management.

ince he

previous

year,

thad

actively

ollaborated ith

management

n

drafting

henew

convenio

interviews

.1,

1.15).

Moreover,

ts leaders

enjoyed

easy

access

to

the

op management,

hich llowedunions n

thefederation

to offer

uick

resolutiono their onstituents'

veryday roblems.

he

agreementinallyigned ythefederationn 1994covered our ears

and

ncluded

generous,

ne-timeash

bonus,

s well

as

some

modest

wage

increases

n

boththe fixed nd

variable

arts

f

the

wages.

n

addition,

ederation

informallyegotiated

he criteriaor

llocating

job

losses,

generous ompensation

or

workersaid off nd workers

who

accepted

ffersf

early

etirement,

nd

somekind f

ob

continu-

ation orworkersn areas

being

ubcontracted

interviews

.14,

1.15).

Management

hen

pened negotiations

ith

Unions

and

7.

Both

had been excludedfrom he

earlydrafting

f

collective

argaining

agreementsndhadhad ittleo noinputn the llocation f ob osses.

Leaders

f thesetwo unions

hought,

owever, hat,

iven

he firm's

strong

conomic

erformance

n

recent

ears

nd the

mprovement

f

relations etween eadersof Union 6 and

management,hey

ould

negotiate higher age

readjustment

han heone achieved

y

Feder-

ation

1

(interviews

.5,

1.7).

The

two

unions

negotiatedogether

ut

were oo small o offer

ny

real

challenge

o

management.hey

nded

up signing

he same

agreement egotiated y

Federation .

The

firm

subsequently

xtended he ame conditionso all

workers,

utFedera-

tion1

amply

ublicized

he

point

hat t had

been

a

key

player

ehind

the greement.imilarynamicsccurredn1998 nd 2000.

Unable o

shape

the

bargainingynamics,

nions and

7

focused

their ffortsn

recruiting

embers

interviews

.5,

1.7).

This

yielded

some

positive

esults:oth nions

were ble to recoverome

prior

mem-

bers.

Organizing

riveswere modest nd

short, owever,

nd did not

systematicallyarget norganized

orkers.

herefore,

either

f

these

unionswas able to recover

revious

membership

evels. he twounions

also

undertook

alks bout

merging

o boostunion

membership,

ut t

least s of 2004 his dea had notbecome

reality

interviews

.5,

1.7).

In

2000thebank

began

a

new

merger,

hich ulminated

n

2002.

Thenewly ncorporatedankhad been one of the hreeargestnthe

country.

t had a

strong

raditionf unionism nd an

amalgamated

union

Union 1)

that

n

1997

had

ed an

aggressive,

ilitant

ampaign

and had achieved ne

of the best collective

ontracts

n

the

ndustry

during

he

1990s.

Although

ess

militant,

heother

our nions

Unions

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 12/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES:HILE'S

LABOR

UNIONS

83

2, 8, 9, and10)were also strong. ntil heirrrivaln thebankunder

study,

hese ive

nions hared

general

rajectory

f

membership

ta-

bility

interviews

.2,1.8,1.9,

1.10).

Most fthe

ncoming

nion eaderswere

riticalfFederation

In

initial

onversations,

eaders

f

Federation came

across s

defending

personal

ositions

f

privilege

nd

offering

nclusion

n thefederation

under onditionsf subordinationather

han

ooperation

interviews

1.2,1.8,

1.9).

As a

result,

ll theunions

xcept

Union

(at

the ime ne

ofthe mallest nions

n

the

firm)

efused

o

oin.9

Union

sought

ut

Federation

as

an

opportunity

o

grow

interview.16).

Between 000 nd2002,Federationwas a conspicuous resence

in thefirm.ts eaders

requentlyppeared

n

the

ompany

f

manage-

ment,

romoting

he

firm's

olicies

nd

motivating

orkerso

oin

with

management

n

making

he

firmuccessful.

y

then he

ogo,

website,

and overall

mage

f Federation

closely

esembled hefirm's

orpo-

rate

mage.

During

his

period,

he

big

debate

between nions nd

manage-

ment oncernedhe

rimming

f

merger-induced

edundancies.

n

2000

Federation

secured n informal

greement

hat

pared

ts

members

fromayoffsfthey howedgoodperformancendnegotiated new

convenio

interview

.14).

These

agreements,

imilaro the

1994

gree-

ment,

ereextended o therest f the

workers,

hether

nionized r

not.Newcomers ere more

ikely

o have ower

valuationsmmedi-

ately

fter he

merger

nd thereforeo be morevulnerable

o

ob

loss.

However,

ecausethefirstvaluation

as

supposed

o take

place

after

two

years,many

ew workers ound

ccommodationn thefirm. nce

again,

ederation

amply ublicized

ow ts

negotiations

ad benefited

even

unaffiliatedorkers.

In

2003,

ederationsucceeded

n

negotiatingage

nd

benefit

ead-

justmentslightlybovethe ndustryverageinterview.15).The collec-

tive

bargainingrocess

ollowed he

pattern

f the

previous

nes since

1990.

ederation

was thefirsto

sign

collective

argaining

ettlement,

which,

or he

previous

ix

months,

thad been

ointly

rafting

ithman-

agement.

onfederatednions ried o

negotiate igher age

readjust-

ments,

utwere

argely

nsuccessful.s a union eader

ecounted,

We

Unions

, 9,

and

10]

didnotwant o

sign

n

agreement

e had

not

negotiated,

ut he

firm

ust gnored

s.

They

oldus to

present

our

proposal,

hichwe

actually

id.Butwhenwe went o discuss

it hey ad thedocumentfFederation there or s tosign. hey

added a few lauseswe

wanted,

utwe did not ikehow the

firm

proceeded,

interview.10)

All

the nonfederated

nion eaders

nitially

esisted

management's

pressures

o

sign

hedocument

lready igned y

Federation

,

but

hey

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 13/31

84

LATINAMERICAN OLITICS

AND SOCIETY

52:

2

faced ignificantressuresrom heir wn rank ndfile o accept he

conditionsffered

y management

interviews

.9,

1.10).10

ccording

o

union

eaders,

his

was theresult

f

two

factors. ne was that

members

of the

ncoming

nions

had a hard ime

dapting

o the

firm

ecause

newwork emands

nd

pressures

ere

perceived

s

significantly

reater

than

nthe

riginal

anks

interviews

.2,1.8,

1.9).

Theother

eason,

ne

that ffectedew

and old

unions,

as that he

greement

egotiatedy

Federation

was attractive

y

contemporary

hilean

tandards.

Most

unions

gave

in to rank-and-file

ressures

s soon as

they

started

o

experience

membership

osses or even

threats f massive

membershipefectioninterviews.8,1.9).Union11,at the time he

largest

f henonfederated

nions,

fferedhe

ongest pposition,

hree

months.

ccording

o

its

eaders,

uring

hat

eriod

heunion ost

five

hundredmembers

nd

experienced

ainful

nternal

ivisions

inter-

views

1.2,

1.8).

Roughly

alf fthese

membership

osseswere

aptured

by

unions

n Federation

.

According

o one ofthe

federation's

eaders,

their nions id

not need to

actively

ecruithose

potential

members:

We

leaders

f Federation

]

are

managers

f

success,

otconflict.

e

don't

needto seek

people

out.Our

president

as a lotof nfluence

ith

the dministrationinterview.14).

The other alf

fthe osseswere

captured

y

Union

,

a nonfeder-

ated

union

interviews

.2,

1.8).

Union8's

success,

n

turn,

was the

result f

twofactors.t

was

among

he

firstf thenonfederatednions

to

sign

he

2003

convenio.

n

doing

o,

twas able

to add some

modest

specific

enefits

o

ts ersion f he ollective

ontract,

hich

were ater

expanded

o

Unions and 10.

In

addition,

s a result f nternal

ivi-

sions

a

couple

of months

efore he

collective

argaining

rocess,

senior

nion eader

had

organized

recruitingampaign

o boost

his

power

within

heunion

interview.8).

