Frederickson-Technology and Music Performance in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

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Technology and Music Performance in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

Author(s): Jon FredericksonSource: International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Dec.,1989), pp. 193-220Published by: Croatian Musicological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/836729.

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J. FREDERICKSON, TECHNOLOGY & PERFORMANCE, IRASM (1989), 2, 193-220

TECHNOLOGY AND MUSIC PERFORMANCEIN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRO-DUCTION

JON FREDERICKSON1410 Hamilton St., N. W.WASHINGTON D. C. 20011, U.S.A.

UDC: 78.01:78.091:159.982Original Scientific PaperIzvorni izanstveni radReceived: February 25, 1989Primljeno: 25. velja6e 1989.Accepted: April 25, 1989Prihva6eno: 25. travnja 1989.

Abstract- Resum6The introduction of itechnologyinto musical performance is transform-ing traditional aesthetic definitionsof musical experience. Once social tech-nology allows the abstraction of theindividual from the performance, ma-chine technology can complete the ab-straction process. This process trans-forms traditional aesthetic definitionsof what constitutes live musical expe-rience: the relationship of the perform-

er to the audience, to his sound andaura, Ito other musicians making mu-sic together, to his ears and environ-ment, and to time. The discussion ofmusical time illustrates how aesthet-ics can function as a theory of expe-rience rooted within a symbolic ,uni-verse. Further, as the technologicalsymbolic universe becomes dominant,we can observe a parallel shift iin aes-thetic theories.

Technology has had a tremendous impact on musical performancein the twentieth century. Traditionally, the musical artwork has comealive only through performers. But with the development of technology,electronic media can replace human media - performers. Such a develop-ment raises important questions for music and the performer. Amongthose questions one must ask how an artworld which has treasured thepersonal expression of the performer could allow that performer to bereplaced through technology.To answer that question we will need to remember that the changingrole of the performer was already being outlined during the nineteenthcentury. Aesthetic arguments were redefining music's relationship to oth-er arts within artworlds. Those relationships in turn defined the relation-ships of the musicians to the artworld as a whole. For example, Wagner

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redefined the position and role of opera orchestra musicians through theintroduction of the covered orchestra pit. The gradual definition of theserelationships and their organization within a cohesive unitary vision ofthe artworld constitutes a social technology, an essential element in therationalization of production. This formal rationalization (BENSMAN 1983:30) renders all collective actions subject to formal, standardized rules ofprocedure which are ,>...rationally - i.e., systematically - planned,calculated, and worked out in order to achieve explicitly agreed-upongoals.


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sound engineer. The social technology involves the method of hiring, thepatterns of cooperation to produce the show, and the artistic conventionsof the musical show artworld.Social technology prepared the way and was the stimulus for machinetechnology in musical artworlds. When social technology moved the or-chestra to the pit, it would be only a matter of time before the orchestracould be moved to the sound studio for musical shows. If the social technol-ogy established that the orchestra need not be visible, it was only a matterof time before machine technology would replace the orchestra. If theaudience can't see the orchestra, its live presence is not necessary sinceit has become merely a soundsource to be submitted to rational prin-ciples of organization. For instance, in the artworld of musical shows anentire orchestra can be replaced by four synthesizers. Four musicians

playing synthesizers, one each for brass sounds, woodwind sounds, stringsounds, and drums, create the illusion of an entire orchestra in the pit.Or when an orchestra is used in a musical show, the orchestra may berecorded in a studio, its sounds subjected to manipulations by an engineer,then broadcast into the hall. Or an orchestra may be completely replacedby machine technology as in ballet performances given with the accom-paniment of tape recordings.The social technology which creates invisible human components ap-pears to be an important precondition for the development of machinetechnology. This is as true for conductors as for orchestras. When thesocial technology created an invisible conductor, he could be replacedtoo. In 1822 BERLIOZ(1904) described the advantages of an electric me-tronome, a precursor for the modern day click track. He noticed that aback stage orchestra often was poorly synchronized with the stage or-chestra. Since the back stage conductor was invisible to the audience, hecould be replaced by a machine. The conductor by pressing a key wouldsend an electrical impulse to an electrical metronome backstage. >,Theperformers being grouped behind the scenes, their eyes fixed upon thestick of the electric metronome, are thus directly subject to the conductor,who could, were it needful, conduct, from the middle of the Opera or-chestra in Paris, a piece of music performed at Versailles.* Since thebackstage conductor was simply the extension of the other conductor'sbaton, he could be replaced by a metronome.One might note, however, that the social technology of the conductorand the pit has not led to similar machine technology in opera perform-ance for musicians. Opera productions have not shifted to machine tech-nologies in musical performance because the social technology of operais different from that of ballet and musical shows. In opera, the conductorcontrols the production, not the dancers nor the producer. He controlsthe stage, the stage does not control him. Since the audience listens forhis interpretation, he cannot be replaced by machine technology. The operaconductor is central to the production, whereas the ballet conductor isless so, and the musical show conductor is often just a hired hand. The

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show conductor is hired less for his interpretation than for his handmovements which direct the orchestra. Since his job is hand movement,not interpretation, technology can replace his hand movement throughthe click track (an electronically generated beat transmitted over head-phones), but not the interpretive process behind the movement.These distinctions reveal that the degree to which machine technol-ogy will influence an artworld depends upon the type of social technol-ogy that has evolved in that artworld. Musicians who struggle for aes-thetic control within artworlds find that they can be abstracted from theproduction in varying degrees. When the conventions of an artworldallow a type of social technology by which musicians can be abstractedfrom the production, machine technology can make its greatest inroadsinto musical performance.

