FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017 2017_Sudan.pdf · FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017. Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017 ... November 2016 to include specifi clauses pertaining to online journalism,

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FREEDOM ON THE NET2017

Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017

● Economicchallengesintensifie withhighinflatio ratesinSudan,resultinginhighercostanddecliningqualityofservicesforSudanesecitizensinthepastyear(seeAvailability and Ease of Access).

● Socialmediauserswereactiveinorganizingcivildisobediencecampaignsagainstcutstosubsidiesonfuel,basiccommodities,andmedicine,thoughso-calledCyberJihadistsworkedtothwartthecampaignsthroughtheimpersonationofsocialmediaaccountsanddisseminationofmisinformation(seeMedia, Diversity, and Online Manipulation;andDigital Activism).

● ThehighlyrestrictivePressandPrintedPressMaterialsLawof2004wasupdatedinNovember2016toincludespecifi clausespertainingtoonlinejournalism,extendingonerouslimitationslongplacedonthetraditionalpresstotheonlinesphere(seeLegal Environment).

● Arrestsandharassmentforonlineactivitiescontinuedinthepastyear,particularlyasheavy-handedcensorshipontheprintandbroadcastsectorsledjournaliststomigrateonlinetodisseminatenews(seeProsecutions and Detentions for Online Activities;andIntimidation and Violence).

Sudan2016 2017

Internet Freedom Status Not Free

Not Free

ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 16 16

LimitsonContent(0-35) 18 18

ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 30 30

TOTAL* (0-100) 64 64

*0=mostfree,100=leastfree

Population: 39.6 million

Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 28 percent

Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: No

Political/Social Content Blocked: No

Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes

Press Freedom 2017 Status: Not Free

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FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017


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IntroductionInternetfreedomremainedtenuousinSudaninthepastyear,characterizedbydecliningconditionsforaffordabl accesstoqualityICTservicesandconcertedeffort tosilencegovernmentcriticsamidalargescalecivildisobediencecampaignorganizedbyactivistsonsocialmedia.

Socialmediaandcommunicationsplatformswerecriticaltotheorganizationofcivildisobediencecampaignsinlate2016.Activistsralliedonlinetoprotestcutstosubsidiesforbasiccommodities,fuel,andmedicinesthathadcauseda30percentincreaseinpetrolanddieselpricesanda300percentpricehikeonsomedrugs.A3-daynationwidecivildisobediencecampaignbeganonNovember27,2016,whichinvolvedstrikesthatsuccessfullycloseddownbusinessesandschoolsincitiesacrossthecountry.ActivistscalledforasecondcivildisobediencecampaigninDecember,whichprogovernmenttrollsknownastheCyberJihadistsattemptedtothwartthroughthespreadofpropagandaandmisinformationonline.Whilethecampaignsultimatelyyieldedfewconcessions,theeffort helpedrestoretrustincollectiveactionandthepoweroforganization,particularlyagainstagovernmentknownfortakingviolentactionagainstcriticsandprotestors.Thecivildisobediencecampaignshadenabledcitizenstopowerfullyprotestwithouttakingtothestreetsandriskingarrestorbeatings.

Meanwhile,theauthoritariangovernmentunderPresidentOmaral-Bashirimposedgreaterrestrictionsononlineactivities.ThehighlyrestrictivePressandPrintedPressMaterialsLawof2004wasupdatedinNovember2016toincludespecifi clausespertainingtoonlinejournalism,extendingonerouslimitationslongplacedonthetraditionalpresstotheonlinesphere.DraftamendmentstotheITCrimeActwereintroducedinJune2016tofurtherregulateonlinespeech.Arrestsandinterrogationsforonlineactivitiescontinuedinthepastyear,particularlyasheavy-handedcensorshipontheprintandbroadcastsectorsledjournaliststomigrateonlinetodisseminatenews.Harassmentandtechnicalattacksagainstactivistsandonlinejournalistsremainedhigh.

Obstacles to AccessEconomic challenges intensified with high inflation rates in Sudan, resulting in higher cost and declining quality of services for Sudanese citizens in the past year. Mobile phone penetration continued to decline over a two year period, while floods damaged fiber optic cables and caused internet disruptions for numerous subscribers.

Availability and Ease of Access

AccesstotheinternetremainedchallengingforSudanesecitizensduringthecoverageperiodamiddecliningqualityandspeeds,andincreasingcosts.Internetpenetrationstoodat28percentin2016,growingmarginallyfrom26percentin2015,whilemobilephonepenetrationdeclinedfrom71percentto69percent,accordingtothelatestdatafromtheInternationalTelecommunicationsUnion(ITU).1TheNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation(NTC)CommunicationsIndicatorsReportsforthe2ndand3rdquartersof2016indicatedadropininternetusageviamobilephonesby14percent

1 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,2000-2016,”and“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.

Introduction

Obstacles to Access


Restrictions on Connectivity

ICT Market

Regulatory Bodies

Limits on Content

Blocking and Filtering

Content Removal

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Digital Activism

Violations of User Rights

Legal Environment

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

Intimidation and Violence

Technical Attacks

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and9percent,respectively,thoughnoreasonswereprovidedforthedrop.2Mobilepenetrationhaddeclinedthepreviousyearaswell.3

Key Access Indicators

Internet penetration (ITU)a 2016 28.0%2015 26.6%2011 17.5%

Mobile penetration (ITU)b 2016 69%2015 71%2011 69%

Average connection speeds (Akamai)c 2017(Q1) 3.0 Mbps2016(Q1) 2.1 Mbps

aInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.bInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.cAkamai,“StateoftheInternet-ConnectivityReport,Q12017,”https://goo.gl/TQH7L7.

