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www.freedomonthenet.org FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017 Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017 Following orders to block popular messaging service WhatsApp in 2015 and early 2016, a new order temporarily blocked WhatsApp in July 2016 for not turning over encrypted communications sought in a criminal investigation (see “Blocking and Filtering”). Requests to remove content deemed to be injurious to candidates surged in the lead- up to municipal elections in October 2016. A judge also threatened to temporarily block Facebook if it did not comply with a request to remove a satirical page parodying a mayoral candidate; Facebook removed the page and the block was not implemented (see “Content Removal”). Police raided the home of a blogger and took him in for questioning in an attempt to uncover the sources of a story in which he revealed that police were going to question former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in relation with a corruption probe (see “Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities”). Brazil 2016 2017 Internet Freedom Status Partly Free Partly Free Obstacles to Access (0-25) 8 8 Limits on Content (0-35) 7 8 Violations of User Rights (0-40) 17 17 TOTAL* (0-100) 32 33 * 0=most free, 100=least free Population: 207.7 million Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 59.7 percent Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes Political/Social Content Blocked: No Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes Press Freedom 2017 Status: Partly Free 1

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FREEDOM ON THE NET2017

Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017

● FollowingorderstoblockpopularmessagingserviceWhatsAppin2015andearly2016,anewordertemporarilyblockedWhatsAppinJuly2016fornotturningoverencryptedcommunicationssoughtinacriminalinvestigation(see“Blocking and Filtering”).

● Requeststoremovecontentdeemedtobeinjurioustocandidatessurgedinthelead-uptomunicipalelectionsinOctober2016.AjudgealsothreatenedtotemporarilyblockFacebookifitdidnotcomplywitharequesttoremoveasatiricalpageparodyingamayoralcandidate;Facebookremovedthepageandtheblockwasnotimplemented(see“Content Removal”).

● PoliceraidedthehomeofabloggerandtookhiminforquestioninginanattempttouncoverthesourcesofastoryinwhichherevealedthatpoliceweregoingtoquestionformerBrazilianPresidentLuizInácioLuladaSilvainrelationwithacorruptionprobe(see“Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities”).

Brazil2016 2017

Internet Freedom Status Partly Free

Partly Free

ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 8 8

LimitsonContent(0-35) 7 8

ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 17 17

TOTAL* (0-100) 32 33

*0=mostfree,100=leastfree

Population: 207.7 million

Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 59.7 percent

Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes

Political/Social Content Blocked: No

Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes

Press Freedom 2017 Status: Partly Free

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Introduction

Brazil’sinternetfreedomenvironmentdeclinedthisyearasrestrictionsimposedoncontentdeemedtobeinjurioustoelectoralcandidatesinthelead-uptomunicipalelectionsresultedinasurgeofremovalrequests.

Despiteboastingsomeofthemostprogressiveandcomprehensivelegislationondigitalrights,Brazil’s“InternetConstitution”hasbeenusedasakeyargumentforrecurringsuspensionsofWhatsApp.FollowingthreeorderstoblockpopularmessagingserviceWhatsAppin2015andearly2016,anewblockingorderwasissuedinJuly2016fornotturningoverrequestedinformationsoughtinacriminalinvestigation.Inresponse,billsinCongressproposedtorestrictthepowerofjudgestoorderblockingsofsuchamagnitudeandpublichearingstookplaceintheBrazilianSupremeCourt.

InternetfreedominBrazilremainsconstrainedbyviolenceagainstindependentbloggers,criminaldefamationlaws,restrictionsonanonymity,andrestrictivelimitsoncontentrelatedtoelections.Givenrestrictionsimposedbytheelectorallaw,municipalelectionsinOctober2016sawanexpectedriseincontentremovalrequests.Mostcompanytransparencyreportsnotedariseingovernmentrequestsforpersonalinformationandfortheremovalofcontentdeemeddefamatoryagainstpoliticiansandcandidates.InOctober,anorderalsothreatenedtoblockFacebookifitdidnotcomplywitharequesttoremoveasatiricalpageparodyingamayoralcandidate.

Themassiveinvestigationintopoliticalkickbacksoncontractscalled“OperationCarWash”(LavaJato)garneredintensereactionsonsocialnetworksduringthereport’speriodofcoverage,alsoresultinginonlineleaksofconfidentia conversations.Inonecase,anonlinebloggerwastakeninforcompulsoryquestioningafterreportingthatpoliceweregoingtoquestionformerBrazilianPresidentLuizInácioLuladaSilvainrelationwiththeprobe.

Obstacles to Access

Internet and mobile penetration rates have increased steadily in Brazil, but significant regional disparities in access persist. In July 2016, millions of users were once again affected by a temporary block of messaging service WhatsApp—the most popular communication app in Brazil.

Availability and Ease of Access

Key Access Indicators

Internet penetration (ITU)a 2016 59.7%2015 59.1%2011 45.7%

Mobile penetration (ITU)b 2016 119%2015 127%2011 119%

Average connection speeds (Akamai)c 2017(Q1) 6.8 Mbps2016(Q1) 4.5 Mbps

aInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.bInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.cAkamai,“StateoftheInternet-ConnectivityReport,Q12017,”https://goo.gl/TQH7L7.

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Despiteeconomicgrowthinrecentyears,Brazil’saccessratesremainbelowaveragecomparedtomanyNorthAmericanandEuropeancountries.AccordingtotheCenterofStudiesonInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(CETIC),some50percentofhouseholdsdidnothaveaccesstotheinternetasofJune2016.1Variousobstaclescontinuetopreventmanyhouseholdsfromaccessingtheinternet,suchashighprices—aproblemthatextendstofi edbroadband,wireless,and3Gand4Gtechnologies—andpersistentsocialinequalities.Asignifican digitaldivideanddisparitiesininfrastructureareevidentbetweenvariousgeographicalregions,aswellasbetweenurbanandruralareas.

Internetisincreasinglybeingused“onthemove”onthestreet,busorsubway,accordingtothemostrecentsurveypublishedbytheCenterofStudiesonInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(CETIC)in2016.Theuseoffreepublicaccesscentershasalsoincreased,especiallygiventhegreateravailabilityoffreeWi-Fihotspotsandpublicpoliciespromotingfreeinternetaccessinpublicspacessuchassquares.Whilenationalwirelessnetworksarestillsmallcomparedtoothercountries,ANATELregisteredoveronemillionhotspotsinBrazilasofAugust2016.2

Mobilepenetrationhasgrownsignificantl overthelastfewyearsandmobilebroadbandconnectionshavequicklybecomeadominantmeansforBrazilianstoaccesstheinternet.However,aslightdropinthenumberofmobilesubscriptionsoverthepasttwoyearshasbeenattributedtoBrazil’seconomiccrisisandstrictercreditpoliciesimposedbyoperators.3Thesupplyofsmartphoneswith4Gserviceshassignificantl increasedsinceitsintroductioninApril2013,but4GavailabilitystillscorespoorlycomparedtotheglobalandSouthAmericanaverage.4AsofDecember2016,nearly115millionusers(approximately48percent)had3Gservices.5AccordingtotheconsultancycompanyTeleco,Brazilhad60millionactive4GsubscriptionsbyDecember2016,representinganincreaseofapproximately114percentcomparedtoJanuary2016.6Suchadvancedinternetservices,however,areheavilyconcentratedinwealthyurbancenterssuchasSãoPaulo.7

Brazil’sfederalgovernmenthasbeenimplementinganumberofinternetexpansionandimprovementprogramssince2010,includingtheNationalBroadbandPlan(PlanoNacionaldeBandaLargaorPNBL).8In2017,theMinistryofScience,Technology,InnovationandCommunicationsannouncedthattheNationalBroadbandPlanwasunderreview,launchingapublicconsultationforanew“NationalConnectivityPlan”inthelatterpartoftheyear.Thenewplanaimstoexpandaccesstounderservedareasandincreasefi edandmobilebroadbandinfrastructureinthecountry.9InMay2017,Brazilalsolauncheditsfi stdefenseandstrategiccommunications