This

yielded nly

modest

mem-

bership ainsbutmadetheunionbetter nownwithin hefirm. nion

8,

moreover,

ad a

unique pportunity

o seek

prior

members

fUnion

11 because

t offered

imilarlyenerous

enefits.11

Following

he

2003

collective

argaining

rocess

nd a series

of

internal

eadership isputes

n Federation

,

Unions

2

and

13

eft

ed-

eration and

oined

he

ncoming

nion

1

These

hree nions reated

a new and more

militantederation.

uring

004,

he

new federation

sued the

firm or nfairabor

practices,

sked

for unds

llegedly

wed

to

workers,

icketed

he

orporate

uilding,

nd tried o

nullify

he

on-

venio

hey

ad

agreed

n

previously

s

part

f Federation

Thisbehaviorwas not well received y managementinterviews

1.3,1.4,

1.6).

As unions

n

thenew federation

ardened

heir

ositions,

they

met ncreased

esistance rom

he firm.

Management

irculated

internal

emos

enouncing

eaders

n

this ederation

s

treasonous,

nd

Federation

did the ame.

Althoughnhappy

ith

management,

on-

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 14/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES:

CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

85

federatednions lsorejectedhebehaviorfthenewfederation.any

argued

hat

iven

he successof Federation

,

militancy

as suicidal

(interviews

.5,

1.8).

Some

also felt hat

he awsuits

resented

y

the

new federation

id

nothave a solidbasis

interviews

.9,

1.10).

Joining

the new federation

ost Union

12

close to

a third f its

membership

(interview

.3).

The hardest

it

nion,

owever,

as stillUnion

11,

the

most ocal

oftheunions

n Federation

(interviews

.3, 1.5,

1.17).

The

Telecommunications

Firm

Between

990

nd

2004,

verall

nion

ensity

eclined

y

lmost

fifth

in this

firm. wo

unions,

Unions

1

and

5,

experienced

rowth.

ntil

2002,

hese

unions hared

with he

other nions

he ame

membership

trajectory:

tability

ntil

999,

ollowed

y

decline.

After

002,however,

theseunionsbroke

with

he

typical rajectory

nd

grew

dramatically.

The rest f

heunions

ad an overall

rajectory

f oss

see

table

).

Two

of these

Unions

2

and

10)

appear

to have

expanded

heir hareof

unionized

workers,

ut

thisreflects

he

sharp

hrinkage

n the firm's

workforce

atherhan

eal

growth.

nions

were

organized

long

occu-

pational ines.Unions4 and 5, whichorganized rofessionals,om-

peted

for

he ame

members.

ikewise,

nions

, 6, 7,

8, 9, 10, 11,

12,

and

13,

which

rganized

killed lue-collar

orkers nd

technicians,

competed

mong

hemselves.

Between

990

nd

1998,

he elecom

irm

ursued gradual djust-

ment f

theworkforce

o

technological

hanges

nd marketiberaliza-

tion.

Afterhe

1980s,

decade marked

y

adversarial

elations,

an-

agement

nd

workers

ought

hese

changes hrough

ccommodation

(interviews

.8,

2.11,

2.12).

Unions

exchangedwage

restraint

or

involvement

n

managerialecisions,ayoffompensations,

llocation

of

ob

losses,

nd

negotiation

f areasto be subcontracted.ll unions

were

present

t the

bargaining

able,

ut he

argest

Union

)

wielded

more

nfluence

interviews

.3,

2.10,

2.11).

In

general,

nion eaders

perceived

his ituations

a

system

f

cogovernance

interviews

.9,

2.11,

2.12).

Although

ndividual

nions ontinued

he radition

f

negotiating

n

small

locs f wo

rthree

nions,

he

participation

f ll unions

ogether

in

drafting

he

bargaining

ocument

reated ne

blueprint

f

theconve-

nio

interview

.4).

Although

hey

ooperated,

ndividual

nions

taged

routinemall toppagesonegotiatearticularssues rto acceleratepe-

cific

negotiations

egarding

he

blueprint's

ppendixes.

hese strikes

tended

obe

very

hortnd

mall,

ut

elatively

uccessful

interviews

.3,

2.8).

As a result f

this

dynamic,

etween

990

and

1999,

unions

uc-

ceeded

n

negotiating

etter ollective

onditions

orworkersnd

man-

aged

to establish

hort-termnstrumental

nterunion

oordination.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 15/31

86 LATINAMERICAN OLITICS AND SOCIETY

52:

2

Table 2. LaborUnionMembershiprajectoriesnthe

Telecommunications

irm,

990-2004

WorkersUnionized Share of

the Workforce

%)

Union

1990

2004 Difference

1990

2004

Difference

1

700

1,473

773

7.0

39.3 31.8

2

190

186

-21

2.0

5

2.8

3

600

219 -381

6.5 5.8

-0.7

4

1,100

190 -910

11.9

5.1

-6.9

5

40

111

71

0.4

3

2.5

6 130 2 -128 7.6 0.1 -1.4

7

85

7 -78

0.9

0.2

-0.7

8

1,700

24

-1,676

18.4 0.6

-17.8

9 300

3

-297

33

0.1

-3.2

10

25

16

-9 0.3

0.4 0.2

11

585

23

-562

6.3

.6

-5.7

12

500

31 -469

5.4

.8 -4.6

13

600

50 -550 6.5

1.3

-5.2

Total

6,555

2,335

-4,220

76.5

62.3

-14.2

Source:

Membership

ata

provided y

union eaders. he workforceor ach

year

s

based on thefirm'snnual

reports,

hich nclude

nly

full-time

mployees

irectly

hired

y

thefirm.

The

union-managementartnership

stablishedn the

1990s,

ow-

ever,

was not without ensions. n

particular,ignificant

ntraunion

debatetook

place

about how far ccommodationhould

go.

Several

union eaders ecame

ncreasinglyary. hey rgued

hat

abor

unions

were

giving p

job

security

ithout

fight

ecausethe

ystem

llowed

formere consultationather han

cogovernance

nd the

preference

given

o some eaderswas a

managerial

trategy

o

co-opt

nions

inter-

view

2.3).

As a

result,

ome

prominent

eaders eft heir nions o form

new

ones

Unions

, 5,

10,

and

12).

This

fragmented

heunion truc-

ture nd reduced he

unions'

verage

ize.

Despite

their

hetoric,

n

practice

heseunions id not

dopt

moremilitanttance.

These

problems otwithstanding,uring

he

collective

argaining

process

f

1998,

workersmade

mportantains.

The

agreementigned

that

ear

aised

many

enefitsnd eveled

wages,

o that ll

workers

n

the ame

occupationalategory

hared he ame

alary.

n

top

of

this,

unionsnegotiatedpecific enefitso be appended o their ndividual

collective ontracts.

his

negotiation

as,

according

o union

eaders,

the best since

1986

interviews

.7,

2.10,

2.11,

2.12).

n

regard

o the

allocation f

ob

losses,

this

greement

ed

management

o continue

gradual

ob

shedding

cross he

company, sually enerouslyompen-

sated

nd

voluntary.

oth

he

more

ccommodating

nd the

more rit-

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 16/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

87

ical unionsparticipatedntheprocess nd signed he sameblueprint

agreement.

Between

990

and

1998,

unions hared similar

membership

ra-

jectory,

haracterized

y

some osses but

overall

tability

n

regard

o

each union's

hare f heworkforce.

he

exceptions

ereUnions

and

7,

which

rganized

mostly

orkers hose functionsad been

elimi-

nated

n

the

1980s.

Theseunionshad

negotiated

t that ime

gradual

shedding

f hose

obs,

o be

finalized

y

1991;

during

he

period

f his

study,

hey

aw

very

ittle

ctivity.

The

year

1999

marked heend of the

honeymoon

etween nions

and management.t also marked hebeginningf a trend oward

increasing

ifferentiationf

union

trategy.

The

firm

as

in a

precarious

conomic

ituation,

nd the

op

man-

agement

hanged.

he new teamhad a mandate

adically

o downsize

thefirm.

ts

pproach

was

quite

ggressive

nd

was

perceived

s

highly

authoritarian

y

union

eaders, ho,

until

hen,

ad been

used to

giving

input

n such

mportant

ecisions

interviews

.7,

2.8, 2.11,

2.12).