Sudan’scontinuallydeterioratingeconomyhascreatedanexpensiveoperatingenvironmentfortheICTsector,impactingbothtelecomcompaniesandtheirsubscribers.Inflatio rosetoover30percentinDecember2016amidrisingfoodandenergyprices,impactingthespendingpowerofconsumersfortelecomservices.4Asaresult,Zain,thecountry’slargesttelecomoperator,reportedadecreaseinnetprofit of11percentattheendof2016.5Exacerbatingmatters,thegovernment’sannualbudgetpassedinDecember2016increasedvalue-addedtaxes(VATs)onthetelecommunicationsindustryby5percentagepointsto35percent,6whichofficia claimedwouldencouragetelecomstousetheirresourcesmoreefficientl 7Meanwhile,thetelecommunicationsindustryblamedincreasingpricesonhighlicensingandregistrationfeesandtheproliferationofcheaperinternet-enabledvoiceandmessagingservicessuchasWhatsAppthathavedisruptedtheirtraditionalrevenueflows

Inadditiontohighprices,qualityofservicewaspoorandcharacterizedbyintermittentservicedisruptionsthroughouttheyear.Inoneoutage,DynResearchrecordedanoutageontheSudatelnetworkfor3.5hoursinAugust2016duetoflood thatdamagedthenetwork’sfibe opticcables,resultingin72percentofSudatel’sinternetroutestakenofflin 8

ElectricityshortagesalsolimitinternetservicesinSudan,especiallyinmajorcitiesthathaveexperiencedperiodicpowerrationingamidelectricitypricesincreases,whilemostoftheperiphery

2 TheNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation(2016).CommunicationsIndicatorsReportssecondquarter2016http://bit.ly/2mF51SQ;thirdquarter2016http://bit.ly/2n7ZXTg3 See“Sudan,”FreedomontheNet2016.4 “Sudaninflatio risesto30.47pctinDecember,”Reuters Africa,January18,2017,http://bit.ly/2ncTg355 “Zainphonenetworksees11%dropinprofits, Middle East Monitor,March13,2017,http://bit.ly/2nkyGzC6 Sudan’sbudgetshowsdefici of6.1billionpoundsanddependanceontaxesby74%,”[inArabic]Sudan Tribune,December21,2016,http://bit.ly/2n08J5N7 “Parliament:Increasecommunicationtaxtorationalizetelephoneconversation,”[inArabic]Alsudan Alyoum,December24,2016,http://bit.ly/2oblvya8 DynResearch.(Aug2,2016).“Sudateldroppedoffli for3.5hrstodaydowning72%ofInternetroutesof#Sudan.”

“Damagetothefibe paralyzestheSudani’sInternetandthepledgestoaddressthedamage,”Alrakoba,August3,2016(Arabic)http://bit.ly/2v3ztHlhttp://bit.ly/2nkLiGX

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areashaveunsteadyornoelectricityatall.9Twomajorblackoutshitthecountryduringthecoverageperiod,negativelyaffectin internetaccess.10


Sudanisconnectedtotheglobalinternetthroughthreeinternationalgatewayscontrolledbythepartlystate-ownedSudanTelecomCompany(Sudatel),Zain,andCanarTelecom,11whichareinturnconnectedtofoursubmarinecables:SaudiArabia-Sudan-1(SAS-1),SaudiArabia-Sudan-2(SAS-2),EasternAfricaSubmarineSystem(EASSy),andFALCON.12Partialcontrolovertheinternationalgatewayhasenabledthegovernmenttorestrictinternetconnectivityduringparticulareventsinthepast.

Therewerenoreportsindicatingthatthegovernmentblockedinternetconnectionduringthecoverageperiod;however,Zain’ssubscribersexperiencedslowconnectionsinthecapitalcityandothermajorcitiesinOctober2016,13andacompleteshutdowninMarch2017thatlastedforfourhours.14ThecompanyattributedthedisruptiontoatechnicalmalfunctionsimilartoonethathadoccurredonJanuary13,2016,whichsawthesuspensionofservicesformorethan12hours.

ICT Market

TherearefourlicensedtelecommunicationsoperatorsinSudan:Zain,MTN,Sudatel,andCanar.AllarefullyownedbyforeigncompanieswiththeexceptionofSudatel,inwhichthegovernmentownsa22percentshare.15However,theSudanesegovernmentholdssignifican swayoverSudatel’sboardofdirectors,whichincludeshigh-rankinggovernmentofficial 16

Twoproviders,MTNandSudatel,offe broadbandinternet,whileCanaroffer fixe phonelinesandhomeinternet.TheBankofKhartoumsubsequentlypurchasedCanarfromUAE’sEtisalatinJune2016,afterthebankusedits3.7percentshareinCanartoblockZain’seffort topurchaseit.Observersbelievethegovernment’smovetoincreaseitsmarketshareofthetelecomindustrywillhaveanegativeimpactoninternetfreedomforSudaneseusers.

Regulatory Bodies

Sudan’stelecomssectorisregulatedbytheNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation(NTC),whichishousedundertheMinistryofTelecommunicationsandInformationTechnology.TheNTCistaskedwithproducingtelecommunicationsstatistics,monitoringtheuseoftheinternet,introducingnewtechnologyintothecountry,anddevelopingthecountry’stelecommunications

9 “Sudan:FuelandElectricityPricesIncreaseinSudan,”All Africa,November6,2016,http://bit.ly/2niOvqr10 “PowercutsthroughoutthedayinmostpartsofSudan,”[inArabic]Dabanga Sudan,October14,2016http://bit.ly/2mxYFo6;“GeneralelectricityshutdowninSudanafterbreakdownsincontroldevices,”[inArabic]Sudan Tribune,February27,2017,http://bit.ly/2nOewPQ11 DougMadory,“InternetBlackoutinSudan,”DynResearch,September25,2013,http://bit.ly/1QN46V312 Checkinteractive,HuaweiMarineNetworks,“SubmarineCableMapforSudan,”http://bit.ly/1ZRMhKz13 “ZainSudanoutofcoveragewithinthestateofKhartoum,’[inArabic]Mugrn.net,October22,2016,http://bit.ly/2nMePKz14 “TechnicalmalfunctiondisruptsmobileInternetserviceforZainsubscribers,”[inArabic]Altareeq,March17,2017,http://bit.ly/2mYZmSU15 RupaRanganathanandCeciliaBriceno-Garmendia,Sudan’s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective,AfricaInfrastructureCountryDiagnostic, (Washington,D.C.): WorldBank,June2011),http://bit.ly/1OOZoXz16 SudanCentralBank,“ThePresentBoardofDirectors,”http://bit.ly/1jxA7pG

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andITindustry.Itisalsoresponsiblefordecidingwhatcontentshouldbeaccessibleontheinternet.Althoughitisastatebody,theNTCreceivesgrantsfrominternationalorganizationssuchastheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopmentandtheWorldBank,anditswebsitedescribesthebodyas“self-financing.