1 CenterofExcellenceinInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(CETIC),“ProporçãodedomicílioscomInternet”[PercentageofHouseholdswithInternetAccess],November2015-June2016,http://bit.ly/2orrwXU;CETIC,“NoBrasil,60%dascasasaindanãotêminternet”[InBrazil,60percentofhouseholdsstilldonothaveinternet],July1,2013,http://bit.ly/1jbuXiH2 Teleco,“Hot-spotsWi-FinoBrasil”[Wi-FihotspotsinBrazil],August2016,http://bit.ly/2dLKJAo3 “Brazillosesmobilesubscribersforsixthmonthinarow,”Telecompaper,January13,2016,http://bit.ly/2c5NqL44 OpenSignal.StateofMobileNetworks:Brazil(January2017).http://bit.ly/2r2VhDZ5 Teleco,“EstatísticasdeCelularesnoBrasil,”[StatisticsonMobilePhonesinBrazil],http://bit.ly/1w6LIAI6 Teleco,“4G:4ªGeraçãodeCelularesnoBrasil”[FourthGenerationofCellphonesinBrazil],December2016,http://bit.ly/2ddg2RO7 “CidadedeSPéo5˚maiormercadodaAméricadoSul,dizFecomerico”[SãoPaoloistheFifthLargestMarketinSouthAmerica,SaysFecomercio],O Globo,January1,2014,http://glo.bo/1JqlYzg8 MinistryofCommunications,“ProgramaNacionaldeBandaLarga”[NationalBroadbandPlan],Newsrelease,May25,2015,http://bit.ly/UJ4JY6;“Em2018,70%dosbrasileirosterãoacessoàbandalarga”[In2018,70percentofBrazilianswillhaveaccesstobroadband],Portal Brasil,October22,2015,http://bit.ly/2bPJzpi9 RafaelBucco,“MCTICOpensConsultationontheNationalPlansofConnectivity(Portuguese),Tele.Sintese,October18,2017,http://www.telesintese.com.br/mctic-abre-consulta-sobre-o-plano-nacional-de-conectividade/

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satellite,withtheaimofprovidingsecurecommunicationchannelsfordefensepurposes,whilealsoboostingbroadbandcapacity.10

Thegovernmentestimatesthat30millionindividualsgainedbroadbandaccesssincetheadoptionofPNBLin2010.11Butsomespecialistshavecriticizedthesefigu es;afteralmostfouryears,only1.8million(7.9percent)ofthe23millionfi edbroadbandsubscriptionswerecontractedthroughPNBL.12

Restrictions on Connectivity

Thegovernmentdoesnotplacelimitsonbandwidth,nordoesitimposecontrolovertelecommunicationsinfrastructure.Therehavebeennoreportedinstancesofthegovernmentcuttingoffinternetconnectivityduringprotestsorsocialunrest.OnJuly19,2016,however,ajudge’sorderbriefl suspendedmessagingserviceWhatsApp,followingtwotemporaryshutdownsinDecember2015andagaininMay2016,afterWhatsApp’sparentcompanyFacebookwasunabletocomplywithinformationrequestsaspartofcriminalinvestigations(see“BlockingandFiltering”).

InFebruary2016,theNationalAgencyforTelecommunications(ANATEL)issuedanadministrativeactauthorizingtheArmy’scyberdefensesectiontouseradio-communicationsignalblockers( jammers)intheOlympicstomaintainlawandorder.Civilsocietyorganizationsexpressedconcernsthatsuchequipmentcouldbeusedtoblockinternetandcellphonesignalsduringfuturestreetmanifestations,onthebasesoflegalinstituteslikelawandorderguaranteeortheantiterrorismlaw.13

MostofthebackboneinfrastructurefortheinternetisprivatelyownedinBrazil.In1998,thestate-ownedcompanyEmbratel,whichwasresponsibleforbuildingtheinternetbackbone,wasprivatizedandacquiredbytheU.S.companyMCI;itwaslateracquiredbytheMexicantelecomAméricaMóvilin2003.Overthepastdecade,privatebackboneinfrastructure,suchasthatofEmbratel,GVTandOi,hasexpandedinBrazil.WiththePNBL,Brazilwasexpectedtoexpandgovernment-ownedinfrastructure—includingunderutilizedfibe optics—toallowforlow-costconnections.14

Internationally,underseacablesconnecttoBrazilfromNorthAmericaandEurope.InApril2017,theSpanishandBraziliangovernmentsconfi medplanstobuildthefi stunderseafibe opticcablelinkingBraziltoEuropetoBrazil.15SomeoftheimpetusforbuildingtheseconnectionsisrelatedtoadesiretoavoidrelianceonU.S.infrastructureafterrevelationsofpervasiveU.S.spyingonBrazilians

10 “FirstSatelliteControlledbyBrazilLaunchesSuccessful(Portuguese),”Valor,May4,2017,http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/4958144/primeiro-satelite-controlado-pelo-brasil-e-lancado-com-sucesso11 “Em2018,70%dosbrasileirosterãoacessoàbandalarga”[In2018,70percentofBrazilianswillhaveaccesstobroadband],Portal Brasil,October22,2015,http://bit.ly/2bPJzpi12 LucianaBruno,“Programadebandalargaseaproximadofi cheiodecríticas,”[Broadbandprogramnearsendwithcriticism],Exame,September30,2014,http://abr.ai/1QyPXdC13 JoãoPauloVicente,”ComoasOlimpíadasajudaramoBrasilaaumentarseuaparatodevigilânciasocial”[HowtheOlympicshelpedBrazilincreaseitssocialsurveillanceapparatus],Vice,June27,2016,http://bit.ly/2yHBKNd14 “BrasilProgramaNacionaldeBandaLarga”[Brazil’sNationalBroadbandProgram],Tech in Brazil,October17,2014,http://bit.ly/1Vb2cyi15 “Spain,BrazilPlanSubseaFiberOpticCableby2019,”Reuters,April24,2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/spain-brazil-telecoms/spain-brazil-plan-subsea-fibe -optic-cable-by-2019-idUSL1N1HW1VO

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in2013,16althoughtherearestillongoingprojectsrelatedtotheconstructionofmorecablesconnectingBraziltotheUnitedStates17

In2004,theBrazilianInternetSteeringCommittee(CGI.br)launchedaninitiativecalledPTTMetrotocreateinternetexchangepoints(IXPs)acrossBrazil,startingwiththeirfi stIXPinSãoPaulo.Currently,Brazilhasatleast25IXPsinstalledinthecountry.18

ICT Market

Althoughtherearenosignifican legaloreconomicbarriersforcompaniescompetingintheISP,mobile,ordigitaltechnologysectors,theBrazilianICTmarketishighlyconcentrated.AsofApril2017,threelargeprivatecompanies—Oi,ClaroandVivo(TelefônicaBrasil)—representedover82percentofthecountry’sbroadbandmarket.19AccordingtothemostrecentdataregardingBrazil’smobilemarketinApril2017,fourlargeprivatecompanies—Vivo,TIM,Claro,andOi—held98percentofthemarket.20Suchhighmarketconcentrationcouldmakeitverydifficul forotherproviderssuchasAlgarandNexteltocompeteinthemobilesector.21

InJanuary2014,theBraziliancompetitionauthorityapprovedthemergerofOiandPortugalTelecomintoCorpCo.Thismergerwascompletedin2015andrankedCorpCoastheleadingtelecommunicationcompanyinPortuguese-speakingcountriesworldwide.22Alsoin2014,theacquisitionofVivendi’sGVTbyTelefônicaBrasilresultedinamergeroftwoofthecountry’slargerbroadbandservices–GVTandVivo–furthercontributingtomarketconcentration.23InJune2016,Oifile forbankruptcyprotectionandhasstruggledtomaintainthequalityofitsservices.24

InMarch2017,theSenateapprovedabillprohibitingdatacapsonfi edbroadband(PLS174/2016),andtheprojectthenproceededtotheHouseofRepresentatives.25Thebillhadnotyetbeenapprovedbymid-2017.AnannouncementinMarch2016thatISPswouldimposedatacapsonbroadbandinternethadcauseduproaramongusers,politiciansandinternet-dependentbusinesses.26