The

incoming anagement

eam

gnored

heunions

ltogether

nd offered

no concessions.

ore

mportant,

etween

999

nd

2002,

management

delayedpaymentfmany f the benefitsn the1998convenio nd

undertook

hreemassive

ounds

f

layoffs,ffering

o

compensation

beyond

he

egal

minimum.ach

department

as

requested

o downsize

its nternal

ccupationalroups

y

the

ame

percentage.

hus,

no union

escaped

painful

membership

osses.As

in

the

previous

eriod,

etween

1999

nd

2002,

membership

rajectory

id not

vary

ignificantly.

During

he waves of

layoffs,

orkers

would

be

called

by

their

supervisor

very

riday

nd informed hether r not

they

would be

fired.

any

eft he

premises

n

tears

interview.10).

Relationsetween

workers nd

supervisors

eteriorateds

many

upervisors

dopted

taket or eave t ttitudehat reated natmospheref fear nddis-

engagement

n

the

firm

interview.10).

n

thewords f

a firm

fficer,

Thefirmas hifted

way

romculture

here hat he

irm

ave

to he

worker atteredhemost oone

nwhich orkers'

ttitudes,

collaborationith

he

firm,

nd trust ake hedifference.

his

means

ransforming

hemindset

fworkers. e re hus

nforming

workersnd

new recruitsbout he hift rom enured

ob

to

employ

bility.

e stress

hat

wages

willbe basedon internal

equity

nd

firm

ompetitiveness.

Interview.4)

Not

surprisingly,

he conflictscalatedn

2002,

he

year

he

1998

convenio

xpired.

Managementpproached

he

negotiation

roposing

further

age

and benefituts.

All

unions nited

o

reject

his

roposal

and founded he

argest

nioncoordinationommittee

n

the

history

of

the

company,

alling

massive trike hat asted28

days

and

cap-

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 17/31

88

LATINAMERICAN

OLITICS AND SOCIETY

52:

2

tured hemedia's ttentioninterviews.11,2.14).Of theunions ov-

ered

here,

nly

Unions

, 5,

and

6,

whichhad

negotiated

arlier,

id

not

participate.

Although

lmost ll

unionizedworkers

oined

t,

he strike as a

failure. orkers ereunable o

stop

he

firm

rom

unctioningormally

(interview

.2).

By

2002 thefirm ad

completely

utsourcednd sub-

contractedunctionselated o the

maintenancef infrastructurend

provision

f

customerervices nd had also

automatedts

plants.

hus,

most fthe

daily rovision

f

ervices as

already erformedemotely.

The

firm

lso hired ubstitute

orkers,

nd

offeredustomers

xperi-

encing ifficultiesith heir hone ervice ew cellphones nd other

forms f

compensation.uring

he

trike,

oreover,

eaders fUnion

were

questioned y

the

police

under

llegations

f

abotaging

he

firm,

which s a crime hat alls

nder hile's ntiterroristaw

interview.14).

As the

days

of the strike

assed,

he firm

emainednflexiblend

seemed

willing

o

absorb

ny

oss o avoid

giving

n

toworkers'emands.

According

o union

eaders,

his ntimidated

orkers

interviews

.7,2.10,

2.12).

Halfwayhrough

he

trike,

any

eturned

o their

obs.

Union

,

which

rganized

hite-collar

rofessionals,

as

thefirsto

defect,

nd

was followedyUnion ,a blue-collarnioninterview.10).Defections

continued,

o that

y

the

28th

ay

of

the

trike,

nion eaders

ecided

o

call t off.

y

then,

nion

,

representingop professionals

nd

supervi-

sors,

had

openednegotiations

ith hefirm.t

ended

up accepting

he

cuts

interview.10).

Thismade tclear o the ther nions hat hefirm

was determinedot o

give

n

to

any

of their

emands,

making

ccept-

ance of the cuts

precondition

or urther

egotiation.

he

remaining

unions

ejected

anagement's

emands

nd

usedArticle

69

of heLabor

Lawto extend heir

revious

ollective

greement

or

nother 8 months.

Article

69

protects

orkers hen

abor

negotiations

tall nd

manage-

ment sseekinguts othe ollectivegreement.

In

2003,

ivemore nions

1,

4, 5, 6,

and

7)

also

accepted

he uts.

Althoughegotiations

ere

ndividual,

n

practice

hese nions nded

up

with ne common ollectiveontracttructure

interview.6).

According

to the main eaderof Union

1,

they

decidedto

abandonArticle

69

because

People

weredisillusionedfter he

trike,

nd we were fraid

that ur

people

were

going

o

oin

paraunionargainingroups.

he

firm

also seemed

more

pen

to

talk

interview.9).

n

contrast,

nions

, 9,

10,11,12,

nd

13

decided obide heirime

y xtendinggain

heir

998

collectiveontractnderArticle

69

interviews

.3,2.5,

2.8).

Althoughll theunions hat egotiatedfter002stoppedmassive

defectionnd

recaptured

ome

members,

nly

Unions

1

and

5

grew.

These wounions idnotundertake

rganizing

ampaigns;

nstead,

hey

benefitedrom

unique

tatus:

hey

were

he

only

nions

n

this

roup

that

ompeted

ith ther

nions.Union

1

competed

ith ll the

blue-

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 18/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

89

collar unionsand Union 5 competedwith Union4, a more combative

professional

nion.

Although hey,

ike all the other

unions that

negoti-

ated,

ost

many

benefits

nd were unable to

stop

ob

losses,

they

were

granted

few

privileges:

heir

eaders had more access to

management

for

resolving everyday problems, participated

with

management

n

developing

raining

eminars nd career

development

rograms,

nd had

modest

uccess

reaching

nformal

greements

o

delay

or slow

job

losses

(interviews

.9,

2.13).

The

remaining

ccommodating

unions,

which

mostly

rganized professionals,

ever

sought

this

kind of

relationship,

instead

focusing xclusively

n

finding

ormulas o

compensate

wage

and benefit osses for heirmembersinterviews .10,2.11).

Firm

fficers

ere

very utspoken

n their

upport

orUnions

1

and

5.

They appeared

publicly upportive

specially

of Union

1,

the

larger

of the two

and the

only

accommodating

blue-collar

union. Between

2003

and

2004,

management

howcased

Union

1 in

the

firm s a

good

example

of

partnership

ith workers.

According

o

the firm's uman

resources

manager,

Unions hat o

bettern this

irm

re

those hat ave eaders

hat

understand

hebusiness.

or

xample,

e

hear he eader fUnion

1speakingbout he probabilityf mploymentnstead f enure.

Thatmakes

lot f ensebecause he

ontracts

ill

get

treamlined

and

more lexible we

will

liminate

ll fixed osts. he others

ust

don't

et

t.

Interview.4)

In

contrast,

management

circulated a series of internal

memos

against

unions

underArticle

69 (Unions

8, 9, 10,

11, 12,

and

13).

Alien-

ated

and

facing

ncreased

management

hostility,

hese unions

had

to

settle each

of theirdemands

through

he courts

interviews

.3,

2.8,

2.10,

2.11).

Despite

some

legal

victories,

management ostility

ed

many

workers o leave these unions. Since by 2003 most of these workers

were blue-collar

nd Union

1

was the

only

blue-collarunion on

good

terms

with

management,

he latter

apitalized

on most of these

losses

(interviews

.1, 2.7, 2.8,

2.9).

Explaining

Variation in Union

Membership

Trajectories

This

study

has

sought

to understand

why,

between

1990

and

2004

in

two large private ectorfirms,ome unions experiencedmembership

growth

while othersdid

not,

and whether ndividual uccess

translated

into overall ncreases

n firm-levelnion

density.

With

regard

o

the first f these

questions,

the literaturedentifies

two

possible explanations:

abor

restructuring

nd union

strategy.

n

principle,

ariation

n

labor

restructuring

ould have

influenced he rei-

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 19/31

90

LATIN

AMERICAN OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

ative uccess fdifferentnionsnmaintainingr ncreasingheirmem-

berships.

he

evidencemarshaled

ere,however,

ndicates hat

n the

two

cases,

no

significant

nterunion

ariationccurred

n the

exposure

ofunions o abor

estructuring.