Limits on ContentNo online news outlet, social media, or communications platforms were restricted this year. Social media users were active in organizing civil disobedience campaigns against the government’s austerity measures, though so-called Cyber Jihadists worked to thwart the campaigns by impersonating social media accounts and disseminating misinformation.


TheSudanesegovernmentopenlyacknowledgesblockingandfilterin websitesthatitconsiders“immoral”and“blasphemous.”TheNTCmanagesonlinefilterin inthecountrythroughitsInternetServiceControlUnitandissomewhattransparentaboutthecontentitblocks,reportingthat95percentofblockedmaterialisrelatedtopornography,17thoughtheregulatorrecentlyacknowledgedthatithadnotbesuccessfulinblockingallpornographicsitesinSudan.18TheNTCalsoobligatescybercaféownerstodownloadblockingandfilterin softwareasarequirementtosustaintheirlicenses.19

TheNTC’swebsitegivesuserstheopportunitytosubmitrequeststounblockwebsites“thataredeemedtonotcontainpornography,”20butitdoesnotspecifywhethertheappealsextendtopoliticalwebsites.Usersattemptingtoaccessablockedsitearemetwithablackpagethatexplicitlystates,“ThissitehasbeenblockedbytheNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation,”andincludeslinkstofurtherinformationandacontactemailaddress.21

InadditiontotheNTC,NationalIntelligenceandSecurityService(NISS)agentsreportedlyhavethetechnicalcapabilitytoblockwebsitesdeemedharmfulandthreateningtoSudan’snationalsecurity,22whiletheGeneralProsecutoralsohastherighttoblockanysitethatthreatensnationalsecurityorviolatessocialmores.23

Content Removal

Theextenttowhichthegovernmentforceswebsitestodeletecertaincontentisunknown,thoughanecdotalincidentsinthepastfewyearssuggeststhatsomedegreeofforcedcontentremovalby

17 NationalTelecommunicationsCorporation,“BlockingOrUnblockWebsites,”lastmodifie September21,2016,http://www.ntc.gov.sd/index.php/en/blocking-websites18 NTC:pornographicsitesareincreasingontheInternetandotheronlineplatform,”Almeghar,August9,2015,bit.ly/1X8CQDm.19 “SudaneseintelligenceprosecutesInternetcontentthat‘threatensthemoralsofthenation’,”Alhayat,February29,2016,http://bit.ly/21iftrT;“Khartoum’sInternetcafesinviolations,”Ashorooq, September24,2016, http://bit.ly/2pg7K23 20 NTC,“BlockingOrUnblockWebsites.”21 Imageofablockedsite:https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6mgwvplJ6IadER T3RTZW1jSkk/edit?pli=122 “Expert:NISSiscapableofblockingwebsitesthatareposingathreattoSudan’snationalsecurity,”Aljareeda,November7,2014.23 “Cybercrimeisanactofterrorismthatthreatensthesovereigntyofthestate,”[inArabic]Alintibaha,August13,2014,http://bit.ly/1NRfFg5.

Introduction

Obstacles to Access



ICT Market

Regulatory Bodies

Limits on Content


Content Removal


Digital Activism

Violations of User Rights

Legal Environment




Technical Attacks

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thestateexists,andthatsuchadhocrequirementslacktransparency.Nospecifi incidentswerereportedduringthisreport’scoverageperiod.


Comparedtothehighlyrestrictivespaceinthetraditionalmediasphere—whichischaracterizedbypre-publicationcensorship,confiscation ofentirepressrunsofnewspapers,andwarningsfromNISSagentsagainstreportingoncertaintabootopics;24theinternetremainsarelativelyopenspaceforfreedomofexpression,withboldvoicesexpressingdiscontentwiththegovernmentonvariousonlineplatforms.OnlinenewsoutletssuchasAltareeg,25Altaghyeer,26RadioDabnga,27Hurriyat,andAlrakobacovercontroversialtopicssuchascorruptionandhumanrightsviolations.Facingheavycensorship,manyprintnewspapershaveshiftedtodigitalformats,circulatingcensoredorbannedmaterialontheirwebsitesandsocialmediapages;asaresult,Sudanesecitizensincreasinglyrelyononlineoutletsandsocialmediaforuncensoredinformation.28

WhatsApphasbecomeparticularlypopularamongSudanese,whohaveturnedtotheplatform’srelativeprivacyandanonymitytosharecriticalnewsviatheapp’sgroupchatfunction.29Bloggingisalsopopular,allowingjournalistsandwriterstopublishcommentaryfreefromtherestrictionsleveledonprintnewspapersandprovidesethnic,gender,andreligiousminoritiesaplatformtoexpressthemselves.ThemoreactiveSudanesebloggerswriteintheEnglishlanguage.However,self-censorshiphasriseninrecentyears.Manyjournalistswritingforonlineplatformspublishanonymouslytoavoidprosecution,whileordinaryinternetusersinSudanhavebecomemoreinclinedtoself-censortoavoidgovernmentsurveillanceandarbitrarylegalconsequences.