16 AnnaEdgertonandJordanRobertson,“Brazil-to-PortugalCableShapesUpasAnti-NSACaseStudy,”Bloomberg Business,October30,2014,http://bloom.bg/1gOGiDz17 AngelicaMari,“Brazil-USunderseacablesuffersdelays,”ZDNet,December,16,2016,http://zd.net/2rC56Yb;“SeabornNetworks’Seabras-1subseacablesystembetweentheUSAandBrazilisreadyforoperations,”PressRelease,September8,2017,http://bit.ly/2zF4w1318 LatinAmericaandCaribbeanNetworkInformationCenter,“InternetExchangePointsenAméricaLatinayCaribe,”http://bit.ly/1V9O79Q19 Teleco,“Seção:BandaLarga—MarketSharedeBandaLarganoBrasil,”[Section:Broadband—MarketShareofBroadbandinBrazil],http://bit.ly/1ix3MhE20 Teleco,“TelefoniaCelular—OperadorasdeCelular”[CellularTelephony—CellularOperators,April2017],http://bit.ly/1ix42gx21 Teleco,“OperadorasdeCelular-April2017”[CellularOperators,April2017],http://bit.ly/1cfEPkY22 “BrazilcompetitionwatchdogapprovesOi,PortugalTelecommerger,”Reuters,January14,2014,http://reut.rs/1Ov29ys23 “AnatelaprovacompradaGVTpelaVivo(eoqueissomuda)”[AnatelapprovespurchaseofGVTbyVivo,andwhatthischanges],Technoblog,September2014,http://bit.ly/2bQCbVX24 LaisLis,“Sobriscodeintervenção,Oimantémníveldequalidadedoserviço,dizAnatel,”G1,April6,2017,https://glo.bo/2imNn4X25 “Senadoaprovaprojetoqueproíbelimitaçãodedadosnainternetfixa”[SenateApprovesBillProhibitingDataLimitsforFixedBroadbands],Senado Notícias, March1,2017.http://bit.ly/2n2BQIv26 AngelicaMari,“Braziliansprotestagainstfi edbroadbanddatacap,”ZDNet,April13,2016,http://zd.net/2c4dCGR

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Regulatory Bodies

TworegulatoryagenciesoverseeBrazilianICTs:theBrazilianAgencyofTelecommunications(ANATEL)andtheAdministrativeCouncilforEconomicDefense(CADE),anantitrustagencythatisfocusedonreviewingmergersandanticompetitivepracticesintelecommunicationsmarkets.27ThegovernmentalsocreatedtheBrazilianInternetSteeringCommittee(CGI.br)in1995,amulti-stakeholderindependentorganizationinchargeofcoordinatingandintegratingallinternetserviceinitiativesinBrazil,aswellaspromotingtechnicalquality,innovation,andthedisseminationofservices.ProvisionsinMarcoCivilmandatethatthegovernmentconsultwithCGI.br,andinvariousinstancesdirectlyinvolvetheCommittee,inpolicy-makingandimplementationofMarcoCivilprocesses.28

ANATELisadministrativelyandfinanciall independent,andnothierarchicallysubordinatetoanygovernmentagency.Itsdecisionscanonlybeappealedincourts.FromtheMinistryofCommunications,ANATELhasinheritedthepowersofgranting,regulating,andsupervisingtelecommunicationsinBrazil,aswellasmuchofitstechnicalexpertiseandothermaterialassets.In2016,ANATELinitiallybackedpoliciesestablishingdatalimitsonhomebroadbandinternet,butbacktrackedinthemidstofpubliccriticism(see“ICTMarket”).

CGI.brisformedbyelectedmembersfromgovernment,theprivatesector,academia,andnongovernmentalorganizations.CGI.br’scontributionsincludecomprehensiveandreliableannualreportsoninternetuseinBrazil,fundingforinternetgovernance-relatedresearch,andthepromotionofconferencessuchastheannualBrazilianInternetGovernanceForum,andtheinternationalNetMundialconference,whichwasorganizedinBrazilin2014.29InJune2009,CGI.brdeclaredthe“PrinciplesfortheGovernanceandUseoftheInternet,”whichincludethegoalsofonlinefreedom,privacy,humanrights,andnetneutralityasabasefortheBrazilianinformationsociety.30ManyoftheseprincipleswereadoptedintoBrazilianlawthroughtheMarcoCivilin2014.

InAugust2017,outsideofthereport’scoverageperiod,thegovernmentproposedapublicconsultationtosignificantl changeCGI.Br’srepresentationandelectionmodel.ThepublicconsultationsparkedcriticismasitwasannouncedwithoutanypriordialoguewiththemultistakeholdercommunityorevenothermembersoftheSteeringCommittee,andunderthesuspicionthattheultimategoalwastoincreasethegovernment’scloutovertheCGIandtoallowforarevisionofthenetneutralityrulesintheMarcoCivil,mostlikelyinfavoroftelecomcompanies.31

Limits on Content

Repeated orders to block WhatsApp, including one in July 2016, resulted in two legal actions now

27 ViniciusMarquesdeCarvalho,“Brazil:CADE,”The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2014 (London:GlobalCompetitionReview,2014),http://bit.ly/1LG4xjL.28 MarcoCivil,Art.24,II.29 FortheoutcomesofNetMundial2014,see:CGI,“CadernosCGI.br|DeclaraçãoMultissetorialdoNETmundial,”January28,201530 CGI.br,“PrinciplesfortheGovernanceandUseoftheInternet,”January28,2015,http://bit.ly/2bREEnM31 CoalizãoDireitosnaRede.“OntheattacksoftheTemergovernmentontheInternetSteeringCommitteeinBrazil,”August8,2017,http://bit.ly/2yuN6DC;AdamSegal,“Brazil’sInternetisunderattack,again,”CouncilonForeignRelations,August14,2017,http://on.cfr.org/2wbhBO2

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pending in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Brazil’s electoral law once again impacted online content removals in the lead-up to municipal elections in October 2016.

Blocking and Filtering

TherearenoprovenindicationsthatBrazilianauthoritiesarefil eringmessagesorengaginginwidespreadblockingonline.Braziliansfreelygatheranddisseminateinformationviatheinternetandmobilephonetechnologies.Theyhaveaccesstoawidearrayofnationalandinternationalnewssources,blogs,socialnetworkingplatforms,andcitizenjournalism,thelatterofwhichhasproliferatedoverthepastyears.

Socialnetworks,communicationapps,andvideo-sharingplatformssuchasFacebook,Twitter,YouTube,VimeoandVevoare—forthemostpart—freelyaccessibleandwidelyusedinBrazil.However,judgeshaverepeatedlyaskedtelecomcompaniestotemporarilyblockaccesstoWhatsAppforfailingtocomplywithinformationrequestsincriminalinvestigations.InJuly2016,ajudgefromDuquedeCaxiasorderedthenationwideblockofWhatsAppfornotcomplyingwitharequesttomonitorencryptedcommunications.Theshutdown,basedonArticle12oftheBrazilianInternetCivilRightsFramework,lastedforapproximatelyfourhoursbeforetheorderwasoverturnedbyBrazil’sSupremeCourt.32

Thiswasthefourthdecisiontosuspendtheapplicationandthethirdtobeimplemented,followingtwotemporaryshutdownsinDecember2015andMay2016.33AnotherorderissuedinFebruary2015wassuspendedandtheapplicationwasnotblocked.34WhatsApphasarguedthat“wecannotprovideinformationwedonothave.”Especiallysinceexpandingend-to-endencryptionforallusers’communicationsinApril2016,WhatsApphasinsistedthatsuchrequeststoturnoverinformationaretechnicallyimpossible.35

TheWhatsAppblockingsresultedintwolegalactionscurrentlypendingintheBrazilianSupremeCourt,whichhelditsfi stpublichearingsinJune2017tocollectpositionpapersandstatementsfromgovernmentalbodies,NGOs,academia.36Bothactionswerestillpendingasofmid-2017:

● Ontheonehand,aclaimofnon-compliancewithafundamentalprecept(ArguiçãodeDescumprimentodePreceitoFundamental)arguesthatthedecisionstoblockWhatsAppwereillegalbecausetheybreachedtherighttocommunicationanddisproportionatelyaffectedmillionsofconsumers.37

● Ontheotherhand,adirectunconstitutionalityaction(AçãoDiretadeInconstitucionalidade)

32 InternetLab,Bloqueios.info,“WhatsAppCaseIV-Noncompliancewithjudicialrequestsforuserdata,”July19,2016,http://bit.ly/2qXDfi33 RafaelBarifouse,FernandoDuarte,GuilhermeBarrucho,“PorqueobloqueiodoWhatsAppnãovingou–ecomoissoafetaráabrigaentreempresasdeinterneteJustiça”[WhytheblockingofWhatsAppdidnotsucceed–andhowthiswillaffectthefigh betweeninternetcompaniesandJustice], BBC Brasil, December17,2015,http://bbc.in/1mbcOmp;“WhatsAppOrderedBlockedAgaininBrazilOverDataDispute,”Bloomberg,May2,2016,http://bloom.bg/1rsCA8y34 “JuizdoPiauídeterminasuspensãodoWhatsAppnoBrasil,”[JudgeinPiauidecidestosuspendWhatsAppinBrazil],Folha de S. Paulo,February25,2015,http://bit.ly/2bA4aIF35 JanKoum(CEOandco-founderofWhatsApp),Facebookpost,May2,2016,http://bit.ly/2bzZ8zf.AccessedMay30,2017.36 “STFhasdefine whoaretheparticipantsforthepublichearingaboutblockingofWhatsAppandtheMarcoCivilLaw,”STFNotícias.April24,2017,http://bit.ly/2sTQNfu37 PaulaPecoradeBarros,ADPF 403 in STF: Are WhatsApp Blockings Constitutional? InternetLab,Bloqueios.info.http://bit.ly/2ogrBSh