In the

bank,

he

cross-occupational

nd

cross-departmental

harac-

terof

unions,

he merit-basedharacter

f

ob

losses,

nd the relative

evenness f abor

lexibility

cross he

firm

eant hat nionswere

im-

ilarly

ffected

y

labor

restructuring.

here

was, however,

ignificant

variation

n

union

trategy.

hisvariation

rguably

xplains

nterunion

variation

n

membershiprajectory.

Between 990 nd2004, aborrestructuringn the elecommunica-

tions irm lso had a

comparable

mpact

crossunions. rom

990

to

2002,

nion

trategies

nd union

membership

utcomes ere lso rela-

tively omogeneous.

n

contrast,

etween 002

nd

2004,

herewas

sig-

nificantnterunionariation

n union

strategy

nd

membership

ut-

comes,

while abor

estructuring

ecamemore ntense ut

ontinuedo

be

relatively

ven across

unions.Thus the

evidence

uggests

hat he

main actor

xplaining

ariation

n

membership

rajectory

etween

990

and 2004

was variation

n

union

trategies

n

regard

o

management.

As the iteraturendicates,nions esorto a varietyfstrategieso

boost

membership,

he most common

of which nvolve

recruiting

drives,

oalition

uilding,

mergers,

nd

partnership

argaining

trate-

gies.Although

he ase studies

uggest

ittle

ctivity

n the rea ofunion

organizingampaigns

nd no

activity

n the reasof coalition

uilding

or nternal

estructuring,

hey

ndicate hat nions hat

rew

were hose

that,

t critical

unctures

f

firm

estructuring,

ccommodated

anage-

ment's

emands arliest r

most

ggressively,

ater

stablishingpart-

nership

elationship

ith

management.

n

a situation

f

great

mbalance

in the

power

of unions relative

o

management,

his

partnership

involved nionrestraintndcooperationnexchange ormodest ar-

ticularisticenefits

hat

gave

these unions

a

competitivedge

over

others.The

logic

of such

strategic

hoice resembled

prisoner's

dilemma,

n which hose nions

hat efected irst

ot

hebestresults.

In

the

bank,

unions hat

xperienced

rowth

n

membership

ere

those

belonging

o Federation

,

along

withUnion 8.

Federation

accommodatednd

supported

management'slans

to

restructurehe

compensation

ystem

nd increase

abor

flexibility

n

1990

after he

strike,

nd

in

1994

and 2002 after

mportant ergers.

t also delivered

wage

restraint

uring

ll thecollective

argainingrocesses,

eginning

in1990. nexchange,managementfferedederation's leaders xclu-

sive

informal

enefits,

uch

as a voice

in

layoffs

nd

subcontracting

decisions,

monopoly

ver

the collective

argainingrocess,

nd

easy

access o

top

corporate

fficers.

n

general,

nions

n this ederationad

a

steady pward

membership

rajectory.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 20/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

91

Union ,whichwas notpart f Federation,experienced ost f

its

growth

fter

003.

Although

ot

cooperative

o the

degree

hat ed-

eration

was,

n

2003

Union was thefirstf henewunions o accom-

modate

management,ignaling

ther imilar nions to follow uit.

Although

his id not

bring

heunion ll the nformal

enefits

njoyed

by

Federation

,

Union was able to

negotiate

ome modest enefits

for

ts

members,

nd ts eaders

ained asy

ccess o

higher

xecutives,

something

hat imilar nionshad more

ifficultyoing.

Thismadethe

union ttractiveo

potential

members

ecently

rrived

n

the

firm,

nd

at the same time

represented

middle-of-the-roadlternativeo the

accommodatingederationandthemilitantederation.

In

the ase of he elecommunications

irm,

wounions

xperienced

growth

fter

002,

Unions

and

5.

They

were

among

hefirst nions

that ccommodated

anagement

emands

n

2002 and were the

only

accommodating

nions

hat

ompeted

ith thers or

members.

hese

unions

xperienced

anagementostility

t a

very

ifficult

uncture

f

worker-management

elations

nd

subsequently

ecame

management's

partner

n

trainingolicies.

Unlike he

bank,

whichhad seen variation

in union

trategies

nd individual nion

membership

rajectories

ince

1990, his ariationecame ignificantnthefirmnly fter 002.How-

ever,

despite

he shorter

eriod

nvolved,

he

relationship

etween

union

trategic

hoice

and

membership

utcome

s

even clearer:

he

two

most

ccommodating

nions

njoyed

mportant embershipains

at thedirect

xpense

f their

ompetitors.

In a context f

significant

ob

losses,

rising

work

demands,

nd

weak

nstitutionalnd

political upport

or

nions,

rivileged

anage-

ment

ecognitionielded ractical

esources

hat

nhanced

he

apacity

of

these

unions o deliver enefitso their onstituentsnd

gave

more

accommodating

nions

competitivedge

over ther nions.

Although

someofthese ainswere ubsequentlyxtended o otherworkers,hey

demonstrated

hat he unions

were

on

good

termswith

management,

which ould

potentially

ean ndividual

rotection

rom

ob

losses or

fasterolutionso

workplace roblems.

ield nterviews

uggest

hat

n

most

cases,

workers hemselves

ought

ut unionsthatwould offer

them

more

practical uarantees

nd

identify

hem s

good

team

lay-

ers,

ncreasing

heir

opportunities

or

ong-termmployment

nd

career dvancement.12

n

contrast,

orkers

bandoned

nions hat ad

adversarialelations ith

management.

he fact hat

nly

handful f

unions

Unions

and

7

in

the

bank)

devoted esources o

organizingcampaigns, ithmodest esults,ndicates hestrongmpacthatman-

agement upport

ad on worker

isposition

o

join

particular

nions

over thers.

Moremilitant

nions

e.g.,

Unions

1

and

12 n

thebank nd Union

8

in

thetelecommunications

irm)

r unions hat ccommodated an-

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 21/31

92

LATIN

AMERICAN OLITICS

AND SOCIETY

52:

2

agementemands ater n (e.g.,Unions and7 in thebank nd Union

4 in

thetelecommunications

irm)

xperiencedmarginalization

nd,

n

some

cases,

managementersecution.

hisfostered

esentmentoward

management

nd the more

ccommodating

nions nd decreased he

possibilities

funion

oordination,

eaving

moremilitantnions solated

and ineffectivend therefore orevulnerable o union

raiding.

he

iconic

xamples

fthiswereUnions and

11 n

the

bank,

which ost

significant

umber fmembers

n

the

arly

990s

nd

dramatically

fter

2003,

espectively,

nd Union

in

the elecommunications

irm,

hich

lostmassive umbers f membersfter 002.

Whydid some unionsrefuse o accommodateespite he harsh

consequences?

he field nterviews

uggest

hree

easons. ne was that

the

dynamics

f dversarialelations urtured

igh

evels fmutual ni-

mosity

nd distrustetween nions nd

management

hatwere

difficult

to

overcome nce established.

s

adversarial elations

volved,

he

divide

ecame

ncreasinglyersonal

nd had

mportant

motionalver-

tones

or

nion eaders

interviews

.3,

2.8).

The secondreasonhad to

do with

he

objective

onditions f certain nions.For small

unions

organizing

lder

constituencies,

he costs of

accommodation ut-

weighed hecosts fmilitancy,ecausetheconcessions emanded y

management

nvolved maller etirementunds

interview.10).

A

third easonwas that omeunion eaders alculatedhat hefirm's

long-term

uccess

ultimatelyepended

on the collaborationf labor

and

that

hey

ad

enough

esources

o resist

management

ntimidation

for few

years

interview

.12).

During

hat

eriod, hey hought,

he

management

eamwouldhaveto

change, iving ay

to one better is-

posed

toward nions.

n

the absence of

management ostility,

heir

unionswould

have an

advantage

n

luring

members ack

precisely

because

they

had

kept

he

older,

more

generous

ollective ontracts.