InresponsetoSudan’smorevibrantonlineinformationlandscape,thegovernmentemploysaconcertedandsystematicstrategytomanipulateonlineconversationsthroughitsso-calledCyberJihadistUnit.Establishedin2011inthewakeoftheArabSpring,theunitfallsundertheNationalIntelligenceandSecurityService(NISS)andworkstoproactivelymonitorcontentpostedonblogs,socialmediawebsites,andonlinenewsforums.30Theunitalsoinfiltrate onlinediscussionsinaneffor toascertaininformationaboutcyber-dissidentsandisbelievedtoorchestratetechnicalattacksagainstindependentwebsites,especiallyduringpoliticalevents31

Inthepastyear,CyberJihadistsworkedtothwartcivildisobediencecampaignsorganizedonsocialmediainresponsetoausteritymeasures.AfterasuccessfulcampaigninNovember2016—whichsawwidespreadstrikesclosedownbusinessesandschoolsacrossKhartouminthelargestdemonstrationofpublicdissentsinceantigovernmentprotestsinSeptember2013—CyberJihadistsmobilizedagainstplansforasecondcivildisobediencecampaignplannedforDecember2016.

24 “SudaneseSecuritycontinuescrackdownonpress,journalistsstrike,”Sudan Tribune,December01,2016,http://bit.ly/2okLKm025 AltareegwasestablishedinJanuary2014.26 Altaghyeer[Arabicforchangewithpoliticalconnotation]wasestablishedin2013followingthegovernment’scrackdownonindependentjournalists,whowereeventuallybannedfrompracticingtraditionaljournalisminSudan.27 LaunchedfromtheNetherlandsinNovember2008,RadioDabangafocusesonreportingonDarfurandhasastrongonlinepresenceandwideaudienceinconflict areas.Itwebsiteisbilingualandrunsindepthreportsandfeatures.ItisaprojectoftheRadioDarfurNetwork.Dabnga,“AboutUs,”http://bit.ly/1LkMr5H.28 “Blocking information in Sudan revives websites,” Aljazeera, January 9, 2017, http://bit.ly/2nloyos 29 KhalidAlbaih,“HowWhatsAppisfuelinga‘sharingrevolution’inSudan,”TheGuardian,October15,2015,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/15/sudan-whatsapp-sharing-revolution30 “Sudantounleashcyberjihadists,”BBC,March23,2011,bbc.in/1V3FWdi.31 SeeFreedomontheNet,Sudan2015,bit.ly/1QQpZp5.

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Deployingaconcertedsocialmediaoperation,CyberJihadistscreateddozensoffakesocialmediaprofile toinfiltrat prominentFacebookandWhatsAppgroupsorganizingthecampaignandexposedtheidentitiesofsomeactiviststotheauthorities.Theoperationalsoinvolvedspreadingmisinformation,suchascommentspostedaboutmedicationspurchasedatregularpricestocontradicttherealityofrisingprices,doctoredphotospostedofpopulatedstreetsduringthedisobediencecampaigntogivetheimpressionthatthecallforstrikeshadfailed,andfalsereportsthatthegovernmentwasplanningtoreinstatesubsidies.32OnlineactivistssaidtheywerereportedtothepoliceforparticipatinginFacebookgroupssupportingthedisobedience(seeProsecutionsandArrestsforOnlineActivities).33

Digital Activism

Socialmediaandcommunicationsplatformswerecriticaltotheorganizationofprotestsandcivildisobediencecampaignsinlate2016.Thecampaignswerelaunchedinprotestofgovernmentsubsidycutstobasiccommodities,fuel,andmedicinesthathadcauseda30percentincreaseinpetrolanddieselpricesanda300percentpricehikeonsomedrugs.34The#ReturnSubsidiesForMedicinestrendedacrossSudan,Egypt,andSaudiArabia,andwonsupportfromcitizensintheregion,includingcelebritiesfromLebanon,Bahrain,Kuwait,andUAE,35whichledtohighprofil coverageofthecampaigninreputablenewschannels.36DigitalactivismalsoencouragedcitizenstodemonstrateinthestreetsofKhartoum,37leadingtoseveralarrests,38whileSudanesecitizensinthediasporasupportedtheirfellowcountrymenandwomenbyorganizingprotestsinfrontofSudaneseembassiesaroundtheworld,39thereportsofwhichthegovernmentdenied.40

Theprotestslaterevolvedintoa3-daynationwidecivildisobediencecampaignbeginningonNovember27,2016,whichinvolvedstrikesthatcloseddownbusinessesandschoolsincitiesacrossthecountry.41TheSudanesepresidentridiculedthedisobediencecampaign,callingitafailure,42thoughnotbeforeannouncingplanstoreducethepricesoflive-savingmedicationforhypertension,diabetes,Parkinson’s,andmentaldiseasestwodaysbeforethecampaignbeganinaneffor todiffus tensions.43Priceswereonlymoderatelyreducedfromthehighlyinflate pricehikes.