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arguesthatprovisionsinvokedbylowercourtjudgesasbasisfortheblockingsareillegalunderBrazilianconstitutionallaw.Article12oftheBrazilianInternetCivilRightsFrameworknotablyestablishessanctionsforviolationsofArticles10and11,whichrequireapplicationproviderstodisclosethecontentofprivatecommunicationsundercourtorders.Criticsarguethata“temporarysuspension”wouldviolatethesamerighttocommunicationestablishedbytheConstitution.Severalresearchinstitutes,scholars,NGOsandspecialistshavenotedthattheBrazilianInternetCivilRightsFrameworkdidnotallowfortheinterpretationsmadebyjudgesintheblockingcases.Theyargued,forinstance,thatremediesprovidedbyArticle12donotallowfortheentireblockingofsitesandapplications,butonlyofdatacollectionandtreatmentactivitiesmentionedinArticle11.38

Legalrestrictionsoncertaincontentdeemedtobeinjurioustoelectoralcandidatesintherun-uptoelectionsalsoresultedinathreattoblockFacebookduringthisperiod(see“ContentRemoval”).InOctober2016,ajudgefromJoinvilleorderedtotemporarilysuspendFacebook.comforfailingtocomplywithacourtorderrequestingtheremovalofasatiricalpagethatpokedfunofamayoralcandidate.Facebookremovedthepageandfile anappeal.InOctober2016,theRegionalElectoralTribunalruledthattheblockingwasaninadequateanddisproportionatemeasure.Whileitliftedtheblocking,itmaintainedthedecisiontoremovethepageandimposeadailyfin onthecompanyforitsdelayincomplyingwiththepreliminaryinjunction.39

Content Removal

WhiletheenactmentofMarcoCivilhasbeenhailedasaprogressivelandmarkforinternetgovernance,certainlegalprovisionscriminalizingdefamationandblasphemyandrestrictingspeecharoundelectionscontinuetoputsomeconstraintsoninternetfreedomonline.Braziliancybercrimelegislationalsolimitscertainonlinecontent.The“AzeredoLaw”ofNovember2012establishesthecreationofspecializedteamsandsectorsstructuredbythejudicialpolicetofigh againstcybercrimesandtotakedownracistcontent.40

Brazil’selectorallawonceagainimpactedonlinecontentremovalsinthelead-uptomunicipalelectionsinOctober2016.Brazil’scontroversialElectoralActof1997hasfacedintensescrutinyparticularlybecauseitsbroadtermsharborthepotentialtoconstrainfreedomofexpressionbothonlineandoffline asitcontinuestolimitcertaincontentdeemedtobeinjurioustocandidatesduringelectoralperiods.Anamendmenttothelawin2013creatednewandspecifi restrictionstoonlinecontentconcerningcandidatesandpoliticalparties.41

38 FelipeMansur,Bloqueios.info-“ADI5527andappblocks:aprobleminthewordingofthelaworinitsinterpretation?” InternetLab,http://bit.ly/2oGuGqZ39 Bloqueios.info,FacebookCaseII-Non-Compliancewithjudicialrequestsforcontentremoval,October5,2016,InternetLab, http://bit.ly/2qX6l3Phttp://bit.ly/2dZZQtb40 Law12.735ofNovember30,2012,http://bit.ly/1sUwjhz41 Restrictionsincludeliabilityofserverswithregardtoearlyonlinecampaigning;unsubscribemechanismsforelectoraladvertising;elevationoffine duetoviolationsofonlineelectoralconduct;andthecriminalizationofhiringpeopleinordertoperformonlinebashingofcandidates.See:Law12.891of2013,http://bit.ly/1my5W1I

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BetweenJulyandDecember2016,Googlereceived66removalrequestsundertheelectorallaw,alongwith189requestsfordefamationand124requestsforprivacyandsecurity.42Facebook’sTransparencyReportindicatesthat1,708piecesofcontentwererestrictedbetweenJulyandDecember2016,“incompliancewithordersfromlocalcourtsrelatedtocivil,criminal,andelectoralproceedings.”43ThenumberofremovalrequestsissuedtoTwitteralsoincreasedtolevelssimilartothoseseenduringpresidentialelectionsinlate2014,althoughjust15tweetswerereportedlywithheldforcontentwhichwaseitherdefamatoryorviolatedelectorallaw.44

TheBrazilianAssociationforInvestigativeJournalism(ABRAJI)documented606requestsbypoliticians,politicalpartiesorthepublicprosecutor’soffic tocensorcontentonwebsites,newspapers,radioorTVduringtheelectioncampaignperiodin2016,settingrecordhighscomparedtopreviouselections.45Thisincluded44blogsand22newswebsites.Whilethesefigu esmaynotencompassallcases,ABRAJIregistered237removalrequestsdirectedatFacebook,and40atGoogle.46Judgesruledinfavorofcontenttakedownin56percentofthe606requests.47

Otherattemptstoremoveonlinecontentalsosparkedcontroversyduringthecoverageperiodofthisreport.InFebruary2017,ajudgeinBrasíliaaskedprominentnewspapersFolha de S.PauloandO GlobotoremovearticlesfromtheirwebsitesaboutahackerconvictedofattemptingtoextortBrazil’sfi stlady,claimingviolationofprivacy.Bothnewspaperscompliedwiththerequest,adecisionwhichreceivedcriticismfrommediarightsassociations.48Acoupleofdayslater,anappealscourtoverturnedthedecisionagainstFolha de S.Paulobasedonfreedomofexpressionconsiderations,andthecontentwasrepublishedonthesite.49InMay2017,O Globo reportedthatthefi stladyhaddroppedthesuitagainstbothpapers.50

42 Brazil,“GovernmentRequeststoRemoveContent,”Google,2017,https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/by-country/BR43 Brazil,“GovernmentRequestsReports,”Facebook,2016,https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/Brazil/2016-H2/44 Twitter,“Removalrequests”Transparency Report, July-December2016.http://bit.ly/2nkHVwh.AccessedMay30,2017.45 TheBrazilianAssociationforInvestigativeJournalism(ABRAJI),“Ctrl + X”Project,2016,http://www.ctrlx.org.br/noticia/eleicoes-de-2016-batem-recorde-de-acoes-para-esconder-informacoes46 “Almost350VehicleswereProcessedtoRemoveInformationFromAir(Portuguese),”August12,2016,http://www.ctrlx.org.br/noticia/quase-350-veiculos-foram-processados-para-retirar-informacoes-do-a47 “JudgeshaveCompliedMorethanHalfoftheRequestsofPoliticianstoHideInformation(Portuguese),”Abraji,December6,2016,http://www.ctrlx.org.br/noticia/juizes-acataram-mais-da-metade-dos-pedidos-de-politicos-para-esconder-informacoes48 ComitteetoProtectJournalists,“OGloboandFolhadeS.PauloorderedtoremovereportsaboutBrazil’sFirstLady,”February2017,http://bit.ly/2nQkpeH49 RenataMariz,“JustiçaderrubacensuracontrajornalnocasoMarcelaTemer,”O Globo,February15,2017,https://glo.bo/2rZa2EO50 “MarcelaTemerdesistedeaçãocontrajornais,”[MarcelaTemerResignsFromActionAgainstNewspaper]O Globo,May4,2017,https://glo.bo/2qCD8Jn