This relationship between social technology and machine technologyfor musicians can also be observed in the social technology of servanthood.According to FAIRCHILDS (1984:54), ,The ideal servant was efficient,hard-working, and above all inconspicuous, if not completely invisible- as one early nineteenth century manual put it, 'an intelligent andobedient machine costing 200 francs per year.' This image of the servantas a machine to do housework is striking, both for its repudiation of theclose and personal master-slave relationships of the past and for its antic-ipation of the future, when actual machines for housework would finallyguarantee the inviolability of domestic space and doom the servant toextinctionMechanical music permits the establishment of the master--interpretation. The future is with the completely mechanical orchestra,which will offer first the advantage of being no longer limited by thehuman possibilities of extent and duration... I believe in the futureof the mechanical in the domain of music, in the development of machine--made music, and perhaps - perhaps - in the resurrection of the lyrictheater by modern scientific methods, which alone are capable of solvingthe problems created by the growing demands of human interpreters.

>>By uppressing them?


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it would be easy for me to make some capable of performing roulades,tour des forces like the average singer (Mes Dames et MM); but in orderto make a mechanical singer like the Toldis, the Moriellis, the SaintHubertis, the Crescentinis, that is not in my power.< Breton persisted inhis questioning: ,Since you have calculated all the probabilities of thechessboard (Malzel had constructed a machine capable of playing chess)and those are many times more numerous than those of the harmonyof our musical system, could you perhaps build a machine capable ofcomposing music?


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But what if his recorded passages were not precisely coordinatedwith the beat on the click track? He corrects this problem by feeding allthe recorded information back to the synthesizer which is coordinatedwith a track known as the MIDI. This track makes all the recordedtracks >talk< to each other. As a result, all the rhythmic irregularities be-tween the tracks are resolved by a computer so that they play exactlytogether.This scenario which summarizes current recording techniques providesus with an opportunity to discover how rapidly relationships between theperformer and the listener are changing. The artist's relationship to theaudience changes as a result of technology. The musician in the recordingstudio does not play to an audience: he plays to a microphone. He doesn'tnecessarily have the opportunity to adjust to an audience. Instead, hisperformance is adjusted by the sound engineer. The audience, hearingan orchestra, may assume it is experiencing a direct personally mediatedperformance when it is not. Some audience members were shocked whenthey came down to the orchestra pit to greet some musician friends whowere playing the musical show Cats. They found an empty orchestra pit.The musicians were sequestered elsewhere in the theatre where theirplaying was recorded, mixed, and transmitted to the stage loudspeakers.Hence, the audience members who expected to find musicians in the pit,inadvertently encountered a new convention of musical production.These musicians were not in the hall playing to an audience. In asound studio playing into microphones they were somewhat like the filmactor described by Pirandello (Quoted in BENJAMIN 1968) who >...feelsas if in exile - exiled not only from the stage but also from himself.With a vague sense of discomfort he feels inexplicable emptiness: hisbody loses its corporeality, it evaporates, it is deprived of reality, life,voice, and the noises caused by his moving about, in order to be changedinto a mute image, flickering an instant on the screen, then vanishing intosilence... The projector will play with his shadow before the public andhe himself must be content to play before the camera.-When recorded, the musician's physical presence has no reality forthe audience. His presence evaporates, changed into a sound, instanta-neously manipulated by a sound engineer, projected into the auditoriumfor an instant then followed by the silence of an auditorium withoutmusicians. For the musicians, the microphone becomes the audience, andan unforgiving one at that, for the microphone does not respond, it doesnot register the personal presence, expression, and communication of theperformer. It only records the notes.

BENJAMIN (1968) touched on this aspect of technology when henoted the inhumanness of the camera: we look into a machine whichrecords our likeness without returning our gaze. The musician plays intoa microphone which records his sound without being able to listen to him.Playing in the sound studio for a run of performances, performers have