Thus, imilaro the eaders f more ccommodatingnions,manymil-

itanteaders'main oncern

was institutionalurvival.13

Differences

n

strategic

alculation

etween

ccommodating

nd

militantnion eaders o not

ppear

o

havebeen rooted

n

age, parti-

san

affiliation,

r

any

other

bjective

ondition. he nterviews

uggest

instead hat

hey

reflectedhe most nfluentialnion eaders' areer

experiences

nd the

varying

essons

hey

derived rom hose

experi-

ences. As a union eader

tated,

We've earned hatwe cannot

ight

windmills ecause workers

re not

nterested.

es,

I am

promanage-

ment,

ecause

f hefirm oes

well,

we do well.We'vedecided o be

management'shield. f omebodyttacksheiroliciest's s if heyre

attacking

s,

becausewe've

helped

hape

them

interview.14).

As this rticle's

indingsuggest,mployers

ctively

ought

o

shape

their elations ith ndividual nions

n

ways

that ontributed

o their

own

objective

f

maximizingrofits,

nd forced nion eaders o make

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 22/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

93

strategicecisions. mployersidnot,however,elect prioriwhich

unionswouldreceivemore

avorablereatmentnd become

privileged

negotiatingartners.

heir hoices

regarding

elations ith ndividual

unionswere

hapedby

the

trategies

dopted

y

union eaders t criti-

cal momentsf

firm

estructuring.

omeunion eaders hoseto accom-

modate

management's

emandsfor

change,

while

others owed to

resist. hese

choices,

n

turn,

haped

management's

wn

bargaining

strategies

owardndividual

nions.

With

egard

o the second

question,

whetherndividual uccess

translatednto verall ncreases

n firm-levelnion

ensity,

he

findings

of this tudyndicate hatdespitebringingome relative uccess for

individual

nions,

he

strategy

f

partnership

ccommodationid

not

translatento nion

ensity ains

t thefirmevel.Moremilitantnions

found

hemselveslienated rom he normal

rameworkf aborrela-

tions,

which ncreased

nter- nd intraunionactionalism.

eanwhile,

the more successful nions

expanded

their

membershipy

raiding

other

nions,

nd thereforead little

ncentiveo

organize

he unor-

ganized.

Thus,

although

ome

unions

experienced

bsolute

growth

overall,

nion

density

eclined.

Scholars iffern their valuations f the effectsf partnership

strategies

n

union

trength.

he conventional isdom

mong

Chilean

government

fficials,

enter-left

arties,

nd some

employers

n

this

regard

as been that

nion-managementartnership

nsures

combi-

nation

f stable

firm

erformance

nd

organized

aborvoice

on

key

issues.

Although

his

erspective ay

e

roughly

ccurate here nions

are

egally trong

nd

organizationally

nified,

his

tudy uggests

very

different

eality

n

theChilean ontext.

Where nions re

nstitutionally

weak,

ack a

strong olitical

oice,

and face

ncreasingmployment

instability,artnership

trategies ay

well

represent

fforts

y

unions o

advance heir wn narrow nterestshrougherticalatron-clienties

that

perate

t the

expense

f other nions nd undermineabor oli-

darity.14

n the

ong

run,

uchtiescould also

potentially

eakenmore

accommodating

nions

by making

hem

ncreasingly

ependent

n

management's

avor s a source of

legitimacy.

his

dependency,

s

some of

the

more

ccommodating

nion eaders

openly

recognized,

made them

ulnerableo

changes

n

management

isposition

oward

unions own

heroad

interview.14).

Beyond Union Decline

This

tudy

as

emphasized

owthe tructuraleakness f abor

n

con-

temporary

hile

hapes

the kinds f

strategies

hat

ringmembership

recruitment

uccess o ndividualnions nd how those

trategies

ffect

union

density.

wo broader ssues are tied to

the

question

f union

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 23/31

94

LATINAMERICAN OLITICS AND SOCIETY

52:

2

weakness. ne is therelationshipetween niondecline nd theper-

sistence f

high nequality

n

Chile;

he thers the onditionshat ould

potentiallyring

revitalization

f Chilean

rganized

abor

n

thefore-

seeable

future.

Since

tsredemocratization

n

1990,

Chile

has

been

applauded

or

makingignificant

dvances

n

poverty

eduction

Haggard

nd

Kaufman

2008;

Mesa-Lago

008b;

Weyland

997).

At he

ame

ime,

henation as

exhibitedne ofthemost kewed ncome

istributionsn Latin

merica,

with Ginicoefficient

veraging

round

.55

ECLAC

001,71, 2006,

90).

5

This situationtems rom

wage

inequality

Ffrench-Davis

002,

198;Larrañaga009, 2) and thefact hat ealwageshavegrownmuch

more

lowly

han as national

ncome

Banco

Central

.d.).

These rends

in

wages,

n

turn,

re

probably

t east

partly

functionf

the

tructural

weakness f

unions,

ince research lsewhere

as

demonstrated

hat

unionshave an

important

ole

n

pushing p

and

compressing

ages

(Freeman

nd Medoff

984;

Rueda nd Pontusson

000).

High

evels

of income

nequality ay

have

significant

acroeco-

nomic

nd

political mplications.

ith

egard

o the

economy,

ome

scholars

rgue

hat

high

evelsof

inequality

re associated

with

poor

long-termrowtherformanceEasterly002, 66).With egardopol-

itics,

he iterature

uggests

hat

igh

evels f

nequality

re associated

with

ower-quality

nd more nstable

emocracy

Kauffman

007;

Wey-

land

1996,

).

Although

hile

does notface hese

problems ight

ow,

failure o deal

with

his ituation

n the

presentmay

make he

country

vulnerable

o

them

n thefuture.

Given the current

ituation f union weakness

nd its

negative

implications,

t s

worth

sking

what onditions

ouldmake t

possible

to foresee

strengthening

f the labor movement

n

Chile.Besides

engagingmanagement

n

training

nd worker

rotection

nitiatives,

ll

ofwhichmaymake unions moreappealing o potentialmembers,

unions

must

make nroads ntonew constituencies.

lthough

ormal

employment

as becomemore

precarious

han n the

past

Sehnbruch

2OO6),

hile

till as the

argest

ormalector

n the

region Mesa-Lago

2008a,

).

This

presents

n

opportunity

or

ecruiting

ut

requires

more

will, nnovation,

nd

energy

n

mobilizing

orkers ho

may

have dif-

ferent eeds

from hose f traditional

onstituencies.

The

findings

f his

tudy uggest,

owever,

hat uch

trategies

ill

have imited ffects

n the absenceof a labor

reformhat ackles he

multiple

ncentivesor nion

ragmentation.

herefore,

stronger

nion

movementrobably illrequire broad hangen the egalframework

in

whichworkers

egotiate

ith

management.

his annot e achieved

whileunions ontinue

o hold ittle

oliticaleverage.

The

sharp

ncrease

n

union

militancy

nderPresident

ichelle

Bachelet

2006-10)

howsthat ven under

xisting

onditions,

nions

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 24/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S

LABOR UNIONS

95

canfind ommon oliticalroundnd relativeuccess nseizing olit-

ical

opportunities.

owever,

hese ffortsavebeen

imitedo workers

in the

public

ector,

nd have

not

yet

ranslated

nto

ignificant

eforms

to the collective

spects

f the LaborCode.

This ndicates hat

more

pressure

s

needed,

not

only

rom nions ut lso

fromncumbent

ar-

ties hat ad

historicalies

o

unions,

specially

heSocialist

arty

nd

theChristian

emocrats.

For

the ast 18

years,

while

eading

he

government,

hese

parties

have embraced

elatively

rthodox

market

rinciples

n

regard

o the

labor

market,

aking

t

difficulto rebuild

he

trong

ut autonomous

relationsetween enter-left

arties

nd unions hat xisted eforehe

1973

militaryoup.

This ituation

as

been

theresult

f the

negotiated

character

fthedemocratic

ransition,

hefear nd

distrustf abor

mil-

itancy esulting

rom

he

1973

breakdown

f Salvador

llende's

ocial-

ist

egime,

nd the

ubsequent

all

f real ocialism

n Eastern

urope.