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IntermediaryliabilityissueshavebeensettledbyacaselawestablishedbytheBrazilianHighCourtofJustice(STJ)andbystatutoryprovisionsenactedbyMarcoCivilin2014,whichestablishesthatinternetprovidersshallnotbeheldliableforcivildamagesresultingfromcontentcreatedbythirdparties,andthatapplicationproviderswillonlybeheldliableforcivildamagesresultingfromcontentgeneratedbythirdpartiesshouldtheyrefusetofollowacourtorderrequestingspecifi removalofsaidcontent.51Inrecentyears,caselawwasslowlybuiltaroundasimilarunderstanding,withtheBrazilianSTJrulingtowardsajudicialnotice-and-takedownmodel.52Exceptionsweremadeforcopyrightinfringementand“revengeporn,”suchasdisseminationofsexuallyexplicitphotosorvideoswithouttheconsentoftheindividualappearinginthem.Incasespertainingtorevengeporntheuser’snotificatio aloneisenoughtomaketheintermediaryliableshoulditrefusetomakethecontentunavailableinashorttime.53

InNovember2016,theSTJunanimouslyruledthatthe“righttobeforgotten”cannotbeimposedonsearchenginessuchasGoogle.54Althoughtwobillstocreateaso-called“righttobeforgotten”wereproposedinBrazil’sCongress,bywhichsearchengineswouldberequiredtoremovelinkstopersonaldatauponrequestsbyusers,legislativeproposalshadyettobebroughtupfordebate.55Apublichearingwasmarkedbyconflictin pointsofviewbetweenthedifferentgroups:thoseagainst(mainlyassociationsrelatedtomediaandjournalism),thoseinfavor(mainlycomposedbycriminallawyers)andthosespeakingforacompromise(civillawyers’associations).56Duetoanongoingpoliticalcrisis,therehasbeenlittleprogressonthematter.

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Blogsandsocialnetworkingplatformshavebecomeimportantinstrumentsforcitizenjournalistsandotherstoaccessinformation,defendcivilrights,andexpresspoliticalpointsofviewsinBrazil.Brazilianscanreadnewsfromnationalandinternationalsources,withoutgovernmentrestriction.Withinsuchadiversemedialandscape,somecontentprovidersareneutralandothersshowbiastowardsoragainstthegovernment.

51 SeeLaw12.965(MarcoCivildaInternet),Art.18:Theproviderofconnectiontointernetshallnotbeliableforcivildamagesresultingfromcontentgeneratedbythirdparties.Art.19:Inordertoensurefreedomofexpressionandpreventcensorship,theproviderofinternetapplicationscanonlybesubjecttocivilliabilityfordamagesresultingfromcontentgeneratedbythirdpartiesif,afteraspecifi courtorder,itdoesnottakeanystepsto,withintheframeworkoftheirserviceandwithintimestatedintheorder,makeunavailablethecontentthatwasidentifie asbeingunlawful,unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw.52 Thecaselawevolvedtoanoticeandtakedownmodel,whichmeansinternetprovidersandcontentproviderswererequestedtoremovetheallegedinfringingoroffensivematerialwithin24hoursuponjudicialorder.SeeforinstanceSTJ,Educacional/Yahoo,REsp1.338.214/MT,decisionasofNovember13,2013;STJ,Sassaki/Google,Resp1.338.214/MT,decisionasofDecember12,2012.53 PereiradeSouza,CarlosAffonso,“ResponsabilidadecivildosprovedoresdeacessoedeaplicaçõesdeInternet:EvoluçãojurisprudencialeosimpactosdaLeiNº12.965,”IN:Lemos,Leite,MarcoCivildaInternet,Atlas,2014.54 “BrazilSuperiorCourtRulesinGoogle’sFavorAgainst‘RighttobeForgotten’,” Global Voices,November21,2016,http://bit.ly/2gbZ63L55 SenadoFederal,“ConselhodeComunicaçãoSocialdefendesigilodafontejornalística,”Newsrelease,September14,2009,http://bit.ly/1iO7y71;Seealso:InstitutodeTecnologiaeSociedade,“Direitoaoesquecimento:omundotodopreciseesquecer?”Brasil Post (blog), August8,2015,http://bit.ly/1Hofb7Y;SeealsotheProposedBills:CâmaradosDeputados,ProjetodeLei7881/2014,http://bit.ly/1QAItH8;andCâmaradosDeputados,ProjetodeLei215/2015,http://bit.ly/1JjdKNY.56 AndersonSchreiber,“Astrêscorrentesdodireitoaoesquecimento,”JOTA,June18,2017,http://bit.ly/2ink3eI

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Althoughself-censorshipislesspervasiveinBrazilthaninsomeneighboringcountries,theongoinguseofthreats,intimidation,andviolenceagainstonlinejournalistsandindependentbloggersincertainareasofthecountryisontheriseandhascontributedtopocketsofcontinuousself-censorship(see“IntimidationandViolence”).57

Reportsaboutonlinedisinformationandfalsenewsstoriescirculatingonsocialnetworkshavereceivedattentionoverthepastyear.InNovember2016,ananalysisbyBuzzfeedBrazilfoundthatthetop10falsenewsstoriesaboutthe“CarWashscandal”receivedmoreFacebookengagementthanthetop10realnewsarticles.58Anotherrecentstudylookedatthegrowingroleofonlinemanipulationtacticssurroundingpolitically-sensitiveperiods,notablyduringlocalelectionsinRiodeJaneiroandtheimpeachmentofformerpresidentRousseffin2016.Whileitacknowledgedthedifficult inmakingconnectionsbetweenactualbotsandcampaigns,thestudyfoundthatbotnetworksappearedtobeparticularlyactiveduringtheelectioncampaign.Inonecase,researchersfoundabotnetof3,500Twitteraccountsattackingonecandidatewithrepeatedmessages,mostlikelyinattemptstocreatetrendingtopicsagainsthim.59

EversincetheapprovaloftheMarcoCivil,theprincipleofNetworkNeutralityhasbeenincorporatedintoBrazilianlaw.EnactedinMay2016,anewdecreeregulatingtheMarcoCivilsolidifie therulesthatprohibitthediscriminationordegradationoftraffi forcommercialpurposeswhilepermittingitforemergencyandpubliccalamitysituations.60Zero-ratingandFacebook’sFreeBasicsprogram61arethusconsideredtobebarredbythisnewlegislation,andanynoticeofviolationofsaidprinciplebycompaniesmaybeinvestigatedandsanctioned.62However,zero-ratingisstillacommonpracticeamonglargermobileinternetcompanies.63

Digital Activism

SocialmediaplatformssuchasFacebookandTwittercontinuetoplayacentralroleincivicactivisminBrazil.

Socialnetworkshaveplayedapivotalroleintheorganizationandmobilizationofprotestsforandagainstthegovernment.Aftertheimpeachmentofex-presidentDilmaRousseffinmid-2016,protestscontinuedthroughlate2016andearly2017,especiallytodenouncePresidentTemer’seconomicandsocialreforms,64orsupportcorruptioninvestigationsandproposedmeasurestotacklecorruptionwithin“OperationCarWash.”65

57 Fenaj,“ViolênciacontrajornalistaseliberdadedeimprensanoBrasil-Relatório2016,”January17,2017,http://bit.ly/2jQAlfg58 AlexandreAragao&CraigSilverman,“TheTopFakeNewsStoriesOutperformedRealNewsAboutAMajorScandalinBrazil,Too,”BuzzFeed,November22,2016,http://bzfd.it/2m4Av5659 DanArnaudo,“ComputationalPropagandainBrazil:SocialBotsduringElections,”SamuelWoolleyandPhilipN.Howard,Eds.WorkingPaper2017.8.Oxford,UK:ProjectonComputationalPropaganda,http://bit.ly/2zsRz7E 60 Decree8.771,May11,2016,http://bit.ly/2c7Iqqv.61 Internet.orgchangeditsnametoFreeBasicsinSeptember2015.62 PedroVilela,“OquemudacomodecretoderegulamentaçãodoMarcoCivil?”[WhatchangeswiththedecreeregulatingMarcoCivil?],InstitutodeReferênciaemInterneteSociedade,May13,2016,http://bit.ly/2bLHR3963 RafaelBucco,“AméricaMóvilreavaliaofertadezero-ratingnoBrasil,”[AmericaMovilreevaluateszero-ratinginBrazil],Telesíntese,August2,2016,http://bit.ly/2crx2sB64 “ProtestoscontraPEC55têmônibusqueimadoemBrasíliaeinvasãodaFIESP”El País,December14,2016,http://bit.ly/2gHqk1C65 “MilharesvãoàsruaspelaLava-JatoeaumentampressãosobreoCongresso,”El País,December5,2016,http://bit.ly/2oqLMcQ;“ProtestoscontrareformadaPrevidênciaeterceirizaçãoocorrememváriascidades,”El País,March31,2017,http://bit.ly/2oIiohv

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Citizensalsoincreasinglyengagewithformalgovernmentplatformstoexpressopinionsandshapethedesignandimplementationoflegislation.OnlineparticipationwasespeciallyvibrantforthedraftingandregulationoftheMarcoCivil.66AnewappcalledMudamos+wasproducedin2017,aspartofaninitiativebyInstitutoTecnologiaeSociedade(ITS-Rio)inpartnershipwiththeMovementAgainstElectoralCorruption(MCCE).Theopen-sourceappusesBlockchaintechnologytocreateasecurewayofproposingandsigningpopularinitiativebills,creatingapotentiallystrongtoolofdirectdemocracythroughtheinternet.AbillwasproposedinCongresstolegitimateelectronicsignaturesinpopularinitiativebills,whichwouldenableMudamos+andsimilarappstobecomelegitimateformsofparticipation.67

BrazilisalsoafoundingmemberoftheOpenGovernmentPartnership—aglobalefforttoincreasetransparencyandaccountability—and,aspartofthiseffort,hassignificantl improvedstandardsofaccesstopublicinformationinrecentyears,establishingasystemwherebycitizensareentitledtorequestinformationthroughanelectronicsystem.