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described a sort of estrangement when they heard themselves over themonitors. That estrangement is rooted in the separation of the recordedsound from the musician-audience relationship. In the recording studiofor one musical show performance, a conductor complained after a se-lection that the audience didn't seem responsive. The piano player sug-gested, >Turn up the monitor.< Sometimes, in order to cope with thisestrangement, musicians joke about >phoningthe part in.? Both the micro-phone and the telephone substitute for face-to-face interactions. How-ever, whereas the telephone allows for reciprocal communication, mi-crophones may or may not. Again this possibility of reciprocal communi-cation depends upon aesthetic control within an artworld. A show musicianwill have little if any influence on the technological mediation whereasa singer in concert may respond to the ongoing recording process andwork with an engineer who is responding to her cues for special effectsduring the concert. What this reveals is that the artist is allowed to havereciprocal relationships with the audience and the engineer, whereas thesupport personnel may not.The musician not only loses a live connection to the audience, butthe very definition of what is a live sound can change due to technology.Sound engineers produce musical shows, in part, because audiences findlive performances less exciting than the technologically mediated perform-ances on radio, television, and recordings. Audiences now identify withrecording technology without being aware of it. They have come to ex-pect a certain kind of dramatic, engineered sound available on recordingsbut unproducable live. So live musicians must imitate recordings whichhave created a new norm for what constitutes live music. Changing tech-nology creates a new aesthetic expectations which in turn generate newartworld conventions. Live music begins to imitate technologically medi-ated music.Yet technologically mediated music also imitates live music. A re-cording engineer stated that his job was to >... create an illusion. Youhave to make it sound like it took place in a concert hall; violins on theleft, and so on. You have to create an effect of a hall, of depth, whereinstruments are and so on. But it's not real. Remember that review Ishowed you where the guy said it was a natural sound? I used reverb(reverberation dial which creates the effect of a slight echo like in aconcert hall) on that. Although it's a recording, it's supposed to imitatelive music.< Live musicians are imitating recordings which are imitatinglive performances. That which is >live? can be analyzed, reconstituted,and then simulated through a judicious use of the dials. In fact, criticsoften praise >live? performances which are artificially created. Due tothe unconscious identification with recording technology it is often nolonger possible to distinguish between live and mechanically producedmusic.One way recording technology provides the appearance of reality,of live music, is through creating the illusion of closeness to the performer.

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Perhaps increased loudness is technology's attempt to recover the lostintimacy of live musical experience. This may provide an explanationfor a change SHORE (1986:92) observes: the person listening to a recordingis placed >in the orchestrathe orchestra played the same passage later a whole step higher so Iwas able to splice that note, slow it down to get the right pitch, and putit in so no one would notice. Otherwise, I would have been in trouble.Technique analyzes its objectsso that it can re-constitute them.,< This is never as clear as in the analysisand reconstitution of musicians' sounds. Today a sound engineer canrecord a musician's sound, analyze it, and then recreate that exact sound.Now able to create that sound, the engineer need never hire that mu-

sician again. He can sound like any musician he chooses. How does thiscome about?

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Suppose an oboe player wanted to sound like John Mack, the prin-cipal oboe player of the Cleveland Orchestra. The oboist would ask asound engineer to analyze Mr. Mack's sound with a Synclavier. The Syn-clavier is an electronic device which performs what is known as a spec-tral analysis. That is, the machine records several sounds of Mr. Mack'soboe playing, then it converts those sounds into digital information whichis stored on diskettes. Then the sound wave of Mr. Mack's oboe is anal-yzed. It is analyzed because, like fingerprints, every musician's soundis unique. Each musician's sound looks different when the sound waveis analyzed. The sound engineer would take a sample of Mr. Mack'ssound then submit it to spectral analysis, sampling the sound wave at16,000 different places to obtain an aural fingerprint as it were.

An oboist could then perform a sonata which would be taped andeach note would be enhanced or altered to fit the spectral analysis of Mr.Mack's sound. As a result, the oboist's recording would contain her nu-ances but Mr. Mack's sound. But perhaps the sound engineer decidesto dispense with the oboist altogether. Since he has analyzed the sound,he can recreate it himself without the aid of an oboist. After samplingthree or four notes of an instrumentalist he can recreate the sounds ofthat performer and never hire him again.

The >sound< of many pop and rock groups is in fact the result ofsuch spectral analyses and enhancements. A group plays the notes andthe engineer creates the >sound.. . Part of whatyou are hired for is your sounds< (NEUMANN 1988:3).

According to WEISSMAN (1988) there have been instances wheremusicians were hired for a recording session but were asked to play only

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a few notes then sent home. Those players will never be hired again bythe studio because it owns their sounds now. This raises the question:what are the limits of ownership of the musician's sound?The answer to that technologically created question will be decidedin the courts in the near future. Several groups and performers havefiled suits alleging that their sounds have been stolen. To assess the ve-racity of such claims a programmer is hired to give expert testimony.He takes musical >fingerprints< by comparing spectral analyses of aperformer's sound and the sound of the group who is alleged to havestolen that performer's sound. Identical spectral analyses provide proofthat the sound was stolen.Once a musician can prove that his sound is stolen, he must gothrough the courts to find redress. At this point he encounters a fas-cinating legal question: is one's sound, one's musical or auditory iden-tity (McGIVERIN 1987) a form of property which cannot be stolen byothers? Some recent court decisions suggest some legal limits to thetechnological appropriation of one's auditory identity.In the case of Midler v. Ford Motor Co. an ad agency used anunknown singer to impersonate a famous singer. The judge ruled thatto impersonate a singer's voice >,is to pirate her identity.?< However, thelimitations of the ruling are also significant given our earlier distinctionbetween well known artists and support personnel. The judge ruled thatnot every use of sampling is subject to legal action. Only when the art-ist is well known can the artist claim that sampling has infringed uponhis or her identity. Hence, fame translates into a marketable identitywhich is then protected.In the meantime, according to one producer, >We're all blatantlystealing from everyone else. That's just the way it's done in the 80's