Divisions

n the abormovement

nd

strong ressure

rom

mployers

have not

helped.

n

this

ontext,

abor

eformeems

lusive.

Ironically,hange

ould

potentially

ome

as a result

f electoral

shifts

hat

romote

lternation

n

power.16

he success f

he

right

n the

2009-10 residentiallection illprobablymean hatn the horterm,

progress

n

labor

ssues

will

be

delayed.

n

the

ong

run,

owever,

his

situation

ouldcreate

more ncentives

or enter-left

arties

o

develop

a labor

genda

hatwould

llow hem

o

activelyompete

or

working-

classvotes

while

reeing

oth

nion nd center-left

arty

eaders o

crit-

icize the

government

nd the current

evelopment

odel.While

he

greater

olitical olarization

his

cenario

mplies

might

worry

ome

observers

ho

fear

repetition

f the

country's

raumatic

ast,

t

may

be

the

nly

way

o

substantively

lter he abor elations

tructure

nher-

itedfrom

he

militaryegime.

Interviews

All nterviews

ere conducted

n

Santiago,

hile

n

2004.

Translations

of nterview

uotations

y

the uthor.

Bank

1.1

Corporate

anager,

f Labor

Relations,

ugust

1.2

Member,

oard

f

Directors,

nion

11,

May

10

1.3Member,oard fDirectors,nion12,May5

1.4

Member,

oard f

Directors,

nion

13,

May

5

1.5

Member,

oard f

Directors,

nion

,

April

6

1.6

Member,

oard

f

Directors,

nion

12,

May

13

1.7

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

,

May

3

1.8

Member,

oard

f

Directors,

nion

,

May

12

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 25/31

96

LATIN

AMERICAN OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

1.9Member, oard ofDirectors, nion9,July 9

1.10

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

10,

July

4

1.11

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

3,

June

1

1.12

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

4,

July

7

1.13

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

5,

August

11

1.14

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

1,

April

29

1.15

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

1,

June

1

1.16

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

2,

June

4

1.17

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

11,

May

12

Telecommunications Firm

2.1

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

9,

August

30

2.2

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

6,

September

7

2.3

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

12,

August

26

2.4

Corporate

Manager

of

Labor

Relations,

eptember

0

2.5

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

10,

September

7

2.6

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

7,

September

2.7

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

13,

August

31

2.8

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

11,

August

23

2.9 Member, oard ofDirectors, nion 1,August12

2.10

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

2,

August

19

2.11

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

4,

August

25

2.12

Member,

oard

of

Directors,

nion

8,

July

2

2.13

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

5,

September

8

2.14

Member,

oard of

Directors,

nion

3,

August

27

Notes

I

would

iketo thank

velyne

uber,

uan

ablo

Luna,

Jana

Morgan,

he

editor fLAPS, ndfour nonymouseviewers or heirnsightfulomments

on differentersions

f

the

paper.

also would

iketo

thankGabriel

ndetti

for

his

encouragement

nd

his

relentless,

ut

n theend

always

onstructive,

criticism.

1.

Unfortunately,

ross-national

ata

eries n

union

ensity

n Latin

mer-

ica between

990

and 2004

are

problematic.

he International

abour

Office

(ILO)

database,

or

xample,

as

comparability

roblems

ue to

considerable

cross-national

ariation

n themethods

sed to

collect he

data,

he

overage

f

the

figures

n

trade nion

membership,

hedefinitions

sed,

nd

the

pproach

to

calculating

rade

nion

density

ates.

ountry-specific

tudies

ndicate,

ow-

ever,hat nionsnMexico, eru, ndUruguay,hich harewith hile long-

standing

radition,

ave

experienced

imilar

hrinkage

Cassoni

000, ;

Fairris

and

Levine

004;

aavedra-Chanduví

nd Torero

002,

1-13).

2. The

other

2

percent

f

unionized

orkersre

organized

n unions f

independent

nd

temporary

orkers,

wo

types

f

unions hat

avea different

legal

tatus.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 26/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS

97

3. The connection etweenunion-partyolitical lliances nd union

strength

as been well documented

n

both he

LatinAmericannd

European

contexts

Burgess

004;

Cook

2007;

Levitsky

nd

Way

998;

Murillo

001;

West-

ern

1995,

87-88).

4. Studies

funion

ensity

n

more

eveloped

ountriesind imilarinks

(Ebbinghaus

nd

Visser

999;

Visser

992;

Lee

2005).

5.

Partnership

eremeans

strategy

f

firm-levelnion ccommodation

characterized

y

permanent

nd

highlyooperative

nteractionsetween nions

and

management

ntended

o

produce

mutual

ains.Militancy

efers

o union

strategies

haracterized

y

ittle

ccommodation,

ainly

rientedoward btain-

inggains

orworkers.

6. Mostunionized irms ave one or twounionsDirección el

Trabajo

2007,

9).

7.

Although

n

2004

roughly

0

percent

r all theworkers

aboring

or

both

irms ere

ubcontracted,

heunions nder

tudy

ere

rganized

ery

ew,

if

ny,

ftheseworkers.

8.

UnderChilean abor

aw,

the

employer

annotrefuse

o

negotiate

formal ollective

ontracts.his

procedure

lso

requires

igher uorums

f

union

epresentation

han heconvenio

nd follows

rigid

et of

procedures.

On

average,

0

percent

f

unions

mploy

his

ype

f nstrument

Dirección

el

Trabajo

.d.,

).

9. Union soughtutFederationas an opportunityogrowinterview

1.16).

10.

According

o a

firm

fficer,

Inthe ast

bargaining

ound

was author-

ized to

ncrease he ostof the ollective

greement

y

2

percent

o

4

percent.

I succeeded

n

negotiating

n increase f

only

.8

percent

interview.1).

11.

In

addition,

ostworkersmaintained

trong

motionalttachment

o

their ank

f

origin.

nionswere

nformally

amed n referenceo those anks.

12. This ttitude

s consistent ith hat ound

y

earlier,

lassicworks

n

labor elations

n

Chile

e.g.,

Landsberger

967).

13.

Golden

1997)

argues

hat

nion

eaders

may

undertake

trikes

hey

know

will

ailwhen

hey erceive

hat he riteriaor

llocatingayoffs

hreaten

union urvival.

14. Kauffman

1974,

285)

defines

patron-client

elationship

s one char-

acterized

y

a

particularistic

nformal

xchange

elationship

etween ctors

f

unequalpower

nd status

n

which ach

party xpects

eturns

y rendering

goods

and services

o theother.

15.

One recent

nalysis

ndicateshat

nequality

eclined etween 000

nd

2006

Larrañaga

009).

However,

venwith he ecent

all n

nequality,

he ver-

age

Gini

oefficientor he

post-

990

period

s above

0.55

Larrañaga

009,

).

16. It could

lso come about s a result f an electoral

eformhatwould

give

more

epresentation

o

political

inoritieshan he urrent

inominal

ystem.

References

Ackers,

eter,

nd

Jonathan

ayne.

998.

British

radeUnions nd Social

Part-

nership:

hetoric,

eality

nd

Strategy.

nternational

ournal

f

Human

Resource

anagement

,

3: 529-50.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 27/31

98

LATIN

AMERICAN OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

Angell, lan.1972.Politicsnd the aborMovementnChile. ondon:Oxford

University

ress.

Anner,

ark.

003.

Defending

abor

Rights

cross orders: entral merican

Export-Processing

lants.

n

Strugglesor

ocial

Rights

nLatin

America,

d.

SusanEcksteinnd

Timothy

.

Wickham-Crowley.

ew

York:

Routledge.

147-66.

Ara

ena,

Antonio.

999.

El

sindicalismon el sector

omercio. evista e

Economía

Trabajo

ET

9: 59-83.

Armbruster-Sandoval,

alph.

003.

Globalization

nd Transnationalabor

Orga-

nizing:

he Honduran

aquiladorandustry

ndthe

Kimi

ampaign.

ocial

Science

History7,

4:

551-76.

Arrieta,

dolfo.003.Mercado el

trabajo: rganización representación

indi-

cal v

gremial.

antiago:

IT/CUT.