Violations of User Rights

Brazil’s Marco Civil Law established a framework for internet users’ rights, but other legal provisions—such as criminal defamation laws and those restricting certain speech during elections—contribute to a legal environment where individuals can face prosecutions for what they write online. High levels of violence in Brazil’s urban centers, coupled with impunity for many crimes, have contributed to one of the highest rates of violence against journalists in the region. At least two journalists, including one editor of a news website, were killed during the coverage period.

Legal Environment

AlthoughBraziladoptedsomeofthemostprogressivelegislationintheworldrelatedtointernetgovernancewiththeenactmentofMarcoCivil,severalcompetinglegalprovisions,suchaslawscriminalizingdefamationandblasphemyandrestrictingspeecharoundelections,continuetothreatenusers’rightsonline.

TheBrazilianFederalConstitutionforbidsanonymitybutprotectsfreedomofthepressandfreedomofspeech,includingculturalandreligiousexpression.68BrazilmadenoteworthyprogressinestablishingafoundationforinternetuserrightswiththepassageoftheMarcoCivilLaw,aso-called“ConstitutionfortheInternet,”signedintolawinApril2014.69Thegroundbreakinglegislationestablishestherighttofreedomofexpressiononline,offersdetailedprivacyprotectionspertainingtopersonaldata,guaranteesnetneutrality,andpromisestoupholdtheparticipatorynatureoftheinternet.OnMay11,2016,duringherlasthoursinoffic beforetheimpeachmentprocessthatsuspendedherfrompower,DilmaRousseffsignedintolawthedecreeregulatingtheMarcoCivillaw,whichcontainedspecifi rulesregardingnetneutralityanddataprotection.70

66 OpenGovernmentPartnership,“Brazil,”http://bit.ly/2d8fzoH67 “ITSRioprotocolanaCâmaraatoparaaceitaçãodeassinaturaseletrônicasemleisdeiniciativapopular”ITSRio,March30,2017,http://bit.ly/2nFhYJq68 ConstituiçãoFederalde1988,[FederalConstitutionof1988],Englishtranslation:http://bit.ly/1iOdLz.69 Law12.965,April23,2014,http://bit.ly/1kxaoKm;SeealsoEnglishversionbyCarolinaRossini,distributedbyCGI.BrattheendofNetMundialevent:http://bit.ly/1jerSOK70 Decree8.771,May11,2016,http://bit.ly/2c7Iqqv

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Nevertheless,Brazilhascontinuedtoseeinstancesoflocalofficial suingbloggersandonlinejournalistsfordefamation,whichisacrimepunishablebysixmonthstotwoyearsinprisonorafin accordingtothepenalcode.71Althoughpeoplearerarelychargedorimprisonedforracistordiscriminatoryspeech,Brazilianlawestablishespenaltiesrangingfromtwotofi eyearsinprisonforpracticingorincitingdiscriminationbasedonrace,ethnicityorreligioninthemediaorinotherpublications.72TheCriminalCodefurtheroutlinespunishmentforvilifyingormockingreligion,withpenaltiesrangingfromonemonthtooneyearinprison,althoughitisunclearwhetherthesepenaltieshavebeenappliedonline.

Braziliancybercrimelawcriminalizesbreachesofdigitalprivacysuchascomputerintrusion,the“installationofvulnerabilities,”andediting,obtaining,ordeletinginformation—includingcreditcardnumbers—withoutauthorization.Thedistribution,sale,production,orofferofprogramsordevicesmeanttofacilitatetheseactions,ortointerruptICTservices,arealsocategorizedascrimes.73

AreportbyaParliamentaryInquiryCommissionproposingaseriesofbillsrelatedtocybercrimessparkedcriticisminearly2016.ThebillsincludedchangestotheoriginaltextoftheMarcoCivil,andwereseenbycivilrightsactivistsasathreattofreedomofexpression,privacyandseveralotherdigitalrights.74OnMay4,2016,theParliamentaryCommissionadoptedthefina report.75Themostcontroversialproposalsweredroppedaftersignifican backlashfromcivilsocietyandactivists.76

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities

DefamationlawsuitscontinuedtoposeathreattofreedomofexpressiononlineinBrazil.

Onlinejournalistsandbloggersreportingonuncomfortabletopicssuchascorruptionfrequentlyfaceintimidation,includingjudicialaction.Onelocalnewswebsitereportedbeingsuedbylocalofficial eleventimessincelaunchingin2014,inretaliationforpublishingcorruption-relatedstories.InarecentcaseinDecember2016,aformermayorsoughtdamagesbecausethewebsitereferredtohisremovalfromoffic duetohisfinancia management.77

71 Decree2848/40,PenalCode,Art.331,http://bit.ly/1OV4Vwj72 Law9.459,May13,1997,Art.20,http://bit.ly/2dYnwN373 EsterbanIsrael,“BrazilAimstoBringOrdertoLawlessCybers,”Reuters,February26,2013,http://reut.rs/2Atct6X74 AndrewFishman,“PropostasdaCPIdosCrimesCiberneticosameaçamaInternetlivrepara200milhõesdepessoas,”[Cybercrimeproposalsthreatenfreeinternetfor200millionpeople],The Intercept,April26,2016,http://bit.ly/1SIrFAB75 CâmaradosDeputados,[ChamberofDeputies],“ConheçaaspropostasdoRelatórioFinaldaCPICIBER,”[Seetheproposalsofthefina reportbyCPICIBER],http://bit.ly/2dLfiG76 JoséAntonioMiracle,“Relatóriofina daCPIdosCrimesCibernéticosgeradiscussão,”[Finalreportgeneratesdiscussion],May13,2016,http://bit.ly/2e9MUgk;ColetivoIntervozes,“CPIdecrimescibernéticosaprovarelatórioqueatacaliberdadenainternet,”[Commissionapprovesreportthatattacksfreedomonline],Carta Capital,May6,2016,http://bit.ly/2dl03V377 “Brazil:localjournalistssued11timesovermunicipalcorruptioncoverage,”Reporters Without Borders,February1,2017,http://bit.ly/2yI2RrI

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In2016,dailynewspaperGazeta do Povofacedanonslaughtoflawsuitsbyjudgesalleginginvasionofprivacy,afterthepaperaccessedinformationreadilyavailableonlineanddiscloseditinitsreporting.ThestoryanalyzedthesalariesofjudgesandprosecutorsfromthestateofParaná,basedoninformationpubliclyavailableonthegovernment’stransparencywebsite.78Inresponse,lawyersforGazeta do PovolodgedacomplaintwiththeSupremeCourt,whichsuspendedallcasesinJuly2016.79Afina decisionwasstillpendingmid-2017.Similarlyin2017,amunicipalaccountantsuedanotherjournalistfromFolha MSafteraccessingandreportingonsalariesavailableonthemunicipalgovernmentwebsite.80