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J. FREDERICKSON, TECHNOLOGY & PERPORMANCE, IRASM (1989), 2, 193-220

Machine Technology: Making Music Together?Machine technology transforms traditional conventions of musicmaking by separating musicians from one another and treating them ascomponents. We have already described the social technology of musicalshows where musicians may be isolated in a sound studio. In one musicalthe conductor and the stage performers could observe one another onlyvia television monitors. This arrangement calls into question some of thefundamental conventions which define musical performances. Thesechanging conventions demonstrate that technology can make its greatestinroads into music when its aesthetic control in a given artworld is rel-atively weak. In contrast, when music has great aesthetic control withinan artworld, technology makes few inroads. For example, although the

singers of the Metropolitan Opera could perform an opera while observ-ing a televised image of the conductor, no such performance would takeplace since the presence of a live conductor is considered an essentialelement of the conventions of opera production, at least so far.When live presence of performers is not necessary, however, record-ing techniques can further the process of separating musicians from oneanother. The music for a radio or television advertisement, for example,is recorded according to rational principles of organization rather thantraditional aesthetic principles of music making. If the music for thecommercial involves strings, brass, woodwinds, piano, and drums, each ofthose groups of players will record individually. For example, the rhythmsection will record first, or, as they put it, >lay down a track.< Later inthe day the woodwinds will record their music while listening to a clicktrack and to the previous music recorded by the rhythm section. Thenthe strings will enter the studio to record their music in the same fashionand so the process continues. Instead of an interlocking web of musicalrelationships between performers listening to and responding to oneanother we have a series of layers of technologically connected relation-ships between performers listening to a click track and responding tothe pitch and rhythms of the previously recorded players. In this mu-sical artworld, musicians do not make music together as is customaryin other settings. They play with tapes but not with players who arefitting together and responding to one another. This change in musicmaking is taken one step further when we examine the impact of thesynthesizer and sampling.The reader may recall the example of a recording session where asingle player created the illusion of an orchestral performance throughthe use of synthesizers. He then linked all the parts together through acomputer. The image of a group of performers making music togetherdisappears. Yet the concept of musicians making music together disap-pears not only because one person plays all the parts on synthesizers,but because the human interaction which coordinates musical lines hasbecome transformed into a technological function, the MIDI. The MIDI,

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not a group of listening and cooperating musicians, electronically coor-dinates and unifies the sounds. Players are no longer members of aninteracting ensemble, but rather components in a technologically medi-ated system. Music making is no longer a form of communication betweenplayers but the result of computerized manipulation of sounds.The synthesizer encloses the individual within a non-echoing me-chanical universe in which he is alone, communicating only to his pre-viously recorded sounds, and to his machines. The separation betweenhimself and fellow musicians is complete. He becomes accustomed tocommunicating with machines. In place of musical dialogues, he performsin a perpetual monologue. Technology envelops him in solitude. Insteadof communicating with others, he 'interfaces' with a diskette. Complexityderives not from the interaction with numerous performers and theirideas, but from the accumulation of more diskettes and the musical linesthe synthesizer creates.While one might argue that the synthesizer is simply another in-strument which can play entire works much like the piano, we mustpoint out several key differences. The synthesizer creates the illusionof an orchestra. It substitutes a technological function for music making,sounds for artists, and technological time for musical time. It abstractstechnological components of music making and reconstitutes them. Butit does so at the cost of abstracting out the human relationships in whichmusic making has been traditionally embedded.

Machine Technology: The Musician and his EnvironmentMany have written about the impact technology has on the waysmen perceive the world around them. We have already examined howtechnology has changed our perception of what is live. Now we willbriefly explore the impact of the microphone and recording equipmenton auditory space, i. e. how we experience the space around us throughour ears. Auditory space has been praised by McLuhan as a space wheresound >fills the air


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presence of a room which speaks back to them. One musician claimed,>It's like you drop it (the sound) into a hole and it disappears.


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much technological manipulation in recording is precisely to create anillusion of reality. BOSANAC (1981) points out that >... when they aimat presenting as a part of that reality, the mass media offer just anillusion of objectivity... By means of various kinds of manipulation, theycontribute to the distortion of reality..Technology is able to analyze and reconstitute the musical perform-ance and thereby change how it is defined. As a result, this processalters the relationships between performers and listeners and the worldaround them, relationships which have been traditionally defined andlegitimized through aesthetics. To develop this last point we will shiftto a discussion of a concept drawn from music aesthetics: musical time.We hope to illustrate how musical time, an aesthetic concept rooted inan earlier symbolic universe, describes a type of relationship betweenman and the world. With the introduction of technology, musical timehas been superceded by technological time, and man's relationship totime and the world around him has changed as a result.