32 DetailsoftheNationalCongressParty’sreportonsocialmediaoperationtoaddress(CivilDisobedience),”[inArabic]Al-Jareeda,March1,2017,retrievedfromhttp://bit.ly/2oUaOUI33 Authorinterview,December2016.34 “Sudansteeledforsharppricerisesasstatecutsfuelandelectricitysubsidies,’The Guardian,November10,2016,http://bit.ly/2fAbKXt;“#ReturnSubsidiesForMedicinestrendsastheSudanesestruggletoaffor basicdrugs,”Albawaba,November21,2016,http://bit.ly/2fjbfm935 “Sudan’sdrugcrisisgoesviralonTwitter,”[inArabic]Alarab,Novmber25,2016,http://bit.ly/2ocF6zk36 [SkyNewsArabia].(2016,November23,2016).Results of #ReturnSubsidiesForMedicines in Sudan.[VideoFile].Retrievedfromhttp://bit.ly/2jRMHDW;“How did the high prices of medicine affect lives of Sudanese?,”[inArabic[BBCArabic,November22,2016,http://bbc.in/2nQ3pBs;“WillcivildisobedienceworkinSudan?,”AlJazeera English,November30,2016,http://bit.ly/2olAIjB37 “Students’demonstrationsinnorthernofKhartoumexpressingovationof#ReturnSubsidiesForMedicines,”[inArabic]Sudan Tribune,November24,2016,http://bit.ly/2nQ6Qbb38 “ArrestsatmorepricehikeprotestsinSudan,”Radio Dabanga,November24,2016,http://bit.ly/2ftiLYc39 “CivilDisobedienceSpreadsAcrossSudan,”VoiceofAmerica,November29,2016,http://bit.ly/2oUWEQL40 “Ghandour:Wedidnotreceivedanycommentsfromoutsidepartiesregardingthecivildisobedience,”[InArabic]Al Ray Alaam,November30,2016,http://bit.ly/2nQ5cGF41 “Sudan’scivildisobediencebeginsamidvaryingpopularresponse,”Sudan Tribune,November28,2016,http://bit.ly/2fDbiWQ;

“Khartoum:emptystreetsinthefirs daysof“civildisobedience,”[inArabic]Sky News Arabia,November27,2016,http://bit.ly/2oRUYtK42 “SudanesePresident:Civildisobedienceisafailureofonemillionpercent,”[inArabic]Alarabiya,November29,2016,http://bit.ly/2nX0xnn43 “Sudanannouncesreductionofmedicineprices,Radio Dabanga,November27,2016,http://bit.ly/2giZKJP

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TherelativesuccessoftheNovembercivildisobediencecampaignencouragedagroupofonlineactiviststocallforanopen-endedcampaignonDecember19,44whichCyberJihadistsattemptedtothwartthroughthespreadofpropagandaandmisinformationonline(seeMedia,Diversity,andContentManipulation).WhiletheDecember19campaignwaslesssuccessfulthantheNovemberprotests,thecombinedeffort helpedrestoretrustincollectiveactionandthepoweroforganization,particularlyagainstagovernmentknownfortakingviolentactionagainstcriticsandprotestors.Thecivildisobediencecampaignsenabledcitizenstopowerfullyprotestwithouttakingtothestreetsandriskingarrestorbeatings.45

Violations of User RightsThe highly restrictive Press and Printed Press Materials Law of 2004 was updated in November 2016 to include specific clauses pertaining to online journalism, extending onerous limitations long placed on the traditional press to the online sphere.Draft amendments to the IT Crime Act were introduced in June 2016 to further regulate online speech. Arrests and interrogations for online activities continued in the past year, particularly as heavy-handed censorship on the print and broadcast sectors led journalists to migrate online to disseminate news. Harassment and technical attacks remained high.

Legal Environment

Sudanhasrestrictivelawsthatlimitpressandinternetfreedom.Mostnotably,theInformaticOffence (Combating)Act2007(knownastheITCrimeAct,orelectroniccrimeslaw)46criminalizestheestablishmentofwebsitesthatcriticizethegovernmentorpublishdefamatorymaterialandcontentthatdisturbspublicmoralityorpublicorder.47Violationsinvolvefine andprisonsentencesbetweentwotofiv years.

InJune2016,theMinisterofCommunicationsandInformationTechnologyannounceddraftamendmentstotheelectroniccrimeslaw,whichareexpectedtoincludedefamationonsocialmediaplatformsandcommunicationsapps,48andincreasepenaltiestoupto10yearsinprison.49Inearly2017,theFirstDeputyProsecutoroftheCyberCrimeUnit,AbdelMoneimAbdelHafez,alsostatedthatthegovernmentwasseekingtoimplementprogramsthatcontrolthespreadofinformation

44 “Sudaneseactivistscallforopen-endedgeneralstrikeinDecember,”Afro Insider!,November29,2016,http://bit.ly/2oloXtA45 “Sudan’ssocialmediacampaignofcivildissentboostshopesofchange,”The Guardian,January11,2017,http://bit.ly/2ji4yRd46 TheInformaticOffence (Combating)Act,2007,http://bit.ly/1NkNx1R.47 AbdelgadirMohammedAbdelgadir,Fences of Silence: Systematic Repression of Freedom of the Press, Opinion and Expression in Sudan,(InternationalPressInstitute,2012)http://bit.ly/1Pv7nee.AccordingtoSection4,crimesagainstpublicorderandmoralitySudancyberlaw,ofSudan’sCybercrimeLaw(2007),intentionalorunintentionalproducing,preparing,sending,storing,orpromotinganycontentthatviolatespublicorderormorality,makestheoffende liabletoimprisonmentof4to5yearsorafin orboth.Themaximumpenaltyforcommittingbothcrimesis7yearsorfin orboth.Also,underthesamesection,creating,promoting,using,websitethatcallsfor,orpromote,ideasagainstpubliclawormoralityispunishedby3yearsinprisonorfin orboth.Cyberdefamationcrimesnecessitate2yearsinprisonorfin orboth.Publicorderisnotdefine clearlyinthelaw.Subsequently,mostoftheoppositioncontentonlinefallsunderthissectionmakingonlineactivistsliableunderthislaw.48 “Al-BashiriswageswaragainstInternetactivistswiththedraftlawagainstcybercrime,”[inArabic]Al-Youm Al-Sabi’,June12,2016,http://bit.ly/2oWIaQa49 “MinisterofCommunications:informaticscrimespunishableupto10years,”[inArabic]Al-Youm Al-Tali,October4,2017,retrievedfromhttp://bit.ly/2nYMJZr

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onsocialmedia.50TheMinisterofJusticealsoapprovedestablishinganewcybercrimesprosecutionunitinAugust2016.51