OnMarch21,2017,policeraidedthehomeofbloggerCarlosEduardoCairoGuimarãesandconfisca edhiselectronicdevices,beforetakinghiminforquestioningunder“coerciveconduction,”whichiswhenajudgeauthorizespolicetotakeawitnesstoaprecinctinordertotestify.81Guimarãesownedablogaboutpoliticsand,in2016,releasedinformationleakedtohimaboutaseizureandsearchwarrantaddressedtotheformerBrazilianpresident,LuizInácioLuladaSilva,somedaysbeforeitwasscheduledtohappen.Thecasesparkedcriticismfromcivilsocietyforweakeningfreedomofpressandtheprotectionofjournalists’anonymoussources,bothrightsprotectedbytheconstitution.82OnMarch23,thejudgethatissuedthewarrantagainstGuimarãesreviewedhispreviousdecisionandannulledanyevidenceobtainedfromthetestimonyandfromthewarrants.Ontheotherhand,hereaffi medthatEduardowasnottobeconsideredajournalist,sohewouldnothaveprotectionofsourceguaranteedbylaw.83

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

TheBrazilianConstitutionexplicitlyforbidsanonymity.84Althoughinpractice,anonymousspeechonlineiscommon,judgeshaveoccasionallyreferredtotheconstitutionasabasisforlimitingcertaininstancesofanonymousspeech.Otherjudges,however,haveupheldanonymousspeechonthegroundsthatitisimportantforfreeexpressionandprivacy,rulingthatanonymouspostsonlineareprotectedaslongasitispossibletotechnicallytracethespeechthroughIPaddresses.TheBrazilianSuperiorCourtofJustice(STJ)hasheldthatidentificatio throughIPaddressisa“reasonablyeffectivemeansforidentification andcorrespondsto“averagediligence”expectedfrominternetproviders.85

78 SérgioRoxo,“JuízesdoParanámovem36açõescontrajornalereporters,”[JudgesofParanámove36lawsuitsagainstnewspaperandreporters]O Globo,June7,2017,https://glo.bo/2qX1boI;EstelitaHassCarazzai,“Magistratesfil dozensoflawsuitsagainstjournalistsinPR,”Folha de São Paulo,June7,2017, http://bit.ly/1XaixZw79 HeloísaMedonça,“STFsuspendeaçõesdejuízescontrajornalistasda‘GazetadoPovo’”[FederalSupremeCourtsuspendactionsfromjudgesagainstjournalistsfromthenewspaperGazeta do Povo]El País, July1,2016,http://bit.ly/2rVNRPS80 AndrewDownie,“InBrazil,outdateddefamationlawsandcostlycourtcasesusedtopressurecritics,”Committee to Protect Journalists,April6,2017,https://cpj.org/blog/2017/04/in-brazil-outdated-defamation-laws-and-costly-cour.php81 ThiagoHerdy,“PFrealizaconduçãocoercitivadeblogueiroemSãoPaulo,”[FederalPoliceconductscoercivelyabloggerinSãoPaulo],O Globo,March21,2017,https://glo.bo/2nyrYXH82 Article19,“SérgioMoro’sdecisionagainstbloggerisintimidatedandviolatestheConstitution,”March22,2017,http://bit.ly/2nJqLfw;“AbrajiexpressesconcernoverMoro’srulingovercoerciveblogger,”O Globo,March22,2017,https://glo.bo/2neLapb;DanielaFernandes,“Coerciveconductionofbloggerisseriousattackonfreedomofthepress,saysReportersWithoutBorders,”BBC,March22,2017,http://bbc.in/2nsaw4x83 BrazilianFederalJustice-13ª Vara Federal de Curitiba,SearchandSeizureWarrantNo.Nº500876224.2017.4.04.7000/PR(March23,2017),http://bit.ly/2ovARxV84 ConstituiçãoFederalde1988,art.5,http://bit.ly/1FieR0R85 SeeBrazilianSuperiorCourtofJusticeAppealstotheSuperiorCourtofJusticeNo.1192208-MG,REsp1186616-MGandREsp1300161-RS

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SeverallegalprovisionsalsoplacerestrictionsonanonymityinBrazil.Real-nameregistrationisrequiredforindividualsorlegalentitiesinordertopurchasemobilephonesortoaccessprivateinternetconnections,althoughtheuseofpseudonymsindiscussionforumsacrossthewebisquitecommon.LawmakershaveurgedfurtherrestrictionsonanonymitywithregardtopublicaccesspointssuchasLANhouses,suggestingthatinternetcommunicationsshouldberecordedinordertopreventcybercrimes.SeveralpiecesoflegislationofthiskindalreadyexistinSãoPaulo86andRiodeJaneiro,87andabillunderdebateintheSenatewouldrequireLANhousestoregisterallusersandkeepadirectoryofindividualidentificatio foranunspecifie amountoftime.88TheMarcoCivilrequiresinternetserviceproviderssuchasLANhousestoconfidentiall storeconnectionrecordsinasafe,controlledenvironment,foratleastoneyearfollowingtheprovisionoftheservice.89

MarcoCivilLawtreatsprivacyanddataprotectionasfundamentalrights,bansthedisclosureofusers’personaldatatothirdparties—withtheexceptionofpoliceandjudicialauthorities—andrequiresproviderstomakeprivacypoliciesandtermsofuseclearandunderstandable.90DigitalrightsactivistshaveraisedconcernsaboutMarcoCivil’sdataretentionmandate,whichimposesobligationsoninternetconnectionproviderstokeeprecordsoftheirsusers’connectionlogsfor12months,andforapplicationproviderstokeeprecordsofaccessfor6months.91Ontheotherhand,Article10notesthatthecontentofprivatecommunicationscanonlybeaccessedwithjudicialauthorization.RegulationsdecreedonMay11,2016furtherclarifie securitymeasurestobetakenbyprovidersregardinglog-keeping,includinghowauthoritiesmustrequestusers’datafromintermediaries,theleveloftechnicalsecuritysaidintermediariesmustadopttosafeguardlogsfrombeingleaked,andotheridentificatio andsecurityprocedurestobeundertakenbytheprofessionalsresponsibleforhandlingsaiddata,suchastheobligationforindividualidentificatio andfortheuseoftwo-factorauthentication.92

TheBraziliangovernmenthascontinuedtoincreaseitscapacityforsurveillanceusingasjustificatio majoreventssuchastheOlympicsGames,whichhappenedinAugust2016,inRiodeJaneiro.Inresponsetoaninformationrequest,theMinistryofDefensereportedithadspentR$68million(approximatelyUSD21million)between2014and2016onsurveillanceequipment.93Civilsocietyorganizationshavecontinuedtocriticizethelackoftransparencyonhowthegovernmentusessurveillance,frequentlyjustifie asapretexttocombatcrime.94

86 LegislativeAssemblyoftheStateofSãoPaulo,Law12228/2006,http://bit.ly/2nuRWbN87 RiodeJaneiroMunicipalDecree36.207,September12,2012,http://bit.ly/1WB0trP88 Arapporteurinthe Commission for Science, Technology, Innovation, Communication and Information TechnologyfromtheSenatewasdesignatedinMarch2017toanalyzeBill28/2011,http://bit.ly/1OxjBE889 MarcoCivildaInternet,Art.13,http://bit.ly/1kxaoKm90 LawNo.12.965,GovernmentofBrazil,April23,2014.EnglishversionbyCarolinaRossini,distributedbyCGI.BrattheendofNetMundialevent,availableathttp://bit.ly/1jerSOK91 CodingRightsandInstitutoBetaparaInterneteaDemocracia,“NotaTécnica:RetençãodeRegistrosdeConexãoeAplicações,”[Technicalnote:Retentionofconnectionandapplicationlogs],accessedOctober12,2016,http://bit.ly/2egPy7C92 Decree8.771,May11,2016,http://bit.ly/2c7Iqqv;Seealso:Artigo19,“RegulamentaçãodoMarcoCivildaInternetéumavanço,”[RegulationofMarcoCivilisabreakthrough],May20,2016,http://bit.ly/2dYbhjf93 NataliaViana,“ArmedForceswanttousecellphoneblockersagainst‘hostile’dronesandterrorismintheOlympics,”Publica - Reporting Agency And Investigative Journalism,June30,2016,http://bit.ly/2ocGIvA94 DennusAntonialli&JacquelinedeSouzaAbreu,“VigilânciadasComunicaçõespeloEstadoBrasileiro,”Internetlab Association of Research In Law and Technology, 2016,http://bit.ly/2he8se4

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MaindigitalrightsadvocacyorganizationshavelargelysupportedaproposedPrivacyandDataProtectionBill.ItwassenttoCongresstobeanalyzedbyaSpecialCommissioncreatedinOctober2016,beforebeingsubmittedforavoteinplenary.95Thebillaimstoestablishcomprehensivedataprotectionsystemgovernedbyanewindependentauthority,withclearuserrightsregardingbothgovernmentandprivatesectorcollectionanduseofdata,andintermediaryliabilityregardingthecollection,storageandtreatmentofpersonaldata.96