Musical Time and Technological TimeUp to this point we have observed how technology alters the tra-ditional aesthetic definitions of musical relationships. Now we will focuson the effect technology has on our experience of time in music. We hopeto illustrate several points: 1) one aspect of musical aesthetics, musicaltime, functions as a theory about how we experience time; 2) as a theoryabout the experience of time, it is rooted in a pre-technological symbolicuniverse and differs from technological time; and 3) as the technologicalsymbolic universe becomes dominant, aesthetic theories begin to shiftin response.We will focus on one aspect of musical aesthetics, musical time, toillustrate how one area of aesthetics defines man's mode of perception,his relationship to the world around him. As social conditions change,our relationship to and our mode of perception of the world change aswell. These changes are reflected in new musical aesthetics based on

technological values. Before we examine these changes, however, we needto explore how man has experienced time throughout history.For centuries, men lived without measuring time precisely. Timewas measured by needs and events. Life had been regulated accordingto psychological and biological tempos, nature's time, the rising and set-ting of the sun, the movement of the stars, the changes in the seasons.But with the development of the clock, time became abstracted from thenatural rhythms of life (MUMFORD 1934); it could be quantified andseparated from lived time.We are so accustomed to clock time that we have lost sight of itsimpact on our lives. Yet music allows us to observe the impact that tech-nology can have on lived time. Music is one of the few areas of life

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where we can still experience lived time unmediated by the clock. Acommonplace experience which demonstrates this simple fact is the occa-sion of listening to a piece of music and being surprised afterwards thatso much clock time had passed because our experiential time was sodifferent (ORLOV 1979).Musicians experience this conflict of lived time and clock time whenthey perform with a click track. Normally, the players shift tempos slight-ly in response to the conductor, fellow players, and the music. Theyshare an experience in time which varies and shifts subtly throughoutperformance. The indicated tempo of a work provides only a frameworkwithin which lived time occurs with all its fluctuations.The click track tempo, on the other hand, is an imposed clock timewhich does not vary according to the experiences of the players or inresponse to their interpretation of the organic processes of the work.The click track determines how time will be lived. Clock time eliminatesthe performer's role as an interpreter of experience. Players performingwith a click track experience something similar to what people on as-sembly lines experience: the loss of lived time. Notes must be producedat an unvarying speed preordained by a machine or else the player willhold up the rest of the musical assembly line. Movable time becomesimmovable (BRINER 1979).One musician referred to his work in the pit as being, >... just likean assembly line except it's a beat stream.< The player was implicitlyreferring to the differences between lived time and clock time. The paceof lived experience gives way to the pace of clock time. One might betempted to argue that this analogy is an exaggeration, but in key re-spects it is not. In both the assembly line and musical performances withthe click track, machinery determines the tempo. The assembly line work-er and the musician both must submit to technological time and workat the preordained pace. Objective time -machine time rules; not sub-jective or musical time. And in both cases the tempo is unvarying, predic-table, in contrast to normal musical experience.ZUCKERKANDL (1956:196) allows us to clarify the distinction be-tween musical and technological time. In a discussion of the role of theconductor, he observes that the conductor >>... begins with the tones,not before them.< That is, the conductor or performer decides a tempoby finding the tempo of the music in the notes, the way they sound, theeffect they have. He is not guided in advance by an abstract idea of themusic's tempo, but rather he is guided by his experience of the motionof the music, the time in the music. Rather than being imposed from theoutside, tempo is derived from musical events, inseparable from theirform and content, and ,.... is experienced as a natural flow arising fromthe intrinsic nature of the music< (PIKE 1970:18).The click track, on the other hand, creates a new aesthetic of musicmaking. Time is abstracted from its musical origins and imposed on themusic. The conductor with the click track begins not with the music,

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but, rather, before the music. He is not guided by an idea of musicalmotion nor by the time in the music, but, rather, by an idea of clockmotion, the time music must fit in: how long should this piece last?Rather than performers feeling the time within the music, the click trackputs time into the music. This represents a radical shift from the tra-ditional philosophy of tempo according to which tempo fluctuations aredetermined by the music's structure. (See, e.g. YESTON 1975.) Timewhich had always been discovered in relation to the structure of themusic becomes a technological function. In this sense, the click trackrepeats in music what the clock accomplished in society, >... the newtime substituted quantity for quality and automatism for the rhythmicpulse of the natural world< (RIFKIN 1987:86). The click track removestime from its musical origins and parcels it out in steady, predictablebeats.The click track also has an impact on musical time as it affects per-formers and listeners. SCHUTZ (1964; 1976; BERGMAN 1973) describedmusical time among performers as a shared time which differed fromthat of objectified clock time. According to SCHUTZ (1976:43), when theconductor raises his baton, listeners >>... are no longer involved in themaze of activities necessary to deal with men and things. They acceptthe guidance of music in order to relax their tension and to surrenderto its flux, a flux which is that of their stream of consciousness in inner--time.,< Musical time then is a shared intersubjective experience. In con-trast, the click track, or technological time would then represent anintrusion upon shared time of the performers. They can no longer re-spond to or share one another's sense of inner time. They can only sharethe experience of submitting to a time outside of them, clock time.As we can see, musical time is very different from technologicaltime. Musical time cannot be divided and measured. It is not a meresuccession of moments but rather an organic process which is in motion,always containing the past and generating the future rhythmic move-ment. It is a time which is active, full of past, present, and future time.It is a shared time, a time of >growing old together-< (SCHUTZ 1964). Itcontrasts with technological time which is static and empty, a series ofpoints which provides a means of measuring processes which take place>in