BancoCentral,.d.Base

de datos stadísticos.

ttp://si2.bcentral.cl/Basededatos

economicos/951_portada.asp?idioma=E

ccessed

une

,

2009-

Barrera,

anuel.

998.

Macroeconomic

djustment

n

Chile nd the

Politics

f

the

Popular

ectors.

n

What ind

of

Democracy?

What ind

of

Market?

Latin

American the

Ageof

Neoliberalism,

d.

Philip

xhorn nd Graciela

Ducatenzeiler.

niversity

ark:

ennsylvania

tate

University

ress.

27-50.

Behrens, artin,

erstin

amann,

nd Richard urd.

004.How Does

Restruc-

turing

ontributeo Union

Revitalization?n

Frege

nd

Kelly

004.

11-30.

Bronfenbrenner,ate,and RobertHickey. 004.Changingo Organize:A

National

ssessmentfUnion

trategies.

n

Milkmannd

Voos2004.

17-60.

Burgess,

atnna.

004. Parties nd

Unions n theNewGlobal

conomy.

itts-

burgh: niversity

f

Pittsburgh

ress.

Campero,

uillermo.

998.

Organización

indical relaciones

aborales.

n

Chile

en los

noventa,

d. Cristian oloza

and

Eugenio

Lahera.

antiago:

resi-

denciade la

República/DOLMEN.

05-26.

Campero,

uillermo,

nd RenéCortázar.

986.

Logics

f Union

Action

n

Chile.

KelloggWorking

aper

5.

Notre ame:

Kellogg

nstitute.

Carmichael,

sla.

2004.Union-Basedension

unds,

Worker ontrolnd Social

Investment:

New

Role

forUnions

n

the

Economy.

n

Verma nd Kochan

2004.105-16.

Cassoni,

driana. 000.Trade

Unions

n

Uruguay:

ome

Historicaleatureshat

Explain

heir

conomic ole.

Working

aper

04/00.

Montevideo:

epart-

ment

f

Economics,

niversidade la

República.

Cook,

María

orena.

007.

The

olitics

f

Labor

Reform

n LatinAmerica. ni-

versity

ark:

ennsylvania

tate

University

ress.

De la

Maza,

Gonzalo.

999.

Los

movimientosociales n la

democratizacióne

Chile.

n

El modelo

hileno. emocracia

desarrollon los

noventa,

d.

Paul Drake

nd ván

Jaksic.

antiago:

OM.

377-405.

Dirección el

Trabajo.

007.

ENCLA

006:resultadose la

quinta

ncuestaab-

oral. antiago: irección elTrabajo.

.

n.d.

Compendio

e

series stadísticas

990-2007:

apítulo

indicalismo.

http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/l6l2/article-626l4.html.

ccessed

May

25,

2008.

Easterly,

illiam.

001.

The

Elusive

uest

or

Growth:

conomists'

dventures

and Misadventuresn

the

Tropics. ambridge:

IT

Press.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 28/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR

UNIONS

99

Ebbinghaus,Bernhard,ndJelleVisser.1999.When Institutions atter:Union

Growth

nd Decline in Western

urope,

1950-1995.

European Sociological

Review

15,

2:

135-58.

Economic Commissionfor Latin

America and the Caribbean

(ECLAC).

2001.

Social Panorama 2001: Income Distribution,

ttp:

/www.

clac.org/publica-

ciones/xml/l/796l/PSI2001_chap2.pdf

.

2006. Social Panorama:

Poverty

and Income,

http://www.eclac.org/

publicaciones/xml/4/27484/PSI2006_Capl_Poverty.pdf

ccessed

June

2,

2009.

Escobar,

Patricio.

1999.

Hacia una caracterización el mercado del

trabajo.

n

Trabajadoresy empleo

en el Chile de los

noventa,

d. AntonioAra

ena et

al.

Santiago:

LOM. 11-81.

Espinosa,

Malva.

1996.

Sindicalismo n la

empresa

moderna: ni ocaso ni crisis

terminal.

antiago:

Dirección

del

Trabajo.

Etchemendy,

ebastián,

and Ruth B. Collier.

2007.

Down but Not Out: The

Recovery

of a Downsized Labor Movement in

Argentina

2002-2006).

Working aper

141.

Berkeley:

nstitute orResearchon Labor

and

Employ-

ment,

University

f California.

Fairris,

avid,

and Edward Levine. 2004.

Declining

Union

Density

n

Mexico,

1984-2000.

Monthly

abor Review

127,

9:

10-17.

Ffrench-Davis,

icardo.

2002.

Economic

Reforms

n Chile: From

Dictatorship

o

Democracy.Ann Arbor:UniversityfMichiganPress.

Fichter,

Michael,

and Ian Greer.2004.

Analyzing

ocial

Partnership:

Tool of

Union Revitalization?

n

Frege

and

Kelly

2004.

71-93.

Frank,

Volker. 2002.

The Labor Movement

n

Democratic

Chile,

1990-2000.

Working aper

298.

NotreDame:

Kellogg

nstitute.

.

2004.

Policies Without

Policy:

The Failure of Social Concertation

n

Democratic

Chile,

1990-2000.

In

Victims

f

the Chilean Miracle: Workers

and

Neoliberalism n the Pinochet

Era, 1973-2002,

ed.

Peter Winn.

Durham:

Duke

University

ress.

71-124.

Freeman,

Richard

.,

and

Joseph

Medoff.

984.

WhatDo UnionsDo? New York:

Basic

Books.

Frege,

Carola,

and

John

Kelly.

2004. Varieties

f

Unionism:

trategiesor

Union

Revitalization n a Globalizing

Economy.

Oxford:Oxford

Università

ress.

Frias,

Patrício.

1998.

El

sindicalismo

y

su crisisen

la

perspectiva

de la vincu-

lación entre

a

política

y

la economía. Revistade Economía

y Trabajo

PET

7:

89-109.

Frundt,

Henry

J.

2002. Central

AmericanUnions in the Era of Globalization.

LatinAmericanResearchReview

37,

3: 7-53.

Garretón,

Manuel

Antonio.

1994.

The PoliticalDimensionof Processes of Trans-

formation

n

Chile.

n

Democracy,

Markets,

nd Structural

eform

n Latin

America:

Argentina,

Bolivia,

Brazil,

Chile,

and

Mexico,

ed.

William C.

Smith,Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra. Coral Gables: North-

South CenterPress.

217-36.

George,

Alexander

L.,

and

Andrew Bennett.

2005.

Case Studies and

Theory

Development

n theSocial Sciences.

Cambridge:

MIT Press.

Golden,

MiriamA.

1997.

Heroic

Defeats:

ThePolitics

f

ob

Loss.

New York:Cam-

bridge

University

ress.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 29/31

100

LATIN

AMERICAN OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

GonzálezSantibáñez, ristian.998.Notas sobreempleoprecarioy precarización

del

empleo

en Chile. Revista e Economía

y

Trabajo

PET

1

-.

8-85.

Haagh,

Louis.

2002.

The

Emperor's

New

Clothes: Labor Reform nd Social

Democratization

n

Chile. Studies

of Comparative

nternational

Develop-

ment

1,

1:

86-115.

Haggard, Stephan,

and Robert

R. Kauffman.

008.

Development, emocracy,

and

Welfare

tates.Princeton: rinceton

University

ress.

Hébert,

Gérard.

1993.

Unionism n

a Different ontext: he Case of

Quebec.

In

Jenson

nd Mahon

1993. 93-111.

Heery,

Edmund,

nd

Lee Adler.

004.

Organizing

he

Unorganized.

n

Frege

and

Kelly

2004.

45-70.

Herrera,

Gonzalo.

1995.

Tendencias del cambio

tecnológico

en la industria

chilena.Revista e Economía

y Trabajo

en ChilePET

5:

77-94.

Jenson,Jane,

and Rianne

Mahon,

eds.

1993.

The

Challenge of Restructuring:

NorthAmericanLabor Movements

espond. Philadelphia:Temple

Univer-

sity

Press.

Jessup,

David,

and Michael E. Gordon.

2000.

Organizing

n

ExportProcessing

Zones: The

Bibong Experience

n

the Dominican

Republic.

In

Transna-

tional

Cooperation

mong

Labor

Unions,

d. Michael

E.

Gordon and Lowell

Turner. thaca: Cornell

University

ress.

179-201.

Kauffman,

Robert.

1974.

The Patron-Client

Concept

and Macro-Politics:

Prospects nd Problems.Comparative tudies n Societynd History 6,3:

284-308.

.

2007.

The PoliticalEffects f

Inequality

n

LatinAmerica:Some

Incon-

venientFacts.

Working aper

13/2008/07.

Moscow: Center

forAdvanced

Studies.

Kelly,

ohn.

1996.

Union

Militancy

nd

Social

Partnership.

n TheNew

Workplace

and Trade

Unionism,

d. Peter

Ackers,

Chris

Smith,

nd

Paul Smith.New

York:

Routledge.

7-109.

Kochan, Ihomas,

Richard

Locke,

Paul

Osterman,

nd

Michael Piore. 2004.

Extended Networks:

A

Vision for the Next Generation

Unions.

In

Verma

and Kochan

2004.

30-43.

Landsberger,

enry

A. 1967. The Labor Elite: Is It

Revolutionary?

n Elites n

Latin

America,

ed.

Seymour

Martin

Lipset

and

Aldo Solari.

New

York:

Oxford

University

ress.

256-300.

Larrañaga,

svaldo.

2009.

Inequality, overty,

nd

Social

Policy:

RecentTrends

in

Chile.

Working aper

no.

85.

Paris: Social

Employment

nd

Migration,

OECD.

Lee,

Cheol-Sung.

2005.

International

Migration,

eindustrializationnd Union

Decline

in

16 Affluent ECD

Countries,

962-1997.

Social Forces

84,

1:

71-88.

Levitsky,

teven,

nd

Lucan

A.

Way.

1998.

Between a

Shock and a Hard Place:

The Dynamics f Labor-BackedAdjustmentnPolandandArgentina. om-

parative

Politics

30,

2:

171-92.

Mesa-Lago,

Carmelo.

2008a.

Social Insurance

Pensions

and

Health),

Labour

Markets nd

Coverage

n LatinAmerica.

Working aper

36.

Geneva: Social

Polity

and

Development Program,

United Nations Research

Institute or

Social

Development.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 30/31

PALACIOS-VALLADARES:

CHILE'S LABOR

UNIONS 101

. 2008b. Social Protectionn Chile:Reforms o ImproveEquity. nterna-

tionalLabour

Review

147,

4:

377-402.

Milkman,

uth.

993-

Union

Responses

to

Workforce eminization

n

the United

States.

n

Jenson

nd Mahon

1993. 3-17.

Milkman,Ruth,

nd

Kim

Voos,

eds. 2004.

Rebuilding

Labor:

Organizing

and

Organizers

n theNew Union

Movement. thaca:

Cornell

University

ress.

Montero,

ecilia.

2000.

Las relaciones aborales:

¿un

asunto

público?

n El estado

y

el sector

privado,

ed. Oscar

Muñoz Goma.

Santiago:

FLACSO-Chile/

DOLMEN.

77-120.

Moulián,

Tomas.

1997.

Chile actual.

Anatomía de un mito.

antiago:

LOM.

Murillo,

María

Victoria.2001.

Labor

Unions,

Partisan

Coalitions and

Market

Reforms

n Latin America.

Cambridge:Cambridge

University

ress.

Radrigán,

uan.

1999-

Movimiento

indicalen Chile:

una visión crítica.

Working

Paper

46.

Santiago:

Centrode

Investigaciones

ociales,

ARCIS.

Rojas,

Jorge,

nd Antonio

Aravena.

1999.

El

mundo

sindical

y

el

trabajo

salari-

ado

en Chile.

In

Trabajadores

y empleo

en los

noventa,

d.

PatricioEsco-

bar.

Santiago:

ARCIS/PET/LOM.

37-227.

Rueda,

David,

and

Jonas

Pontusson. 000.

Wage Inequality

nd

Varieties f

Cap-

italism.

World olitics

2

(3):

350-383.

Rueschemeyer,

ietrich,

velyne

Huber

Stephens,

nd

John

D.

Stephens.

1992.

Capitalist

Development

nd

Democracy. Chicago:

University

f

Chicago

Press.

Saavedra-Chanduvi,

aime,

nd Máximo Torero. 2002.

Union

DensityChanges

and Union

Effects n

Firm

Performance

n

Peru. RES

Working aper

3158.

Washington,

C: Inter- merican

Development

Bank.

Saint-Pierre,

eline.

1993.

Recognizing

he

Working

Mother: he

Quebec

Labor

Movement

nd theFeminizationf Labor.

n

Jenson

nd

Mahon

1993. 269-84.

Salinero

B.,

Jorge.

006. Veinte

ños de

afiliación

indical

y negociación

colec-

tiva en Chile:

problemasy desafíos.

Santiago:

Dirección

del

Trabajo.

Scruggs,

yle,

nd

Peter

Lange.

2002.

WhereHave All the Members

Gone? Glob-

alization, nstitutions,

nd Union

Density

Journal

of

Politics

64,

1:

126-53.

Sehnbruch,

Kirsten. 006.

The Chilean Labor

Market:

A

Key

to

UnderstandingLatinAmericanLabor Markets.

Basingstoke: algrave

Macmillan.

Sharpe,

Theresa. 2004. Union

Democracy

and

Successful

Campaigns:

The

Dynamics

of Staff

Authority

nd

Worker

Participation

n

an

Organizing

Union.

n Milkman nd

Voos

2004.

62-87.

Silva,

Eduarde

1997.

Business

Elites,

he

State,

nd

Economic

Change

in Chile.

In Businessand theState

n

Developing

Countries,

d.

Sylvia

Maxfield nd

Ben Ross

Schneider. thaca: Cornell

University

ress.

152-89.

Strachan,

Glenda,

and

John

Burgess.

2004.

Trade Union Survival nd

Women

Workers

n Australia.

n Verma nd Kochan 2004.

165-78.

Terry,

Michael. 2004.

Partnership :

Serious

Strategy

orUK Trade Unions?

n

Verma nd Kochan 2004. 205-19.

Verma,Anil,

nd Thomas

A. Kochan. 2004. Unions

n the 1st

Century:

n Inter-

national

Perspective. asingstoke:

algrave

Macmillan.

Visser,

Jelle.

1992.

The

Strength

f Union Movements

n Advanced

Capital

Democracy:

Social and

Organizational

ariations. n The Future

of

Labour

Movements,

d. Marino

Regini.

London:

Sage.

17-52.

This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:27:30 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/10/2019 From Militancy to Clientelism.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-militancy-to-clientelismpdf 31/31

102 LATIN

AMERICAN

OLITICS

AND

SOCIETY

52:

2

Wells,Donald. 1993-Recent nnovationsn Labor-Managementelations:The

Risks and

Prospects

forLabor in

Canada and the United

States.

n

Jenson

and Mahon

1993. 287-313.

Western,

ruce.

1995.

A

Comparative tudy

of

Working-Class isorganization:

Union Decline in

Eighteen

Advanced

Capitalist

ountries. mericanSocio-

logical

Review

0,

2:

179-201.

Weyland,

Kurt.

1996.

Democracy

Without

quity:

Failures

of

Reform

n Brazil.

Pittsburgh: niversity

f

Pittsburgh

ress.

.

1997.

Growthwith

Equity

n

Chile's New

Democracy?

atin

American

Research

Review

32,

1:

37-67.

Williams,

Heather

L.

2003.

Of Labor

Tragedy

nd

Legal

Farce: The Han

Young

Factory truggle

n

Tijuana,

Mexico. Social Science

History 7,

4: 525-50.

Yates,

Charlotte.

003.

The Revivalof

Industrial nions

in

Canada: The

Exten-

sion and

Adaptation

f Industrial

nion Practices o the

New

Economy.

n

Trade Unions n Renewal:

A

Comparative

tudy,

d. Peter

Fairbrothernd

Yates. London: Continuum.

21-43.