Intimidation and Violence

Threats,intimidation,andviolenceagainstonlinejournalistsandbloggersconstituteamajorrestrictiononfreedomofexpressionandhumanrightsinBrazil.Atleasttwojournalists,includingoneeditorofanewswebsite,werekilledduringthecoverageperiod.97

OnJuly24,2016,JoãoMirandadoCarmo,54,editoroftheoutspokennewswebsiteSAD Sem CensurawasshotbyatleasttwomenfromacarparkedoutsidehishouseinSantoAntôniodoDescoberto.Accordingtolocalnewsreports,themanwascalledbythemurderersand,assoonashesteppedoutofhishouse,wasshotseventimes,dyinginstantly.98Recentreportsonhiswebsitehadcriticizedmunicipalproblemssuchasalocaltaxongarbagecollectionanddelaysinpaymentstolocalmunicipalemployees.Followingthearrestoftwosuspects,investigationspointedtothevictim’sreportingasthelikelymotivationforthecrime.99

BrazilrankedninthintheCommitteetoProtectJournalists’2016ImpunityIndex,whichtrackscountrieswherejournalistsaremurderedandkillersrunfree.100InameetingwithaCPJdelegationin2014,theex-PresidentDilmaRousseffcommittedtosupportlegislativeinitiativestofederalizethecompetenceforjudgingcrimesagainstfreedomofexpressionandtoadopta“zerotolerance”policy.101Sincethen,theconvictionin2015ofthemurderersofJoséRobertoOrnelasdeLemos,theadministrativedirectorofthedailyHora H, hasbeenconsideredabenchmarkforjusticeandhumanrights.Lemoswasshotatleast41timesin2013afterwritingaboutthespreadofmilitiasallegedlyledbycorruptpoliceoffice sinthesuburbofNovaIguaçu.InNovember2015,policearrestedsixpeopleaccusedofrunningamilitiabelievedtobedirectlylinkedtoLemos’murder.Thearrestsalsoresultedinthecreationofanewhomicidedivisioninthecity.102However,mostcondemnationsstillonlytargetthedirectperpetratorsofthesecrimes,allowingtheirplannerstoescapejustice.

95 NationalCongress,DraftBillnº5.276/2016,http://bit.ly/1TujEke96 Ministérioda Justiça,“AnteprojetodeLeiparaaProteçãodeDadosPessoais”[LegalProposalfortheProtectionofPersonalData],accessedMarch25,2016,http://bit.ly/1PQ0LpT97 ReportersWithoutBorders,“JournalistsKilled2016,”http://bit.ly/2oA0Vb1;MarietaCazarré,“Correção:Brasiléo4ºpaíscommaismortesdejornalistasem2016,dizONG”[Correction:Brazilisthe4thcountrywiththemostdeathsofjournalistsin2016,accordingtoNGO],AgênciaBrasil,October13,2016,http://bit.ly/2ebmI3z98 CommitteetoProtectJournalists,“JoãoMirandadoCarmo,”http://bit.ly/2nijXl699 PoliciaCivil,“CivilianpolicearrestsuspectofkillingjournalistinSantoAntôniodoDescoberto,”August08,2016,http://bit.ly/2yhvyas100 ElisabethWitchel,“GettingAwayWithMurder,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,October27,2016,http://bit.ly/2fb0JiW101 CommitteetoProtectJournalists,“GettingAwayWithMurder,”October8,2015,http://bit.ly/1G1HEGQ102 AndrewDownie,“AmidrisingviolenceinBrazil,convictionsinjournalists’murdersarecauseforoptimism,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,February29,2016,http://bit.ly/1MHdHtS

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IntimidationandharassmentremainsaseriousconcerninBrazil.InonecaseinApril2017,attackersfi edatacarbelongingtotheownerofablogfocusingonlocalpoliticsandcorruptioninRioGrandedaSerra,nearSãoPaolo.Hehadpreviouslyreceivedthreatsforhiswork.103Onlinebloggersandjournalistswhoworkinpoororruralareasandarenotlinkedtomajorurbanmediaoutletsmayfacemoreharassmentbecausetheylackvisibilityandsupport.Undersuchcircumstances,authoritiesfeellittlepressuretosolveattacksontheprovincialpress.Unsolvedattacksonjournalistsmayinturndissuadelocalreportersfrominvestigatingcrimeandcorruptionintheirregions.104

Technical Attacks

Brazilremainsatopsourceandtargetofcyberattacks:AccordingtoAkamaiinthelastquarterof2016,Brazilwasthefourthsourcecountryintheworldforwebapplicationattacks,andthesecondmosttargeted.105ItwasalsotheeightsourcecountryforDDoSattacks.106TheNortonCyberSecurityInsightsReportestimatedafinancia lossofU$10.3billionduetocybercrimeinBrazilin2016,affecting42.4millionsofusers.107

Therewasatleastoneattacktargetingamediaoutletduringthisperiod.OnJanuary6,userswereunabletoaccessthewebsiteofFolha,oneofBrazil’smajornewssites,andothershostedbyUniversoOnline(UOL),awebfi mownedbyGrupoFolha,afterahackingattackthatmanagedtoredirectdomainsunderUOLandGrupoFolhatopornographicwebsites.Usersalsoreportedbeingledtoadefacemessage,whichredirectedthemtositeswithpornographiccontent.108

Anothercasethatgarneredsignifican mediaattentionwasthehackingofacellphoneandemailsofthepresident’swifeMarcelaTemerinanextortionattempt.TheincidenthappenedinApril2016,butreappearedinthemediainFebruary2017,whenthehackerwascondemnedtofi eyearsinprison.109

ThegroupofhackersAnonymousBrasilwasbehindseveralattacksduringthecoverageperiod.InAugust2016,thegroupclaimedresponsibilityforhackinggovernmentalsitesanddatabasesbelongingtothestateofRiodeJaneiro,inprotestagainsttheOlympicGames.110InMay,AnonymousleakedpersonaldataaboutPresidentMichelTemerandsomeofhisministersandpoliticalallies,exposingIDcards,emails,phonenumbers,residentialandworkaddresses,andbusinessinformation.111

103 “InBrazil,attackerfi esatpoliticalblogger’scar,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,April06,2017,https://cpj.org/2017/04/in-brazil-attacker-fi es-at-political-bloggers-car.php104 JohnOtis,“BloggersTargetedasMurdersSpikeinBrazil,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,February2013,http://bit.ly/1LzzPt0105 AkamaiInc,“Akamai’s[StateoftheInternet]/SecurityQ42016Report”,2016,p.16http://akamai.me/2ld6n1u106 AkamaiTechnologiesInc.,“Akamai’s[stateoftheinternet]/SecurityQ42016report”,2016.p.11,http://akamai.me/2ld6n1u107 SymantecCorporation,“NortonCyberSecurityInsightsReport2016-GlobalComparisonBrazil”,2016,http://symc.ly/2nHgOiB108 “HackerattackdamagesaccesstoFolha’swebsite(Portuguese),” Folha,January06,2017,http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2017/01/1847522-ataque-de-hacker-prejudica-acesso-ao-site-da-folha.shtml109 “HackerthreatenedtothrowTemer’sname‘inthemud’byleakingahackedaudio,”Folha de São Paulo, February 10, 2017, http://bit.ly/2luNNqn110 AltieresRohr;CauêMuraro,“AnonymoussayshestoledatafromgovernmentwebsitesandthemunicipalgovernmentofRJ,”G1,August8,2016,https://glo.bo/2nSjWIP111 FelipePayão,“AnonymousexposessensitivedataofMichelTemerandgovernmentministers,”Tecmundo,May22,2017,http://bit.ly/2qcUz21

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Brazilianauthoritieshavemadesomeeffortstoincreasecybersecurityandinvestmoreresourcesinovercomingcurrentobstacles.Since2008,Brazilhasengagedinamulti-stakeholderdebatetodevelopitscybersecurityagenda,whichresultedintheopeningofaNationalCyberDefenseCommand,andaNationalSchoolforCyberDefenseaimedatpreparingmilitarypersonnelfortheuseofcybertoolsonnationaldefense.112

112 AndreaBarreto,“BrazilianArmedForcesStrengthentheNation’sCybersecurityDefense,”Diálogo Digital Military Magazine, April 14, 2015, http://bit.ly/1FinqJ7

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