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notes but rather as a continous flux, a succession of states, each of whichinterpenetrate the other. From this perspective, musical time knows nodivision into equal parts; it is organic. Musical time is the content ofexperience.Technological time also differs from musical time because it meas-ures events whereas musical time produces events. To illustrate this, ZUC-KERKANDL (1956) uses the example of the half life of radioactive ma-terial. Suppose an object has a half life of 100 years. This half life is theresult of physical forces, not time. The physical forces take place withintechnological time, a time which is not the force at work.Musical time is different. The effect of rhythm in music is due notto the tones themselves but to their duration. >Because tones have du-ration, because time elapses in them, and for no other reason, we havethe rhythm of our music. Only time can be the agent and source of theforces active in meter and rhythm? (ZUCKERKANDL 1956:206). In con-trast to technology which abstracts time from the music, music revealsthat time cannot be separated from the forces that create rhythm. With-out tones there is no rhythm or time, without time there is no music.The agent and the acting force are inseparable.For the musician, musical time moves. When he hears meanings inmusic, he hears implications, incompleteness, direction, flowing, becoming,change, motion. For the performing musician, motion is immanent in themusical line. According to Ernest Kurth (HSU 1966:12-13), >. .. whatone calls the soul of an art can never consist of rigidly established exter-nal forms, but can only be felt as a flowing state; it cannot be thoughtof as a substance to be delineated, but rather as direction, motion, striv-ing.... the equality of hours is the equality of the distances traveledby clock hands; it is in the last analysis an equality of spaces not of times?.Musical time on the other hand holds that time cannot be dividedinto equal parts. In fact, ERICKSON (1963:178), in reference to musicaltime, suggests that >>... any music which takes as its point of departurethe belief that rhythms is more than the pounding of a trip hammer willbe likely to exploit this aspect of our time experience... the time of ourunclocked real existence.< Yet it was the introduction of a regular 'triphammer', the metronome, which called this unclocked real existence intoquestion.

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The Metronome vs. Musical TimeMusical time is not measured by the ticking of the clock but by the

unfolding of musical events as in lived time. Hence, musical time is sim-ilar to the pre-clock time concept in many cultures. In pre-clock cul-tures an individual when asked for the time will not respond with ?>oneo'clock< but will respond with what kind of time it is: the time to eat,the time to sleep, etc. When a musician is asked for the tempo of a workhe may respond, ,quarter note equals 132 beats per minute


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way. (DORIAN 1942:200). A composer who initially favored the objec-tivity of clock time began to realize that what would be lost would bemusical time, the capacity to find the right feeling. But in an age ofindustrialization and increased rationalization of production, musical val-ues began to shift accordingly favoring increased concern with objectivityin performance, accurate reproduction, synchronization, and precision.This greater concern for technological precision was expressed byLOMBARD (1897) who maintained that the metronome was indispensablefor the transmission of >exact< traditions. Not just traditions, but >exacttrueguardian of tempo traditions< he was redefining one of the most impor-tant elements of musical tradition - the role of the performer who de-rives the character of the time from the music itself. Furthermore, tra-dition would no longer be passed down in an aural tradition but throughobjective measurements. These comments reflect a shift to the new valueof clock time - precision. With the rise of values rooted in the ration-alization of production such as precision, the subjective interpreterwould become the objective reproducer.The influence of the worldwide rationalization of production wasimplied in SAINT-SAENS' (1922:124) remarks on the metronome. Wel-coming this machine's influence, he suggested that the Academie desSciences standardize, stamp, and approve metronomes ?... as in the casewith weights and measures.>Themetronomic scale is not borrow-ed from the measures of length peculiar to any one country, but isfounded on the division of time into minutes. The minute being thus,as it were, the element of the metronome scale, its divisions are therebyrendered intelligible and applicable in every country: an universal stand-ard measure for musical time is thus obtained, and its correctness maybe proved at all times by comparison with a stop-watch... Italy, Germany,France, and England applaud fully the author and inventor of the machinewhich will faithfully read all the intentions of the composers, where

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their productions will not be guessed at in the presence and in front ofthe public as it has often been done up to now.< The interpreter hasbeen impugned as a guesser rather than a faithful, accurate reproducer.Subjectivity is equated with inaccuracy and guesswork. But this critiqueis mild compared to Weber's. Upon first hearing of the metronome he issaid to have screamed, >,Do we want to mechanize our art?