InNovember2016,thehighlyrestrictivePressandPrintedPressMaterialsLawof2004wasupdatedtoincludespecifi clausespertainingtoonlinejournalism,extendingonerouslimitationslongplacedonthetraditionalpresstotheonlinesphere,52suchasprovisionsthatholdeditors-in-chiefliableforallcontentpublishedbytheirpressoutlets.53Nationalsecurityimperativesalsorestrictjournalism,particularlyunderthe2010NationalSecurityAct,whichgivestheNationalIntelligenceandSecurityService(NISS)immunityfromprosecutionandthepermissiontoarrest,detain,andcensorjournalistsunderthepretextofnationalsecurity.54

InDecember2016,thevicepresidentoftherulingNationalCongressParty(NCP)announcedthatonlineactivistswouldnotbeallowedtoenterSudanandthattheywouldbedetaineduponarrival.55

InOctober2017,theministryofinformationandbroadcastingproposednewamendmentstothePressandPublicationsActthatwillreportedlyrequiredigitalnewspaperstoregisterwiththeJournalismCouncilandsubjectsocialmediatoothergovernmentcontrols.56


Arrestsandinterrogationsforonlineactivitiescontinuedinthepastyear,particularlyasheavy-handedcensorshipontheprintandbroadcastsectorsledjournaliststomigrateonlinetodisseminatenews.Thearrestsreflecte anongoingtactictolimitinternetfreedombysilencingcriticalvoicesandencouragingself-censorship.

InNovember2016,AmeenSendada,ajournalistforPort Sudan,publishednewsaboutacholeraoutbreakinhiscityandthegovernment’snegligentresponseonhisFacebookpage.Governmentofficia haddeniedthespreadofcholeraacrossseveralstatesandclaimedthatthecaseswerewaterydiarrhea.57NISSagentscalledSendadaforquestioningabouthisFacebookpost,releasinghimafterfourhoursofinterrogation.Hewasforcedtosignapledgetoreporttothesecurityoffi at10amonthefollowingMonday.58Shortlyafter,hewasreportedlybannedfrompracticingjournalism.59

50 “ComputerCrimeExpertAbdelMoneimAbdelHafezspeaksto,”[inArabic]Al-Intibaha,January16,2017,http://bit.ly/2ofVdwk51 “Establishmentofanewcybercrimesprosecutionunit,”[inArabic]Al-Jarida,August9,2016,retrievedfromhttp://bit.ly/2oQbUkR52 “MinistryofJusticereceivesamendmentstotheSudanesePressLawof2016,”[inArabic]Altareeq,November8,2016,http://bit.ly/2nvP1Tr;“TheSudanesePressFreedomForum:onlinejournalismtobeincludedinthePressLaw,’[inArabic]Alsahafa,August30,2016,http://bit.ly/2nSjYwB53 CommitteetoProtectJournalists,“RepressivepresslawpassedinSudan,”June11,2009,https://cpj.org/x/2c67.54 AmnestyInternational,“Sudanesesecurityservicecarriesoutbrutalcampaignagainstopponents,”July19,2010,http://bit.ly/1OP3OOi.55 “TheNationalCongressPartythreatenstopreventonlineactivistsfromenteringSudan,”[inArabic]Alsayha,December30,2016,http://bit.ly/2oWkvzh;“IbrahimMahmoudthreatenstopreventonlineopponentsfromenteringSudan,”[inArabic]Alhowsh,December30,2016,http://bit.ly/2oPQhRP56 SudaneseCabinetPressRelease,October26,2017.https://goo.gl/anHZQX;“AmendmentstothePressLawtorestrictsocialmediaandincreasenewspapers’suspensiondays,”Altaghyeer,(Arabic),November11,2017.https://goo.gl/ZUmTw1;“Sudan:AnewlawincludesdigitalpresstothePressCouncil’sjurisdiction,”Altareeq(Arabic),Nov6,2017.https://goo.gl/NnCxgZ57 “TheSudanesegovernmentdeniesthespreadofacholeraepidemicinthecountry,”Al-Araby Al-Jadeed,September15,2016,http://bit.ly/2oRm5p858 “PortSudan’MaritimePortsstudentsblockthenationalroadandthesecurityserviceisinvestigatingajournalist,”Radio Dabanga,November21,2016,http://bit.ly/2nt4QdQ59 “JournalistscomplainofharassmentinSudan’sRedSeastate,”Radio Dabanga,April6,2017,http://bit.ly/2okKOBw

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PoliticalactivistsfacedlegalchargesundertheITCrimesAct,2007duringthecoverageperiod.InMarch2017,threecivilsocietyactivistsworkingwiththeCentreforTrainingandHumanDevelopment(TRACKS)werefoundguiltyunderarticle14oftheITCrimesActforallegedpornographyfoundontheircomputers,whichobserversbelievewasplantedtodiscreditthemintheeyesofthecourt.Thethreedefendantsweresubsequentlyreleasedontimeservedandeachfine 50,000SDG(approximatelyUS$7,463)afterbeingdetainedfor10months.60

InApril2017,ajournalistwasarrestedunderthearticle15oftheCybercrimeActforpostingonsocialmedia.TheplaintiffinthecaseistheMinisterofHealthoftheAlQadarifstate.61

Thecivildisobediencecampaignsorganizedonsocialmediainlate2016alsoledtoseveralarrests.62Additionally,atleastthreemembersofafemale-onlyFacebookgroupwhoorganizedotherprotestsinKhartoumandothercitiesaroundthecountrywerearrestedinNovember2016.63

Inanewdevelopment,theauthoritiesincreasinglypursuedonlineactivistsbasedoutsideSudan,particularlythosewholiveinSaudiArabia,inadditiontobanningsuchactivistsfromenteringthecountry(seeLegalEnvironment).InDecember2016,Saudiauthorities,detainedtwoSudaneseonlineactivistsbasedinSaudiArabia,ElgasimSeedAhmedandElwaleedImam,atthebehestoftheSudaneseauthorities,forsupportingthecivildisobediencecampaignsonsocialmedia.64AhmedisthefounderofapublicFacebookgroupcalled,“ThetragedyofthemilitaryandKeizangovernanceinSudan,”65whichiscriticaloftheSudanesegovernmentandhasover173,400members.Thepagewasalsolaterhackedafterthearrests(seeTechnicalAttacks).AlongwithImam,AhmedwasalsoafoundingmemberofaFacebookpagecalled,“Abna’Al-Sahafa”(“CitizenofAl-Sahafa”inArabic),whichfacilitatedhumanitarianassistanceandbasicservicestoSudanesepeopleinneed.66NISSofficia reportedlytraveledtoSaudiArabiatointerrogatethedetaineeswhowereheldincommunicadobeforetheywereextraditedtoSudaninJuly.67OtheronlineactivistswerereportedlyarrestedalongwithAhmedandImam,includingAlaaEldinDafaAllaAlamin(AdDivina),whowasalsoactiveintheonlinecivildisobediencecampaign.68


UncheckedsurveillanceofICTsisagraveconcernamongcitizensinSudan,wherethegovernmentisknowntoactivelymonitorinternetcommunicationsonsocialmediaplatformsandtargetonline

60 InternationalFederationforHumanRights.“SUDAN:TRACKs-affiliat rightsdefenderssentenced,fine andfinall releasedaftertenmonthsofarbitrarydetention,”March8,,2017http://bit.ly/2oQdoeV61 “Assayha’scorrespondentdeportedtoKhartouminlightsofacomplaintfile byAlQadarifstate’sMinisterofHealth,”[inArabic]Assayha,April4,2017,http://bit.ly/2pj9Az862 AuthorinterviewJanuary2017.63 “Socialmedia,women‘playprominentrole’inSudanprotestactions,Radio Dabanga,December12,2016,http://bit.ly/2hldWFH64 AmnestyInternational,“TwoSudaneseDissidentsInterrogatedForActivism,”UrgentActionUpdate,March20,2017,http://bit.ly/2nWYv6v65 ThetragedyofthemilitaryandKiezangovernanceinSudan[inArabic].(n.d.).InFacebook[Grouppage].RetrievedApril2016fromhttp://bit.ly/2okKwua66 TheObservatoryfortheProtectionofHumanRightsDefenders,“SaudiArabia/Sudan:SecretdetentionofMessrs.WaleedImamandAlgasimMohamedSidahmed,”January17,2017,http://bit.ly/2nX1CLM67 FrontLineDefenders,“AL-QASEMMOHAMMADSAYYEDAHMADDETAINEDINUNKNOWNLOCATIONBYSAUDIAUTHORITIESANDATRISKOFDEPORTATIONTOSUDAN,”Action,7April2017,http://bit.ly/2ocCmCi68 SudanHumanRightsNetwork,”UrgentAction;fearofdeportationandotherill-treatment:AlaaEldinDafaAllaAlamin(Ad’Difina), UrgentAction,22January2017,http://bit.ly/2oOuWIv

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activistsandjournalistsduringpoliticallysensitiveperiods.TheNISSregularlyinterceptsprivateemailmessages,enabledbysophisticatedsurveillancetechnologies.69

InternalemailsleakedbyhackersinJuly2015confirme thattheNISShadpurchasedHackingTeam’sRemoteControlSystem(RCS)spywarein2012,70whichhastheabilitytostealfile andpasswords,andtointerceptSkypecallsandchats.71WhileotherleakedemailsrevealedthatthecompanyhaddiscontinuedbusinesswithSudaninNovember2014,72CitizenLabresearchfoundthatSudanalsopossesseshigh-techsurveillanceequipmentfromtheU.S.-basedBlueCoatSystems,atechnologycompanythatmanufacturesmonitoringandfilterin devices.ThesurveillancesystemwasinitiallytracedtothreenetworksinsideSudan,includingonthenetworksoftheprivatetelecomproviderCanar.73

Sudaneseauthoritiesincreasinglyrequesteduserinformationfromsocialmediaplatforms.InitsglobalgovernmenttransparencyreportcoveringJanuarytoDecember2016,Facebookdisclosedthatithadreceivedatotaloffiv RequestsforUserData,whichFacebookdidnotprovide.74Sudaneseauthoritieshadrequestedinformationforatotalof18accountssince2013.75

Article9oftheNTC’sGeneralRegulations2012,basedonthe2001CommunicationsAct,obligatesmobilecompaniestokeepacompleterecordoftheircustomers’data,thusrequiringSIMcardregistration,whichwasenactedin2008.76ThegovernmentreportedlyplanstolinkSIMcardstousers’nationalidentificatio numbersinthefuture,77whiletheMinistryofInformationstatedinMarch2016thatitisconsideringnewrequirementstoregisterallmobiledeviceswithrealnames.78

Cybercaféslackprivacyandarealsosubjecttointrusivegovernmentsurveillance.InSeptember2016,NISSagentsraidedinternetcafesinKhartouminsearchofcontentthreatening“publicmorals.”79TheyhadpreviouslyraidedinternetcafesinFebruary2016.80


Onlinejournalistsandactivistsoftenfaceextralegalintimidation,harassment,andviolencefortheironlineactivities.Femaleactivistsinparticularweresubjecttomultilayeredattacksonsocialmedia.

OnlineactivistssupportingthecivildisobediencecampaignsinNovemberandDecember2016weresubjecttothreatsandintimidationbygovernmentsupportersandCyberJihadists.81Inoneexample,

69 See,“Sudan,”FreedomontheNet2015,FreedomHouse.70 PDFofareceiptthatshowstheNationalIntelligenceandSecurityServicesofSudanpurchasedHackingTeam’sservices:http://bit.ly/1Pv9A9p.71 HackingTeam,“CustomerPolicy,”accessedFebruary13,2014,http://bit.ly/1GnkbjG.72 CoraCurrierandMorganMarquis-Boire,“ADetailedlookAtHackingTeam’sEmailsAboutItsRepressiveClients,”The Intercept,July7,2015,http://bit.ly/1jxGv0h.73 EllenNakashima,“Report: WebmonitoringdevicesmadebyUSfir BlueCoatdetectedinIran,Sudan,” Washington Post,July8,2013,http://wapo.st/1Pv95fA.74 FacebookGovernmentRequestsReport,SudanJanuary2016-June2016,http://bit.ly/2oPS75075 “Sudanseekstodisclose18accountsfromtheFacebook,”Alahdath News,December22,2016,http://bit.ly/2nvsNRC;

“Sudanrequestsinformationon4Facebookusers:report,”Sudan Tribune,April14,2014,http://bit.ly/2oTJiXL76 SIMcardregistrationcompromisesmobilephoneusers’privacyandanonymity,asitrequiresanoffici identificatio cardandhomeaddressinformation.“NTCannouncestheendofgraceperiodtoregistersimcards,”[inArabic]Sudani Net,June1,2014,http://bit.ly/1W2A0n3.77 “Sudan:Telecomscompaniesblocknon-registeredSIMcards,”African Manager, June1,2014,http://bit.ly/1NRlJ8x.78 “Aproposalforanewcybercrimelawthatstipulatesprisonsentencesuntoto3years,”AlJaridah,March20,201679 “EthicalviolationsinsideInternetcafesinKhartoum,” [inArabic]Arabs Today,September24,2016,http://bit.ly/2ol1gSk80 “SudaneseintelligenceprosecutesInternetcontentthat‘threatensthemoralsofthenation’,”Alhayat,February29,2016,http://bit.ly/21iftrT81 Author’sinterviewsDecember2016-January2017

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avideocirculatingonFacebookshowedanoffic liftingweightswhilethreateningthosewhosupportthedisobedienceinNovember.82

InthewakeofthedisobediencecampaigninDecember2016,ShamaelAl-Noor,ajournalistworkingwithAl-TayyarrnewspaperinSudanwhowritesaboutcorruptionandIslamistextremism,facedintenseonlineharassmentandbullyingaftershepostedonFacebookaboutcrackdownsonthepressduringthecampaignandhowthepublicwasseekinguncensoredinformationfromsocialmedia.83Trolls(whowerelikelyCyberJihadists)targetedonlineactivistswhoexpressedsupportforAl-Noorwiththreatsoflegalconsequences.84Despitetheharassment,Al-Noorcontinuedtosupportthedisobediencecampaigns,alongwith500otherreportersandwriters.85ShecameunderattackagaininFebruary2017foracolumncriticizingthegovernment’spublichealthpoliciesandobsessionwithwomen’spietyinpublic,resultinginradicalizedvoiceswagingapersonalvendettaagainsther.86Al-Noorfile acomplainttothepoliceandtoCyberCrimeUnit.87

Technical Attacks

Independentnewssitesarefrequentlysubjecttotechnicalattacks,whichmanybelieveareperpetratedbythegovernment’sCyberJihadistUnit.Attacksusuallyintensifyduringpoliticaleventsandunrest,whilesomeprominentnewssiteswardoffdailyDDoSattempts.88Severalonlineoutletsreportedtechnicalattacksagainsttheirwebsitesinthepastyear,buttheywereabletorespondbyincreasingtheircybersecuritycapabilities.89

OnlineactivistsreportedanincreaseintechnicalattacksagainsttheirsocialmediaandemailaccountsduringthecivildisobediencecampaignsinNovemberandDecember2016.90AfewWhatsAppgroupsorganizingthecivildisobediencecampaignswerereportedlyhackedbyCyberJihadists,viamalwaresenttooneofthegroupmembers,whichexposedinformationaboutthegrouporganizers.

Throughout2017,aFacebookpagecreatedbySudanesewomentopostscreenshotsofsexualharassmentincidentsfacedseveralhackingattemptsfollowingstrongcondemnationfromnumerousmaleusers.91Thewomenalsohaveaprivategroupwithover7,300membersonsocialmediacalledInboxat[Arabicfor“Inboxmessages”]wheretheysharesexualharassmentmessagestheyreceiveonsocialmediawithoneanother.92

82 Facebookvideohttp://bit.ly/2oWh1wH83 ShamaelENoor[December14,2016].In Facebook [PersonalAccount].http://bit.ly/2ofIn2p;Dr.MohiElDinTitaw[December15,2016].InFacebook[PersonalAccount].http://bit.ly/2ofmvmt84 Screenshotofthethreathttp://bit.ly/2nRJB0G85 “Morethan500Sudanesejournalistsandwriterssupportcivildisobedience,”[inArabic]Aljamaheer,December18,2016,http://bit.ly/2nRIo9m86 FrontlineDefenders,“JOURNALISTSHAMAELAL-NOORTHREATENED,”February22,2017http://bit.ly/2oW40Dd87 JournalistsforHumanRights(JHR).(2017).StatusofSudanesewomenjournalistsfrom8March2016to8March2017.[Pressrelease].88 Author’sinterviewwithinternalsourceswhorequestedtostayanonymouswiththisinfotoavoidmakingtheirvulnerabilitiesknown.89 AuthorinterviewFebruary2017.90 AuthorinterviewFebruary2017.91 “After(30)thousandgirlspledgedtopublishtheirownmessages..awarof(inboxat)..prestigiouspersonalitiesatrisk,”[inArabic]Al-Sudani,March2,2017,retrievedfromhttp://bit.ly/2ogdfzW92 Inboxat[inArabic].(n.d.).InFacebook[Grouppage];“Sudanesewomenconfrontharassmentwith‘Inboxat’,”[inArabic]Sarmad,March28,2017,http://bit.ly/2oU6t48;“Inboxat:Thenightmareoftheharassers,”[inArabic]AlSudanAlyoum,March30,2017,http://bit.ly/2ofXgjJ

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Documents

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017 2017_Sudan.pdf · FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017. Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017 ... November 2016 to include specifi clauses pertaining to online journalism,