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J. FREDERICKSON, TECHNOLOGY & PERFORMANCE, IRASM (1989), 2, 193-220 213

Technology and AestheticsAs we have illustrated, technology is radically changing the typesof social relations between the musician and the audience. That is because

technology can analyze each of the components of a given activity andthen reconstitute them. Technology can abstract a product from the hu-man relationships previously necessary for its production. Insofar as mu-sical performances become reconstituted through technology, these socialrelations disappear as well as the aesthetic definitions associated withthem. As a result, a technological aesthetics of music is evolving. Wewill now review a sample of writings which suggest the outlines of atechnological aesthetics of musical performance.Recent aesthetic judgements which state implicitly that the musicalobject is more important than the performance reflect an altered senseof the artwork. For instance, HOSOKAWA (1981:33) suggests that a suf-ficient musical experience may arise through recordings. He notes thatrepeated experiences are sometimes condemned as false whereas >... livedexperience is not necessarily a non-repeated experience.< He arguesthat by listening to a recording repeatedly, one may gain a new type ofmusical understanding of the artwork. While this is true, Hosokawa'sargument implies that gaining a fuller understanding of the artworkseparated from the performance is sufficient; awareness of and a rela-tionship to the performers is not necessary. He is legitimizing a newform of listening: listening to the music and not the performance. Withtechnology, the performance can be detached from the music. Hosokawa'sargument justifies that which technology achieves: the detachment ofmusic from performance. Traditionally, music and the relationships in-volved with its performance were inextricably intertwined. But throughtechnology these aspects are separated.Another writer who legitimizes the technological aesthetics of musicis JOSIPOVIC (1984). He suggests that the technological changes effectedon music are less drastic than some might suggest. As an example, hestates that ... a number of surveys have shown that regular concert-goers can receive the full experience of a work of art whether they per-ceive it at a concert or through a mass medium< (1984:50). To do so, hesays, requires only the listener's concentration. For JOSIPOVIC (1984)concentration, not proximity, is necessary. By his approach, he suggeststhat the musical experience is rooted not in the web of human relation-ships that comprise a performance, but in the musical object itself. Theaudience listens only to the musical work, not to the communicatingplayers. The music is separated from the act of communication by whichthat work is brought to life. Like HOSOKAWA (1981), he abstracts the

musical work from the rationships which create it. He thereby repeatsintellectually the technological abstraction of music from its setting, per-formance. An aesthetic position follows from social condition.



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This shift in the aesthetic definition of the musical object has accel-erated in recent years because recording technology has detached the mu-sical object from the external conditions necessary for its creation. KA-DEN (1984) refers to two types of listening which might be understoodas the aesthetic positions of the past and the present. In the past, listen-ing involved a concern with the inner meanings of the music as well as,. .. all the references of the musical event to the external world.... the film actor lacksthe opportunity of the stage actor to adjust to the audience during hisperformance, since he does not present his performance to the audiencein person. This permits the audience to take the position of a critic, with-out experiencing any personal contact with the actor. The audience'sidentification with the actor is really an identification with the camera.Consequently the audience takes the position of the camera; itsapproach is that of testing.inspector< as ELLUL(1964) puts it. The listener's role becomes technical rather than social.He measures sensory data as an observer rather than experiences mean-ings as a participant. Benjamin unwittingly extolled an alienated form ofmusic making.This narrowing of focus in listening is reflected in yet another area:the redefinition of the ear. Some (BALLANTINE 1984; BENJAMIN 1968;McLUHAN 1968) maintain that technology extends our comprehensionand frees us from our 'auditory prison'. They view the microphone asan extension of the ear. BALLANTINE (1984:126-127) quotes Vertov'shomage to the camera as a possible homage to the microphone: >I aman eye. I am a mechanical eye. I, the machine, show you a world the wayonly I can see it. I free myself for today and forever from human im-mobility. I am in constant movement. I approach and pull away fromobjects. I creep under them. I move alongside a running horse's mouth.I cut into a crowd in full speed. I run in front of running soldiers. Iturn over on my back. I soar with an aeroplane. I fall and rise with thefalling and rising bodies... Freed from the obligation of shooting 16 to17 frames per second, freed from the boundaries of time and space, Icoordinate any and all points of the universe, wherever I want them tobe. My way leads towards the creation of a fresh perception of the world.Thus I explain in a new way the world unknown to you.


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J. PREDERICKSON, TECHNOLOGY & PERFORMANCE, IRASM (1989), 2, 193-220 215when he describes how technology reduces >... a whole human beinginto a magnified eye, a magnified hand, a magnified finger, subordinatingevery other function to that whose province is enlarged*live- music are subtly conditioned by technology, when we considerthat performer-audience relationships are occasionally established pri-marily according to organizational rationality alone (as in some musicalshows described previously) - then the concept of technology as con-trolled extension falls apart. The free-lance classical musician removedfrom the hall into a sound studio, playing into a microphone, observingthe stage through a television monitor, hearing the audience's applausethrough loudspeaker monitors, while following a click track, poignantlyillustrates Marx's conclusion that men were becoming the appendagesof machines in a factory system. Perhaps anticipating these developments,MALZEL (1822:5), the inventor of the metronome, warned his readersthat >... one does not pretend that a skillful musician should play anentire piece with the metronome because all expression would be para-lyzed by such slavery.to pretend to fix a body of musicians to a pendulum,< yet technologyin certain musical settings does just that.Interestingly, some of these technological changes bring up old aes-thetic arguments. For instance, we are reminded of Wagner who felt thatvisible musicians interfered with auditory enjoyment. The question re-turns of whether the perfect performance is one without performers. Theemphasis is on the artwork, not on the performance. Hence, a reproducedartwork is sufficient for those who emphasize the artwork, but insufficientfor those who emphasize the live performance which is irreproducable.This abstraction of the performer from the performance takes placewhen a social technology allowing such abstraction prepares the wayfor machine technology. This social technology has developed over the pasttwo hundred years in the form of aesthetic arguments. Current aestheticarguments which view technology in utopian terms reflect values bywhich man is abstracted from his productions. In so doing, they reflectsocial conditions rather than analyze them.An approach to music aesthetics which suggests that musical ex-perience can be detached from musical performance without any signifi-cant loss intellectually rationalizes the technological abstraction of qualitiesfrom human experience. If time can be abstracted technologically, thenthat is considered better and more sensible than the previous arrangement.If time can be imposed by technique and therefore verified, the conceptof musical time which is perceived within the music by a musician be-comes less important. The musician who interprets musical time has beenreplaced by the clock which imposes technological time. Time becomes



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an abstract element which can be imposed from the outside. An exact,objectively measured quantity of time replaces an inexact, subjectivequality of time. If the performance can be abstracted out of musical ex-perience by means of technology then music is supposedly adequate whendetached from performance. If the quantity of sensory data can be in-creased, that is better than the quality of the listening relationship. Theseare aesthetic judgements which justify technological values and as suchthey dehumanize musical performance and ignore the inroads of technol-ogy on musical experience. Through technology, music can be removedfrom the web of human relationships in which it has been traditionallyrooted.

The human elements of music making can be abstracted and recon-stituted thereby eliminating the necessity of human interaction. This isgiving rise to a new aesthetics of music. >For the first time in history thehuman intermediary between the creator and the listener is voluntarilyexcluded from the domain of music, that intermediary whose frequentimperfections were, however, preferable to the inhuman perfection ofthe machine< (GOLEA 1954:198).

ConclusionWe have tried to illustrate some of the specific implications technology

poses to the traditional aesthetic definitions of musical performance. Thesedefinitions are radically transformed by advances in technology: 1) Theperformance need not be live; 2) the performer relates to the microphone,not to an audience; the audience relates to a machine, not a performer;4) musical time is replaced by clock time; 5) the 'aura' of the musician,his sound, becomes transformed into electronic information; the artist'sunique voice becomes a universal possession; 6) the act of making musictogether (SCHUTZ 1956) becomes transformed into an electronic functionof a computer track which coordinates all the other tracks; 7) technologysimulates live music so well that the simulated reality often becomes thenew definition of reality music.We have also analyzed an area of aesthetics, musical time, as alegitimation of a significant construction of reality in modern society.Within this perspective, the arts are considered as . . . institutionalizedprocedures for systematically realizing the intrinsic values? of a society(MARTINDALE 1978:275). Aesthetics can be understood as a theory ofhow man experiences the world. Without examining the scientific >>proof?


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J. FREDERICKSON, TECHNOLOGY & PERFORMANCE, IRASM (1989), 2, 193-220 217However, the rise of a technological order requiring the mechanizationof human activity generates a rationale, an aesthetic, for the new order.The sociology of technology has explored two major themes: 1) the me-

chanization of human activity; and 2) the conditioning of people throughtechnology. In this paper we have argued that technology conditions themode of perception by which music is experienced. In response to thetransformation of musical experience, aesthetics has shifted to a rationalefor a technologically mediated musical experience. The ends (aestheticdefinitions of music) shift to accomodate the means (technology). We wouldagree with WINNER (1977:202) that .... we do not use technologies somuch as live them.< New technologies are transforming the lived experi-ence of music. And by transforming the performer's and the listener'srelationship to music, technology changes man's relationship to the worldaround him.

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SaSetakTEHNOLOGIJA I GLAZBENA IZVEDBA U RAZDOBLJUMEHANICKE REPRODUKCIJE

Uvodenje tehnologije u glalzbenu izvedbu transformira tradicionalne estetickedefinicije glazbenoig iskus'tva. Kad jednom drustvena tehnologija dopusti odvaja-nje pojedinca od ,izvedbe strojna tehnologija moze do vrsiti proces odvajanja. Ovajproces transformira tradicionalne estetil,ke definicije o to.me stol uspos tavlja zivoglazbeno iskustvo: odnos izvoditelja i publike, odnos spram vlastitoga zvuka i 'ima-gea', odnos spram drugih glazbenika s Ikojiima zajedno muziicira, odnos spram vla-stitog uha i okoline, te odnos spraim vremena. Rasprava o glazbenom vremenupokazuje kako estetika moize funkci,onirati kao teorija iskustva utemeljiena unutarsimbolickog svijeta. Nadalje, kako tehnoloski simbolicki svijet postaje dominan-tan \mozemo promatrati paralelni poimak u estetilckim teorijama.

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Frederickson-Technology and Music Performance in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction