Framework for Climate Migration

Readiness for Fiji for Relocation of

Pacific Islanders to Fiji

Nilesh Nirvaan Bilimoria PGDTT, PGDCC, LLB, PDLP, LLM, GDLP

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Law Queensland University of Technology

2020

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Keywords

Climate Change-induced Human Mobility, Climate Migration Readiness, Criteria for

Readiness, Cross-border Relocation, Displacement, Forced Resettlement, Human Rights-

based Approach, Pacific Islanders, Planned Relocation, Relocation Guidelines, Readiness,

Sovereign Borders

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Abstract

The central question in this thesis asks how ready is the Fijian Government to respond to

climate-induced cross-border relocation of the Pacific Island communities from Kiribati and

Tuvalu to Fiji? This investigation stems from the announcement by the Fijian Government,

delivered at the Paris UN climate conference in 2015, that it would provide a permanent home

to its Pacific neighbours disproportionately affected by the debilitating impacts of climate

change. The announcement brings to the fore questions about the readiness of Fiji, which the

thesis aims to explore and analyse.

To determine the readiness of the Fijian Government, this thesis employs multiple layers of

analysis from three main sources. This study employs doctrinal analysis of the experiences

and lessons learned from the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders and multidisciplinary

literature on readiness to identify a host of determinants across legal, operational and

procedural dimensions. This study also analyses empirical evidence obtained through semi-

structured field interviews with state and non-state actors in Fiji and shows that readiness

spanning legal, policy and institutional arrangements is inadequate. The empirical evidence

also draws upon participants’ perspectives of what it means to be ready in the Fiji context. The

analysis reveals further requirements for readiness in Fiji, including the availability of land for

relocation, citizenship and nationality status determination, funding and the sovereignty of

states, among other factors identified in this study.

This thesis synthesises and analyses the different sources of data to conceptualise and

articulate a set of criteria for readiness that has not been explained elsewhere in the literature.

These criteria are then applied as an analytical framework to appraise Fiji’s readiness,

analysing the empirical evidence gathered in the research. This thesis shows that Fiji is not

ready to receive and relocate Pacific Islanders in the context of climate change. Moreover, this

thesis identifies an array of determinants extrapolated from the sources of data as a starting

point to guide decision-makers in the development of a framework for climate migration

readiness. This thesis also identifies within existing laws where possible reform is needed. The

set of criteria and determinants represent a significant original contribution to the existing

knowledge on readiness studies, and more specifically in the Fiji context.

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Table of Contents

Keywords……………………………………………………………………………………...1 Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………...….2 Table of Contents……..………………………………………………………………………3 List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………………….5 Statement of Original Authorship………………………………………………………….…7 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………...8 Chapter One: Introduction ………………………………………………………………..9 1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..9 1.2 Contextual Background …….………………………………………………………15 1.3 Gaps in the Literature……………………………………………………………….19 1.4 Research Objectives ……………………………………………………………..…26 1.5 Research Questions…………………………………………………….…………...27 1.6 Methodology ……………………………………………….………………………28 1.7 Research Significance ………………………………………………...……………29 1.8 Interpretation of Terms……………………………………………………………...30 1.9 Outline of Chapters...……………………………………………………….………32 Chapter Two: Methodological Approach and Research Design...………………………35 2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………35 2.2 Research Paradigm….……………….……………………………...………………35 2.3 Research Methodology………………………………………………………….…..36 2.4 Research Design…………………………………………………………………….39 2.5 Research Limitations………………………………………………………………..50 2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..52 Chapter Three: Human Mobility of Climate Vulnerable Populations of Pacific Island Nations and International Arrangements under International Law……………………53 3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………53 3.2 Brief Synopsis for Investigation…………………………………………………….54 3.3 Scientific Basis of Climate Change…………………………………………............56 3.3.1 Scientific Climate Evidence………………………………………………………...56 3.3.2 Food Insecurity and Future Livelihoods……………………………………………59 3.4 Climate-induced Displacement and Migration Outlook and Planned Relocation….61 3.4.1 Susceptibility to Environmental Change……………………………………………61 3.4.2 Compounding Migration Perceptions………………………………………………65 3.4.3 Adaptation Strategy of Last Resort…………………………………………………68 3.4.4 Magnitude of Human Mobility……………………………………………………..74 3.4.5 Snapshot of Future Mobility Planned Relocation…………………………………..78 3.4.6 Determinants of Planned Relocation………………………………………………..81 3.5 Climate Displacement and Migration under International Law…………………….91 3.5.1 Global Mobility Dynamics………………………………………………………….91 3.5.2 Legal Protection Gap………………………………………………………………..91 3.5.3 Gap in Terminology………………………………………………………………...93 3.5.4 International and Regional Climate Treaty…………………………………………99 3.5.5 Soft Law Mechanisms……………………………………………………………..105 3.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………110

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Chapter Four: Historical Resettlement in the Pacific Islands Region ………………..112 4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..112 4.2 Case Studies of the Banabans, Vaitupuans, Gilbertese and the Carteret Islanders..117 4.3 Lessons Learned about Mobility of Pacific Islanders……………………………..131 4.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………134 Chapter Five: Readiness–A Multidisciplinary Perspective.…………………………....135 5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..135 5.2 Disaster Preparedness …………….……………………………………………….136 5.3 Climate Finance Readiness...……………………………………………………...144 5.4 International Humanitarian Assistance Preparedness…..........................................152 5.5 Public Health Preparedness………………………………………………………..161 5.6 REDD+ Readiness…………………………………………………………………170 5.7 Readiness Literature Elements and Considerations ………………………………181 5.8 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………185 Chapter Six: Readiness–Insights from Empirical Evidence…..……………………….187 6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..187 6.2 Internal Relocation Experiences and Lessons …...………………………………..188 6.3 Readiness of the Fijian Government……………………………………………....195 6.4 Legal Readiness of the Fijian Government ……………………………………….197 6.5 Cross-border Relocation to Fiji …………………………………………………...201 6.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………226 Chapter Seven: Analysis of the Fijian Government’s Readiness………………………229 7.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..229 7.2 Multifaceted Determinants ………………………………………………………..230 7.3 Criteria for Analysing Readiness.............................................................................234 7.4 Importance of Criteria…………….…………………………………………….....245 7.5 Readiness of the Fijian Government………………...…………………………….248 7.6 Reform Perspective and Direction for Framework………………………………..257 7.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………262 Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Directions for Future…………………………………265 8.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..265 8.2 Summary of Key Findings………………………………………………………...265 8.3 General and Specific Contributions……………………………………………….270 8.4 Limitations of the Study and Future Directions...…………………………………271 8.5 Overall Conclusion………………………………………………………………...275 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….277

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List of Abbreviations

Description Abbreviation Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS

Asian Development Bank ADB

Climate Finance Readiness CFR

Conference of Parties COP

Convention on Biological Diversity CBD

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Refugee Convention

Emergency Management EM

Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ

Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Safeguard Policies FCPF Safeguards

Framework Convention on Climate Change Cancun

Adaptation Framework Cancun Adaptation

Framework

Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific 2017-2030 FRDP

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration Compact for Migration

Green Climate Fund GCF

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement UN Guiding Principles

Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 Hyogo Framework

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC

International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance IDRL Guidelines

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre iDMC

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies IFRC

International Finance Corporation IFC

International Humanitarian Assistance IHA

International Labour Organisation ILO

International Law Commission ILC

International Organisation for Migration IOM

Least Developing Countries LDCs

Legal Preparedness LP

Measurement, Reporting and Verifications MRV

Millennium Development Goals MDGs

National Accredited Entity NAE

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National Climate Funds NCF

Official Development Assistance ODA

Pacific Climate Change Migration Project PCCM

Pacific Climate Change Treaty Model Treaty

Pacific Community SPC

Pacific Conference of Churches PCC

Pacific Island Countries PICs

Pacific Islands Climate Action Network PICAN

Pacific Island Development Forum PIDF

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat PIFS

Paris Climate Change Agreement Paris Agreement

Principle of Equitable Sharing of Benefits ESB

Principle of Free, Prior And Informed Consent FPIC

Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees Protocol to the Refugee

Convention

Public Health PH

Public Health Emergency Preparedness PHEP

Public Health Preparedness PHP

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest

Degradation REDD

Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme SPREP

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 SFDRR

Small Island Developing States SIDS

UN Collaborative Programme on REDD UN-REDD Programme

UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples UNDRIP

United Nations UN

United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea UNCLOS

United Nations Development Programme UNDP

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia

and the Pacific UNESCAP

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNISDR

University of the South Pacific USP

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Statement of Original Authorship

QUT Verified Signature

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank the spirits of the land and the divine source of energy

for providing strength for the completion of my thesis. I would also like to thank the

administration of the Queensland University of Technology in granting the scholarship award

[QUT Postgraduate Award (QUTPRA)] to undertake my studies, as I had been making

numerous attempts to secure a scholarship award through various scholarship schemes by

different institutions at different countries in previous years. Thank you.

My sincere and heartfelt gratitude extends to my supervisory team consisting of Dr Bridget

Mary Lewis, as my principal supervisor and Dr Rowena Grace Maguire, as my associate

supervisor. My supervisory team was invested in my project from the outset of the proposal

stage. Thank you for your copious support in this journey. I would also like to acknowledge

Professor Reece Albert Walters, who spent the first twelve months as an associate supervisor

with the supervisory team towards my project. To Bridget, Rowena and Reece, my prayers to

the Almighty, will always be with you. Thank you.

Alongside, the supervisory team, my gratitude extends to Professor Belinda Carpenter,

associate Dean of Research (faculty of law), for her leadership towards the circumstances of

my journey. And, how can I forget her fantastic administration student support staff since my

journey began. They included Leana Sanders, Ilana Bolingford, Catherine Mackenzie and

Mayuko Bock. Thank you for your swift responses to my emails and the assistance you

provided.

I wish to also extend my gratitude to Professor Jennifer Corrin, director Centre for Public,

International and Comparative Law at The University of Queensland. Jennifer, you have been

the pillar of encouragement for many years. My sincere thanks also goes to Dr Evan Vaughan

Hamman at the Queensland University of Technology for his availability for our conversations

on my project. I extend my gratitude to Dr Fiona Bucknall (www.thethesisdoctor.com.au) for

her copious care in copyediting and proofreading my thesis. Thank you, Fiona, for

accommodating my request and you have been fantastic. For my interview participants, thank

you for your time and testimonies you shared during my field research.

Lastly, I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Heena Bilimoria. Heena without your emotional

support over many years and just not limited to my present studies, I would not have reached

here. Thank you. Together the end of this journey opens a new chapter of our lives we can

share that lies ahead.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Declining human security exacerbated by the accelerating global effects of climate change,

particularly for Pacific Island nations, is projected to cause unprecedented human population

movement across international borders in the twenty-first century. The contribution from the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Groups I, II and III to the special report

on global warming released in 2018 (Special Report 1.5 0C) reports that ‘[g]lobal warming is

likely to reach 1.5 0C between 2030 and 2052’ if concerted global climate action is not

accelerated by state parties to the Paris climate accord.1 The Special Report 1.5 0C further

reports that ‘[s]mall islands are projected to experience multiple inter-related risks at 1.5 0C

and 2 0C of coastal flooding and impacts on population, infrastructure and assets, freshwater

stress, and risks across marine ecosystems, limiting adaptation opportunities, and migration

internally and internationally owing to sea level rise.’2 Similarly, the findings of the first

household regional survey conducted in Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru into climate change

migration in 2015 presented at the Pacific Climate Change Migration Project (PCCM) at the

twenty-first climate change conference of parties in Paris in 2015 (COP 21) revealed that more

than 70 per cent, 70 per cent and 35 per cent of households respectively, believed that

migration was a necessary response to climate change impacts such as worsening droughts and

floods or increased rising sea levels.3

1 Myles R Allen et al, ‘IPCC: Global Warming of 1.5°C - Summary for Policymakers’ in Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al (eds), ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C - An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018) 6. 2 Ove Hoegh-Guldbery et al, ‘Impacts of 1.50C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems’ in Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al (eds), ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C - An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018) 181. 3 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Pacific Climate Change Migration Project’ (Research Survey Fact Sheet, European Union, International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Development Program, 2015) 2 (‘PCCM Fact Sheet’).

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The global climate trajectory identifies the need for significant consideration of cross-border

population movement of climate-vulnerable populations in the not too distant future.4 This

means that receiving states need to be ready to manage legal, policy, institutional, geopolitical,

socio-economic and cultural dimensions as well as cross-jurisdictional issues, such as

statehood and the sovereignty of states to effectively facilitate and implement all phases of

large-scale human population cross-border relocation.5 This presents a conundrum,

particularly for Fiji, in opening its border to its Pacific island neighbours for relocation in

response to climate change.6 The focus on Fiji and the need for further exploration of its state

of ‘readiness’ stems from the announcement delivered at the COP 21 by the Fijian Government

that it would permanently accommodate the populations of the atoll island nations of Kiribati

and Tuvalu disproportionately affected by the effects of climate change.7

There is a growing body of literature peppered with references to readiness and preparedness

spanning multiple fields of study.8 However, a precise interpretation of the phenomenon of

readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility is undetermined.

Contributors to this body of knowledge, which includes significant field research, have

directed little attention to examining readiness specifically within the context of climate

4 Bruce Burson and Richard Bedford, ‘Facilitating Voluntary Adaptive Migration in the Pacific’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 54–5. See also Jane McAdam and Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate: Unpacking the Legal and Conceptual Issues’ (2015) 4(1) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 137–166; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Lessons from Planned Relocation and Resettlement in the Past’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 30–2. See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC-Paris COP 21: Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility November 2015’ (Research Report, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, November 2015) 3; see also Climate and Development Knowledge Network, ‘The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report: What’s in it for Small Island Developing States?’ (Research Report, Overseas Development Institute and Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014) 16–17 (‘CDKN Report’). 5 See above n 4 and accompanying text. 6 Burson, above n 4 and accompanying text. 7 Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, ‘Fiji’s Statement at the COP-21 United Nations Conference On Climate Change’ (Speech delivered at the Leaders Event at the Paris Climate Conference – COP 21/CMP 11, Paris, 30 November 2015) < http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_fiji.pdf>; see also Richard Black et al, ‘Migration, Immobility and Displacement Outcomes Following Extreme Events’ (2013) 27S Environmental Science and Policy S32, S40. 8 Lorenzo Guadagno, ‘Human Mobility in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (2016) 7(1) International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 30–40; see also Jale Samuwai and Jeremy Maxwell Hills, ‘Assessing Climate Finance Readiness in the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2018) 10(4) Sustainability 1192–1209; see also Kirsten Nakjavani Bookmiller, ‘Professional Standards and Legal Standard Setting: INSARAG, FMT, and International Disaster Volunteers’ (2015) 48(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 957–84. See also Anthony D Moulton et al, ‘What is Public Health Legal Preparedness?’ (2003) 31(4) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 672–83; see also Malayna Raftopoulos, ‘REDD+ and Human Rights: Addressing the Urgent Need for a Full Community-based Human Rights Impact Assessment’ (2016) 20(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 509–30.

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change-induced human mobility.9 To address this gap in the literature, this thesis employs

multifaceted doctrinal analysis, synthesis of the multidisciplinary literature and empirical

evidence generated in this study to articulate a set of criteria for analysing readiness for climate

change-induced human mobility. This set of criteria is then used as an analytical framework

to appraise Fiji’s readiness to receive Pacific Islanders. This thesis also identifies some key

areas within existing laws where reform may be needed. Furthermore, the thesis identifies

overarching determinants as first steps to guide the direction of a broad framework spanning

legal, social, cultural, economic and political dimensions. The investigation undertaken in the

thesis using multiple lines of scientific evidence and the body of knowledge on human mobility

stemming from sudden- and slow-onset environmental change is threefold. First, this thesis

examines the existing legal assistance and protection arrangements under international law for

population movements in the context of climate change. In acknowledging the existing ad hoc

and non-binding international instruments and normative frameworks, this thesis argues that a

comprehensive framework specifically tailored to climate change-induced human mobility is

underdeveloped.10

Second, this thesis investigates the policy, institutional and legal arrangements advanced by

the Fijian Government to facilitate large-scale climate change-induced mobility of

communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. The long-term habitability of Pacific Island

nations may sever from the future impacts of climate change which supports the inquiry into

the arrangements of the Fijian government.11 To determine whether the Fijian Government is

ready for climate change-induced human mobility, this thesis uncovers the determinants for

what it means to be ready from various sources of data. The sources of data encompass: case

studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders; the phenomenon of readiness from

multidisciplinary perspectives and the findings recorded in the field research conducted with

eighteen participants (n = 18) in Fiji. These are discussed in chapters four, five and six. The

determinants from the sources of data are synthesised and analysed to identify the criteria for

readiness. The analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the criteria is further determined by using

data from field interviews. This thesis establishes that the underlying arrangements understood

as readiness for all phases of large-scale climate change-induced mobility of communities

from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji is lacking (program, policy, guidelines and laws, for example)

9 See above n 8 and accompanying text. 10 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 1–8; see also Bart W. Edes, Francois Gemenne, Jonathan Hill and Diana Reckien, ‘Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific’ (Research Report, Asian Development Bank, March 2012) 55–8 (‘ADB Report’). 11 John Campbell and Olivia Warrick, Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2014) 2–10.

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by the Fijian Government. This thesis argues that sustained funding, preservation of cultural

identity, inclusiveness and participation of communities in decision-making, and the allocation

of suitable land for relocation, for example, are determinants that demand concerted and

nuanced consideration as a starting point to facilitate and implement all phases of large-scale

relocation of communities across sovereign borders from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji.12

Moreover, this thesis identifies overarching determinants as a starting point to guide the Fijian

Government in crafting a framework that spans legal, social, cultural, economic and political

dimensions. This thesis does not limit its analysis to narrowly construed legal domains of

immigration, citizenship, land rights, social security and administrative decision-making

typically associated with migration matters.13 Instead, it adopts a broad focus to consider a

wider range of social, cultural, economic and political dimensions that interact with the legal

structures and processes to influence the degree of readiness.14 This reinforces the need for a

wide-ranging set of determinants in determining a framework for readiness. The framework

informs a tool and provides impetus for decision- and policy-makers to design well-rounded

policies, plans, programs, guidelines and standards of all phases of climate change-induced

human mobility. Finally, this thesis provides a brief overview of the key areas for reform

within the existing laws.

There is a considerable body of literature on human resettlement in the context of development

projects, including numerous empirical studies on the historical migration and relocation of

Pacific Island communities in the Pacific. This literature documents the existing experiences

12 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 152, 163; see also Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Planned Relocation and Climate Change’ (Policy Brief Report No 8, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 31–5. 13 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; ibid 137–166; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Under Two Jurisdictions: Immigration, Citizenship, and Self-governance in Cross-border Community Relocations’ (2016) 34(2) Law and History Review 282, 282–333. See also David Fisher, ‘Regulating the Helping Hand: Improving Legal Preparedness for Cross-border Disaster Medicine’ (2010) 25(3) Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 208, 210; see also International Organization for Migration, CADRI Capacity Assessment and Planning Tool for Disaster Risk Management: Human Mobility The CaDRi Partnership < https://www.cadri.net/en/cadri-tool-en> click “Human Mobility”. 14 McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; see also Jane McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’ (2016) 39(4) The University of New South Wales Law Journal 1518, 1518–46; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. See also The Nansen Initiative, ‘The Nansen Initiative: Disaster-induced Cross-border Displacement, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change Volume 1’ (The Nansen Initiative, December 2015) 6–10 (‘Protection Agenda Volume 1’); see also ADB Report, above n 10, 47–9; see also Black et al, above n 7, S32-S43. See also Frank Vanclay et al, ‘Social Impact Assessment: Guidance for Assessing and Managing the Social Impacts of Projects’ (Guidance Note, International Association for Impact Assessment, April 2015) iv, v.

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and lessons learned.15 This body of knowledge underpins planned relocation (sometimes

equated with ‘managed relocation’, ‘voluntary adaptive migration’ or ‘government-led

relocation’) from non-climatic and climatic determinants.16 The research to date has tended to

focus on planned relocation but has not dealt with what it means to be ready for large-scale

relocation of communities across sovereign borders as a result of climate change.17 Because

the phenomenon of readiness in relation to climate change has not been explained elsewhere

in the literature, fresh questions need to be asked. First: What are the criteria for readiness in

the context of climate change-induced human mobility? Second: What pragmatic

arrangements, mechanisms and measures need to be developed by the host country Fiji, with

acute economies of scale and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, to open its

sovereign borders to relocate Pacific island neighbours permanently to Fiji? This thesis

establishes the need for a broad inquiry as to what it means to be ready. The researcher

acknowledges that this thesis is not specifically designed to consider the change in future

political leadership in Fiji including the merits of the announcement to relocate Pacific island

communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. This limitation means that caution must be

applied, as the study findings into readiness might not be transferrable under a new

administration by the Fijian government in the future.

Both Kiribati and Tuvalu, as countries of origin cited for permanent relocation to Fiji, have

actively taken ownership to independently manage the risks of climate change in their

communities already.18 Kiribati’s national policy on migration with dignity is a key example

as a starting point. This policy, through a series of initiatives, programs, and activities, provides

‘a long-term merits-based mobility strategy that embraces education and vocational training

to make Kiribati citizens competitive and marketable in international markets.’19 However, the

policy has been scaled-down through the introduction of the Kiribati 20-Year Vision (KV20)

2016–2036.20 The KV20 is a national policy in present times developed in an attempt to

15 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Walter Kalin, ‘Results from Nansen Initiative Regional Consultation to Date’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 24–9. 16 Scott Leckie, ‘Human Displacement’ (Policy Brief No 8, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 26, 28; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 4, 54–5; see McAdam and Elizabeth Ferris, above n 4, 137–66. 17 See above n 16 and accompanying text; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 142; see also ‘climate change may induce migration from a large number of Pacific island countries and territories and from a broad range of environmental settings’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 19. 18 Jane McAdam, ‘Climate Change-related Displacement of Persons’ in Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard G Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 534; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1544. 19 McAdam, ‘Climate Change-related Displacement of Persons’, above n 18. 20 Office of Te Beretitenti Republic of Kiribati, Kiribati 20-Year Vision (KV20) <http://www.president.gov.ki/kiribati-20-year-vision-kv20/> (‘KV20’); see also Office of Te

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alleviate the risks of climate change by ‘mainstreaming climate change adaptation and

mitigation into development programming for sustainable development’ and livelihoods of I-

Kiribati citizens.21 The Tuvalu Government has been similarly proactive on behalf of its

citizens. At the seventy-first session of the UN General Assembly it submitted a ‘UN

Resolution on the establishment of a legal process’ for the long-term security and human rights

protection and assistance for the climate-vulnerable populations of Tuvalu.22 Despite a lack of

financial resources, the government has also established the Tuvalu Climate Change Survival

Fund as a local mechanism to manage climate change impacts.23 In establishing measures to

respond to climate change adaptation and mitigation through its nationally determined

contributions prescribed by the Paris Agreement, the Tuvalu Government has pointed out that

‘they have a right to pursue any and all means to ensure their nation survives and the legacy

remains, with future generations living productive lives on these islands.’24 Both Kiribati and

Tuvalu have established long-standing foreign policies on regional cooperation partnerships

advanced by Australia and New Zealand through seasonal labour programs and educational

schemes as prospective routes by which to seek migration in the future.25 The scale of

progressive action undertaken by both island nations demonstrates their resolution to address

the risks of climate change independently. The motivation of the Fijian prime minister to

deliver the announcement at the COP 21 lies beyond the scope of this study, and suffice to

say, the announcement has been made and what it means to be ready for climate change-

induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji remains undetermined.26 The researcher

Beretitenti Republic of Kiribati, Tobwaan Ao Karikirakean Kiribati: Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2016-2036, 9, 56 <http://www.president.gov.ki/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/kiribati-20-year-vision-2016-2036%E2%80%A2sept.final_.pdf> (‘Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2016-2036’); see also Elenoa Turagaiviu, ‘Kiribati Government will not relocate its people to Fiji’ (Media Release, 22 October 2019) <https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/news/kiribati-government-will-not-relocate-its-people-to-fiji/>; see also Ben Walker, ‘An Island Nation Turns Away from Climate Migration, Despite Rising Seas’ (Media Release, 20 November 2017) <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20112017/kiribati-climate-change-refugees-migration-pacific-islands-sea-level-rise-coconuts-tourism>; 21 See above n 20 and accompanying text. 22 Sopoanga, Enele Sosene, ‘Tuvalu’ (Speech delivered at the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2016) para 8; see also Sopoanga, Enele Sosene, ‘Tuvalu’ (Speech delivered at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 21 September 2017) paras 25 and 26. 23 Sopoanga, ‘Tuvalu’ (2016), above n 22 para 27. 24 Government of Tuvalu, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (27 November 2015) 9 <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tuvalu%20First/TUVALU%20INDC.pdf>. 25 Milla Emilia Vaha, ‘Hosting the Small Island Developing States: Two Scenarios’ (2018) 10(2) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 229, 230; see also Justin T. Locke, ‘Climate Change-induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and Long-term Developments’ (2009) 175(3) The Geographical Journal 171, 177–9; see also Harriet Farquhar, ‘Migration with Dignity: Towards a New Zealand Response to Climate Change Displacement in the Pacific’ (2016) 19 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research 29, 29–55. 26 ‘I (Epeli Nailatikau-President of Fiji) want to assure you all that Fiji will stand shoulder with you (Kiribati)…Today I repeat what our Prime Minister told the world at the recent Pacific Islands

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acknowledges the potential variance in future political leadership of national governments in

Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu and making dormant representations for climate change-induced

mobility of Pacific island communities in the future.27 Caution must be applied to the

generalisability of the study findings.

In summary, this introductory chapter sets out the background and context of research, details

the significance of the study and identifies the gaps in the literature before presenting the

research objectives, research questions and the research design adopted to respond to the

research questions posed in the study. The introduction chapter concludes with an outline of

the remaining chapters of the thesis.

1.2 Contextual Background

Climate Change Trajectory and Island Communities

The global scientific evidence related to climate change established through the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirms that ‘warming of the climate

system is unequivocal.’28 Among the findings reported by the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report

conference on conservation and protected areas. If sea level continues to rise because the international community won’t tackle global warming, some or all of the people of Kiribati may have to some and live and Fiji. Fiji will not turn its back on our neighbours in their hour of need…’ as cited in Epeli Nailatikau, ‘His Excellency Ratu Epeli Nailatikau-Address at State Dinner Hosted by the President & First Lady of Kiribati’ (Speech delivered at the State dinner hosted by the President & First Lady of Kiribati), Tarawa-Kiribati, 10 February 2014) < https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Centre/Speeches/HIS-EXCELLENCY--ADDRESS-AT-STATE-DINNER-HOSTED-BY->; see also Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, ‘Prime Minister’s Closing Speech of the 9th Pacific Islands Conference on Conservation and Protected Areas’ (Speech delivered at the Pacific Islands Conference on Conservation and Protected Areas, Suva–Fiji, 6 December 2013) < https://www.sprep.org/news/prime-ministers-closing-speech-9th-pacific-islands-conference-conservation-and-protected-areas>. 27 See above n 20 and accompanying text; see also Sosene, above n 22 and accompanying text. 28 Thomas F Stocker et al, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 8–14 (SPM B - E, 4, Chps 1, 8); see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 16–17; see also ‘A Special IPCC Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.50C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pathways is to be Released in 2018. Two other special reports are also to be released in 2019, one on Climate Change, Oceans and the Cryosphere as well as a special report on Climate Change Decertification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land Management, Food Security and Greenhouse Gas Influxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems’ as cited in Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, ‘Pacific Islanders Encouraged to help Develop IPCC Climate Change Science Reports’ (Media Release, 12 November 2016) <http://www.sprep.org/climate-change/pacific-islanders-encouraged-to-help-develop-ipcc-climate-change-science-reports>; (‘Pacific Community 1.50C’); see also ‘The science will confirm that we do need 1.5 to stay alive, it will confirm what our Small island and Pacific Islands have been saying all along that yes, we need to make it happen’ as cited in Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, ‘1.5 to stay alive to be supported by IPCC Report’ (Media

16

(IPCC AR5), one of the more significant findings of the Working Group I (AR5 WG 1)

confirmed that ‘global mean surface temperatures for the period 2081-2100 (relative to 1986-

2005)’ are projected to rise from 0.30C-1.70C under the lowest emissions scenario to 2.60C-

4.80C under the highest emissions scenario.29 In reinforcing the existing findings, the Special

Report 1.5 0C, as highlighted earlier, maintains that global warming of 1.50C between 2030

and 2052 is imminent unless ‘rapid and far-reaching transitions in land, energy, industry,

buildings, transport, and cities’ are significantly advanced to limit anthropogenic greenhouse

gas (GHG) emissions.30

The implications of existing GHG emission pathways accelerating, particularly for Pacific

Island nations as reported by the IPCC, are detailed in two stages. Under the lower emissions

scenario, the impacts of climate change will threaten natural systems in Pacific Island

communities and result in ‘risk of loss of marine and coastal ecosystems, biodiversity and the

ecosystem goods, functions and services they provide for coastal livelihoods.’31 Under the

higher emissions scenario, the impacts will ‘increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive and

irreversible impacts to which it will be difficult to adapt, such as disrupted livelihoods due to

storm surges, coastal flooding and sea level rise.’32 A further strand of scientific evidence from

the IPCC delineates that the existing anthropogenic GHG emission pathways are ‘projected to

increase displacement of people’, particularly Pacific island populations, where the ‘majority

of human communities and infrastructure is located in coastal zones with limited on-island

relocation.’33 The impacts of climate change on Pacific Island communities include sea level

rise, coastal erosion, storm surges and groundwater salinity. These impacts are formidable and

will potentially necessitate the internal relocation of coastal communities, or alternatively,

relocation across international borders as an adaptive response of last resort.34 In addition to

the documented human mobility of Pacific Island communities in the Pacific from climatic

Release, 9 November 2016) <http://www.sprep.org/climate-change/q15-to-stay-aliveq-to-be-supported-by-ipcc-report>. 29 Stocker et al, above n 28, 20 [SPM-E1]; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 6, 10–11. 30 Allen, R. Myles, et al, above n 1, 14, 17; see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.50C Approved by Government’ (Media Release, 24/PR, 8 October 2018) 2. 31 Leonard A Nurse et al, ‘Small Islands’ in Vicente R Barros (ed), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part B: Regional Aspects (Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 39; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 10. 32 See above n 31 and accompanying text. 33 Rajendra K Pachauri et al, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers (Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Switzerland, 2015) 16 (SPM 2.3); see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1619. 34 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618.

17

and non-climatic factors in the past, preliminary empirical studies conducted by seminal

authors such as McAdam, Barnett and Webber, Campbell and Warrick, Donner, Edwards,

McNamara, and Nunn substantiate assertions advanced by the IPCC on the internal relocation

of coastline communities inland.35

The Fijian Announcement

In 2015, at the twenty-first session of the Conference of Parties (COP 21) held under the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, the Fijian Prime

Minister Voreqe Bainimarama delivered the ground-breaking announcement that ‘Fiji is

willing to provide a permanent home to the entire populations of Kiribati and Tuvalu, our two

closest neighbours…we have made this offer to our fellow Pacific islanders with open hearts

because we understand how vulnerable they must feel.’36 In the researcher’s initial attempts to

uncover the research problem from a plain reading of the announcement revealed to the

researcher that national governments will potentially have a host of considerations to carve out

at the micro and macro levels. Some of the preliminary underlying questions that struck the

researcher were as follows:

1) When will the wholesale population resettlement of Pacific Islanders to Fiji take place?

2) How many Pacific Islanders are projected to relocate to Fiji?

3) What political strategy, policy and legal frameworks exist in facilitating dignified

relocation?

35 Jane McAdam, ‘Disappearing States’, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 105–29; see also Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, ‘Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 37–55; see also Simon D Donner, ‘The Legacy of Migration in Response to Climate Stress: Learning from the Gilbertese Resettlement in the Solomon Islands, (2015) 39 Natural Resources Forum 191, 191–210. See also Julia B Edwards, ‘The Logistics of Climate-induced Resettlement: Lessons From the Carteret Islands, Papua New Guinea’ (2013) 32(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 52, 52–78; see also Lacey Allgood and Karen E McNamara, ‘Climate-induced Migration: Exploring Local Perspectives in Kiribati’ (2017) 38 Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 370, 370–85; see also Patrick Nunn and Roselyn Kumar, ‘Understanding Climate-Human Interactions in Small Island Developing States (SIDS): Implications for Future Livelihood Sustainability’ (2017) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 245, 245–272; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–34. 36 Bainimarama, above n 7; see also The Fiji Government, ‘Fiji’s Statement at the COP-21 United Nations Conference on Climate Change’ (Media Release, 12 December 2015) < http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Speeches/FIJI%E2%80%99S-STATEMENT-AT-THE-COP-21-UNITED-NATIONS-CONF.aspx?feed=news>; see also Fiji, Parliamentary Debates, Members of Parliament, 18 March 2015, 969 (M. Vuniwaqa-Minster for Lands); see also Nailatikau, above n 26 and accompanying text.

18

4) Will the Fijian Government implement any guidelines, standards and processes from a

number of non-binding global initiatives or policy agendas?

5) How will issues surrounding sovereignty be addressed?

6) Is the Fijian Government offering a short-term solution to Pacific Islanders?

7) As a destination country, has the Fijian Government considered the social (demographic,

cultural, community, socio-psychological) impacts, costs of resettlement (economic and

fiscal) and health impacts that wholesale population resettlement may potentially present?

8) How does the Fijian Government plan to proportionately make land available when Fiji

faces many of its own challenges in internally relocating its own vulnerable communities

facing climate change and disaster relocation in Fiji?

9) What strategies will be used to resolve conflicts and tensions in relation to land?

Moreover, some of the more precise questions narrowed from the preliminary questions led

the researcher to focus on the legal, policy and institutional arrangements at both national and

regional levels, and to draw on the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian

Government as a backdrop to uncover potential issues in the context of cross-border relocation

schemes to inform readiness.

The announcement brings to the fore a fundamental challenge for the Fijian Government as a

host country to be ready. There are policy, legal, economic, social and political dimensions to

accommodating and permanently re-settling communities of origin from Kiribati and Tuvalu.

The announcement provided the motivation to the researcher to investigate into what it means

to provide a whole-of-government response to climate-induced cross-border relocation and to

draw on the framing of readiness. Against this background, the key areas of inquiry of the

thesis are situated around the phenomenon of readiness: What are the criteria informing a legal

framework for climate migration readiness? What does it mean for the Fijian Government to

be ready for the large-scale climate-induced cross-border relocation of Pacific Islanders to

Fiji?

The investigation in this study takes a legal perspective that engages in-depth analysis of the

legal literature and literature from multifaceted disciplines. The aim is first, to extrapolate the

determinants of readiness for contributing to and guiding decisionmakers towards crafting a

legal framework and second, to inform the criteria of readiness in the context of climate

change. The coverage of the investigation is expansive because no previous study has

investigated climate migration readiness. This is discussed further in chapters four and five.

Much uncertainty still exists on climate-induced cross-border migration in global policy fora

and under international law, as is highlighted in the discussion that follows.

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1.3 Gaps in the Literature

Legal Gap

There is widespread consensus among scholars and practitioners in the field of slow-onset

environmental studies that no legal instrument or framework under international law exists to

respond and manage climate change displacement and migration.37 A precise and definitive

legal terminology, legal instrument—or convention and assistance and protection framework

for human mobility dimensions of climate change under international law—are lacking.38

Whilst there are extensive legal gaps in the context of climate change, a notable exception

from the standpoint of international law and international institutions is the existence of widely

established non-legally binding voluntary instruments that draw on a broad human rights

framework, embodying binding principles and norms. These address the ‘protection and

assistance needs of persons displaced across borders in the context of disasters, including the

adverse effects of climate change’, for example, the Platform on Disaster Displacement.39

Other examples of initiatives and instruments articulated at global policy fora include the

37 Koko Warner et al, ‘Changing Climate, Moving People: Framing Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation’ (Policy Brief No 8, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 10; see also: ‘Emerging climate policy related to human migration, displacement and planned relocation can provide a stepping stone for transitions between immediate-term use of existing approaches to necessary longer-term paradigm changes about population shifts, governance of borders and mobility, livelihood viability and planning locally, regionally and globally’ as cited in Warner et al, 13. See also W. Neil Adger et al, ‘Human Security’ in Christopher B Field (ed), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects (Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 768, 771 < https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/>; see also Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre & Norwegian Refugee Council, Quarterly Update (April – June 2016) <http://internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/IDMC-quarterly-update-2016-QU2final.pdf>; see also ADB Report, above n 10. 38 Warner, above n 37; see also Adger et al, above n 37; see also ADB Report, above n 10; see also Lauren Nishimura, ‘Climate Change Migrants: Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies’ (2015) 27(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 107, 108. 39 Nishimura, above n 38, 107, 109, 117; see also McAdam, above n 14; see also Michelle Yonetani, et al (ed), ‘Global Estimates 2015: People Displaced by Disasters’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, July 2015) 11, 76 (‘IDMC GRID 2015 Report’); see also Protection Agenda Volume 1, above n 14. See also Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Economic and Social Council, 54th session, Agenda Item 9 (d0, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 1998) (UN Guiding Principles) para 2 Forward, Principle 2 Scope and Purpose, Para 2 Introductory Note; see also: ‘Although they do not constitute a binding instrument, these Principles reflect and are consistent with international human rights law and humanitarian law and analogous refugee law’ as cited in UN Guiding Principles Para 2 - Introductory Note <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GPEnglish.pdf >.

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Global Compact for Migration (Migration Compact), the United Nations Guiding Principles

on Internal Displacement (UN Guiding Principles) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster

Risk Reduction (SFDRR). However, much uncertainty remains under international law in

providing a meaningful and coordinated legal response to climate-induced human mobility.40

In recognising gaps in international law, this thesis is not advancing a critique of the

international law but considers its usefulness.

Moreover, gaps in the development of legal mechanisms at the Pacific regional level to

respond to climate-induced migration resonate with uncertainties in international law

identified in chapter three. The formulation of a concept proposal to develop a Pacific Climate

Change Treaty (Model Treaty) remains poorly articulated in regional policy fora.41 Briefly,

the model treaty aims to offer a ‘new source of international law and provide a beacon of

inspiration for Pacific island states to tackle climate change.’42 The thinking surrounding the

40 Walter Kaelin, ‘Global Compact on Migration and Disaster Displacement Prof. Walter Kaelin, Addresses Member States’ (Media Release, 24 May 2017) 1–9 <https://disasterdisplacement.org/global-compact-on-migration-and-disaster-displacement>; see also Sarah Opitz Stapleton et al, ‘Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: The Need for a Risk-informed and Coherent Approach’ (Research Report, Overseas Development Institute and United Nations Development Programme, November 2017) 24–9. See also General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘United Nations Finalises First Ever Global Compact for Migration’ (Media Release, 13 July 2018) 1–2 < https://www.un.org/pga/72/2018/07/13/press-release-united-nations-finalizes-first-ever-global-compact-for-migration/>; see also Refugees and Migrants, Compact for Migration (2018) <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact>; see also Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, GA Res 73/195, UN GAOR, 73rd session, 60th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES73/195 (11 January 2019) <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/195> (‘Compact for Migration’). See also Alwyn Didar Singh, ‘Making the Global Compact on Migration Count’ on World Bank People Move (14 December 2017) <http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/making-global-compact-migration-count>; see also Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP), ‘Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific - An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP) 2017–2030 - Voluntary Guidelines for the Pacific Islands Region’ (Research Report, Pacific Community, 11 September 2016) 9 <http://www.pacificdisaster.net/dox/FRDP_2016_Resilient_Dev_pacific.pdf> (‘FRDP 2017-2030’). 41 Michael Slezak, ‘Pacific Islands Nations Consider World’s First Treaty to Ban Fossil Fuels’, theguardian (online), 14 July 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/14/pacific-islands-nations-consider-worlds-first-treaty-to-ban-fossil-fuels>. 42 Pacific Island Development Forum, Outcome Document - Fourth PIDF Leaders’ Summit-Stewardship for Healthy Oceans & Health Nations (12–13 July 2016) 20 (‘PIDF 4 2016’) <http://pacificidf.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2016-Leaders-Summit-and-Presummit-Outcome-Document.pdf>; see also Official website: Pacific Islands Climate Action Network <https://pacificclimateactionnetwork.wordpress.com/>. See also ‘PICAN is a regional network of 30 non-governmental organizations, coalitions, social movements, and educational institutions from the Pacific who work to address climate change and sustainable development goals. PICAN is the Pacific regional node of the Climate Action Network International, which has a membership of over 950 NGOs in more than 110 countries – the largest climate network in the world’ as cited in Scoop Independent News, ‘Pacific Islands Climate Action Network Pacific Must Continue to Lead Climate

21

model treaty demonstrates the significant solidarity of Pacific Island nations as a region in

responding to insecurities exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. Whilst the full text

of the model treaty is unavailable, conversational pieces and media reports cite the following

thematic areas present in the model treaty:

1) banning or ‘phasing out of fossil fuels;’

2) ensuring ‘“universal access” to clean energy by 2030’, which will be facilitated through

the establishment of the ‘“Pacific framework for renewable energy”’ in line with the

Sustainable Development Framework Agenda 2030;

3) establishing a fund to ‘provide compensation for communities that have suffered climate-

change-related losses;’ and

4) ‘climate-related migration and adaptation.’43

It can be argued that the move towards a climate treaty by regional leaders is premature

because it raises concerns about the extent and influence of international law in its formulation

and the kind of regional leadership it is providing to the international community in light of

the migration compact and accelerated global climate action under the Paris climate accord.

Similarly, other regional cooperation policy agendas exist, such as the Framework for Resilient

Development in the Pacific 2017–2030 (FRDP), which is a voluntary hybrid regional

framework for climate change and disaster risk management to be used to inform regional

policy negotiations and deliberations.44 To date, no single study exists that has evaluated the

scope and implementation of the FRDP across the Pacific region, and it remains descriptive in

nature.45 The gaps in regional policy agendas also validate the investigation of this thesis on

Action’ (Media Release, 22 April 2016) <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1604/S00038/pacific-must-continue-to-lead-climate-action.htm>. 43 Slezak, above n 41; see also Lealaiauloto Aigaletaulealea Tauafiafi, ‘Pacific Leaders Agree to Further Consultations on Proposed Pacific Climate Treaty’ on Pacific Guardians 15 July 2016 <http://pacificguardians.org/blog/2016/07/15/pacific-leaders-agree-to-further-consultations-on-proposed-pacific-climate-treaty/.html>. 44 Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, Forty-Seventh Pacific Islands Forum, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia-Forum Communique (8–10 September 2016) (‘2016 PIFS 47’) <http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/embeds/file/2016_Communique_FINAL_web>; see also ‘The FRDP was developed in response to recommendations from the Pacific Platform for Disaster Risk Management and Pacific Climate Change Roundtable in 2011 and endorsed by the Pacific Island Forum Leaders in 2012’ as cited in Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, New Framework to build resilience to climate change and disasters in the Pacific Islands (16 September 2016) <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/press-statements/2016-media-releases/new-framework-to-build-resilience-to-climate-change-disasters-in-pacific-islands.html>. 45 Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, ‘Forty-Ninth Pacific Islands Forum’ (Forum Communiqué, 18(10), Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 3–6 September, 2018) 1–14 (‘2018 PIFS 49’); see also Pacific Community, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme, ‘Implementation of the Framework for Resilient Development (FRDP) in

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the readiness of potential climate-induced cross-border relocation of Pacific Island

communities in the future.

Data Gap

There is widespread consensus in both the scientific literature and the growing body of

published studies in the Pacific region that there is much uncertainty regarding the future

human mobility patterns of Pacific Island communities arising from the impacts of climate

change. One of the published studies of the Secretariat of the Pacific Environment Programme,

conducted in partnership with other intergovernmental agencies and regional institutions on

the Pacific Island countries’ and territories’ (PICTs) climate change outlook, has confirmed

that ‘data collection issues (data collection and data consistency), data management and

dissemination, data analysis and interpretation, and the use of data to inform and direct policy

responses to climate change presents significant challenges within PICT.’46 However, progress

has been made on informing fragmented desk-based estimates. For example, the preliminary

field-based research conducted in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu towards the PCCM

project in 2013 reveals that ‘the pressure to migrate is likely to be relatively high among these

countries’ as population growth in these low-lying atoll nations becomes heavily concentrated

in urban centres escalating to approximately ‘298,000 people in 2050 compared to 170,000

people in 2013.’47 In 2015, the PCCM concluded that international migration trips for

Kiribati—with a population of approximately 175 560 in 2055— would increase by 35 per

cent, and for Tuvalu—with a population of approximately 13 246 in 2055—would increase by

100 per cent.48

It is acknowledged in the literature that the generalisability of published data on climate-

induced mobility for the Pacific region is problematic. This is due to an array of factors, for

example, varying elevation on coastal settlements.49 Other factors include the difficulty in

the Pacific - Establishment of the Support Unit and the Taskforce for the Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP)’ (Media Release, 19 January 2018) 1–3. 46 Secretariat of the Pacific Environment Programme, ‘Pacific Environment and Climate Change Outlook’ (Research Report, Secretariat of the Pacific Environment Programme, 2012) 1, 4. 47 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 16–17. 48 PCCM Survey Fact Sheet, above n 3 and accompanying text; see also United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations Development Program, and International Labour Organisation, ‘Pacific Climate Change & Migration Project’ (Newsletter, February, 2016) 1 (‘UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter’) <http://www.unescap.org/resources/pacific-climate-change-and-migration-project-newsletter-february-2016>. 49 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 18; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 7.

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extrapolating ‘scenarios and projections from global climate change models to the resolution

required for small island developing states’50 (SIDS) and variability of extreme events

(frequency, intensity, for example).51 These factors represent gaps in information about the

Pacific Island region. This suggests that consistent and coherent targeted quantitative and

qualitative research into the human mobility dimensions of Pacific Island communities is

needed to inform Pacific Island governments in decision-making and to craft well-defined

policies, plans and regulatory frameworks. These need to be supported by appropriate budgets

to respond to climate-driven migration to neighbouring Pacific Island countries in the future.52

Approaches to strengthen data collection, retention and dissemination that can be adopted by

Pacific Island nations (among others) could include: periodic national censuses; investment in

technological apparatus; capacity building and sharing of data.53 This thesis does not explore

any extended discussions specific to the approaches cited.

Together, the evidence presented in relation to the legal and information gaps at the global

level and more importantly, at the Pacific regional level, reveals extensive issues and

challenges. These are more important for receiving states in the context of climate-induced

human mobility. This also suggests that proactive mechanisms and flexible approaches will

need to be tailored to respond to cross-border migration and relocation by countries of origin

and the host country to effect readiness.

Knowledge Gap

As discussed earlier, no previous studies to date have investigated the phenomenon of

readiness in the context of climate change human mobility. Similarly, no single study has

investigated a whole-of-government response from a legal perspective to inform climate

migration readiness at either the national and Pacific regional levels. However, there has been

some emerging empirical investigation by scholars such as McNamara and Combes, Klepp

and Herbeck, Bertana, Piggott-McKellar et al, and Charan, Kaur and Singh, into the internal

50 See above CDKN Report, above n 4, 7. 51 Hoegh-Guldbery et al, above n 2, 273; see also ‘climate model projections of trends over the next five decades and beyond…suggest an increased frequency of heavy precipitation events at global scale…in some regions…predictions are weak and inconsistent between different models’ as cited in Black et al, above n 7, S32, S34. 52 Adelle Thomas and Lisa Benjamin, ‘Policies and Mechanisms to Address Climate-induced Migration and Displacement in Pacific and Caribbean Small Island Developing States’ (2018) 10(1) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 86, 95–7. 53 ADB Report, above n 10, 53–4

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relocation of coastal communities inland in Fiji.54 These internal relocations have been

initiated and implemented by the Fijian Government.55 The findings provided some important

insights to the researcher in framing the research questions, the interview questions and the

ethics application submitted to undertake field research in Fiji. The researcher employed

qualitative modes of inquiry into participants’ experiences and the lessons learned from the

internal relocation projects to inform the determinants of readiness for climate change-induced

mobility of communities across sovereign borders to Fiji.

A number of studies have examined readiness from a variety of perspectives, for example,

accessing climate finance through global funding mechanisms for low-carbon development

projects (climate finance readiness) and preparedness for sudden-onset natural hazards

(disaster preparedness). These are discussed further in chapter five.56 The variety of

perspectives make only infrequent linkages and provide only a smattering of references to

readiness and preparedness in the context of climate change. To date, none have explained and

investigated readiness in the context of climate change, which provides the rationale to adopt

a broad approach to inform the phenomenon of readiness. The knowledge gaps in the

phenomenon of readiness and the findings of the field research are discussed further in

chapters five and six.

To address gaps in the literature, this thesis employs various layers of analysis and synthesis

of the literature as well as new empirical evidence. These are presented in chapters four, five

and six to guide the development of the framework, which spans the legal, social, cultural,

economic and political dimensions of climate migration readiness. Chapter four articulates and

54 Karen E McNamara and Helene Jacot Des Combes, ‘Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji’ (2015) 6(3) International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 315, 315–19; see also Silja Klepp and Johannes Herbeck, ‘The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region’ (2016) 7(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 54, 70; see also Amanda Bertana, How a Community in Fiji Relocated to Adapt to Climate Change (10 January 2017) Scholars Strategy Network <https://scholars.org/brief/how-community-fiji-relocated-adapt-climate-change>. See also Annah E. Piggott-McKellar et al, ‘Moving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Cases Studies in Fiji’ (2019) 8(5) Social Sciences 133–150; see also Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur and Priyatma Singh, ‘Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation – A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji’ in Walter Leal Filho (ed), Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific Countries – Fostering Resilience and Improving Quality of Life (Springer International Publishing, 2017) 19–33; see also Pierick, C.M. Martin et al, ‘Responding to multiple climate-linked stressors in a remote island context: The example of Yadua Island, Fiji’ (2018) 21 Climate Risk Management 7; see also Jon Barnett and Celia McMichael, ‘The effects of climate change on the geography and timing of human mobility’ (2018) 39(4) Population and Environment 339-356. 55 McNamara and Combes, above n 54 and accompanying text.  56 Feja Lesniewska, ‘UNFCCC REDD+ COP Decisions: The Cumulative Effect on Forest Related Law Processes’ (2013) 15(1) International Community Law Review 103, 103–21; see also Ademola A Adenle, Dale T Manning and Joseph Arbiol, ‘Mitigating Climate Change in Africa: Barriers to Financing Low-carbon Development’ (2017) 100 World Development 123, 123–32.  

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catalogues the experiences and lessons learned from the historical migration case studies in

the Pacific, including literature specifically dealing with the concept of readiness and

preparedness from a range of disciplines.57 Chapter four also presents the first phase of analysis

of the determinants of readiness. Chapter five presents the second phase of the analysis of

readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives in order to unpack the determinants of readiness.

Chapter five also supplements the analysis in chapter four. Chapter six presents the empirical

evidence generated from participants’ lived experiences of the internal relocation projects

initiated by the Fijian Government and the institutional knowledge of historical incidences of

migration in the Pacific. The phases of analysis are consolidated in chapter seven, which

synthesises the determinants of readiness from the sources of data to articulate a set of criteria

for analysing readiness. The set of criteria for readiness is then applied as an analytical

framework to appraise Fiji’s position, analysing the empirical evidence gathered in this study

as reflected in chapter six.

There is a considerable body of experience in the literature that documents the phenomenon

of human mobility from sudden-onset natural hazards and development projects. The gamut

of standards and guidelines in the context of mega-project development, such as the World

Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement and the International Finance

Corporation Performance Standards, are notable examples of global lending institutions

assisting in voluntary resettlement.58 Similarly, SFDRR priority action four identifies the need

to ‘enhance disaster preparedness for effective response recognising the importance of

planning and preparedness of communities and local authorities to the threat or impact of

disasters.’59 In both these fields of study, the reference to voluntary or managed is not uniform

or expressly cited. However, a plain reading of the relevant experience has advanced appeals

for planned relocation in response to population movement. The references to planned

relocation in the literature offer important insights into the broad nature of the inquiry into

57 McAdam, above n 4. 58 Bogumil Terminski, Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Causes, Consequences, and Socio-legal Context (Columbia University Press, 2014) 17, 51; see also Bogumil Terminski, Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Theoretical Frameworks and Current Challenges (University of Geneva, 2013) 162. See also The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The International Development Association, World Bank Board Approves New Environmental and Social Framework (4 August 2016) The World Bank <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/08/04/world-bank-board-approves-new-environmental-and-social-framework>; see also Nicholas K Tagliarino, ‘The Status of National Legal Frameworks for Valuing Compensation for Expropriated Land: An Analysis of Whether National Laws in 50 Countries/Regions Across Asia, Africa, and Latin America Comply with International Standards on Compensation Valuation’ (2017) 6(2) Land 1, 7–8. 59 Michelle Yonetani, ‘Positioned for Action: Displacement in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (Briefing Paper, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, 16 February 2017) 8.

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readiness. This is because some aspects of planned relocation, such as ‘resources available in

the place of new residence; appropriate infrastructure; sustainable environmental conditions;

and restoration of livelihoods’ resonate with conceptualising readiness for climate change-

induced human mobility.60 However, there is no explicit reference in planned relocation

literature to readiness, that is, what it means for a host country to be ready to respond to climate

change-induced mobility of communities across sovereign borders.61 It can thus be suggested

that to advance the understanding of the phenomenon of readiness in the context of climate

change, there needs to be a shift in focus in the body of research on planned relocation to

underscore and develop the understanding of readiness in greater depth.

In summary, there are significant gaps in the literature. First, the assistance and protection

arrangements under international law, including coordinated responses at the Pacific regional

level for human mobility from the impacts of climate change, are inadequate and poorly

defined.62 Second, there is a lack of coherent and robust data on the influx, magnitude and

timeframe for cross-border relocation of Pacific Island communities. It is well established that

there is a general lack of research on readiness in the context of climate change (thereby

referring to previous references).

1.4 Research Objectives

The key objectives of this research aim to address the gaps identified in the literature. The first

objective is to articulate the criteria for readiness from the synthesis and analysis of the sources

of data presented in chapters four to six. The second objective is to assess Fiji’s readiness

against these criteria by using data obtained from the field interviews, which is discussed in

chapter six. Finally, key areas within existing laws where reform is needed—and the

60 Terminski, Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Causes, Consequences, and Socio-legal Context, above n 58, 404. 61 The researcher acknowledges that developing an understanding of readiness from the perspective of the country of origin is also important to provide insights into well-rounded considerations and issues to implement cross-border relocation. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to frame readiness from the perspective of the country of origin which can be explored through further research. See also political leadership in Kiribati and perspectives on migration as cited in KV20 above n 20 and accompanying text. 62 Much uncertainty still exists about law and practice as McAdam points out that: ‘there has been no systematic analysis of state practice relating to relocations and the legal issues involved…the legal framework for decisions for relocation varies from state to state, and very few states have developed laws or policies relating specifically to relocations…by the effects of climate change. In some countries, constitutional provisions may restrict the state’s ability to relocate specific communities, such as indigenous groups. But even where legal guidance exists, it requires implementation and enforcement to effective’ as cited in McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 161.

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determinants to guide and contribute to a framework spanning legal, social, cultural, economic

and political dimensions—are identified and presented in chapter seven. The identification of

criteria for analysing readiness and the determinants to guide the framework for readiness in

the context of climate change-induced human mobility make a significant and original

contribution to the growing field of readiness studies to inform the policy making, future

coordination of, and practice in, managing climate change-induced human mobility at both

local and Pacific regional levels.

1.5 Research Questions

In order to achieve the research objectives outlined above, this thesis proceeds by defining and

investigating a number of core research questions:

Research Question 1: What are the criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-

induced human mobility?

Research Question 1(a): What can we learn from the historical experiences of human mobility

across the Pacific Islands regions?

Research Question 1(b): What can we learn from the experiences and lessons learned from

the internal relocation of communities in Fiji?

Research Question 1(c): What can we learn from the literature on other forms of mobility or

other contexts of readiness?

Research Question 2: What is the current state of Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale

mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change?

Research Question 3: What reforms are necessary to ensure that Fiji is ready to receive Pacific

Islanders as a result of climate change?

The responses and findings relating to the research questions posed in this study provide a

basis on which to respond and fill the identified gaps in the literature that have not been

previously examined in climate change migration studies.

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1.6 Methodology

The methodological approach employed to respond to the research questions comprises

doctrinal legal research and qualitative empirical legal research. Doctrinal research

methodology entails ‘primary sources of legal doctrine’ (legislation and case law) and

‘secondary literature and commentary.’63 This research draws on an extensive range of primary

and secondary sources to determine the legal arrangements on population movements from the

impacts of climate change under international law, including existing legal arrangements at

the Pacific regional level.64 The review of the different sources of data and material is assessed

as part of doctrinal analysis and reported on in chapters three, four and five. It examines

existing legal arrangements, knowledge gaps and the determinants of readiness in the context

of climate change-induced human mobility to guide the development of a framework for

readiness. Moreover, this research engages doctrinal analysis of the historical migration

documented in case studies in the Pacific in chapter four, and the phenomenon of readiness

from multidisciplinary perspectives in chapter five, to uncover the determinants of readiness.

Qualitative empirical legal research methodology is used to answer RQ 1(b), which focuses

on the lived experiences of the participants involved in the internal relocation projects initiated

by the Fijian Government. This is achieved by conducting field interviews with senior state

officials from within the Fijian administration and non-state actors, such as in-country regional

institutions, intergovernmental agencies and the church, among others. The field research

draws on phenomenological and grounded theory approaches, which are underpinned by

interviews.65 The interview data is discussed in chapter six.

This study uses a multimethod approach, which reflects the need to draw on different sources

of data generated.66 This study also applies triangulation to enhance the reliability of the field

63 Nigel Duncan and Terry Hutchinson, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 113; see also Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 13, 22. 64 See above n 63 and accompanying text. 65 Barbara M Grant and Lynne S Giddings, ‘Making Sense of Methodologies: A Paradigm Framework for the Novice Researcher’ (2002) 13(1) Contemporary Nurse: A Journal for the Australian Nursing Profession 10, 17; see also M Cole, ‘Qualitative Research a Challenging Paradigm for Infection Control’ (2006) 7(6) British Journal of Infection Control 25, 27; see also Paul D Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Omrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design (Merrill, first published 1993, 2010 ed) 141–2. 66 Grant and Giddings, above n 65; see also Lyn Spillman, ‘Mixed Methods and the Logic of Qualitative Inference’ (2014) 37(2) Qualitative Sociology 189, 197; see also Moin Syed and Sarah C Nelson, ‘Guidelines for Establishing Reliability When Coding Narrative Data’ (2015) 3(6) Emerging Adulthood 375, 383. See also John Tribe, ‘Research Paradigms and Tourism Curriculum’ (2001) 39(4)

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data of various participants generated from the interviews.67 The strategies and approaches,

including both doctrinal and empirical methodological approaches, are discussed in chapter

two.68

1.7 Research Significance

There are several important areas where this study makes an original contribution. First, this

is the first study to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the historical migration case studies

in the Pacific and the phenomenon of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives to

conceptualise the determinants of readiness in the context of climate change-induced human

mobility. This is also the first study of this kind that has developed a set of criteria for readiness

in the context of climate change-induced human mobility through comprehensive analysis of

the literature and empirical evidence presented in chapters four to six. The criteria for readiness

are applied as an analytical framework to examine Fiji’s position in response to the climate

change-induced mobility of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji and are presented

in chapter seven. This study demonstrates for the first time that Fiji is insufficiently ready for

climate change-induced mobility of communities to the host country Fiji. The analytical

framework for climate migration readiness is a key outcome and an original contribution to

the field of studies on mobility dimensions from slow-onset environmental change. Moreover,

the determinants to guide the direction of a framework spanning legal, social, cultural,

economic and political dimensions will serve as a base that could be usefully explored and

developed in further research.

In addition, the findings about the level of Fiji’s readiness are the first empirical investigation

conducted on this issue. These findings make an original contribution to the existing empirical

studies of the Pacific on mobility dimensions from sudden-onset and slow-onset

environmental change. Although the findings are generated from a relatively small pool of

participants (n = 18), the analysis has nonetheless extended our knowledge of what it means

to be ready as a starting point for mobility of communities as a result of change climate across

sovereign borders. The participants in the field research had firsthand knowledge, including

institutional knowledge, on the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government

for coastal communities in Fiji. The participants provided insights on what issues,

Journal of Travel Research 442, 445; see also Nancy Carter et al, ‘The Use of Triangulation in Qualitative Research’ (2014) 41(5) Oncology Nursing Forum 545, 545. 67 See above n 66 and accompanying text. 68 Ibid.

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considerations and aspects could resonate in terms of what it means to be ready in the context

of climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji. The experiences and lessons

of participants provided enabled the researcher to conceptualise readiness in the context of

climate change human mobility.

1.8 Interpretation of Terms

Climate Change

The term climate change from the scientific body of research encompasses ‘a change in the

state of the climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity and which can

be identified (e.g. by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its

properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.’69 The natural

causes for ‘a change in the state of the climate’ entails ‘external forcings such as modulations

of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition

of the atmosphere and land-use change.’70 The ‘impacts of climate change include higher

atmospheric and oceanic temperatures, changing rates of precipitation, increased intensity of

extreme events and decreased fresh water availability and sea level rise.’71

In this thesis, the term climate change is used to refer to the ‘slow-onset effects of climate

change (e.g. sea level rise, coastal erosion, increased drought frequency, coral bleaching, and

storm surges).’72 The broad use of the term climate change is sometimes equated with ‘extreme

weather event’ pertaining to natural hazards ‘(e.g. floods, hurricanes, typhoons, cyclones and

heatwaves)’ because climate change is considered ‘to increase the frequency, severity and

intensity of natural hazards, raise sea levels, and change rainfall variability.’73 The researcher

utilises the term climate change to refer to slow-onset event in this thesis to address ‘human

69 Katherine J Mach, Serge Planton and Christoph von Stechow, ‘Annex II: Glossary’ in Pachauri, K. Rajendra, et al, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers (Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Switzerland, 2015) 120; 70 Ibid. 71 Mach, Planton and Stechow, above n 69, 120–121; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86 –7. 72 Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus, ‘The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu’ (2012) 22 Global Environmental Change 382, 382; 73 Black et al, above n 7, S32–S33; see also Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also Nansen Initiative, ‘The Realities of Climate Change-Related Human Mobility to be Addressed in Paris’ (Discussion Paper, The Nansen Initiative, September 2015) 1; see also Mach, Planton and Stechow, above n 69, 120–1, 123.

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mobility (migration, displacement and relocation)’ in the context of Pacific island nations.74

The researcher reiterates that extreme weather event can also be considered to address human

mobility which the reader should not rule out. The investigation of this thesis does not focus

on extreme weather event as a basis to respond to the dimensions of human mobility.

Resettlement and Relocation

There is widespread consensus among seminal authors such as McAdam and Ferris, Campbell,

Connell, Donner, and Warner et al, that the terms resettlement and relocation are used

interchangeably in the context of population movement from ‘sudden- and slow-onset

environmental change, and large-scale project developments.’75 Human mobility entails

‘voluntary and involuntary movement both short- and long-distances’ spanning ‘internal and

across international borders.’76 McAdam asserts that ‘relocation and resettlement–both posit

as intellectual constructs and tools for population management.’77

Resettlement can be defined as a ‘process by which a number of homogenous people from one

locale come to live together in a different locale.’78 Resettlement entails restoration of the

‘housing, assets, livelihoods, land, access to resources, and the living standards’ of

communities relocated.79 The broad use of term resettlement encompasses ‘identifiable

proponents such as local governments, national governments, local and international

corporations, as well as development banks and finance corporations, responsible for planning

and organising the activity of resettlement.’80

74 Warner et al, above n 37, 7–11; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 87. 75 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 141; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Relocation and Resettlement from Colonisation to Climate Change: The Perennial Solution to Danger Zones’ (2015) 3(1) London Review of International Law 93, 94; see also John Campbell, ‘Climate-induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Importance of Land’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 57-79; see also John Connell, ‘Population Resettlement in the Pacific: Lessons from a Hazardous History?’ (2012) 43(2) Australian Geographer 127, 127-142; see also Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also Donner, above n 35, 191–210; see also Brooke Wilmsen and Michael Webber, ‘What can we learn from the practice of development-forced displacement and resettlement for organised resettlements in response to climate change?’ (2015) Geoforum 76, 76–85; see also Alex Arnall, ‘Resettlement as climate change adaptation: what can be learned from state-led relocation in rural Africa and Asia?’ (2019) 11(3) Climate and Development 253, 253. 76 Warner, et al, above n 74, 10-11; see also McAdam, ‘Relocation and Resettlement’ above n 75, 93, 94. 77 McAdam, above n 75, 93, 94. 78 Campbell, above n 75, 58. 79 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 141. 80 Wilmsen and Webber, above n 75, 76, 77.

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The term relocation tends to be used to refer ‘the physical movement of people that can be

carried out without resettlement (for example, when government transports urban squatters to

the outskirts of a city and leaves them there without providing housing or ensuring access to

public services).’81 The broad use of the term relocation has come to be used in the context of

‘extreme weather-related disasters, gradual environmental deterioration, and the long term-

term impacts of climate change as a permanent mechanism for moving communities out of

harm’s way.’82 A further definition of relocation described by Campbell entails:

the permanent (or long-term) movement of a community (or a significant part of it) from one location to another, in which important characteristics of the original community, including its social structures, legal and political systems, cultural characteristics and worldviews, are retained; the community stays together at the destination in a social form that is similar to the community of origin.83

The researcher recognises the variety of perspectives of the terms and adopts them to be used

interchangeably in this thesis. The terms are used in their broadest sense constituting of three

layers. First, is the physical movement of affected communities from ‘sudden- and slow-onset

environmental change’ to a new location inland and across international borders.84 Second, is

the permanent re-establishment of communities by restoring their livelihoods in the new

location in the country of origin (inland) and destination country (cross-border). Third, is a

whole-of-government response by the country of origin (inland); and country of origin and

destination country (cross-border) to facilitate population movement.

1.9 Outline of Chapters

This thesis consists of eight chapters. This introductory chapter outlines the research problem,

contextual background, significance of the research, underlying objectives of this research,

knowledge gaps and research questions and provides a brief summary of the other chapters in

this thesis.

Chapter two discusses the methodological approach adopted to respond to the research

questions posed in this thesis. It also sets out the research design to explain the extensive

processes engaged by the researcher to gather, code and analyse the data generated from the

field interviews. Chapter two details the multimethod approach adopted in this study, including

81 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 141. 82 Jane McAdam and Marc Limon, ‘Human Rights, Climate Change and Cross-border Displacement’ (Research Policy Report, Universal Rights Group, August 2015) 18; see also McAdam, above n 75, 93–4. 83 Campbell, above n 75, 58–9. 84 Black et al, above n 7, S32–S43.

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triangulation as a strategy to demonstrate the reliability of the data generated to inform the

different strands of considerations to articulate the determinants of readiness.

Chapter three presents a comprehensive review of the literature in the field of human mobility

dimensions from sudden- and slow-onset environmental change. The review details the

scientific evidence underlying global warming and projections of global climate change

impacts and risks in the twenty-first century.85 The review also examines numerous empirical

studies conducted in the Pacific region to demonstrate the existing and future declining human

security risks to Pacific Island communities from the impacts of climate change. The literature

review on the body of experience on human mobility dimensions from non-climatic factors,

such as development projects and the historical migration of Pacific Islands communities, is

also detailed.86 Additionally, the literature review identifies knowledge gaps spanning legal,

information and data dimensions of population movement in the context of climate change as

part of validating the research problem. The detailed and considered analysis of the body of

knowledge demonstrates the scale and urgency of the climate change problem in the Pacific.

This study provides an important opportunity to advance the understanding of readiness in the

context of climate change human mobility.

Chapter four draws on historical case studies documenting the mobility of Pacific Islanders,

primarily during the period of British colonial government administration of territories in the

Pacific Islands region.87 Chapter four examines Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and

experiences of mobility within and across sovereign borders in the past century. This

corresponds with RQ 1 (a): What can we learn from the historical experiences of human

mobility across the Pacific Islands region? It also presents the first phase of analysis to uncover

the determinants to guide the way to articulate the criteria for readiness in chapter seven.

Chapter five examines the phenomenon of readiness documented in the literature from

multidisciplinary perspectives and uncovers what might be learned from the considerable body

of experience on readiness. This corresponds with RQ 1(c): What can we learn from literature

on other forms of mobility or other contexts of readiness? Additionally, this chapter unpacks

85 Warner et al, above n 37, 1–58. 86 Brent Doberstein and Anne Tadgell, ‘Guidance for Managed Relocation’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 27, 27-–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. 87 Jane McAdam, ‘Historical Cross-border Relocations in the Pacific: Lessons for Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change’ (2014) 49 (3) The Journal of Pacific History 301, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9. See also Connell, above n 75, 127, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78.

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the determinants of readiness across a range of disciplines and presents the second phase of

analysis.

Chapter six presents the findings of the field research conducted with a total of eighteen

participants (n = 18) in Fiji. It corresponds with RQ 1 (b), which focuses on the participants’

accounts of the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government. Chapter six

also presents the third phase of analysis and produces a list of determinants of readiness as a

basis to articulate the criteria of readiness in chapter seven. The determinants from chapters

four and five are synthesised in this chapter to generate the set of criteria for readiness in

chapter seven.

Chapter seven brings together the strands of determinants generated in chapters four, five and

six to articulate a set of criteria for readiness in response to RQ 1. Chapter seven demonstrates

that this is the first study to undertake a comprehensive analysis of different sources of data.

It also demonstrates that the criteria for readiness presents a new way of conceptual thinking

about climate migration readiness, as readiness is not explained elsewhere in the literature.

Additionally, the criteria for readiness in chapter seven is applied as an analytical framework

to assess Fiji’s ability to respond to climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Islanders to

Fiji. The examination of Fiji’s ability response against the criteria for readiness is buttressed

by the empirical evidence generated in chapter six. Moreover, this chapter provides a brief

overview of the key areas for reform within the existing laws and identifies overarching

determinants as a starting point to inform a framework for readiness spanning legal, social,

cultural, economic and political dimensions.

Chapter eight provides conclusions drawn from the entire thesis, and chapter seven in

particular. Chapter eight highlights priority areas where the Fijian Government will need to

extensively direct attention to implement relocation schemes in the future, such as funding and

identification of land, followed by other areas such as institutional, sectoral and community

capacity building. Chapter eight concludes by identifying areas for further research and

potential directions for future.

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Chapter 2: Methodological Approach and Research Design

2.1 Introduction

The introductory chapter provided the overall synopsis of the thesis and set the tone of the

investigation of the thesis. This chapter discusses the research methodology and design

adopted by the researcher to gain insights into this study’s inquiry into readiness.

2.2 Research Paradigm

The philosophical approach to this research is grounded in both quantitative and qualitative

traditions.88 The interpretive paradigm, interchangeably expressed as the constructivist

paradigm, is synonymous with qualitative research and situated squarely in the qualitative

tradition.89 Grant and Giddings argue that ‘[a]s a researcher in the interpretive paradigm, you

relate and interact with your participants in an effort to come to understand their experiences

and the meaning they ascribe to the phenomenon under scrutiny’ by you as the researcher.90

Similarly, Tribe argues that ‘the interpretive tradition treats the social world as subject

encouraging it to speak for itself.’91 The researcher relied on the qualitative tradition, which

required qualitative modes of enquiry, including examination of the lived experiences of

participants and institutional knowledge of the state machinery, as a basis to answer RQ 1(b).92

88 Sandip Mukhopadhyay and Rajen K Gupta, ‘Survey of Qualitative Research Methodology in Strategy Research and Implication for Indian Researchers’ (2014) 18(2) The Journal of Business Perspective 109, 109–10; see also above n 65 and accompanying text; see also Tribe, above n 66, 442–8; see Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook Of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 929–31. 89 Grant and Giddings, above n 65,10–28; see also Cole, above n 65, 25–30; see also Tribe, above n 66, 442–8; see also Webley, above n 88. 90 Grant and Giddings, above n 65, 16–17. 91 Tribe, above n 66, 442, 445. 92 Webley, above n 88; see also Hutchinson, above n 63, 7–33.

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2.3 Research Methodology

The researcher adopted doctrinal and empirical research methodological approaches to answer

RQ 1 (a–c). The researcher used a doctrinal research methodology as a basis to understand and

examine the determinants underpinning readiness in the context of climate change-induced

human mobility.93 As noted by Hutchinson, doctrinal research methodology is commonly used

in research projects that are legal in nature.94 Within the discipline of law, a researcher ‘would

need to use doctrinal research to identify the pertinent law before embarking on an empirical

work on the policy or context behind the implementation of the law, or the subsequent effects

of the law on the community.’95 In addition, doctrinal research method involves ‘locating the

sources of law and then interpreting and analysing the text.’96 The researcher carried out a

comprehensive review and critical analysis of primary and secondary law materials.

The primary sources encompassed constitutions, statutes, regulations and cases, primarily

those of Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu.97 The secondary resources included international

instruments and agreements, international soft law instruments, global policy frameworks and

principles and scholarly literature including journal articles, texts, published reports, and

empirical studies conducted in the Pacific.98 In addition, documentary resources such as

content in conversational pieces, media reports, parliamentary debates and materials publicly

accessible from websites formed part of the secondary materials.99 The review enabled the

researcher to examine the current state of knowledge on readiness to advance the

understanding of the determinants of readiness from various legal, social, cultural, economic

and political dimensions. The review of the sources of data from the standpoint of doctrinal

research methodology traverses chapters three, four and five.

Hutchinson also argues that ‘[n]ot all doctrinal research begins with a legal problem.’100

Hutchinson claims that doctrinal research presents an opportunity for the researcher to account

for ‘what is known and not known about the topic’, including the relevant law.’101 The

literature documents that the relocation of Pacific Island communities due to the effects of

93 Hutchinson, above n 63, 7–28; see also Duncan and Hutchinson, above 63, 83–119. 94 Hutchinson, above n 63, 28. 95 Ibid 11. 96 Ibid 13. 97 Hutchinson, above n 63, 9, 11, 22. 98 Ibid 22. 99 Ibid. 100 Hutchinson, above n 63, 14. 101 Ibid 13–14.

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climate change is imminent.102 It is argued in this thesis that the provision of non-binding

international soft law principles present in international instruments may serve as a basis to

respond to climate change-induced mobility of communities across sovereign borders.103

However, the development of a concerted and conclusive response towards a legal framework

under international law is uncertain, and there are inadequate tailored and pragmatic solutions,

particularly for Pacific Island nations to respond to climate change-induced mobility of

communities across sovereign borders.104 The determinants of readiness, that is, what it means

for a host country to achieve readiness, are unknown. The researcher adopted a

multidisciplinary approach to understand the various perceptions of readiness to inform the

criteria of readiness from secondary sources as part of the doctrinal analysis.105

Alongside doctrinal research methodology, the researcher employed qualitative empirical

legal research ‘which shares its underpinnings with the interpretive paradigm’ to answer RQ

1(b).106 According to Reeve and Weller, empirical legal research is an ‘investigation of legal-

and justice-system-related questions that attempt to understand a topic through data-driven,

statistically based, controlled experiments, interview responses, case studies, historical

analysis, or other quantitative or qualitative data collecting mechanisms.’107 The researcher

used the qualitative research method of semi-structured interviews, as well as the more

inductive methods of phenomenology and grounded theory within the qualitative tradition.108

The integration of phenomenology and grounded theory methods was considered appropriate

102 McNamara and Combes, above n 54. 103 Sam Adelman, ‘Climate Justice, Loss and Damage and Compensation for Small Island Developing States’ (2016) 7(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 32, 34; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54–73. 104 See above n 103 and accompanying text. 105 Hutchinson, above n 63, 22; see also Webley, above n 88, 938–9. 106 See Cole, above n 65, 25–30; see also Webley, above n 88, 926–50. 107 Allison C Reeve and Travis Weller, ‘Empirical Legal Research Support Services: A Survey of Academic Law Libraries’ [2015] 107(3) (Summer) Law Library Journal 399, 400–1; see also ‘A useful definition by Epstein and Martin to round empirical legal research is noteworthy which they describe as the ‘investigation of legal-and justice-system-related questions that attempt to understand a topic through data-driven, statistically based, controlled experiments, interview responses, case studies, historical analyses, or other quantitative or qualitative data collecting mechanisms’ as cited in Reeve and Weller, 401. See also Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 901–25. 108 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Sage Publications, 4th ed, 2014) 189; see also Tribe, above n 66, 442, 445; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 141–2. See also Webley, above n 88, 930, 932, 937; see also ‘In qualitative research, the data are usually collected through three main methods used singly or in combination: direct observation, in-depth interviews and analysis of documents’ as cited in Webley, above n 88, 928.

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in gathering and analysing data as part of qualitative empirical research in the present study

because both approaches are synonymous with interviews.109 Both are discussed in turn below.

Phenomenology ‘attempts to understand people’s perception, perspectives, and

understandings of particular situations (lived experiences).’110 RQ 1(b) in particular, required

research participants to reflect on their lived experiences, interactions with local and non-

governmental bodies and communities, including the lessons learned from internal relocation

projects initiated by the Fijian Government. Against the background of these internal

relocation projects, participants were encouraged to provide insights into determinants that

could potentially be transferable in the context of climate change-induced mobility of Pacific

Islanders from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. The researcher also engaged in phenomenology to

examine the extent of readiness of the Fijian Government buttressed by using the interview

data. This corresponds to the second research question (RQ 2): What is the current state of

Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate

change?

A grounded theory approach was used to supplement the phenomenological stance adopted by

the researcher. Grounded theory ‘focuses on a process (including people’s actions and

interactions) related to a particular topic, with the ultimate goal of developing a theory about

that process.’111 The use of, and engagement with, grounded theory occurred at various levels

to explore and examine the underlying phenomenon of readiness. The various levels entailed

using material from the literature and the interview data on readiness at different stages in this

study as a basis to articulate the criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-induced

human mobility. The researcher uncovered the determinants of what it means to be ready by:

conceptualising the determinants that emerged from the body of research, case studies and the

empirical data in chapters four, five and six respectively; synthesising and analysing the

sources of data to articulate a set of criteria for readiness; and using the set of criteria for

readiness as an analytical framework to appraise the Fijian Government’s readiness as

presented in chapter seven. The different stages and integration of the sources of data on the

phenomenon of readiness demonstrate a process  as grounded approach adopted by the

researcher. Phenomenology and grounded theory approaches have a number of underlying

features that were appropriate in complementing the overarching method of collecting data

through interviews for the phenomenon under investigation.  

109 Grant and Giddings, above n 65, 10, 17; see also Cole, above n 65, 25, 27. 110 Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 141. 111 Ibid 142.

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Overall, qualitative empirical legal research methodology was considered appropriate to

investigate and gain insights into the Fijian Government’s readiness for climate change-

induced mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders to Fiji. This encompassed the

experiences, interactions and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by

the Fijian Government, conceptualising the determinants of readiness as well as the set of

criteria for analysing the Fijian Government’s readiness. Taken together, doctrinal and

empirical research methodological approaches provided a basis to inform the criteria for

analysing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.

2.4 Research Design

There is widespread consensus by qualitative research practitioners including Flick, Webley

and Gray that ‘[t]he design of an investigation touches almost all aspects of the research, from

the minute details of data collection to the selection of the techniques of data analysis.’112 The

research design adopted by the researcher took its cue from the suggested approach and is

outlined and described in the following sequence: the approach deployed to collect data; the

technique used to code the data; and the further techniques used to analyse the data.

Data Collection

Interview data generated from semi-structured individual interviews formed part of the field

research.113 Semi-structured individual interviews were considered appropriate for

investigating the underlying aspects of readiness because they offered the researcher a holistic

account of the arrangements of the Fijian Government in responding to cross-border

112 Uwe Flick, Designing Qualitative Research: Qualitative Research Designs (Sage Publications, 2007) 37; ‘Flick relied on Ragin’s definition of the term research design…Research design in qualitative traditions extend to encompass other areas of studies such as cross-sectional, comparative and longitudinal studies to name a few’ as cited in Flick, 45; see also David E Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 2009) 164–215; see also Webley, above n 88, 932–3, 941. 113 Webley, above n 88, 937; see also ‘There are a number of research strategies, including experiments, historical analyses, interviews and surveys used to determine views and perceptions, case studies, documentary analysis and analysis of researcher-generated or extant statistics such as cost/benefit analyses…individual and group interviews; observation and participant observations; document analysis; and case study research’ as cited in Webley, 933, 936. See also Creswell, above n 108, 189–93; see also ‘Qualitative researchers typically gather multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, documents, and audio-visual information rather than rely on a single data source. Then the researchers review all of the data, make sense of it, and organise it into categories or themes that cut across all of the data sources’ as cited in Creswell, 186.

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relocation, delineated the experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects

and informed the determinants of readiness in the context of cross-broader relocation. As noted

by Webley, ‘[i]ndividual interviews are used extensively by qualitative researchers examining

legal phenomena, and perceptions of law and the legal profession.’114 Similarly, the use of

individual interviews, as Hennink, Hutter and Bailey argue, allows the researcher to explore

the experiences of participants and complex issues that are less conducive to group

discussions.115 The semi-structured interview questions consisted of six skeleton topical areas.

In addition, the researcher exercised flexibility in anticipating and accommodating a host of

other issues and concerns presented by the participants during the field interviews. The topical

areas consisted of the:

1) reactions of participants to the announcement advanced by the Fijian Government ‘to

provide a permanent home to the entire populations of Kiribati and Tuvalu’116

(announcement);

2) extent of arrangements to respond to cross-border relocation spanning the legal, economic,

social, political dimensions at the local, national and regional levels by the Fijian Government

(readiness);

3) experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian

Government (internal relocation);

4) potential focus areas from the internal relocation projects that can be adopted in the context

of cross-broader relocation by the Fijian Government (readiness focus areas); and

5) historical migration arrangements of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji

(historical migration).

Alongside noted references in individual interviews, the researcher acknowledges the

possibility of bias in gathering data. ‘Biases can occur at any stage of information gathering,

selection, conversion, or processing’ as identified by Sipes.117 The researcher recognises that

data collection through individual interviews may affect data quality because participants may

carry ‘preconceived theories and expectations’ on cross-border relocation and the Fijian

114 Webley, above n 88, 937. 115 Monique Hennink, Inge Hutter and Ajay Bailey, Qualitative Research Methods (Sage Publications, 2011) 139–40. 116 Bainimarama, above n 7; see also Fiji Government, above n 36 and accompanying text; see also Elfriede Hermann and Wolfgang Kempf, ‘Climate Change and the Imagining of Migrations; Emerging Discourses on Kiribati’s Land Purchase in Fiji’ (2017) 29(2) The Contemporary Pacific 231, 231-405. 117 Richard Grey Sipes, ‘A Test for Coder Bias’ (1976) 11(3) Behavior Science Research 149, 150.

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Government’s stance on accommodating Pacific peoples to Fiji on grounds of climate

change.118

A purposive sampling strategy was deployed by the researcher to select research participants

so as to gain insights from various perspectives into the underlying aspects of readiness.119

Identifying issues, considerations and focus areas from local government bodies, non-

governmental bodies and communities in the context of internal relocation projects initiated

by the Fijian Government provided a basis to inform the criteria of readiness for cross-border

relocation of communities of origin to Fiji. In his review of an array of sampling approaches

in qualitative research, Robinson points out that ‘purposive sampling strategies are non-

random ways of ensuring that particular categories of cases within a sampling universe are

represented in the final sample of a project.’120 Robinson argues that ‘[t]he rational for

employing a purposive strategy is that the researcher assumes, based on their a-priori

theoretical understanding of the topic being studied, that certain categories of individuals may

have a unique, different or important perspective on the phenomenon in question and their

presence in the sample should be ensured.’121 In the same vein, Webley notes that the

‘researcher may seek out key people or events that are likely to provide rich sources of

information or data.’122 The researcher conducted field interviews with representatives from

government and non-government bodies in an attempt to seek rich data on the underlying

aspects of readiness. The information on the recruitment of participants was sourced from

material accessible to the public (google search; official websites of government ministries,

organisations and institutions; and print material) and snowball technique. The discussion that

follows expands on the recruitment of participants for the field research.

Prior to commencing the field research, ethical clearance was sought and granted from the

Office of Research Ethics and Integrity (OREI) at the Queensland University of Technology

(QUT). The application for human research ethics approval comprised of the principal

application form which set out three broad areas as follows: research proposal overview;

participant overview; and data management. In responding to the particulars of the form, the

researcher was required to support the application with a set of interview questions to conduct

118 Paul D Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Omrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design (Pearson, 11th ed, 2016) 260. 119 Webley, above n 88, 934; see also Creswell, above n 108, 189. 120 Oliver C Robinson, ‘Sampling in Interview-based Qualitative Research: A Theoretical and Practical Guide’ (2014) 11(1) Qualitative Research in Psychology 25, 32. 121 Ibid. 122 Webley, above n 88, 934.

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field interviews with his participants. Forty two questions for the first set of participants (state

actors) was prepared followed by twenty two questions for the second set of participants (non-

state actors). The researcher exercised flexibility with the interview questions submitted as

part of the ethics application. The researcher also allowed the interviews to take their natural

course using the interview questions as a guide for the categories of participants. The set of

questions were prepared from the topical areas (1-5) listed in the preceding page. Moreover,

other supporting material included the: participant information sheet; participant consent form;

participant recruitment strategy. The participant information sheet detailed the nature of the

research project, expected benefits for participating in the research, risks associated with the

interview and the research in question, maintenance of privacy and confidentiality of the

participant, and a complaints mechanism for the participant. The participant consent form set

out information about the voluntary participation by the participant and the opportunity to

withdraw at any stage of the field interview. It also offered the participant to voluntary consent

to audio recording. The researcher adopted email and verbal recruitment strategies to conduct

field interviews which was facilitated by QUT generic templates tailored respectively. As

noted by Flick, ‘[i]n the analysis of qualitative data, anonymity and confidentiality are central

issues from the angle of ethics - in transcription, in analysis itself, and most of all in presenting

results and excerpts from the data.’123 The anonymity of all participants was maintained and

their data rendered non-identifiable for the purpose of data analysis. The names, organisations,

agencies and institutions were sourced from publicly available material. A total of eighteen

participants (n = 18) participated in the field interviews, of which seven participants were state

actors and eleven were non-state actors. All interviews were conducted in English.

The first category of participants comprised state actors representing senior state officials with

the Fijian Government ministries. These included the:

1) Ministry of Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster

Management;

2) Ministry of Defence, National Security and Immigration;

3) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and

4) Climate Change Unit under the Ministry for Economy, Public Enterprises, Civil

Service and Communications.

123 Flick, above n 112, 103–4.

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The second category of participants comprised non-state actors representing a wide array of

institutions and agencies, such as civil society organisations, intergovernmental agencies and

United Nations organisations. These included the:

1) Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP);

2) Pacific Community (SPC);

3) Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS);

4) United Nations Development Program (UNDP);

5) United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

(UNESCAP);

6) Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC)

7) Asian Development Bank (ABD);

8) International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN);

9) Fiji Environmental Law Association (FELA); and

10) High Commission of Kiribati.

One of the reasons for selecting this category of participants (non-state actors) was because

these participants represent to some degree communities’ “voices” and institutional knowledge

beyond that of government machinery. Together, the categories of participants (state and non-

state) provided important insights into the determinants of readiness. The initial list of

participants was broadened by use of the snowballing technique to ensure that hard-to-reach

participants were included.124 As Hennink, Hutter and Bailey describe, this technique of

participant recruitment method ‘is based on using social networks in the community and

shared knowledge about individuals.’125 This technique is effective as it introduces the

researcher to “information-rich” participants.126 This technique enriched the data collection in

the field research, particularly with regard to participants’ experiences of the processes

involved with the internal relocation of communities adversely affected by the risks posed by

climate change impacts in Fiji. The experiences of these participants enabled them to relate

and extrapolate potential focus areas for determining the readiness of the Fijian Government

for cross-border community relocation of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change to Fiji.

Attention is now turned to the approaches adopted to code the data generated from the field

interviews conducted in Fiji followed by the strategies employed to analyse the qualitative

empirical data.127

124 Webley, above n 88, 934. 125 Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, above n 115, 100. 126 Ibid 85, 87, 100–1. 127 Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 137–45; see also Webley, above n 88, 940–5.

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Data Coding

There is widespread consensus among researchers and practitioners that there are no rigid

formulae in coding data that have been generated inductively (for discovery) or deductively

(for testing).128 Coding, as identified by Baralt, is an ‘activity that the researcher engages in,

while codes are the names or symbols used to stand for a group of similar items, ideas, or

phenomena that the researcher has noticed in his or her data set.’129 Similarly, coding ‘is about

naming segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorises, summaries, and

accounts for each piece of data’ as described by Thornberg and Charmaz. 130

The researcher adopted a manual approach to code the qualitative data obtained from the

interview transcripts. Manual coding allowed the researcher to conceptualise the determinants

of readiness and articulate the criteria for analysing readiness.131 Before proceeding with a

description of the coding process, it is important to mention the steps deployed by the

researcher to prepare the data.

The participants’ interview records were transcribed from the audio recordings of the field

interviews. A minority of participants (n=3) did not agree to audio recording. Their narratives

were captured by note-taking and then transcribed with their agreement.

As with the coding, transcription was undertaken solely by the researcher. The researcher

adopted a narrow transcription format as opposed to a broad format.132 This is because narrow

transcriptions present ‘quite precise and highly sophisticated’ detail from the conversational

data despite its ‘very time- and labour-intensive enterprise.’133 The researcher spent eight-ten

hours on average transcribing each hour of conversation. The transcripts were sent to

128 Jose P Esteves and Joan Pastor, ‘Using a Multimethod Approach to Research Enterprise Systems Implementations’ (2004) 2(2) Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods 69, 70; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 137–45; see also Webley, above n 88, 940–5; see also Epstein and Martin, above n 107, 909–12. 129 Melissa Baralt, ‘Coding Qualitative Data’ in Alison Mackey and Susan M Gass (eds), Research Methods in Second Language Acquisition: A Practical Guide (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 222–3. 130 Robert Thornberg and Kathy Charmaz, ‘Grounded Theory and Theoretical Coding’ in Uwe Flick (ed), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis (Sage Publications, 2014), 157. 131 Webley, above n 88, 942; see also ‘…the basic procedures…followed with traditional pen-and-paper methods or with other software programs’ as cited in Baralt, above n 129, 222. 132 Andrea Revesz, ‘Coding Second Language Data Validly and Reliably’ in Alison Mackey and Susan M Gass (eds), Research Methods in Second Language Acquisition: A Practical Guide (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 206. 133 Ibid.

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respective participants to confirm the accuracy of their narratives. The participants were also

provided with the opportunity to amend any section(s) of their transcripts. All the interview

transcripts were then used in coding and analysing the data. The discussion that follows

describes the coding process.

The researcher adopted an ‘inductive data-driven bottom-up approach’ to code the interview

transcripts of participants.134 According to Syed and Nelson, this approach involves identifying

common themes from the data.135 The first task (task 1) undertaken by the researcher involved

identifying segments or units of analysis present in the interview transcripts in relation to

emerging themes or criteria.136 For example, the allocation of “land” for cross-border

community relocation by the host country emerged in the data in connection with the

phenomenon under investigation. The researcher deployed three steps to code the data. The

first involved interacting with the data, for example, pertaining to “land”. The second involved

allocating a unique identifier/label. Lastly, a code “L” to reflect “land” (for example) was

attached as one of the emerging categories or criteria. The code was placed in the margins of

the transcript. These steps were undertaken manually and different coloured highlighters were

used to identify and highlight any other emerging themes or criteria present in the data.137 The

researcher followed these recursive steps for all 18 transcripts. The researcher continuously

interacted with and examined emerging patterns generated in the data.138 Moreover, the

frequency of the themes or criteria present in the transcripts was accounted for and the

transcripts were then compared and contrasted by the researcher.139 The final step for task one

was to generate a preliminary list of codes.

The second task (task 2) was identical to the first task, except that the researcher identified

emerging peripheral themes or criteria, sub-themes or sub-criteria connected to the core or

major theme or criteria identified in the first task. For example, “consent” by landowners to

make land available for the relocation of the communities of origin to the host country was a

134 Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 375, 377. 135 Ibid. 136 “unit of analysis” – ‘…section of qualitative data that will receive a code’ as cited in Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 375, 377. 137 ‘In traditional pen-and-paper methods of qualitative coding, coding is done manually by physically writing the code on the margin of a paper, right next to the text it represents. Codes done this way are usually in the form of letters that represent a code (e.g., ANZ for “anxiety”). The researcher may also choose to do color coding with different highlighter pens, and highlight the text to represent a coding decision…researchers manage codes by keeping the coding label, its definition, and an example in a separate codebook’ as cited in Baralt, above n 129, 231. 138 Ibid 223, 231–44. 139 Ibid.

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sub-theme that emerged in the data in connection with land. “Consent” was manually

highlighted with a different colour to represent its connection with the core category of “land”.

It was given a sub-code as “L-1”, that is “land-consent”. Task 2 was applied to all 18 transcripts

to identify various emerging sub-themes or sub-criteria. The researcher was also vigilant in

detecting any repeated core themes or criteria that might have been overlooked during task 1.

The themes/criteria were coloured manually using different highlighters. The themes/criteria

were then allocated different identifiers and sub-labels and organised under respective labels

in the margins of the transcripts. The preliminary list of codes generated from task 1 was then

revisited to account for sub-codes generated from task 2. Thus, a revised list of codes (codes

and sub-codes) was generated.

Once all coding was complete, the next task (task 3) involved systematically organising all the

codes and sub-codes and re-arranging them in terms of commonality from the most frequent

to the least frequent. The sub-codes corresponding to the core codes were highlighted manually

with the same colour. Other codes and sub-codes that remained independent were coloured

manually in different colours. A comprehensive list of codes (codes and sub-codes) was

generated from task 3.

The researcher observed that some codes and sub-codes emerged ‘directly from things that

participants’ said verbatim, commonly referred as in vivo (living) code.140 An in-vivo code is

defined as ‘a code that comes from the data itself…the word or phrase that is so descriptive

and illuminating that the researcher abstracts the data as its own code.’141 The refined list of

codes was used for interpretation and analysis.

The inductive approach used to code the qualitative data manually was useful. The researcher

originally considered using computer software as an alternative to manual coding but

determined that the manual coding approach was most appropriate. Recent research has

suggested that the intervention of computer generated software such as NVivo, has been useful

to code and analyse qualitative and quantitative data electronically.142 Each has its advantages

and drawbacks.143 Baralt, in citing the work of Johnston, distinguished between electronic and

140 Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 293. 141 Baralt, above n 129, 230–1. 142 Ryan S Hoover and Amy L Koerber, ‘Using NVivo to Answer the Challenges of Qualitative Research in Professional Communication: Benefits and Best Practices’ (2011) 54(1) IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication 68, 76; see also Nancy L Leech and Anthony J Onwuegbuzie, ‘Beyond Constant Comparison Qualitative Data Analysis: Using NVivo’ (2011) 26(1) School of Psychology Quarterly 70, 70–84. 143 See above n 121 and accompanying text.

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manual modes of coding and analysis.144 He pointed out that the former ‘allows for closer

examination of the process, whereas’ the latter ‘focuses on the final product.’145 One drawback

with the use of electronic software is that it has the potential to ‘turn the process into a

ritualistic act where the researcher continuously codes documents without interpretive

introspection.’146 One of the key reasons the researcher conducted manual coding in the present

research was because the “data was speaking to the researcher”. What this meant was that

whilst conducting field interviews with the participants and transcribing the narratives, various

themes or focus areas explicitly spoke for “themselves”. For example, the issues of land,

sovereignty and funding immediately became apparent from the transcripts for the

phenomenon under investigation. Having discussed the steps deployed to code the data,

attention is now turned to the approaches used for the data analysis

Data Analysis

The qualitative data obtained from the transcripts were coded and analysed simultaneously

and separately to examine the underlying aspects of readiness.147 According to Gray, ‘the task

of data collection and analysis is not necessarily sequential but can be an iterative process.’148

Each process informed the other with respect to discovering emerging themes or focus areas

and the frequency with which they occurred in the data. Furthermore, the preliminary findings

generated from these processes were compared, contrasted and integrated with the existing

body of knowledge and empirical studies on the phenomena under investigation using a

grounded theory approach, as discussed earlier.149 Briefly, ‘[t]he term grounded refers to the

idea that the theory that emerges from the study is derived from and grounded in the data that

have been collected in the field rather than taken from the research literature.’150 Leedy and

Ormrod point out that ‘[n]o matter what form (verbal statement, visual model, or series of

hypothesis) the theory takes, it is based entirely on the data collected.’151 Similarly, Esteves

and Pastor argue that ‘by using grounded theory a theory is inductively derived from the study

of the phenomenon.’152 The grounded theory approach of investigating and conceptually

144 Baralt, above n 108, 224–9. 145 Ibid 228. 146 See above n 142 and accompanying text. 147 Webley, above n 88, 943–4; see also Thornberg and Charmaz, above n 130, 154. 148 Gray, above n 112, 511. 149 Thornberg and Charmaz, above n 130, 154; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 142. 150 Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 142. 151Ibid 143. 152 Esteves and Pastor, above n 128, 76.

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analysing the underlying aspects of readiness enabled the researcher to systematically organise

similar and contrasting themes or focus areas from the data which “spoke for themselves”.153

The processes used shaped the research design and enabled the conduct of the empirical legal

research.154 Attention is now turned to the quality of data generated from the field interviews

and the generalisability of the empirical evidence.155

Multi-method and Triangulation

The researcher used a multimethod approach complemented by triangulation to scaffold the

research design and support the quality of the data generated.156 The term multi-method has

come to be used to refer to the integration of ‘different sorts of quantitative methods, or

different sorts of qualitative methods (such as interviews and textual analysis)’ for data

analysis.157  The data generated from the qualitative and doctrinal research techniques were

triangulated. Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe and Neville, define triangulation as

‘the use of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive

understanding of phenomena.’158 The researcher employed ‘method triangulation which

involves the use of multiple methods of data collection about the same phenomenon.’159 For

example, the inductive themes and focus areas, such as land, sovereignty, funding and

citizenship, which emerged from the empirical evidence were triangulated with the themes and

focus areas that emerged from the large volume of published studies and research literature

(availability of land, regulation, participation, for example).160 In addition to using

153 Gray, above n 112, 505; see also ‘Process means showing the evolving nature of events by noting why and how action/interaction (in the form of events, doings, or happenings) will change, stay the same, or regress’ as cited in Gray, 511. 154 Webley, above n 88, 928–9, 936; see also Creswell, above n 108, 187. 155 Leedy and Omrod, above n 118, 86–7, 260–1, 301, 311–12. 156 Ibid. 157 Spillman, above n 65, 197. 158 Carter et al, above n 65, 545. 159 Ibid. 160 Meghan D. McGinty, et al, ‘Legal Preparedness for Hurricane Sandy: Authority to Order Hospital Evacuation or Sheltering-in-Place in the Mid-Atlantic Region’ (2016) 14(2) Health Security 78–85. See also Rebecca Barber, ‘Legal Preparedness for the Facilitation of International Humanitarian Assistance in the Aftermath of Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam’ (2018) 8(1) Asian Journal of International Law 143–65; see also Marleen Buizer, David Humphreys and Wil de Jong, ‘Climate Change and Deforestation: The Evolution of an Intersecting Policy Domain’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science & Policy 1–11. See also Apriwan and S. Anita Afriani, ‘Local Readiness towards REDD+ UNFCCC Scheme (Study in Province of West Sumatera Indonesia)’ (2015) 28 Procedia Environmental Sciences 649, 649–56; see also Nicholas K Tagliarino, ‘Encroaching on Land and Livelihoods: How National Expropriation Laws Measure up Against International Standards’ (Working Paper, World Resources Institute, 2016) 1–44, 23; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 103–21.

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triangulation to ‘compare multiple data sources in search of common themes’, it was necessary

to ‘minimise some of the concerns surrounding the validity and reliability’, that is ‘increasing

the robustness of results…’161

There has been a shift by qualitative researchers to employ terminologies of dependability and

integrity in qualitative study.162 This is because difficulties can arise when ‘applying positivist

interpretations of reliability to qualitative research, which is less concerned with quantity and

distribution and more with people’s understandings of the meanings of social facts.’163 As

described by Syed and Nelson, ‘…the closest thing to reliability is the concept of rigor…is a

product of the entire research process and derives from the researcher’s presence, the nature

of the interaction between researcher and participants, the triangulation of data, the

interpretation of perceptions and rich, thick descriptions…’164 They add that ‘the rigor is as

much a product of the researcher and research context, bias, and subjectivity as it is the data.’165

There are also explicit references, such as ‘quality, credibility, trustworthiness, confirmability

and interpretive rigour’ to connote the veracity of data present in qualitative research.166

The rigour of the qualitative data in the present research was not limited to the theme/focus

area level (land, sovereignty, for example). It was underpinned by multiple data collection

methods (qualitative and doctrinal) and in-depth analysis. The multilayered methods employed

allowed the researcher to compare, contrast and integrate themes/focus areas and examine

‘consistencies or inconsistencies among the data.’167 These methods further allowed the

161 Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 375, 376; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 86–8, 260, 301, 312; see also Mukhopadhyay and Gupta, above n 88, 109–10; see also Cole, above n 65, 27; see also Esteves and Pastor, above n 128, 73–4; see also Mandy Burton, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 62; see also ‘Reflexivity is a term that has come to be used in variety of ways…It is important to recognise, as part of reflexivity, that research is an active process, in which accounts of the world are produced through selective observation and interpretation of what is seen and heard, through asking particular questions and seeking to understand what is said in reply, through writing fieldnotes and transcribing audio- and video-recordings…’ as cited in Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography Principles in Practice (Routledge, 4th ed, 2019) 15, 17. 162 Flick, above n 112, 368; see also Webley, above n 88, 935; see also Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 260; see also ‘Data by qualitative researchers must be both (a) reasonably accurate with regard to the characteristics and dynamics of the entities to situation being studied (this is validity) and (b) consistent in the patterns and dynamics they reflect (this is reliability)’ as cited in Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 260. 163 Webley, above n 88, 935. 164 Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 383. 165 Ibid. 166 Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 88; see also ‘trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability as criteria for qualitative research’ as cited in Flick, above n 112, 376. 167 Leedy and Ormrod, above 118, 260.

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researcher to uncover new layers of meaning, or theory to develop, or a more nuanced

understanding of readiness under investigation.168 Having described multimethod and

triangulation strategies as part of the research design, attention is now turned to some of the

limitations of the study.

2.5 Research Limitations

The generalisability of the results is subject to at least five limitations. First, the researcher

acknowledges potential English language differences when conducting field interviews with

participants. This is because some participants ‘may have limited knowledge of English’ and

familiarity with technical terms which may have been ‘borrowed phrases, essentially

becoming loanwords’ for participants.169 The interpretation of technical terms may have

resonated differently with participants when conducting the field interviews in English. The

researcher offered explanations to participants where required and exercised caution when

coding and analysing the field data to mitigate the potential language barrier. Second,

representatives from the private sector such as the Fiji Commerce and Employers Federation

and private legal practice, for example, were not included in the list of participants. Other

institutions, bodies and agencies that were included in the participants list, such as the Human

Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission (HRADC), Delegation of the European Union

for the Pacific (EU Pacific), International Federation of Red Cross (Fiji), The World Bank

Group, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Office of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), could not be reached due

to the non-availability of senior representatives during the period that the field interviews were

conducted in Fiji. Their participation would have reinforced the existing core themes and focus

areas that emerged from the data by existing participants. Alternatively, the participants could

have illumined additional themes and focus areas to identify the aspects of readiness specific

to the Fiji context. Third, communities that have already been relocated internally by the Fijian

Government, or those communities marked to be relocated in the near future, were not

included in the list of participants. The head of a village (Turaga-ni-Koro), including members

resident in a particular village community, would have provided firsthand experiences of their

168 Ibid 86, 260; see also Gray, above n 112, 502. 169 Peter Rudiak-Gould, ‘Promiscuous corroboration and climate change translation: A case study from the Marshall Islands’ (2012) 22 Global Environment Change 46, 48; see also ‘…translator can resort to…foreignizing, source based translation…simply imports the foreign term as a loanword…resort to compensation, circumlocution…in which a poor translation is used but compensated for with additional comments…final option…translator…perform a domesticating translation in which the mismatch is simply ignored, and the closest lexical equivalent is used, discrepancies be damned’ as cited in Rudiak-Gould, 49-50.

51

relocation and the manner in which the Fijian Government and other agencies engaged with

the whole internal relocation project. Fourth, the Banaban and the Vaitupuan communities,

located on the islands of Rabi and Kioa respectively, in the group of islands in Fiji were

excluded due to time constraints in terms of travelling to these two islands. A further limitation

was the duration of the research project. The researcher acknowledges that the participant pool

could have been expanded to include the host of communities that have experienced internal

relocation (Vunidogoloa, Narikoso) and cross-border relocation (Rabi and Kioa) employing a

bottom-up approach in gathering the empirical data.170 The researcher further acknowledges

that the data would have uncovered personal and collective community-centred accounts of

significant drawbacks and advantages with respect to a whole-of-government response to the

human security and protection arrangements on these settlements and islands. The empirical

data would have been beneficial in enhancing the existing interview data integrating a variety

of perspectives. In this thesis, a small pool of participants were selected based on their ability

to contribute diversity of views within a limited time. Further research is needed to include the

host communities. Lastly, senior representatives from the Kiribati and Tuvalu Governments

were outside the scope of the research with the exception of an I-Kiribati national’s

perspective, which was recorded. The present research was also limited by the lack of

information on the readiness by the States of origin (Kiribati and Tuvalu) in terms of the legal

and/or alternative arrangements for its citizens to relocate them across sovereign borders on

the grounds of climate change to the host country (Fiji). The researcher acknowledges that

with the existing sample size for this study, caution must be applied, as the empirical evidence

might not be transferrable to inform decision makers, planning and programs addressing large-

scale cross-border relocation of communities from the impacts of climate change.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical evidence of the present research into

investigating the determinants of readiness offers a starting point for further comprehensive

targeted research into readiness in the Fijian context. Moreover, there is also abundant room

for Pacific Island governments at a regional level to identify tailored and pragmatic responses

to address cross-border relocation, which presents an opportunity for future targeted research.

170 Cosmin Corendea, ‘Climate Law and Governance: Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific’ (Working Paper No 3, United Nations Development Program, University of Cambridge, University of Nairobi and Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2016) 15-17; see also ‘…migration process in the Pacific should…be implicitly addressed, in a local bottom-up context, placing climate-induced migrant at the core of the problem and to be considered at the national and regional level when developing policy and design actions around migration due to climate change’ as cited in Corendea, 17.

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2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the methodological approach and research design adopted by the

researcher is suitable for investigating the underlying determinants of readiness present

through RQ 1 and RQs 1 (a–c). This chapter has also demonstrated the usefulness of adopting

the interpretive paradigm underpinned by qualitative research tradition in investigating and

understanding the determinants of readiness present from real and practical events, lived

experiences and behaviours of human beings, corresponding with RQ 1 (b). Moreover, this

chapter has also shown the extensive multilayered processes and tasks (participant recruitment,

ethical clearance, colour coding, for example) adopted by the researcher. These was then

integrated into each stage of the research design (data collection, coding and analysis) for in-

depth analysis of the empirical data generated from data obtained to answer RQ 1 (b). To

enhance the quality of the data generated from both doctrinal and empirical research

approaches, a multimethod approach followed by the technique of triangulation was employed

to bolster the robustness of the investigation into the underlying determinants of readiness.

This chapter also detailed the limitations of the investigation. The multitude of approaches,

techniques and strategies is indicative of the rigour of the data from in-depth analysis and the

overall quality of the investigation into the determinants of readiness.

This chapter has laid the foundation for chapters four, five and six. Chapter four examines

Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of mobility within and across sovereign

borders during the period of British colonial government administration of territories in the

Pacific Islands region.171

Chapter five outlines the determinants of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives.

Chapter six reports on the findings of the empirical research and details the themes and focus

areas of readiness specific to the Fiji context. The determinants of readiness are analysed in

chapter seven to inform the criteria for readiness. The next chapter provides a comprehensive

review of the body of knowledge and published studies on human mobility in the context of

slow-onset environmental change under existing international arrangements from a legal

perspective, including developments at the Pacific regional level and gaps in the literature.

     

171 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78.

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Chapter 3: Human Mobility of Climate Vulnerable Populations of Pacific Island Nations and International Arrangements under International Law

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the research design underpinning the thesis and the

methodological approach adopted to undertake the field research to answer RQ 1(b). This

chapter presents an in-depth review of the body of research spanning established scientific

evidence, including the growing evidence in the field of climate-induced displacement and

migration studies. It also identifies and explores some key initiatives developed in the Pacific

regional context that demonstrate the growing concern about, and recognition of, climate-

induced displacement and migration issues in the coming decades. This chapter also includes

a review of the literature and the scholarly and policy debate surrounding responses in the

context of the legal, institutional and governance arrangements to address mobility within

countries and across international borders on the grounds of climate change. It then considers

the growing scholarly debate to advance a rights-based approach embedded in soft law

mechanisms as an alternative to respond to climate change-induced displacement and

migration in contemporary international policy fora and in international law.172 Importantly,

this chapter also introduces planned relocation as a strand of human mobility to underpin future

climate change-induced displacement and migration within countries and across international

borders, which is widely acknowledged in the scholarly discourse and global policy

deliberations in contemporary times.173 It considers the lessons and experiences learned from

the resettlement of populations from development projects and historical population

movements in the Pacific as to their relevance in the future relocation of communities on the

grounds of climate change. It also identifies some of the key considerations in this thesis,

172 McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 2, 13–23; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 163; see also McAdam, above n 10, 15, 237–66. 173 See above n 172 and accompanying text.  

54

which are developed in later chapters, to complement the analysis of readiness of the Fijian

Government for cross-border relocation of climate vulnerable communities from Kiribati and

Tuvalu to Fiji in the future. This chapter concludes with a brief summary.

3.2 Brief Synopsis for Investigation

Anthropogenic climate change is increasingly recognised as a pertinent global phenomenon

characterised to accelerate the trajectory of human mobility in the twenty-first century,

particularly for Pacific Island nations. There is widespread consensus and high confidence

among the scientific community that ‘climate variability (temperature, precipitation, oceanic

circulation, etc.) and shifts in climate patterns associated with glacial melt, seas level rise and

desertification’ are projected to globally reorder the ‘patterns of climate-driven human

mobility (migration, displacement and planned relocation).’174 This is particularly pertinent

for regions such as the ‘low-lying islands, deltas, coastal zones, glacial-fed water systems’,

which will become more vulnerable and ‘sensitive to climatic stressors’ in the coming

decades.175 These views are shared by institutions—such as the IPCC and World

Meteorological Organization (WMO), international development and operational

organisations and institutions—such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB),

United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) and

International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as migration scholars and

practitioners—such as Jane McAdam, John Campbell, Olivia Warrick and Jon Barnett.

There are some immediately dependable conclusions in the scientific literature and published

studies that establish and explain the correlation between human mobility and converging

human insecurities (food, livelihoods and health for example) in response to the debilitating

impacts of climate change on Pacific Island nations and low-lying coastal communities.176 This

literature confirms that the strands of human mobility, that is, displacement, migration and

relocation, in response to sudden-onset events (disasters, floods, cyclones) within sovereign

borders is already a global phenomenon.177 It also confirms and reinforces that human mobility

across international borders in response to slow-onset environmental change (desertification,

land degradation, sea level rise) is imminent, particularly in the case of Pacific Island nations

174 Warner et al, above n 37, 9, 14–15; see also ‘…climate-related extremes, such as droughts, floods, cyclones and wildfires, reveal significant vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystem and many human systems to current climate variability’ as cited in Pachauri et al, above n 33, 8. 175 See above n 174 and accompanying text. 176 Adger et al, above n 37, 758–60, 768–9. 177 Ibid 767.   

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that are on the “frontlines” of climate change.178 From a broader perspective, a variety of

pragmatic and coordinated responses with regard to the protection regime (c.f. refugee law,

human rights law and complementary protection), legal (security), policy (development) and

migration governance (environmental migration) arrangements at all levels (global, regional,

and national) are urgently needed.179 The last section of this chapter addresses the international

response to human mobility from the impacts of climate change.

It is widely acknowledged in both the legal and non-legal literature that ‘Small Island

Developing States (SIDS), as which all Pacific Island Countries (PICs) identity, have been

labelled as some of the most vulnerable places to climate change’ among other nations (Alaska,

Bangladesh and Maldives, for example).180 This is because ‘majority of communities,

infrastructure, agricultural areas and freshwater supplies are situated in coastal zones exposing

low-elevation PICs to extreme tides, wave, surge events and sea level rise.’181 It is also

acknowledged that one of the implications of this is the ‘complete disappearance of people’s

land on islands, exacerbating livelihood risks due to loss of economic and social assets’,

inevitably resulting in some islands becoming uninhabitable in the future.182 This suggests

178 Christopher B Field et al, ‘Technical Summary’ in Christopher B Field (ed), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects (Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 62–3; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1616, 1619–20. See also Sam Adelman, ‘Human Rights in the Paris Agreement: Too Little, Too Late?’ (2018) 7(1) Transnational Environmental Law 17, 21; see also Dina Ionesco, Daria Mokhnacheva and Francois Gemenne, The Atlas of Environmental Migration (Routledge, 2017) IX (‘Atlas Report’); see also Walter Kalin, ‘The Nansen Initiative: Building Consensus on Displacement in Disaster Contexts’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 5, 5. See also ‘…slow-onset environmental change or degradation process (such as desertification) affecting people who are directly dependent on the environment for their livelihood and causing them livelihood stress’ as cited in Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, ‘Defining Environmental Migration’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 10, 10; see also Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘19.3 million displaced by disasters but mother nature not to blame’ (Media Release, 20 July 2015) < http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201507-globalEstimates-2015/20150706-GE-2015Press-release-FINAL-v1.pdf>. See also The Nansen Initiative, Norwegian Refugee Council, Prepare and Adapt: Climate Change and Human Mobility in Paris and Beyond (27 November 2015) Platform on Disaster Displacement Follow-up to the Nansen Initiative <https://disasterdisplacement.org/prepare-and-adapt-climate-change-and-human-mobility-in-paris-and-beyond>; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 19–20; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 179 McAdam, above n 10, 1, 39–51, 52–98, 267–70; see also Alexander Betts, ‘Towards a Soft Law Framework for the Protection of Vulnerable Irregular Migrants’ (2010) 22(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 209, 209–36. 180 Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54, 1; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86–7; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–166; see also Roger-Mark De Souza et al, ‘Re-framing Island Nations as Champions of Resilience in the Face of Climate Change and Disaster Risk’ (Working Paper No 17, United Nations University Institute of Environment and Human Security, February 2015), 2; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 14, 17. 181 See above n 180 and accompanying text. 182 Ibid.

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mobility of ‘Pacific island communities across international borders’ formidable in the

future.183

The body of research from scientific climate assessments and published reports on the

observed and projected impacts of climate change on human systems (biophysical, coastal

ecosystem, terrestrial biodiversity for example) of small island nations184 establishes the

veracity of the problem and the evidence to extend the claim of potential wholesale relocation

of Pacific Island communities across international borders in the future on grounds of climate

change.185

3.3 Scientific Basis of Climate Change

3.3.1 Scientific Climate Evidence

As discussed in chapter one, the Fifth Assessment Report (AR 5) of the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirms that ‘warming of the climate system is

unequivocal.’186 The IPCC AR5 scientific assessments project with ‘95% certainty that human

activities have been the dominant cause of observed warning since the mid-20th century.’187

Due to past global emission trends, further warming from anthropogenic processes, such as

‘population size, economic activity, lifestyle, energy use, land use patterns and technology’, is

reported to significantly escalate and amplify the existing recorded adverse impacts in the

twenty-first century and beyond.188

One of the central findings by the IPCC Working Group I (WG I) to the Fifth Assessment

Report (AR5) (IPCC WG I AR5) confirms that ‘global average surface temperatures for the

183 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–166; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86-105; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 372. 184 McAdam, above n 13, 283. 185 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625. 186 Stocker et al, above n 28, 14 (SPM B - E, 4, Chps 1, 8); see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 1–41, 16–17; see also Pacific Community 1.50C, above n 28; see also Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, above n 28. 187 CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 188 Allan Lavell et al ‘2012 Climate Change: New Dimensions in Disaster Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability, and Resilience’ in Christopher B. Field (eds), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 25–64, 29. See also Pachauri et al, above n 33, 8; see also ‘In 2010, in Cancun, Governments agreed on a long-term global goal (LTGG) to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels’ as cited in Alliance of Small States, ‘Small Islands Propose Below 1.50C Global Goal for Paris Agreement’ (Media Release, 8 June 2015) <http://aosis.org/small-islands-propose-below-1-5%cb%9ac-global-goal-for-paris-agreement/>.

57

period 2081-2100 (relative to 1986-2005) is projected to rise from 0.30C-1.7oC under the

lowest emissions scenario to 2.60C-4.8oC under the highest emissions scenario.’189 The IPCC

reports that the impact of these projections on small island nations is twofold. In terms of

projections under the lower emission scenario, the impacts of climate change will threaten the

natural systems of small island communities such as ‘risk of loss of marine and coastal

ecosystems, biodiversity and the ecosystem goods, functions and services they provide for

coastal livelihoods.’190 With respect to the higher emission scenario, the impacts will ‘increase

the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts to which it will be difficult to adapt,

such as disrupted livelihoods due to storm surges, coastal flooding and sea level rise’

extending to ‘increase risk of death, injury, or ill-health.’191 The contribution from the IPCC

Working Group II to the AR5 (IPCC AR5 WG II) confirms that while small islands contribute

only negligibly to global emissions, the adverse impacts such as rising sea levels on them are

palpable.192 Similarly McAdam, in her book Climate Change, Forced Migration, and

International Law, asserts that ‘small island countries emit less than 1 per cent of global GHGs,

their small physical size, exposure to natural disasters and climate extremes, very open

economies, and low adaptive capacity make them particularly susceptible, and less resilient,

to climate change.’193

At the Paris twenty-first Conference of Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the campaign by Pacific Island nations of “1.5 to

stay alive”, and a joint global effort by global leaders and Pacific small island developing states

to limit global mean surface temperature received robust traction in the Paris Agreement on

climate change adopted in 2015 and entered into force in 2016.194 The states signatories to the

189 CDKN Report, above n 4, 6, 10–11; see also Stocker et al, above n 28, 20 [SPM-E1]. 190 CDKN Report, above n 189; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 39. 191 See above n 190 and accompanying text. 192 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618. 193 McAdam, above n 10, 19. 194 Paris Climate Change Agreement, opened for signature 16 February 2016, 63.2016 UNTS XXVII.7d (entered into force 4 November 2016) art 2(1)(a) (‘Paris Agreement’); see also UN Department of Public Information, ‘Paris Climate Agreement to enter into force on 4 November’ on UN Department of Public Information, Sustainable Development Goals (5 October 2016) <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/10/paris-climate-agreement-to-enter-into-force-on-4-november/>. See also Patricia Espinosa and Salaheddine Mezouar, ‘Paris Enters into Force - Celebration and Reality Check’ on UN Climate Change Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (4 November 2016) <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-agreement/paris-agreement-enters-into-force-celebration-and-reality-check/>. See also: ‘The Paris Agreement is a legal instrument that will guide the process for universally acting on climate change. It is a hybrid of legally binding and nonbinding provisions. The Agreement consists of a core agreement that governs the international process will be binding on parties, while there are elements that are not part of the legally binding agreement. These parts, such as the intended nationally determined contributions, may be binding at the national level’ as cited in UN Department of Public Information, ‘Paris Agreement Frequently Asked Questions’ on UN Department of Public Information, Sustainable

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Paris Agreement committed to ensuring that its increase was limited to well below 20C, as

compared with pre-industrial levels, and attempting to limit it to 1.50C.195 The COP 21 also

provided an opportunity to states parties in the margins of the climate summit to address issues

of ‘human mobility arising from the impacts of climate change.’196 However, climate change

as one of the drivers for population displacement and migration was not strongly reflected in

the wording of the Paris Agreement. The inclusion of the term “migrants” appears in the

preamble of the Paris Agreement rather than as a dedicated stand-alone section.197 This

suggests that the global community has not considered climate change-induced human

mobility in much detail compared to low-carbon development, financing mechanisms, and

reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), which have been

integrated into the operative part of the Paris Agreement.198

The scientific evidence demonstrates fine distinctions between the high- and low-emission

assessments. For example, Schleussner et al claim that:

the difference between 1.50C and 20C marks the transition between an upper limit of present-day natural variability and a new climate regime in terms of heat extremes globally, and that changes in water variability and local agricultural yields are already unevenly distributed between world regions at 1.50C and even more so at 20C. Under a 20C warming, coastal tropical regions and islands may face the combined effects of a near-complete loss of tropical coral reefs, on-going sea-level rise above present-day rates over the 21st century and increased threats by coastal flooding and inundation.199

Development Goals (12 December 2015) <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/the-paris-agreement-faqs/>. See also United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, UN Chief Offers Thanks to Civil Society for its Role in Paris Agreement (14 December 2015) <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/12/un-chief-offers-thanks-to-civil-society-for-its-role-in-paris-agreement/>; see also Sebastian Oberthur, ‘Compliance Under the Evolving Climate Change Regime’ in Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard G Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 120–3. See also Benoit Mayer, ‘Human Rights in the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 109, 109–11; see also PCCM Survey Fact Sheet, above n 3; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above n 48, 1. 195 Paris Agreement, above n 194 and accompanying text; see also Carl-Friedrich Schleussner et al, Differential Climate Impacts for Policy-relevant Limits to Global Warming: The Case of 1.50C and 20C’ (2016) 7(2) Earth Systems Dynamics 327, 327–8; see also Carl-Friedrich Schleussner et al, ‘Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris Agreement Temperature Goal’ (2016) 6 Nature Climate Change 827, 827–30. 196 UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above n 48, 1; see also United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security, ‘Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project Makes Waves at COP 21’(Media Release, 16 December 2015) <http://unu.edu/news/news/pacific-climate-change-and-migration-project-makes-waves-at-cop21.html>. 197 Paris Agreement, above n 194; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above n 48; see also Mayer, above n 194, 109–17. 198 Paris Agreement, above n 194, art 4–10. 199 Schleussner et al, ‘Differential climate impacts’, above n 195, 343–4.

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A special report by the IPCC working group to the Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC AR6) is

marked for release in 2023 during the UNFCCC inaugural global stocktake.200 This is when

the States signatories to the Paris Agreement ‘will review the progress made towards ensuring

that global warming remains below 20C and further efforts to prevent it rising as high as

1.50C.’201 In light of the Special Report 1.5 0C highlighted earlier in chapter one, the permanent

representative to the United Nations and Solomon Islands Ambassador to the United States,

Colin Beck pointed out:

The issue now is the impact of 1.50C reaching us in less than five years, much of our livelihoods in the Pacific islands will be impacted. The IPCC 1.50C Special Report…tell us, the consequences and impacts of a global temperature increase to 1.50C or more above pre-industrial and how important the 1.50C is for our survival. Not just for the vulnerable countries, but for everyone.202

Global leaders need to take ownership of the Paris Agreement and raise the ambition for global

climate action to limit GHG emission levels to 1.50C, particularly for a chance of survival of

Pacific Island communities.203 The special reports are timely and awaited to predict the future

trajectory and propensity of GHGs on natural and human systems.204 Having examined the

scientific projections on Pacific Island nations and what it may potentially translate to in terms

of the habitability of small island communities, attention is now turned to the impacts of

climate change on the food security of Pacific Island communities. This adds to the dimension

of insecurity of Pacific Island communities, which advance the claim that a strong case may

exist for human migration in the future.

3.3.2 Food Insecurity and Future Livelihoods

The IPCC AR5 projects that ‘climate change will progressively threaten food security and

economic growth in complex ways in small island nations.’205 The IPCC AR5 maintains that

the marine ecosystem is ‘linked to the ongoing coastal and subsistence food productivity of

200 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘The IPCC and the Sixth Assessment cycle’ (Media Release, October 2017) 1. 201 Ibid; see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.50C Approved by Governments’ (Media Release, No 24, 8 October 2018) 1–4; see also Allen et al, above n 1; see also Hoegh-Guldbery et al, above n 2. 202 Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, above n 28; see alsoAllen et al, above n 1, 1-32. 203 Allen et al, above n 1, 6–19; see also Hoegh-Guldbery et al, above n 2, 177–181, 212–21, 231. 204 See also above n 203 and accompanying text. 205 CDKN Report, above n 4, 2; see also The term ‘food security is determined by a range of interacting factors including poverty, water availability, food policy agreements and regulations, and the demand for productive land for alternative uses’ as cited in Adger et al, above n 37, 763.

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small tropical islands and wellbeing of many island communities.’206 The IPCC AR5 confirms

the risks of them experiencing adverse impacts arising from climate change. 207 Moreover, the

IPCC AR5 projects ‘[t]he annual economic damage of ocean-acidification-induced coral reef

loss by the end of the century to be US$528-870 billion’, which in its assessment ‘represents

a very large Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss for the economies for many coastal regions

or small islands that rely on the ecological goods and services of coral reefs.’208 The

contribution from the IPCC Working Groups I, II and III to the AR5 in the Synthesis Report

(IPCC SYR) concedes that ‘global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity in

sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other

ecosystem services.’209 The IPCC SYR claims that the increase in competition for water in

subtropical regions will adversely impact food security, and that this will include the

production of food, access to food and the stability of food process.210

Supplementing IPCC (AR5, SYR) claims, the inaugural field research in 2011 by the ADB on

the potential effects of climate change on the food security of nations in the Pacific Island

region reported that climate change-induced projected impacts on ‘land, soil and water

resources, agricultural productions systems (including those of livestock and fisheries),

infrastructure, and social (community) systems will in turn exacerbate the consequences of

climate change on food security.’211 It recorded that agricultural production per capita for the

last 45 years in the Pacific region declined.212 It further recorded that the ‘agricultural output

per capita’ is projected to further decelerate due to climate change-induced natural disasters

and the increase in sea level.’213 The ADB noted disruptive habitat disturbances from

destructive practices such as coastal trawling for fish, pollution from land-based sources such

as ‘inappropriate coastal development and industrial wastewater’ and the overharvesting as

well as the misuse of resources as examples of the food security vulnerability of Pacific Island

communities.214 The ADB acknowledges that given the ‘uncertainty of future climates,

assessments of the impacts of climate change on Pacific agriculture can only be broad’, and

206 CDKN Report, above n 4, 12; see also Mohammed Ahmed et al, ‘Food Security and Climate Change in the Pacific: Rethinking the Options’ (Research Report, Asian Development Bank, September 2011) viii (‘ADB Food Security Report’). 207 See above n 206 and accompanying text. See also Global Landscapes Forum, Climate Change and Migration (2018) < http://events.globallandscapesforum.org/climate-change-and-migration/>. 208 CDKN Report, above n 4, 12. 209 Pachauri et al, above n 33, 14. 210 Ibid. 211 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, viii, xix, 1, 8, 28-31; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 1621, 1632. 212 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, viii. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid 8–9, 34.

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may lend itself to unprecedented human movement in the longer term.215 It also acknowledges

that ‘climate change impacts and food security vulnerability bear the influence of economic

growth, poverty reduction, status of environment, resource productivity, and improvement of

infrastructure and social services.’216

Similarly, the 2016 Post Disaster Needs Assessment Report (PDNAR) compiled by the Fijian

Government in partnership with the international development community (World Bank,

United Nations, European Union, for example) reported that in Fiji in 2016 Cyclone Winston

destroyed agricultural crops, ‘compromising the livelihoods of 60 percent of Fiji’s

population.’217 The preliminary findings from the ADB and the PDNAR closely mirror the

IPCC’s assessment of the adverse effects of climate change on the food security of small island

nations.218

3.4 Climate-induced Displacement and Migration Outlook and Planned Relocation

3.4.1 Susceptibility to Environmental Change

Section 3.3 presents an account of the scientific evidence and a number of published studies

and reports to establish the gravity of the climate change problem, particularly for Pacific

Island nations. Pacific Islanders face potential migration in the longer term. The following

section sets out two areas on population displacement widely documented in the literature and

in the growing body of research on adaptation to respond to climate change by Pacific Island

communities. The first relates to Pacific Island nations’ high susceptibility to sudden- and

slow-onset environmental change and displacement.219 This encapsulates discussions related

to rural-urban migration, mobility decisions and the drivers for human mobility, which are

interconnected with population displacement and migration. Another area of discussion relates

to climate-induced migration as an adaptation strategy of last resort, particularly for Pacific

low-lying coastal communities. This research acknowledges other widely investigated and

215 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, 30. 216 Ibid 34–5; see also ‘Other threats to future food security in the Pacific region include rapid urban population growth, land degradation and declining land productivity, erosion of crop genetic diversity, coastal and coral degradation and declining productivity of fisheries, and breakdowns in traditional social safety nets’ as cited in ADB Food Security Report, ix. 217 Ministry of Economy, ‘Disaster Recovery Framework: Tropical Cyclone Winston 20 February 2016’ (Research Report, Ministry of Economy, World Bank, United Nations, European Union, Asian Development Bank, Pacific Community, September 2016) 2; see also: ‘combined damage and loss reached 20 percent of Fiji’s GDP in 2015’ as cited in Ministry of Economy, 2. 218 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, viii–ix, 8; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 761–2; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 12. 219 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370.

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prominent focus areas in the growing body of research and ongoing discourse on global

migration agendas. These concern the international arrangements to facilitate and support

climate-induced population movements, the governance of migration and other arrangements

(location, scale and the integration of communities for example) by the host and destination

countries, which intersect with the discourse on climate vulnerable populations and regions

and adaptation to climate change (two focus areas).220 Some of these areas are briefly

considered further on in this chapter. Attention is now turned to the two focus areas, which are

discussed in turn.

The observed (shoreline change, groundwater resources and human health, for example) and

potential (sea level rise, food security, extreme dry/wet events, for example) impacts of climate

change on Pacific Island nations can be attributed to their remote physical geography, spatial

topography and frequent exposure to weather-related hazards (such as heatwaves, floods and

cyclones, for example) and slow-onset hazards (sea level rise and desertification, for

example).221 This is reinforced by the joint research report of the Internal Displacement

Monitoring Centre (iDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) on global disaster-

induced displacement (iDMC 2016), which reported that ‘[S]IDs face disproportionately high

disaster risk because their mostly low-lying, coastal populations tend to be exposed to a range

of hazards, particularly cyclones, floods, landslides, earthquakes and tsunamis.’222 This is

evident from the case of the category five tropical Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in 2015, which

affected 22 islands and an estimated 166 000 people, with approximately 65 000 of those

people displaced internally.223 Likewise, approximately 62 000 people were displaced

internally from Cat 5-TC Winston in Fiji in 2016.224 The 2016 PDNAR following the Cat 5-

TC Winston reported the deaths of 44 people and 40 000 people needing immediate assistance.

The toll included ‘30,369 houses, 495 schools, and 88 health clinics damaged or destroyed.’225

220 Ibid 370–2. 221 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1616, 1619–26; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 19–20; see also Norwegian Refugee Council, above n 178. See also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3; see also Adelman, above n 178, 21; see also The Nansen Initiative, Norwegian Refugee Council, above n 178; see also Atlas Report, above n 178, IX; see also Kalin, above n 178, 5. 222 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘GRID 2016: Global Report on Internal Displacement’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2016) 19 (‘IDMC GRID 2016 Report’). 223 Ibid 19–20. 224 ‘IDMC GRID 2016 Report’, above n 222, 5, 19–20; see also Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘GRID 2017: Global Report on Internal Displacement’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2017) 37 (‘IDMC GRID 2017 Report’); see also Borge Brende and Didier Burkhalter, ‘Foreword’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 4, 4. 225 Ministry of Economy, above n 217, 3; see also Simone Esler, ‘Fiji Post-disaster Needs Assessment: Tropical Cyclone Winston 20 February 2016’ (Research Report, Government of Fiji, May 2016).

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It also reported the total damage of physical assets and economic losses sustained as a result

of economic production as FJD1.98 billion.226

The IPCC WG II AR5 to the IPCC Report on Small Islands (IPCC AR5 on Small Islands)

points out that the majority of the population and concomitant infrastructure of small islands

‘is located in coastal zones with limited on-island relocation opportunities.’227 The IPCC

Report on Human Security (IPCC AR5 on human security), in citing the contribution from the

IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance

Climate Change Adaptation (SREX), concludes that ‘an increasing incidence and changing

intensity of extreme weather events due to climate change will lead directly to the risk of

increased levels of displacement.’228 The IPCC AR5 on human security reports that while some

population displacements will be short term, a proportion of these will result in ‘more

permanent migration.’229 This view is expanded upon by the SREX, which reports that the

long-term impacts of climate change will significantly affect migration and result in permanent

displacement in the future.230 In the case of extreme weather events, the studies conducted by

the iDMC 2015 identify the social networks and property of displaced populations, including

the need to register for assistance in an emergency’, as some of the key reasons for them

returning to their places of origin, which complements the findings reported by the IPCC AR

5 on human security.231

In recognising the claims of the IPCC AR5 on human security and the SREX, McAdam and

Limon, in a joint policy report on human rights, climate change and cross-border displacement,

point out that the act of migration will not be straightforward. Some of the population will

migrate before a major deterioration in conditions occurs; however, others will only move as

a result of displacement arising from ‘sudden-onset disasters or slow-onset processes.’232

Moreover, governments may need to engage in the planned relocation of people for safety

reasons.233 An example of this is the (internal) national relocation project deployed by the

Fijian Government to relocate coastal communities in Fiji, with at least three low-lying coastal

226 See above n 225 and accompanying text. 227 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1619. 228 Adger et al, above n 37, 767. 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid 768–9; see also Adelman, above n 178, 21; see also: ‘Climate change is anticipated to lead to more frequent and severe natural disasters, and in some cases its impact may render some parts of the world uninhabitable’ as cited in McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 2. 231 Adger et al, above n 37, 767; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 17. 232 McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 2. 233 Ibid.

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settlements relocated inland since 2014.234 Another example is provided by the first nationally

representative household survey into Pacific island migration conducted by the United Nations

University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), International Labour Organization (ILO), and European

Union (EU) under the PCCM project in 2015.235 It recorded an increase of 83 per cent for

internal migration trips for the period 2005 to 2015 in Kiribati, ‘two-thirds of whom

constituted people moving from outer islands to South Tarawa.’236 The 2015 PCCM Survey

Fact Sheet reports that for Kiribati and Tuvalu, ‘internal migration is not a solution as most

internal migration is to the already overpopulated capital cities.’237 By 2055, the PCCM Survey

Fact Sheet projects a 100 per cent and 70 per cent increase in internal migration in Kiribati

and Tuvalu respectively, based on the medium range climate modelling scenario.238 The

impacts of the rapid-onset disasters on small island communities and the impending

projections of population displacement reinforce the susceptibility of Pacific Island nations

and suggest that the future relocation, particularly of low-lying island nations across

international borders is potentially inevitable in the coming decades.

The findings of Campbell and Warrick’s published report on climate change and migration

issues in the Pacific stemming from the PCCM project in 2014239 reinforce those reported in

the 2015 PCCM Survey Fact Sheet referred to earlier. The capital cities of ‘the atoll States

such as Funafuti, Tuvalu; Tarawa, Kiribati; Majuro, Marshall Islands and the island of Ebeye,

Marshall Islands have some of the highest population densities in the Pacific.’240 They claim

that ‘[i]t is not unreasonable to anticipate that rates of rural-urban migration may be increased’

in the context of climate change.241 For instance, ‘urban population is projected to more than

234 The Fijian Government, ‘Making Communities the Focus of Climate Change Relocation’ (Media Release, 19 February 2015) < http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Press-Releases/MAKING-COMMUNITIES-THE-FOCUS-OF-CLIMATE-CHANGE-REL.aspx>; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Acting Permanent Secretary sets Priorities for Climate Change Division Issue 10 (March, 2015) <http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/FJI_2015_CC_Newsletter_March_Issue_10.pdf>; see also McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19. 235 United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Labour Organization (ILO), European Union (EU), ‘Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project’ (Newsletter, November 2015) 7 (PCCMP Newsletter 2017); see also PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3, 2; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 371. 236 See above n 235 and accompanying text. 237 Ibid. 238 PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3, 1–2. 239 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–56. 240 Ibid 2, 19. 241 Ibid.

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double to 107% of 2010 levels, growing from roughly 2.5 million to 5 million.’242 A global

perspective adopted by the IPCC AR5 on human security validates this claim, that is, that to

date migration has largely centred on urban areas within a country.243 It projects that by 2030,

the global population trend for urban mobility will reach 59 per cent.244 Campbell and Warrick

note that such “movements” ‘strain the capacity of urban areas’, accelerating demand for

development and services (infrastructure, amenities and housing, for example) against the

declining environmental conditions of low-lying atoll nations.245 They argue that ‘as urban

populations continue to grow there is likely to be increased demand from urban populations

for international migration’, for instance, Pacific Access Category (New Zealand), migration

with dignity policy (Kiribati) and planned relocation, to list a few.246 The concentration of

Pacific Island communities in urban centres offers a temporary response to the impacts of

climate change arising for other reasons (such as socio-economic, for example). Robust policy

deliberations and decisions at all levels (local, national and regional) are needed to manage

migration across international borders on the grounds of climate change in the future.247

3.4.2 Compounding Migration Perceptions

McAdam asserts that ‘[t]he economic, social, and political capacity of small island nations,

including its infrastructure, economic resilience and ability to assist its people to rebuild their

lives will necessarily affect mobility decisions’ (adaptation, climatic impacts).248 This view is

supported by Barnett and Webber who maintain that ‘without improved political and economic

institutions to reduce poverty and marginality, environmental change will continue to be an

important proximate factor in migration decisions.’249 The iDMC, in acknowledging that

‘future displacement will be influenced by climate change and environmental degradation’,

points out that much uncertainty about the impact of climate change, including responses to

242 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, 7. 243 Adger et al, above n 37, 770. 244 Ibid 767. 245 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 2, 19; see also ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, 7. 246 See above n 245 and accompanying text; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 767. 247 ‘Government of Pacific Island countries have not sufficiently addressed displacement and resettlement in their national legal frameworks. They should: a) review their national laws and policies to identify areas where legal or policy changes are needed, and b) implement the necessary changes’ as cited in Elizabeth Ferris, Michael M Cernea and Daniel Petz, ‘On the Front Line of Climate Change and Displacement: Learning from and with Pacific Island Countries’ (Research Report, The Brookings Institute, September 2011) 31. 248 McAdam, above n 10, 1. 249 Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 38.

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them, remains.250 One of the reasons for this can be attributed to the data gaps in the growing

field of human mobility studies. In the context of global internal displacements from sudden-

onset disasters and conflict (armed and communal, for example), the iDMC admits that the

‘limited geographic coverage across and within countries’, the ‘disaggregate and geophysical

flow of data on IDPs and their movements’, including keeping an account of ‘all types of

displacement’ inhibit conclusive reporting.251 For example, the iDMC recorded the differing

governance capacities as a barrier to obtaining comprehensive displacement data for East Asia

and the Pacific.252

Similarly, there is consensus among scholars in the field of climate science to orient regional

‘(Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Oceans and Mediterranean islands, for example)’ scale

climatic projections to ‘smaller spatial scales’ particularly for Pacific Islands nations because

the ‘climate scenarios are generally much smaller than the resolution of the global climate

models (mathematical models and computer simulations, for example).’253 They note that by

introducing ‘statistical downscaling models’, the problem remains, as ‘long-term quality

controlled climate data for at least three decades for a number of representative points on the

widely dispersed islands is sparse.’254 This is primarily due to the uneven ‘climate change risk

profiles of small islands’, which means that ‘climate change impacts, vulnerability and

adaptation varies from one island region to another and among countries in the same region.’255

In light of these concerns, the ‘lack of data on the scale and patterns of possible climate change-

related migration is one of the key factors’ that influences human mobility decisions.256

Aside from data gaps, some of the other reasons for mobility decisions are also notable. The

‘social differentiation in access to resources’ is another factor that influences mobility

decisions.257 The contribution from the IPCC WG II AR 5 focusing on human security

identifies ‘culture, identity, cultural ecosystem services and cultural attachment to place’ as

some of the compelling reasons for people choosing to remain at their place of origin and

250 IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 15. 251 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘Global Report on Internal Displacement’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2018) (‘IDMC GRID 2018 Report’) 5–7, 28–9, 72–81, 75. 252 Ibid 28–9. 253 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1626–7, 1644; see also Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 234. 254 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618, 1626; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 255 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 256 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618, 1625, 1643–4; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 20; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 8. 257 Adger et al, above n 37, 767.

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confront future environmental conditions.258 In contrast, ‘well-being, livelihoods, and

economic opportunities and other human factors’ are also reasons considered to influence

people’s decision to avert anticipated environmental risks and migrate.259 This dichotomy

brings to the forefront this widely established argument made by many scholars, multinational

organisations and institutions in the field of migration, development and resettlement studies

that multiple factors affect migration.260

Kalin, in citing the findings of the 2012–2015 global consultations of the consultative

institution established by the Norwegian and Swiss Governments outside the ambit of the

institutions of the United Nations, that is, the Nansen Initiative on cross-border displacement

in disaster context, confirms that ‘population movements are occurring in the context of

disasters and climate change rather than being caused exclusively by such events.’261

According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) ‘[e]nvironmental change,

including climate change is nevertheless rarely the sole or direct cause of population

movements’ as it is layered with ‘[e]conomic, social, cultural, political and demographic

factors.’262 Likewise, Nishimura points out the differences in the impact of mobility between

‘[s]low and sudden-onset events. For example, reasons behind migration arising from slow-

onset events include ‘stability, better security, livelihood opportunities, and a sustainable

source for food’, while in the case of disasters ‘needs are immediate.’263 In the same vein,

McAdam admits that migration resulting from climate change effects occurs because it ‘tends

to multiply pre-existing stressors, rather than causing movement on its own’, as indicated

above.264 Issues such as ‘political or social tensions’, and ‘economic and social vulnerabilities’

are notable examples of stressors or pressures that influence human mobility patterns

(displacement, migration and relocation).265

It is largely acknowledged that a number of underlying causes influence the decision-making

process to migrate as indicated by scholars within the field of migration studies. As Gemenne

and Blocher argue, ‘[p]eople move short and long distances within the larger frame of their

258 Ibid 770; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625: see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 15. 259 See above n 258 and accompanying text. 260 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625. 261 Kalin, above n 178, 5; see also Brende and Burkhalter, above n 224, 4. 262 Ileana-Sinziana Puscas, ‘Central and North America: Migration and Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Environmental Change’ (Research Policy Report Issue 1 Volume 4, International Organization for Migration, March 2018) 5. 263 Nishimura, above n 38, 112–13. 264 McAdam, above n 18, 520, 532. 265 Nishimura, above n 38, 112; see also McAdam, above n 10, 267; see also McAdam, above n 18, 520, 532; see also The Nansen Initiative, Norwegian Refugee above n 178.

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responses to the world around them, an evolving relationship shaped by subjective and non-

environmental factors.’266 However, there is a general lack of research and empirical data to

conclusively link climate change with human mobility. The incongruous motivations that

influence migration add another layer of complexity in terms of the legal definition and

protection arrangements for population mobility on the grounds of climate change, which is

addressed in the section related to the international response.267 Having considered a host of

factors (susceptibility and urbanisation, for example) and their linkages (mobility decisions

and drivers) with the projected trends in human mobility of Pacific Island communities, the

next section addresses the second area of focus, that is, migration as an adaptation strategy of

last resort.

3.4.3 Adaptation Strategy of Last Resort

Almost every scholarly discourse in the field of population displacement and climate-induced

migration and scientific studies includes a section relating to adaptation strategies and

interventions in response to the effects of climate change.268 However, there are recognisable

differences in the arguments posed by many scholars. These are discussed in turn.

Some literature supports the claim of migration as an adaptation strategy. Briefly, by way of

background, the global advocacy around the inclusion of the strands of human mobility ‘dealt

with under adaptation’ originate from international climate policies such as the Cancun

Adaptation Framework (CAF) and Doha Climate Gateway Decision (Doha Decision) adopted

by the Conference of the Parties (COP) at the sixteenth session (COP 16) in 2010, and the

eighteenth session (COP 18) in 2012 respectively under the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).269 For instance, paragraph 14(f) of the CAF

266 Francois Gemenne and Julia Blocher, ‘How can Migration Serve Adaptation to Climate Change? Challenges to Fleshing out a Policy Deal’ (2017) 183(4) The Geographical Journal 336, 338. 267 Nishimura, above n 38, 112. 268 Koko Warner et al, ‘National Adaptation Plans and Human Mobility’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 8, 9; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 7–8; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 76 2, 777; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1640–3. 269 Warner et al, above n 37, 5, 10, 14–15; See also Walter Kalin, ‘Changing climates, moving people: Distinguishing voluntary and forced movements of people’ (Policy Brief No 8, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 40, 44, 46; see also Koko Warner, ‘Human Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaption to Climate Change: the Cancun Adaptation Framework and Potential for Future Action’ (2012) 30(6) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 1061, 1061; see also David Freestone, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - The Basis for the Climate Change Regime’ in Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard G Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 96–119.

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obliges states parties to the UNFCCC to take ‘measures to enhance understanding,

coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration

and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels.’270

The accretion of climate negotiations in the UNFCCC policy process complements human

mobility responses within potential in situ adaptation strategies as well as migration as an

adaptive strategy of last resort on account of sudden-onset extreme events and slow-onset

environmental change.271 This binary is buttressed by Article 4 of the UNFCCC, which

outlines adaptation measures in response to environmental change.272

The IPCC AR–5 on human security asserts ‘migration and mobility are adaptation strategies

in all regions of the world that experience climate variability. Extreme weather events provide

the most direct pathway from climate change to migration. Expanding opportunities for

mobility can reduce vulnerability to climate change and enhance human security.’273 Some of

the strands of adaptation from a broader perspective include ‘diversifying household income

sources to increase adaptive capacity (temporary and seasonal migration)’, providing

‘transformational opportunity (different income streams from different locations) to increase

long term resilience for individuals and households’ and finally, as the iDMC articulates, ‘a

life-saving adaptive measure of last resort in response to a crisis.’274

270 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun Adaptation Framework, GA Dec 1/CP.16, 16th session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4> (‘Cancun Adaptation Framework’); see also Warner et al, above n 37, 5, 11, 14; see also Freestone, above n 254, 96–119; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 112. 271 Warner et al, above n 37, 15; see also Graeme Hugo, ‘Climate Change-induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2012) 10, 23–7. 272 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 14 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) (UNFCCC) <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en>; Article 4 (1) 9e) (‘UNFCCC’); see also Christine Gibb and James Ford, ‘Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Recognise Climate Migrants? (2012) 7 Environmental Research Letters 1, 2, 4; see also Warner et al, above n 268, 8. See above n 269 and accompanying text. 273 Adger et al, above 37, 758, 767 (para 12.4.1.2); see also United Nations Higher Commissioner for Human Rights, International Organization for Migration, United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security, United Nations Development Programme, International Labour Organisation, Sciences Po-Ceri and Refugees International, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change: Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility COP 20 Lima, Peru’ (Research Report, International Organization for Migration, 2014) 5–6 3, <https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/Human-Mobility-in-the-context-of-Climate-Change.pdf>. 274 Michelle Yonetani, ‘Seizing the Momentum’ (Briefing Paper, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2 November 2016) 4; see also Richard Black et al, ‘Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities’ (Research Report, Foresight, 20 October 2011) 175; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 371–2. See also Cecilia Tacoli, ‘Migration and Mobility in a Changing Climate: A Policy Perspective, (2011) 19(36) Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana 113, 120; see also Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 38; see also ‘migration decisions…are largely within the control of people’ as cited in Barnett and Webber, 38.

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Similarly, with regard to the PCCM project referred to earlier, Campbell and Warrick

acknowledge that ‘[m]ost Pacific island countries have now established policies, strategies or

planning tools to guide national in situ adaptation activities’ such as ‘disaster risk reduction,

improved agricultural practices and access to freshwater sources’, which are incorporated into

national adaptation programs of action (NAPAs).275 However, they remind us that such options

may prove inadequate and that migration of some kind may be considered and pursued as an

alternative and realistic response in the future.276 Moreover, Campbell and Warrick point out

that the general lack of research data on Pacific small islands, as indicated earlier, reduces the

capacity of governments in the Pacific region to develop ‘strategies and policy options with

regard to human migration’ on the grounds of climate change.277 Furthermore, Campbell and

Warrick assert that ‘migration is an ingrained part of Pacific history and their culture and

society for generations so they could maximize resource opportunities and expand social

networks as a common strategy for reducing risks associated with climate pressures.’278

Similarly, the ADB supplements the claims and points out that ‘migration planning as an

adaptation strategy is virtually non-existent in policy design.’279 The ADB maintains that in

Asia and the Pacific region ‘[f]ew if any national action plans for adaptation give serious

attention to migration.’280

Along with in situ issues of human insecurities, the IPCC SYR argues that ‘adaptation and

mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate

change.’281 There is widespread consensus that adaptation and mitigation technologies, such

as geoengineering and solar radiation management for example, ‘deliver and confer co-

benefits to countries over different timeframes.’282 The Climate and Development Knowledge

275 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 7–8. 276 Ibid; see also KV20 above n 20 and accompanying text. See also Sosene above n 22 and accompanying text. 277 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 8, 22; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618, 1625. See above n 31 and accompanying text; see also CKDN Report, above n 4, 20. 278 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 3, 11, 23, 25; see also Sandra McCubbin, Barry Smit and Tristan Pearce, ‘Where does Climate Fit? Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Context of Multiple Stressors in Funafuti, Tuvalu’ (2015) 30 Global Environment Change 43, 43–55; see also ‘identity, culture, community and livelihoods are deeply interwoven in the historical and cultural fabric of communities’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, 11, 23, 25 and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 53. 279 ADB Report, above n 10, 46–7. 280 Ibid. 281 Oxford University Press, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (at January 2011) ‘Climate International Protection’ [2]; see also: ‘As an intergovernmental body jointly established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) had provided policymakers with the most authoritative and objective scientific and technical assessments in the field’ as cited in Pachauri et al, above n 33, v, 17–19. 282 CDKN Report, above n 4, 7, 11.

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Network (CDKN) points out that ‘these technologies raise questions about costs, risks,

governance, and ethical implications.’283 In addition, caution must be applied ‘to ensure that

donors do not drive the adaptation and mitigation agenda in small islands’284 because of the

‘risk that options under this scenario may result in the loss of scarce resources.’285 The

published studies of the IPCC and the CDKN are complemented by Tacoli, a leading scholar

on human settlements. She argues that ‘linking adaptation and mitigation initiatives and

policies is the next unavoidable challenge for local, national and global actors.’286 In the case

of Pacific Island nations, the ‘general absence of credible regional socio-economic scenarios

at spatial scales’ and the ‘local lenses (cultural, ecological, etc.) through which wholesale

transfer of adaptation-migration options’ occur are considered to be barriers to the energy

security of island nations.287 The scholarly works and the scientific literature are consistent,

which supports such claims to advance the argument of migration as a strategy of last resort.

According to the IPCC AR–5 on small islands, the trajectory in response to the climate risks

of small islands predominantly ‘focuses on managing present-day risks through risk transfer

(index-based insurance), risk spreading (social networks), or risk avoidance (engineered

structures)’ and is seldom clear cut to ‘address high future risks.’288 Similarly, the CDKN

argues that while nations with ‘[m]ore diversified economies’ are sufficiently equipped to

‘respond to climate stresses’, the Pacific Island nations are presented with a host of adaptation

planning and implementation barriers.289 Some of these barriers include ‘low economies of

scale in production, inadequate access to financial, technical, human resources, culture, ethics

and attitudes to risks.’290 These barriers also straddle in the context of rural-urban migration

where the ‘residents of low-income informal settlements, often do not have the skills, financial

capital and social networks to move to the urban centres.’291 Recent trends in urban population

growth have led ‘most governments in low- and middle-income nations’ to concede ‘migration

as a growing problem and a key policy issue.’292

283 Ibid 11. 284 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1643. 285 Ibid. 286 See above n 277 and accompanying text; see also Tacoli, above n 274, 122. 287 CDKN Report, above n 4, 11, 25. 288 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1637–8. 289 Ibid 1639; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 21. 290 CDKN Report, above n 4, 21; see also Britta Heine and Lorenz Petesen, ‘Adaptation and Cooperation’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 48, 48. 291 Cecilia Tacoli, ‘Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a Context of High Mobility’ (2009) 21(2) Environment and Urbanisation 513, 514–15. 292 Ibid.

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Anchored in contrast to the projections of the IPCC and the observational and empirical data

gaps for Pacific Island nations detailed earlier, the CDKN acknowledges that ‘[t]here also

remains limited evidence as to which regions will experience the largest sea level rise and

worst climate impacts.’293 Likewise, Tacoli admits that it is difficult to ‘predict with any

precision how climate change will impact on population distribution and movement.’294 Tacoli

lists two reasons for this, while also acknowledging improvements in scientific projections.295

First, it is due to the ‘relatively high levels of uncertainty on the locally-specific impacts of

climate change and the speed at which they may occur.’296 Second, it is due to the ‘lack of

comprehensive data on migration, especially movements (and particularly temporary ones)

within national boundaries or cross-border flows in and between low-income nations that are

likely to be most affected by climate change.’297 The CDKN reminds us, as noted earlier, that

the ability of Pacific Island nations to raise financial capital is scant, especially given the costs

required for adaptation projects, such as sea walls and surge barriers, for example.298 This view

is supplemented by the iDMC, which, in recognising the contribution of the IPCC, points out

that ‘more research is needed on the adaptation strategies appropriate for different types of

islands under different socio-economic scenarios.’299 It further points out that ‘[t]he impact of

different adaptation strategies on displacement and migration will be influenced by the scale

of climate change and human factors such as their cultural and social acceptability and

communities confidence in their effectiveness.’300 Similarly, the CDKN cautions that

‘[r]esettlement and migration should only be regarded as a last resort on islands, as they may

actually discourage viable adaptation initiatives, by fostering over-dependence on external

support.’301

The scholarly and scientific evidence presented so far suggests that ‘migration as a long-term

adaptation option’, particularly for Pacific Island nations is plausible.302 Along with this

argument, the final report on ‘addressing climate change and migration in Asia and the Pacific’

by the ADB is noteworthy.303 The ADB recognises, as indicated earlier, that adaptations that

293 CDKN Report, above n 4, 22. 294 Cecilia Tacoli, ‘Not Only Climate Change: Mobility, Vulnerability and Socio-economic Transformations in Environmentally Fragile Areas of Bolivia, Senegal and Tanzania’ (Working Paper No 28, International Institute for Environment and Development, February 2011) 2. 295 Ibid; see also Tacoli, ‘Migration and Mobility’, above n 274, 114. 296 Tacoli, above n 294. 297 Ibid. 298 CDKN Report, above n 4, 17–18, 21–2; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 7–8, 15. 299 IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 15. 300 Ibid. 301 CDKN Report, above n 4, 21. 302 Ibid 22. 303 ADB Report, above n 10, 1–94.

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enable populations to remain in situ are expected to be pursued rather than migration.304 From

a policy development and practice perspective, the ADB recommends ‘the need to develop

new and effective governance systems and policy mechanisms’ in at least two respects.305

First, to cope with mobility-based adaptation strategies from ‘sudden-onset cataclysmic

events’, which trigger population displacement.306 Second, to cope with non-mobility-based

adaptation strategies from ‘longer-term processes which see an incremental decline in the

ability of an area to provide livelihood.’307 Collectively, the growing body of research adds

weight to extend the argument of human migration as an alternative strategy to the impacts of

climate change in the future.

While some literature supports the claim of migration as an adaptation strategy, as argued

above, many other scholars and published reports depart drastically from the future-focused,

migration-centric strategy to claim ‘migration as an adverse impact of climate change and an

adaptation failure.’308 The IPCC AR–5 on human security highlights that ‘[v]ulnerability to

weather extremes and long-term environmental change is inversely correlated with

mobility.’309 It notes that those who are most vulnerable are also those with the least capacity310

because migration usually occurs in the context of a climate emergency.311 These

circumstances ‘create conditions of debt and increased vulnerability, rather than reducing

them’ (displacement).312 This distinction is further exemplified in the global field research

conducted by Warner, Dun and Stal. Their case study examined 22 locations in six regions

under the Environmental Change and Forced Scenarios (EACH-FOR) project, which assessed

the migration in the context of environmental change at local, national and regional levels.313

The evidence from the case studies reveals that ‘[m]igration may be an adaptation mechanism

for those with resources to move early’ while ‘in extreme cases migration may be an

expression of failed adaptation for those with fewer means to move.’314 This view is supported

by Gemenne and Blocher, who argue that ‘[s]hort term coping strategies that mitigate harm

may be seen as adaptive, but in many cases have proven to be maladaptive in the long term.’315

304 Ibid 37. 305 Ibid; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 22. 306 ADB Report, above n 10, 37. 307 Ibid. 308 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 371–2; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 18–23. 309 Adger et al, above n 37, 767–7. 310 Ibid. 311 Ibid.  312 Adger et al, above n 37, 767. 313 Koko Warner, Olivia Dun and Marc Stal, ‘Field Observations and Empirical Research’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 13, 13–15. 314 Ibid.  315 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 338. 

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Some of the other reasons advanced by scholars such as Campbell and Warrick, and Allgood

and McNamara, relate to concerns that if the strands of human mobility—particularly

migration and planned relocation—are presented as a solution, then this may potentially derail

concerted global climate efforts by the global community to reduce GHG emissions and global

warming targets to 20C, or closer to 1.50C.316 Likewise, Gibb and Ford point out that dismissing

migration within existing adaptation strategies, ‘could undermine and render adaptation efforts

maladaptive, and even permit powerful actors to use forced migration for political and

economic gain.’317 The ADB cautions that ‘[i]f migration is not carefully planned and assisted,

it can turn into maladaptation, i.e. leave people more vulnerable to environmental changes.’318

The divergent responses to the migration-adaptation nexus to sudden- and slow-onset

environmental change provides important insights for unpacking a host of issues and

identifying variables for future empirical research, particularly for Pacific Island climate-

vulnerable populations.319 The comprehensive suggestion of Gemenne and Blocher is notable.

They state that ‘all vantage points of migration should be weighed objectively and

comprehensively and it is necessary to develop a better appreciation of how migration, when

employed as a strategy to respond to climate change, affects the adaptive capacities of

migrants, communities of origin, and communities of destination.’320 These present

interwoven considerations for emerging global policy deliberations by the international

community on contemporary mobility dimensions in the future.

Having considered the existing vulnerabilities, future resilience capacity and the potential

human mobility and migration of Pacific Island nations in response to the impacts of climate

change, attention is turned to the rich variety of perspectives that have set out to determine the

magnitude of internal and cross-border migration of climate vulnerable populations at a global

level, including the potential case of Pacific Island nations and communities most susceptible

to climate change.

3.4.4 Magnitude of Human Mobility

The Nansen Initiative asserts that ‘both sudden- and slow-onset climate-related hazards

combined with rapid urbanisation, population growth and pre-existing social vulnerabilities

316 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 25; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 372. 317 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 3.    318  ADB Report, above n 10, 47. 319 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 338; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 762. 320 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 344.

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and poverty are likely to increase displacement and migration in the future, including across

international borders.’321 The 2018 global report released by the iDMC recorded ‘30.6 million

new internal displacement associated with conflict and disasters in 2017 across 143 countries

and territories’, of which ‘8.6 million accounted from floods and 7.5 million from storms.’322

The iDMC further recorded a stand-alone total of 18.8 million displacements from disasters

(droughts, wildfires, landslides, for example) in 135 countries.323 The iDMC confirms that the

East Asia and Pacific regions are more widely affected by climate hazards than any other

regions, with 36 per cent of ‘global disaster displacement risk’ concentrated there.324

A number of prominent scholars from the field of environmental and migration studies, such

as Corendea, Warner, Warren, Johnson, Edwards, Brown, and Wannier and Gerrard,

acknowledge the frequently cited seminal work of Professor Myers of Oxford University and

Lord Stern of Brentford. They forecast global population displacement and migration from

climate change and disasters to be around approximately 200 to 250 million by 2050.325

Similarly, projections determined by the United Nations (UN) institutions and agencies are

notable. For example, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights projects the displacement

of 50 to 200 million refugees by 2050 across borders, either permanently or temporarily.326

Similarly, the UN Environment Program (UNEP) projects ‘50 million environmental refugees

in Africa alone’ by 2060.327

Likewise, the report released by the global charitable agency for poverty alleviation Christian

Aid, reports that a billion people from developing countries will be forced to leave their homes

by 2050, of which approximately 50 million will be because of natural disasters, 645 million

321 Brende and Burkhalter, above n 224, 4–5; see also Warner et al, above n 37, 5. 322 IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 251, v, 2, 5–7, 52. 323 Ibid. 324 Ibid 28. 325 Craig A Johnson, ‘Governing Climate Displacement: The Ethics and Politics of Human Settlement’ (2012) 21(2) Environmental Politics 308, 308; see also Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier, ‘Overview’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 5–7; see also Cosmin Corendea, Legal Protection of the Sinking Islands Refugees (Vandeplas Publishing, 2016) 24–5. See also Michelle Leighton, Xiaomeng Shen and Koko Warner, ‘Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction’ (Research Report No 15, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, 25–31 July 2010) 13; see also Phillip Dane Warren, ‘Forced Migration After Paris COP 21: Evaluating the Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility’ (2016) 116(8) Columbia Law Review 2103, 2113; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78; see also also Oli Brown, ‘The Numbers Game’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 8, 8–9. 326 Brown, above n 325, 8–9, 8; see also Warren, above n 325, 2113. 327 See above n 326 and accompanying text.

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because of development projects, and 250 million because of climate change.328 Scholars

Leighton, Shen and Warner argue that ‘[t]he deepening of problems for developing countries

in water scarcity, food insecurity, spread of disease, job losses and human displacement’ due

to climate variability ‘may lead to migration between four and seven billion’ by 2050.329 For

Brown, ‘on current predictions, the carrying capacity of large parts of the world, the ability of

different ecosystems to provide food, water and shelter for human populations will be

compromised by climate change.’330

In the case of Pacific Island nations, little is known about ‘migration and resettlement patterns

and trends’ as there have been few empirical investigations.331 Some of these empirical

investigations include field research conducted with Pacific Island communities by Nunn,

which takes the form of ‘86 case studies of community relocations’, Campbell and Warrick,

who adopted quantitative measures and qualitative analysis on the ‘causes and consequences

of climate change and its impact on migration’ in eleven Pacific nations, and the empirical

evidence presented in the 2015 PCCM Survey Fact Sheet (2015 PCCM), as indicated earlier.332

According to the 2015 PCCM, ‘[m]ore than 70 per cent of households in Kiribati and Tuvalu,

and 35 per cent of households in Nauru felt that migration would be a likely response if

droughts, sea level rise, floods or saltwater intrusion worsens.’333 The 2015 PCCM recorded

that by 2055, international migration trips for Kiribati, with a projected population of 175 560,

will increase by 35 per cent, and that for Tuvalu, with a projected population of 13 246, that

will increase by 100 per cent.334

Similarly, Campbell and Warrick report that the combined atoll population of Kiribati, the

Marshall Islands and Tuvalu was approximately 170 000 (in 2013) and that by 2050 it would

increase to 298 000.335 In adding other atoll populations of the Federated States of Micronesia,

Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tonga, they project that the total

328 Rachel Baird et al, ‘Human Tide: The Real Migration Crises’ (Research Report, Christian Aid, May 2007) 1, 5–6. 329 Leighton, Shen and Warner, above n 325, 17. 330 Brown, above n 325, 9. 331 Nurse et al, above n 31, 73. 332 Ibid 1625; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, iv; see also PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above 48, 1. See also United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security, above n 196; see also Ted Scheinman, ‘Disaster and Migration in the South Pacific: A Failure of International Law’ (Media Release, 2 December 2015) <https://psmag.com/disaster-and-migration-in-the-south-pacific-a-failure-of-international-law-104817a19ed9#.r2h32dk8i>. 333 PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3. 334 Ibid; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above 48. 335 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 16.

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population by 2050 may comprise 350 000 people, ‘who under the worst possible scenarios

would become displaced and the pressure to migrate is likely to be relatively high among this

population.’336 They acknowledge that due to the barriers created by current elevation data on

coastal settlements that estimates of the population likely to be adversely affected by climate

change, and especially the number of those who will migrate, is difficult to determine.’337 The

empirical evidence for Pacific Island nations has resulted in estimates, but there is still

insufficient data. However, the combined official national census may offer policymakers

insights as a starting point for the planning phases of relocation.

It is evident that large-scale projections for population displacement and migration in the

context of climate change are not uniformly represented in the literature. Corendea points out

that ‘[s]uch estimates have a large margin of error and depend on underlying assumptions

about population growth, economic development, temperature increase, or the degree and

timing of climate change impacts.’338 This view is supported by Johnson, who recognises that

‘[s]uch estimates are of course speculative and controversial’ and reminds us that ‘they also

raise important questions about the ways in which, and extent to which, national governments

and international institutions may be expected to accommodate and protect populations

displaced by climate change.’339 According to Gibb and Ford, the scale of displacement and

migration ‘represents a global affirmation that climate change induced mobility takes on

different forms and needs diverse policy approaches.’340 McAdam, in acknowledging the

widely held view that ‘there will be cross-border movement on account of climate change’,

departs from the ‘magnitude often predicted’ and argues that such estimates cannot necessarily

be equated ‘in the nature of refugee-like flight.’341 She reminds us that caution must be applied

‘when it comes to devising appropriate legal and policy responses, which must be attuned to

the reality of movement.’342

With these broad perspectives anchored in both available information and data gaps, there is

general agreement in the literature that ‘nobody really knows with any degree of precision

what climate change will mean for human population distribution.’343 Brown suggests that

‘objective and empirically-based detailed numerical scenarios, advanced climate models,

336 Ibid 16–19; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 6. 337 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 18. 338 Corendea, above n 325, 25. 339 Johnson, above n 325, 309. 340 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1. 341 McAdam, above n 10, 16–17. 342 Ibid. 343 Brown, above n 325, 9.

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building capacity of institutions and governments to track forced migrants both within and

across national boundaries’ are some measures that can be developed to obtain a fuller and

more precise understanding of the trajectory of global human displacement and migration from

anthropogenic climate change in the coming decades.344 The global population movement in

response to sudden- and slow-onset environmental change affirms the magnitude of the global

migration crisis; one that demands robust global coordinated action by the international

community (states, agencies, organisations, etc.) and an array of actors (private public

organisations, etc.) around global population displacement and migration, particularly in the

case of Pacific Island nations by the middle of the twenty-first century.345

Having examined the copious trajectories of human mobility, attention is now turned to

planned relocation, which is frequently cited in the literature as part of adaptation planning.346

This is in addition to other adaptation interventions (ecosystem conservation) and human

mobility dimensions of voluntary and involuntary human migration and population

displacement.347

3.4.5 Snapshot of Future Mobility Planned Relocation

The scholarly literature on population displacement and migration from sudden– and slow-

onset environmental change and the large volume of published studies drawing on the

experience of other strands of mobility (internal displacement and forced migration, for

example) from large infrastructure and development projects have broadened the narrative of

human mobility in the twenty first-century.348 Moreover, several studies acknowledge the

significant contribution of the leading expert, ‘Michael Cernea’s impoverishment, risk and

344 Ibid. 345 Bogumil Terminski, ‘The Concept of Human Security as a Tool for Analysing the Consequences of Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement’ (Research Paper, 25 March 2012) 31. 346 Koko Warner et al, ‘Integrating Human Mobility Issues within National Adaptation Plans’ (Policy Brief No 9, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 4. 347 Warner et al, ‘Changing Climate, Moving’, above n 37; see also Koko Warner, ‘Environmental Change and Migration: Methodological Considerations from Ground-breaking Global Survey’ (2011) 33(1) Population and Environment 3, 3; see also Tacoli, above n 291, 513. 348 Anthony Oliver-Smith and Alex de Sherbinin, ‘Resettlement in the Twenty-first Century’ (2014) 45 Forced Migration Review 23, 23–5; see also Scott Leckie, ‘Human Rights Implications’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 18, 19; see also Marine Franck, ‘National Adaptation and Planning for Relocation’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 35, 37; see also Koko Warner, Walter Kalin and Susan Martin, ‘Outlook for Adaptation Planning and Human Mobility’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 43. See also Doberstein and Taggell, above n 86, 23–5, 27; see also Warner, Dun and Stal, ‘above n 313, 13; see also McAdam, above n 10, 1, 3; see also ADB Report, above n 10; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222.

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reconstruction model (IRR)’ in the field of development-forced displacement and resettlement

studies (DFDR).349 The model represents ‘eight impoverishment risks embedded in forced

relocation projects, with targeted counter strategies for risk prevention.’350 These include

‘landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food security, and increased health

risks, loss of common lands and resources, and social disintegration.’351 Cernea’s IRR model

emerged as a reliable predictor of ‘resettlement schemes in terms of its planning, negotiation,

and execution’ of development projects.352 The key argument that the majority of this body of

knowledge emphasises is with regard to the need for specific consideration of planned

relocation in adaptation planning to respond to the future impacts of climate change and

organised resettlement in the context of development projects.353

Before proceeding to outline further arguments, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is

widespread consensus among migration scholars and practitioners that ‘mass relocation of

whole populations’ triggered from slow-onset environmental change within sovereign borders

and potentially across international borders in the future ‘provides a rare opportunity to plan

for responses.’354 This is because such population movement ‘is less likely to be in the nature

of sudden, spontaneous (and desperate) flight.’355 The enumerated grounds (race, religion, for

example) for seeking legal protection pursuant to the refugee instrument ‘where people flee

across an international border’ is one example of sudden onset movement.356 This view is

supported by Thomas and Benjamin, who note that in the case of Pacific Island countries and

territories, planned relocation means that being able to relocate ‘on their own terms, in advance

of the potential devastation or of migration processes that may be developed externally and

forced upon them.’357

349 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 67; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58–66; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 152; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 350 See above n 349 and accompanying text. 351 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 67; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 352 See above n 349 and accompanying text. 353 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23–5; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also Warner et al, ‘Integrating Human Mobility’, above n 346, 5, 31–8; see also Doberstein and Taggell, above n 86, 23–5, 27–9. See also ADB Report, above n 10; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58. 354 McAdam, above n 10, 267–9; see also McAdam, above n 13, 283; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Refusing ‘Refuge’ in the Pacific: (De)constructing Climate-induced Displacement in International Law’ (Research Paper No 27, University of New South Wales, 2010) 1. See also Walter Kalin, ‘Conceptualising Climate-induced Displacement’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 81–103. 355 See above n 339 and accompanying text; see also ‘…in slow-onset scenarios, it is likely that movement will happen in several stages rather than spontaneously. First, a general deterioration in conditions, which may be exacerbated rather than directly caused by climate change…’ as cited in Jane McAdam, ‘Review Essay: From Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 579, 583. 356 See above nn 354–5. 357 Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also Nunn and Kumar, above n 35, 1–28.

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Moreover, the probable explanation from empirical studies conducted in the Pacific Island

countries with respect to the trajectory of potential future population movement caused by

slow-onset environmental change reveals that the best places for relocation are other islands

in the Pacific because of the similarities in culture and environment.358 This view is

corroborated by case studies undertaken by Edwards, and Thomas and Benjamin, who point

out that while ‘[i]t is almost impossible to replicate island life anywhere other than on another

small island, the long history of mobility based on clan and kinship networks and solidarity

after disasters’ including the ‘diaspora of Pacific island communities’ could lead climate-

induced movements to neighbouring Pacific Island countries in the coming decades.359 In the

same vein, policy analyst of the Expert Council of German Foundations on integration and

migration, Popp, one of the contributors towards the book on the variety of perspectives of

environmental change on migration, corroborates the views of Edwards, and Thomas and

Benjamin. She adds that ‘pre-existing migration routes and networks and the typically low

levels of resources available to those affected by environmental degradation and natural

disasters combine to favour nearby destinations over distant ones.’360 Likewise, numerous

reports originating from the ADB for the Asia and the Pacific region complement the variety

of perspectives on the trajectory of future movements and highlight that 50 per cent of cross-

border migration comprises people from developing countries moving to other developing

countries and that around 80 per cent of this movement comprises migration to neighbouring

countries.’361

As indicated at the beginning of this section, further arguments uniformly presented in the

literature are discussed next. First, the decades of experience and lessons learned (human (in)

security) from the myriad of cases of community resettlement from various phases (design,

planning, implementation) of development projects may offer a strong basis for managed

inland relocation and potential cross-border relocation where ‘large areas of a country are

deemed unsuitable for habitation’ as a result of the adverse impacts of climate change.362

Second, that ‘well managed migration has the potential to increase resilience of climate

358 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 20.  359 Edwards, above n 35, 77; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 18. 360 Karoline Popp, ‘Regional Policy Perspectives’ in Etienne Piguet and Frank Laczko (eds), People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration (Springer, 2014) vol 2, 229–30. 361 ADB Report, above n 10, 47. 362 Warner et al, above 346, 31–5; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58–62; see also Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23–5.

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vulnerable populations’ (new livelihoods).363 On the other hand, migration may compound the

existing vulnerabilities of relocating communities, which can be illustrated by specific risks

such as ‘economic exploitation, discrimination and abuse’ of marginalised groups (such as

women, the elderly and Indigenous people, for example.) to list a few.364 Each has its

advantages and drawbacks, which is why there is widespread consensus by scholars in the

field of displacement and migration studies that place a number of caveats on the inception of

planned or managed relocation with respect to the implementation and post relocation of

communities, particularly in the destination area or host country. The respect for the rights and

self-determination of the population, including restoration of the living standards (housing,

assets, livelihoods, etc.) of communities of origin through normative measures (safeguards,

guidelines, risk factors, etc.) and legal and policy responses are primarily notable

considerations.365

3.4.6 Determinants of Planned Relocation

Scholarly discourse on planned relocation does not specifically answer the research questions.

However, as cited above, it offers some important insights into a spectrum of issues for

consideration by the host country and communities of origin to implement planned relocation

in response to the accelerating risks exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. Some of

the issues contribute to developing an understanding of readiness, which offers important

insights in answering RQ 1. These insights are addressed in detail in chapters four and five

and used to articulate the criteria for analysing readiness presented in chapter seven. What

follows next is a brief overview of a variety of perspectives that detail the significance of

planned relocation, including well-settled issues stemming from a body of experience on

involuntary relocation and development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR),

commonly cited also as development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR). One

purpose of this study is to support the claim that the cross-border relocation on the grounds of

climate change of communities of origin from Kiribati and Tuvalu to the host country Fiji need

363 Marine Franck, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC-Paris COP 21’ (Research Report, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, November 2015) 7; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1643; see also ‘Strategies and actions can be pursued now which will move towards climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development, while at the same time helping to improve livelihoods, social and economic well-being and effective environmental management’ as cited in Pachauri et al, above n 33 , 31. 364 See above n 363 and accompanying text. 365 Franck, above n 363, 7; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 382; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58–62; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also McAdam, above n 10, 266.

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to be adequately planned, or as the ADB states, the ‘real option to relocate to a more secure

place with livelihood options.’366

With regard to the extensive experience and technical assistance extended by international

development agencies, such as the World Bank and the ADB in the field of DIDR to list a few,

the ADB argues that ‘migration planning as an adaptation strategy should be seen in the

context of the broader, complex dynamics of migration, and that responses should be

considered as part of wider development efforts aimed at sustainably raising living

standards.’367 The ADB claims that ‘both internal and cross-border migration often can

improve livelihoods, reduce poverty, meet labour force needs, bolster economies, and

strengthen links between communities and countries’ if managed properly and accentuated in

the ‘adaptation scheme or migration policy.’368 The ADB further claims that ‘[t]he onus is on

decision makers in central and subnational governments to take action’, which needs to be

complemented by the concerted efforts of a wide range of sectors, organisations, institutions

and agencies.369 Moreover, the ADB reminds us that it is imperative to ensure that

communities of origin are entitled to equality of rights as well as the benefits of the population

of the community in which they will settle, as alluded earlier, to avert potential violence and

conflict over resources among communities post relocation.370 Similarly, in the case of host

communities, the ADB points out that the impacts on the local economy, the environment as

well as the social impacts resulting from the migration are significant factors for

consideration.371 There are relevant determinants that need to be considered.

Commenting on the policy interventions detailed by the ADB, Tacoli argues that ‘[t]here is a

real risk’ of climate-induced migration resulting ‘in inappropriate policies that will do little to

protect the rights’ of climate vulnerable populations.372 She reminds us that ‘policies try to

influence the volume, direction and types of movement rather than accommodate flows and

support migrants’ (duration, destination and composition).373 Similarly, McAdam draws

attention to the special case of communities of origin where the ability to remain in the long

term is threatened, and reminds us that ‘more sustainable options’ that ‘place the needs and

rights of the affected individual in the centre, so that legal and policy responses are human-

366 ADB Report, above n 10, ix. 367 Ibid vii, 46–7. 368 Ibid. 369 Ibid. 370 ADB Report, above n 10, vii, 47–8, 72. 371 Ibid 72. 372 Tacoli, above n 291, 514. 373 Ibid 514; see also Tacoli, ‘Not Only Climate Change’, above n 294, 15–17.  

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rights focussed’ are needed.374 These, including migration support and flows outlined by

Tacoli, are pivotal issues that need to be considered.

The joint empirical study conducted by the UNU-EHS and the Nansen Initiative in 2014 that

set out to investigate the linkages between mobility and ‘climate change-related policies and

planning’ reveals that the realistic response to situations in which areas are declared to be

‘permanently uninhabitable because of the effects of climate change and when no other means

of adaptation is available to allow individuals to continue to live in the same location’ is

planned relocation.375 Similarly, the joint study by the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Platform on Disaster Displacement

(PDD) in 2018 on the ‘slow onset effects of climate change and human rights protection for

cross-border migrants’ launched at the thirty-seventh session of the Human Rights Council

reported that it is likely that land will become uninhabitable due to other factors before

submergence by sea level rise of SIDS such as Tuvalu.376 Moreover, both the OHCHR and

PDD reported that ‘[t]he possibility and need for planned relocations have been repeatedly

raised for some Pacific Island states as questions about their continued habitability persist in

which significant international movement may become inevitable over time.’377 The OHCHR

and PDD argue that ‘[l]oss of territory and population also poses a threat to governance and

statehood.’378 These are issues that need to be considered.

Other examples relate to the widely acknowledged history of population movements across

international borders and on-island (local) migration of Pacific Island communities in the

scientific and academic literature. This can be illustrated briefly by isolated instances of the

less benevolent resettlement of island communities triggered by non-climatic drivers such as

population redistribution, large-scale mining projects, nuclear testing and military activity for

example.379 In addition, other contributing causes include geophysical hazards such as

374 McAdam, above n 10, 266. 375 Doberstein and Taggell, above n 86, 19; see also Franck, above n 363, 37; see also Warner, Kalin and Martin, above n 348, 43; see also Warner, Dun and Stal, above n 313, 13; see also McAdam, above n 10, 3. 376 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Slow Onset Effects of Climate Change and Human Rights Protection for Cross-border Migrants 37th session, Agenda Items 2 and 3, UN Doc A/HRC/37/CRP.4 (22 March 2018) para 111, 34–5 (‘Human Rights Council 37th session, Mar 2018’); see also McAdam, above n 10, 1. 377 Human Rights Council 37th session, Mar 2018, above n 376, para 116, 36. 378 Ibid para 111, 34–5. 379 Colette Mortreux and Jon Barnett, ‘Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu’ (2009) Global Environmental Change 19 Global Environment Change 105, 105–112; see also Kelly Wyett, ‘Escaping a Rising Tide: Sea Level Rise and Migration in Kiribati’ (2014) 1(1) Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 171, 171–85; see also Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Sea Level and Maritime Zones: Preserving the Maritime Entitlements “Disappearing States’’’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E

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volcanic activity, as well as human-induced migration from environmental degradation—such

as drought and sea level rise to list a few examples—as indicated earlier in the section on

global climate evidence.380 This evidence can be clearly seen in the case of the resettlement of

the Banaban (Kiribati) and Vaitupuan (Tuvalu) communities to Fiji, Gilbertese (Kiribati) to

Ghizo (Solomon Islands), Carterets (Papua New Guinea) to Bougainville (Papua New

Guinea), and the Bikinians and Enewetakese (Marshall Islands) to the United States of

America, for example.381

The resettlement of Pacific Island communities over the past few centuries is exemplified in

the works undertaken by a host of seminal authors such as Connell, Donner, Edwards,

McAdam, Mortreux and Barnett, and Campbell and Warrick for example. According to

Connell, the historical cases of resettlement and migration of communities at the time of

British colonial administration in Pacific Island countries and territories is ‘no longer regarded

as politically feasible’ in contemporary times due to international borders, maritime zones,

sovereignty of states and the seldom clear-cut global response to address human displacement

and migration, such as internally displaced persons, asylum-seekers and refugees.382

Moreover, Connell points out that one of the prominent issues is the access of, and tenure to,

land that was relatively easily designated for resettlement in colonial times in Pacific Island

countries.383 However, Connell also claims that ‘[i]n post-colonial times, land boundaries have

become frozen and land too valuable for most islanders to be willing to enable even displaced

people to lease or purchase it.’384 Moreover, Connell argues that ‘post-colonial governments

have been without financial resources, management capacity, commitment and focus to

develop effective settlement schemes or identify the need for them.’385 These present some

key determinants for consideration.

Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 167, 167–91. See Connell, above n 75, 127–42; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30–2; See also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 2–3, 14–25; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78; see also Donner, above n 35, 191–210; see also Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231-405.   380 See above n 379 and accompanying text. 381 Ibid; see also ‘…researchers have that spiritual beliefs, traditional governance mechanisms, and a short-term approach to planning were barriers to understanding of climate change…few initiatives pay little more than perfunctory attention to the importance of awareness, knowledge, and understanding in climate change adaptation’ as cited in Nurse et al, above n 31, 1640. 382 See above n 379 and accompanying text; see also Connell, above n 75, 129, 138. 383 Connell, above n 75, 135. 384 Ibid 136. 385 Ibid 135; See also ‘Political sovereignty brought increased and disproportionate costs for state functions, including environment protection, infrastructure development, national defence and international representation, otherwise undertaken by colonial authorities’ as cited in John Connell, Islands at Risk? Environments, Economies and Contemporary Change (Edward Elgar, 2013) 19.

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Connell further claims that ‘[m]ost Pacific island governments do not have the will or capacity

to develop, legislate for or administer effective resettlement policies in the face of local

anxieties, tensions and hegemony over land.’386 One possible implication of this (land), as

Connell points out, is that governments may need to consider the compulsory acquisition of

land in the future to respond to climate-vulnerable populations in Pacific Island countries.387

Similarly, Campbell and Warrick, in commenting on land tenure security, point out that land

ownership in Pacific Island countries and territories remains predominantly customary land,

which raises key political issues with respect to rights to land, ‘nationality, and the

responsibility for the costs of moving and resettlement’ of the communities of origin in the

destination area.388 Likewise, many seminal authors, in acknowledging the importance of land

for relocation, hold the view that ‘it offers no solution unless affected communities also have

the right to enter and reside in the other country, enjoy their full range of human rights, and

not be subject to expulsion.’389

Commenting on the availability of land for relocation, Edwards points out that the duration of

time needed to access land affects the physical relocation of affected communities to the

destination area or country.390 Edwards argues that resettlement planning is a lengthy process

that can span years given protracted negotiations that can occur between stakeholders.391 This

view is supported by Ferris, who recounts one of the chief outcomes from the lessons and

experiences of DIDR and claims that in the context of adaptation planning in response to

climate-induced migration that governments must plan relocations ‘at least several years’ prior

to the actual move and that the process of planning needs to be anchored in adaptation funding

mechanisms.392 Moreover, Ferris maintains that little is known about the ‘optimal time for

resettling people in the case of climate change’ and reinforces the importance of not only

planning but funding to avert increased vulnerability of climate vulnerable communities in the

destination area or county.393 These are essential issues that need to be considered.

There is widespread agreement in several published studies and the emerging body of research

which pays particular attention to the significant provision of costs and access to funding for

involuntary resettlement associated with development projects and human mobility from

386 Connell, above n 75, 138–9. 387 Ibid. 388 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 21. 389 McAdam, above n 13, 284. 390 Edwards, above n 35, 65, 75; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 391 Ibid 75. 392 Ferris, above n 12, 34. 393 Ibid.

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sudden- and slow-onset environmental change.394 There are several independent and isolated

tiers (international, regional, national, public, private) from which to mobilise financial

resources for population movements from an array of factors (armed conflict, generalised

violence, disasters, asylum, for example) presented in the literature that lie beyond the scope

of this project.395 However, global efforts by the international development community and

multilateral agencies through the establishment of funding avenues to respond to human

insecurities of affected populations from development projects and climatic events are

notable.396 Some these include adaptation and mitigation funding for developing countries

through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) under the auspices of the UNFCCC, sudden-onset

disaster relief assistance through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and global

humanitarian aid in response to armed conflict and natural disasters through the United

Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Other funding avenues

are available through international financial institutions, multilateral development banks and

organisations, such as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, ADB, Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development for example, towards infrastructure projects

pursuant to policies (Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement), standards (Performance

Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability), safeguards (social safeguards) and

guidelines (Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement).397

This list is far from exhaustive, but it is representative of the funding vehicles at a global level.

There has been little attention drawn by the global community to articulate financial resources,

394 Ibid 32–5; see also ADB Report, above n 10, ix, 52, 60–71; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 23–4, 26–7, 29–30; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 767; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 380. 395 Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 30, see also ADB Report, above n 10, 64; 67; IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 5; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 771–9. 396 Ferris, above n 12, 32–5; see also ADB Report, above n 10, ix; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 23–4, 26–7, 29–30. 397 CDKN Report, above n 4, 29–30; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 60–1, 68, 70; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 380; see also The World Bank, Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook: Planning and Implementation in Development Projects (The World Bank, 2004) xviii, xxiii, xxxi, 3–6, 82. See also Lidewij van der Ploeg and Frank Vanclay, ‘A Human Rights Based Approach to Project Induced Displacement and Resettlement’ (2017) 35(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 34, 34–52; see also Eddie Smyth and Frank Vanclay, ‘The Social Framework for Projects: A Conceptual but Practical Model to Assist in Assessing, Planning and Managing the Social Impacts of Projects’ (2007) 35(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 65, 65, 67, 70–2; see also International Finance Corporation, IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability Effective January 1, 2012 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/publications/publications_handbook_pps>. See also United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Financing < https://www.unocha.org/our-work/humanitarian-financing>; see also United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Global Humanitarian Overview 2018 <https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/globalhumanitarianoverview/>; see also Christian Aid, ‘A Time to Lead: Our Position on the Global Refugee and Migration Summits (September 2016)’ (Working Paper, Christian Aid, July 2016) 18.

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tools and activities for climate-induced internal relocation, including cross-border

relocation.398 This is evident in the case of the Paris Agreement.399 The operative parts of the

Paris Agreement overlook the inclusion of a dedicated section on climate-induced migration

and appropriate funding mechanism to underpin the global phenomenon.400 By contrast, the

appeals of the global community for a loss-and-damage mechanism, which addresses the

‘collateral effects of inadequate or failed mitigation and the limits of adaptation’, advanced

unabated in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement.401

With regard to empirical studies conducted by the ADB in Asia and the Pacific region on

climate change funded projects, the ADB points out that there has been no reliable evidence

of ‘funds being used for migration of any kind’, and ‘where funding for relocation is included,

e.g., in adaptation funds, it is not clear how often its purpose is to accommodate the project

rather than to facilitate.’402 The ADB claims that ‘migration planning as an adaptation strategy

is virtually non-existent in policy design.’403 McAdam and Ferris, in acknowledging and

synthesising the findings of the Nansen Initiative Pacific Report, confirm that the ‘Pacific’s

national disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation policies and planning

instruments shows weak, almost non-existent reference or inclusion of human mobility

challenges in the context of natural disasters and climate change (e.g. displacement, relocation,

evacuation, protection, etc.).’404 The ADB highlights that at a ‘domestic level, governments

need to factor in migration-related spending needs into development plans, poverty reduction

strategies, and National Adaptation Programs of Action.’405 This view is complemented by

Ferris, who adds that ‘[i]f adaptation strategies are to include planned relocations, then funding

needs to be made available to support basic institutional capacity-building and international

guidelines to guide government actions and to support government efforts to plan.’406

However, the ADB maintains that ‘new climate change funds are still under development and

funding for climate-induced migration is, at best, a theoretical possibility.’407 A possible

explanation for this situation described by the ADB might be the less-well established legal

398 CDKN Report, above n 4, 24–30; see also ADB Report, above n 10, ix, 74, 70; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. 399 Paris Agreement, above n 194, art 2(1)(a). 400 Ibid; see also ‘ADB Report’, above n 10, 1. 401 Paris Agreement, above n 194; see also Maxine Burkett, ‘Reading Between the Red Lines: Loss and Damage and the Paris Outcome’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 118, 119. 402 ‘ADB Report’, above n 10, 70. 403 Ibid 47. 404 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 161. 405 ADB Report, above n 10, ix. 406 Ferris, above n 12, 35. 407 ADB Report, above n 10, 70.

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definition and protection arrangements for climate vulnerable populations at a global level,

which are addressed later on in this chapter.408

Likewise, the research report by the CDKN, which synthesis the key findings for SIDS from

the contribution of the IPCC working groups to the AR5, acknowledges that the SIDS do not

possess the resources for relocation, which is likely to continue to impede the ability of States

to obtain the needed finance locally to design, implement and monitor planned projects.409

According to the ADB, ‘money-raising strategy is risky.’410 This is because of the various

layers that may exist. For instance, funding, including its appropriate distribution may

germinate from ‘bilateral and multilateral agencies’ and extend to the next level of assistance

and resources from donor agencies which may not necessarily be readily accessible. This is

because financial assistance and technical support from bilateral and multilateral agencies as

well as donor agencies is tailored for specific projects as part of their short- and long-term

assistance arrangements for example, in emergencies such as natural disasters, and future

focused projects such as climate change adaptation and low-carbon development projects.411

This view is supported by advocates of the global organisation Christian Aid, which in

exploring the financial programs and plight of refugees argues that ‘reality is that donors do

not follow through on pledges made, and financial systems in place at the receiving end are

not functioning well.’412 The CDKN also acknowledges that the SIDS ‘rely heavily on

multilateral finance and technical support to design and deliver major climate compatible

development policies.’413 The CDKN suggests that the provision of technical assistance and

support, which is advanced by various civil society organisations in the SIDS, may potentially

animate the pathway to finance from sources other than the local level.414 In addition, the

CDKN admits that international support is critical.415 The ADB also admits that international

cooperation is pivotal for migration across borders, which can potentially be established and

advanced through ‘[b]ilateral and multilateral agreements’ to constitute a ‘regional network of

law and standards’ in the context of climate-induced migration.416 These are issues that need

to be considered.

408 Ibid 70–1. 409 Ibid 52; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 23–5; see also Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23–5; see also Doberstein and Tadgell, above n 86, 23–5.  410 ADB Report, above n 10, 48, 61. 411 Ibid; see also Takako Morita and Christina Pak, ‘Legal Readiness to Attract Climate Finance: Towards a Low-carbon Asia and Pacific’ (2018) 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 6, 6–14. 412 Christian Aid, above n 397, 2. 413 CDKN Report, above n 4, 23.  414 Ibid. 415 Ibid 26. 416 ADB Report, above n 10, 72–3.  

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Similarly, Ferris, in acknowledging the lessons and experiences of DIDR—including the

stewardship (guidelines, safeguards, etc.) of multilateral financial institutions and agencies to

finance and facilitate the resettlement of communities associated with development projects—

points out that the costs of resettlement are integrated in the overall budgets of such institutions

and agencies for resettlement projects.417 She further points out that ‘relocation of communities

because of the effects of climate change will not generally be carried out in the expectation of

realising increased revenues which can support the resettlement projects; rather the funds

would likely have to come from government budgets.’418 Moreover, Ferris argues that in the

case of Pacific Island nations and low-lying atoll communities with acute economies of scale,

‘it is unlikely that governments will have the necessary resources to plan and implement

resettlement plans that uphold the rights of communities’, and therefore international financing

is imperative.419 Against the stands of evidence in the field of DIDR, Ferris further argues that

several questions remain unanswered and queries whether the “platform” for development

projects in terms of international project development funds, policies, standards and

safeguards, as indicated earlier, can be adopted to access funding and resources to respond to

inland (local) and cross-border planned relocation of communities on grounds of climate

change.420 The issues surrounding relocation costs and access to international finance or

alternative financing avenues are among key determinants that need to be considered in

response to internal and cross-border climate induced relocation.

Another important aspect of resettlement associated with development projects and human

mobility in the field of migration studies is the consideration of the inclusion and participation

of communities of origin and host communities in all phases of the project processes (plans,

programs, implementation, etc.).421 It is well established in the literature that ‘[a] concerted

effort to engage from the outset those vulnerable groups (women, children, people with

disabilities and the destitute, for example) could prove to be an effective strategy to improve

the chances for a successful assessment of how migration, displacement and planned

relocation would best feature in a country’s NAP.’422 Likewise, Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin

point out that the ‘displaced must be seen as active social agents with their own views on rights

417 Ferris, above n 12, 35. 418 Ibid 33, 35. 419 Ibid 35; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 24. 420 Ferris, above n 12, 35. 421 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23. 422 Ferris, above n 12, 35; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 52; see also Youssef Nassef, ‘National Adaptation Plans and Building Adaptive Capacity’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 17.

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and entitlements.’423 Yonetani, in acknowledging these considerations points out that ‘[e]ven

when relocation is planned in ways that respect a community’s perspectives and wishes’,

caution must be applied as ‘a lack of adequate policy and governance mechanisms and

prohibitive financial costs may prove significant obstacles when it comes to implementation,

leaving communities trapped in vulnerable situations.’424 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin suggest

that ‘[r]esettlement is a complex social process’ and ‘at its best it should support and nourish

the coping and adaptation processes that enable a population to regain the functionality and

coherence of a viable community.’425 These are some key markers to mediate into all levels of

decision-making in planned relocation that need to be considered.

Taken together, a host of considerations identified from the lessons and experiences of human

mobility in the context of development projects and sudden- and slow-onset events from

environmental change provide important insights to unpack determinants of readiness. The

comprehensive set of considerations espoused by authors such as Kalin, Warner and Ferris,

for example, relate to concerns for ‘sufficient and sustained financing to resettle people in a

way that respects their rights, having sufficient lead time to enable careful participatory

planning processes, to giving particular attention to sensitive issues around land acquisition,

and maintaining the identity and cultural ties’ of communities origin and host communities.426

Alongside the foregoing considerations for planned relocation, it is important to explore the

preliminary question of the responsiveness of both laws and institutions at the international

level to the protection, security, institutional and governance arrangements that address human

mobility on grounds of climate change in contemporary times, which is discussed in the

following section. This is among other areas of focus (adaptive capacity of Pacific Island

nations, and migration as an adaptation option of last resort) as was mentioned earlier in this

chapter.427

423 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 25. 424 Yonetani, above n 274, 4.  425 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 25. 426 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 35; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Warner, Kalin and Martin, above n 348, 38–42. 427 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 3, 11, 23, 25; see also McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43–55; see also ‘identity, culture, community and livelihoods are deeply interwoven in the historical and cultural fabric of communities’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, 11, 23, 25 and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 53.

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3.5 Climate Displacement and Migration under International Law

3.5.1 Global Mobility Dynamics

There is widespread agreement in the field of migration studies that climate–driven population

displacement and migration is ‘no longer a matter of migration policy but rather of

environmental policy.’428 This is due to ‘[t]he prospect of migration’ as ‘a powerful adaptation

strategy’, which has culminated in international climate policies, for example, the CAF and

the Doha Decision adopted under the UNFCCC, and the prevalence of multifaceted drivers

(economic, cultural, environmental degradation, for example) surrounding migration

decisions, as discussed earlier.429 However, as Leighton, Shen and Warner argue ‘[t]he

international community has so far been slow to grasp the political reality of environmental

migration.’430 This view is reinforced by Werz and Hoffman who point out that the

‘[c]umulative effects of climate change and associated migration have serious implications for

stability in nations.’431 They suggest that the primary focus of international leaders and

governments should be on the well-being of people affected by the outcomes of climate change

and its consequent migration, insecurity and conflict.’432

3.5.2 Legal Protection Gap

Examining the legal and policy discourse to explore arrangements for climate change-induced

human mobility by the international legal community spans legal scholarship and includes

broader perspectives from the field of scientific, anthropological and sociological published

studies that confirm that the global response in terms of the protection, security, institutional

and governance dimensions is not well established to address population movement on the

428 Francois Gemenne, ‘One Good Reason to Speak of Climate Refugees’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 70, 70–1; see also Demola Okeowo, ‘Examining the Link: Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration’ (2013) 15(4) Environmental Law Review 273, 277. 429 Okeowo, n 428, 274–3; see also McAdam, above n 18, 520; see also Andrew Morton, Philippe Boncour and Frank Laczko, ‘Human Security Policy Challenges’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 5, 5–7; see also Gemenne, above n 428, 70–1; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 767, 771. See also Walter Kalin and Claudine Haenni Dale, ‘Disaster Risk Mitigation-Why Human Rights Matter’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 38, 38–9; see also United Nations University Migration Network, Pacific <https://migration.unu.edu/research/forced-migration/pacific.html#outline>. 430 Leighton, Shen and Warner, above n 325, 13; see also Warner et al, ‘Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration’ (2010) 55(3) Natural Hazards 689, 691–2. 431 Michael Werz and Max Hoffman, ‘Climate Change, Migration, and the Demand for Greater Resources: Challenges and Responses’ (2015) 35(1) SAIS Review of International Affairs 99, 99–100. 432 Ibid.

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grounds of climate change. It is widely acknowledged by scholars such as McAdam, Corendea,

Warner, Nishimura, Kalin, and Koser for example, who confirm that ‘no international

agreement or protection framework exists that explicitly accounts for climate-change induced

migration.’433 The body of knowledge and practice across forced migration and displacement

studies maintains that ‘international law acknowledges only a very small class of forced

migrants as people whom other countries have an obligation to protect (refugee and stateless

persons), and those eligible for complementary protection (non-return to torture)’ compared

with climate-induced displacement and migration.434 Similarly, Cohen and Bradley point out

that climate-vulnerable populations are not recognised as refugees and therefore ‘there is no

normative framework to address their specific needs and vulnerabilities and States have not

been willing to commit to more than temporary protection on an ad hoc basis.’435 Many

scholars and migration practitioners maintain that where international law extends to offer

protection, as discussed above under existing ‘refugee, environmental, and human rights law

regimes’, it fails to ‘account for climate change-induced displacement and migration, creating

legal gaps in protection.’436

In acknowledging the ‘lack of clarity about the status and protection needs’ of climate-

vulnerable populations, Cohen and Bradley argue that the largest gap in protection is that for

populations crossing borders.437 Similarly, McAdam and Ferris acknowledge that ‘planned

relocations by the effects of climate change are expected to occur within an affected country’s

own borders’; however, they argue that ‘international relocations may be necessary in some

regions, such as the Pacific’, which demands consideration of impending legal protection

issues such as social and cultural rights, citizenship and nationhood (to list a few) by the

international legal community.438 Moreover, international climate policies for instance, the

CAF and Doha Decision adopted under the UNFCCC, including the Paris Agreement, which

also stems from the UNFCCC, remain poorly equipped to respond to the legal and protection

arrangements.439

433 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–9. 434 Ibid 107–34; see also McAdam, above n 18, 521; see also Farquhar, above n 24, 32–6; see also Corendea, above n 325, 52; see also ‘International law recognises only a small category of forced migrants as people whom other countries have an obligation to protect: refugees, stateless persons, and those eligible for complementary protection (under international human rights law)’ as cited in Jane McAdam, above n 14, 1520. 435 Roberta Cohen and Megan Bradley, ‘Disasters and Displacement: Gaps in Protection’ (2010) 1 International Humanitarian Legal Studies 95, 95–6. 436 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–9. 437 Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95. 438 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 142–3, 162–3. 439 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1–4; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 114–18; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 691–5; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 276–8, 282–9.

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Against this background, Nishimura’s account of a host of impediments for a unified

international legal and policy protection framework is notable.440 These include:

(a) a lack of political will; (b) the current security discourse surrounding climate change-induced migration; (c) institutional capacity issues; (d) the complicated causes underlying climate change and the desire of global actors to avoid responsibility; and (e) the inability of civil society to organise effectively around climate change-induced displacement.441

In the same vein, Leighton, Shen and Warner, in commenting on these protection gaps, claim

that they ‘present key challenges for governments, particularly for both sending and receiving

countries, where migrants cross borders to protect their lives or seek alternative livelihoods.’442

Against this background, a parallel layer of uncertainty resonates with respect to the

appropriate terminology for human mobility on grounds of climate change.

3.5.3 Gap in Terminology

To date, a uniform terminology to account for vulnerable populations crossing international

borders on the grounds of climate change and in search of protection is lacking in international

fora.443 This is despite multidisciplinary literature spanning legal, economic, development and

sociological studies for example, containing an array of terminologies such as ecological or

climate change refugees, survival migrants, and environmentally-induced migrants to list but

a few.444 Similarly some scholars acknowledge ‘clinical terms such as climate-induced

migrants or mobility in the context of climate change.’445 The term ‘‘environmental refugees’’

is frequently used in the literature and is equated with the broad use of the term ‘‘climate

refugees’’.446 The vast majority of studies on human displacement and migration in the context

of sudden- and slow-onset environmental change include a section to acknowledge the

440 Nishimura, above n 38, 118–25. 441 Ibid; see also Liv Feijen, ‘Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law’ (2012) 28(75) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 61, 63. 442 Leighton, Shen and Warner, above n 325, 12. 443 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34; see also Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1–4; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 691–5; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 273–4, 284–5. 444 Nishimura, above n 38, 110–14; see also Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1–4; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 689–715; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 273–89. See also Monika Mayrhofer and Margit Ammer, ‘People Moving in the Context of Environmental Change: The Cautious Approach of the European Union’ (2014) 16 European Journal of Migration 389, 399; see also ‘...environment-related migration will primarily occur in the developing world, with migrants moving either internally or to countries in the same region…Many persons displaced inter alia by environmental factors in particular those who cannot return permanently or long-term have similar protection needs as refugees or persons qualifying for complementary forms of protection’ as cited in Mayrhofer and Ammer, 428. 445 Gemenne, above n 428, 70. 446 See above n 444 and accompanying text.

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contribution of seminal authors, including Lester Brown and El-Hinnawi, who introduced the

term environmental refugee.447 Environmental refugees are defined as ‘people who are forced

to leave their places of habitual residence because of human or naturally induced

environmental issues.’448 Similarly, climate refugees is the term used to depict, as McNamara

and Gibson argue, a ‘particular discursive category’, which embodies ‘entire nationalities of

people in the Pacific region, whose future residential stability (island homelands)’ is

disproportionately at risk of the exponential impacts of climate change and projected to be

subject to mass migration in the foreseeable future.449 The lack of a uniform terminology has

implications for these vulnerable populations in areas such as policy responses and protection

of rights, to identify but a few.

Moreover, ‘human movement is theorized as a continuum, with forced migration at one end

and voluntary movement at the other.’450 Legal scholarship recognises that movements on

account of climate change constitute a grey area in that they are ‘neither entirely forced nor

entirely voluntary.’451 Much uncertainty still exists about the relationship between voluntary

and forced movements coalescing around environmental factors.452 Furthermore, ‘temporary

and permanent, internal and across an international border’ movements are strands, or aspects,

of human mobility.453 This creates a difficulty in establishing the essential elements for the

legal definition of movement of people due to environmental and climatic factors.454 The

nearest definition scholarly discourse offers relates to the widely employed term

“environmental migrants”.455

447 Ibid. 448 Okeowo, above n 428, 275. 449 Karen Elizabeth McNamara and Chris Gibson, ‘We do not Want to Leave our Land: Pacific Ambassadors at the United Nations Resist the Category of Climate Refugees’ (2009) 40(3) Geoforum 475, 483, 475–6, 480–2. 450 Bridget Lewis, ‘Neighbourliness and Australia’s Contribution to Regional Migration Strategies for Climate Displacement in the Pacific’ (2015) 15(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Review 86, 89–92; see also McAdam, above n 10, 1–8. 451 International Organization for Migration, IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (International Organization for Migration, 2014) 6, 21–2 (‘IOM 2014 Report’); see also McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; see also Yonetani, above n 39, 13–15; see also Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10. 452 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 693. 453 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451 and accompanying text. 454 Corendea, above n 325, 52, 110. 455 McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; see also Feijan, above n 441, 62–3; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 110–15; see also Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10; see also Kalin, above n 354, 89–91. See also Warren, above n 325, 2109–117; see also Gregory White, ‘The Securitization of Climate-induced Migration’ in Kavita R Khory (ed), Global Migration-Challenges in the Twenty-first Century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 1, 27–30.

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In 2007, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) framed a broad working and

advocacy definition, or as expressed by the IOM, ‘a non-normative definition’ in an attempt

to channel global efforts for human migration policy and practice.456 While no legal definition

exists, IOM defines environmental migrants as:

persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.457

This definition mediates between the continuum of ‘forced and voluntary migration, as it

engages the expressions ‘obliged to leave’ and ‘choose to do so’, respectively.’458 On the one

hand, the introduction of a working definition can be celebrated in legal academic work even

though it is not fully articulated with protection needs and the rights of people or populations

in the context of climate change-induced displacement and migration.459 On the other hand,

considerable uncertainty remains in settling on a precise legal definition for “such” a category

of people as indicated earlier.

Forced migration practitioners, legal scholars and policymakers in existing migration studies

have identified multiple implications arising from the lack of a precise definition. Some of

these relate to the:

1) development of appropriate policy responses for migration flows triggered by

environmental or climatic factors;460

2) ‘difficulty in systematically progressing deliberations about appropriate multilateral legal

and institutional responses;’461

3) governance arrangements under existing agreed climate policy or emerging climate policy

under the UNFCCC;462 and

4) recognition of rights and protection of environmental migrants.463

456 ‘IOM’s working definition is not intended to serve a legal and/or normative purpose or have implications for the granting of rights. Rather, it represents an attempt to capture the complexity of the issue at hand’ as cited IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 22. 457 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 6; see also Warner et al, above n 37, 10; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 14. 458 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451 and accompanying text. 459 Ibid; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34. 460 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10. 461 McAdam, above n 10, 7. 462 Ibid. 463 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10.

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In the same vein, Gibb and Ford extend the governance implications to include the ‘scale of

governance at all levels (e.g. local, regional or international).’464 Moreover, they include the

‘extent of the

phenomenon, and state and institutional responsibility, as well as on whose agendas are

served.’465 However, they suggest that ‘articulating a clear definition of persons displaced by

climate change would thus appear to be an essential starting point for international

protection.’466

Other scholars in the field of migration and displacement studies are more concerned with

ensuring that the definition is as broad as possible so as to capture the largest number of people

as possible.467 McAdam’s work on existing international protection frameworks cites ‘one-

size-fits-all’ when attempting to frame a legal definition for climate displaced populations.

Legal and non-legal literature recognises that to frame a generic definition would: 1)

‘downplay the cultural and livelihood needs of displaced communities and local knowledge

bases for adaptation; 2) potentially overlook migrants in need for protection and assistance;468

and 3) ‘draw larger or bigger numbers of migrants.’469

Against this background, many scholars have attempted to offer possible explanations with

respect to the debate around the lack of a precise definition. A likely explanation articulated

by McNamara and Gibson is that the ‘category of climate refugees reduces the ability of

national ambassadors representing Pacific small island states at the United Nations to pressure

for change, lessening the onus on multilateral institutions and industrialised nations to curb

greenhouse gas emissions.’470 Another possible explanation is that ‘environmental conditions

do not constitute a basis for international protection’ within international refugee law, which

falls short of constituting ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ within one of the enumerated

grounds of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political

opinion as set out in Article 1A under the 1951 Refugee Convention.’471 As McAdam

maintains, making a claim on account of the adverse impacts of climate change under the

refugee protection regime is difficult because the definition of a refugee is limited to a person

464 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 3.    465 Ibid 2. 466 Ibid.   467 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 3; see also McAdam, above n 10, 7; see also Jane McAdam, above n 18, 520–42. 468 See above n 467 and accompanying text; see also Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 11. 469 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 11; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 9. 470 McNamara and Gibson, above n 449, 475, 481–82.  471 Warner et al, above n 430; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 273–5, 284–5; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 114–5. 

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who has already engaged in cross-border movement and there is disparity between

‘characterising “climate change” as “persecution”, which entails violations of human rights

that are particularly egregious owing to their inherent nature or cumulative impact.’472

Similarly, Corendea concludes that the ‘notion of the climate refugee is problematic and

controversial, problematic because it has no legal standing under existing international refugee

and asylum law, and controversial because there is little agreement as to what to do about the

problem it presents’ in international policy fora.473

The ineffectiveness of relying on the impacts of climate change, such as the rise of sea level

to establish refugee status, has been exemplified in the most recent ruling by the Supreme

Court of New Zealand in the case of Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of

Business Innovation and Employment. The applicant applied for refugee status pursuant to

section 129 of the Immigration Act 2009 (NZ) on the grounds that: ‘1) his homeland Kiribati,

was facing rising sea levels, increasing coastal damage through erosion, infrastructure losses,

reduced quality and quantity of water resources, damage to agriculture crops, and deterioration

in public health as a result of impacts of climate change’, and ‘2) over time, the rising sea level

and the associated environmental degradation will force the inhabitants to leave their

islands.’474 The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dismissed

the applicant’s argument on the grounds that ‘there was no evidence establishing that the

environmental conditions the applicant faced or was likely to face on return to Kiribati would

be so parlous as to jeopardise his life or mean he and his family would be unable to resume

their prior subsistence life with dignity.’475 The Tribunal concluded that the ‘applicant was

unable to show that there was a sufficient risk to his life ‘at the present time’’, which was also

472 McAdam, above n 18, 521–3; see also Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 248 (Dawson J) as cited in McAdam, above n 18, 523; see also Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489, 499–500 (Lord Hope), Minister for Immigration v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, 48–9 (Gummow J) as cited in Jane McAdam, above n 18, 523. See also: ‘General claims based on climate change do not fit this framework, as decision-makers have explained in a number of cases in Australia and New Zealand in which Pacific Islanders have sought to claim asylum on the basis of climate change impacts on their home countries’ as cited in McAdam, above n 18, 522. See also Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107 (20 July 2015) (‘Teitiota’s Case-NZSC’), Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173, Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2013] NZHC 3125, AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517-520, AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, Refugee Appeal No 72314/2000, RSAA (Oct. 2000) (Tuvalu) as cited in McAdam, above n 18, 522. 473 Corendea, above n 325, 110. 474 Teitiota’s Case-NZSC, above n 472; see also Mark Baker-Jones, and Melanie Baker-Jones, ‘Teitiota v the Chief Executive of Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment - A Person Displaced’ (2015) 15(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Review 102, 103–4; see also ‘Immigration Act 2009 (NZ) s 129 (invokes the test for a refugee set out in the Refugee Convention)’ as cited in Teitiota’s Case-NZSC, above n 472, para 5. 475 See above n 474 and accompanying text.

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categorically upheld by the New Zealand courts during each stage of the applicant’s appeal.476

This case clearly illustrates how the adverse impacts of climate change are misplaced within

the refugee narrative, particularly the Refugee Convention grounds for seeking refugee status.

A number of similar Australian and New Zealand cases have been brought by Pacific Islanders

seeking asylum as a result of the adverse impacts of climate change. These have also been

unsuccessful.477 The Convention grounds refute claims based on the grounds of climate change

or environmental degradation.478

According to Corendea, ‘[u]se of the term climate refugee is, in other words, nothing more

than a quasi-definitional description, not legally enforceable under any current international

treaty, convention or instrument.’479 It ‘represents an unrecognised category of migrants that

risks falling through the cracks of international refugee and immigration policy.’480 There is

consensus amongst migration and border agencies such as IOM and the Office of the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—and across scientific and legal

literature—that the terms currently used are problematic and misleading.481 The terms

“environmental refugees” or “climate refugees” could potentially ‘undermine the international

legal regime for the protection of refugees’.482 Moreover, ‘it would be difficult to obtain

international agreement on the global stage that climate change impacts, natural disasters or

environmental degradation constitute “persecution” under the refugee instrument.’483

However, some forced migration practitioners and legal scholars depart drastically from this

view and argue that the use of the term environmental or climate change refugees works well

by ‘mixing those displaced by environmental causes with those defined as refugees’ under the

476 Ibid; see also McAdam, above n 18, 525–6; see also McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 15–16; see also Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 2728/2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2106 (7 Janurary 2020) 1 (‘Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand’); see also Kate Lyons, Climate refugees can’t be returned home, says land UN human rights ruling (20 January 2020) The Guardian < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling>. 477 See above n 476 and accompanying text. 478 ‘Political opinion, race, nationality, religion or membership of a particular social group’ under the definition of the term “refugee” in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) art. 1(A) (2) (‘Refugee Convention’); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (‘Protocol to the Refugee Convention’). See also Mayrhofer and Ammer, above n 444, 416–18; see also McAdam, above n 18, 522; see also McAdam, above n 10, 3 (para [V]). 479 Corendea, above n 325, 111. 480 Ibid 110. 481 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 22, 28; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 771 (Box 12–4). 482 See above n 481 and accompanying text. 483 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 23; see also McAdam, above n 10, 3 (para [V]).

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Refugee Convention.484 Gemenne echoes similar sentiments and claims that to dismiss these

terminologies, ‘is in a way, foregoing the idea that climate change is a form of persecution

against the most vulnerable and that climate-induced migration is a very political matter, rather

than an environmental one.’485

Similarly, a broader perspective has been adopted by some scholars who argue that

government-induced environmental degradation is an appropriate terminology on the basis

that it equates to ‘a form of persecution usually by the home government of the person seeking

refugee status or a non-state actor and, furthermore, that such persecution is taking place by

reason of environmental refugees’ membership in a social group.’486 Taken together the

definitional issue remains unresolved in academic research and the international policy fora.

Having considered the compounding layers of complexity and existing gaps in legal and policy

protection arrangements, including the seldom clear-cut definition under law at the

international level to formally situate population movements on grounds of climate change

across international borders, attention is briefly turned to the parallel scholarly debate to

underscore a new international convention exclusively for ‘this new, unrecognised

category.’487

3.5.4 International and Regional Climate Treaty

At one end of the debate over ‘legal protection and climate change policy’, scholars such as

Biermann and Boas, and Hodgkinson and Young, and Docherty and Giannini, coalesce in

arguing for a unified global multilateral climate treaty or convention that acknowledges both

rights and responsibilities for climate-induced population displacement and migration at the

international level.488 For example, this group of scholars proposes a ‘single stand-alone

convention for climate-change-displaced persons (CCDPs)’ to underpin the rights of ‘those

displaced internally and those who cross international borders’, including ‘adopting a

484 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178; Morton, Boncour and Laczko, above n 429, 5; see also Protocol to the Refugee Convention, above n 478. 485 Gemenne, above n 428, 71. 486 Okeowo, above n 428, 284–5. 487 Corendea, above n 325, 110–11; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10. 488 Okeowo, above n 428, 285–6; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10–11; see also David Hodgkinson and Lucy Young, ‘In the Face of Looming Catastrophe: A Convention for Climate-change-Displaced Persons’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 229–36; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 125–6.

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multifaceted, cooperative and international approach to provide assistance for both temporary

and permanent relocation, and protect CCDPs.’489 In addition, alternative proposals include

the: ‘1) adoption of Protocols to the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to serve the interest of people

displaced by environmental impacts’, and ‘2) expansion of current agreements to add a right

to a healthy and safe environment.’490

More recently, two parallel developments have been advanced by prominent scholars and

migration policy experts such as Kaelin, Gemenne, Adamo, Doyle, and Siegel at global policy

fora. The first relates to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

(Compact for Migration).491 It is marked to be adopted formally as an agreement under the

auspices of the existing ‘non-binding political New York Declaration for Refugees and

Migrants’ by the UN Member States to the UN General Assembly in December 2018.492 The

Compact for Migration is the ‘first intergovernmental negotiated agreement, to cover all

dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner.’493 A press

statement released by the Platform on Disaster Displacement adviser, Professor Walter Kaelin,

outlined that the Compact for Migration embeds and synthesises principles contained in

existing international regimes and guidance documents spanning the Paris Agreement, Sendai

Framework, 2030 Agenda and the Protection Agenda.494 It aims to ‘address drivers of

migration, build on domestic law and practices and achieve the noble goal of safe, orderly and

regular migration for all, including those crossing borders in the context of climate change and

disasters.’495 The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP), in acknowledging that the Compact for Migration ‘aligns with existing

international frameworks on climate change’, notes that much uncertainty still exists about a

‘framework for implementation.’496 The ODI and UNDP argue that the impact on the policy

positions of individual States is as yet unknown.497

489 Hodgkinson and Young, above n 488, 300, 307–9. 490 Okeowo, above n 428, 285–6; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 118. 491 Kaelin, above n 40; see also Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24–9; see also Compact for Migration, above n 40; see also General Assembly of the United Nations, above n 40, 1–2; see also Singh, above n 40. 492 See above n 491 and accompanying text. 493 Ibid. 494 Kaelin, above n 40, 1–9. 495 Ibid. 496 Stapleton et al, above n 40, 27. 497 Ibid; see also Global Policy Initiative Columbia University, Model International Mobility Convention 25 August 2017 <http://globalpolicy.columbia.edu/mobility-convention>.

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The second development relates to the Model International Mobility Convention (MIMC)

which stems from the Columbia Global Policy Initiative (CGPI) under the international

migration project steered by signatories in the ‘fields of migration, human rights, national

security, labour, economic and refugee law’ in 2017.498 The ‘MIMC consists of 213 articles

divided over eight chapters.’499 The provisions spell out the ‘rights held by a wide array of

mobile people, from visitors, students, tourists, migrant workers, investors and residents,

forced migrants, refugees, family members, migrant victims of trafficking and migrants caught

in countries in crises.’500 There is general consensus among scholars such as Doyle, Borgnas,

Banerjee, and Achiume, all of whom argue that while some of the groups of mobile people

have rights under existing laws regimes,501 that the MIMC is unique for three key reasons.

First, it provides a single framework for these groups of people.502 Second, it ‘serves the

ambitious goal of creating a holistic, rights-respecting governance regime for all aspects of

international migration, filling in the gaps in the existing international legal regime and

expanding protections where needed.’503 Third, it ‘makes realising collective and fair

responsibility sharing a core element of international protection by proposing a framework for

allocating shares among State Parties to provide adequate funding and resettlement as well as

establishing a mechanism to ensure accountability.’504 The draft treaty is still in its infancy.

Several questions remain unanswered as it is subject to future engagement by a number of

academics at a global level before it precipitates as global policy and lawmaking under

international law.

Turning to the other end of the debate, scholars such as McAdam, Corendea, Nishimura,

Okeowo, Wyman, Zetter and Koser for example, refute considerations of the alternative

proposals suggested earlier under existing international law.505 Some scholars speculate that a

498 Global Policy Initiative Columbia University, above n 480; see also Michael W Doyle, ‘The Model International Mobility Convention’ (2018) 56(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 219, 221; see also Emma Borgnas, ‘An Overview of the Model Convention’ (2018) 56(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 238, 238-47; see also Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Taking Mobility Seriously in the Model International Mobility Convention (2018) 56(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 296, 296–302. 499 See above n 498 and accompanying text. 500 Ibid. 501 Ibid. 502 Ibid. 503 Ibid. 504 Aleinikoff, above n 498, 302. 505 McAdam, above n 355, 2–3; see also McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; 67–70; see also McAdam, above n 18, 520–37; see also Corendea, above n 325, 49–53, 110–11. See also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10–11; see Nishimura, above n 38, 125–9; see also Katrina M Wyman, ‘The National Immigration Policy Option: Limits and Potential’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 337–68. See also Roger Zetter, ‘Legal and Normative Frameworks’ (2008) 31

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treaty is not necessarily the best way to advance the rights of people forced to relocate as a

result of climate change.506 McAdam is concerned ‘whether those displaced would be subject

to individual status determination (similar to refugee status determination), or whether

protection would be granted on the basis of the objective country of origin conditions from

which people flee.’507 Other scholars such as Okeowo and Koser argue that ‘[n]egotiating a

convention is a time consuming process; there is unlikely to be significant consensus around

a convention that cuts to the very heart of state sovereignty; even binding conventions

sometimes have little impact in reality.’508 Okeowo argues further that ‘[t]he economic, social

and political implications of making environmental commitments in the form of treaty

ratification may also be a source of reluctance for states to agree a treaty on climate change

refugees.’509 Similarly, Zetter cautions in replicating established ‘normative and legal

instruments’ because it is difficult to characterise ‘climate-change induced migration as forced

environmental change.’510 Similar points of view by Wyman, who argues that ‘[p]olicymakers

should recognise the potential utility of building on the existing immigration policies of likely

destination countries and think of the option of a new multilateral climate displacement treaty

as a backdrop rather than a top priority.’511 Alongside the argument over the need for a new

convention, scholars maintain that it would likely be ineffective due to either being ‘‘watered

down’’ or not adopted at all by relevant countries. They expressed concern that ‘efforts to

secure a new international convention will detract from more practical efforts to use and

improve on existing channels.’512

One unanticipated proposal by way of a UN Resolution for a ‘binding instrument on the

protection of persons displaced by the impacts of climate change’ including the ‘establishment

of a legal process to ensure human rights protection and security’, was submitted by Prime

Minister Enele Sopoanga of Tuvalu at the seventy-first session at the General Assembly of the

United Nations in 2016, and followed subsequently at the seventy-second session in 2017.513

At both sessions the proposal was less well received.514 Prime Minister Sopoanga, in delivering

his statement, alluded to the ‘uncontrolled mass migration and mass violation of human rights’

Forced Migration Review 62, 62–3; see also Khalid Koser, ‘Gaps in IDP Protection’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 17; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 285–86. 506 McAdam, above n 355, 3. 507 Ibid. 508 Okeowo, above n 428, 285; see also Koser, above n 505, 17. 509 Ibid. 510 Zetter, above n 505, 62–3; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 125–9. 511 See also Wyman, above n 505, 338–9. 512 Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10. 513 Sopoanga, above n 22 and accompanying text. 514 Ibid.

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in Europe as a yardstick to propose that ‘preparation must include developing appropriate

international legal tools to cope with the complex and multifaceted challenges posed by

climate change, which cut across a number of different areas of international law’ to ‘formulate

effective international systems to protect the human rights ultimately to save the lives of people

displaced by climate change.’515 The proposal was reiterated at the sidelines of the thirty-

seventh session of the Human Rights Council in 2018 and received little traction.516

In like manner, the deliberation of Pacific small island states at the international policy fora

contrasts with policy initiatives at the regional level by the Pacific island leaders who joined

the regional call which led to the development of a concept proposal for the creation of a

Pacific Climate Treaty in 2016.517 The draft Pacific Climate Change Treaty (“Model Treaty”)

while still in its infancy, has been formulated by a coalition of non-governmental organisations

recognised as the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN).518 It is intended to offer

a ‘new source of international law, provide a beacon of inspiration for other states working

together to tackle climate change, and help drive the sustainable development of the Pacific

through enhanced cooperation among Pacific Island states and their development partners.’519

The emergence of a model treaty is a recent prominent regional initiative and consideration

for future empirical and desk-based research detailing the model treaty would be interesting.

Whilst the full text of the model treaty is unavailable, conversational pieces and media reports

make reference to the following thematic areas in the model treaty:

1) ‘phasing out of fossil fuels;’520

2) ensuring ‘universal access to clean energy by 2030’, which will be facilitated by a ‘Pacific

framework for renewable energy’ in line with the ‘Sustainable Development Framework

Agenda 2030;’521

3) ‘establishing a fund to provide compensation for communities that have suffered climate-

change-related losses;’522 and

4) ‘climate–related migration and adaptation.’523

515 Ibid; see also Human Rights Council 37th session, Mar 2018, above n 376, para 117, 36. 516 See above n 515 and accompanying text. 517 Slezak, above n 41; see also McNamara and Gibson, above n 449, 475-83. 518 PIDF 4 2016, above n 42 and accompanying text. 519 See above n 518. 520 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 521 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 522 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 523 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 

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These offer insights into appropriate responses to support climate-induced on-island relocation

and may potentially lead to relocation across international borders.524Although the draft model

treaty is inconclusive at present, it is relevant in analysing the readiness of the Fijian

Government for climate-induced cross-border migration, which needs to be considered.

Assuming that the Pacific climate change treaty is ratified by Pacific Island nations, first

impressions are that it will demonstrate the solidarity of Pacific Island leaders with respect to

the political will, leadership and cooperation at regional policy fora on the issue of climate

change displacement and migration in the Pacific.525 However, it can also be argued that the

move towards a climate treaty by regional leaders is premature, because it raises concerns as

to the extent and influence of international law in its formulation. These concerns include the

kind of regional leadership it is providing to the international community in light of global

climate action efforts underway by the international community under the Paris Agreement.

Other practical and operational issues may also arise during the implementation and

enforcement phases of the treaty at national levels. Nevertheless, Nishimura points out that

while a ‘focus on regional solutions will not solve all the underlying issues that allow legal

gaps to persist, these changes will provide a necessary starting point to advance protection

efforts for climate change migrants.’526

The host of markers required to reach consensus and develop a new international climate

convention at the international stage is lacking as identified by the scholarly debate above.

According to McAdam, ‘there is little political appetite for a new international agreement.’527

If the debate is to be advanced, a better understanding of ‘all forms of movement due to

environmental factors or climate change’ needs to be conclusively established.528 Okeowo

suggests that ‘it might be academically sound to establish, based on empirical findings, how

climate change affects people’s decision to move.’529 Commenting on empirical studies,

Gemenne and Blocher also suggest that ‘[m]ore empirical evidence at micro- and macro-levels

is needed to fill the gaps in current knowledge in order to develop’ uniform policy approaches

for climate affected populations across regions.530 The overall consensus in legal academic

524 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 525 See above Slezak, above nn 520-4; see also Tauafiafi, above nn 520-4; see also Margaretha Wewerinke, ‘Thinking Globablly, Acting Regionally: The Case for a Pacific Climate Treaty’ (Research Report, Pacific Islands Climate Action Network and Pacific Island Development Forum, 23 June 2016) 1–22. 526 Nishimura, above n 38, 134. 527 McAdam, above n 18, 532. 528 Feijen, above n 441. 529 Okeowo, above n 428, 274. 530 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 344.

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research and the impetus for a new international convention at international policy fora by

global leaders for climate-induced human mobility across-borders under existing international

law is yet to be resolved.531

3.5.5 Soft Law Mechanisms

Having considered the legal and policy arrangements for climate-vulnerable populations,

which are fraught with normative, definitional and protection caveats under international law,

attention is turned to the scholarly discourse that draws on soft law approaches, also cited as

‘international soft law mechanisms’ or ‘soft law initiatives.’532 These embody established

‘protection norms, general principles and operational guidelines’, such as ‘duty to cooperate’,

‘duty of the affected State to seek external assistance’, ‘principles of humanity’, and ‘principles

relating to protection from displacement’ from an array of voluntary, non-binding global

initiatives, instruments and agreements.533 These agreements include the 2030 Agenda, UN

Guiding Principles, Platform on Disaster Displacement, Peninsula Principles on Climate

Displacement, Sendai Framework and Protection Agenda, among others, which traverse the

‘current body of international law’ and protection regimes (refugee, asylum, environmental,

humanitarian and human rights).534 The soft law mechanisms stem from within the UN system

(UN Guiding Principles) or ‘through state-led processes’ (Protection Agenda) or ‘by legal

experts (non-state actors).’535

In their examination of the ‘alternative ways that legal and normative frameworks can be used

to uphold the rights of those displaced internally or across borders in the context of

anthropogenic climate change’, Ferris and Bergmann reiterate that the ‘present hard law

531 Hugo, above n 271, 31. 532 Elizabeth Ferris and Jonas Bergmann, ‘Soft Law, Migration and Climate Change Governance’ (2017) 8(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 6, 14; see also IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 251, 14, 18–19, 57; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95–142; see also McAdam, above n 18, 531–4. 533 Alexander Betts, ‘Governance Questions for the International Community’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 72, 72–6; see also Prabal Barua, et al. ‘Ensuring the Rights of Climate-displaced People in Bangladesh’ (2017) 54 Forced Migration Review 88, 88–91; see Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24–9. See also Nishimura, above n 38, 109; see also Corendea, above n 325, 109–13; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95–142. See also McAdam, above n 18, 530–4; see Okeowo, above n 428, 273–89; see also Farquhar, above n 25, 30; see also Feijen, above n 441, 61, 62. See also Zetter, above n 505, 63; see also UN Guiding Principles, above n 39; see also International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (2016) art. 4–7, 11 [‘ILC Draft Articles’] <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/6_3_2016.pdf>. 534 See above n 533 and accompanying text. 535 Zetter, above n 505, 62; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 14; see also Koser, above n 505, 17; see also Kalin, above n 178, 5.

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system governing movement of people is poorly equipped to handle complexities of

population movements in the context of climate change.’536 They claim that much uncertainty

still exists as to whether any significant shift or transformation will occur in international law

fora and policy on climate change and human mobility in the coming decades.537 Ferris and

Bergmann also argue that the focus should be on developing soft law mechanisms rather than

attempting to merge climate change-vulnerable populations and ‘existing legal

frameworks.’538 They acknowledge that the ‘real impact of both hard and soft law remains a

function of rigorous follow-up processes, including targeted advocacy, as well as technical,

financial and implementation support to enable the recommended extend and quality of

actions.’539 Similarly, Popp argues that to ‘analyse environmental migration exclusively

within the logic of migration policy’ requires caution.540 This is because ‘it tends to be

embedded in broader discussions, principally in the fields of migration, climate/environment,

security and human rights.’541 Popp confirms that policy on environmental migration as a result

of climate change ‘has begun to permeate international policy agenda, mainly through

exhortatory statements of intent and soft policy tools.’542

Before proceeding to illustrate some of the soft law mechanisms, attention is briefly drawn to

some of their advantages and disadvantages. For example, soft law mechanisms are ‘[n]on-

binding agreements, easier to negotiate because they are less binding on states and less

threatening to state sovereignty.’543 Moreover, ‘soft law processes can yield relatively rapid

results as they bypass lengthy and politically contentious domestic ratification.’544 Despite

their efficacy, soft law mechanisms suffer from serious weaknesses, for example, their non-

binding nature makes them legally unenforceable.545 Moreover, their compliance mechanisms,

including ‘monitoring, assessing and reporting obligations and responsibilities of States’,

intrinsic in treaties under international hard law, are seldom clear cut in soft law

mechanisms.546 Illustrations of some of the soft law mechanisms are discussed next.

The UN Guiding Principles provide States with the impetus to introduce measures to ensure

adequate protection to displaced populations, and address situations leading to internal

536 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 6–7, 14. 537 Ibid; see also Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24. 538 See above n 537 and accompanying text. 539 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 28. 540 Popp, above n 360, 230–1. 541 Ibid. 542 Ibid. 543 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 12–13. 544 Ibid. 545 Ibid. 546 Ibid.

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displacement in the event of disasters, generalised violence and armed conflict.547 Moreover,

they underpin ‘normative grounding for the development of guidelines for operational

agencies’, for example, the Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations

of Natural Disasters.548 Commenting on the usefulness of guidelines, Yamamoto and Esteban

argue that the ‘merit of using a Guideline for climate change displacement would be that States

would choose when and in what conditions they might turn such guidelines into hard law in

their domestic legislation.’549 The African Union (AU) Convention for the Protection and

Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) commonly cited in the literature as the

Kampala Convention presents a unique example how soft law mechanisms can be turned into

hard law in regional policy fora in Africa.550 It is the ‘first legally binding mechanism on

internal displacement’ under the auspices of the UN Guiding Principles.551 However, scholars

and migration practitioners note that there are certain drawbacks associated with the Kampala

Convention. Some of these relate to the exclusion of legal protections for people affected by

cross-border displacement as a result of both disaster and climate change, as well as the

‘institutions charged with the ‘implementation of the convention.’552 The ‘lack of capacity,

failure to make the issue a political and economic priority, and unclear budget allocations at

the national level’ are noted as some of the key barriers to effectively implement provisions of

the convention.553

Another example relates to the empirical findings entrenched in the Agenda for the Protection

of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection

Agenda), which stems from the inter-governmental and regional consultations conducted by

the Nansen Initiative, a state-led process between 2012 and 2015.554 The Protection Agenda

underpins the Platform on Disaster Displacement and was adopted in 2016.555 Briefly, the term

“protection”, which appears throughout the operative text of the Protection Agenda refers to

‘any positive action undertaken by States on behalf of disaster displaced persons or persons at

547 McAdam, above n 18, 530–4; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 34, 40, 48–9, 60, 82, 84. 548 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 16. 549 Lilian Yamamoto and Miguel Esteban, Atoll Island States and International Law: Climate Change Displacement and Sovereignty (Springer, 2014) 253. 550 Black et al, above n 259, 152–5; see also IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 236, 14, 18–19, 57; see also Tamara Wood, ‘Developing Temporary Protection in Africa’ 49 (2015) Forced Migration Review 23, 23–4. 551 See above n 533 and accompanying text; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 515, 14–16. 552 See above n 534 and accompanying text. 553 Black et al, above n 274, 152–5; see also IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 251, 19; see also Wood, above n 550, 23–5. 554 Brende and Burkhalter, above n 224, 4; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 6–7, 18–20; see also Kalin, above n 178, 5. 555 McAdam, above n 14, 1518–46; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 19.

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risk of being displaced.’556 McAdam argues that the Protection Agenda ‘marks a tentative “first

step” towards international policymaking’ in the cross-border displacement and rights-based

field of studies.557 With regard to the Platform on Disaster Displacement, McAdam further

argues that ‘like the Nansen Initiative, the Platform will also play a lead role in coordinating,

contemplating and/or feeding into existing activities and processes, rather than reinventing the

wheel, since no single institution or body can harness the resources or expertise to provide

authoritative guidance across the vast majority of policy areas involved.’558 These soft law

mechanisms are among others, such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Protection

for Internally Displaced Persons and the Protection of persons in the Event of Disasters of the

International Law Commission, to list a few.559

Alongside the soft law mechanisms, the emerging tailored regional efforts by leaders of Pacific

small Island states is notable with the formulation of the Framework for Resilient

Development in the Pacific 2017-2030 (FRDP), which was endorsed by Pacific Island Forum

Leaders at its forty-seventh session (PIF 47) in September 2016 at Pohnpei, the Federated

States of Micronesia (FSM).560 The FRDP is the:

world’s first integrated regional framework to: 1) ensure that climate change and disasters are understood as a development challenge with priority actions to address vulnerability to climate change and disasters, and to 2) build resilience across all development sectors (such as health, education, water and sanitation, social assistance, energy, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, tourism, mining, culture, environment, transport and infrastructure).561

556 The Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change Final Draft (6 October 2015) para 1, II–III (‘Protection Agenda-Final Draft’). 557 McAdam, above n 18, 534. 558 McAdam, above n 14, 1518–46, 1532–4. 559 McAdam, above n 18, 529–34; see also Feijen, above n 441, 63–4; see also UN Guiding Principles, above n 39; see also IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 27–9; see also Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper, Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper (Policy Paper, December 1999) [‘IASC’] <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy files/FINALIDPPolicy.pdf>. See also: Text of the draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters Articles 1 - 18 para E in the Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-eighth session (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016)’ as cited in International Law Commission (ILC), 68th session, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2016/english/a_71_10.pdf>; see also International Law Commission (ILC), 68th session, UN Doc A/C.4/679/Add.1 (31 March 2016) <http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/679/Add.1>. 560 2016 PIFS 47, above n 44; see also ‘The FRDP was developed in response to recommendations from the Pacific Platform for Disaster Risk Management and Pacific Climate Change Roundtable in 2011 and endorsed by the Pacific Island Forum Leaders in 2012’ as cited in Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, New Framework, above n 44. 561 See above n 560 and accompanying text.

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The FRDP implementation aligns with global frameworks, which include the ‘Agenda 2030,

Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework, and the Small Islands Developing States Accelerated

Modalities of Action (S.A.M.O.A).’562 The FRDP establishes a body identified as the Pacific

Resilience Partnership to oversee the delivery of development initiatives set in the FRDP.563

One of the key features of the FRDP is that it entrenches human rights principles from a wide

range of international human rights instruments to accomplish its goals.564 It enables

vulnerable groups to access humanitarian and development assistance from a human rights

perspective.565 It also extends protection to the ‘communities most vulnerable to climate

change displacement and migration and post-disaster displacement.’566 The FRDP is a further

display of regional leadership and the political will of Pacific Island leaders to engage with

international human rights and humanitarian law—as articulated in international soft law

protection norms and principles to address human mobility.

With respect to the gap in legal protections, Nishimura points out that ‘[t]o date, there is no

binding human rights agreements that address climate change migrants or that contemplate

expansion for their inclusion.’567 Nishimura reminds us that the uncertainty surrounding the

protection gap, including the ‘lack of institutional mechanisms to ensure the enjoyment of a

number of human rights, including the right to life, health, housing food, water, and adequate

standard of living’ of climate vulnerable populations will remain underdeveloped ‘until the

‘international community is willing to consistently enforce human rights for migrants, or

provide clarity as to what constitutes a legal violation in the climate change context.’568

There is widespread agreement among a number of academics, migration and humanitarian

intergovernmental agencies and institutions of the need to campaign for and advance a ‘human

rights-based approach within a broad human rights framework’ to address gaps in protection

for both internal displacement and displacement across international borders triggered by

sudden-onset and slow-onset environmental change.569 Specifically, ‘addressing all forms of

562 Ibid; see also Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme, New Framework, above n 44; see also FRDP 2017-2030, above n 40, 10, 17, 33. 563 FRDP 2017-2030, above n 40, 33. 564 Ibid 22–3 (goal 1), 30–1 (goal 3). 565 Ibid 23. 566 Ibid 16, 22–4 (goal 1), 30–1 (goal 3), 36. 567 Nishimura, above n 38, 117. 568 Ibid. 569 Maria J Fernandez, ‘Refugees, Climate Change and International Law’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 42, 42; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 4, 54–5; see also Mayrhofer and Ammer, above n 444, 390; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95, 102; see also International Law Commission Sixtieth Session, Protection of persons in the event of disasters (Agenda item 8: Document A/Cn.4/598, 5 May 1998) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/60/> and <http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_598.pdf&lang=ESX>.

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migration that are influenced by environmental change, including displacement as a rights-

based challenge’, particularly at the operational and practical levels, ‘inevitably demands that

affected populations are fully involved in developing response strategies, and that advocacy

tools and processes are enhanced to promote their rights.’570 Moreover, there is scholarly

appreciation for ‘a more accessible entry point to establish solutions that focus on rights, needs,

and the harm faced’ by affected populations on the grounds of climate change to effectively

ensure ‘partnership and engagement’ on the global stage in response to human mobility

arrangements and challenges in the coming decades.571 There is abundant room for further

progress to take a “protection” stance with non-binding legal soft law mechanisms under

international law to escalate protection arrangements potentially legal protection for climate

vulnerable populations.

3.6 Conclusion

Climate change poses a minefield of unanswered questions in both global policy fora and

international law. This chapter documents the scientific evidence, and the growing evidence

of climate-induced displacement and migration, particularly for the future habitation and

livelihoods of Pacific Island nations, leading to migration to potential destination countries in

the near future. This demonstrates the merit of this thesis, which seeks to assess the readiness

of Fiji for the cross-border migration of Pacific Island communities in the future as an

adaptation strategy of last resort.

This chapter also documents the widely acknowledged scholarly debate around advancing and

pursuing planned relocation as a strand of human mobility when adaptive strategies, coping

capacities and resilience to sudden- and slow-onset environmental change is no longer

avoidable, particularly in the case of Pacific Island communities. It shows that the historical

migration of Pacific Island communities and the existing experiences and lessons of

resettlement of communities from development projects account for a host of considerations

(for example, land tenure security, finance and sovereignty), which are discussed briefly in

this chapter. This provides a platform to extend the discussion to identify further issues that

570 Zetter, above n 505, 63; see also also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 28; see also Black et al, above n 274, 155. 571 Nishimura, above n 38, 129; see also Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24–9; see also ‘…attention to some of the ongoing challenges relating to legal scope/protection gaps and current commitments, as well as identifying entry points across agendas for partnership and engagement’ as cited in Stapleton et al, 24.

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need to be considered in the relocation of communities on the grounds of climate change as

well as what it means to be ready for cross-border migration.

Finally, this chapter documents that there are no established legal, institutional and governance

arrangements under international law to address human mobility within countries and across

international borders. The absence of a resolute global response and protection framework for

“this category” has reinvigorated the global policy and legal fora to engage with, and embrace,

a human rights-based approach embedded in soft law mechanisms. This chapter demonstrates

a shift in the debate surrounding this category of people and that this incisive proposal as an

alternative needs to gain sufficient momentum and priority in contemporary global human

mobility agenda and policy deliberations. The next chapter examines case studies of Pacific

Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of mobility within and across sovereign borders

during the last century to inform the determinants of readiness as building blocks to articulate

the criteria for analysing readiness for climate change-induced human mobility presented in

chapter seven.

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Chapter 4: Historical Resettlement in the Pacific Islands Region

4.1 Introduction

This chapter draws on historical case studies conducted by seminal authors such as McAdam,

Campbell, Connell and Edwards on the mobility of Pacific Islanders primarily during the

period of British colonial government administration of territories in the Pacific Islands

region.572 This chapter seeks to examine Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of

mobility within and across sovereign borders in the past century, which corresponds with RQ

1 (a). RQ 1 (a) asks: What can we learn from the historical experiences of human mobility

across the Pacific Islands regions? The experiences and lessons learned from the historical

resettlement of Pacific Islanders examined in this chapter, in conjunction with chapter five,

which draws on readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives and the empirical evidence

recorded in chapter six, contribute to articulating the criteria for analysing readiness presented

in chapter seven.

There are many historical case studies of the mobility of Pacific Islanders from large-scale

development projects and non-climatic factors, such as famine and sudden-onset hazards.573

They demonstrate that the mobility of Pacific Islanders in the region is not uncommon. These

issues involved for example, restoration of livelihoods, access to local services, food security

and citizenship, and are relevant to the contemporary relocation of Pacific Islanders within

borders and across international borders.574 Moreover, the experiences and lessons

documented in the case studies offer insights to inform the criteria needed for the successful

future mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change.

This chapter examines four case studies. It is beyond the scope of this study to detail the

manifold historical case studies documenting resettlement of Pacific Islanders in the Pacific

Islands region.575 This chapter documents the resettlement of the Banabans to Rabi, the

572 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78. 573 Connell, above n 75, 128–35. 574 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also McAdam, above n 13, 284, 333; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 151, 165–6. 575 ‘A series of…resettlements has occurred where islanders have been moved away from land or less forcibly acquired for military and other purposes…migration from islands such as Bikini…to make way for nuclear testing-and from different islands in Kwajalein atoll (Marshall Islands) for a US

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Vaitupuans to Kioa, the Gilbertese to Ghizo and the Carteret Islanders to Bougainville

respectively.576 First, the two case studies of the Banabans and Vaitupuans have direct

relevance to determining existing arrangements extended by the Fijian government which

might be transferable for the future relocation of Pacific Islanders from Kiribati and Tuvalu to

Fiji. Second, the three case studies of the Banabans, the Vaitupuans and the Gilbertese

occurred across sovereign borders which offers insights into the host of issues national

governments might need to consider facilitating future cross-border migration of Pacific

islanders. Third, the resettlement of the Pacific Islanders in these three case studies offers an

overview of the recent history of mobility marshalled by the British colonial administration.577

Fourth, the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders is concerned with mobility within sovereign

borders which might assist in our understanding of the host considerations when planning for

resettlement for the local host communities.

The case study of the resettlement of the Banabans to Rabi reveals the need for the

inclusiveness and participation of whole populations in relocation decisions.578 This case study

details the involuntary resettlement of the Banabans as a result of large-scale phosphate mining

on Ocean Island.579 The resettlement of the Vaitupuans to Kioa documented in the second case

study shows that resettlement occurred voluntarily and demonstrates the provision of agency

to communities in making decisions about their future livelihoods.580 The third case study,

documenting the resettlement of the Gilbertese to Ghizo, reveals the need to identify suitable

and available land as a basis for sustained food security and acquisition of land, and land

missile range….short distance migrations…in Bougainville (PNG) and at Gold Ridge (Solomon Islands)…from large-scale mining...’ as cited in Connell, above n 75, 131; see also J R McNeill, ‘Of Rats and Men: A Synoptic Environmental History of the Island Pacific’ (1994) 5(2) Journal of World History 299, 299–349; See also McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43–55; see also The researcher acknowledges the work of historian McNeill, who traces the arrival of Pacific Islanders before the pre-European contact (1769) to the oceanic islands approximately ‘3,500 years ago’ who endured ‘robust challenges during the long age of island settlement with shrinking low islands, drowning reefs, and impoverished landscapes’ which suggests ‘a long history of human occupancy and resilience to changing socioeconomic and environmental conditions’ by Pacific Islanders as cited in McNeill, 303, 310, 312; and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 43. See also ‘…land insecurity affected by extreme sea-levels and storminess and also by increasing population and changing pattern of land use has caused human settlement to expand into low-lying areas’ as cited in McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 53. See also The researcher has considered the historical case studies during the period of the British colonial administration as instructive (as opposed to pre-European contact) in uncovering the experiences and lessons of Pacific Islanders to inform the determinants for climate migration readiness. 576 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42; see also Edwards, above n 35, 60, 62. 577 See above n 572 and accompanying text. 578 Ibid. 579 Ibid. 580 See above nn 577–9.

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rights.581 The final case study documents the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders in the 1990s

to avoid the debilitating effects of slow-onset environmental change ‘across cultural

boundaries’ of Papua New Guinea.582 This resettlement occurred under the ‘provincial

government resettlement scheme’, which was short-lived and succeeded by the ‘Tulele Peisa

(Sailing the waves on our own)’, an autonomous Bougainville Government resettlement

scheme marked to conclude by 2020.583 The resettlement reveals the need for concerted

support and prioritisation by the government of the day to ensure that the planning and

designing of resettlement schemes is future focused. Adequate ‘financial resources to secure

land’ and restore the livelihood of communities from the impacts of slow-onset environmental

change are required.584 The four case studies highlight several important areas, such as socio-

economic and legal dimensions, and cultural characteristics for example, that assist in our

understanding of what it means for national governments to be ready for large-scale human-

mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders.585

Before examining the case studies, this chapter presents a brief overview of the arrangements

in place for resettlement of Pacific Islanders during the colonial administration and details the

reasons why these arrangements are less likely to be relevant in contemporary times. This

chapter also outlines issues from the body of research on the Pacific historical mobility of

islanders. The arrangements made by the colonial administration offer a basis upon which to

inform relocation of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders.

Colonial Administration Arrangements

The purpose of detailing the arrangements for the resettlement of Pacific Islanders during the

period of British colonial administration is to show existing and amenable arrangements

between British colonies in the Pacific region. The geography, ‘smallness, isolation,

fragmentation and barrenness of island’ nations situated in the South Pacific region offers a

probable explanation ‘for the political appropriation of the space (islands as experimental

space) political point-scoring’ by the colonial authorities to capitalise on ‘an already

581 Donner, above n 35, 191–201. 582 McAdam, above n 87, 317–18; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–8; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42. 583 John Connell, ‘Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls’ (2016) 57(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 3-15, 10; see also Edwards, above n 35, 64–7. 584 See above n 583 and accompanying text. 585 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also McAdam, above n 13, 284, 333; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66.

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marginalised population.’586 Another possible explanation for the encroachment of the colonial

administration as detailed by Farbotko might be related to ‘the islands as intrinsically poor in

natural resources, offering few opportunities for development and economic self-sufficiency

for their inhabitants ever to be able to rise above their present condition of dependence on

wealthy nations.’587 Some of the areas of concern emerging of the ‘vulnerability in the Pacific’

as described by Farbotko and Lazrus relate specifically to ‘greater openness to islander

emotions, Pacific economic, social, and cultural values…human rights and global

citizenship…Pacific people’s indigenous knowledge and understanding of the their

movements’ and spaces ‘(structural, economic, and political environments).’588 The colonial

authority’s governance arrangements in the past suggests a weak link in contemporary times

to respond to future mobility of Pacific Islands across borders in the context of climate change.

The arrangements may no longer be meritorious for relocation schemes between national

governments. It can therefore be assumed that ‘small island states continuing position remains

marginal to international political and economic interests.’589 However, Pacific Island

governments have the agency to respond to and scale up efforts on issues such as future

relocation affecting Island nations in contemporary times. This suggests that relocation

schemes will need to embody an array of issues, such as land and costs for relocation,

compensation to relocating communities, and economic opportunities for relocating

communities, among others, in the planning and design stages before implementation for

relocation of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders takes place between national

governments.590 The arrangements and issues assist in uncovering determinants for readiness

in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.

As noted by Campbell, flexible arrangements, such as waiving the requirement for passports,

recognition of residency and citizenship and granting visas to Pacific Islanders, were non-

existent. 591 Moreover, colonial administrators retained autonomy and agency over ‘decisions

about land and community locations’, including ‘moving people across international

boundaries provided the territories were colonized by the same metropolitan power.’592 There

is widespread consensus among seminal authors of human mobility studies in the Pacific that

586 Carol Farbotko, ‘Wishful sinking: Disappearing islands, climate refugees and cosmopolitan experimentation’ (2010) 51(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 47, 51; See also Farbotko and Lazrus, above n 72, 384–6. 587 Farbotko, ‘Wishful sinking’ above n 586, 51. 588 Farbotko and Lazrus, above n 72, 388. 589 Ibid 387. 590 See above n 585 and accompanying text. See also Farbotko, ‘Wishful sinking’ above n 586, 47-60; see also Farbotko and Lazrus, above n 72, 382–390. 591 Campbell, above n 75, 77. 592 Ibid.

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the colonial arrangements may no longer be valid or appropriate under post-colonial

governments of sovereign states of the Pacific Island regions.593 For example, Campbell points

out that ‘[i]t is highly unlikely that it would be possible to transplant a community from one

cultural and environmental setting to another in the contemporary Pacific.’594 This is because

relocation demands ‘drastic changes in lifestyle, economy, politics, legal systems and cultural

norms.’595 Connell argues that ‘[i]n post-colonial times land boundaries have become frozen

and land too valuable for most islanders to be willing to enable even displaced people to lease

or purchase it.’596 Connell further argues that far too little attention has been directed by Pacific

Island governments ‘to commit and develop effective settlement schemes or identify the need

for them’ primarily because ‘governments have been without financial resources and

management capacity.’597 Together, this suggests that a strong link may need to be established

between governments of sending and receiving countries with well-coordinated and proactive

arrangements at the heart of future relocation of Pacific Island communities.

Issues for Relocation

The issues arising from the historical mobility of Pacific Islanders have received considerable

attention by seminal authors and provide insights into future relocations of Pacific Island

communities. Future relocations bring to the fore issues such as:

1) land issues spanning ‘the availability and quality of land; early identification of land,

including suitable land sites; appropriate land acquisition; and the recognition of

customary land tenure systems;’598

2) ‘financial commitments to ensure sustained and sufficient financing’ in all phases of

relocation; and logistical costs such as the ‘organisation of transport, transfer of property

and assets’ of relocatees to the destination country;599

593 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326; see also Campbell, above n 75, 59, 77–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 135–8; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78. 594 Campbell, above n 75, 77. 595 Ibid 78. 596 Connell, above n 75, 136. 597 Ibid 135. 598 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 93, 124; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89, 97; see also Connell, above n 75, 127; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27. 599 McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35.

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3) ‘re-establishing sustainable livelihoods’ to include the ‘provision of necessary

infrastructure, housing, assets and access to public services;’600

4) ‘preserving and maintaining cohesion of communities of origin through linguistic, cultural

and spiritual identity and traditional values;’601

5) articulating mechanisms to address tensions and conflicts emerging between communities

of origin and local host communities over land and unequal access to resources and

services;’602

6) ‘political commitment and management capacity’ of Pacific Island governments of host

and sending countries to ‘negotiate, develop, legislate for and administer effective

resettlement policies in the face of local anxieties, tensions and hegemony over land;’603

and

7) engaging local communities of origin and the local host communities in meaningful and

participatory relocation decision-making processes that are ‘gender-sensitive, equitable

and transparent.’604

These issues are central to our understanding of the determinants of readiness in the context

of climate change-induced human mobility. Attention is now drawn to the case studies. The

case studies demonstrate the host issues and provide more definitive evidence of the

experiences and issues of Pacific Islanders’ resettlement in the past to inform future relocations

of Pacific Island communities.

4.2 Case Studies of the Banabans, Vaitupuans, Gilbertese and the Carteret Islanders

Rabi Island

The resettlement of the Banaban community on ‘Banaba (also known as Ocean Island) and

present-day Kiribati to the island of Rabi in north-eastern Fiji’ occurred between 1945 and

600 McAdam, above n 87, 327; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141, 152; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 601 McAdam, above n 87, 310, 320, 326–7; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Franck, above n 348, 37; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 20. 602 McAdam, above n 87, 327; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19–20; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 363, 107. 603 McAdam, above n 66, 305, 327; see also McAdam, above n 576, 130; see also McAdam, above n 338, 4; see also Connell, above n 66, 135, 138; see also Ferris, above n 12, 34, 35. 604 McAdam, above n 66, 305; Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 100, see also Connell, above n 75, 140.

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towards the end of the twentieth century.605 The ‘forced resettlement of the Banabans

instigated by the British colonial government was premised on commercial interests generated

from the phosphate mining activities by the British Phosphate Corporation’ on Ocean Island,

among others.606 The resettlement to the uninhabited island of Rabi provided an option for the

Banabans to return to Ocean Island after two years.607 The debilitating effects of the mining

operations on the biophysical environment permanently derailed the return of the Banabans to

Ocean Island.608 Several archival and empirical studies conducted by seminal authors such as

McAdam, Connell, and Campbell and Warrick investigating the Banaban population

resettlement have been published and reveal both the drawbacks and strengths of the

resettlement.609

One major drawback was the lack of meaningful participation and concerted engagement

extended by the colonial administration to the Banabans in resettlement decision-making.610

A number of studies reveal that representations about the destination island of Rabi were

misleading and there was far too little attention directed to the conditions on arrival on Rabi

as well as the long-term arrangements for the Banabans. For example, the ‘Banabans had to

live in canvas tents beside the beach and become self-sufficient to plant the island’ on Rabi.611

Furthermore, the lack of medical and educational facilities added uncertainties to the existing

arrangements.612 As noted by Green, ‘[t]he experience of the Banabans provides a warning

about the sense of injustice that can endure when people are resettled without being involved

or in control.’613 The centrality of resettlement suggests that a strong link needs to be

established between the relocatees and proponents to ensure proper and full consideration of

the relocatees in decision-making in all phases of resettlement occurs. Studies have also

revealed that over time, conditions improved with the establishment of the Rabi Council of

Leaders (Rabi Council), which represented the village governance of the Banabans.614 Whilst

the ‘Rabi Council is subject to the ultimate control of the Fijian Government, it maintains a

large degree of autonomy and has acquired freedom from supervision in [its] affairs.’615 This

605 McAdam, above n 87, 301–14; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–7; see also Connell, above n 75, 131–2. 606 McAdam, above n 87, 308, 311. See also above n 605 and accompanying text. 607 McAdam, above n 87, 313; see also Campbell, above n 75, 74; see also Connell, above n 75, 132. 608 McAdam, above n 87, 311. 609 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–7; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–34. 610 McAdam, above n 87, 319. 611 Ibid 312. 612 Ibid. 613 Michael Green, ‘Contested Territory’ (2016) 6 Nature Climate Change 817, 819. 614 McAdam, above n 87, 324. 615 Ibid.

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suggests that the Banabans now have the agency to make decisions on behalf of the Banaban

population on Rabi.

A further drawback is the distribution of proceeds generated from the decommissioned

phosphate operations, including consideration of the rights of the Banabans to control

resources on Ocean Island, present-day Kiribati.616 The entitlements commissioned by the

colonial administration to phosphate profits provided Kiribati with 85 per cent, leaving the

Banabans with only 15 per cent.617 The investigations further highlight that ‘[m]ost Banabans

do not regard themselves as I-Kiribati and regard that country (Kiribati) as having wrongfully

profited from “their” island.’618 The findings suggest that the resentment of relocatees towards

their original homeland is less likely to occur if consideration is given to relocatees to benefit

equitably from resources in their homeland.619 Adopting a consistent and accountable

compensation payment strategy by the country of origin can be one of the ways of ensuring

the equitable benefit sharing of resources.

The ‘loss of homeland’ (Ocean Island) is not limited to the ‘loss of place and personality’ but

extends to encapsulate ‘loss of self-determination’, which traverses ‘land, rights, sovereignty

and the power to shape one’s destiny.’620 Some contributors to the literature on the relocation

of Pacific islanders, particularly with regard to the Banaban resettlement, frequently cite the

notion of ‘mixed blood and mud’ delineated by Martin Silverman to demonstrate the veracity

of the connection and interplay between the Banaban people and land.’621 The expression has

come to be used to refer to the ‘[P]eople and the land as mutually constituted: blood mixed

with the land and the mud of Banaba retained its primacy in the identity of the people.’622 The

investigations reveal that the resettlement to Rabi inhibited the advancement of land claims by

the Banabans on Ocean Island, including the ‘sovereign rights to the island’ under the colonial

administration.623 However, this was short-lived and safeguards were incorporated into, and

facilitated by, the ‘1947 Statement of Intentions’ (Statement) for the Banabans.624 The

Statement identified the need ‘to provide a specially privileged constitutional status for Banaba

and the Banabans, within a sovereign independent Gilbert Islands State.’625 The statement

further permeated ‘[c]hapter IX of the Constitution of Kiribati, which ‘establishes a special

616 Ibid 318, 320, 326–7. 617 Ibid 320. 618 Ibid. 619 Ibid 311; see also Campbell, above n 75, 77; see also Connell, above n 75, 132. 620 McAdam, above n 87, 319; see also Campbell, above n 75, 75. 621 Campbell, above n 75, 75–6. 622 Ibid; see also McAdam, above n 87, 319–25. 623 Campbell, above n 75, 75; see also Connell, above n 75, 132. 624 McAdam, above n 87, 314, 322. 625 Ibid.

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status for the Banabans. It secures their land rights and interests on Ocean Island and preserves

their right to enter and reside in Kiribati.’626 Similarly, security of land tenure for the Banabans

on Rabi is addressed under the 1997 Fiji constitution (section 178), which entrenches the

Banaban Lands Act and the Banaban Settlement Act.’627 This is re-defined by section 28(5) of

the 2013 Fiji constitution.628 The section accords ‘ownership of all Banaban land with the

customary owners of that land’ and extends to avert permanent alienation of existing Banaban

land.629 However, section 28(5) is limited by the ‘compulsory acquisition of land by the State

for a public purpose’ as underscored in sections 27 and 28 (6).’630 Scholars such as McAdam

and Donner have been interested in questions concerning the interpretation of customary

owners, as far too little attention has been directed in the constitution to define them, and

potentially reversing the status of the Banabans as ‘tenants-at-will of the state’ is subject to

debate.631 The findings suggest that rights of ownership to existing land are secured by the

constitution in the country of origin and the host country.632 While this is a positive feature, a

greater degree of accuracy needs to be exercised by decision-makers and legal drafters of the

arrangements for land tenure recognition, particularly in the host country.633

The investigations also reveal additional considerations for the rights of the Banabans in the

country of origin and the host country. Pursuant to the Kiribati constitution, these include the

allocation of ‘two positions in the Kiribati parliament.’634 One member representing ‘the

electoral district comprising or including Banaba’ as an ‘elected member.’635 And, ‘the other

member representing the Banaban community’ as a ‘nominated representative selected by the

Rabi Council.’636 The ‘members have a power of veto over any proposed amendments to the

Banaban provisions in the constitution.’637 In addition, they ‘do not have to be citizens of

Kiribati.’638 Moreover, the ‘Banabans are entitled to acquire citizenship by registration and are

626 Ibid; see also The Constitution of Kiribati 1995, c IX, s 119(4) (‘Constitution of Kiribati 1995’). 627 McAdam, above n 87, 322–3. 628 Ibid; see also Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013 c 2, s 28 (‘Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013’). 629 McAdam, above n 627. See also ‘Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013’, above n 628, s 27–28. 630 See above n 629 and accompanying text. 631 McAdam, above n 87, 323–4; see also Donner, above n 35, 199. 632 McAdam, above n 87, 322–3; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Campbell, above n 75, 7–79; see also ‘Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013’, above n 626, s 28–30. 633 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326–7; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141, 144–5, 152, 154, 162–3. 634 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also Connell, above n 75, 132; see also Constitution of Kiribati 1995, above n 626, c IX, s 117–119; see also McAdam, above n 13, 316–317. 635 See above n 634 and accompanying text. 636 See above nn 634–5. 637 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also Connell, above n 66, 132; see also Constitution of Kiribati 1995, above n 604, c IX, s 117–119; see also McAdam, above n 13, 282, 315–317, 325–327. 638 See above n 637 and accompanying text.

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permitted to hold dual nationality.’639 Similarly, representation of the Banabans in the Fijian

parliament, including dual citizenship status and the retention of Kiribati passports, are

supported by the constitution and the laws of Fiji.640

The combination of findings on the Banaban resettlement provides some support for the

deepened areas of concern that can be drawn upon to inform relocation of communities across

sovereign borders in the context of climate change. These relate to security of land tenure;

collective consensus; ‘authority and participation in planning processes; right to self-

determination and self-governance; preservation of identity and culture; right to control

resources’ including constitutional protections spanning political representation, nationality

and citizenship status in the original homeland and the host country.641

Kioa Island

The community-led decision of the Vaitupuans on the island of Vaitupu, present day Tuvalu,

to purchase and relocate to the uninhabited island of Kioa in northern Fiji occurred between

1947 and the end of the twentieth century.642 The purchase, made between the Vaitupuans and

the colonial Fiji Government was finalised in 1946 for £3 015.643 The future-focused relocation

decision by the Vaitupuans was an ‘insurance policy against overpopulation and land

scarcity.’644

In 1947, 35 Vaitupuans journeyed to Kioa where ‘they had to clear the land, construct houses

for each family group one by one, and eventually plant crops.’645 The testimony of one of the

participants in the field research conducted by Green recorded that ‘[w]e pulled together as a

639 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also ‘Constitution of Kiribati 1995, above n 626, c III, s 23, c V, s 56. 640 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013, above n 628, c 1, s 5; see also Citizenship Decree 2009 (Fiji) s 6– (‘Citizenship Decree 2009’). 641 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 140. 642 Jane McAdam, Relocation Across Borders: A Prescient Warning in the Pacific (15 March 2013) Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/relocation-across-borders-a-prescient-warning-in-the-pacific/>; see also Julia Edwards, A Polynesian Pearl in Fiji: Kioa Island (August - September 2012) The Methodist Church <https://www.methodist.org.uk/media/5864/wcr-julia-edwards-newsletter-augsept-2012.pdf>; see also McAdam, above n 4, 31; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71; see also Connell, above n 75, 128, 135. 643 McAdam, above n 642. See also Edwards, above n 642. 644 See above n 643 and accompanying text; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71; see also Connell, above n 75, 128. 645 McAdam, above n 642; see also Edwards, above n 642.

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community, we were pioneers, we really built something. It wasn’t always rosy, but certainly

the idea of relocation came from within the community.’646 Koch, in his book Logs in the

Current of the Sea, highlights some of the challenges which initially inhibited the ‘settlers of

Kioa to clear the land, plant and develop the island’ in anticipation for long-term habitation on

the island.647 These entailed: ‘registration of title of Kioa Island’ which was registered with

‘the people of Vaitupu (natives of Vaitupu)’ by the administration in Fiji; ‘the transfer of title

to Kioa settlers and succession to ensure that their land and crops pass to their children on their

death; survey and subdivision of the land; assessment and collection of rent; formation of a

landholding cooperative society; and the legal status of the council of matai (headman) in

Vaitupu’ synonymous with ‘the Island Council of Vaitupu’ which managed the ‘affairs of the

Kioa community.’648 Two decades later since the arrival of the Kioa settlers, ‘the Resolution

Regarding Kioa Island’ was reached by the matai for ‘the transfer of the title to Kioa to the

Public Trustee of Fiji to hold the island as the Custodian Trustee for registered owners.’649

Five years later in 1972, the ‘Instrument of Tenancy’ was issued to ‘grant tenure to individual

settlers by a lease agreement under Fijian law (Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance,

for example).’650 This was followed by issuing ‘a certificate of Fiji citizenship’ to the Kioa

settlers.651 Koch further highlights that the ‘legal and administrative problems occupied the

governments of Fiji and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands disturbed relations between Vaitupu and

its Kioa settlers, retarding the development of the island for half a generation.’652 The

“arrangements” for the resettlement of the Kioa settlers suggests that well-rounded planning,

and extensive participation and consultation between national governments, including the

communities are key markers for implementing future resettlement.

By 2012, approximately three hundred Vaitupuans had settled in Kioa and the population has

continued to grow.653 The field research by McAdam recorded that the descendants of Vaitupu

‘acknowledge that Kioa, the homeland, presents adequate provision for abundant food and

water, including sustaining far larger populations than Vaitupu ever could. Moreover, young

people have access to better educational and economic opportunities.’654 Additionally, the

decision-making and conduct of their community affairs is represented through their

646 Green, above n 613, 819. 647 Klaus-Friedrich Koch, Logs in the Current of the Sea: Neil Lifuka’s Story of Kioa and the Vaitupu Colonists (Australian National University Press, 1978) 93 648 Ibid 89–100. 649 Ibid. 650 Ibid. 651 Koch, above n 647, 100. 652 Ibid 91, 100. 653 Edwards, above n 642. 654 McAdam, above n 642; see also McAdam, above n 87, 319.

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governance structure identifiable as the Kioa Island Council.655 While the ‘Council has no

elevated status in Fiji’, it functions to represent the interests of the Kioans with the Fiji

Government.656 The findings suggests that a strong link may exist between autonomy and

ownership in relocation decision-making when it is decisively carved out by communities

without potential interference by actors, such as governments and proponents driven by

commercial interests. This creates the agency anchored in the governance structures of

communities to reach decisions about their existing and future human security in the

destination country.

It is well established in the Pacific literature, particularly by scholars such as McAdam,

Campbell, Connell and Edwards, that the Vaitupuan relocation was a partial, as opposed to a

whole-population, resettlement of communities across sovereign borders.657 As noted by

Campbell and McAdam, ‘a substantial and sustainable population remain settled in Vaitupu

with more openness among the Kioans towards adopting two identities.’658 While the ‘Kioans

remain citizens of Fiji, their special constitutional status in the country of origin, Tuvalu’

remains undetermined and is open to debate.659 The findings suggests resonance with the sense

of identity, belonging and connection to the homeland in the destination country when

relocation is inclusive and coupled with legal support from the host country government.

It is recognised that much of the research on the Vaitupuan relocation to Kioa has been

descriptive in nature and restricted to limited comparisons with the Banaban population

resettlement. This is because the relocation of these island communities across sovereign

borders was to the uninhabited islands of Rabi (Banabans) and Kioa (Vaitupuans) to the host

country Fiji.660 Despite its exploratory nature, the Vaitupuan relocation to Kioa offers some

insight into areas such as creating the agency for communities to make decisions in all phases

of relocation—which encapsulates and re-establishes their security, spanning livelihoods

arrangements, maintenance of culture and identity, establishing village governance systems—

to ensure future economic growth.661 These issues can be drawn upon to inform relocation

across sovereign borders in the context of climate change.

655 Edwards, above n 642; see also McAdam, n 87, 325. 656 See above n 655 and accompanying text. 657 McAdam, above n 642; see also Edwards, above n 642; McAdam, above n 4, 31; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71; see also Connell, above n 75, 128, 135. 658 McAdam, above n 642; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71. 659 McAdam, above n 87, 319. 660 McAdam, above n 642; see also Edwards, above n 642; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30–2; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 128, 135. 661 McAdam, above n 642; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 127, 133, 135–40.

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Phoenix and Ghizo Islands

The resettlement of the Gilbert Islanders (Gilbertese) in present-day Kiribati during the period

of colonisation by Britain in the South Pacific Ocean in the second half of the nineteenth

century and into the twentieth century is threefold. The first entails resettlement of the

Gilbertese on the Phoenix Islands, which occurred under the ‘Phoenix Islands resettlement

scheme (Phoenix scheme)’ in the early twentieth century.662 The second relates to the

compounded resettlement of the Gilbertese from the Phoenix Islands to Ghizo Island and

Wagina Islands in the Solomon Islands. This was underpinned by the ‘Gilbertese internal

resettlement scheme (Gilbertese scheme)’ in the second half of the twentieth century.663 The

third resettlement of the Gilbertese from the coastlines of Ghizo to higher ground in Ghizo

followed the devastating tsunami that caused several deaths among the Gilbertese in 2007.664

There is widespread consensus in the literature by scholars such as Donner, McAdam, and

Burson and Bedford, for example, that the resettlement of the Gilbertese to the Phoenix Islands

was a pre-emptive strategy to manage population growth, and that the further resettlement

from the Phoenix Islands to the Solomon Islands was triggered by periods of drought triggering

significant strain on food security for the Gilbertese.665 The Phoenix Islands resettlement

scheme comprised of land allocated to every adult, including further land containing 25

coconut trees.666 In addition, wasteland was allocated to families with children on the condition

that they tilled the land and planted copra within five years.’667 The long-term habitability of

the Gilbertese on Phoenix Islands was not possible due to extreme weather events, which

caused the further resettlement of 2 300 Gilbertese to the coastlines of the Solomon Islands.668

The Gilbertese were granted title to ‘four acres of freehold land and the right to acquire further

land’ in Ghizo under the Gilbertese internal resettlement scheme.669 The scheme also made

provision for the resettlement of the Gilbertese to the neighbouring uninhabited islands of

662 Donner, above n 35, 194–5. 663 Ibid 195–6; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30. 664 Donner, above n 35, 191, 197, 199; see also Rachel Nowak and Reuters, Ten-Metre-High Tsunami Strikes Solomon Islands (2 April 2007) New Scientist <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11514-ten-metre-high-tsunami-strikes-solomon-islands/>. 665 Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30; see also Bruce Burson and Richard Bedford, ‘Clusters and Hubs: Toward a Regional Architecture for Voluntary Adaptive Migration in the Pacific’ (Discussion Paper, The Nansen Initiative, 9 December 2013) 22. 666 Donner, above n 35, 195. 667 Ibid. 668 Ibid. 669 Ibid 195–6.

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Choiseul.670 Other provisions of the scheme included receiving citizenship, ‘access to marine

resources; building materials, social services and restoration of livelihoods’ of the

Gilbertese.671

The Gilbertese settlements in Ghizo were subsequently decimated by the tsunami in 2007, as

indicated earlier. With the assistance of the Solomon Islands Government, the displaced

Gilbertese were relocated to ‘unoccupied government forest land.’672 The local customary

owners remained the custodians of the forest land.673 This type of land was not amenable for

pastoral and farming activities.674 The discussion that follows draws on the empirical evidence

reported by Donner and assists in our understanding of the issues and challenges arising from

the resettlement of the Gilbertese.675

The uncertainty surrounding land rights was one of the key issues under the Gilbertese scheme

and extended beyond the post 2007 tsunami.676 The rights of the Gilbertese to freehold land

was short-lived with new laws enacted following the independence of the Solomon Islands in

1978.677 The new laws aimed to ‘restrict automatic entry rights for children of settlers.’678

Moreover, assigning land to respond to the growing Gilbertese population in Ghizo remained

perfunctory by the government, which led to the Gilbertese women marrying local Melanesian

men.679 This facilitated children of the marriage access to secure local customary land, and

ameliorated the Gilbertese population pressures.680 Disputes ‘over title to a series of small

offshore islands’ allotted under the scheme spawned insecurity for the settlements established

by the Gilbertese settlers.681

Further insecurity in relation to land rights related to the relocation of the Gilbertese to forest

land post-tsunami. The deterioration of the ‘traditionally communal subsistence culture’ of the

Gilbertese was one of the issues closely connected to land tenure insecurity, post-tsunami.682

The traumatic nature of the devastation caused to the established coastline settlements,

670 Ibid. 671 Ibid. 672 Ibid 197. 673 Ibid. 674 Ibid. 675 Ibid 193–4. 676 Ibid 196. 677 Ibid. 678 Ibid 195. 679 Ibid 196. 680 Ibid. 681 Ibid. 682 Ibid 197.

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mortality, and the relocation and re-establishment of the Gilbertese decimated their tight-knit

community.683 The decline in Gilbertese elders passing on the traditional knowledge and skills

underpinning the maintenance of their culture and identity to the younger generation were key

concerns documented. The skills and knowledge took the form of: dance performances and

costumes; Gilbertese language over Pidgin; and conducting communal meetings and decision-

making in the traditional ‘maneaba (community meeting house)’ facilitated by the ‘unimane

(old men)’, which represented the ‘old system of village governance.’684 Moreover, food

security was an additional issue arising from the relocation of the Gilbertese to forest land

post-tsunami. The reliance on ‘fishing and other marine resources’ embedded within

Gilbertese maritime culture diminished.685 The Gilbertese turned to vegetables and fruits and

purchased imported food items due to ‘nutrient-poor soils’ in the forest land.686 This was a

significant shift and ‘decline from their traditional practices’ of planting ‘traditional crops such

as babai (swamp taro), pandanus, breadfruit and coconut trees.’687 Other issues related to the

recognition of land tenure; culture and identity; and food security of the Gilbertese. The

opportunities to: seek ‘government and business jobs’; secure educational scholarships; and

participate in government politics were further issues that indicate that the Gilbertese were

viewed as ‘second-class citizens.’688

Drawing on the extensive range of issues emerging from the field research into the ‘Gilbertese

resettlement in Ghizo’, Donner recognises and reminds us that tensions and resentment are

prominent indicators because of competing interests ‘over resources, rights to land, economic

opportunities’ of the host communities with the communities resettled.689 He further reminds

us that to ‘maintain a sense of community’ is a challenge.690 He suggests that ongoing

community integration programs aligned with all phases of resettlement are a useful tool to

manage the echelons of cultural traditions and customs of the host communities and the

communities resettled.691 Moreover, he points out that that in addition to natural disasters,

‘large-scale political events’ can seriously affect those who are resettled.692 This was evident

when the Solomon Islands gained independence and there was the subsequent relocation of

the Gilbertese to forest land post-tsunami. Furthermore, Donner points out that the resettlement

683 Ibid 197, 199. 684 Ibid 193, 197–8. 685 Ibid 195, 197–8. 686 Ibid. 687 Ibid. 688 Ibid 196, 198–9. 689 Ibid 199. 690 Ibid. 691 Ibid. 692 Ibid.

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experiences of the Gilbertese offer some insight into the future resettlement of communities

necessitated by the debilitating impacts of climate change. These include:

1) developing ‘robust and long-term land or resource agreements between the relocating

communities and present-day government’ to curb any future political interference to

reverse existing arrangements;

2) undertaking vulnerability and risk-informed assessments in parallel with future climatic

projections to avert ‘poor assessment of the social and financial costs of resettlement;’

3) introducing effective resettlement programs that embody ‘land audits, customary rights

assessments, and ongoing monitoring and assessments;’ and

4) designing programs ‘to establish and finance permanent mechanisms for dealing with land

and resource disputes.’693

The empirical findings of the Gilbertese experience identify issues that can be drawn upon in

the context of climate change for future community resettlement. These relate to: certainty of

land rights for the resettling community irrespective of changes to political leadership in the

future; suitability of land to sustain potential population growth and provide food security;

autonomy to exercise cultural traditions and customs in the host community; recognition as

citizens and equitable entitlement to access and secure employment, education, public services

and political participation.694 The lessons from the Gilbertese experience enhance our

understanding of the approaches that can be adopted for well-thought-out resettlement

processes, such as articulating comprehensive resettlement programs that entail vulnerability

assessments, mechanisms to respond to disputes and provision of resettlement costs in all

stages of the community resettlement processes.695 The findings provide some information that

can be adopted for use in future climate change community resettlement.

Carteret Islands

The government-led relocation of the Carteret communities as a result of famine and the

adverse impacts of slow-onset environmental change in the low-lying Carteret Islands in Papua

New Guinea (PNG) is two pronged.696 The initial relocation occurred in the second half of the

693 Ibid 198–9. 694 Ibid 191–201. 695 See above nn 666–94. 696 Edwards, above n 35, 59, 63–7, 77; see also Campbell, above n 75, 57–9.

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twentieth century.697 The relocation is ongoing however, has continued from 1997 and is

expected to conclude by 2020.698 Both relocations are to Bougainville and other parts of

mainland PNG.699 The past century resettlement scheme articulated as the Atolls Resettlement

Scheme (AR Scheme) was poorly implemented, which resulted in the majority of the Carteret

communities retreating to their atoll islands.700 The AR Scheme suffered from several major

drawbacks. These included resettling the Carteret communities to alienated land and to

locations with close proximity to the correctional institutions of the provinces, not allowing

resettlers to undertake commercial fishing activities, poorly coordinated and fragmented

implementation interventions by the government and the lack of community integration

programs and mechanisms to resolve disputes.701

The past century resettlement experiences of the Carteret communities provided the impetus

to the Tulele Peisa, a non-profit organisation, and the Autonomous Bougainville Government

(ABG), a ‘governing entity within the Autonomous Region of Bougainville’ to independently

articulate in parallel, future resettlement schemes for the Carteret communities in conjunction

with the assistance extended by the national government.702 The schemes are identified as the

Tulele Peisa scheme, and the ABG scheme and they are buttressed by the ‘atolls integrated

development policy.’703 These schemes provide for the resettlement of 300 Carteret families

and an estimated land allocation of 1,500 hectares.704 The Tulele Peisa scheme aims to resettle

a total of 83 families, equating to approximately 2 700 Carteret Islanders in five separate

islands of PNG by 2020.705 The Roman Catholic Church of Bougainville has gifted

approximately ‘71 hectares of their land’ and will gift further land under the Tulele Peisa

scheme.706 Moreover, the estimated resettlement costs are calculated to include (among other

costs): household construction to ‘25 000 kina (AuD $10 000)’ per house, and compensation

to host communities of approximately to ‘6 000 kina (AuD $2 400)’ per host household under

the Tulele Peisa scheme.707 Similarly, the ABG scheme aims to resettle ‘forty families per year

on an individual-clan basis’ across ‘600 hectares of land’ with a ‘2 million kina (AuD

697 Edwards, above n 35, 63–7. 698 Ibid; see also Connell, above n 583, 10. 699 Edwards, above n 35, 60, 62. 700 Ibid 57, 63. 701 Ibid 63–5. 702 Ibid 57, 65–7; see also Autonomous Bougainville Government, How ABG Works < http://www.abg.gov.pg/government/how-abg-works>. 703 Edwards, above n 35, 64–7. 704 Ibid 68. 705 Ibid 66–7. 706 Ibid. 707 Ibid 71.

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$800,000) advance extended by the national government.’708 The reference to clan is

understood as the internal governance structure underpinned by the powers and functions of a

head clansman.709 Both organisations recognise the lessons learned under the AR scheme. That

is, that the availability of land, acquisition of land and a suitable resettlement site ought to be

at the heart of future resettlement of the Carteret communities.710 Moreover, ‘landownership

issues such as resettlers rights to land title’ and allocation of finances in all phases of the

resettlement schemes are additional considerations that the Tulele Peisa and the ABG

recognise to be integral to articulating resettlement schemes.711

In her case study-designed field research, which determines the issues relocation presents for

the Carteret Islanders, Edwards highlights approaches to respond to an array of issues and

offers important insights for the future climate-induced relocation of communities.712 To assist

her investigation, Edwards engages ‘Cernea’s impoverishment, risks and reconstruction (IRR)

model.’713 The well-established IRR model is a conceptual tool used in the context of

development-induced displacement and resettlement consisting of ‘interrelated risk factors of:

landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity

and mortality, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration.’714 The IRR model

was highlighted earlier in chapter two.

Edwards found first, that customary land rules govern 96 per cent of Bougainville Island,

which precludes ‘individuals and clans’ from giving away land on an ad-hoc basis.715 She

argues that land tenure recognition and access to land present challenges to relocation.716 She

suggests that ‘culturally appropriate compensation for both host communities and those

displaced’ may serve as a pragmatic option considering the power relation levels of individual

clans and governance structures in customary and communal land tenure-ships.717 Second, the

Carteret Islanders would arrive at the new relocation site with expectations of adequate

housing and access to public health services, employment opportunities—such as operating

micro-businesses, farming and fishing—and autonomy and integration with the host

708 Ibid 64, 66. 709 Ibid 70, 76. 710 Ibid 57, 63–5. 711 Ibid 58, 68. 712 Ibid 67. 713 Ibid 52, 54–5, 57–8, 67–76. 714 Ibid. See also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 715 Edwards, above n 35, 68. 716 Ibid. 717 Ibid 68, 78.

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community.718 Edwards argues that the majority of the Carteret Islanders would be unfamiliar

with their new surroundings and might be ‘enclosed by high ground and vegetation’,

decimating their food security.719 Third, relocating communities might potentially ‘experience

general low levels of energy’, and the zest at the initial stages of their ‘arrival at a resettlement

site’ might dissipate, ‘ill-feeling among relocating and host communities’ might develop, and

the relocating communities might be susceptible to psychological and traumatic

experiences.720

Edwards suggests that ‘much thought and consideration has to go into the process for site-

selection’ to offer opportunities and restore livelihoods of relocating communities.721 Edwards

adds that concerted, purposeful and on-going involvement of communities extending to

vulnerable and marginalised groups, the ‘Church, and other community organisations’ by the

government in relocation decision-making, plans and policy formulation is one of the key

considerations.722 ‘Better planning and regulation in neighbouring urban centres to off-set any

population growth pressures’, the right to unrestricted movement, the right to ‘physical, mental

and moral integrity’ of the relocating communities, and designing strategies for ‘trust building

and awareness raising among resettlers and host communities’ are additional considerations

that ought to be integrated into all phases of relocation planning.723 Last of all, Edwards

maintains that ‘[s]uccesful resettlements can only be achieved with land security, the creation

of livelihoods, and support from host communities.’724

Some of the issues emerging from the findings of the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders

include:

a) recognition of the type of land, such as customary tenure; site of the land, such as proximity

to ‘local correctional institutions’ or ‘unfamiliar dense vegetation;’ and the access to land;

b) the costs related to the ‘planning, negotiations and execution’ stages of the relocation; and

c) the recognition of the rights of resettlers such as land title, commercial fishing; employment

opportunities and health services at the host communities.725

718 Ibid 68–70. 719 Ibid 68–70, 77. 720 Ibid 69, 74–5. 721 Ibid 68–9, 77–8. 722 Ibid 58, 64, 75, 76–8. 723 Ibid 72, 77–8. 724 Ibid 52, 78. 725 Ibid 58, 63, 70. See also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4.

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Considerations in planning the resettlement of communities include allocating finance to

compensate landowners and resettlers and the participation of resettlers actively and

consistently in resettlement decision-making in all phases of resettlement. Other

considerations include the provision of support services to minimise psychological risks

extended by the church and non-governmental organisations, proactive planning and

regulation of urban population growth and identifying the costs of infrastructure and the

number of resettlers relocating.726

4.3 Lessons Learned about Mobility of Pacific Islanders

This chapter has sought to examine Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of

mobility within and across sovereign borders primarily during the colonial administration of

territories in the Pacific Islands region.727 The usefulness of the lessons learned from the case

studies of the historical mobility of Pacific Islanders to inform future mobility of Pacific

Islanders in the context of climate change needs to be considered both from the perspective of

communities of origin and the host communities. The case studies show that these perspectives

cannot be considered in isolation. Furthermore, the intersection of these perspectives needs to

be anchored in culturally sensitive arrangements and decisions negotiated between the Pacific

Island governments of both the sending and receiving states.728 As this chapter shows, the

considerations in the case of communities of origin from the case studies relate to:

1) meaningful consultation extended by proponents of relocation and the inclusiveness of all

community members including community and religious organisations in all phases of

relocation decision-making;729

2) land with regard to its suitability—such as wasteland, forest land or coastlines to provide

food security and restore the livelihoods of relocating communities through micro-

businesses, farming, and fishing—choice land site—which is accessible to public services

and employment and education opportunities as opposed to penal institutions or dense

vegetation—recognition of land tenure ownership, for example, customary, state or church

land and certainty of land rights facilitated through grant of land title, including the right

to buy further land;’730

726 Edwards, above n 35, 52–78. 727 Ibid; see also McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, n 75, 128. 728 McAdam, above n 10, 11; see also McAdam, above n 354, 5; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 96. 729 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 64, 68, 75, 76–8. 730 Ibid 58, 63–70. See also Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4.

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3) financing sufficient for all phases of relocation spanning social costs, for example,

intangible heritage, culture, traditions and identity, psychological trauma, and physical

costs, for example, transportation, housing, food and water;731

4) ‘control and access to common resources’, including equitable entitlement to benefits from

the resources at the origin and/or homeland.732 The resettlement experience of the

Banabans shows that the socio-economic gains of past mining operations on Ocean Island

(now Kiribati) lurk in the far distant future for the Banabans on Rabi.733

5) ‘maintenance of identity and cultural ties’, including the legal status recognition for

citizenship and political representation at the origin and/or homeland.734 For example,

seeking citizenship and political participation status in Tuvalu by the Vaitupuans of Kioa

is untenable.735

This chapter has also shown that some of the considerations of the host communities presented

by the case studies mirror those of the communities of origin. These relate to:

1) meaningful consultation conducted by the host state with local host communities,

landowners and marginalised groups as a pre-emptive measure to curb tensions and

conflicts triggered potentially through: ‘cultural and community cohesion’; equal access

to economic opportunities, public services, and resources such as fishing.736 The

resettlement experience of the Gilbertese to Ghizo shows that the ‘Gilbertese were

considered as second-class citizens’, decimating opportunities to seek ‘government and

business jobs, including educational scholarships;’737

2) suitability and site of the land, including the availability of land. For example, freehold

land with the option to acquire further land and seek legal title to land was made available

to the Gilbertese pre-2007 tsunami;738

3) costs of relocation, for example, the physical infrastructure construction and livelihood

restoration of communities of origin post relocation.739 The resettlement of the Carteret

731 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 319; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also McAdam, above n 642; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Edwards, above n 35, 69, 74–5. 732 McAdam, above n 87, 326, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 140; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Carol Farbotko, No Retreat: Climate Change and Voluntary Immobility in the Pacific Islands (13 June 2018) Migration Policy Institute <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/no-retreat-climate-change-and-voluntary-immobility-pacific-islands>. 733 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 145. 734 Ibid 163; see also McAdam, above n 13, 284. 735 McAdam, above n 87, 319. 736 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 20; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 737 Donner, above n 35, 196, 198–9. 738 Ibid 195–6. 739 Edwards, above n 35, 68–9, 77–8.

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Islanders shows that costs are not limited to household construction but extend to

‘culturally appropriate compensation’ to entail customary landowners and communities of

origin per household for the initial re-adjustment at the new host location;740

4) certainty around the ‘maintenance of the host community’s culture and identity and social

practices’ such as traditional, linguistic and artistic expressions and religion, including the

retention of host community’s governance arrangements.741 The relocation of the

Vaitupuans to Kioa shows that the Vaitupuans have the agency to make decisions related

to the affairs of the Vaitupuans through the establishment of the Kioa Island Council.742

Additionally, the case studies have shown that the security of the communities of origin in

terms of their access to ‘economic opportunities; education, health care and social services;

political participation; entitlement to land ownership; nationality and citizenship; and the

enjoyment of cultural practices and traditions’ needs to be established through laws and

buttressed by institutions of the host state.743 For example, the citizenship status and political

participation of the Banabans and Vaitupuans is enshrined in the constitution and laws of the

host country, Fiji. However, as highlighted earlier, in the case of the resettlement of the

Gilbertese to Ghizo, new laws following the independence of the Solomon Islands ‘restricted

automatic entry rights for children of settlers.’744 Moreover, this chapter acknowledges and

echoes sentiments of seminal authors presented by the case studies that the human mobility

arrangements of Pacific Islanders during the colonial administration may no longer appeal to

national governments of the Pacific as a mechanism by which to respond to the relocation of

Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders in contemporary times. This is because there is a

political dimension that embodies ‘political commitment, financial and resource capacities’,

primarily of the host state and extending to the sending state ‘with weak economies of scale

and diverse cultures.’745 These considerations suggest the need for an extensive role of the

governments of both the sending and receiving states to provide a more solid framework on

which to make policy to avoid decimating the livelihoods of relocating communities in the

future. Chapter four has gone some way to present a gamut of considerations from the

historical case studies to advance our understanding to consider more in-depth into responding

to future mobility of Pacific Islanders from slow-onset environmental change. The researcher

740 Ibid 66, 70–1, 78. 741 McAdam, above n 10, 11, 148–9; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 742 McAdam, above n 87, 325; see also Edwards, above n 642. 743 McAdam, above n 10, 11, 148–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–5; see also Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–9; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 99–100; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48–9. 744 Donner, above n 35, 195. 745 Ferris, above n 12, 34–5; see also Leckie, above n 16, 29; see also Connell, above n 75, 135, 138, 140.

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recognises that caution needs to be applied as the accounts of past decades administration and

experiences might not be transferable in contemporary times in its entirety.746 The researcher

further recognises that there are emerging empirical studies by scholars Piggott-McKellar et

al, McNamara and Combes, Klepp and Herbeck, and Bertana, especially in the Fiji context of

the internal relocation of communities which can also be drawn upon to supplement the inquiry

into relocation of Pacific Island communities across sovereign borders in the future.747

4.4 Conclusion

The experiences and lessons learned from the case studies have contributed towards our

understanding of the considerations that can be drawn upon from the perspectives of

communities of origin and the host communities to inform the criteria of readiness for the

climate-induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign states in the future.

These findings correspond to RQ 1(a). The next chapter explores readiness across a range of

disciplines. It extrapolates the determinants of readiness to be discussed further in chapter

seven.

746 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 151; See also Corendea, above n 170, 13. 747 Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54, 1-17; see also McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54, 70; see also Bertana, above n 54.

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Chapter 5: Readiness–A Multidisciplinary Perspective

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter uncovered an array of considerations learned from the experiences of

human mobility of Pacific Islanders during the colonial administration of territories in the

Pacific Islands region.748 These considerations provide insights to inform the future relocation

of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders in the context of climate change and draw upon

the criteria of readiness, which is the key investigation of the study. This chapter examines the

phenomenon of readiness in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives. The purpose of

this chapter is to unpack what might be learned from the considerable body of experience of

the phenomenon of readiness in the literature, which corresponds to RQ (1) (c). RQ 1 (c) asks:

what can we learn from the literature on other forms of mobility or other contexts of readiness?

This chapter also unpacks the elements of readiness and identifies considerations across a

range of disciplines to provide insights into framing readiness for climate-induced human

mobility. This chapter, in conjunction with chapters four and six, presents building blocks to

inform the criteria of readiness as presented in chapter seven.

The researcher argues that most studies in the field of human mobility have tended to focus on

the future relocation of populations yet to be planned. Researchers have not considered in as

much detail what it means to be ready for climate change-induced human mobility across

levels for action by the sending and receiving states. This constitutes a significant gap in the

literature. Given the lack of a single and coherent study, the researcher draws on relevant

elements of readiness from other sources to identify elements of climate migration readiness.

This study aims to contribute to this growing area of research and therefore the investigation

of the study provides a new and more holistic understanding of what is required to build

readiness.

748 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78.

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This chapter acknowledges that the review of the phenomenon of readiness in the literature is

far from exhaustive. It contains a comprehensive review of the literature pertinent to the

research questions posed in this study drawn from literature on:

1) disaster preparedness;

2) climate finance readiness;

3) international humanitarian assistance preparedness;

4) public health preparedness; and

5) REDD+ readiness (readiness literature).

This chapter begins by reviewing disaster preparedness and climate finance readiness literature

because of the frequently cited references to human mobility from sudden- and slow-onset

environmental change. It is acknowledged that the term readiness is not used uniformly across

the full spectrum of disciplines and is sometimes equated with preparedness. The reference to

readiness is used in its broadest sense in this chapter. A synopsis to review the body of

experience on the phenomenon of readiness in this chapter is presented firstly by identifying

the elements of the definition of preparedness, or readiness, specific to the discipline. It then

considers barriers to achieving readiness, before considering implementation measures to

achieve readiness (where applicable). Finally, a brief summary of the elements and

considerations emerging from the phenomenon of readiness specific to the discipline is

provided.

5.2 Disaster Preparedness

A large body of scholarly work, including various reports originating from UN agencies such

as the Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), Inter-Agency Standing Committee

(IASC) and the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI), has been published on

disaster preparedness.749 Preparedness is important for sudden-onset disasters because

749 Guadagno, above n 8, 30–1; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2–3; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1518–46; see also Lilian Yamamoto, Diogo Andreola Serraglio and Fernanda de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters: A South American Approach’ (2018) 10(1) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 65, 67–9. See also United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction Cancun, Mexico’ (Proceedings Report, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 22–26 May 2017) 3 (Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017) <https://www.preventionweb.net/files/55465_globalplatform2017proceedings.pdf>; see also Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, UN Doc A/CN.206/6 (22 January 2005) (‘Hyogo Framework’); see also Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, GA, 9th plen mtg, UN Doc A/1361 (18 March 2015) (‘Sendai Framework’).

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disasters require coordinated responses and the deployment of comprehensive strategies and

emergency plans by government institutions at the community and national levels.750 In

addition to the operational dimensions, preparedness also requires well-articulated national

policies and programs and a legal and regulatory framework at the national level to enable

officials to exercise functions in preparation and immediately in the aftermath of disasters.751

Moreover, strengthening the capacity of government institutions, especially those of

developing countries which have acute economies of scale relative to developed nations to

access disaster-relief assistance and finance from donor agencies, is a further reason

preparedness is important in the disaster context.752 The determinants outlined below are

indicative of the arrangements and measures needed to equip the government at community

and national levels before the onset of sudden-onset disasters as well as during, and in the post-

disaster phase. The discussion that follows expands on the determinants to offer some

important insights needed to frame readiness in the context of climate-induced human

mobility.

Elements of Disaster Preparedness

The broad use of the term disaster preparedness is equated with ‘disaster preparedness,

response, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.’753 Disaster preparedness is underscored

in ‘international instruments on disaster risk reduction and disaster resilience particularly, the

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which is the successor

framework to the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA)’ under the aegis of the

Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.754 Moreover, a generally accepted definition of

750 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, ‘Words into Action Guidelines: Disaster Displacement: How to Reduce Risk, Address Impacts and Strengthen Resilience – A Companion for Implementing the Sendai Framework Target E’ (Consultation Paper, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2018) 26, 52–3 (‘Sendai Framework Target E 2018’). 751 Ibid 23–5, 40, 49, 52. 752 Protection Agenda Volume 1, above n 14, 6–10; see also United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, ‘Words into Action Guidelines: Introductory Capstone Enhancing Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response’ (Consultation Paper, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, May 2017) 5, 13, 57 (‘DR IntroCapstone 2017’). 753 Sendai Framework, above n 749, paras 2, 14, 17, 24 (l), 33(h); see also Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 3; see also Andrew Collins et al, ‘The 3rd Global Summit of Research Institutes for Disaster Risk Reduction: Expanding the Platform for Bridging Science and Policy Making’ (2017) 8(2) International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 224, 240; see also Guadagno, above n 8, 31; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1527–28. 754 Sendai Framework, above n 749 and accompanying text.

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preparedness and preparedness action cited frequently in the disaster preparedness literature is

important to note, as there are parallels that can be drawn from the standpoint of human

mobility from sudden- and-slow onset environmental change.

The term ‘‘preparedness’’ is commonly used to refer to ‘[t]he capacities and knowledge

developed by governments, professional response organisations, communities and individuals

to anticipate and respond effectively to the impact of likely, imminent or current hazard events

or conditions.’755 In the same vein, preparedness action is based on ‘a sound analysis of disaster

risks and good linkages with early warning systems, and includes such activities as

contingency planning…the development of arrangements for coordination, evacuation and

public information…It must be supported by formal institutional, legal and budgetary

capacities.’756 The term “readiness” has not been used in the disaster preparedness literature

and remains underexplored. However, the disaster preparedness literature acknowledges

readiness succinctly as the ‘ability to quickly and appropriately respond when required.’757

Collectively, the engagement by a full spectrum of actors, the development of regulatory

frameworks, enhancing institutional capacities and arrangements to set aside emergency

financial resources—including accessing financial assistance—are elements drawn from the

definition of disaster preparedness.758 The researcher recognises that attaining consensus at

various levels for action may present potential challenges which ought to be acknowledged as

part of preparedness. The plurality of elements provide rich perspectives to frame readiness

for human mobility in the context of climate change.

Disaster Preparedness and Build Back Better

The SFDRR encompasses ‘four policy-oriented priorities for action in the main body of the

text.’759 These aim to ‘address displacement risk and minimise its negative consequences,

including facilitating human mobility as a voluntary or protective measure to strengthen

resilience.’760 Moreover, the SFDRR consists of ‘guiding principles to frame a variety of key

activities relevant to reducing, preparing for and responding to disaster displacement under the

755 United Nations, Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008) 3 (‘Hyogo, Priority Five-2008’); see also DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71. 756 See above n 755 and accompanying text. 757 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71. 758 See above n 757; see also Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1524–25. 759 Sendai Framework, above n 749; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 3. 760 Yonetani, above n 59, 3.

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priorities for action at global to national levels.’761 Discussion on all the priorities for action

and guiding principles of the SFDRR is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, two

categories conspicuously aligned to priority four of the SFDRR include: ‘enhancing disaster

preparedness for effective response, and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and

reconstruction.’762 The discussion that follows examines both categories to supplement and

extend the elements of preparedness, which can be drawn upon to frame readiness for human

mobility in the context of climate change.763

Disaster Preparedness

‘Community preparedness such as evacuation drills, training and area-based support systems,

and the preparedness of local authorities, through measures to strengthen their capacity to

manage evacuations’ are strands that correlate with the first category of ‘enhancing disaster

preparedness for effective response.’ 764 Other strands include ‘strengthening risk knowledge

and timely delivery of early warning systems.’765 Expanding on the first category, disaster

preparedness and planning (preparedness) traverses local, national, regional and global levels

to address disaster-induced human mobility.766 Enhancing the capacity of local authorities is

instructive in building an understanding of readiness in the context of cross-border climate-

induced mobility.

Disaster preparedness involves ‘adopting and implementing national and local disaster risk

reduction strategies and plans’ to reduce disaster displacement risk.767 The strategies and plans

entail ‘strengthening local authorities’ capacity to evacuate people from disaster-prone areas;

ensuring assistance programmes and mechanisms account for the specific needs of particular

groups within the displaced population; and engaging in meaningful participation of people

displaced by disasters.’768 The legal dimension of disaster preparedness entails using ‘national

and local laws, regulations and policies’ essential for ‘protecting land, property and other

761 Ibid 2–3; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 8–9, 17–18. 762 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 15, 18, 39, 52; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 5; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4. 763 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 10; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2. 764 Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4, paras 28(d), 33(h), 33(m); see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 39; See also Yonetani, above n 59, 7–8. 765 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 39; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 7–8. 766 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 48–54; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, art 30(l). 767 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 26, 48–52; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, para 27(b); see Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 26, 48–52. 768 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 26, 52–3.

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productive assets during displacement.’769 Additionally, making land available for either

temporary or permanent relocation forms part of the policy and legal arrangements.770 Further

considerations integral to the legal and policy dimensions at the local and national levels

include ‘institutional leadership, development and reconstruction of budgetary allocations,

designating roles, responsibilities, legal and administrative authority, including aligning

domestic, regional and international instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal

Displacement’ with existing frameworks.771

In addition to strategies and plans to develop capacity of responders at a national level, the

resilience of communities to respond to sudden-onset disasters also needs to be recognised.772

Corendea points out that ‘it is important not to lose sight of the realities within the islands and

the culture and traditions of communities’ which is integral to disaster preparedness and

resilience.773 Some notable examples include ‘traditional coping strategies in rural indigenous

communities in the South Pacific’ such as ‘land use planning, building methods, food

resilience (leaves of cassava plants, and cutting banana leaves, coconuts and other root

crops)…to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters.’774 A further example includes the ‘role of

traditional ecological knowledge…practiced by indigenous communities…to predict

environmental changes, including changes in weather and climate…’ such as ‘reading the sky

and clouds’, observing the ‘types of wind’, and monitoring seasons and recording and updating

them in their ‘seasonal calendar.’775 Other examples extend to ‘practical strategies’ such as

‘traditional warning signs (nesting behaviour of bees and hornets, ocean current and tides, fruit

growth, rainbows) and oral histories of previous disasters.’776 The host of coping and

adaptation strategies are notable in demonstrating resilience at a community level for

preparedness.

Likewise, the SFDRR has been broadened in recognition of the ‘potential for cross-border

disaster displacement covering both outflows to a neighbouring country and influxes of people

769 Ibid 23–5, 40, 49, 52. 770 Ibid 23–6, 40. 771 Ibid 24–6; see also Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3. 772 Corendea, above n 170, 15-16; 773 Ibid. 774 Ingrid Johnston, ‘Disaster management and climate change adaptation: a remote island perspective’ (2014) 23(2) Disaster Prevention and Management 123, 124, 127. 775 Penehuro Fatu Lefale, ‘Ua ‘afa le Aso Stormy weather today: traditional ecological knowledge of weather and climate. The Samoa experience’ (2010) 100 Climate Change 317, 323-332; 776 Ingrid Johnston, ‘Traditional warnings signs of cyclones on remote islands in Fiji and Tonga’ (2015) 14(3) Environmental Hazards 210, 211, 214-221.

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fleeing disasters abroad’ as part of disaster preparedness and response.777 At the regional and

global levels, strategies and plans include ‘baseline data on displacement, bilateral or regional

contingency and response plans, operational guides, budgetary allocations for development,

service provision and land-use management as part of larger investments.’778 The legal and

policy perspectives encompass the ‘inclusion of specific plans, laws and policies aligned with

broader instruments and tools, such as regional policies and agreements on free movement,

displaced people’s rights, sustainable development, DRR, climate change and humanitarian

action.’779 The ‘seasonal labour migration opportunities for Pacific island nations through

well-managed schemes’ underscored in bilateral agreements, and the ‘voluntary guidelines to

enhance resilience to climate change and disasters through the Framework for Resilient

Development in the Pacific’ are some notable examples.780 Moreover, other complementary

components include sharing information about good practices, thus ensuring that cooperative

systems are established.781 This can be illustrated briefly by the Protection for Persons Moving

Across Borders in the Context of Disasters: A Guide to Effective Practices for RCM Member

Countries, which was developed under the auspices of the Regional Conference on Migration

(RCM). This guide facilitates ‘trans-boundary simulation exercises among Member States of

RCM to prepare for potential cross-border disaster-displacement and agree upon ways of

cooperation during any response.’782 The array of considerations at regional and global levels

provides useful insights into the legal, policy and operational aspects of readiness, which can

be built around in the context of cross-border climate-induced mobility.

Build Back Better

The ‘build back better’ principle is characterised by ‘a whole of-society approach, including

the engagement of all stakeholders, strong partnerships to support scientific and technical

research and its applications, and clear political commitment before and after disasters.’783 The

strands of ‘build back better’ are anchored across the full spectrum of ‘risk-informed

preparedness and recovery plans, multi-stakeholder engagements at both national and local

777 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 40, 53. 778 Ibid 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54. 779 Ibid. 780 Ibid 35, 37. 781 Ibid 51. 782 Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 45; see also Regional Conference on Migration, Fostering and Strengthening Regional Dialogue and Cooperation <http://www.crmsv.org/en>. 783 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 10; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2.

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levels, tailored policy and legal frameworks for reconstruction to facilitate disaster recovery

process, including community capacity development and local ownership.’784

Building and strengthening institutional and political capacities at the national level and

developing the capacities of communities at the local level, the protection of property, the

availability of land and access to land, crafting disaster risk reduction strategies, plans, guides,

laws and policies; stakeholder engagements and budgetary allocations are all key determinants

from the array of strands associated with both categories under priority four to address disaster

displacement pre- and post-disaster phases.785 These determinants offer important insights to

guide the framing of the criteria for climate-induced cross-border mobility.

Platform on Disaster Displacement

A parallel initiative widely acknowledged in the disaster preparedness literature, including at

global policy fora, is the ‘Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), the successor to the

Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda.’786 The central goal underpinning the PDD is to ‘manage

disaster displacement risks in the country of origin to prevent cross-border disaster

displacement.’787 Moreover, the PDD embodies a multitude of action areas. Some of these

include the development of law and policy at the domestic and regional levels; the creation of

bi-lateral/regional frameworks on admission, stay and non-return of cross-border disaster-

displaced persons; and ensuring that relevant research and analysis is conveyed to policy and

decision makers’ to respond to cross-border disaster displacement.788

The PDD underpins both the Nansen Initiative and the SFDRR position, which is ‘to create

global legal norms and standards’ exclusively for disaster-displaced persons.789 The synergy

between the PDD and global cooperation initiatives can be exemplified by the action areas

indicated above and the strategic priorities. The strategic priorities involve: ‘consolidating and

784 Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4; see also Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 10. 785 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 7–54. 786 McAdam, above n 14, 1532–4. 787 See above n 786; see also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction: UNHCR Statement: From Commitment to Action’ (Speech delivered at the 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, Cancun, 22-26 May) (‘Cancun Speech DRR’) <https://www.unisdr.org/files/globalplatform/UNHCR%20Statement%20to%20DRR%20GP%20_%2018%20May%202017.pdf>. 788 McAdam, above n 14, 1533. 789 See above n 788, 1532–4; see also Protection Agenda Volume 1, above n 14, 7–8.

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enhancing the use of effective practices, promoting policy coherence by linking into existing

initiatives, coordinating, complementing, and/or feeding into existing activities and processes,

and extending technical support to states to translate their commitments and aspirations’ under

the initiatives and agreements.790 The PDD offers some important insights to be considered in

informing the definition of readiness from the legal, policy, operational and practice

perspectives at both domestic and regional levels in the context of cross-border climate-

induced mobility. Taken together, the PDD, initiatives and agreements are indicative of

noteworthy contributions that can be used to underpin the definition of readiness.

Determinants Drawing on Disaster Preparedness

The engagement of state and non-state actors—including communities at risk of disaster

displacement, the capacity development of government institutions, the allocation of finance

in national budgets for disasters and domestic regulatory arrangements—are all elements

drawn from the definition of disaster preparedness.791 Moreover, the ability to respond quickly

and appropriately in sudden-onset disaster context underscores the elements of readiness.792

Together, the definition of preparedness from the analysis entails five salient elements, which

constitute quick and appropriate action, engagement, capacity, finance and regulation. These

elements assist in our understanding of how to frame readiness in the context of climate-

induced human mobility.

Furthermore, the notion of disaster preparedness is harnessed through the initiatives and policy

agendas at the global level from the standpoint of global initiatives and policy agendas such

as the Nansen Initiative, SFDRR and the PDD. Disaster preparedness at the national level has

identified the need for community preparedness and whole-of-society participation in the

formulation of strategies, plans, programs and policy measures in all stages of sudden-onset

disasters. Disaster preparedness at the national level also requires the development of laws and

regulations to facilitate and manage sudden-onset disasters, to ensure the protection of and

respect for the human rights of disaster displaced populations, budgetary allocations and the

institutional capacity development of government authorities and officials.793 The

790 See above n 789 and accompanying text; see also Cancun Speech DRR, above n 787; see Yonetani, above n 59, 9. 791 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54. 792 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752. 793 Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 10; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54.

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arrangements at regional and global levels include the formulation of laws, strategies, plans

and policies on disaster preparedness aligned to practice standards outlined in international

operational guidelines, human rights principles and instruments, as well as the technical

assistance extended and future research conducted by regional agencies. The elements and

considerations drawn from the disaster preparedness literature have gone some way to enhance

our understanding of the building blocks to frame readiness for climate-induced human

mobility.

5.3 Climate Finance Readiness

Global climate policies under the aegis of the UNFCCC, such as the Copenhagen Accord,

Cancun Adaptation Framework—including other ‘international financial mechanisms’ outside

the UNFCCC process such as the ‘Official Development Assistance (ODA)’, among others—

are potential sources of climate finance.794 Much of the literature spanning economics, finance,

environmental and development dimensions pays particular attention to the readiness of

‘countries vulnerable to climate change such as Least Developing Countries (LDCs), Small

Island Developing States (SIDS) and Africa to maximise access to, leverage from, and to make

effective use of, international climate finance.’795 Readiness is important for climate finance

because it supports and facilitates nations with acute and vulnerable economies of scale to

achieve the commitments under the Paris Agreement.796 Climate finance involves advancing

global financial assistance to nations to ‘promote low-emission and climate-resilient

development’ as underscored in the Paris Agreement.797 The premise of readiness straddles

the institutional, regulatory, policy and planning dimensions of countries seeking to access

794 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192; see also Lianbiao Cui and Yuran Huang, ‘Exploring the Schemes for Green Climate Fund Financing: International Lessons’ (2018) 101 World Development 173, 173–4; see also Walid Ali and Fuad Al-Kadasi, ‘A Framework to Strengthen National Climate Finance Readiness in Yemen: An Interim Mechanism Under the Social Fund for Development (SFD)’ (Policy Concept Note) 3 <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/search.html?q=readiness+>. See also Veerle Vandeweerd, Yannick Glemarec and Simon Billett, ‘Readiness for Climate Finance: A Framework for Understanding What it Means to be Ready to Use Climate Finance’ (Research Paper, United Nations Development Programme, 16 April 2012) 1 (‘UNDP Readiness Paper 2012’). 795 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 123–4; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. See also Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Climate Finance Readiness Programme (CF Ready), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (‘GIZ CF Ready Programme’) <https://www.giz.de/expertise/html/19694.html>. 796 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14. 797 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–3, 1203; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 123–4, 131.

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financial assistance to implement climate change mitigation projects.798 Collectively, the

climate finance readiness literature (CFR literature) provides an important opportunity to

advance our understanding to frame readiness for human mobility in the context of climate

change.

Elements of Climate Finance Readiness and Green Climate Fund

Capacity is at the heart of climate finance readiness (CFR), which traverses an array of strands

to access and allocate climate finance effectively.799 The reference to CFR in the CFR literature

usually refers to ‘the capacities of countries to plan for, access, deliver, and monitor and report

on climate finance, both international and domestic, in ways that are catalytic and fully

integrated with national development priorities and achievement of the Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs).’800 The four key elements that underpin capacity, as identified

by Vandeweerd, Glemarec and Billett, are ‘1) financial planning, 2) accessing different forms

and types of finance, 3) delivering finance and implementing and executing projects and

programmes, and 4) monitoring, reporting and verifying on financial expenditures and

associated results/transformative impacts.’801

Furthermore, the interplay between the definition of CFR and the legal dimension of CFR

underpinned by an enabling environment is also a central feature reflected across the CFR

literature.802 For ‘developing countries to attract public or private investments, a robust

enabling environment based on predictable, transparent and enforceable legal and regulatory

framework’ is pivotal.803 From a legal perspective, Morita and Pak identify the ‘barriers to

access public and private international climate finance in the Asia-Pacific region.’804 They

argue that ‘passing new laws and regulations or adjusting existing laws and regulations to

ensure that climate change considerations are fully incorporated into the applicable legal and

regulatory framework for low carbon and climate resilient pathways’ is required.805 Morita

798 Smita Nakhooda et al, ‘Understanding Readiness to Access and Use Climate Finance Effectively – Insights from Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia’ (Synthesis Brief, Overseas Development Institute and African Climate Finance Hub, October 2013) 3 <https://www.odi.org/projects/2735-climate-finance-readiness>. 799 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–7, 23; see also Cui and Huang, above n 794, 174–5. 800 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, ii. 801 Ibid 4–5, 23. 802 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13. 803 Ibid. 804 Ibid 11. 805 Ibid.

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and Pak argue that the laws and regulations need to be ‘based on comprehensive assessment,

analysis and consultations to create the enabling environment for renewable energy uptake.’806

Moreover, there is growing recognition in the CFR literature of the need to situate the ‘role of

private-sector finance in funding climate related activities’ within the tenets of international

public finance to enhance ambition towards low-carbon development.807 Finance flows from

the private sector are recognised as able to ‘catalyse public climate finance alongside much

larger capital flows.’808 Private sector finance readiness is described as the ‘readying phase,

which involves activities such as strengthening of regulatory frameworks, institution building,

capacity building, and provision of incentives to attract private sector investments towards

climate change initiatives.’809 Private sector finance readiness is also integral to establishing

an ‘enabling/investment environment’, as highlighted above.810 The strands of both public and

private international climate finance offer rich perspectives in framing readiness for human

mobility in the context of climate change.811

Similarly, in considering capacity as a central feature underlying CFR, the activities woven

into readiness can be enabled by the Green Climate Fund (GCF).812 The GCF is the ‘principal

financial resource’, among other climate funds (REDD+), ‘for financing climate change

mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.’813 In their recent case study assessing

climate finance readiness in ‘twelve countries in the Asian sub-region and the Pacific sub-

region’, Samuwai and Hills argue that to date, ‘USD 39.5 million has been mobilised for

readiness to increase the support that will ready countries to access this (GCF) finance.’814 By

way of illustration, ‘123 readiness projects covering 88 developing countries have been

806 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 7, 9, 11, 13. 807 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193, 1203; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1. 808 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 2. 809 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193, 1203. 810 Ibid. 811 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 7–8, 11. 812 Nakhooda, above n 798; see also GIZ CF Ready Programme, above n 795; see also United Nations Environment, United Nations Development Programme and World Resources Institute, What Is Climate Finance Readiness, GCF Readiness Programme (‘UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme’) <http://www.gcfreadinessprogramme.org/what-climate-finance-readiness>; see also Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Climate Finance Readiness Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/57753.html>. 813 Nakhooda, above n 798; see also GIZ CF Ready Programme, above n 795; see also UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812; see also Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Climate Finance Readiness Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/57753.html>. 814 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1201.

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approved by the GCF.’815 The definition of GCF readiness, as described by Samuwai and Hills,

‘relates to the preparation of a national accredited entity (NAE) of a developing country to

directly access finance from the Fund.’816 The building blocks to ‘get ready for GCF financing’

are twofold.817 First, the institutional mechanisms at a national level need to be developed with

regard to ‘planning, budgeting, programming and monitoring procedures and systems.’818

Second, the ‘mechanisms need to be compatible with existing and future planning and

budgeting systems and integrated with the country’s national plans, policies, and sustainable

development priorities.’819 Samuwai and Hills point out the ‘GCF readiness approach tends to

adopt a narrow scope of readiness by assessing institutions’ relative to a broader perspective

of readiness in the context of global climate finance which, ‘adopts a country-wide approach.’ 

820

The capacity of local authorities to access and use international climate finance traversing the

planning, accessing, delivering and monitoring, reporting and verifying phases for climate

change mitigation activities are elements drawn from the definitions of CFR and GCF. Other

elements include the alignment of capacities principally present in national development plans,

priorities and budgets, the alignment of the legal and regulatory framework for climate change

mitigation activities through the formulation of laws and regulations, or the strengthening of

existing laws and regulation through revision. The inclusion of consultations and participatory

approaches to inform the legal and regulatory framework to establish an enabling environment

as well as seeking accreditation for tailored entities for climate investment through national

laws, policies and plans are additional elements drawn from the definition of CFR and GCF.821

Barriers to Accessing Climate Finance

There is a considerable body of experience in the CFR literature that has enhanced

consideration of the challenges in accessing climate finance. For example, ‘economic strength,

public opinion, government intention, and international peer pressure’ are barriers to attracting

815 Ibid 1193. 816 Ibid. 817 UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812. 818 Ibid. 819 Ibid. 820 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193. 821 Ibid 1192–1209; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14.

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new investments or using finance for climate-related activity.822 Samuwai and Hills argue that

the rigorous conditions for accessing climate finance are inevitable.823 Identifying barriers

within the context of CFR assists in developing an understanding of future-focused

considerations necessary for relocation projects in the context of climate investment. It also

provides an opportunity to advance knowledge to frame readiness human mobility in the

context of climate change in the future. It is acknowledged that the parameters to access

climate finance are situated within adaptation and low-carbon development programs, which

dismiss funding for relocation projects.824 This warrants substantial attention in international

climate policy fora to ‘simplify and to enhance direct access to multilateral funds’, which is

currently the subject of debate.825

Adenle, Manning and Arbiol’s empirical study investigating the constraints of obtaining

finance for climate mitigation projects in Africa reveals the ‘lack of institutional capacity and

clear legal frameworks, including weak institutions’ as key barriers to project financing and

implementation.’826 Furthermore, they draw attention to approaches that can strengthen

institutions, which include: ‘1) capacity building, 2) research and development, 3) partnership

development, and 4) disbursement of financial resources.’827 Commenting on the barriers

identified by Adenle, Manning and Arbiol in relation to capacity, Morita and Pak outline seven

capacity challenges for climate investment which involve:

(i) inadequate legal and regulatory framework and limited enforcement capacity; (ii) weak organisational capacity, leadership and governance; (iii) weak research capacity and lack of access to systematic climate data; (iv) delays in budgetary prioritisation for climate actions; (v) limited capacity to identify, develop and process climate change projects and programs; (vi) a lack of access to expertise and international good practice for climate change mitigation and adaptation; (vii) lengthy technical and administrative processes involved in issuing permits and licenses for climate change activities.828

In the same vein, the contribution by Dean, in the book The Routledge Handbook of Disaster

Risk Reduction Including Climate Change Adaptation details some of the barriers to access

finance which encompasses:

(i) misalignment between institutional arrangements for DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA), and the budgetary systems in place to allocate, categorise and track resources at the

822 Cui and Huang, above n 794, 185; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, ii, 1; see also Annika Dean, ‘Funding and Financing for Disaster Risk Reduction including Climate Change Adaptation’ in Ilan Kelman, Jessica Mercer and JC Gillard (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Disaster Risk Reduction Including Climate Change Adaptation (Routledge, 2017) 393, 393–406. 823 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193, 1203. 824 Katrina Miriam Wyman, ‘Responses to Climate Migration’ (2013) 37(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review 167, 181–5; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 138. 825 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1201, 1203. 826 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124–5, 131. 827 Ibid 124. 828 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 7–9.

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national level; (ii) capacity constraints of countries most vulnerable to disaster risks, including climate change, which have the least capacity to access, use, report and acquit funding; (iii) inappropriate modalities as finance is delivered on a project-by-project basis via multilateral implementing agencies that hamper use of national systems.829

Collectively, the general lack of capacity of institutions, technical skills, climate mitigation

projects and programs—as well as research and data inventories—inhibit developing countries

from being able to access finance flows for climate investment.830 The lack of adequacy

spanning the legal and regulatory framework and policy dimensions and poorly defined

climate mitigation activities in budgets are additional barriers to gaining access to finance

flows.831

The Outlook for Vulnerable Pacific Island Countries

The multilateral and private finance flows have important implications for building readiness,

particularly for climate vulnerable countries with potentially acute economies of scale.832 The

reason for drawing attention to Pacific Island countries (PICs) within the broader scope of

CFR is twofold. First, an absence of adequate support to PICs in the form of capacity

development, technical assistance, skills and knowledge may mean that the readiness of PICs

for climate investment could be sporadic and difficult to establish.833 This may mean that the

ability to participate in climate change mitigation activities and access international climate

finance may be substantially delayed as PICs continue to cope and build resilience to the

adverse effects of sudden- and slow-onset environmental change through adaptation

activities.834 Secondly, for PICs, readiness for future human mobility in the context of climate

change may potentially present additional challenges.

The CFR literature pays particular attention to ‘developing countries that lack the financial

resources necessary or the institutional, policy, and skills system to access and use climate

finance effectively’, relative to ‘developed countries which have internal capacities to generate

829 Dean, above n 822, 393, 397–402, 404 –5. 830 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 123–32; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 831 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–1209; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 832 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–3, 1203; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–2. 833 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–1209; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 834 See above n 833 and accompanying text; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14.

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and use climate finance.’835 The CFR literature has tended to focus on financial resources as a

factor for consideration towards readiness for the PICs.836 Nunn and Kumar point out that ‘[I]t

seems unlikely…developed-country governments…will be able to sustain their present level

of adaptation funding to developing countries in the face rising costs…as they (developed

countries) endeavor to climate proof their vulnerable regions.’837 They assert that ‘…reviving

cashless (or cash-minimized) adaptation…by communal construction of stone-built from

seawalls to artificial islands; communal planning and labour (local materials), and re-discovery

of traditional Pacific ways…from food preservation…use of traditional pharmacopoeias’ may

need to be considered by PICs as part of readiness.838

Echoing similar sentiments, the study by Samuwai and Hills discussed earlier reveals a

‘massive readiness gap between the Asian sub-region and the Pacific sub-region.’839 The study

records that the Asian countries’ readiness performance was progressive.840 This was reflected

by the ‘variety of financial instruments issued such as green bonds, tax-free infrastructure

bonds for renewable energy projects, and the establishment of National Climate Funds (NCF)

to mobilise domestic and international climate finance.’841 Based on these accounts, among

others, they found that these financial instruments enabled Asian countries to attract diverse

funding and to be able to comply with the required financial mechanisms.842 In the case of

PICs, Samuwai and Hills found that the readiness progress was not uniformly defined and was

less well established.843 They recorded that ‘access to climate finance was primarily limited to

bilateral sources and multinational entities, with grants being the main instruments geared

towards adaptation activities instead of mitigation finance.’844 The ‘lack of knowledge-based

capacities to implement innovative financial instruments, underdeveloped or non-existent

financial sector due to their very small and largely undiversified economies’ were other key

reasons recorded as barriers to their readiness progress.845 Samuwai and Hills concluded that

the current readiness approach designed for the Pacific sub-region ‘provides little assurance

that it will improve their access to climate finance conundrum and the impact of on-going and

835 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1, 23. 836 Patrick D Nunn and Roselyn Kumar, ‘Cashless Adaptation to Climate Change: Unwelcome yet Unavoidable?’ (2019) 1(1) One Earth 31, 31–34. 837 Ibid 31, 33. 838 Ibid. 839 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192, 1200, 1203. 840 Ibid 1200, 1203. 841 Ibid. 842 Ibid. 843 Ibid. 844 Ibid. 845 Ibid.

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prolonged inaccessibility of multilateral funds, as well as private finance will be severe, and

existential for some.’846 They suggest that for Pacific nations in particular, ‘readiness needs to

be viewed as a nationwide phenomenon rather than a mere institutional issue.’847 Furthermore,

they identified ‘strengthening national policy, effective longitudinal monitoring of readiness

progress, and a better understanding of the magnitude of risks posed by climate change in

relation to a country’s abilities’ as focal points to inform readiness progress of the Pacific sub-

region.848

Determinants drawing on CFR

Salient elements conceptualised from the definition of CFR include the presence of capacity

development, a robust enabling environment, laws and regulations, consultations, incentives,

budgets and institutional mechanisms in a number of administrative and operational

components, principally plans, policies, strategies and priorities.  849 These offer valuable

insights in framing readiness for future human mobility in the context of climate change. In

addition, the CFR literature has broadened understanding of the barriers to accessing

multilateral and private finance flows, which include ‘limited capacity, weak institutions, and

a lack of clear legal frameworks.’850 The CFR literature also identifies potential measures that

can be adopted to respond to these barriers by national and sectoral levels. These include

‘capacity building, research and development, partnership development, and disbursement of

financial resources.’851 Similarly, there is widespread consensus in the CFR literature that PIC

will always be on the ‘‘back foot’’ in seeking to access international climate finance. One of

the approaches suggested in the CRR literature to address this issue is to frame the response

to—and integrate readiness from—a broader frame of reference of a nation, relative to the

narrow framing around institutional capacity.852

The constituent elements and considerations drawn from the CFR literature provide

considerable insights to frame readiness for human mobility in the context of climate change

846 Ibid 1203. 847 Ibid 1193. 848 Ibid 1193–4. 849 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 850 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124. 851 Ibid. 852 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193.

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as well as to develop targeted interventions as a basis to access international climate finance

for future relocation projects.

5.4 International Humanitarian Assistance Preparedness

There is a considerable body of experience documented in the international humanitarian

assistance [IHA] literature that acknowledges considerations spanning legal, practical and

operational dimensions to extend international humanitarian relief across international

borders, also commonly cited as ‘cross-border disaster assistance in the immediate aftermath

of a rapid-onset disaster.’853 The central features underlying transnational relief advanced by

‘international responders such as humanitarian NGOs or UN agencies’ from a broader

perspective entail ‘goods and materials (material convergence), informational inquiries and

offers of assistance (informational convergence), and a significant influx of people (physical

convergence).’854 It is widely recognised in the IHA literature that disaster relief, search and

rescue, and the deployment of ‘emergency medical care providers’, including military

personnel, are well-known sources of immediate emergency assistance in response to a

disaster.855

Preparedness is important for cross-border humanitarian assistance because it requires

comprehensive coordination between the government of the disaster-affected state and

international responders. Moreover, preparedness requires a well-articulated legal and

regulatory framework to underscore the processes, functions, responsibilities and authority of

local government bodies to effectively facilitate, manage and execute international disaster

assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.856 Furthermore, preparedness identifies the

need for the sovereignty of the disaster-affected state to be acknowledged with the advent of

853 Bookmiller, above n 8, 957–84; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208; see also Barber, above n 160, 144; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95–142; see also Tessa Kelly and Lucio Cipullo, ‘Typhoon Haiyan: Shaping the Future of Legal Preparedness for International Disaster Relief’ (2014) 23(1) Human Rights Defender 11, 11–13; see also Takashi Nagata et al, ‘Successful Hospital Evacuation After the Kumamoto Earthquakes, Japan, 2016’ (2017) 11(5) Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 517, 520. 854 Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 961–2; see also Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Stellina Jolly, ‘Interrogating the Pedagogy of State Responsibility and Individual Rights in Disaster Law’ in Amita Singh (ed), Disaster Law Emerging Thresholds (Routledge, 2017) 146. 855 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958–9, 966; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9; see also Aahna Srikanth, ‘Letter to the Editor’ (2010) 25(6) Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 604. 856 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12; see also Barber, above n 160, 143–165.

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international assistance and international personnel and volunteers deployed to disaster-

affected areas of the state.857 The integration of effective monitoring mechanisms and controls

into the domestic regulatory framework for the overall transition of cross-border humanitarian

assistance is also part of preparedness.858 These are considerations that the government of a

disaster-affected state needs to have established to procure international humanitarian

assistance. Together, the IHA literature provides important insights into building an

understanding of the focus areas of readiness in the context of climate-induced human

mobility.

Elements of IHA Preparedness

The IHA literature confirms that a formal convention or legal instrument exclusively for cross-

border humanitarian assistance is not well supported under international law.859 The broad use

of the term IHA preparedness is underscored in soft-law instruments, or as Bookmiller states

‘soft-law oriented technical guidelines’ established by institutions of the UN agencies such as

the ‘International Law Commission [ILC] and the United Nations Office for the Coordination

of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA]’, to cite a few.860 Other institutions include ‘major non-

governmental relief organisations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies (IFRC), CARE and OXFAM.’861 Some notable examples include the

‘Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and

Initial Recovery Assistance [IDRL Guidelines 2007]’, which articulate to the ‘Model Act for

the Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance

[Model Act 2013], the ‘Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters

[Draft Articles 2014]’ and the ‘Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability

2014’, among others.862 In addition, soft law instruments are non-obligatory, which suggests

that governments of states are not compelled to embed them into their domestic legal

framework.863

857 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11, 13; see also Barber, above n 160, 149–50. 858 See above n 856 and accompanying text. 859 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958–9; see also Jolly, above n 812, 146; see also Barber, above n 139, 147. 860 Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 961, 965; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146, 151; see also Barber, above n 160, 144, 147–8; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 861 See above n 860 and accompanying text. 862 Barber, above n 160, 147–8, 150; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 211; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 965–6. 863 Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146.

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It is acknowledged that a multitude of interconnected elements present in soft law instruments

embody the definition of IHA preparedness. Due to practical constraints, this thesis cannot

provide a comprehensive review of all these elements. The discussion drawing on soft law

instruments that follows, outlines the building blocks for preparedness of countries for IHA.

For example, the IDRL Guidelines serve to ‘assist governments in strengthening its domestic

legal arrangements for managing international disaster.’864 Moreover, the guidelines

recommend ‘that governments provide certain legal facilities’, for example ‘visas, customs,

and taxes, among others to international disaster responders to allow them to efficiently assist

communities in need and that governments hold international actors to minimum humanitarian

quality standards.’865 Another example, is the Model Act, which ‘supports the implementation

of the Guidelines and is intended as a reference tool for law-makers of governments of the

states as they develop national legislation on managing and strengthening the legal

preparedness of international aid in a manner appropriate to their national circumstances.’866

In addition, the Draft Articles contribute to ‘clarify the roles, rights, and duties of the affected

state in disaster response vis-à-vis the duties and rights of states providing international

assistance.’867 This list is far from exhaustive, but it is representative of the minimum ‘practice

standards, guidelines and procedures’ present in soft law instruments to inform

preparedness.868 Soft law instruments underpin the legal, operational and logistical aspects of

‘large scale disasters requiring international assistance’ at a national level, which provides an

opportunity to advance the understanding of readiness in the context of climate change-

induced mobility.869

Similarly, soft law instruments are ‘based on existing international instruments’, such as

‘international human rights law and international humanitarian law where applicable.’870 They

embody a multitude of ‘legal norms and principles.’871 For example, the ‘ILC draft principles

on the protection of individuals’ underscore the ‘right to protection, safety and security, right

to disaster relief and basic needs of economic and social rights.’872 This suggests that the scope

864 Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’ (Programme Report, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2011) 6 (‘IFRC Guidelines 2011’). 865 See above n 864 and accompanying text. 866 Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 867 Barber, above n 160, 147–8. 868 Ibid 150; see also Jolly, above n 854, 144; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 869 See above n 868 and accompanying text. 870 Jolly, above n 854, 151–2; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210. 871 Jolly above n 854, 143; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11. 872 See above n 871 and accompanying text.

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of IHA preparedness amongst the considerations highlighted above straddles a human-rights

based approach. According to Jolly, the purpose of a human rights approach is twofold.873 The

first purpose is to scale-up ‘efforts at both national and international levels to establish state

responsibilities towards its people for international relief and humanitarian relief during

disasters.’874 The second is to accelerate action ‘to promote people-oriented, human-rights

based disaster relief plans and strategies’ within ‘social, economic and cultural’ dimensions.875

The IHA literature, in adopting a rights-based approach offers insights to draw upon to frame

readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility from a protection standpoint.876

The usefulness and effectiveness of soft law instruments to inform preparedness for cross-

border humanitarian assistance can be illustrated by the preliminary study conducted by Kelly

and Cipullo into the national legal and operational arrangements following Typhoon Haiyan

in the Philippines in 2013.877 The results of their analysis reveal that all ‘relevant government

departments spanning registration, customs, immigration, quarantine and taxation’ centralised

their administration and functions at a single location to inspect, assess and process the

‘passage of international relief goods.’878 The approach to this initiative was recorded by Kelly

and Cipullo as a ‘One-Stop-Shop.’879 For example, ‘customs excise duty and taxes were

exempt on the entry of foreign goods and prior visa applications’ suspended temporarily for

international responders.880 Moreover, access for, and transition of, ‘humanitarian personnel

working in the field’ proved efficient and effective with the establishment of a ‘taskforce

deployed to disaster-affected locations.’881 The approach adopted is consistent with the IDRL

Guidelines, which serve legal facilities as indicated earlier. Kelly and Cipullo argue that the

IDRL Guidelines underscore the importance of such facilities if international responders

‘comply with fundamental humanitarian principles, the national laws of the affected state and

minimum standards of quality and accountability.’882

Moreover, Kelly and Cipullo argue that the domestic legal framework to respond to cross-

border disaster assistance by international responders remains poorly defined.883 Their

873 Jolly, above n 854, 152–4. 874 Ibid 154. 875 Ibid 151–2. 876 Ibid; see also Betts, above n 533, 72. 877 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13. 878 Ibid 12. 879 Ibid. 880 Ibid. 881 Ibid. 882 Ibid. 883 Ibid 11–13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208.

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investigation also revealed that the Government of the Philippines expedited regulatory

arrangements to ‘improve the legal preparedness for international disaster response’ from the

experiences and lessons learned in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan.884 The Model

Act underpins the legislative framework of the Philippines’ regulatory preparedness for cross-

border humanitarian aid in future.885 The analysis undertaken by Kelly and Cipullo is useful

as it demonstrates the legal dimension for preparedness of the Government of the Philippines

by integrating soft law instruments, such as legal facilities and the Model Act, in its operational

functions and the national legal framework for cross-border humanitarian assistance.886 The

explicit integration of global ‘practice standards, guidelines and systems into domestic law and

policy’ from Kelly and Cipullo’s study extends our understanding of the role soft law

instruments play in underscoring preparedness from a legal perspective.887 Their study

provides rich perspectives that can be advanced to develop readiness in the context of climate-

induced human mobility. Another example of what is meant by preparedness from a legal

dimension is detailed in the discussion that follows.

It is widely acknowledged in the IHA literature that ‘global humanitarian needs are increasing

and the international humanitarian system is becoming more stretched.’888 This indicates that

governments of states need to legally prepare, or as Jolly describes, ‘strengthen their legal

preparedness’ to ‘manage disasters within their own borders.’889 The integration of soft

instruments, as indicated earlier, into the ‘domestic legal framework of national governments’

for the ‘facilitation and regulation of international disaster assistance’ is a strand of

preparedness from a legal perspective.890 A broader perspective adopted by ‘international

responders to reduce legal uncertainties’ is anchored in ‘bilateral and/or regional disaster

agreements with governments on international co-operation in disaster response’, which

constitutes a further strand.891

The focus areas drawn from the IHA literature to inform preparedness encompass the explicit

inclusion of soft law instruments and their integration into domestic legal and regulatory

884 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 885 Ibid; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959. 886 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13. 887 Ibid; see also Barber, above n 160, 144, 147. 888 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13; see also Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12. 889 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11; see also Barber, above n 160, 148; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146. 890 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11. 891 Barber, above n 160, 147; see also Fisher, above n 13, 209, 211; see also Jolly, above n 854, 145.

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frameworks, developing targeted interventions to extend legal facilities by the government of

the affected disaster state, as well as examining guidelines to inform policymakers in

formulating national laws to manage and execute cross-border humanitarian assistance.

Another focus area includes demarcating the roles, responsibilities and duties of local

authorities and articulating them into the domestic regulatory framework to implement cross-

border humanitarian relief. The integration of a human rights approach to formulate disaster

relief plans, strategies, programs and policies, and arrangements facilitated by bilateral and

international cooperation is an additional focus area.892 These focus areas provide rich

perspectives to conceptualise readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

Barriers to Cross-border Humanitarian Assistance

There is widespread consensus among scholars such as Barber, Fisher, Bookmiller, and Kelly

and Cipullo, that barriers spanning legal, political, administrative and logistical dimensions

lead ‘to the detriment of an effective, efficient response to the needs of the disaster affected

population.’893 The purpose of acknowledging barriers identified from the experiences and

lessons learned from cross-border humanitarian assistance is twofold. First, it better enables

policymakers to plan, manage, coordinate and facilitate relocation of communities across

international borders to the host country in the areas of policy, institutional and regulatory

dimensions at the domestic level. Second, it identifies approaches that underscore concerted

cooperation with the host country and countries of origin, including the international

community.

As noted by Bookmiller, in the ‘wake of natural disasters, many governments are not in a

position to appropriately manage a significant flow of external actors, in such circumstances,

states may not consistently enforce or may waive their rules altogether to open their doors

without any control over the assistance that comes in.’894 This can be illustrated briefly from

the global study carried out by the IFRC, which investigated ‘law(s) and legal issues, including

legal challenges in cross-border disaster operations’ at a global level.895 The analysis revealed

that bureaucratic processes relating to ‘delays due to ambiguous domestic procedures for

892 Barber, above n 160, 143–65; see also Jolly, above n 854, 143–58; Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13. 893 Barber, above n 160, 147, 150, 161; see also Jolly, above n 854, 149; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 958. 894 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958, 966; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11. 895 Fisher, above n 13, 208–9.

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making an appeal for international relief; and difficulties in legal registration for foreign

humanitarian organisations’ because of poorly defined regulations contributed to a host of

issues. These included, among others, the ‘importation of unneeded or inappropriate relief

items, poorly trained staff, failures to consult with beneficiaries’ and the insensitivity of

international responders to ‘culturally appropriate behaviours’ towards host communities.’896

There is a growing recognition in the IHA literature of the need for regulation within the ‘field

of cross-border [international] disaster medicine’, which presents an array of challenges linked

to cross-border humanitarian assistance.897 These challenges traverse two categories:

‘practitioners of disaster medicine’ and volunteers.898 The desk-based analysis conducted by

Fisher into IFRC’s qualitative and quantitative study above revealed that much uncertainty

still exists around the regulatory arrangements for cross-border disaster medicine that involve:

‘1) foreign credentials and competence of medical staff; 2) professional liability and insurance;

and 3) importation of medications and medical equipment.’899

Similarly, Bookmiller points out that ‘spontaneous or unaffiliated volunteers lacking

international experience arrive without self-sufficiency, proper vaccinations for endemic

diseases, language skills or any familiarity with the country’s culture and may be imposters

who falsely indicate they are professionally credentialed.’900 Bookmiller further points out that

these factors raise a series of issues and challenges that include ‘creating an immense

bottleneck at border entry points of affected states; burdening an already stressed local

response capacity; draining supplies from international providers meant for the local victims

of the crisis; and causing additional suffering and physical harm to the victims.’901 In

acknowledging ongoing global initiatives in relation to ‘professional quality standard-setting

among established networks of humanitarian providers’, Bookmiller maintains that far too

little attention has been paid to ‘converging unaffiliated volunteers and the quality challenges

they may pose.’902

896 Ibid 209. 897 Ibid 208; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959; see also Srikanth, above n 855. 898 Fisher, above n 13, 209; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 958, 959, 962. 899 Fisher above n 13, 209; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 964–5. 900 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958, 959, 962, 964; see also Jolly, above n 854, 153; see also ‘[i]nternational help must be sensitive to the local practices and cultural sensitivities in accordance with the needs of those affected and strike a balance between excessive regulatory laws and lack of any regulation’ as cited in Srikanth, above n 855, 604. 901 Bookmiller, above n 8, 962, 964. 902 Ibid 959, 965–6.

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Taken together, the bureaucratic structure that may exist at the domestic level, and the seldom

clear-cut regulatory arrangements—specifically those of professionals from the medical field

and volunteers—present a host of challenges that offers useful insights to inform readiness in

the context of cross-border relocation.903 Furthermore, the consideration to establish and

maintain professional standards for the regulation of the medical profession deployed in the

disaster-affected state, including establishing similar standards to uniformly regulate the

conduct and practices of volunteers, is part of preparedness. These considerations offer

insights into the legal dimensions to draw upon in framing readiness in the context of climate-

induced human mobility.

Future Efforts to Cross-border Humanitarian Assistance

The IHA literature recognises that extending humanitarian assistance across borders is

sporadic.904 This is because at one end of the spectrum ‘international humanitarian responders

are more familiar with their own humanitarian procedures, toolkits, and guidelines than they

are with legal frameworks.’905 The other end of the spectrum consists of national responders

acclimating to the ‘large influx of international aid and all of the associated co-ordination and

information management tasks’, because of the seldom clear–cut ‘national laws and policies

and structures.’906 In these circumstances, the underlying humanitarian imperative to ‘prevent

and alleviate human suffering at a pace that is not possible without international actors playing

a strong role to manage and coordinate relief response’, sever skeleton arrangements and

efforts on the ground of disaster-affected states.907 To address the dichotomy between

international and national responders, the IHA literature identifies the need for a ‘sustained

programme of awareness raising and capacity building to support national actors to better

prepare for and manage international humanitarian assistance.’908

Similarly, in acknowledging the host of regulatory challenges identified in the study by IFRC

cited above, Bookmiller argues that ‘cross-border humanitarian relief will only be improved

if governments of disaster-impacted countries, the UN agencies and the major relief sectors

themselves strongly work in tandem to enforce standards and guidelines in the wake of a

903 Ibid 959, 961–2; see also Jolly, above n 854, 153–4; see also Barber, above n 160, 143–65. 904 Barber, above n 160, 149–51; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12. 905 Barber, above n 160, 149. 906 Ibid 150. 907 Ibid 150–1. 908 Ibid 149–50.

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sudden-onset disaster.’909 Echoing similar sentiments, Barber points out that it is ‘incumbent

on domestic law-makers and disaster management authorities more so even than international

law-makers to ensure that domestic legislation regulates and facilities the well-meaning efforts

of international actors so that these efforts support, rather than undermine, the efforts of

national actors.’910

The approach to established programs, capacity building at the institutional level and the

collaborative efforts of a full spectrum of actors from national to international responders are

added layers to inform preparedness. These strands provide important insights into building

readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

Determinants drawing on IHA

Salient elements present in soft instruments to inform preparedness for cross-border

humanitarian assistance include the international minimum ‘practice standards, guidelines and

procedures’ related to the demarcation of roles, functions and duties of national and

international responders to receive and advance cross-border humanitarian assistance.911 Other

elements include the need for developing an effective legislative framework at the domestic

level, the arrangements for legal facilities ‘(registration, customs, immigration and taxation)’

for the inflow of humanitarian assistance, enhancement of existing national laws, the

integration of a human rights-based approach in the design of plans, programs and strategies

and the need for ‘multi-sectoral consultations.’912 The alignment of regulatory, administrative

and operational arrangements at the national level starting from the very beginning with

practice standards, guidelines and procedures present in IHA soft law instruments provides a

basis to conceptualise readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

The IHA literature has enhanced consideration of the barriers to accessing cross-border

humanitarian assistance, which primarily involves ‘bureaucratic processes and the lack of

regulation (delays, ambiguous procedures, inappropriate relief items, for example).’913 The

IHA literature draws attention to the importance of well-established regulatory frameworks

909 Bookmiller, above n 8, 983–4. 910 Barber, above n 160, 148–9. 911 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–12; Barber, above n 160, 150; see also Jolly, above n 854, 143–4. 912 See above n 911 and accompanying text. 913 Fisher, above n 13, 209.

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and uniform standards related to medical professionals and volunteers. It provides rich

perspectives to frame readiness, and more specifically, to conceptualise the legal dimension

of readiness. Furthermore, the IHA literature identifies potential approaches that can be

adopted to respond to the barriers. These include well-articulated programs, building the

capacity of local government bodies and the holistic partnership and cooperation arrangements

facilitated through bilateral agreements across the full spectrum of responders of IHA.914 The

elements and focus areas drawn from the IHA literature assist in providing the building blocks

for readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

5.5 Public Health Preparedness

Over the past two decades, a large and growing body of literature has been published about

public health preparedness (PHP), which is interchangeably cited as public health emergency

preparedness (PHEP), to address the health and safety insecurities of the public from

widespread global threats.915 Within the broad framing of public health emergency, the first

category of threats includes ‘infectious disease epidemics, natural disasters and terrorism.’916

The second category of threats comprises ‘all other types of dangers to the health of the public’,

such as ‘tobacco use, HIV/AIDS, and food and water contamination’, to cite a few.917

Preparedness is important for the public’s health because it requires a well-coordinated and

comprehensive emergency response ‘through the health system (medical care and public

health)’ of the state.918 Moreover, preparedness requires well-articulated policies, plans,

strategies and programs by local government bodies and medical care facilities to maintain,

control and safeguard the health of the public in emergencies and potential pandemics.919

914 Ibid 208–12; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 983–4. 915 McGinty et al, above n 160, 79, 83; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also Maxim Gakh and Lainie Rutkow, ‘Lessons from Public Health Legal Preparedness to Operationalise Health in All Policies’ (2017) 45(3) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 392, 392–401; see also James G Hodge, Lexi C White and Sarah A Wetter, ‘From [A]nthrax to Zika: Key Lessons in Public Health Legal Preparedness’ (2018) 15(1) Indiana Health Law Review 23, 23–42. 916 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672, 677; see also Hodge, White and Wetter, above n 915, 23. 917 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79, 83. 918 Belinda Bennett et al, ‘Health Governance: Law, Regulation and Policy’ (2009) 123(3) Public Health 207, 207. 919 Ibid 207; see also ‘Introducing the Major Concepts of Public Health Act 2005’, (Linda Selvey) <https://www.health.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/146326/32042.pdf >; see also Belinda Bennett and Terry Carney, ‘Pandemic Preparedness in Asia: A Role for Law and Ethics?’ (2011) 23(3) Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Health 419, 421–3. See ‘…regional capacity building and information sharing programs’ as cited in Bennett and Carney, 419, 422; see also “programs” entails ‘continuing education programmes for public health practitioners and policy makers’…in the context

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Similarly, the legal dimension of preparedness in the context of public health emergencies

requires a well-articulated public health regulatory framework and updated public health laws

consistent with emerging public health threats and outbreaks, including public health

requirements and standards in contemporary health practice.920 To effectively manage and

execute public health emergency services to members of the public, it is important to delineate

the exercise of authority, functions and responsibilities of local authorities, public health

professionals and medical care facilities in emergencies underpinned by legal arrangements at

the domestic level.921 The determinants present in the PHP literature are indicative of the

extensive requirements and measures that are needed by the public health system of the state

to cohesively and effectively respond to public health emergencies. Collectively, the PHP

literature provides a basis to develop an understanding to frame readiness in the context of

climate-induced human mobility.

Elements of Public Health Preparedness

Public health preparedness (PHP) as defined by seminal authors Moulton et al, is the ‘readiness

of a public health system (of a community, a state, the nation, the world community) to respond

to specified health threats.’922 Similarly, Gakh and Rutkow in their comparative study of

‘health in all policies (HiAP) and PHP’ argue that ‘PHP refers to a community’s collective

capability to prevent, protect against, quickly respond to, and recover from health emergencies,

particularly those whose scale, timing, or unpredictability threatens to overwhelm routine

capabilities.’923 They also point out that ‘concerted collaboration and data sharing’, including

articulating appropriate ‘systems and networks’ within ‘government agencies at multiple

levels, the private sector, and communities’ are key features of PHP.924 Collectively, the

capacity of the public health system to respond effectively to the various phases of public

health emergencies, the engagement and inclusivity of local government bodies, agencies,

communities—including the private sector—to inform decision-making on effective public

health emergency response, as well as approaches to data sharing are elements drawn from the

of ‘public health tabacco programmes includes use of smokeless tabacco as an option in smoking cessation’ as cited in Bennett et al, above n 918, 207, 208, 211; 920 McGinty et al, above n 160, 84, 79; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 673–4; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393. 921 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83. 922 Ibid 673; see also Botoseneanu et al, ‘Achieving Public Health Legal Preparedness: How Dissonant Views on Public Health Law Threaten Emergency Preparedness and Response’ (2011) 33(3) Journal of Public Health 361, 361–8. 923 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 394. 924 Ibid 394–5.

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definition of PHP.925 These elements provide building blocks to conceptualise readiness for

climate-induced human mobility.

Legal Dimension of Public Health Preparedness

There is a considerable body of experience in public health practice that acknowledges that

public health legal preparedness (PHLP) is pivotal to ‘enable the government to fulfil its duty

to safeguard public health and the responsibility to ensure appropriate protection action is

taken to respond to threats.’926 Legal preparedness (LP) is described as the ‘contribution legal

tools make to assuring safe and healthy conditions of a society along with public health

tools.’927 The legal tools encompass ‘public health statutes, ordinances, regulations and legal

authorities.’928 The underlying purpose of the tools draws attention to levels for protective

action by ‘prioritisation through planning; allocation of responsibility; collaboration and

coordination; responsive funding; and the emphasis on vulnerable populations.’929 An example

of what the phrase ‘emphasise the needs of vulnerable populations’ means is the development

of ‘[s]pecific policies and plans to acclimate vulnerable populations into preparedness

planning and response, including paying greater attention to culture, language, and trust

through mapping, community engagement, emergency planning, and appropriate information

dissemination.’930 In addition to law as a component in the development of tools, policies and

plans, including approaches to craft the legal and regulatory framework for PHP, the

‘competencies (i.e. abilities, skills) of those responsible for applying the law; coordination of

legally based interventions across sectors and jurisdictions; and the access to information

resources on the content and interpretation of law by multidisciplinary practitioners’ are

strands oriented towards the legal dimension of PHP.931 A brief overview of these strands is

examined respectively.

The reference to competencies relates to public health officials and practitioners (health

officials) being knowledgeable with appropriate skills to access, ‘understand, interpret and

apply public health laws’ in times of public health emergencies as part of public health

925 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–7, 681–2. 926 Ibid 673–4; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 84, 78–9; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361. 927 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 422–3. 928 Moulton et al, above n 8, 675, 681; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–9; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361. 929 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393, 395–8; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361. 930 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393, 397–8. 931 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 676–7, 681.

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practice.932 These tasks cannot be considered in isolation and require joint efforts from a host

of members drawn from the public and private sector to orient health officials such as ‘law

enforcement officials, advocacy organisations, academics, etc.’933 Likewise, coordination

requires congruent engagement by health officials with respect to ‘public health practice,

policy, guidelines and resources’ because they encompass all jurisdictions, including

international.934 Lastly, information focuses on the procurement of ‘public health emergency

statutes and regulations, judicial rulings, reports on innovations and public health law best

practices and practice guidelines’, which presents a catalogue streamlined for public officials

to address and respond to emergencies.935 One of the aspects of information sharing can be

clearly seen in the case of the role courts play during public health emergencies.936 For

example, under the ‘US system of justice’ at the federal and state levels, courts recognise that

‘public health officials may subject individuals or groups to involuntary civil confinement,

such as isolation, quarantine, or other compulsory social distancing measures.’937 LP

‘necessitates courts to provide procedural due process protections such as access to legal

counsel to ensure that those measures do not unduly interfere with the rights of individuals or

groups.’938

The legal dimension of preparedness in the public health emergency context is exhibited by

the development of tools, policies and plans with the explicit integration of legal authority,

responsibilities and functions of public health officials and personnel, and public health bodies

and facilities to respond to public health emergencies.939 Other key factors include the

inclusivity, engagement, collaboration and coordination by the ‘public health and population

health system’ (communities, agencies, private sectors, and the state) to inform legal tools, the

knowledge of legal tools and the competency to effectively interpret them by public health

officials and personnel in public health emergencies, access to information (practices,

guidelines, reports, rulings) and the explicit inclusion of the role of courts to safeguard the

comprehensive rights of the members of the public and medical professionals, including

individuals in health emergencies.940

932 Ibid 674. 933 Ibid. 934 Ibid. 935 Ibid. 936 Daniel D Stier, Diane Nicks and Gregory J Cowan, ‘The Courts, Public Health, and Legal Preparedness’ (2007) 97(S1) American Journal of Public Health S69, S69–3. 937 Ibid S69, S71. 938 Ibid S71. 939 Moulton et al, above n 8, 682; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–401; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 419–30. 940 See above n 939 and accompanying text.

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Moreover, an added complication with LP is how legal tools are ‘actually understood,

perceived, and implemented (de facto law), including differences in interpretation.’941 As

Moulton et al, cite, implementation approaches include ‘evacuation orders, administrative

rules and regulations, memoranda of understanding, and mutual aid agreements among

localities, states or nations.’942 For example, the ‘legal powers and responsibilities’ from the

standpoint of government administration during ‘public health emergencies enables

governments to declare emergencies that may temporarily expand government powers and

suspend certain requirements, provide legal immunity to responders and even encourage

response.’943

The importance of clarifying the division of powers and responsibilities of local government

bodies and health officials to respond consistently to public health emergencies is illustrated

by the empirical investigation of McGinty et al, into a host of ‘emergency preparedness laws

in 4 contiguous mid-Atlantic states’ following Hurricane Sandy in 2012.944 The findings

revealed that ‘all 4 states had enacted laws enabling the government to order evacuation of the

public from an area when safety is imperiled or to order evacuation of a specific facility such

as a hospital, when conditions at that facility pose a threat.’945 The second major finding

revealed that ‘[n]one of the 4 states had enacted statutes or regulations explicitly granting the

government the authority to order people to seek immediate refuge wherever they were (i.e.

“shelter-in-pace”) at the time of Hurricane Sandy.’946 McGinty et al, argue that the lack of a

comprehensive legal framework inhibits the government administration and public healthcare

facilities (officials) to be ready to response to public health emergencies during natural

disasters.947 This is because it officials have competing priorities, including encountering the

‘complex decision of whether to evacuate, shelter-in-place, or do nothing.’948 McGinty et al,

suggest that ‘[s]tates can improve their readiness for catastrophic disasters by ensuring the

explicit statutory authority where it does not already exist.’949

941 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393, 395–8. 942 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 676–7, 681–2; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361, 366. 943 Moulton et al, above n 8, 678–9; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 395. 944 McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–9, 80, 84. 945 Ibid. 946 Ibid 78, 83. 947 Ibid 78, 82–3. 948 Ibid 78–9, 82. 949 Ibid 78–9, 84.

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A further illustration of the inconsistent approaches to implementing and interpreting legal

tools across public health organisational structures can be illustrated briefly by the qualitative

case study conducted by Botoseneanu et al, with ‘144 public health and emergency officials

at state level and local jurisdictions in the US region.’950 In acknowledging that some research

has been carried out to identify ‘gaps in the existing laws hindering cross-sectoral (e.g. public

health, emergency management, law enforcement, health-care providers) and cross-

jurisdictional (local, state, federal) cooperation and coordination of emergency preparedness’,

Botoseneanu et al, confirm that no single study exists that has reported on ‘how differences in

organisational culture shape the interpretation of the law and further shape collaboration across

sectors.’951 One of the more significant findings to emerge from their empirical research is that

‘organisational culture and discourse, derived from public health [PH] and emergency

management [EM] practitioners’ interpretations of and expectations from the legal

environment, influence their approach to preparedness work and to collaboration with other

stakeholders.’952 They recorded ‘wide variation in how local preparedness law defines

emergencies, liability protection and the role of authorities in emergency response

situations.’953 Their findings further reveal that the ‘PH and EM organisational culture differed

significantly’ with respect to ‘PHP initiatives in their organisation, administration, work-force

and funding sources.’954 They noted the lack of synergy in the ‘interpretation of the law’, which

presented as operational and practical indicators to instigate potential friction and conflict

among ‘PH-EM organisational cultures.’955 Botoseneanu et al, argue that ‘collaborative

processes are essential to achieving the mission of public health.’956 They suggest a subjective

process be adopted by ‘exposing and addressing the reasons behind ineffective collaboration

and better guidance and transparent inter-agency communication for the application of laws’

as a course of action for consideration towards emergency preparedness in the future.957 A

further suggestion advanced by Botoseneanu et al, correlates with undertaking ‘legal

amendments to clarify the extent, scope and context of legal authority of multi-agency and

multi-jurisdictional response for routine and exigent circumstances.’958

950 Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361–2. 951 Ibid 362, 366. 952 Ibid 366. 953 Ibid. 954 Ibid. 955 Ibid. 956 Ibid. 957 Ibid. 958 Ibid.

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Likewise, the quantitative study conducted by Nagata et al, into inpatient hospital evacuation

following the 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes in Japan is also notable.959 The study is indicative

of the legal dimension of preparedness outlining effective implementation approaches to

public evacuation emergency. The significant finding to emerge from the data reveals that

‘more than 700 patients were transferred to other facilities’ of the Kumamoto Prefecture within

a span of 24 hours.960 Nagata et al, recorded that ‘[f]our doctors, 80 hospital staff, and an

additional 100 off-duty staff members joined to the triage, assessment, and hospital reception’,

which were in addition to the existing medical staff at various medical facilities.961 They

further recorded that the ‘overall medical response in the immediate aftermath of the

Kumamoto earthquakes’ was successful.962 The success of the emergency response and

operation is attributed in part to the lessons learned from the ‘Great East Japan Earthquake and

hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant’ in 2011.963 Nagata et al,

document that the ‘lack of information, lack of coordination among agencies, lack of

leadership’ and the poorly defined emergency laws for instance, the ‘Disaster Countermeasure

Basic Act [DCBA]’ were key impediments to a comprehensive medical response to the

devastation.964 Against this background, key changes included the revision of the DCBA,

‘including the availability of shelters, and multi-agency coordination and collaboration to

enable sharing of information.’965 Furthermore, the Disaster Medical Assistant Team [DMAT],

which consists of teams spanning ‘fireman, police, Japan Self-Defense Forces, and the local

population’ was subsequently reviewed with respect to communication plans, functions,

activities (training and drills) and guidelines to operationalise the DMAT system effectively

in times of natural disaster.966

The implementation approaches exemplified by the extensive body of experience presented in

studies by McGinty et al, Botoseneanu et al, and Nagata et al include the explicit inclusion and

articulation of authority, powers and responsibilities of public health officials, facilities and

personnel integrated and reflected in public health statutes and the revision of existing laws,

regulations and policies to reflect contemporary public health emergency standards, guidelines

959 Nagata et al, above n 853, 517. 960 Ibid 517–18, 520. 961 Ibid 519. 962 Ibid 517, 520. 963 Ibid 518–19, 520. 964 Ibid 520. 965 Ibid. 966 Ibid 517, 520.

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and practice.967 Other implementation approaches from these studies include the integration

and alignment of effective multiagency coordination and inter-agency communication and

coordination in policies, plans, strategies and in public health statutes as well as information

sharing and communication plans across the full spectrum of public health emergency

channels ‘(cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional)’, including administrative, operational and

organisational structures. These studies go some way towards demonstrating how

implementation approaches interact with the law as a component in the PHP context.968

Similarly, a parallel body of research anchored in influenza pandemic preparedness to ‘detect

emerging pandemic and to respond to public health emergencies’ is notable in supplementing

the legal dimension of preparedness in the context of public health emergencies.969 Bennett

and Carney, in their comprehensive review and analysis of scholarly articles from the legal,

socioeconomic and cultural dimensions of pandemic preparedness in the Asia region note three

key features underlying the legislative framework.970 These are the formulation of an: ‘1)

influenza national preparedness plan, 2) assessment of the legal basis for public health tools

(quarantine, isolation, etc.), and the 3) review of existing public health emergency laws and

policies relating to vaccination of health care workers, and the liability and licensing of retired

health care workers and volunteers who may assist during a pandemic.’971 To complement the

legal framework with respect to pandemic planning they also highlight the consideration of

‘ethical principles for the allocation of scarce resources such as access to antivirals and

vaccines particularly in resource-poor countries.’972 The ‘principles of utility (saving the most

lives) and fair innings (fairness)’ focused on the allocation of resources, which is based on the

criteria of priority setting.973 The non-discriminatory aspects of ‘race, gender, class or national

origin and vulnerable populations most at risk’, to cite a few, are equated with the criteria for

priority setting for pandemic preparedness.974 The consideration of ‘local conditions,

indigenous cultural and religious perspectives’ are other ethical aspects that embody pandemic

planning as part of the legal framework for pandemic preparedness.975

967 Ibid 517–21; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–85; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361–8; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–3. 968 See above n 967 and accompanying text. 969 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420–2. 970 Ibid 421–3. 971 Ibid; see also Hodge, White and Wetter, above n 915, 23. 972 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 424–5. 973 Ibid 421, 424. 974 Ibid. 975 Ibid 421, 422, 424–5.

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The revision of existing laws and policies intrinsic to the liability and licensing of registered

and retired medical personnel, including volunteers, the legal implications of constraint and

confinement of a section or majority of the population; and the development of national

preparedness plans are elements of pandemic preparedness from a legal perspective. The

development of preparedness planning underpinned by ethical considerations, such as the

inclusiveness of vulnerable communities, their religious, cultural and social (gender, race, for

example) backgrounds and the principles of utility and fairness in the allocation of resources

and medical supplies in less privileged states are added strands that traverse pandemic

preparedness.976

Determinants from PHP

The capacity development of the public health system across the various phases of public

health emergencies; the engagement and inclusivity by the spectrum of public health officials,

medical personnel, private sector and communities on effective approaches to emergency

response; and adopting measures to share data are elements drawn from the definition of

PHP.977 Taken together, capacity development, engagement and inclusivity, and data sharing

are salient elements of preparedness in public health emergencies which assist in our

understanding of framing readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

Moreover, salient elements of preparedness from a legal dimension in the public health

emergency context include the coordinated approach of the ‘public health and population

health system’ at the levels for action (communities, agencies, private sectors and the state) to

articulate the legal tools, policies and preparedness plans, the knowledge and competency of

public health officials and personnel

to effectively interpret legal tools, access to information (practices, guidelines, reports, rulings,

etc.) and the role of courts (which touch on individual rights in emergencies).978 These

elements provide useful insights to frame readiness in the context of climate-induced human

mobility.

976 Ibid 419–30; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 210; see also Belinda Bennett and Terry Carney, ‘Law, Ethics and Pandemic Preparedness: The Importance of Cross-jurisdictional and Cross-cultural Perspectives’ (2010) 34(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 106, 111. 977 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–85. 978 Moulton et al, above n 8, 682; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–401; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 419–30.

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Furthermore, the levels of implementation of legal tools include combined cooperation,

collaboration, coordination, communication plans and information sharing spanning cross-

sectoral and cross-jurisdictional fields, operational, administrative and procedural channels,

and organisational structures between the public health system and the private sector and

communities.979 Additionally, the demarcation of authority, roles, functions and

responsibilities present in legal tools, and the alignment of organisational arrangements,

emergency budgets and human resource personnel all encompass the implementation of the

legal tools.980 These implementation approaches provide some important insights to draw upon

in framing readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

Similarly, the development of national preparedness plans underpinned by cultural and ethical

perspectives, including the principles of utility and fairness, as well as the revision of laws and

policies related to the liability and licensing of medical personnel and volunteers are

considerations present in pandemic preparedness from a legal perspective that also provide a

basis to frame readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

Overall, the comprehensive elements and considerations from the PHP literature provide rich

perspectives to conceptualise readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

5.6 REDD+ Readiness

Over the past decade a considerable amount of forest conservation, management and

governance literature on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation has

been published.981 This is cited in the literature with the abbreviation REDD.982 The literature

979 McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–85; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361–8; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also Nagata et al, above n 853, 517–21. 980 See above n 979 and accompanying text. 981 Adelman, above n 178, 17–36; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–11; see also Annalisa Savaresi, ‘REDD+ and Human Rights: Addressing Synergies between International Regimes’ (Art 5) (2013) 18(3) Ecology and Society 1, 1–9; see also Christoph Aicher, ‘Discourse Practices in Environmental Governance: Social and Ecological Safeguards of REDD’ (2014) 23(14) Biodiversity and Conservation 3543, 3544; see also Sabine Reinecke, Till Pistorius and Michael Pregernig, ‘UNFCCC and the REDD+ Partnership from a Network Governance Perspective’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science and Policy 30, 31. See also Achu Samndong and Glenn K Bush, ‘Governance Structures Established for REDD+ Implementation and Their Adaptation to the Institutional and Ecological Conditions in Equateur Province of the DRC’ (Research Report, No 81, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, March 2017) 1–59; see also Center for International Forestry Research <https://www.cifor.org/>; see also Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry <https://www.cgiar.org/>. 982 Aicher, above n 981, 3544.

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also frequently cites the abbreviation REDD-plus (REDD+) to emulate the language employed

in the international climate change and policy fora under the auspices of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).983 The ‘unsustainable use of forests

and land use change in most developing countries’ for instance, ‘deforestation, forest

degradation, forest fires and slash and burn practices’ reduces the ability to draw carbon out

the atmosphere and contributes to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.984 The issue of

global deforestation has grown in relative importance because global GHG emissions from the

forestry sector constitute ‘approximately eighteen to twenty-five percent’ in addition to the

energy and transport sectors.985

The REDD+ scheme traverses three interconnected phases, with the “readiness phase”

followed by the “implementation phase” and finally, the “accounting phase”.986 The key

funding vehicles for REDD+ countries to access and participate under the REDD+ scheme

include: global public finance for REDD+ investment, ‘voluntary donations through the

official development assistance (ODA)’, the ‘performance-based or results based payments

for reducing emission from deforestation, degradation, and forest conservation (REDD+), and

clean energy.’987 Briefly, the REDD+ scheme requires developing countries to prepare and

submit ‘Project Information Notes (R-PINs); full project proposals (R-PP) consisting of

detailed plans; and identification of key legal reforms’ as part of the readiness phase, among

other requirements.988

Readiness is important for REDD+ because it engages a full spectrum of actors to implement

REDD+ projects at the national level. These include state actors, local government bodies and

officials, and non-state actors such as civil society organisations, local, forest-based and

Indigenous communities, and private actors such as commercial investors and project

983 Ibid; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 2–3. 984 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 509; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 104–5; see also CDKN Report above n 4, 27; see also ‘…underlying causes of forest destruction, such as poor forest governance, disregard for ecosystems and lack of clarity around land tenure rights is essential first step to reducing forest loss’ as cited in Kate Dooley and Nils Hermann Ranum, ‘REDD+: An Incentive Structure for Long-term Performance’ (Discussion Paper, Ateneo School of Government, September 2012) 4. 985 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 509; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 104; see also CDKN Report above n 4, 27; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31. 986 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12. 987 Ibid 511, 513; See also Adelman, above n 178, 32; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1. 988 Lesniewska, above n 56, 111; see also Global Canopy Programme, REDD in Fiji (January 2014) REDD Desk <http://theredddesk.org/countries/fiji/>.

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proponents.989 Readiness involves multiple power relations and potential conflicting interests

at various governance levels and phases of REDD+ projects, which resonates with ensuring

and safeguarding forest-dependent and Indigenous communities’ rights and interests.990

Moreover, strengthening the capacity of local government bodies to access funding

mechanisms at the global level for REDD+ projects, and developing the legal and regulatory

framework to implement REDD+ projects built around community-centred safeguards,

standards and guidelines such as land tenure security, meaningful participation and equitable

sharing of benefits, to cite a few, present in soft law principles and human rights instruments

is a further reason readiness is important for REDD+ projects.991 The determinants present in

the REDD+ literature are indicative of the extensive planning processes, policy measures and

the role of law needed by the forestry sector and the government to effectively implement

REDD+ projects. The researcher recognises that the circumstances for REDD+ are remote to

the context of climate change human mobility. However, the REDD+ literature is instructive

to advance our understanding of the determinants of readiness and offers building blocks to

conceptualise readiness in the context of climate change human mobility.

Elements of REDD+ Readiness

The broad use of term REDD+ readiness in the REDD+ literature is characterised as ‘the phase

in REDD+ when a country is able to operate a market-based REDD+ system.’992 A further

definition provided by REDD+ practitioners under the Global Forest Atlas project, drawing

on experiences of the Amazon and the Congo tropical rainforest basin, refers to ‘preparing a

country for participation in carbon markets, where countries demonstrate reductions in

deforestation and are compensated according to the associated reduction in carbon

emissions.’993 The explicit reference to carbon markets present in the definition of REDD+

readiness can be described as developing countries reducing carbon emissions through

sustainable forest management practices that are ‘calculated, monitored, and monetized for

989 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510–11, 516; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35. 990 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 5–8; see also Terminski, ‘Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Causes’, above n 58, 15, 49–50, 51, 90. 991 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 2; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Mary Elizabeth Felker et al, ‘Considering Land Tenure in REDD+ Participatory Measurement Reporting, and Verification: A Case Study from Indonesia’ (Research Report, PLOS ONE, 13 April 2017) 2. 992 Lesniewska, above n 56, 111. 993 Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, REDD+ Initiatives in the Congo Basin Global Forest Atlas <https://globalforestatlas.yale.edu/congo/conservation-initiatives/redd>; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 524.

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global exchange.’994 Furthermore, the interpretation of REDD+ readiness cited by Raftopoulos

encompasses framing ‘national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity

building for the implementation of the REDD+ activities.’995 Raftopoulos draws attention to,

among other issues, the development of national strategies in parallel with other elements,

which embody an array of considerations.996 These include the: ‘design of pilot projects, land

tenure rights, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, governance arrangements

(including benefit sharing), gender considerations and safeguards that ensure the full and

effective participation of indigenous peoples’ are centred to the construction of a national

strategy.997 The inclusion of grievance mechanisms to address competing interests and power

relations among multiple parties ‘as well as reports of noncompliance with policies and

guidelines’ represent additional considerations to complement a national strategy.998 Due to

practical constraints, a full discussion of the host of elements and considerations lies beyond

the scope of the REDD+ readiness phase.

The field research conducted by Apriwan and Afriani, which employed qualitative modes of

enquiry to investigate the ‘local readiness of the REDD+ scheme in three regencies in West

Sumatera Indonesia’, is notable in illustrating the readiness phase.999 As recorded by Apriwan

and Afriani, the readiness level encompasses ‘arranging strategies, group formations and

trainings to facilitate local community participation in terms of their duties and

responsibilities’ by the West Sumatera sub-national government.1000 Moreover, at the local

level of the West Sumatera Government, readiness is developed by formulating policies and

regulations to establish institutions such as the Local Government Unit and the Regional

Forestry Agency, to cite a few, and to further demarcate the respective functions, roles, duties

and powers of institutions to conduct the REDD+ scheme.1001

The technical assistance resources exhibiting elements of the readiness phase include the

development of a national strategy, a national readiness policy, the formulation of project

994 Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510; see also ‘…policies include governments strengthening law enforcement or changing the law to stop large-scale logging and forest conservation activities like establishing protected areas or increasing tree plantations’ as cited in Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510. 995 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12. 996 Ibid. 997 Ibid 512; see also Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, above n 993. 998 See above n 997 and accompanying text; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3547, 3550, 3555. 999 Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 649–56. 1000 Ibid 654. 1001 Ibid 652, 653, 655; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11.

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proposals with the explicit inclusion of plans and legislative and regulatory reforms and the

capacity development support to implement REDD+ activities ‘(agroforestry, enrichment tree

planting, etc.)’ and access to finance flows.1002 Moreover, the development of a national

strategy embodies a range of considerations that underpin designing pilot projects, inclusion

of gendered dimensions and operational guidelines, as well as establishing grievance

mechanisms to address incursions on landowners’ land and rights in addition to the interests

of others, which are part of the readiness phase elements. Taken together, crafting an array of

approaches such as community participation, policy measures and regulatory responses, and

establishing institutions among others at national and local levels are significant considerations

that enable a country to engage with the REDD+ scheme.

REDD Safeguards

The integration of monitoring and information systems also forms part of the readiness

phase.1003 The ‘implementation of a national forest monitoring system and a safeguards

information system inform how safeguards are addressed and respected in all REDD+

activities.’1004 Briefly, the Cancun safeguards, which stem from the COP-16 under the

UNFCCC and are commonly cited as ‘REDD safeguards’ or sometimes equated with

community-centred safeguards, have been broadened in recognition of the ‘principle of free,

prior and informed consent (FPIC) for indigenous peoples’ and the ‘principle of equitable

sharing of benefits (ESB).’1005 The FPIC and ESB are strands intrinsic to readiness and are

addressed later.

The REDD safeguards embody aspects of ‘tenure security, stakeholder participation’ and the

recognition of Indigenous rights.1006 As Aicher outlines, ‘REDD related safeguards’ entail

‘policies, measures or procedures to protect and respect cultural settings, capabilities and

categories of forest dependent communities and indigenous peoples.’1007 The REDD

safeguards, including standards, are non-mandatory and originate from norms and principles

in ‘international law instruments in particular, human rights instruments’ including ‘regional

1002 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46. 1003 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 512; see also Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, above n 993. 1004 See above n 1003 and accompanying text. 1005 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1006 Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3551. 1007 Aicher, above n 981, 3543, 3546.

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human rights treaties.’1008 The integration of a human rights frame of reference is pivotal

because ‘[h]uman rights concerns associated with REDD+ activities are particularly

conspicuous with regard to matters concerning access to land and forest resources’, as

identified by Savaresi.1009 A human rights frame of reference encompasses the ‘rights and

interests of local forest communities’ and duties of stakeholders towards communities within

various governance levels of REDD+ projects.1010 The interplay of a rights-based approach

between the REDD safeguards and standards primarily takes account of due process

protections and procedural fairness measures for Indigenous and forest-dependent

communities in all phases of REDD+.1011

Much of the literature on REDD+ acknowledges that the safeguards and standards, in real

terms, are still in their infancy.1012 A broader perspective has been adopted by Raftopoulos,

who points out that ‘considerable work is needed to translate these non-binding principles into

practice’ for REDD+ countries.1013 This is because of the competing interests and incentives

that straddle local forest communities, governments and international commercial parties.1014 

The explicit integration of forest monitoring and information systems at a national level is an

area of focus in the readiness phase.1015 In addition, the inclusion of Indigenous and forest-

dependent communities, cultural and Indigenous rights, due process protections of Indigenous

and forest- dependent communities present in safeguards and standards and aligned with

policy measures and tools through collaboration and participation between a host of

stakeholders and communities are elements of the readiness phase of REDD+ projects.1016

REDD Soft Law Principles

The REDD+ literature confirms that a formal convention or legal instrument exclusively for

1008 Lesniewska, above n 56, 120; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 6; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 1, 3. 1009 Savaresi, above n 981, 1. 1010 Ibid; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3551; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511. 1011 See above n 1010 and accompanying text. 1012 Savaresi, above n 981; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511. 1013 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510–11, 516; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35. 1014 See above n 1013 and accompanying text. 1015 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 512; see also Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, above n 993. 1016 Felker et al, above n 991, 1–22; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3543–60.

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REDD+ is not well established under international law.1017 It acknowledges that the series of

international climate policy deliberations by the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC

for ‘incentivising the reduction of emissions from deforestation, forest degradation and

enhancing forest carbon stocks to be included in a future carbon trading system as well as

sustainably managing forests’ is exhibited through the framing of the Bali Action Plan (COP-

13).1018 It was then developed in the Cancun Agreement (COP-16), which then accentuated

REDD+ in the operative part of the Paris Agreement (COP-21), as reflected in Article 5.1019

However, the protection and assistance arrangements to effectively operationalise REDD+

have not received sufficient attention at the global level. As maintained by Lesniewska, ‘the

normative development and law making for REDD+ is occurring across other forests related

legal processes.’1020 Some of these include international instruments and declarations, for

example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), UN Declaration on the Rights of

Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the UN Rio Declaration on Environment and Development

(Rio Declaration).1021 In reiterating that a comprehensive framework is lacking on REDD+, it

is important to highlight that there is emerging recognition of several soft law principles

embedded in forest-related law.1022 Some of these include the FPIC and ESB alluded to

earlier.1023 The FPIC and ESB present several layers of considerations across socio-cultural

and socio-environmental dimensions. These include the rights, interests, knowledge,

entitlements and the collective inclusion and participation of the Indigenous peoples and local

communities in REDD+ projects.1024 The soft law principles also extend to encompass

governance arrangements that interplay between forests policy and decision-making at

multifaceted levels (local community and national for example).1025 The FPIC and ESB exhibit

some of the areas of focus that are considered intrinsic to the readiness, implementation and

accounting phases of REDD+ and are discussed in turn.

1017 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510; see also Adelman, above n 178, 32; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 103. 1018 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510; see also Adelman, above n 178, 31; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3543–60; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–11; see also Global Canopy Programme, above n 988. 1019 See above n 1018 and accompanying text. 1020 Lesniewska, above n 56, 111–12. 1021 Ibid; see also ‘…Non-legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (2007: Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (1917); the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972)…Rio Forest Principles (1992)…the International Tropical Timber Agreement (2006)’ as cited in Lesniewska, above n 56, 111–12. 1022 See above n 1021 and accompanying text. 1023 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1024 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 521, 524. 1025 Aicher, above n 981, 3546, 3555–6; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 3, 7.

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The FPIC present in the UNDRIP, as described by Felker et al, involves ‘fully informed, non-

coercive, and participatory community agreements.’1026 Felker et al, maintain that the FPIC is

promising; however, in practical terms it is not fully operational and should therefore be

implemented independently from isolated instances of consultations and collaboration by

multiple parties for REDD+ projects.1027 This is to curb any potential incidence of private

arrangements between forest-dwellers and other interested parties.1028 This view is supported

by Raftopoulos, who claims that the inclusiveness of the FPIC and the acclimation of

‘indigenous and forest-based communities’ interests, customary land rights and traditional

knowledge’ of Indigenous peoples are key determinants for the success of REDD+ projects

provided they are ‘integrated into policy deliberations and decision-making processes.’1029

Another prominent area where the FPIC is visible, as outlined in the REDD+ literature, is in

the area of ‘forest carbon accounting’, which involves ‘measurement, reporting and

verifications (MRV) systems.’1030 Felker et al, in acknowledging the works of Gupta et al, on

carbon accountability, point out that a ‘legitimate MRV includes respecting and engaging local

forest knowledge, local values and local needs and being responsive to cultural context and

diversity’ in the design and implementation of the MRV.1031 A legitimate MRV is sometimes

equated with “participatory” MRV (PMRV), which encompasses positive empowerment of

forest-based communities and sustainable REDD+ activities.1032

Similarly, the ESB present in the CBD is a further feature underlying REDD+ programs and

activities.1033 The ESB is interconnected with ‘property rights over forests and forestlands’ and

extends to carbon stocks, carbon rights and carbon credits.1034 As noted by Buizer, Humphreys

and Wil, the ‘notion of benefit-sharing implies that local communities and indigenous peoples

should receive a share of the money that governments receive from the REDD+ projects on

their lands.’1035 There is widespread agreement by scholars in REDD+ studies that the less

well established ‘nature of carbon rights in legal terms’ brings to the forefront pertinent areas

1026 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1027 Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1028 Ibid. 1029 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524. 1030 Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1031 Ibid. 1032 Ibid. 1033 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8. 1034 Ibid. 1035 Ibid.

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of concern that traverse the ownership of rights to carbon stocks stored in tropical forests and

‘management of land and forests upon which the carbon is situated.’1036

Guidelines and Safeguards

One of the prominent initiatives among others acknowledged widely in the REDD+ literature

relates to global programs developed by multilateral bodies within and outside the United

Nations system respectively by the ‘UN Collaborative Programme on REDD (UN-REDD

Programme).’1037 For example, ‘free, prior, and informed consent guidelines (FPIC

Guidelines)’ and the ‘World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility safeguard policies

(FCPF Safeguards)’ are considered to be particularly important during the readiness phase.1038

In the case of the FPIC Guidelines, this is because they take a ‘human rights-based approach’

centred on ‘principles and criteria under UN conventions, treaties and declarations’ into

account.1039 Similarly, the FCPF Safeguards take into account the notion of ‘meaningful

participation and consultation by all stakeholders’ spanning environmental and social impacts

and policy arrangements developed by the FCPF.1040

Strands intrinsic to the FPIC and ESB include explicit engagement and voluntary participation,

the integration and acceptability of cultural values, traditional knowledge, diversity, property

rights and interests in tropical forestlands of Indigenous peoples and the equitable distribution

of monetary benefits to forest-based and Indigenous communities.1041 In addition, the inclusion

of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ underscored in the FPIC Guidelines and the willingness

of the state, stakeholders and commercial entities to engage in meaningful dialogue and

collaboration with the forest-based and Indigenous communities underscored in the FCPF

Safeguards present as additional strands to be considered in REDD+ readiness.1042 The soft

law principles, guidelines and safeguards underpinned by a rights-based approach, including

1036 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516. 1037 Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11. 1038 See above n 1037 and accompanying text. 1039 Ibid; see also Smyth and Vanclay, above n 397, 70, 72; see also Frank Vanclay, ‘Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement: From Impoverishment Risks to an Opportunity for Development?’ (2017) 35(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 3, 3–21. 1040 See above n 1039 and accompanying text. 1041 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1042 Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2.

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international normative protections reflected in international law instruments to inform forests

policy and decision-making spanning various levels of governance, are key elements of the

readiness phase for REDD+ projects.1043

REDD+ Challenges

The purpose of detailing challenges in the implementation of REDD+ projects is to offer

important insights pertinent to designing comprehensive approaches and techniques by

policymakers to respond to potential issues and craft mitigation measures around access to,

and availability of, land from landowners. It is also to ensure the alignment of communication

plans, strategies and programs, including the integration of soft law principles, with policy

initiatives and the role of law for readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

The growing body of research drawing on the experiences of forest-based communities and

REDD+ projects in developing countries such as Peru, Mexico, Indonesia and Papua New

Guinea confirms that the lack of uniformity under international law renders ‘REDD+ more

susceptible to unfair practices, compounded by the fact that it operates in tropical forest areas

where land tenure systems tend to be unclear, contested or poorly enforced.’1044 There is

inherent recognition that the premise of developing countries to effectively achieve REDD+

presented by case studies is situated in ‘accommodating different interest groups, whose

interests are not only linked to the economy and the environment, but also to human rights and

social participation issues.’1045 This is certainly true in the case of ‘exploitative carbon

contracts and corruption, marginalisation of indigenous peoples and forest dwellers, and

increased poverty and disruption of traditional forest-based lifestyles.’1046 As Raftopoulos

claims, ‘indigenous communities are being convinced to sign away their rights to land and

carbon under terms highly favourable to commercial interests.’1047 Moreover, such

arrangements ‘offer little or no guarantee for the protection of their rights, including their right

to use and access natural resources.’1048

1043 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511, 516, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 120; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 6. 1044 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516–17, 524. 1045 Ibid 512. 1046 Ibid 515. 1047 Ibid 516. 1048 Ibid.

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Raftopoulos argues that it is imperative that the design of REDD+ programs is inclusive of

‘forest-based communities from the planning and implementation of the scheme’, including

the provision for, and access to, alternative avenues to resolve disputes and deadlocks in the

‘process of planning for REDD+.’1049 Moreover, she further argues that ‘[c]entral to achieving

an effective and equitable REDD+ mechanism is the clarification and strengthening of land

tenure rights’, which includes customary land rights.1050 Echoing similar sentiments, Aicher

suggests that ‘[a] balance is necessary where international actors have to tolerate, respect, or

even defer to many aspects of the local while crafting institutions that seek to avoid the risks

and errors of rampant localism.’1051

The variety in response to competing interests, claims and rights mediating the relationship

between multiple parties and customary landowners remains formidable.1052 However, lessons

can be learned and caution needs to be exercised with regard to normative policies, operational

aspects and best practices of REDD+, especially when legal arrangements remain inadequate

to almost non-existent.1053 These strands provide a basis to inform our understanding of

readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

Determinants from REDD+ Readiness

Salient elements drawn from the definition of REDD+ readiness include the development of a

national strategy and national readiness policy, the integration of plans, legislative and

regulatory reforms within project proposals and the institutional capacity development and

competencies of local government bodies.1054 These elements provide a basis to frame

readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

Moreover, the smorgasbord of considerations spanning institutional, regulatory and policy

dimensions underpinning REDD+ readiness identifies the need for safeguards, standards and

operational guidelines underpinned by a rights-based approach as well as international

1049 Ibid 515. 1050 Ibid. 1051 Aicher, above n 981, 3544, 3545. 1052 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 8. 1053 Ibid; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11; see also Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 652. 1054 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46.

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instruments to inform the legal and normative framework.1055 Other requirements include

forests policy measures and decision-making at multifaceted levels and phases of the REDD+

projects, designing pilot projects, developing forest monitoring and information systems and

the inclusion of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities in all phases of REDD+

projects.1056 Establishing plans and programs through the collective collaboration, voluntary

participation, meaningful engagement between state actors, third parties (commercial,

investors, etc.) and Indigenous and forest-dependent communities to inform decisions on

REDD+ projects, the integration of cultural traditions, values, traditional knowledge, diversity,

property rights and land tenure interests of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities in

all phases of REDD+ projects are also important.1057 In addition, developing programs to

allocate monetary benefits generated from REDD+ projects equitably to forest-based and

Indigenous communities by the state are also key elements, all of which provide important

insights into readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.1058 

Additionally, the REDD+ literature has been extended in recognition of the challenges to

achieving REDD+ readiness identified from the practical experiences of developing countries

engaged in REDD+ projects. These include seldom clear-cut tenure systems and land rights,

poorly defined policy and legal measures to prevent the rights and interests of Indigenous and

local communities forestlands and resources being usurped by the state and the non-disclosure

of—and lack of accessibility to—complete project information, including transparency of

benefits for the Indigenous and local communities.1059 Taken together, the elements and

considerations drawn from the REDD+ literature provide a rich variety of perspectives that

contribute to framing readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.

5.7 Readiness Literature Elements and Considerations

The plain reading of readiness from a multidisciplinary approach in this chapter can be

described in two layers. First, readiness means to equip a country ‘to quickly and appropriately

respond to and recover from’: 1) catastrophic events such as sudden-onset disasters and public

health emergencies, 2) policy initiatives and funding mechanisms mooted at the global level

for a country to participate and to access international finance for climate change adaptation

1055 Aicher, above n 981, 3543–60; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–11; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 1–22; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11. 1056 Ibid. 1057 Ibid. 1058 Ibid. 1059 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 509–30.

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and low-carbon development national projects as well as humanitarian relief in the aftermath

of sudden-onset disasters.1060 On a closer examination, capacity development support, the role

of law and a whole-of-society orientation are the three interdependent elements of readiness

conceptualised from the readiness literature.1061 These elements are underpinned by a host of

considerations. The discussion that follows expands on each element together with its

intersecting considerations.

The broad use of capacity from multidisciplinary perspectives is generally understood to be

the means by which the national ‘institutions, legal and the budgetary systems of a country is

developed and strengthened’ as a basis to effectively plan, respond to, participate in and deliver

a particular event or initiative across the ‘levels for action (local, national and

international).’1062 There are multiple layers to capacity conceptualised from the literature,

which identify the need for:

1) Plans–government at the national level to frame plans, such as ‘contingency and response

plans’—which have been applied in the context of disaster preparedness, financial plans

to ‘access different forms and types of finance’ in the case of climate finance readiness

and action plans associated with REDD+ activities.1063

2) Collaboration–government at the national level to engage in ‘concerted and purposeful

collaboration’ with ‘cross-sectoral bodies, private sector, communities and

stakeholders.’1064 For example, ‘sharing of data on public health practice and policy and

incorporating health concerns into all decisions’ spanning local government bodies and

agencies to ensure a uniform response and relief during emergencies to members of the

public has been applied in the context of public health preparedness.1065

3) Coordination–government at the national level to set up institutional structures and

administrative processes to underpin logistical and operational tasks, such as assigning

powers and duties to local authorities and agencies to carry out functions.1066 Other tasks,

such as ‘raising and management of international funds’ have been applied to situations to

prepare and respond to international humanitarian relief as well as accessing climate

1060 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393. 1061 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 5; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 207; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 10; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2. 1062 Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3; see also DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 23; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 138. 1063 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–5, 23; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12. 1064 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–5. 1065 Ibid; See also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5. 1066 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 14; see also Barber, above n 160, 150; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124.

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funding mechanisms underscoring ‘information management and partnership

development.’1067

4) Strategies–government to develop and integrate specific strategies at the national level to

enhance the capacity of local government bodies to access funding mechanisms, training,

programs, ‘monitoring procedures and verifications systems’ aligned with global policy

initiatives and instruments such as the PDD; UNDRIP; and GCF in the case of disaster

preparedness, REDD+ readiness and climate finance readiness.1068

5) Research–government at the national level to support institutions by identifying areas for

further ‘research and development, new technologies and practices to inform policy and

decision makers’ to facilitate and respond to a particular event or initiative in the future.1069

The second element conceptualised from the readiness literature is the role of law, which is

equated with ‘the enabling environment’ and interchangeably used with the term ‘the right

domestic environment.’1070 The enabling environment is generally understood to entail

‘national and local laws, regulations and policies’ that underpin the legal and regulatory

framework.1071 A further interpretation expands to include embodying ‘specific plans, laws

and policies aligned with broader instruments and tools, such as regional policies and

agreements on free movement, displaced people’s rights, sustainable development, disaster

risk reduction, climate change and humanitarian action.’1072 There are multiple layers to the

role of law that encompass an array of intersecting considerations to inform the enabling

environment and which is detailed as follows:

1) Review existing and formulate specific laws–government at the national level to ‘adjust

existing laws and regulations and pass new laws and regulations’ spanning vertical

(national-international government administration) and horizontal (national government

administration-multilevel sectors-local agencies) jurisdictional dimensions.1073 For

example, the ‘powers, authorities, and responsibilities of government administration to

make executive orders and declare emergencies when events overwhelm existing

1067 See above n 1066 and accompanying text. 1068 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12; see also Cancun Speech DRR, above n 787; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1532–4; see also Yamamoto, Serraglio and Cavedon-Capdeville, above n 749, 66–7, 72. See also Apriwan and Afriani, above 160, 654; see also UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1069 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124. 1070 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200. 1071 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 23–5, 40, 49, 52. 1072 Ibid 15, 19, 22–3, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–51, 54. 1073 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 11; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5.

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capabilities’ has been applied in the case of public health preparedness.1074 Another

example has been in the context of international disaster responders extending assistance

and humanitarian relief through legal facilities established by the local government

administration, such as ‘prior visa applications and exemptions on customs excise duty

and taxes on the entry of foreign goods.’1075

2) Ethical aspects–government at the national level to include equitable allocation of

resources irrespective of ‘race, gender, class or national origin and vulnerable populations’

as a basis to ‘minimise social disruption.’1076 For example, the principle of ESB traversing

the CBD has been applied in the context of REDD+ projects so that ‘forest-based and

indigenous communities receive a share of the money that governments receive from

trading carbon stocks stored on forestlands of indigenous peoples.’1077

3) Bilateral agreements–government at the national level to extend the scope of cooperation

with regional and international agencies and development partners facilitated through:

bilateral arrangements; ‘memoranda of understanding; and mutual aid agreements to

reduce legal uncertainties in the national laws’ as has been in applied in the context of

disaster preparedness, public health emergencies and international humanitarian relief

assistance.1078

4) Soft law principles–government at the national level to integrate soft law principles with

safeguards and guidelines underpinned by a rights-based approach.1079 For example, the

FPIC and the ESB have been applied in the context of REDD+ projects to protect the

security of ‘forest-based indigenous peoples rights and interests to customary land; forest

resources; local values and needs; and entitlements.’1080

The final element conceptualised from the readiness literature is the whole-of-society

orientation characterised by the non-coercive, explicit inclusion and participation of local

communities and marginalised groups in decisions traversing plans, policies and laws to

embody the ‘social, and economic dimensions, including the local conditions, indigenous

1074 See above n 1073 and accompanying text; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 395. 1075 Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also IFRC Guidelines 2011, above n 864, 6; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 108–9. 1076 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 424. 1077 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1078 Fisher, above n 13, 209; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674. 1079 See above n 1077 and accompanying text; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 1. 1080 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 1.

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cultural and religious perspectives’ of communities.1081 For example, global programs

buttressed by minimum ‘practice standards, guidelines, safeguards and systems’, such as the

UN-REDD Programme and the IDRL Guidelines 2007, which identify the need of the explicit

inclusion of local communities and meaningful consultation by government sectors in all

phases of initiatives and programs (REDD+, SFDRR, etc.) commissioned by the government

administration at the national level.1082

Taken together, the analysis of the phenomenon of readiness from multidisciplinary

perspectives has extended our knowledge of the three interdependent elements and intersecting

considerations to inform readiness. Capacity development support is premised on the

capability of national governments to develop plans and strategies, collaborate and coordinate

with sectors and agencies at both local and international levels, as well as cultivate

communities of research and practice towards a future event or initiative. The role of law

embodies processes, procedures and mechanisms underpinned by soft law principles in

international instruments integrated into existing laws and regulations and/or established

through new laws and regulations by the government at the national level. The whole-of-

society orientation requires national governments to extend agency to local and Indigenous

communities and marginalised groups to make decisions that affect them through meaningful

consultation and participation in the planning and implementation phases of a future event or

initiative.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter set out to uncover the phenomenon of readiness from the considerable body of

experience spanning other modes of human mobility and contexts of readiness to answer RQ

1 (c). This chapter has shown that capacity development support, the role of law and a whole-

of-society orientation are three interdependent elements of readiness conceptualised from the

readiness literature. This chapter has also identified an array of considerations interconnected

to the elements and this has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of what it

means to be ready. The findings of this chapter, in conjunction with the data presented in

1081 Jolly, above n 854, 145–6, 151–2; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 422, 424–5; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1082 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13; see also Barber, above n 160, 144, 147; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also IFRC Guidelines 2011, above n 864, 6.

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chapters four and six provide the building blocks to inform the criteria of readiness presented

in chapter seven.

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Chapter 6: Readiness–Insights from Empirical Evidence

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the phenomenon of readiness examined in the literature from

multidisciplinary perspectives. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the interview data

gathered from the field research with a total of eighteen participants (n = 18). This chapter

corresponds to RQ (1) (b), which asks: What can we learn from the experiences and lessons

learned from the internal relocation of communities in Fiji? The interview data in this chapter

presents participants’ interpretations and understanding of what it means for the government

to be ready for the climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji. The

experiences and lessons from the internal relocation of communities, including the institutional

knowledge of participants beyond the state machinery, have been instructive in

conceptualising the considerations that need to be addressed to ensure the readiness of the

Fijian Government. As discussed in chapter two, a qualitative approach was adopted to gather

the interview data and the semi-structured field interviews were underpinned by a framework

of questions. The researcher acknowledges that a small pool of participants comprising of state

and non-state actors formed part of the field research to uncover the determinants of readiness.

This is a limitation highlighted earlier in chapters one and two. The researcher further

acknowledges that the empirical evidence can lend to one dimensional perspective of the

determinants of readiness. The researcher reiterates that caution must be applied, as the

empirical evidence is not representative in its entirety which suggests that further research is

needed to articulate well-rounded determinants of readiness. An extensive pool of participants

is suggested (Banaban and Vaitupuan communities, and relocatees within Fiji, for example)

to advance our understanding of readiness. 1083 The field evidence presented in this chapter is

supported by, and analysed in conjunction with, the literature and the empirical work by

scholars and migration practitioners in the field of environmental and migration studies. This

evidence and other evidence presented in chapters four and six provide the building blocks to

inform the criteria of readiness presented in chapter seven.

1083 Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54, 1-17; see also McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54, 70; see also Bertana, above n 54; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86-104; see also Connell, above n 75, 127-142.

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6.2 Internal Relocation Experiences and Lessons

The purpose of outlining participants’ accounts of their internal relocation experiences and

lessons is twofold. First, it aims to identify the issues that emerged from internal relocation

projects implemented by the Fijian Government and draw out the key themes. Second, it

enables reflection on the experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation processes

and provides a basis to understand what it means to be ready for the cross-border relocation of

communities by the Fijian Government. The results of the first line of inquiry with all

participants (n = 18) reveal that they were relatively evenly distributed. The availability of

land (n = 15) was the major issue, followed by the inclusiveness of relocating communities in

relocation decisions and conducting meaningful consultation with the relocating communities

(n = 14).

Adequate Land Availability

The majority of the participants (n = 15) attributed the: 1) availability of land; 2) land tenure-

ship (type of land and ownership); 3) consent of landowners; and 4) land transfer/registration

as all intrinsic to the issue of land.1084 According to one state actor:

Land ownership is a very critical issue, because once we have identified communities to be relocated and once they agree, the next question is where? And that is where landownership issues come to the forefront. If they want to move to land that is owned by Mataqali land (Indigenous land owning unit), then they need to be convinced, they all have to agree and the process for this will be different to say for urban area/land. The processes, i.e. the authorities and mandates are different requiring various approvals, e.g. communities -iTaukei (Indigenous) Land Trust Board and informal settlements—Provincial council/local government, together with the different scenarios/circumstance (e.g. city, town, semi-urban or in a community) for relocation.1085

Land (vanua) is determined by ‘membership in a specific clan’ in Fiji, which for most iTaueki

(indigenous Fijians) is registered at birth.’1086 The ‘system of ownership of land is vested in

the mataqali (Fijian clan or landowning unit) which is linked by social groups and hierarchical

1084 Interview with state actor no.2 [SA#2] (Suva, 12 September 2017); interview with state actor no.3 [SA#3] (Suva, 13 September 2017); interview with state actor no.4 [SA#4] (Suva, 13 September 2017); interview with state actor no.5 [SA#5] (Suva, 15 September 2017); interview with state actor no.6 [SA#6] (Suva, 18 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.1 [NSA#1] (Suva, 8 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.3 [NSA#3] (Suva, 14 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.4 [NSA#4] (Suva, 15 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.5 [NSA#5] (Suva, 18 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.7 [NSA#7] (Suva, 20 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.8 [NSA#8] (Suva, 19 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.11 [NSA#11] (Suva, 22 September 2017). 1085 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1086 Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 250; see also Campbell, above n 75, 57, 62; see also Charan, Kaur and Singh, above n 54, 19, 20.

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structures and codified as inalienable, communal property.’1087 The system of ownership for

the iTaueki is intact post-colonisation ‘as lawful owners and guardians of land of their

forebears.’1088 Additionally, ‘[t]he concept vakavanua (the way of the land)’ straddle the ‘land,

people, traditions and socioeconomic structures’ for the iTaueki.1089 The findings suggest that

relocation requires that the government of the day make adequate land available for relocation

and address any potential land disputes advanced by landowners before communities relocate.

Moreover, it is indicative that the government of the day should mobilise efforts to facilitate

the smooth transition for communities during all phases of relocation. This study utilises the

term communities in its broadest sense to refer to the ‘highly exposed populations whose

livelihoods are sensitive to the impacts of climate change and which have ostensibly low levels

of adaptive capacity, such as those living on low-lying atolls.’1090 The term communities is

interchangeably used with communities of origin (Kiribati and Tuvalu, for example). The term

communities have also come to be used to refer to the host communities that is, the settlement

or village where communities of origin will be relocated (Fiji, for example).

Inclusiveness and Meaningful Consultation

The second major issue identified by participants (n = 14), was the need for inclusiveness of

all people, and meaningful consultation with the relocating communities during the planning

and implementation phases of relocation. The central focus on people relocating (people),

obtaining broad consensus from the relocating people (consent), and developing capacity

across the full spectrum of state and non-state actors to implement relocation projects (capacity

building) were the strands closely linked to the issue of inclusiveness and meaningful

consultation. The interpretation of inclusiveness of people and meaningful consultation is the

means by which ‘individual people and communities’ have the agency in decision-making

which is equated with a bottom-up approach.1091 It entails ‘giving voice to the concerns and

opinions of vulnerable and marginalised groups, enhancing equity in decision-making and

encouraging effective, fair and sustainable outcomes through promotion of accountability and

participation in decision-making.’1092 Each of the strands is discussed next.

1087 See above n 1086 and accompanying text. 1088 Ibid. 1089 See above nn 1086–1088. 1090 Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 37, 53. 1091 McAdam, Limon, above n 82, 20; see also Corendea, above n 170, 15-17. 1092 See above n 1091 and accompanying text.

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A third of the participants (n = 6) reported that people are a primary concern in relocation.1093

They also agreed that: ‘children, youth, and mothers’, including the elderly physically

challenged, must be included in all the stages of relocation, especially during the preparatory

and planning phases.1094 According to one state actor:

The first thing you have to deal with…would be the people who are going to be resettled. That is one of the biggest lessons from these resettlements. All these resettlement work we are doing whether it is internal or external, who are you moving? It’s the people…we have to move them first and then develop them who are going to be resettled….When you resettle them, you have to continue to build their lives.1095

Consent was the next most important factor reported by participants (n = 8).1096 As one state

actor stated: ‘…for Fiji’s first internal resettlement of Vunidogoloa…The first task was to

obtain their consent...I have come across incidences where you want to relocate people, they

say “no”. The reason they provide is that “this is where our forefathers lived, we will not move

from our land regardless”…’1097 Close to half of the participants (n = 8) revealed that obtaining

consent from every member of the community presents a barrier to relocation. Participants

were asked to provide suggestions on some of the strategies to manage the issue of seeking

collective consensus from members of the communities. According to one state actor:

You need present them with facts…most effective strategy…the things (consent, facts, cost vs benefits)…put in very simple lay man’s terms/language to the local people….you have to understand how they think, and the emotions that comes with it… Give them adequate time. So that the decision is their own…once they all agree, they put that into paper…everyone signs…we can protect government as well.1098

One other state-actor reported:

‘…you have to speak their language…you cannot just go there and say “it’s part of climate adaptation”….We (National Disaster Management Office)…assist…translation of materials so that they can relate to it…communication strategy illustrates our role for the implementation in the relocation work, it is equally one of the challenges.1099

Another response by one state actor revealed that they were conflicted with respect to the

approaches deployed by the Fijian government for the Vunidogolo (first) relocation project.

The state actor admitted that: ‘I do not have access to that (meeting minutes)’ and reported

that:

1093 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1094 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084; interview with SA#3, above n 1084; interview with SA#5, above n 1084; interview with SA#6, above n 1084; interview with NSA#1, above n 1084; interview NSA#4, above n 1084; interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1095 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1096 Ibid; see also interviews with SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, NSA#1, NSA#3, NSA#4, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1097 Interview SA#3, above n 1084. 1098 Ibid. 1099 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084.

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‘…it may only be the Chief or a handful of people representing everyone as communal unit and…representing the “voices” of the villagers….Maybe, it was one-representative representing the interests…of the village…So, the inclusiveness and the decision-making to relocate to the site,…was something that was lacking…I do not have those facts.1100

A further suggestion extended by participants (n = 6) on strategies to seek collective consensus

from relocating communities was the intervention of faith-based organisations.1101 One non-

state actor admitted that: ‘[o]btaining consensus/consent of communities was one of the

challenges for the Narikoso relocation project. The role of faith-based organisation - Pacific

Conference of Churches [PCC] intervention enabled communities to reach consensus/consent

on relocating to the new site.’1102 Another non-state actor reported:

The Pacific Conference of Churches [PCC] played a significant role particularly with the …relocation of communities in Vunidogoloa…PCC, firstly facilitated discussions with communities and the government agencies…PCC helped to set the platform for both parties to come together in conversations with regard to resettlement. This was carried out because the communities requested it themselves…PCC took carriage of the initial discussions and did awareness with the communities on what they would expect at the old site and new relocation site…PCC was also instrumental in bringing all parties together such as the National Disaster Management Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Climate Change, Ministry of iTaukei (Indigenous) Affairs to name a few.1103

The intervention of institutions such as faith-based organisations may explain their substantial

influence in forging relationships between communities and government institutions,

including agencies. One non-state actor stated: ‘…the promise of Noah i.e. God’s promise to

Noah, i.e. “Rainbow as a Promise and Rainbow as a Hope”.’1104 One state actor reported that

‘…people hold their faith close to their heart.’1105 It may also explain the relatively good

cooperation between faith institutions and communities in reaching informed decisions to

relocate, particularly in light of the adverse impacts of climate change.

Consistent communication, engagement and the distribution of relevant printed material in the

vernacular with which potential relocating communities are familiar and can relate to,

education on the effects of climate change to underscore the human habitation of future

generations and allowing ample time for communities to comprehend the nature of the

relocation processes and overall project so that they take ownership of the decision to relocate

were suggested as strategies by participants. Other strategies suggested included facilitating

the collective decision of communities to relocate formally (i.e., as a written document) and

1100 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084. 1101 Interviews with SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, SA#6, NSA#3, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1102 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1103 Interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1104 Ibid. 1105 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084.

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the intervention of faith-based organisations to establish cooperation between potential

relocating communities and the Fijian Government and agencies.1106 The researcher recognises

that differences in cultural and religious practices of relocating communities may potentially

come into conflict with the host communities which ought to be integrated into the relocation

processes. In the case of Fiji, ‘Christianity was the first religious faith to be introduced, and

accepted by indigenous Fijians in 1835, with more than half of the population of Fiji Christians

now, making Christianity the largest religious faith.’1107 This is followed by ‘many other

religious faiths’ (Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism, for example).1108 This reinforces the inclusion

of faith-based organisations into the relocation processes.1109 These are some strategies that

can be deployed to overcome barriers associated with consensus and relocation decisions and

they provide useful insights that can be incorporated into readiness.

Having considered people to be a primary concern in relocation projects, and the importance

of the consensus of people in relocation decisions, capacity building was one other strand

participants (n = 8) reported as intrinsic to inclusiveness and consultations.1110

As one non-state actor stated: ‘[b]uilding capacity of government agencies/officers including

civil society organisation is a key outcome from the lessons learnt from the Vunidogoloa and

Narikoso relocation projects.’1111 Another non-state actor reported that:

Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC)’s support…included providing training to several government ministries on cost and benefit analysis (CBA)…The Climate Change Unit (CCU), applied the CBA in the Narikoso relocation project…SPC…with CCU also supported the development…of an integrated vulnerability assessment (IVA) tool…through a series of consultations with government officials.1112

1106 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19, 31–2; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 145–8; see also Hannah Fair, ‘Three stories of Noah: Navigating religious climate change narratives in the Pacific Island region’ (2018) 5(2) Geo: Geography and Environment 1–15; see also Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54. 1107 John Cox et al, ‘Disaster, Divine Judgement, and Original Sin: Christian Interpretations of Tropical Cyclone Winston and Climate Change in Fiji’ (2018) 30(2) The Contemporary Pacific 380, 397; See also Matt Tomlinson, ‘Sacred Soil in Kadavu, Fiji’ (2002) 72(4) Oceania 237, 237–257. 1108 Cox et al, above n 1107, 380, 389; see also Tomlinson, above n 1107, 237-38. 1109 ‘Christian churches of Fiji…task is to meet fear of climate change with the promise of hope and healing. In this connection, climate-induced resettlement is associated with departing for Promised Land. Communities that are expected to make land available for relocation of others would have to accept the responsibility on the basis of the parable of the Good Samaritan’ as cited in Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 256. 1110 Interview with state actor no.1 [SA#1] (Suva, 12 September 2017); see also interview with non-state actor No.2 [NSA#2] (Suva, 14 September 2017); See also SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, SA#6, NSA#3, NSA#5, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1111 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1112 Interview with NSA#2, above n 1110.

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According to one state actor, ‘Some key considerations in planning and resettlement of

communities’ from the Narikoso relocation project included: ‘concerted efforts by multiple

agencies (national and other institutions).’1113 To ensure concerted efforts and coordinated

responses are executed effectively, one state actor reminded that: ‘It is important to ensure that

roles are clearly demarcated in driving efforts…I hope all agencies’ efforts are synchronised

rather than working independently…important that we understand each other’s work and that

is how you can do your work better.’1114

For two state actors, the findings on capacity building were interpreted in terms of restoring

the communities post-relocation.1115 One state actor reported: ‘When you resettle them, you

have to continue to build their lives. That includes the awareness, education…’1116 Another

state actor reported ‘...in Vunidogoloa…The women were sent to Barefoot College, India, to

undertake solar powered training program, when they returned they carried out solar

installation at their new relocation site.’1117

These findings are indicative of the extensive role cooperation plays in establishing

partnerships between the state actors, agencies and development partners to implement major

national projects such as the inland relocation of vulnerable communities. Moreover, the

experiences from the internal relocation of communities relating to access to and on-going

technical expertise, skills and knowledge to build capacity, provide useful insights into

advancing our understanding in the context of cross-border relocation.

The findings of this study are consistent with those observed by McNamara and Combes on

the internal relocation of Vunidogoloa village in Fiji.1118 Their field interviews with eight

representatives from the ‘governmental, intergovernmental and local nongovernmental

organisations’ examined measures undertaken by the Fijian Government to address subsequent

internal relocations planned for the future.1119 Their findings reveal three key requirements in

preparation by the Fijian Government.1120 First, ‘the need for communities to lead the

relocation decision-making process (in terms of when, how, where)…resources and human

1113 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1114 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1115 Interview with SA#3, SA#6, SA#4, above n 1084. 1116 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1117 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1118 McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19. 1119 Ibid 315–16. 1120 Ibid 318.

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capital (where possible).’1121 Second, the intervention of ‘[i]nter-agency technical and

financial cooperation to ensure sustainable livelihood options (in the short- and long-term).’1122

And third, ‘issues related to the availability of land to relocate to, if communities cannot

relocate within their customary land boundaries.’1123 Unlike the first two requirements,

McNamara and Combes confirmed that issues pertaining to land were less straightforward.1124

McNamara and Combes also found that efforts made by the Fijian Government for future

internal relocations included the ‘development of national relocation guidelines (“draft

guidelines”).’1125 It is acknowledged that participants made references to the draft guidelines

during the field research in this study; however it remains an internal working document and

is not available to the public.1126 In like manner, the empirical study by Piggott-McKeller et

al, into the internal relocation of ‘Denimanu and Vunidogoloa villages’ in Fiji revealed that

‘there was an expressed lack of involvement in decision-making processes by the village

members themselves’ when considered against representations advanced by the Fijian

government ‘that the process was based on a consensual and participative decision-making

process.’1127 In their investigation for Denimanu village, Piggott-McKeller et al, report that

‘gendered cultural and societal norms and societal norms, which often exclude women from

decision-making processes, were not adequately addressed through the process of these

relocations, serving to perpetuate rather than alleviate inequalities.’1128 The empirical studies

suggest that state authorities and agencies ought to be on the back foot to allow ‘individual

people and communities, including those that normally do not have access to decision-making

fora’ to take ownership and have the agency in relocation decision processes.1129 The

authorities and agencies ought to develop and imbibe genuine ‘understanding of human

choice, volition and self-determination during relocation’ processes.1130

The finding that consent is one of the empirical strands of inclusiveness and consultation is

consistent with previous research conducted by McAdam. Her work examined past historical

relocation lessons and experiences of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities in the Pacific

to inform future relocation responses and policies.1131 McAdam suggested that ‘relocation

1121 Ibid; 1122 Ibid. 1123 Ibid. 1124 Ibid. 1125 Ibid 315. 1126 Interview with SA#4, SA#5, NSA#3, above n 1084. 1127 Piggott-McKeller et al, above n 54, 133, 139. 1128 Ibid 133, 140. 1129 Arnall, above n 75, 253, 255. 1130 Ibid 253, 255, 261; see also Piggott-McKeller et al, above n 54, 133-149; see also Charan, Kaur and Singh, above n 54, 19, 31. 1131 McAdam, above n 87, 317–18.

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should only occur with the free and informed consent of communities concerned. They should

be fully informed of the reasons and procedures of movement, be able to propose alternatives

to relocation that authorities “should duly consider” and be compensated for any losses.’1132

The availability of land as one of the key findings for relocation also corroborates the work of

Edwards. Her work examined the ‘practicalities of climate-induced relocation, based in the

experiences of the Carteret Islanders in Papua New Guinea (PNG).’1133 Edwards suggested

that ‘[t]o ease anxieties, likely issues must be pre-empted, and relocated families assured of

on-going support, shelter, and status at the resettlement location. Successful resettlements can

only be achieved with land security, the creation of livelihoods, and support from host

communities.’1134

Taken together, the empirical findings and the contributions in the literature by McAdam and

Edwards clearly demonstrate that the availability of, and access to, land, including consent by

landowners, engaging in meaningful consultation and participation of communities in

relocation decisions, and the collective collaboration of a host of agencies and organisations—

including the state— are key themes pivotal in the context of internal relocation of

communities. These provide significant insights to conceptualise readiness. The discussion

that follows responds to the second line of inquiry undertaken with all participants on cross-

border relocation.

6.3 Readiness of the Fijian Government

Participants (n = 18) were asked about the extent of the Fijian Government’s readiness for

cross-border community relocation. The most common issue that emerged was the discussion

about the purchase of ‘6 000 acres (approximately 24 kms) of forest land’ in Fiji by the then

Head of State of Kiribati on behalf of the people of Kiribati to guarantee food security and

resettlement of its people to Fiji.1135 Other responses to this question by state actors (n = 3)

reveal as follows: One state actor said that:

1132 Ibid 301, 318. 1133 Edwards, above n 35, 54. 1134 Ibid 78. 1135 Bainimarama, above n 7; see also Fiji Government, ‘Fiji’s Statement at the COP-21’, above n 36; see also McAdam, above n 87, 301, 302; see also Donner, above n 35, 191. See also Christopher Pala, ‘Kiribati President Purchases Worthless Resettlement Land as Precaution Against Rising Sea’, (Media Release, 9 June 2014) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/kiribati-president-purchases-worthless-resettlement-land-as-precaution-against-rising-sea/>. See also: ‘Kiribati, a nation of 100,000 people scattered over 32 Pacific atolls, completed a deal with Fiji this year to buy 6,000 acres (2,400

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It plants me to thinking about cross-border resettlement of communities... The issue…will have to be one of the mandates for my division to address, as the climate change unit expands its human resource personnel/capacity under the recent budgetary allocation…by the Fijian government… Fiji should be-ready-be-prepared in all aspects…it brings to the forefront the issue of two sovereign states. It raises pertinent legal questions about how does it affect our sovereignty and legal space and what is the legality around this issue? We need to start thinking about this in terms of: the legal space (constitution, legislation, and citizenship) and the socio-economic space… It will depend on the government of the day on how sorted/prepared the government is in terms of the policy space.1136

One other state actor commented that: ‘There has not been any discussions on policy. For that

to take place, there needs to be bi-lateral arrangements in place.’1137 Moreover, as another state

actor articulated ‘Government officials really need to work out the intricate details at micro

and macro levels. Whilst the announcement stands, there hasn’t been any work done. Probably,

Fiji would be better placed, if it was ready and then the announcement followed.’1138 In joining

the state actors (n = 3), one non-state actor when asked about “readiness”, said that: ‘We need

to be very serious about it…it is a matter of when the first boat to come…I hate the day when

that happens and for our Minister to say “Okay I need to go to Ministry of iTaukei Affairs”.

It’s too late. That is where preparedness or readiness comes in…’1139

Anchored in contrast, one unanticipated finding reported by a minority of the participants (n

= 5) was that there is a general hesitation by communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to relocate

to Fiji.1140 One non-state actor stated that: ‘Fiji is open and willing to accept, but are people

willing to come?...What is underpinning Fiji’s position?...it is an interesting

contradiction…for Fiji to say…we will take you in…Tuvalu is not interested in moving and

not intending to go anywhere. So, you have contrasting positions.’1141 Another non-state actor

commented: ‘In Kiribati, the issue of resettlement is not popular…current leadership is not

willing to resettle its people to Fiji or elsewhere.’1142 Likewise, one state actor commented

hectares) of forest land for A$9.3 million ($8.3 million) on the island of Vanua Levu, he (Anote Tong) said’ as cited in Alister Doyle, ‘Kiribati President Favors Buying Land Elsewhere as Islands are Threatened by Rising Sea Levels’ (Media Release, 22 November 2014) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/kiribati-president-buying-land_n_5860064>; see also Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231-405. 1136 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1137 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1138 Interview with state actor no.7 [SA#7] (Suva, 20 September 2017). 1139 Interview with NSA#5, above 1084. 1140 Interview with non-state actor no.10 [NSA#10] (Suva, 21 September 2017); see also SA#2, SA#4, NSA#11, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#1, above n 1110. 1141 Interview with NSA#11, above n 1084. 1142 Interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also The empirical study conducted by Hermann and Kempf in Kiribati and Fiji between 2012 and 2015 who point out that the ‘Kiribati President Maamau…has replaced the earlier focus on climate change policies (of former President Tong) with an emphasis on improving people’s living condition in the atoll state, it has also maintained many previous measures designed to reduce Kiribati’s vulnerability vis-à-vis climate change’ as cited in Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 236.

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that: ‘There are mixed feelings…Whether they take it up, is entirely up to those

countries…Tuvalu, because they believe this land was given to them by their ancestors…come

what may, they will not leave…their God-given island/land.’1143

The extent of readiness by the Fijian Government on a plain reading of the empirical findings

is fragmented and remote based on the small participant pool in this study. The data provided

by state and non-state participants on readiness are consistent with each other. The findings

confirm the undetermined standpoint of governments in pursuing cross-border relocation.

Moreover, the findings validate the investigation on readiness and the need for the Fijian

Government to undertake more in-depth consideration of legal and policy arrangements. This

is discussed further below.

6.4 Legal Readiness of the Fijian Government

Participants were asked to reflect on the existing legal, policy and institutional arrangements

in place to implement cross-border relocation schemes. The responses have been arranged

from the standpoint of the host state at the domestic level followed by the arrangements

between national governments of the host state and sending states.

Domestic Legal, Policy and Institutional Arrangements

Approximately half of the participants did not respond to the question on legal readiness.

According to one non-state actor:

…it could begin as “cross-border guideline for resettlement” which then…be developed into a legal policy for resettlement which can then further develop into a separate piece of Act for resettlement…because of my experience for the intra-resettlement…we nominate certain stakeholders…to facilitate…the communities because they have the legal basis or the Act that allows the community to approach them…the iTaukei affairs for instance, the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap 120), and for non-formal communities go to Rural and Maritime Development (Ministry for Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management) for instance the National Disaster Management Act that allows for those affected by disasters.1144

Another non-state actor reported that: ‘[I]n order to create enabling policies and…the legal

approach (existing legislative stipulations) it would be feasible to consider it from a bottom-

up approach…it cannot be imposed…important to consider the whole landscape of the

1143 Interview with SA#1, above n 1110. 1144 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084.

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legislature…the policy and the legislation, assess and synthesise and renovate…i.e. to renovate

a policy framework.’1145 One other non-state actor revealed that: ‘[A]s part of the legal

preparedness…we need to look at our: i) current laws, ii) land, iii) land use plans (when they

come out) under the national green growth framework (one of the goals-to identify how we

are going to use our land i.e. mapping/zoning, etc.)…’1146

Likewise, two state actors echoed similar sentiments. The findings revealed the need for re-

examination of the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji). One state actor reported that: ‘...the

Immigration Act is silent on cross-border resettlement except reference to Part 6, which makes

provision for refugee status determination… They will need to…re-define the term “refugee”

under the Immigration Act. If that definition includes “this” category of people, then it may

be settled.’1147 Another state actor reported:

There has to be review of our immigration legislation to see that there is something that is open, we have to be flexible if we are to allow it…also look at it from a human rights perspective in terms of some of the international conventions which we are a party to. Because the issue is if you had to change our laws only, then it leaves it open for anyone to claim “climate refugee”…Whether to have a stand-alone law or a Convention on it?1148

In terms of the domestic legal arrangements, the findings suggest that relocation can be

facilitated either one of two ways.: either by development of a national policy—followed by a

stand-alone law—or by a revision of the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji). These results confirm

that a whole-of-government response is lacking in terms of legal readiness. The Fijian

Government has yet to extend the boundaries of legal and policy deliberations and institutional

processes. It further confirms that there has been very little consideration by the Fijian

Government of the legal landscape with respect to cross-border relocation schemes. The

arrangements between the host country and sending countries are discussed next.

Host and Sending Countries Arrangements

Regional bi-lateral arrangements between the host country and country of origin were

identified as an important factor by a minority of participants (n = 5) to ensure legal readiness.

According to one state actor:

I would prefer to go by way of bi-lateral arrangements. It is neater, easy to control and manage... and it does not open up “door” for misinterpretation or misunderstanding…With bi-lateral arrangements, you can put in place all the conditions, all the processes that is to be criteria, all the factors one has to put in place and take into account all the different

1145 Interview with NSA#5, above n 1084. 1146 Interview with non-state actor no.9 [NSA#9] (Suva, 21 September 2017). 1147 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1148 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084.

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arrangements between the countries…arrangements are better if it is country to country (i.e. Pacific Island to island nations) and a bi-lateral one.1149

Another state actor, when asked about bi-lateral arrangements, revealed a divergent view,

stating: ‘…bi-lateral arrangements is between two countries. We have offered them to come

to Fiji…bi-lateral arrangements…a potential solution is questionable…Bi-lateral is a conduit

of providing some sort of assistance, training. Trans-border migration…all issues, will be

difficult to address through bi-lateral arrangements...’1150 One state actor remained ambivalent

in responding to the arrangements at a regional level, stating that: ‘It depends if it’s an

agreement or MOU? An agreement, treaty or a convention is legally binding.’1151 These are

the only notable variations in the responses concerning arrangements at the regional level.

The empirical findings demonstrate that cooperation between the sending and host countries

can be facilitated by way of bi-lateral arrangements. Additionally, aside from a single reference

to an ‘agreement, MOU, treaty or convention’, the findings do not reveal any further

suggestions to facilitate relocation between countries at a regional level.1152 The findings

confirm that arrangements at the regional level are poorly defined.

There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by the participants in this study and

those of previous empirical studies conducted by Allgood and McNamara, McAdam, and

Nunn and Kumar, who have examined approaches that can potentially support human mobility

triggered by the impacts of climate change.1153 For example, the work of Allgood and

McNamara on ‘exploring the local perspectives in Kiribati on the future impacts of climate

change’ found that the overall response to climate-induced migration can be facilitated by

‘engaging in bilateral and international discussions to secure support from other countries for

future adaptation funding and migration pathways.’1154

Likewise, the field research conducted by McAdam in Tuvalu and Kiribati, pointed out that

‘[i]n Tuvalu, the predominant official view is that climate change must remain the focal point

in any multilateral or bilateral discussions about development, assistance and migration.’1155

Similar findings on the effect of bilateral arrangements have been reported in a number of

1149 Ibid. 1150 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1151 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1152 Ibid. 1153 McAdam, above n 354, 1–26; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370–85; see also Nunn and Kumar, above n 35, 1–28. 1154 See also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370, 380. 1155 McAdam, above n 354, 10.

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research reports by international financial institutions and multilateral development banks.1156

The studies have found that ‘regional cooperation and migration channels may provide much

of the answer in addressing future climate-induced migration.’1157 The ‘existing geopolitical

bonds and economic relations’ amongst Pacific Island leaders have been cited as underlying

reasons to ‘promote regional cooperation through policy dialogue and deliberation’ on

potential cross-border relocation arrangements in the future.1158 Furthermore, the integration

of ‘islander values and aspirations, and culture attempts to incorporate not only physical but

also imagined movement as a constitutive element of place, culture and identity’ which have

also been cited as complementary factors to buttress regional fora decision making and

cooperation.1159

Moreover, the uncertainty in terms of an agreement, treaty or convention to facilitate

arrangements at a regional level is consistent with previous studies that have examined the

effect of a ‘new international treaty on climate change displacement to create a new class of

refugee-like protected persons’, or for the introduction of ‘new legal instruments to address

climate-related movement’ complemented by the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (UNFCCC).1160 Legal scholars remain divided as to whether adopting an

international treaty will offer an appropriate and lasting solution for population displacement

induced by climate change.1161

In contrast to a global treaty or convention, the idea of a treaty has received traction by Pacific

Island leaders with the formulation of a draft “Pacific Climate Treaty” (“model treaty”),

increasing the probability of Pacific Island nations responding to a host of climate change

issues within the South Pacific region.1162 Aside from noted references to the draft model treaty

1156 ADB Report, above n 10; see also Zara Sarzin, ‘Stocktaking of Global Forced Displacement Data’ (Policy Research Working Paper No 7985, World Bank Group, February 2017) 1-52. 1157 ADB Report, above n 10, 56. 1158 Ibid 1, 55. 1159 Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 234; see also Nunn and Kumar, above n 35, 245, 260. 1160 McAdam, above n 354, 1–2; see also McAdam, above n 10, 190; see also UNFCCC, above n 272. 1161 McAdam, above n 354, 1–26; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1518, 1542; see also Feijen, above n 441, 63; see also Zetter, above n 505, 62; see also Wyett, above n 379, 171, 179; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10–11. See also Robyn Eckersley, ‘Soft Law, Hard Politics, and the Climate Change Treaty’ in Christian Reus-Smit (eds), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 80–90. See also: ‘The government of Kiribati…is keen to secure international agreements in which other States recognise that climate change has contributed to their predicament and acknowledge “relocation” as part of their obligations to assist (in a compensatory way)…In December 2009, the Tuvaluan Prime Minister reiterated that his government rejected resettlement: While Tuvalu faces an uncertain future because of climate change, it is our view that Tuvaluans will remain in Tuvalu…’ as citied in McAdam, above n 354, 8. 1162 Slezak, above n 41; see also Scoop Independent News, above n 42; see also PIDF 4 2016, above n 42.

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in Pacific Island nations regional forums and media reports, no studies exist that outline the

intricacies of the model treaty and its implementation.1163 The evidence presented thus far with

regard to the introduction and formalisation of a treaty at the regional level has received far

too little attention by Pacific Island nations, including the international community. Several

questions remain unanswered with regard to the operationalisation of the model treaty, which

is open to debate.

The findings suggest that bilateral approaches can be adopted as a starting point. However, far

too attention has been devoted by Pacific Island leaders to initiating and undertaking concrete

steps to formalise arrangements for cross-border relocation. Moreover, the issue of climate-

induced migration may not be considered a core priority agenda item for Pacific Island leaders

under the existing leadership of the countries involved. As McAdam outlines, ‘[t]he absence

of bilateral, regional or international migration frameworks means that it is unclear how many

Pacific Islanders will have the opportunity to move voluntarily in anticipation of longer-term

changes to their islands.’1164 In general, therefore, it seems that Pacific Island leaders’

respective national priorities at various global policy fora are possibly focused to scale-up

climate change mitigation efforts by accessing global climate finance for low carbon

development, which potentially shifts the focus of climate-induced cross-border relocation

within the realm of adaptation to climate change. The discussion that follows focuses on the

key themes drawn from the issues identified by participants from the experiences and lessons

of the internal relocation projects implemented by the Fijian Government.

6.5 Cross-border Relocation to Fiji

The perspectives of participants (n = 18) on cross-border relocation are based significantly

upon accounts of the internal relocation experiences and lessons learned from the internal

relocation projects implemented by the Fijian government as discussed above. The key themes

drawn from the issues participants identified in the context of cross-border relocation are

presented in Table 1. Table 1 is organised with the most frequent key themes (n = ) presented

in descending order together with the issues aligned to the key themes. Some of the issues that

interconnect have been arranged under a single key theme. For example, national flag,

exclusive economic zone and so on…are organised under the key theme “sovereignty”. In

addition, the issues identified in the context of cross-border relocation are analysed by

1163 See above n 1162 and accompanying text. 1164 Jane McAdam, ‘The High Price of Resettlement: The Proposed Environmental Relocation of Nauru to Australia’ (2017) 48(1) Australian Geographer 7, 13.

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examining the literature on human mobility from sudden- and slow-onset environmental

change, including published studies on resettlement from developmental projects to sharpen

our understanding of the criteria of readiness. An extended discussion of the key themes drawn

from the issues is explored below in Table 1.

Table 1. Key Themes by State and Non-state Actors with Issues

Issue(s) (n = ) Key Themes

Land tenure-ships. (n = 13) Land

Dual status is a limited response. (n = 10) Citizenship and Nationality

Operational/capital budgets vs onus for relocation costs. (n = 10) Funding

Dimensions of sovereignty include: identity, citizenship,

national flag, exclusive economic zone [EEZ] under United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS].

Negotiating sovereignty?

(n = 9)

Sovereignty

Integration of communities likely to heighten tensions and

conflicts.

(n = 4)

Culture and Identity

People must be at the centre of either a top-down or a bottom-up

approach in relocation regardless.

(n = 3)

Consultations

and

Inclusiveness

Faith-based institutions are well matched to shape perceptions

and relocation decisions. Caution must be applied in relocating

and receiving communities consisting of various religious

denominations.

(n = 3)

Faith-based Organisations

Likely to be misplaced if relocating communities are treated as

secondary citizens despite constitutional protection.

(n = 2)

Human Rights

Weak link may exist between countries in policy choices and

shifting priorities.

(n = 2)

Tertiary Education

Losing sight of people during all stages relocation poses

significant risks.

(n = 2)

People

Caution must be exercised with interpreting the notion of

regionalism.

(n = 2)

Regionalism

Land

Almost two-thirds of the participants (n = 13) indicated that access to land was a primary issue

for the readiness of the host country for cross-border relocation. These empirical findings are

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consistent with previous studies in which land has frequently been identified as the most

critical factor in the case of involuntary resettlement of communities from large-scale

development projects and ‘(voluntary or forced) planned relocation’ from climatic factors.1165

A study conducted by Campbell on the meaning and importance of land across Pacific Island

countries, found that ‘…the great majority of the land…is held under customary forms of

tenure and accounts for less than 90 per cent of the land…The forms of customary

tenure…range from arrangements for individual rights to land through communal

ownership.’1166 Campbell argues that ‘…it is unlikely that communities from one Pacific island

country will be happy to give up their land to newcomers in a way that enables the newcomers

to maintain their social, cultural, political and economic ways.’1167 The findings by Campbell

identify important implications with respect to the relocation of Pacific Island communities to

island countries that may potentially host communities in the future. It is evident that when

availability of land specific to relocation is exiguous, the government of the day may have to

turn to landowners to access communal land for communities of origin who may not have

‘traditional rights of access to that (resettlement) land.’1168 This may result in competing

interests and relations (“interests”). Concerted participation and consultation by an array of

state and non-state actors, including the landowners, may present a viable option to overcome

such interests.

Likewise, concerns revolving around land tenure-ship for cross-border relocation is consistent

with Donner’s empirical research conducted with a total of 45 participants, of which 32

represented descendants from three past generations of the Gilbertese Islands.1169 His study

focused on lessons learned and the ‘challenges faced by Gilbertese people resettled from

modern-day Kiribati to Ghizo in the Solomon Islands’ in the second half of the twentieth

century.1170 He argues that ‘land tenure will be the unifying challenge facing future

communities that relocate due to climate change.’1171 Donner’s empirical findings revealed

that ‘[u]ncertainty over rights to existing land and ability to procure further land for the

growing population was linked to almost all other community issues, including post-tsunami

recovery, political representation, education and employment opportunities, tensions with

1165 Tagliarino, above n 160, 1–44; see also Edwards, above n 35, 60–1; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 13–14. 1166 Campbell, above n 75, 60, 63–6. 1167 Ibid 67. 1168 Ibid 60, 62, 65, 67. 1169 Donner, above n 35, 193. 1170 Ibid 191–210. 1171 Ibid 199.

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other communities, and cultural changes.’1172 Based on the findings of Donner, it can be argued

that a whole host of considerations and priorities may need to be addressed by the host country

before making land available for cross-border relocation.

Similarly, the empirical findings support previous work in the ‘field of displacement and

resettlement studies.’1173 Vanclay argues that ‘large-scale development or infrastructure

projects require land…This need for land can result in the dislocation of the people (i.e.

physical displacement).’1174 Vanclay further argues that ‘given that “land is life” for many

people and that people everywhere have place attachment (a sense of place) to a varying extent,

project land acquisition and the consequent displacement and disruption can cause much hurt

and hardship.’1175 One of the key strategies to minimise the impact of projects on population

displacement, including significant risks like ‘land tenure security, human rights, and

livelihoods’, was the formulation of international safeguard policies, resettlement guidelines

and minimum standards by global lending institutions, for example, the development of

International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standard 5 on Land Acquisition and

Involuntary Resettlement.1176 Primarily, the prescriptions of the international policies,

guidelines and standards (“standards”) demand that project proponents adhere to, and comply

with, the standards in every phase of project development (i.e. planning, preparation,

implementation, decommissioning).1177 In this study, the draft internal relocation guidelines

indicated earlier provide a useful tool. The guidelines could be enhanced and specifically

1172 Ibid. 1173 Vanclay, above n 1039, 3–21; see also Terminski, above n 58, 16, 50, 83, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94–5, 121, 144; see also Anthony Oliver-Smith, ‘Applied Anthropology and Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement’, in Satish Kedia and John van Willigen et al (eds), Applied Anthropology: Domains of Application (Praeger Publishers, 2005) 190–219, 193. See also Prabir Kumar Pattnaik, ‘Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Analysis of Judicial Policy’ (2017) 55(3) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 346, 350; see also Paul K Gellert and Barbara D Lynch, ‘Mega-projects as Displacements’ (2003) 55(175) International Social Science Journal 15, 16; see also Bogumil Terminski, ‘Development-induced Displacement and Human Security: A Very Short Introduction – A General Overview of Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement’ (Working Paper, 28 November 2012) 4. 1174 Vanclay, above n 1039, 3. 1175 Ibid. 1176 Ibid 5, 9–10; Tagliarino, above n 58, 7–8; see also Tagliarino, above n 160, 6–7; see also Ploeg and Vanclay, above n 397, 34–6; see also Terminski, DIDR: Causes, Consequences, above n 58, 17, 51; see also Terminski, DIDR: Theoretical Frameworks, above n 58, 162. See also The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The International Development Association, Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies: World Bank Board Approves New Environmental and Social Framework <https://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies>; see also The World Bank ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies < https://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies>. 1177 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 21–3; see also W. Courtland Robinson, ‘Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Development-induced Displacement’ (Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution, May 2003) 1–96.

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tailored to cross-border relocation by incorporating international minimum standards and best

practices on an array of focus areas, including land recognised in the context of development

resettlement.

Taken together, the explicit inclusion of land as a key issue is suggested in framing policies,

designing relocation programs, formulating guidelines, and establishing institutions to support

and facilitate the cross-border relocation of Pacific Island communities. Presumably, it is

highly unlikely that the government of the day will allocate freehold land for the purposes of

cross-border relocation.1178 Unless concerted efforts and action are extended by the

government of the day to obtain general consensus by the landowners to cede communal lands

for resettlement ‘within their own land boundaries’, relocation will be fraught.1179

Additionally, attempts to restore the livelihoods of relocating communities at the new location

may potentially turn out unfavourably as a result of tensions arising between the communities

of destination and origin.1180

Citizenship and Nationality

Just over half of the participants (n = 10) raised concerns about the legal status of relocating

communities, such as the citizenship and nationality arrangements of the Fijian Government

(Table 1). The reference to the historical migration of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities

to the islands of Rabi and Kioa of Fiji respectively was commonly cited by participants. One

of three non-state actors echoing similar sentiments commented that: ‘The model adopted for

the communities (Rabi/Kioa) could be a starting point to address these emerging issues…i.e.

to retain their identity…access resources, services and maintain their livelihoods…’1181 The

present research is limited by the lack of information on the type of “model” to which the

participants alluded in the interview data. The participants did not exhibit any clear-cut

dimensions of the model other than stating “dual citizenship”. Presumably, the model refers

to communities of origin acquiring dual citizenship and nationality in the host country.

The recognition and status of relocating communities from a legal perspective is also notable.

According to one state actor: ‘…Rabi, they are Fijians, but they still have Kiribati

1178 Campbell, above n 75, 57–79, 67. 1179 Ibid 65. 1180 Ibid 51–2. 1181 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146.

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citizenship.’1182 One other state actor commented that ‘[T]hey (Kiribati/Tuvalu) cannot be

resettled here (Fiji) and…still maintain their identity. They need to relinquish that. Which

system of government will support them?’1183 One non-state actor queried: ‘…do you issue

passports…citizenships to them or they are aliens? How do you demarcate “that” category of

people when they come here…? That will need to be translated into…the policy stance of

government...’1184

The present findings, are consistent with issues on citizenship and dual nationality documented

by McAdam in her archival research, which consisted of interviews conducted with 38

participants from the Banaban and Kioan communities in Fiji and government officials in

Kiribati between 2012 and 2013.1185 McAdam’s investigation was twofold. First, she sought

to explore the governance structures on Rabi to determine the extent of ‘local autonomy

granted to the Banabans within Fiji’.1186 For example, she investigated the formulation of a

local governance framework to account for a ‘system of land tenure and inheritance’ and the

Rabi Island Court facilitated through the Banaban Settlement Act 1978 ch 123 and Banaban

Lands Act 1985 ch 124.1187 Second, she sought to determine further the safeguards for dual

citizenship and dual nationality pursuant to the Fiji and Kiribati constitutions and statutes for

‘persons of I-Kiribati descent.’1188 It is well established that the Fiji Constitution 2013 s 5(4)

and Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s 14 permit dual citizenship and the Kiribati Constitution

1182 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1183 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1184 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1185 McAdam, above n 13, 283, 313; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305–6; see also Edwards, above n 35, 53–4; see also Shawn Shen and Francois Gemenne, ‘Contrasted Views on Environmental Change and Migration: The Case of Tuvaluan Migration to New Zealand’ (2011) 49 International Migration 224, 231. See also: ‘…people described having two homes-Kioa, the homeland, and Vaitupu the motherland. Many identify as both Fijians and Vaitupuan…today they refer to themselves as “Kioans” (after their “new” home)…’ as cited in McAdam, above n 87, 319. 1186 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 285, 296–303; see also: ‘…‘because it involved the movement of almost an entire Banaban population, to an uninhabited island in another country (which meant they did not have to integrate with a pre-existing community)’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 285. 1187 See ‘Banaban Settlement (Amendment) Ordinance No. 15/1951; Banaban Settlement Ordinance No. 38/1970 (October 8, 1970) (repealed the 1945 Ordinance: s8); Banaban Settlement (Amendment) Act No.12/1973 (June 28, 1973) (amended the 1970 Ordinance); Banaban Settlement Act, Cap 123 of 1978 (a consolidated version of the Banaban Settlement Ordinance 1970 and the Amendment Act 1973; Banaban Settlement (Amendment) Act No. 8/1996 (August 28, 1996). The current statute is the Banaban Settlement Act Cap 123 of 1978, as amended by the 1996 statute’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 297 (@ fn81). See also: ‘Banaban Lands Ordinance 1953 No. 30/1953 (November 26, 1953); Banaban Lands Ordinance 1965 No. 31/1965 (July 8, 1965) (repealed the 1953 Ordinance: s 20); Banaban Lands (Amendment) Ordinance No.37/1970 (October 8, 1970); and Banaban Lands Act Cap 124 of 1985 (which appears to consolidate the 1965 and 1970 Ordinances) and is the statute currently in force’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 301 (@ fn 102). 1188 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 285, 304–9, 313, 319, 323, see also McAdam, above n 87, 321–5; see also: ‘…constitutional safeguards that were created to entrench the Banabans’ rights of entry to stay and parliamentary representation in Kiribati, including a right to dual citizenship’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 286.

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ch I ss 23-4 and Kiribati Citizenship Act 1998 ch 8A s8 permit dual nationality.1189 McAdam

argues that dual citizenship was not recognised in Fiji until 2009, when the passage of the

Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 occurred.1190 With respect to the dual citizenship arrangements

for the Kioan community, McAdam found that they lack ‘any special constitutional status in

the country of origin, Tuvalu.’1191 McAdam acknowledges that although her study takes a

historical approach and her findings document past ‘legal solutions created for the Banaban

context’, it ‘enables a rethinking of the concepts of sovereignty, citizenship and minority

protection’ and the ‘maintenance of distinct, self-governing communities, if relocation across

international borders is ever to be considered as a possible adaptive response to the impacts of

climate change.’1192

One non-state actor, who was the only I-Kiribati national from the pool of participants, alluded

to the notion of “third class citizens” and stated:

…we (Hon. President and delegation) heard sentiments like our (Kiribati community in Solomon Islands) “treatment as third class citizens”. My analysis from the information of our diaspora is that they have been treated as “third level” citizens of the host country…President also went to Rabi…the President responded then to quote: “your issues are not new”, they are the same…1193

There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by the non-state actor and those

described in previous studies conducted by Donner, as highlighted earlier above.1194 The field

interviews recorded by Donner reveal that the ‘Gilbertese community in the Solomon Islands

had become recognised as “second-class” citizens’ and faced barriers in ‘securing educational

scholarships and government jobs’ despite their ‘higher literacy rate than the local

population.’1195

Against this background, the literature establishes that there is recognition of the issues around

citizenship and nationality within the legislative framework at a national level. Whether

reliance on the existing legislative arrangements will be adequate to respond to and address

the legal status of communities of origin to the host country on the grounds of climate change

1189 See ‘Fiji Constitution 1970 ss 19, 21, 25(e); Fiji Constitution 1990 s78(1); Fiji Constitution 1997 s185(1); Fiji Constitution 2013 s 5(4); Fiji Citizenship Act 1971 s16; Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s14; Kiribati Constitution chs III, IX ss23–4, 29(1)(a); Kiribati Citizenship Act 1998 ch 8A’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 302–3, 307, 313, 319, 321. See also Jane McAdam, above n 87, 301, 306–17. 1190 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 307; see also Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s14 as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 307. 1191 McAdam, above n 87, 301, 319; see also Tuvalu Constitution ch 1.02 pt III <http://www.tuvaluislands.com/const_tuvalu.htm>. 1192 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 283, 333. 1193 Interview with NSA#10, above n 1140. 1194 Donner, above n 35, 191–210. 1195 Ibid 198.

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is unclear. It may be a determination for the government of the day to make when cross-border

relocation is implemented. However, a revision in policy and legislation by policymakers for

the inclusion of “this” category of communities is suggested.

Funding

Just over half of the participants (n = 10) raised concerns about costs and the funding of cross-

border relocation. The divergent responses by participants on the issue comprised two focus

areas. Some participants proposed that the costs associated with the cross-border relocation of

communities is the responsibility of the international community.1196 A smaller number of

participants (n = 3) proposed that regional agencies play an important role in extending

technical assistance to Pacific Island countries to access global funds.1197 Both focus areas are

discussed respectively.

One state actor commented that: ‘…this (climate change) is not something Pacific Island

nations created…intervention of the international community is important and assist probably

through the climate funding or Global Climate Fund (GCF). Resettlement will amount to huge

funding. We just rely on the international community.’1198 These findings are consistent with

previous research undertaken by Adelman, who confirms that ‘[d]eveloped countries are

historically responsible for the majority of GHGs in the atmosphere and therefore bear the

greatest obligations for the distribution of the burdens of mitigation (distributive justice) and

adaptation (common but differentiated responsibilities).’1199 He argues that ‘[i]slanders face

the prospect of forcible relocation without protection under international law and with few

resources for resettlement.’1200 Adelman further argues that ‘[t]hey are entitled to

compensation for climate-related loss and damage in the interest of climate justice.’1201 He

suggests that the ethical obligation of developed countries to ‘compensate SIDS for climatic

loss and damage can be discharged through...compensation without admission of liability.’1202

He further suggests that ‘such compensation could take the form of resettlement or of monetary

compensation.’1203

1196 Interview with SA#3, SA#4, above n 1084. 1197 Interview with SA#5, NSA#3, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#2, above n 1110. 1198 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1199 Adelman, above n 103, 32–4, 36; see also Stephen Humphreys, ‘Editorial’ (2016) 7(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 1, 2–3. 1200 See above n 1199 and accompanying text. 1201 Adelman above n 103, 32 and accompanying text. 1202 Adelman, above n 103 34 and accompanying text. 1203 Adelman, above n 103, 33, 38; see also Humphreys, above n 1199, 2.

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This suggestion may provide a feasible solution to funding large-scale relocation projects in

light of stringent compliance requirements to access global funds. However, it remains unclear

the degree to which there is consensus at global policy fora to make funding available for

relocation (inland and cross-border) from an ethical perspective and on equitable grounds. As

one non-state actor stated: ‘Money/funding for resettlement is quite a contentious agenda item.

People do not like to fund relocation. That is a big “no-no”...Because of its implications…’1204

Having considered funding for relocation projects from the standpoint of the international

community, including the key tenets of accessing global climate funds, the discussion that

follows highlights regional agencies as existing and possible intermediaries for Pacific Island

nations seeking global climate funding.

Similarly, the ADB, with its extensive experience and technical expertise in large-scale

resettlement of communities from development projects in the Asia-Pacific region, confirms

that financial resources and significant investment are key ingredients in international

resettlement.1205 The ADB reports that ‘resettling communities displaced by climate change

will be expensive and few countries in Asia and the Pacific will be able to fund sustainable

resettlement alone.’1206 The ADB admits that the intervention and support of the

international community is pivotal.1207 The ADB maintains that ‘international

institutional capacity, systems of governance, funding arrangements’ and ‘resettlement

programmes i.e. planned migration for vulnerable populations’ are key considerations

which underpin large-scale international relocation projects.1208

These empirical findings are consistent with previous studies conducted by Barnett and

Webber.1209 Their study focused on migration as a positive strategy and involuntary

resettlement ‘in anticipation of or in response to climate change.’1210 In tracing the global

trends of migrants who move permanently, Barnett and Webber found that migration is

generally ‘within their own country, or to a neighbouring country, rather than over vast

distances.’1211 They claim that people permanently displaced by climate change will generally

be forced to move to ‘developing countries whose ability to meet the needs of migrants is

1204 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1205 ADB Report, above n 10, 36–7. 1206 Ibid 37. 1207 Ibid. 1208 Ibid 36–7. 1209 Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 37. 1210 Ibid 38. 1211 Ibid 51.

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limited.’1212 They argue that this potentially fuels ‘conflict, poverty and environmental

degradation’ in the host country.1213 They contend that it is incumbent upon the international

community to provide for the ‘short-term humanitarian and longer-term settlement needs of

migrants.’1214 In addition, they emphasise that for permanent migration in response to climate

change to be tenable, it is necessary for international agencies to drive efforts in partnership

and collaboration with the organisations and agencies of the host country.1215 This is because

of cognisance of a host of local issues, including the socio-economic and environmental

dimensions in the host country of the communities in the host areas.1216 Research and studies

by Adelman, the ADB, and Barnett and Webber show that the large-scale relocation of Pacific

Island communities demands the intervention of the international community to fund the

associated costs. The studies by Barnett and Webber also show that the engagement of the

international community requires extensive engagement with a network of agencies in the host

country to implement larger-scale relocation projects.

Participants also indicated that access to funds under the global funding mechanisms (GCF,

Paris Agreement, and Warsaw Mechanism) does not feature prominently for cross-border

relocation, which brings us to the next focus area: the role of regional agencies.1217 According

to one state actor:

…we need relocation money…That task should be given to regional agencies…they have adequate resources…personnel and data…advocate to…donors… international community…on relocation for cross-border…Regional agencies will be able to represent the interest of the broader region… as opposed to individual governments…of Pacific Island nations…it demands the international community and the donors to give priority to the Region, especially of the testimonies globally delivered by atoll island nations such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands and Nauru.1218

One non-state actor cautioned that efforts to access funding at a global level by Pacific Island

countries would be stymied and queried: ‘…what are the criteria for accessing the GCF? Will

we (Pacific) be able to meet those criteria (GCF)?1219 The non-state actor indicated that: ‘most

of the agencies will ask for evidence base…A lot of our countries do not have data (data gaps).

So they (global funding institutions) are putting in place a lot of criteria that are limiting our

1212 Ibid. 1213 Ibid. 1214 Ibid. 1215 Ibid. 1216 Ibid. 1217 Interview with NSA#1, SA#5, above n 1084. 1218 Interview with SA#5, NSA#3, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#2, above n 1110. 1219 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084.

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ability to access funding. They have changed the criteria to make it difficult for us to

access….’1220

There are similarities with the empirical findings in this study with the case study approach

adopted by Dean, Green and Nunn, who ‘analysed the first national adaptation project of

Kiribati (Kiribati Adaptation Project–KAP)’ which was supplemented by the empirical

evidence gathered from their field interviews with participants (n = 60) in Kiribati.1221 Briefly,

‘planning and policy; integrated coastal management; improved freshwater supply; capacity-

building and awareness-raising among communities; and project management’ were the

thematic areas of the KAP.1222 They recorded that the ‘continental expectations embedded in

donor procedures and requirements for the KAP hindered the project’s own outcomes from

being achieved and sustained.’1223 They assert that ‘donors impose procedures, policies,

requirements, and techniques based on continental thinking, perpetuate both real and perceived

lack of capacity’ which inhibit ‘geographies of development and adaptation that are

sustainable in island contexts.’1224 They further assert that ‘[c]apacity-building initiatives

(monitoring, reporting, and donor-stipulated formats) for procurement and financial

management often emphasise Western, top-down techniques.’1225 They point out that donors

need to recognise and ‘understand islands on their own terms as there is no official capacity to

respond to all questions and studies and requirements’ in seeking financial assistance for

development projects.1226

In like manner, the empirical findings are consistent with studies conducted by Adelman, who

points out that the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with

Climate Change Impacts (WIM) focuses ‘primarily on insurance (conventional insurance,

insurance-linked securities) rather than compensation at the behest of developed countries.’1227

He further points out that ‘insurance is problematic because premiums are likely to be

unaffordable for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and provide limited coverage that

may not include the costs of relocation and resettlement.’1228 He argues that ‘[t]he

disappearance of one’s homeland through the fault of others (developed countries) is an

1220 Ibid. 1221 Dean, Green, and Nunn, above n 822, 54, 55, 64. 1222 Ibid 54, 65. 1223 Ibid 54, 76. 1224 Ibid 54, 55. 1225 Ibid 54, 60. 1226 See above nn 1221-25, 54–5, 60. 1227 Adelman, above n 103, 48. 1228 Ibid 48–9.

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unavoidable and irrecoverable loss that constitutes an extreme climate injustice for which

islanders should be compensated.’1229 In the absence of adequate prescriptions in the WIM,

Adelman suggests climate justice principles, common but differentiated responsibilities, as a

basis to increase the probability of developed countries to compensate SIDS for climatic loss

and damage.1230

Likewise, further work by Adelman examining Article 5 (REDD+) and Article 8 loss and

damage of the operative text of the Paris Agreement, found that references to relocation and

resettlement remained exiguous in the Paris Agreement.1231 He claims that the omission

‘signifies a significant failure to protect human rights of the citizens of SIDS.’1232 He argues

that ‘[t]here is an urgent need to protect the human rights of climate-displaced persons under

international law, preferably within the UNFCCC.’1233

The empirical evidence in this study is consistent with studies by Adelman, who suggests that

access to existing funding vehicles is less well articulated at the global level for large-scale

relocation projects. The intervention of regional agencies to extend support and technical

assistance to Pacific Island nations to access global funding suggests a practical alternative.

However, global climate funding is non-existent for large-scale relocation (internal and cross-

border) on the grounds of climate change, which brings to the forefront funding as a key theme.

Sovereignty

Half of the participants (n = 9) highlighted the sovereignty of autonomous states as a

significant issue for large-scale cross-border relocation. Participants identified the key focus

areas linked to the issue of sovereignty as ‘1) exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Kiribati and

Tuvalu when these islands no longer exist, 2) EEZ provisions under United Nations

Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 3) citizenship and identity of communities of

origin, and 4) the Pacific Island nations as regional partners under the notion of

regionalism.’1234 The first two focus areas are addressed below, with the remainder integrated

separately in this section (citizenship, nationality and regionalism). Overall, the participants’

1229 Ibid 35. 1230 Ibid 34–6. 1231 Adelman, above n 178, 17. 1232 Ibid 13. 1233 Ibid. 1234 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146; interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#7, NSA#11, SA#4, above n 1084.

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accounts of sovereignty were inquisitorial, which is reflected in the interview data detailed

next.

One state actor queried: ‘… So, who has right over that (Kiribati/Tuvalu basepoints) …is the

big legal question at the international level…if all our basepoints are there and it does not

sustain life, then under the strict legal interpretation of UNCLOS, it is disqualified…

Sovereignty is being challenged internally…geographically…at a regional level and…global

level…’1235 One non-state actor also queried: ‘If Fiji offers to take them, what happens…in

terms of their (Kiribati) ocean…claim…EEZ in return?...under UNCLOS?...become nomads

land or does it remain with Kiribati, because it will be under the ocean? What can be done at

that level for Fiji to benefit? Some sort of compensation? Or access rights to fishing?...’1236

Another non-state actor questioned: ‘…[w]hat level of autonomy you can provide to…Kiribati

and Tuvalu?...do they…become subservient…people would like to maintain their race,

ethnicity, cultural… Do you want a nation within a nation? Can that happen?’1237 One state

actor emphasised that: ‘…identity and sovereignty cannot be negotiated…They

(Kiribati/Tuvalu) cannot create another government…here (Fiji)…An island with two

governments…sovereignty issue is compromised…You will not be moving your territorial

sovereignty within Fiji.’1238

These empirical findings are similar to those in a large volume of published studies that

acknowledge statehood and sovereignty are issues open for debate and require in-depth

consideration in response to the large-scale relocation of Pacific Island communities due to

the adverse impacts of climate change.1239 The studies also acknowledge that ‘in some extreme

cases it is conceivable that land may even disappear’, which brings to the forefront

fundamental questions on ocean governance under the UNCLOS, or as Rayfuse points out, an

‘intriguing juridical dilemma.’1240 The reason for this, Rayfuse argues, is because the

‘discussions on the issue of disappearing states may be premature, an unhelpful diversion, or

1235 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1236 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1237 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1238 Interview with SA#7, above 1138. 1239 Rayfuse, above n 379, 167–91; see also McAdam, above n 13, 281–333; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 6–7; see also: ‘…statehood:…defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and a certain measure of independence…’ as cited in Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, ‘When Do States Disappear?’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 57. 1240 Campbell, above n 75, 57; see also Rayfuse, above n 379, 169; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 6–7.

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both’ in global climate policy fora in contemporary times.1241 Rayfuse, in citing the work of

Khadem, further points out that ‘when a state loses its permanent population (i.e. population

having fled/relocation) and/or physical territory’ it potentially induces inter-state competing

relations, conflict and ‘disputes over navigation rights and, more particularly sovereignty

rights to living and non-living resources.’1242 However, she suggests the ‘juridical dilemmas

posed by sea level rise are necessary preparations that will assist coastal states and

disappearing states to establish the legal conditions necessary to maintain their maritime

jurisdictional interests and, potentially their existence as States.’1243

The findings in this study are consistent with the empirical studies conducted by McAdam,

who examined the incongruous exchange of proposals and demands advanced by both

Australia and Nauru to remedy the impact of their (and New Zealand’s) phosphate mining

during the twentieth century.1244 McAdam argues that the Australian Government proposed

the wholesale relocation of the Nauruan population to Curtis Island in Queensland. Briefly,

the terms of resettlement included restoring the livelihoods of the Nauruan population, fully

covering resettlement costs, granting citizenship, and the ‘right to manage their own local

administration and legislate for their own country.’1245 The Australian Government maintained

that ‘sovereignty will not by surrendered’ to the Nauruans.1246 The Nauruan representatives in

the first instance insisted on ‘rehabilitation of their land over relocation because it would

enable them to remain in their homes and preserve their identity.’1247 Alternatively, ‘Nauruans

proposed the creation of a sovereign Nauruan nation governed by Nauruans in their own

interest.’1248 McAdam points out that the deadlock between the two countries revolved mainly

around a sovereign state on Curtis Island to preserve their distinct identity and culture.1249

McAdam, claims that the dismissed proposal for wholesale relocation between Australia and

Nauru ‘provides a cautionary tale for perennial discussions about future relocation of Pacific

Island communities in the face of climate change.’1250 She identifies ‘the right to self-

determination, self-governance, the preservation of identity and culture, and the right to

1241 Rayfuse, above n 379, 169; see also Paul D’ Arcy, ‘The Lawless Sea? Policy Options for Voluntary Compliance Regimes in Offshore Resource Zones in the Pacific’ (2014) 1(2) Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 297, 297, 304. 1242 Rayfuse, above n 379, 175, 177. 1243 Ibid 169. 1244 McAdam, above n 1164, 7–16. 1245 Ibid 10–11. 1246 Ibid. 1247 Ibid 9. 1248 Ibid 11. 1249 Ibid 7–8, 10–12. 1250 Ibid 7.

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control resources’ as key issues for consideration in planned relocation for ‘low-lying Pacific

island communities at risk from the impacts of climate change.’1251

The empirical findings in this study are also consistent with previous studies conducted by

Campbell and highlighted earlier. Campbell’s investigation into the ‘importance of land to

Pacific island communities’, and its implication ‘for those who may be forced to sever ties

with it (land)’ due to the likely effects of climate change is notable.1252 Campbell claims that

‘[i]t is unlikely that any country, including those in the Pacific, would cede sovereignty over

a part of their territory to a relocated group.’1253 He points out that ‘it is equally unlikely that

a relocated group could sustain its “way” in a foreign land that did not accept or understand

many of the cultural beliefs or practices, including their bond to the land.’1254 He further points

out that ‘if the land is to become uninhabited, uninhabitable, or at worst non-existent, the

critical people-land union may decline.’1255

Taken together, the focus areas (UNCLOS, EEZ and access to resources) linked to the issue

of sovereignty in the context of cross-border relocation presents multiple layers of contentious

and complex issues. Several questions remain unanswered at present as the issues remain

poorly defined under international law. One of the suggested approaches to advance the issue

of sovereignty at the global stage is for Pacific Islands leaders to exert pressure as a region on

the global stage to preserve its maritime boundaries and zones within the Pacific Island region.

Moreover, the international community could collectively participate and scale-up dialogue in

global policy fora to provide a way forward on potential emerging issues before relocation

across sovereign borders specific to Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji is implemented.

Culture and Identity

Culture and identity were identified as issues pertinent for readiness by a small number of

participants (n = 4). Identity here refers to a sense of belonging to a place and recognition as

opposed to the legal identity of a person. According to one non-state actor: ‘[i]t (culture)

is…connections with the ancestors of the land…burial sites…It is a huge trade-off and difficult

1251 Ibid 12; see also Stoutenburg, above n 1239, 77. 1252 Campbell, above n 75, 57. 1253 Ibid 67. 1254 Ibid. 1255 Ibid.

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to reconcile.’1256 There is some evidence in the literature to suggest that if large-scale

relocation is to take place because of the impacts of climate change then the preferred

destination would be to neighbouring Pacific Island nations over other global destinations.1257

The empirical investigation into climate change and migration issues in the Pacific by

Campbell and Warrick found that Pacific Island communities would be ideally positioned to

maintain and retain the cultural values and their identity because of the ‘environmental and

cultural similarities’ in the Pacific region relative to western countries.1258

Similarly, one state actor reflected on the internal relocation experiences recalling testimonies

such as ‘…“my soul is here”, “I and connected to my land”, “my ancestors are buried beside

my house”…“you are not just relocating one person but an entire village settlement”.’1259 The

state actor suggested ‘…do the cultural plan for them…you have to make them understand…it

is the mindset…they have…’1260 The design and particulars of the cultural plan are

undetermined. However, the cultural plan offers some insight into mapping out the issues

around culture and identity in the context of cross-border relocation. In addition, integrating

the cultural plan into all phases (preparation, design and implementation) of the cross-border

relocation project by the Fijian Government is suggested.

The findings observed in this study mirror those of previous studies reported by the United

Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR 5)

Working Group II (IPCC AR 5, WG II), which examined the ‘effect of climate change on

culture.’1261 The report found that ‘climate change threatens human security because it

undermines livelihoods, compromises culture and individual identity, increases migration that

people would rather have avoided, and because it can undermine the ability of states to provide

the conditions necessary for human security.’1262

Additionally, the empirical findings in this study are consistent with Allgood and McNamara’s

field research conducted with 60 local residents situated in four villages in South Tarawa,

Kiribati.1263 Their investigation focused on the perspectives of residents on ‘climate change

impacts and adaptation strategies, and details about how households have used migration, if at

1256 Interview with NSA#11, above n 1084. 1257 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 20. 1258 Ibid. 1259 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1260 Ibid. 1261 Adger et al, above n 37, 758, 762. 1262 Ibid. 1263 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370.

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all, as a livelihood strategy.’1264 The empirical evidence revealed that 74 per cent were in

agreement about the need to migrate when the question on ‘migration as part of a long term

strategy to respond to sudden or gradual impacts of climate change’ was directed to them.1265

Furthermore, Allgood and McNamara recorded that a small number of residents dismissed

‘leaving their homeland.’1266 The ‘strong connection to their land, way of life and the potential

loss of culture and traditions’ were the reasons recorded.1267 Other reasons that also surfaced

included: ‘(i) concern about a different way of life at the destination, (ii) climate change denial,

(iii) religious beliefs and (iv) potential loss of sovereignty and traditional skills.’1268 The

findings from Allgood and McNamara, while preliminary, suggest that for residents to be

uprooted from their land is non-negotiable.

Taken together, the findings in this study suggest that Pacific peoples are rooted in their land

and culture, and these uniquely identify them. In the literature on migration and relocation as

an adaptation strategy of last resort to respond to the impacts of climate change, the relative

importance of land to the Pacific peoples, their culture and identity remains the subject of

considerable debate.1269 Scholars such as Mortreux and Barnett, and Farbotko in

acknowledging land, ‘culture, identity and a sense of home’ of South Pacific peoples as being

important, point out that ‘migration and relocation should not be regarded as the only or most

important form of adaptation strategy.’1270 They point out that the ‘vulnerability of

ecosystems’ in the South Pacific has received considerable attention in the field of

environmental studies rather than on ‘the ways in which social and ecological systems can

avoid or adjust to actual or expected climate impacts (such as forced migration can be

avoided).’1271 They further point out that to date, little evidence has been found ‘about the

likelihood (and desirability) of migration as an adaptation strategy in the Pacific’ which

appears to support ‘the widely held assumption that climate change is, will, or should result in

migration and relocation of whole populations in the Pacific Islands.’1272 This suggests that

interventions into adaptation initiatives is a central feature underlying mobility decisions from

the impacts of climate change.

1264 Ibid 370, 373–4, 381–2. 1265 Ibid 381. 1266 Ibid 370, 379, 381. 1267 Ibid 381. 1268 Ibid 379. 1269 Ibid 381. 1270 Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 105, 111; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1271 Mortreux and Barnett, above n 1270 and accompanying text. 1272 Ibid. See also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 139-40.

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In this study, several questions remain unanswered on arrangements to safeguard the culture

and identity of communities of origin in the host country, as these hinge on some key issues

indicated earlier, for instance, citizenship and nationality, and sovereignty. It can be argued

that the autonomy of communities of origin and host communities may potentially be

encroached.1273 A well-articulated program and congruous plan to operationalise cross-border

relocation is recommended in order to minimise the likelihood of potential emerging conflicts

and tensions amongst communities, post relocation.

Consultations and Inclusiveness

A small number of participants (n = 3) identified consultations with individual clans/heads in

a village as one of the issues of readiness.1274 As one non-state actor stated:

Inclusive approach by the government of the day…conduct consultation and inform the host communities about government’s plan to relocate new communities…let host communities know about the expectations…it is important that the government of the day fully inform host communities as the resettlement will be…indefinitely, which can lead to a number of social implications…government should be able to facilitate issues arising from resettlement… look after the welfare...1275

According to one state actor ‘Government will be the lead agency and we have the faith-based

organisations, local communities, everyone needs to take ownership of this process.’1276

Likewise, participants emphasised the inclusion of a wide range of communities and

vulnerable groups in the implementation of relocation projects.1277 One state actor commented:

‘…look at the gender groups…i.e. women need to be part of this big decision-making because

these are the people that will feel the burden of most relocations.’1278 The state actor reflected

on the first internal relocation experiences of communities in Vunidogoloa and provided an

account of women being divided with regard to: ‘…running the daily household chores and

going out to the sea with their fishing nets to collect fish, i.e. smaller things such as the

travelling time from the new site to the sea unlike a couple

1273 The Inspection Panel, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank Group, ‘Involuntary Resettlement’ (Research Report No 1, The Inspection Panel and The World Bank, April 2016) 16 (‘Inspection Panel Report 2016’). 1274 Interview with NSA#1, NSA#4, NSA#5, SA#5, above n 1084. 1275 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084. 1276 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1277 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084; see also Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 22. 1278 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084.

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of steps at the old site. Psychologically it affects them.’1279 The state actor pointed out that one

common reason for the exclusion of gender groups in major national projects is because:

‘…gender decision-making is silenced in most Pacific island structures.’1280

The empirical findings of this study are also consistent with those of previous studies

conducted by the ADB into advancing technical assistance towards internal and international

migration.1281 The ADB found that ‘[i]n all cases, the participation of affected communities in

the decision-making process will be vital to limit the negative impact on culture and social

networks, and to ensure livelihood opportunities and social services after relocation.’1282 The

explicit inclusion, active participation and consultations by the government of the day with

mainstream and marginalised sections of the community of the host country across

implementation plans and programs for cross-border relocation is suggested.

Faith-based Organisations

The integration and engagement of faith-based organisations in relocation decision-making

was one of the issues identified by participants (n = 3). As identified previously, one non-state

actor alluded to the notion of ‘…the promise of Noah i.e. God’s promise to Noah i.e. “Rainbow

as a Promise and Rainbow as a Hope”’ and pointed out that ‘…some of our communities from

Tuvalu and Kiribati…still tightly gripped to that philosophy…’1283 The non-state actor

indicated that ‘…Churches go in…to give hope…about relocation focusing on opportunities

they could get at the new site which is deteriorating or not promised at the existing site. So

when there is still time to build and relocate is an opportunity. That’s…where the framing of

the Church messages to our communities is changed…’1284

The perspectives of participants in this study are consistent with previous studies conducted

by McAdam, John Connell, Shen and Gemenne, Kelly Wyett, Fair, and Allgood and

McNamara into understanding the role faith plays for Pacific peoples in responding to the

adverse effects of environmental events.1285 The empirical work of authors in the Pacific region

1279 Ibid. 1280 Ibid. 1281 ADB Report, above n 10, 55. 1282 Ibid. 1283 Interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1284 Ibid. 1285 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370–85; see also Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 224–42; see also Wyett, above n 379, 171–85; see also McAdam, above n 354, 1–26. See also Mortreux and

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suggests that the Pacific peoples are strongly rooted in their religious beliefs and that these

overshadow migration and relocation options to sustain their security and livelihoods in the

future.1286 This also accords with earlier observations described by McAdam, Allgood and

McNamara, Fair, and Shen and Gemenne about the ‘Bible story in which God makes a promise

to Noah to never flood the Earth again is often used by communities to justify their decision

to stay, despite the projected severity of conditions.’1287 Shen and Gemenne point out that the

‘Church is now considering the problem seriously, and has started raising awareness about the

problem, as well dismissing Noah’s story as a metaphorical legend, not to be taken

literally.’1288 Fair, in acknowledging the extensive role and inclusion of ‘religious

organisations in the Pacific region’ (Pacific Conferences of Churches, for example) to advance

‘climate advocacy’ points out that ‘Pacific Island churches do not prioritise climate change

due to budgetary restrictions, or shortages of technical knowledge.’1289 She asserts ‘that in

order for churches to be maximally engaged in climate communication, adaptation and

advocacy, there is a need to look beyond churches merely as convenient institutional

frameworks for information and community mobilisation and to consider the power and

potency of religious ideas.’1290 She argues that the interpretation of ‘the Noah story’ from the

standpoint of ‘different combination of knowledges (traditional knowledge and Western

science, for example)’ offers variable responses.1291 She suggests that a greater degree of

importance needs to be directed in ‘balancing multiple epistemologies of climate change and

navigating relationships between the combination of knowledges’ as a way forward to

harmonise ‘faith-based climate change denial.’1292

The intervention of faith-based organisations in reconciling misconceptions of the Pacific

peoples on migration and relocation decision-making and facilitating social cohesion of

communities of origin and communities of destination in all phases of the cross-border

relocation project is suggested.

Barnett, above n 379, 105–12; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 65; see also John Connell, ‘Losing Ground? Tuvalu, the Greenhouse Effect and the Garbage Can’ (2003) 44(2) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 89, 89–107; see also Fair, above n 1106, 1–15. 1286 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370, 380; see also Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 224, 233; see also Wyett, above n 379, 171, 176; see also McAdam, above n 354, 1, 11; see also Connell, above n 1285, 89, 97. 1287 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370, 380; see also McAdam, above n 354, 1, 11. 1288 Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 233. 1289 Fair, above n 1106, 1, 3. 1290 Ibid. 1291 Ibid 1, 12. 1292 Ibid 1, 5, 12.

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Human Rights

Safeguarding the rights of relocating communities’ was one of the issues identified by

participants (n = 2) for readiness. One state actor indicated that: ‘…some parts of the guideline

(national relocation guideline) has been formulated through a human rights lens where

appropriate.’1293 The draft guidelines are publicly unavailable, as indicated earlier in this

chapter. However, it can be presumed that by recognising rights-based concerns in the draft

guidelines, policymakers can be future focused to integrate and establish measures to protect

and safeguard the rights of communities of origin in all phases of the cross-border relocation

process.

Previous work in the field of climate-induced migration and resettlement acknowledges that

the ‘rights to life, health, culture and property’ are likely to be undermined in the process of

relocation.1294 There is consensus among scholars that ‘[r]ights-based concerns are driven by

the need to offer protection to people whose livelihoods will be depleted or destroyed by the

climate-induced changes which impel them to migrate.’1295 The studies conducted by the ADB

indicated earlier confirm that ‘there are no international legal frameworks that specifically

target the people displaced by environmental disruption.’1296 While the ADB acknowledges

the existence of ‘instruments and mechanisms’, they also acknowledge that ‘they are little

known and inconsistently implemented.’1297 The ADB suggests that both regional and global

protection frameworks are required.1298 Several questions remain unanswered at present, as

arrangements negotiated at national and regional levels by Pacific Island governments to

support cross-border relocation are poorly defined and underdetermined. However, it is

suggested that the governments of Pacific Island countries do not lose sight of a rights-based

approach as a key determinant and priority agenda item in regional policy fora.

1293 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1294 Adelman, above n 178, 20–1; see also Kalin, above n 354, 83–4; see also Roger Zetter, ‘Protecting People Displaced by Climate Change: Some Conceptual Challenges’ in McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 131–50. See also: ‘…[t]he resultant injustices will take many forms. It is unclear whether the right to self-determination of such island nations will lapse with the disappearance of their territory, and they have no entitlement to another territory. The rights to health, food and life are amongst those under threat, and affected communities will suffer cultural and spiritual losses when they are dispersed into diaspora communities…’ as cited in Adelman, Climate justice, loss and damage, above n 103, 43. 1295 Zetter, above n 1294, 132; see also McAdam, above n 354, 3. 1296 ADB Report, above n 10, 55. 1297 Ibid. 1298 Ibid.

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Tertiary Education

Introducing specific areas of study is one of the issues identified by participants (n = 2).

According to one non-state actor:

…what type of education program/strategy they (Kiribati/Tuvalu) have in place, what type of skill level they building their population to, in the event that they will have to migrate to allow countries (like Fiji) to absorb them. Have we in Fiji, looked at our needs in the areas that we can say, if we consider resettlement, we want your population (Kiribati/Tuvalu) to endeavour to fill in the gaps in e.g. medical field. So the aid and everything else these countries (Kiribati/Tuvalu) receives goes towards supporting the current population to educate themselves and their children to be able to assimilate into any host country. So they, don’t become a social burden to the rest of the problems of the host country. Maybe there can be a corresponding policy in Kiribati and Tuvalu for them to upgrade their skills in certain areas, before anything happens, they might have an opportunity to come and work over here…it will work for their advantage and get themselves established.1299

There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by participants in this study and those

described by McAdam, whose field research in Tuvalu and Kiribati examined mobility arising

as a result of environmental factors.1300 McAdam found that:

[w]hile people in Kiribati and Tuvalu are aware of climate change, for a variety of reasons they

are not necessarily worrying about it. Religion, lack of education and a culture of “living for

today and not planning for tomorrow” contribute to a certain degree of complacency about

environmental change.1301

This suggests a need for the education sector, the private sector and faith-based organisations

to collectively initiate strategies and programs and to educate and enhance the knowledge and

skills of communities of origin about the debilitating impacts of climate change and potential

migration in the future.

People

One of the issues participants (n = 2) identified was “people” who are at the heart of

relocation.1302 As one non state-actor stated: ‘Cross-border is a complicated issue… three

components are essential: 1) people—developing/building/enhancing the capacity of host

communities and receiving communities in of access to human rights and human security and

sovereignty, 2) land tenure, and 3)financial capital…’1303

1299 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1300 McAdam, above n 354, 1–2. 1301 Ibid 10. 1302 Interview with NSA#3, SA#6, above n 1084. 1303 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084.

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The World Bank, in conducting meaningful baseline studies in response to involuntary

resettlement points out that the explicit reference to “people” is defined as the ‘identification

of vulnerable groups that require special attention, including gender-and aged-based groups;

vulnerable groups (such as indigenous peoples, the disabled or those with special needs); and

the landless.’1304 The broad use of the term “peoples” is sometimes equated with Indigenous

peoples and communities.1305 Adelman, in citing the works of Krakoff, describes that

‘indigenous communities adopt the term “peoples” to reflect core concerns with group identity

and accompanying communal and collective self-determination.’1306 Similarly, McAdam

argues that ‘resettlement across borders must include - but also go beyond - the establishment

of formal institutions such as governance bodies and citizenship.’1307 She points out that

‘[s]afeguards must ensure that the group (relocated group) can carve out an identity in the new

environment (receiving country), have access to the same entitlements as others, and also

understand themselves as having dual identity that has political and cultural relevance in both

settings (both in the sending and receiving countries).’1308

A central issue underlying migration and relocation is the “people”. It is suggested that

policymakers need to examine more closely the interconnected links between “people” and

the economic, legal, social and political dimensions of relocation.1309

Notion of Regionalism

Some participants (n = 2) identified the issue of the intervention and cooperation of Pacific

Island countries to extend support for cross-border relocation under the notion of regionalism

‘(“for Pacific Islanders, by Pacific Islanders” or the “distinctive Pacific voice”) as

important.’1310 As one state actor articulated: ‘Government (Fiji) showing the world that we

1304 Emerging Lessons Series No.1: Involuntary Resettlement (The Inspection Panel – World Bank Group) 7, < http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/521101467989568006/pdf/105660-NWP-Box394887B-PUBLIC-PUBDATE-4-12-16.pdf >. 1305 Adelman, above n 178, 17–36. 1306 Ibid 20. 1307 McAdam, above n 87, 327. 1308 Ibid. 1309 Kalin, above n 354, 82–3. 1310 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#2, above n 1110; see also Joyetter Feagaimaali’i-Luamanu, ‘Why Regionalism Matters’ (Media Release, 2 September 2017) <http://www.samoaobserver.ws/en/03_09_2017/local/23870/Why-regionalism-matters.htm>. See also Sandra Tarte, ‘Regionalism and Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands’ (2014) 1(2) Asia and The Pacific Policy Studies 312, 312–324; see also: ‘…regionalism for Pacific islanders, by Pacific

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are committed to climate change to the extent of accommodating communities. This is part of

regionalism. Regionalism doesn’t recognise borders and sovereignty…’1311 The findings are

consistent with previous research highlighted earlier by the ADB.1312 The ADB reported that

‘regional cooperation which builds on existing geopolitical bonds and economic relations is

more likely to be effective in addressing the problem of climate change displacement.’1313

Another state actor provided a divergent view, pointing out that the notion of regionalism

needs to be interpreted with caution in connection with relocation, stating that: ‘…if you are

compromising everything in the name of regionalism, then you cannot exercise

autonomy…And that is the thing we are seeing now.’1314

There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by participants in this study and the

empirical studies conducted by Klepp and Herbeck.1315 Their field research consisted of

interviews with governmental and non-governmental organisations in Fiji and Kiribati

between 2011 and 2015, which was complemented by their previous empirical research

conducted in ‘2010 and 2011 in Vanuatu, Kiribati and New Zealand.’1316 The investigation by

Klepp and Herbeck focused on the ‘regional Pacific negotiation process on environmental and

climate change migration and the possibilities and limits of various strategies and

alliances.’1317 They recognised the significant role and contribution extended by the ‘Alliance

of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Small Island Developing States (SDIS)’ at global

policy fora under the UNFCCC.1318 They found that ‘island states are trying to develop

common policies to bolster their position at the UN and that many new forms of Pacific

solidarity and cooperation have recently emerged in the course of ongoing climate change

discussions.’1319 In like manner, the evidence of ‘the vision of Pacific governments to protect,

promote and fulfil human rights of all Pacific people’ is reflected in the ‘Framework for Pacific

islanders…’ as cited in Tarte, 322; see also: ‘…regionalism includes Pacific island state and non-state actors…institutional voice of Pacific Small Island Developing States at the global and wider regional levels…’ as cited in Tarte, 313. See also ‘…regionalism through partnerships approach’ as cited in Tarte, 312; see also ‘…Pacific regionalism as a foreign policy and development strategy…Pacific island states have recognised the need to become more active participants in global debates on sustainable development, climate change and ocean governance…(global and regional agendas)…’ as cited in Tarte, 322. 1311 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1312 ADB Report, above n 10, 56. 1313 Ibid. 1314 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1315 Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54–73. 1316 Ibid 56–7. 1317 Ibid 56. 1318 Ibid 65. 1319 Ibid.

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Regionalism (Regionalism Framework) endorsed by Pacific Island Leaders.’1320 The

Regionalism Framework embodies a multitude of ‘regional collective action’ such as

‘coordinated application of shared, best practice, norms and standards; sustainably harnessing

the region’s physical, social and cultural assets for the benefit of the Pacific people; and

regional economic integration and equitable distribution of benefits and costs.’1321 In addition,

the Regionalism Framework has been bolstered by the ‘Denarau Declaration on Human Rights

and Good Governance to drawn upon international human rights treaties, conventions and laws

as tools for policy, legislative and normative change to enhance good governance and the

realisation of human rights for all Pacific peoples.’1322

The findings and the regional policy initiatives suggests that strong agreement exists between

Pacific Island countries on the need to garner support on a host of issues specific to the region.

It demonstrates the impetus of Pacific Island leaders in leading decisions collectively at a

regional level. It also demonstrates that leaders could potentially craft arrangements to

implement climate-induced cross-border relocation projects in the region in the future.

The issues identified by participants for the cross-border relocation of communities

corroborate the findings of many of the previous empirical studies conducted by scholars in

the displacement and migration field of studies, particularly those conducted on the Pacific.

The analysis of the issues undertaken in this study has gone some way towards enhancing our

knowledge to map out the key themes in response to cross-border relocation of communities

from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji.

The availability of, and access to, land for relocation (land); the legal status determination of

communities of origin anchored potentially by citizenship and nationality arrangements

(citizenship and nationality); access to funds specifically for relocation (funding) and the

controversial subject of sovereignty were key themes drawn from the issues and frequently

identified by over half of the participants. The remainder of the key themes presented less

uniformly by fewer than half of the participants related to:

1) maintaining the culture and identity of communities of origin in the host country (culture

and identity);

1320 Pacific Community, ‘Human Rights in the Pacific a situational analysis’ (Research Report, Pacific Community, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016) 1, 5, 7; see also Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, ‘The Framework for Pacific Regionalism’ (Research Report, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2014) 1-16 (‘Regionalism Framework’). 1321 Regionalism Framework, above n 1320, 4. 1322 Pacific Community, above n 1320, 1, 5, 7.

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2) the extensive inclusion and meaningful participation of authorities and agencies with all

members of the relocating communities in every phase of the relocation project

(consultations and inclusiveness);

3) extending to include the participation and inclusion of faith-based organisations assisting

with relocation decision-making by communities (faith-based organisations);

4) ensuring that all phases of the cross-border projects focus on communities (people); and

are implemented using a human-rights based approach;

5) strengthening the education sector to enhance the knowledge and skills of relocating

communities (tertiary education) and;

6) more information on the notion of regionalism in cross-border relocation at a regional

level.

The data dispersion represented by key themes in this study are widely distributed and should

not be interpreted so as to outweigh the less frequent themes. It is recommended that some of

the key themes may need to be positioned and addressed in initial policy-making discussions,

plans and design of cross-border relocation projects. Moreover, the key themes provide a new

understanding to conceptually analyse the criteria of readiness specific to cross-border

relocation projects. This will assist in the analysis of Fiji’s readiness for cross-border

relocation of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji, which is presented in chapter

seven.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore, through field research, the experiences and lessons learned by

participants from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government to answer

RQ 1(b). The field research laid the foundation to further investigate the issues responsive to

readiness in the context of cross-border relocation of communities. What is apparent from the

findings that emerged from the empirical evidence and the analysis of the literature and

published reports is that the availability of and access to land, including consent of landowners,

is pivotal to relocation.1323 The second major finding was the necessity of ensuring the

inclusiveness of all people and conducting meaningful consultation with relocating

communities during all phases of the relocation project.1324 This chapter has also shown that

the most important issue of all was the prioritisation of people: that is, their collective

1323 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; see also McAdam, above n 87, 301–27. 1324 Ibid.

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participation and consensus in relocation decisions. The other key area identified was the

capacity development of state and non-state actors to facilitate relocation projects, which

underscores inclusiveness and consultation in cross-border relocation projects.1325

The field research also set out to examine arrangements by the Fijian Government spanning

legal, regulatory, policy and institutional dimensions at local, national and regional levels as

part of readiness for large-scale climate-induced cross-border relocation of communities from

Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. The overall results of this investigation have shown that

arrangements are not well advanced by the Fijian Government to respond to cross-border

relocation at any of these levels. The findings from the interview data have shown that a

national policy, followed by a stand-alone policy on cross-border relocation, or alternatively,

the revision of the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji) are approaches that can be adopted across the

policy and regulatory dimensions at the national level to enhance readiness. Furthermore, the

interview data have shown that bi-lateral arrangements, a memorandum of understanding

between the host country and countries of origin or alternatively a treaty, are strategies that

could be adopted by the Fijian Government as part of ensuring readiness.

Moreover, it was apparent from the empirical evidence and the analysis of empirical studies

conducted in the Pacific that the relocation of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji,

including the dual citizenship and nationality arrangements, provided a basis for understanding

readiness.1326 Taken together, these results suggest several courses of action by the Fijian

Government as a starting point for ensuring readiness. The arrangements at local, national and

regional levels could be usefully explored in further research.

Finally, this chapter has identified the key themes to be citizenship and nationality, funding

and sovereignty, among others illustrated in Table 1. The data, which emerged from the

empirical evidence and the analysis of published studies on displacement and migration from

sudden- and slow-onset environmental events show that broad considerations must be taken

into account as part of ensuring readiness for large-scale cross border relocation.1327 This

chapter also shows that the issues of citizenship and nationality, culture and identity,

sovereignty and regionalism are subject to considerable debate.1328 This study also identifies

important focus areas for future research and potentially for deliberation and negotiation by

the host country and countries of origin in future regional policy fora. Further, analysis has

1325 Ibid. 1326 Ibid; see also Jane McAdam, above n 13, 281–333. 1327 See above n 1323 and accompanying text. 1328 Ibid.

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shown that a human-rights based approach offers some insight into addressing potential

insecurities and inequalities in all phases of relocation as part of readiness.

Overall, the results from the empirical evidence and analysis have extended understanding of

the areas of inquiry into what it means to be ready for the cross-border relocation of

communities. The next chapter draws together the findings from this chapter with the host of

considerations presented by the case studies in chapter four and the multidisciplinary

perspectives on readiness in chapter five, to articulate the criteria for analysing readiness for

climate change-induced relocation of communities across sovereign borders.

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Chapter 7: Analysis of the Fijian Government’s Readiness

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it draws upon the multifaceted determinants of

the phenomenon of readiness conceptualised in chapters four, five and six to articulate the

criteria for assessing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility. This

answers R Q 1 of the study, which asks: What are the criteria for readiness in the context of

climate change-induced human mobility? To respond to RQ 1, this chapter synthesises and

analyses the findings uncovered from the sub-questions linked to RQ 1. These comprise the

experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific

Islanders (RQ 1a), the empirical findings of the experiences and lessons learned from the

internal relocation of communities initiated by the Fijian Government (RQ 1b) and the body

of experience of readiness documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives

(RQ 1c). Together, these provide the foundation to frame the criteria of readiness.

Second, this chapter analyses the current position, that is readiness, of the Fijian Government

to respond to the climate change-induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign

borders to Fiji. This is evaluated against the criteria of readiness articulated from the

multifaceted analysis of data pertaining to RQ 1. Assessing the level of readiness of the Fijian

Government answers the second key research question (RQ 2) of the study, which asks: What

is the current state of Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale mobility of Pacific Islanders as a

result of climate change? This chapter will use data obtained from the field interviews as

evidence to support the findings of the analysis of the readiness of the Fijian Government.

Third, this chapter provides a brief overview of the key areas for possible reform within

existing laws. Moreover, this chapter identifies overarching determinants as a starting point to

guide and contribute to a legal framework for climate change-induced readiness. The reform

perspective answers the third research question of the study, which asks: What reforms are

necessary to ensure that Fiji is ready to receive Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change?

A comprehensive reform-oriented discussion of the required laws and the development of a

legal framework is beyond the scope of this study, as the core focus of the investigation is to

articulate the criteria for assessing readiness.

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7.2 Multifaceted Determinants

The sources of data to articulate the criteria of readiness are drawn from the considerable case

study literature documenting the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders presented in

chapter four and the phenomenon of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives presented

in chapter five. They also include the findings recorded in the field research conducted with

eighteen participants (n = 18) in Fiji presented in chapter six. What follows are the

determinants conceptualised from the sources of data arranged respectively.

The determinants presented in the case studies in chapter four showed the need for:

1) meaningful consultation by the government and project proponents in the receiving and

host communities with ‘all affected persons, including women, children and indigenous

peoples’, and the inclusiveness of all persons in relocation decision-making;1329

2) suitability and location of land for relocation by the government and project proponents,

including the availability of land to provide food security and restore the livelihoods of

communities of origin in the receiving state;1330

3) ‘sustained and sufficient financing to cover costs and investments of moving and

resettlement’ of communities of origin in the receiving state, ‘and to compensate for loss

of community ties, land and cultural assets’ integrated into relocation planning by the

government and project proponents;1331

4) recognising communities of origin decision to voluntary immobility as a basis to maintain

their deepened ‘ancestral ties to place, cultural identity, religion and indigenous

knowledge’ in the country of origin;1332

5) establishing communities of origin status from a legal standpoint in the receiving state to

tailor for dual citizenship, nationality and political participation and supported by the

domestic laws—including the legal recognition of ‘their descendants living outside their

1329 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 64, 68, 75, 76–8; see also Robinson, above n 1177, 40. 1330 Edwards, above n 35, 63–70; see also Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4; see also The broad use of the term land in the context of Pacific island nations, tends to be used to refer to ‘land held under customary forms of tenure…where customary tenure accounts for less than 90 per cent of the land, public forms of ownership make up the difference…freehold land makes up less than 10 percent of land in the region’ as cited in Campbell, above n 75, 60. 1331 Edwards, above n 35, 69, 74–5; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305, 319; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also McAdam, above n 642; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Cosmin Corendea, ‘Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific’ (Working Paper No 3, United Nations Development Program, University of Cambridge, University of Nairobi and Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2016) 13-14. 1332 Farbotko, above n 732; See also Farbotko, Carol, ‘Voluntary Immobility: Indigenous Voices in the Pacific’ (2018) 57 Forced Migration Review 81, 81-83

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country of origin’ to citizenship and political participation at the origin and/or traditional

homeland;1333

6) ‘retaining control over land and marine resources’ by relocating communities at the origin

and/or traditional homeland—sometimes equated with ‘their original home island’—and

to derive equitable entitlements from resources, even if the relocating communities are no

longer living in those islands permanently;1334 and

7) opportunities for the communities of origin to ‘equal access to common resources and

services’ (fishing, land, health, education, social welfare) in the receiving state.1335

The determinants of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives presented in chapter five

focused on three key needs: to build the capacity of local government administration and

bolster existing institutions, to ensure that the role of law is used in ‘the right domestic

environment’ and to ensure that there is a whole-of-society orientation underpinning the

process. There are a number of sub-requirements that need to underpin each of these needs:

Building the capacity of local government administration and bolstering existing institutions

needs to be underpinned by:

i) formulating national action plans;1336

ii) engaging in ‘concerted and purposeful collaboration’ with ‘cross-sectoral bodies,

private sector, communities and stakeholders;’1337

iii) coordinating responses and activities across local government sectors to leverage

uniformity with administrative processes;1338

iv) formulating national strategies aligned with global policy initiatives, instruments

and practices as a basis to inform government policy development and employ

concrete measures to implement government initiatives and projects;1339 and

1333 Connell, above n 75, 140; see also McAdam, above n 13, 283–4, 307, 319; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 20. 1334 See above n 1333 and accompanying text; see also McAdam, above n 87, 307, 319, 326, 305; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1335 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also Locke, above n 25, 178. 1336 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54. 1337 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–5. 1338 Ibid 395–6; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 14. 1339 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12; see also Cancun Speech DRR, above n 787.

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v) establishing communities of research to enhance development and technology

innovation capabilities.1340

The requirement that the role of law is used in ‘the right domestic environment’ means that it

must embody tools and mechanisms for the:1341

i) review of existing laws, formulation of specific laws and ‘how they are actually

understood, perceived, and implemented, including differences in

interpretation’;1342

ii) integration of ethical considerations ‘to maintain public trust, promote compliance,

and minimise social disruption and economic loss;’1343

iii) inherent recognition of soft law principles underpinned by a rights-based approach

underscored in international instruments, and operational guidelines and

safeguards developed by multilateral agencies and institutions to inform policy

development and the legal framework at the domestic level; and

iv) international cooperation support buttressed by multilateral or bilateral partnership

plans, programs and agreements between governments, agencies and development

partners.1344

A whole-of-society orientation requires that the entire process centre on the interests,

entitlements and rights (land tenure, compensation, access to resources) of local communities,

including women and marginalised groups, taking place through the explicit inclusion and

meaningful consultation in all the phases of initiatives and projects commissioned by the

government and proponents.1345 The researcher acknowledges that interventions through

whole of society orientation among other preparations (capacity, legal) may present scaling

challenges for national governments. These relate to ‘the operational complexities of

resettlement processes–both in terms of developing coherent policy and achieving effective

implementation on the ground.’1346 Additionally, ‘if adequate finance is available,

developmental relocations can be difficult to achieve in practice.’1347

1340 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124. 1341 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200. 1342 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 395. 1343 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 108–9. 1344 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200; see also McAdam, above n 354, 10. 1345 Jolly, above n 854, 151–2; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 422, 424–5; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Wil, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Arnall, above n 75, 253, 255. 1346 Ibid. 1347 Ibid.

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The data from the field research presented in chapter six identified the need for, and raised

inquiries relating to, the following determinants as:

1) availability of land, safeguards for customary landowners’ interests and rights, and

appropriate system of land tenure recognition in the receiving state to relocate

communities of origin;1348

2) legal status recognition of communities of origin to dual citizenship and nationality in the

receiving state supported by domestic laws;1349

3) retaining the sovereignty and self-governance of communities of origin in the receiving

state;1350

4) ‘maintenance and enjoyment of cultural and traditional rights, including social rights

taking place through work rights, access to health care and social security as nationals of

the receiving state’;1351

5) ‘preservation of the identity, social coherence and culture’ of the communities of origin in

the receiving community;1352

6) ensuring that people are at the fore of policy and decision-making underpinned by

‘applying a bottom-up approach’ by the receiving state administration in all stages of

planning, implementation and post resettlement facilitated by the explicit inclusion of and

consultation with the receiving community;1353

7) inclusion of faith-based organisations as intermediaries between the government

administration, proponents, agencies, and the receiving community—and particularly the

local host community—to inform decisions relating to relocation;

8) introducing programs at the tertiary level as a basis for researchers to build the capabilities

of local communities to consider relocation over voluntary immobility within and/or

across sovereign borders from the impacts of climate change;1354

9) determination of whether the sending or host state bears the costs of relocation; and the

10) interplay of the notion of regionalism as a durable response and solution to climate-

induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders in the Pacific region.

Together, the multitude of determinants generated from the case studies of the historical

resettlement of Pacific Islanders, the examination of readiness from multidisciplinary

1348 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326–7. 1349 McAdam, above n 10, 148–9. 1350 Ibid 147, 154. 1351 Ibid 148–9. 1352 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 163. 1353 McAdam, above n 87, 327; see also Corendea, above n 1331, 12, 15, 17. 1354 Farbotko, above n 732.

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perspectives and the empirical evidence from the field research conducted in Fiji are drawn

together holistically, synthesised and analysed to articulate the criteria for readiness in the

context of climate change-induced human mobility. The discussion that follows in informing

the criteria for analysing readiness is two pronged. It provides an overview of the approach

adopted to synthesise the multitude of determinants and shows where the determinants are

supported and presented in the sources of data.

7.3 Criteria for Analysing Readiness

The criteria for readiness are distilled from the synthesis and analysis of the determinants

stemming from the historical resettlement literature, multidisciplinary literature on readiness

and the field research (sources of data). The determinants that appeared significantly more

frequently across the sources of data are articulated as criteria. For example, references to

“explicit inclusion of local communities”, “meaningful consultation” and “people central to

decision-making” appeared uniformly across the sources of data and are represented as the

criterion: whole-of-community orientation at all phases. Furthermore, the determinants that

appeared consistently, while not explicit across all the sources of data, are also articulated as

criteria. For example, “management capacity”, “institutional leadership” and “policy space”

are supported across the sources of data and are interpreted and articulated as the criterion:

institutional capacity and coordination of local government. However, the determinants that

appear discretely and less frequently across the sources of data are considered in one of two

ways. The determinants are integrated with one of the existing criteria. For example, “faith-

based organisations” to facilitate relocation decisions appeared in the field research. This

determinant is aligned with the criterion: institutional capacity and coordination of local

government as part of enhancing community capacity through programs and activities

designed by local government bodies. Second, the determinants that are not well supported

and do not resonate with any of the existing criteria are not reflected as part of the analysis.

This is because the analysis may become too broad with baseless stand-alone criteria that are

beyond the scope of the study. For example, the conceptual notion of “regionalism” is not

reflected in the literature on the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders or the

multidisciplinary literature on readiness.

Having outlined the approach to articulate the criteria for readiness, the discussion that follows

presents each criterion, what it encompasses and pinpoints the determinants that have recurred

uniformly throughout the sources of data. The sources of data here are understood to mean the

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case studies presented in chapter four, the multidisciplinary perspectives presented in chapter

five and the field evidence presented in chapter six.

Whole-of-community Orientation at all Phases

The whole-of-community orientation is identified as a criterion because the determinants

equated with “explicit inclusion and meaningful consultation” and “people at the fore of policy

and decision-making” are cited consistently across the sources of data drawn from the analysis

of both the literature and field research. The sources of data underscore the whole-of-

community orientation approach. The approach is supported by the experiences and lessons

learned from the past human mobility of Pacific Islanders presented in chapter four, which

confirms the importance of whole-of-community inclusiveness and participation in relocation

decisions. For example, seminal authors McAdam, Connell and Campbell maintain that

‘relocation should only occur with the free and informed consent of communities concerned.

They should be fully informed of the reasons and procedures of movement, be able to propose

alternatives to relocation that authorities should duly consider and be compensated for any

losses.’1355 There is also inherent recognition of the explicit inclusion of communities in the

formulation of `national disaster plans and strategies as part of disaster preparedness, which

was discussed in chapter five.1356 Another example from the field interviews in chapter six

reveals that relocation decisions centre on people (n=2), buttressed by consultation and

inclusiveness of communities (n=3).1357 As one state actor articulated: ‘Look at the gender

groups that are there i.e. women need to be part of this big decision-making because these are

the people that will feel the burden of most relocations...’1358 The evidence across the sources

of data resonates closely with the inclusiveness and participation of affected communities in

relocation decisions as part of formulating plans and strategies at the domestic level. Together,

the analysis of the empirical findings from the small participant pool establishes the whole-of-

community orientation as a criterion. The discussion that follows clarifies what the criterion

encompasses for analysing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human

mobility.

1355 McAdam, above n 87, 318. 1356 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 26, 52–3. 1357 Interview with NSA#1, NSA#3, NSA#4, NSA#5, SA#5, SA#6, above n 1084. 1358 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084.

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Together, the analysis establishes the whole-of-community orientation as a criterion. The

discussion that follows clarifies what the criterion encompasses for analysing readiness in the

context of climate change-induced human mobility.

The whole of-community orientation is the means by which a variety of perspectives, such as

‘livelihood restoration, access to resources and public services’ of affected communities, is

recognised and embedded in the design, planning and implementation phases of relocation

schemes by the government administration and multiple proponents.1359 The criterion

identifies the ‘needs of vulnerable sectors of the population, such as indigenous peoples, the

elderly, and people with disabilities, including gender-and aged based groups’ in relocation

programs, policy and decision-making.1360 Moreover, the criterion encompasses the

dissemination of information on relocation in the vernacular of affected communities with

sufficient lead time by the government administration and proponents through ongoing

meaningful consultations.1361 This further encompasses engaging actively with affected

communities to underscore a two-way exchange and participation on the array of concerns

from relocation decisions.1362 Moreover, the whole-of-community orientation extends to entail

international safeguards, such as the principle of free, prior and informed consent of affected

communities in relocation decisions.1363 Taken together, the whole-of-community orientation

as a criterion is appropriate for assessing readiness in the context of climate-change-induced

human mobility.

Funding of all Phases

Funding all phases is identified as a criterion and is characterised by: adequate funding to

implement relocation schemes ‘to enable affected communities to restore their livelihoods’ in

the new host state’1364 allocating costs of relocation to plan and coordinate relocation of

affected communities during the pre-relocation, implementation and post relocation phases—

and strengthening government institutional capacities and capabilities to source finance from

a host of international funding mechanisms to support the relocation of affected communities

from the impacts of climate change. The criterion is cited fairly consistently across the sources

1359 Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 7; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–4. 1360 See above n 1359 and accompanying text. 1361 Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 8–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. 1362 See above n 1361 and accompanying text. 1363 Ferris, above n 12, 32, 35. 1364 McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 130.

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of data drawn from the analysis of the literature and field research. The experiences and lessons

learned from the case studies of the Carteret Islanders presented in chapter four highlight the

need for: ‘culturally appropriate compensation’ to customary landowners and communities of

origin for the initial re-adjustment at the new host location, livelihood restoration of

communities, and the physical infrastructure construction costs as considerations intrinsic to

finance relocation schemes.1365

The climate finance readiness literature in chapter five identifies that building and

strengthening the institutional capacity of developing countries plays a pivotal role to ‘access

public and private international climate finance’ towards national projects.1366 Capacity is the

means by which the institutional mechanisms of local government bodies are developed with

respect to ‘planning, budgeting, programming and monitoring procedures and systems.’1367

Moreover, the ‘mechanisms need to be compatible with existing and future planning and

budgeting systems and integrated with the country’s national plans, policies, and sustainable

development priorities.’1368 The climate finance readiness literature further points out that the

economies of scale of developing countries taking place through their technical, financial and

resource capacities limit the ability of developing countries to access funding mechanisms at

the international level.1369 This suggests that deeper consideration for building and

strengthening the capacity of local government institutions as a basis to source funding to

support future relocation schemes is required. Furthermore, over half of the participants (n=10)

raised concerns in the field interviews about funding for relocation, as highlighted in chapter

six. One state actor pointed out (as reported in chapter six) that: ‘…finance is very critical for

us in the region…the intervention of the international community is important and

assist…through the climate funding or Global Climate Fund (GCF). Resettlement will amount

to huge funding. We just rely on the international community.’1370 The evidence across the

sources of data resonates closely with funding being synonymous with relocation costs and

financing for relocation schemes. Funding all phases of relocation requires developing

institutional capacities of government, harnessing national development plans, programs and

policies that are inclusive of the costs of relocation—such as infrastructure, compensation, and

livelihood restoration—and the allocation of adequate financial resources for the

1365 Edwards, above n 35, 66, 70–1, 77–8. 1366 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 11; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–7, 23. 1367 UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812. 1368 Ibid. 1369 Leckie, above n 16, 29; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–7, 23. 1370 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084.

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implementation of national projects in government budgets.1371 Taken together, the analysis

establishes funding all phases as a criterion for analysing readiness in the context of climate

change-induced human mobility.

Maintenance of Cultural Identity

The maintenance of culture and identity of communities of origin in the new host country is

identified as a criterion.1372 The sources of data underscore deep recognition of ‘identity,

language, religion, traditions and culture’ of communities of origin through practices and

traditional knowledge, such as ‘planting traditional crops, spiritual attachments to ancestral

homes and lands, dance performances and designing traditional costumes.’1373 For example,

the case study documenting the resettlement of the Gilbertese to Ghizo in chapter four reveals

a shift by the younger generation from the ‘traditional knowledge systems and adapting to new

cultures and ways of life’, such as speaking Pidgin over Gilbertese language and retreating

from traditional methods of conducting meetings by the ‘unimane (old men) in the traditional

maneaba (community meeting house).’1374 Moreover, there is also recognition in the REDD+

literature for the inclusion of ‘local forest knowledge, local values and being responsive to

cultural context and diversity’ in the formulation of ‘measurement, reporting and verifications

(MRV) systems’ as part of REDD+ readiness, which was discussed in chapter six.1375

Similarly, ‘indigenous cultural perspectives, religious and communal values, and

accommodation of local conditions’ were found to be essential ingredients to underpin public

health planning for influenza pandemic preparedness, as presented in chapter five.1376 A

minority of the participants (n=4) raised concerns surrounding culture and identity.1377 One

state actor commented that ‘Part of the agreement (Banabans to Rabi) was that they can stay

there, retain their culture, language and practices...They (incoming communities) cannot be

resettled here (Fiji) and they still maintain their identity. They need to relinquish that.’1378 The

evidence across the sources of data reinforces the need for retention of community-based

culture and identity, knowledge systems, traditional practices and local conditions of the

1371 McAdam, above n 75, 97, 100, 124, 130; Ferris, above n 12, 35. 1372 Jane McAdam, above n 354, 14; see also McAdam, above n 87, 326. 1373 Farbotko, above n 732; see also Jessie Connell and Sabrina Coelho, ‘Planned Relocation in Asia and the Pacific’ (2018) 59 Forced Migration Review 46, 46–7; see also Vaha, above n 25, 237–8. 1374 Donner, above n 35, 193, 197–8; see also McAdam, above n 354, 16–17; see also Farbotko, above n 1332, 81. 1375 Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1376 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420–5. 1377 Interview with SA#6, NSA#11, above n 1084. 1378 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138.

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communities of origin as part of framing plans and programs for relocation schemes.1379

Together, the analysis establishes the maintenance of cultural identity as a criterion for

assessing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.

Identification of Suitable Land

The identification of suitable land for relocation of communities of origin is identified as a

criterion. The sources of data drawn from the analysis of the literature and field research show

multilayered considerations towards land for relocation, such as the relocation site, fertility of

land for sustained food security, recognition of land tenure system, compulsory acquisition of

land by the state, securing of property rights by relocating communities through legal

registration to land title and compensation arrangements with customary landowners by the

state—including compensation to communities of origin as re-establishment costs in the host

country.1380 The considerations to buttress land for relocation are cited consistently across the

sources of data. For example, the case study of the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders to

Bougainville Island presented in chapter four revealed that the Carteret Islanders were resettled

to alienated land and to locations with close proximity to correctional institutions under the

atolls resettlement scheme.1381 Similarly, the Gilbertese were granted title to ‘four acres of

freehold land and the right to acquire further land’ under the Gilbertese resettlement scheme

presented in chapter four.1382 The experiences and lessons from the REDD+ scheme presented

in chapter five demonstrate that the commercial interests of the state and project proponents

taking place through ‘exploitative carbon contracts’ for global trading of carbon stocks stored

in rainforests compromised ‘indigenous peoples and forest dwellers interests and customary

land rights.’1383 Additionally, it showed that the arrangements ‘offered little or no guarantee

for the protection of their rights, including their right to use and access natural resources.’1384

The REDD+ literature draws into sharp focus international safeguards as protection

mechanisms, such as the ‘principle of equitable sharing of benefits (ESB)’, which can be

1379 Farbotko, above n 732; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–7; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 419–30; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 1–22; see also Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 238–9. 1380 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48–9. 1381 Edwards, above n 35, 63–5. 1382 Donner, above n 35, 195–6. 1383 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 515–16, 524. 1384 Ibid 516.

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integrated into national programs and plans, including domestic laws, as part of REDD+

readiness.1385

A majority of participants (n=13) raised concerns about land for relocation, as highlighted in

chapter six. One non-state actor pointed out that: ‘…government will have to look into the

availability of land for resettlement. How we going to deal with the land issues? Fiji has got

its own issues with respect to trying to find resettlement areas…where will they be resettled

i.e. on one island?...’1386 Likewise, one state actor commented: ‘…for us locally (Fiji), the issue

really is the availability of land…means not that…one can just move to but it’s about

“availability” as in one has to look into land ownership issue and whether it is something

landowners can give…’1387 The evidence across the sources of data resonates closely with a

host of considerations intrinsic to land for relocation. These include the location, suitability,

protection arrangements and compensation for landowners and Indigenous peoples, land

tenure recognition, access to resources, and the inclusion of international safeguards in

domestic plans and laws. Taken together, the analysis establishes identification of suitable land

for relocation of communities as a criterion for analysing readiness in the context of climate

change-induced human mobility.

The Role of law in Relocation

Relocation schemes need to be effected through law for an array of reasons, such as ‘upholding

rights of relocating communities, developing safeguards and principles embodied in

international instruments’ into the domestic laws and the exercise of duties, powers and

functions of implementing authorities among others.1388 The development of ‘the right

domestic environment; to provide certain legal facilities and/or having the right laws’ is used

interchangeably to describe the role that law can play as a criterion for the facilitation and

implementation of relocation schemes.1389 The role of law encompasses appropriate

procedures, implementation measures and ‘transparent assessment and justification of the

measures’ established through statutes, regulations, administration rules and executive orders

1385 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1386 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1387 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1388 Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 146; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 207–12; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 111. 1389 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 681.

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(to cite a few) at the domestic level.1390 It entails the formulation of new laws and regulations

and review of existing laws and regulations, including the integration of ethical considerations

such as the equitable ‘allocation of resources, access to services, and cultural values.’1391

Additionally, the role of law is leveraged by the inclusion of international principles,

safeguards and norms embodied in an array of soft law instruments, for example, the UN

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and Guidelines for the Domestic

Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance,

among others.1392 The soft law instruments are underpinned by protection mechanisms taking

place through a rights-based approach to ensure that the rights of individuals and communities

are ‘fully respected and protected, such as access to resources, economic opportunities,

education, political participation, housing, land and property’, among others.1393 Likewise, the

formulation of ‘bilateral agreements, mutual aid agreements and goodwill agreements’, among

others, is also identified as part of the role of law in harnessing cooperation, protection and

assistance spanning national, regional and international levels.1394

The role of law is cited fairly consistently across the sources of data drawn from the analysis

of the literature and field research. For example, the case study presented by the resettlement

of the Banabans to Rabi shows that safeguards for dual citizenship were protected and

established through the ‘Fiji Constitution 2013 s 5(4) and Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s

14’ with the further protection of ‘persons of I-Kiribati descent’ to dual nationality taking place

through the ‘Kiribati Constitution ch I ss 23-4 and Kiribati Citizenship Act 1998 ch 8A s8.’1395

Similarly, the case study of the relocation of the Gilbertese to Ghizo reveals that new laws,

such as the ‘1977 Land and Title Amendment Ordinance, nationalised most alienated or

freehold land held by the Gilbertese’, restricting their claims to legal ownership following the

independence of the Solomon Islands.1396 Moreover, ‘automatic entry rights for children of

settlers’ discontinued with the governance structures of the incoming ‘Governing Council of

the Solomon Islands’ post-independence.1397 There is also recognition of the role of law in

responding to public health emergencies as part of public health preparedness, as highlighted

1390 Fisher, above n 13, 208–12; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 146; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 207–12; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 111. 1391 Bennett et al, above n 918, 207, 210; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 108–9. 1392 Lesniewska, above n 56, 103–21; see also Barber, above n 160, 143–65. 1393 Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–28; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; See also ADB Report, above n 10, 47–9; see also Locke, above n 25, 178. 1394 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 48; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674; see also Fisher, above n 13, 209. 1395 McAdam, above n 87, 301–3, 306–7, 313, 317, 319, 321; see also Connell, above n 75, 139. 1396 Donner, above n 35, 196. 1397 Ibid 195.

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in chapter five. Examination of the legal aspects identifies the need for ‘competencies (i.e.

abilities, skills) of those responsible for applying the law; coordination of legally based

interventions across sectors and jurisdictions; and access to information resources on the

content and interpretation of law by multidisciplinary practitioners’ as part of preparedness.1398

Furthermore, there is also recognition of the need for the inclusion of ‘soft-law oriented

guidelines as a reference tool for law-makers of governments of the states to develop national

legislation for the management of international aid in a manner appropriate to their national

circumstances’ as presented in the international humanitarian assistance literature in chapter

five.1399 Over half of the participants (n=10) in this study raised concerns about the legal status

of incoming communities of origin to Fiji in the field interviews, as presented in chapter six.1400

The participants acknowledged the arrangements in place for the Banaban and the Vaitupuan

communities on Rabi and Kioa and pointed out that the existing arrangements present ‘a

starting point to address these emerging issues…i.e. to retain their identity… create a pathway

to access resources, services and maintain their livelihoods.’1401

The evidence across the sources of data consistently validates the veracity of the role of law

traversing procedures, processes and measures, new laws and review of existing laws,

protection mechanisms underpinned by soft law instruments; bilateral arrangements,

competencies, coordination, institution capacity and information resources to develop and

bolster laws and regulations at the domestic level. Taken together, the analysis establishes the

role of law for relocation as a criterion for analysing readiness in the context of climate change-

induced human mobility.

Institutional Capacity and Coordination of Local Government

The institutional capacity of local government bodies and coordination approaches for all

phases of relocation projects is identified as a criterion.1402 Strengthening the capacity of

1398 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 676–7, 681. 1399 Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 961, 965. 1400 Interview with SA#4, NSA#7, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1401 See above n 1400 and accompanying text; see also interview with SA#1, above n 1110. 1402 Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 47; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 130; see also Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 47, 71; see also Susanne Melde and Sieun Lee, ‘Emerging Technical Guidelines for Adaptation Planning and Human Mobility’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 31–7.

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existing institutions and aligning coordination measures across sectors and agencies to inhibit

parallel processes, programs and activities in all phases of relocation is an additional layer to

this criterion.1403 Institutional capacity and coordination approaches identify the need for the

national government to formulate planning processes, design policies, integrate management

strategies, introduce programs and activities and support further research to ensure greater

degree of accuracy in facilitating and implementing relocation projects.

The criterion is cited fairly consistently across the sources of data drawn from the analysis of

the literature and field research.1404 For example, seminal authors McAdam and Connell, in

drawing on the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders presented in chapter four maintain

that ‘financial resources, management capacity and political commitment’ are key

impediments for Pacific Island governments to ‘negotiate, develop, legislate for and

administer effective resettlement schemes and policies.’1405 They point out that ‘local

anxieties, tensions and hegemony over land’ of Pacific Island communities are factors that

inhibit coherent and coordinated dialogue by Pacific island governments in responding to

climate change-induced human mobility across sovereign borders.1406 Similarly, there is

inherent recognition in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), as part

of disaster preparedness discussed in chapter five, to ‘strengthen capacity of local authorities

to manage and evacuate people from disaster-prone areas; develop assistance programmes to

account for the specific needs of particular groups within the displaced population;

institutional leadership; and the development and reconstruction of budgetary allocations.’1407

Moreover, there is recognition in the SFDRR, as part of preparedness for cross-border disaster

displacement, for national governments to develop strategies and plans, for example, ‘baseline

data on displacement; bilateral contingency and response plans; operational guides; and

transboundary simulation exercises’, among others.1408

The REDD+ readiness literature in chapter five outlined the need for capacity development

support to implement REDD+ activities, national readiness policies and project proposals that

1403 See above n 1402 and accompanying text. 1404 Ibid. 1405 Connell, above n 75, 135, 138; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305, 327; see also McAdam, above n 75, 130; See also McAdam, above n 354, 4; see also Elizabeth Ferris, above n 12, 34, 35. 1406 See above n 1405 and accompanying text. 1407 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 24–6, 52–3; see also Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3. 1408 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 40–5, 50–4; see also Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22–26 May 2017, above n 749, 45; see also Regional Conference on Migration, above n 782; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11; see also Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 652.

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embody concrete plans and regulatory reforms as part of the readiness phase.1409 Additionally,

a minority of participants (n=5) in the field interviews raised concerns about institutional

capacity. As previously reported in chapter six, one state actor commented that: ‘It plants me

to thinking about cross-border resettlement of communities...in terms of: the legal space

(constitution, legislation, and citizenship) and the socio-economic space…It will depend on

the government of the day on how…prepared the government is in terms of the policy

space.’1410 One non-state actor pointed out that: ‘…There has been nothing on resettlement. It

goes back to political will, what is the priority of the government of the day.’1411 Another non-

state actor stated that: ‘For any guideline or policy on cross-border…three components are

essential, people— developing/building/enhancing the capacity of host communities and

receiving communities…access to human rights and human security and sovereignty.’1412

The evidence across the sources of data resonates closely with a host of considerations intrinsic

to capacity and coordination for relocation taking place through political will, local institutions

and agencies, local communities and national policies and plans. This also includes their

impact at regional and international levels facilitated by flexible bilateral arrangements, among

others. The analysis establishes institutional capacity and coordination of local government

for planning and implementation as a criterion for analysing readiness.

Taken together, the set of criteria for analysing readiness comprises:

1) a whole-of-community orientation in all phases;

2) funding of all phases;

3) maintenance of cultural identity;

4) identification of suitable land;

5) the role of law in relocation; and

6) the institutional capacity and coordination of local government.

As discussed earlier, these criteria were uncovered through the synthesis and analysis of

different sources of data that have not been explained elsewhere in the literature. The criteria

presents first steps for analysing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human

mobility. Moreover, these criteria assist in aiding understanding of what it means to be

“ready”. These criteria also enable individual governments to respond to, plan and implement

1409 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46. 1410 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1411 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084. 1412 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084.

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relocation schemes in a risk-informed way. The reasons why these criteria are important for

analysing readiness are discussed next.

7.4 Importance of Criteria

Relocation involves affected communities consisting of men, women, children and

marginalised groups. This indicates the need to understand the various perceptions and needs

of affected community members in relocation decision-making, such as livelihood restoration,

protection of their rights relating to land tenure security, economic opportunities, preservation

of their culture and traditions and continuous assistance arrangements in all relocation

phases.1413 There is widespread consensus among scholars in the field of human mobility

studies that relocation is driven from the ‘top down with communities rarely involved in

making decisions which affect their future.’1414 It is important that affected communities have

agency to lead relocation decisions for all relocation phases, supported by local government

bodies through meaningful engagement, participation and consultation.1415 This establishes the

importance of a whole-of-community orientation in all phases as a criterion for climate

change-induced human mobility.

The relocation of affected communities also demands ‘sustained and sufficient financial and

technical resources, including concerted support by national governments to restore the

housing, assets, livelihoods, land, access to resources and services of communities in a way

that improves or at least restores their living standards.’1416 Furthermore, relocation schemes

require the integration of future-focused costs aligned with trends in population growth for

social and economic development by national governments.1417 The financial resources

required to implement relocation schemes are also compounded in the case of national

governments of ‘developing states with acute economies of scale and diverse cultures.’1418

This is because the early infusion of financial resources for relocation schemes will need to be

incorporated into the national budgets of governments against their national development

priorities.1419 This may potentially outweigh national priorities for the host communities and

continue to weaken the economies of scale of national governments for national sustainable

1413 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Melde and Lee, above n 1402, 31–7. 1414 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19. 1415 Farbotko, above n 732. 1416 Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 48; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above 75, 130. 1417 Connell, above n 75, 140. 1418 Ibid. 1419 Ferris, above n 12, 35.

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development. Additionally, national governments will need to develop and enhance the

capacity of national institutions across sectors to access international funding mechanisms to

implement relocation schemes ‘rather than utilise their own scarce financial resources.’1420

However, several questions remain unanswered with regards to international funding

mechanisms available for, and specifically tailored to, climate change-induced relocation

schemes. The onus of financial responsibility to implement relocation schemes is also open to

debate. The host of considerations to plan and implement relocation schemes from a funding

perspective plays a vital role as a criterion in the context of climate change-induced human

mobility.

Relocation also requires land to settle communities by national governments, which entails:

1) sufficient lead time to identify and select appropriate sites that are accessible for

communities to use public services such as roads, health, and education;

2) suitable land for the maintenance of traditional livelihoods, food security and housing; and

3) introducing mechanisms for land acquisition, such as engaging in sustained dialogue with

customary landowners, negotiations with, and extending adequate compensation to,

customary landowners for ‘land, housing and property’ because of the ‘cultural and

traditional ties to land and strong clan and kinship networks.’1421 These factors

demonstrate that land for relocation of communities as a criterion is appropriate in the

context of climate change-induced human mobility.1422

Relocation also requires national governments to recognise the sensitivity of communities of

origin deeply rooted in ‘ancestral ties of place, unique human cultures, collective identity, and

indigenous senses of belonging’ of their homeland in the host state with the local host

communities.1423 This cultural identity encompasses cultural values, intangible heritage,

religion, language, Indigenous knowledge systems, traditional, customary and spiritual

practices.1424 It is well established in the literature that ‘social disruption, conflict and violence’

is likely to occur in relocation with the convergence of communities of origin and host

communities.1425 Relocation requires national governments to develop plans and programs

1420 McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43, 50. 1421 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–7; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 96–7. 1422 See above n 1421 and accompanying text. 1423 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Jane McAdam, above n 87, 326; see also Farbotko, above n 732; see also Farbotko, above n 1332, 81–3; see also Locke, above n 25, 178; see also Vaha, above n 25, 236–8; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89, 99. 1424 See above n 1423 and accompanying text. 1425 Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89, 99; see also Vaha, above n 25, 237–8; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–7; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 20.

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specifically tailored to strengthen the social cohesion of the communities and the integration

of cultural, social and Indigenous knowledge, which can potentially lead to diverse livelihoods

through fishing, farming, and toiling land and resources among the communities.1426 The

recognition and maintenance of the cultural identity of communities in relocation plays a vital

role as a criterion for analysing readiness.

Likewise, the role of law identifies the need for national governments to review existing laws,

frame new laws and regulations, and establish institutions to facilitate, coordinate and

implement all phases of relocation that ‘upholds and ensures the rights of communities is fully

respected and protected’,1427 for example, ‘social rights of citizenship, housing, land and

property rights.’1428 The role of law entails delineating the roles, functions, exercise of power

and duties of officials, implementing authorities, multiple sectors and agencies to effectively

coordinate and implement relocation schemes.1429 It encompasses well-defined processes,

procedures, dispute resolution mechanisms and implementing measures by local government

institutions.1430 Moreover, the role of law involves tailoring appropriate monitoring, evaluation

and reporting processes for transparency of, and accountability for, human and financial

resources.1431 Furthermore, the role of law identifies the need to integrate mechanisms

underpinned by a rights-based approach spanning soft law international instruments,

normative frameworks and global programs.1432 These mechanisms embody ethical

considerations—underscored by the principle of equitable sharing of benefits for example,

equal access to resources and services and compensation to communities.1433 These

mechanisms also embody community-centred safeguards and guidelines—‘meaningful

participation and consultation by all stakeholders’ with local communities and marginalised

groups for example, and cross-jurisdictional support and cooperation underpinned by bilateral

agreements to harness the domestic laws and regulations.1434 The array of considerations

1426 Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89. 1427 Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–9; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 110–11. 1428 See above n 1427 and accompanying text. 1429 Moulton et al, above n 8, 673–4; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–401; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12. 1430 See above n 1429 and accompanying text. 1431 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 131; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11. See also Thomas Baumgartner and Claudia Pahl-Wostl, ‘UN–Water and its Role in Global Water Governance’ (2013) 18(3) Ecology and Society 1, 1–9. 1432 Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 106–12; see also McAdam, above n 354, 24–5. 1433 McAdam, above n 87, 326–7; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420–2; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 106–12. See also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1434 See above n 1433 and accompanying text.

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demonstrates the role of law to be appropriate as a criterion for analysing readiness in the

context of climate change-induced human mobility.

Lastly, relocation requires national governments to have the capacity to plan, facilitate,

coordinate and implement all phases of relocation through policies, plans and programs. There

are a number of considerations that are connected to the capacity of national governments and

local government institutions. These entail the political will of national governments to

recognise climate change-induced human mobility as a ‘significant policy concern’,

developing concrete measures to ‘integrate climate change-induced human mobility into

national plans and policies, including relocation and migration policies’, designing ‘specific

policy actions and implementation’ approaches and coordination by local government

institutions, multilevel sectors, agencies and jurisdictions.1435 Capacity and coordination

responses traverse national governments and local government bodies, including communities,

through programs and activities. Moreover, ‘regional capacity development and information

sharing’ presents an added dimension to the development of coherent policies, plans and

programs to plan, facilitate, coordinate and implement all phases of relocation.1436 The host of

considerations as part of institutional capacity development and coordination plays a vital role

as a criterion in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.

Taken together, the analysis establishes the need for a set of criteria spanning whole-of-

community orientation, funding, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable

land, the role that law can play and building the capacity and coordination of local government

institutions to be appropriate and interdependent for analysing readiness in the context of

climate change-induced human mobility.

7.5 Readiness of the Fijian Government

The discussion in this section presents the case study of Fiji and analyses the level of readiness

of its government to respond to the climate change-induced human mobility of Pacific

Islanders to Fiji. This section uses the set of criteria for readiness articulated in the previous

section as an analytical framework to determine the Fijian Government’s responsiveness to

readiness. The empirical evidence generated from the field research conducted with

1435 Locke, above n 25, 179; see Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 96, 99, 100; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681. 1436 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 422.

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participants (n=18) in Fiji and the analysis of the literature and published reports in chapter

four are used to support the analysis and evaluate the Fijian Government’s readiness against

the set of criteria for readiness. The researcher acknowledges more research needs to be

undertaken before readiness is more clearly understood from the standpoint of the state

machinery. The researcher also acknowledges that the participant list for future research could

be widened to investigate the more nuanced arrangements of the state as highlighted earlier in

chapters one and two. The use of empirical data to analyse and evaluate readiness provides

first steps as a means of advancing the legal, policy and institutional discussion by the state

machinery.

Criterion: Whole-of-community Orientation at all Phases

Consultation by local government bodies and the inclusiveness of communities and

marginalised groups in all phases of relocation was recorded as a consideration by a minority

of participants (n=3) in the field interviews.1437 The participants recognised consultation and

active participation of communities as playing an important role in relocation schemes.1438 One

non-state actor pointed out:

…that (cross-border relocation)…demands very serious consultations. This is where the State comes in…it cannot…impose its position…the whole interconnectedness of all (Province, or Tikina or groups of communities i.e. iTaukei and other ethnic group)…needs to be fully assessed…the whole consultancy from the government level to substrata-to-district level-to-local level is so vital for this.1439

Similarly, the reference to “people” and their explicit inclusion in relocation decisions were

identified by a minority of participants (n= 2).1440 As one state actor articulated: ‘The first thing

you have to deal with…would be the people who are going to be resettled. That is one of the

biggest lessons from…resettlements…whether it is internal or external, who are you moving?

It’s the people…we have to move them first…then develop them…build their lives.’1441

The analysis suggests that concerted and meaningful consultation by local government bodies,

and the explicit inclusion of communities, needs to be embedded into all phases of the

1437 Interview with NSA#4, NSA#5, SA#5, above n 1084. 1438 Ibid. 1439 Interview with NSA#5, above n 1084. 1440 Interview with SA#6, NSA#3, above n 1084. 1441 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084.

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relocation plans, programs and policies by the host state.1442 In addition, relocation plans,

programs and policies also need to acknowledge whole-of-community perspectives, providing

communities with agency to reach informed decisions about, for example, the maintenance of

their traditional livelihoods and cultural identity, protection of their rights and the safeguarding

of their interests and needs for land and employment.1443 The evidence reveals the need for

more in-depth consideration for whole-of-community orientation in all relocation phases. The

evidence suggests that not enough attention to these matters has been paid by the Fijian

Government. The readiness of the Fijian Government is not established against the criterion

of whole-of-community orientation at all phases.

Criterion: Funding all Phases

There is widespread consensus among scholars that the experiences and lessons of human

mobility from non-climatic and climatic factors in the relocation of communities’ demands

substantial and sustained funding, for example, for ‘land acquisition, social, physical and legal

infrastructures’, and the restoration of livelihoods post relocation.1444 One of the significant

considerations among others recorded in the field interviews was the cost of relocation. This

was pointed out by over half the participants (n = 10). One state actor commented that:

‘…finance is very critical for us in the region…the intervention of the international community

is important…Resettlement will amount to huge funding. We just rely on the international

community.’1445 Another state actor pointed out that: ‘Donors do not fund relocation…’1446

Echoing similar sentiments, one non-state actor stated: ‘Money/funding for resettlement is

quite a contentious agenda item. People do not like to fund relocation. That is a big “no-no”

for donors.1447 Dean points that ‘[v]arious funds established under the UNFCCC’ (GCF and

GEF, for example), including funds advanced by donors ‘in the form of project-based grants’

lend to ‘promote impacts-driven climate change adaptation measures such as construction of

infrastructure, rather than measures that address risks or broad socio-economic drivers

underpinning vulnerability (healthcare, education and income poverty, for example).’1448 In

like manner, Adelman argues that ‘[a]id, private, social insurance, and payments from

1442 McAdam, above n 87, 326–7; see also Connell, above n 75, 140; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9. 1443 See above n 1442 and accompanying text. 1444 McAdam, above n 75, 124, 130; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 138, 140; see also Ferris, above n 12, 35. 1445 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1446 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084. 1447 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1448 Dean, above n 822, 393, 395, 399, 401, 403.

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adaptation funds are not sufficient to meet the needs of SIDS to withstand climate-related loss

and damage and, when necessary, the costs of relocation and resettlement.’1449

The analysis reveals that there has been very little consideration directed to finance relocation

schemes by the host state. The analysis further reveals that there is inherent recognition of the

need to access funding internationally through programs of donor agencies and funding

mechanisms developed internationally to facilitate all phases of relocation. The analysis

suggests that the small economies of scale of developing countries, including development

priorities of the government of the day, outweigh consideration of relocation schemes as a key

priority. It further suggests that appropriate institutional, human resource capacity and

accountability mechanisms need to be established with the support of the government of the

day to access or to be a recipient of funding for relocation schemes. The readiness of the Fijian

Government is insufficient and is not established against the criterion of funding all phases.

Criterion: Maintenance of Cultural Identity

A considerable literature has been published on the experiences and lessons of human mobility

from non-climatic and climatic factors that maintains that poorly designed plans, policies and

programs for relocation schemes compromise the ‘individual identity, language, religion,

culture, knowledge traditional and self-determination’ of communities.1450 A minority of

participants (n=4) indicated that relocation of communities of origin with local host

communities is ammunition to marshal social conflicts over access to local resources, services

and opportunities in the host state (cross-border).1451 As one non-state actor stated: ‘In the

Pacific, communities are linked to their land, heritage and culture… the culture and tradition

of the Fijian communities should not be compromised.’1452 Another non-state actor

commented: ‘While we may safely move people and give…access to resources, protect their

rights in their new place…what does it mean for their culture and what does it mean for their

psychological well-being? It is a huge trade-off and difficult to reconcile.’1453 Moreover, a

1449 Adelman, above n 103, 32, 52–3. 1450 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 47; see also Vaha, above n 25, 238; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 758, 762. 1451 Interview with non-state actor no.6 [NSA#6] (Suva, 19 September 2017); see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#11, NSA#4, above n 1084; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–4; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 42. 1452 Interview with NSA#6, above n 1451. 1453 Interview with NSA#11, above n 1084.

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non-state actor stated that: ‘It is all about identity. Sometimes you need to spend time to know

their culture…’1454

The analysis reveals that in all phases of relocation it needs to be recognised that more in-

depth consideration of the cultural identity and practices, traditional knowledge and the

traditional values of communities of origin in the host state are critical. The analysis also

reveals that relocation schemes need to recognise the cultural practices and traditional values

of the local host communities and ensure that the host communities are consulted and informed

about the incoming communities to be settled within their locality or village settlement. The

analysis suggests that relocation schemes need to be well planned to encompass programs and

activities for social cohesion and the diversification of social networks as well as to address

the local circumstances of the locality or village settlement. In addition, relocation schemes

also need to be tailored to resolve disputes between communities through dispute resolutions

mechanisms and domestic laws. The evidence suggests that there has been little consideration

of the need for recognition of cultural identity. This demonstrates that there is insufficient

readiness by the Fijian Government. The criterion for the preservation and maintenance of the

cultural identity is not established.

Criterion: Identification of Suitable Land

One of the significant considerations that recurred throughout the interview data and was

identified by two-thirds of the participants (n=13) related to land for relocation.1455 Some of

the interconnected concerns included issues around the consent of landowners, customary

landowners; rights, the type of land—for example, customary, state or freehold land— and the

availability of land, compensation and potential number of communities occupying land.1456

One state actor commented: ‘…the most important element in relocation is the consent of all

the members of the communities and the landowner at the new site…’1457 Similarly, one non-

state actor pointed out that: ‘…from experience with all other things going on relevant to our

resources…is land. First…government will have to look into the availability of land for

resettlement. How we going to deal with the land issues? Fiji has got its own issues with

respect to trying to find resettlement areas…’1458 Likewise, one non-state actor highlighted:

1454 Interview with NSA#4, above n 1084. 1455 See above n 1084 and accompanying text. 1456 Ibid. 1457 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1458 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146.

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‘…there is no land tenure for instance, if the squatter is on iTaukei (Indigenous) land, then

under iTaukei laws 60% consent of the landowning unit needs to be granted before you can

actually move on it. So, there are disagreements…’1459 Echoing similar sentiments, one state

actor pointed out that: ‘…for us locally, the issue really is the availability of land…means not

that we have something physical there that one can just move to but it’s about “availability”

as in one has to look into land ownership issue and whether it is something landowners can

give…we have seen in the internal relocation examples…’1460

The evidence reveals that the Fijian Government will have to manage a host of significant

issues relating to the availability of land for its internal relocation schemes. The evidence also

reveals that far too little attention has been directed by the government to land acquisition for

cross-border relocation schemes. The analysis suggests that the Fijian Government needs to

recognise that extensive collaboration and comprehensive arrangements will need to be

directed to identify and allocate land for cross-border relocation schemes relative to the issues

presented by the internal relocation schemes. The analysis further suggests that sufficient lead

time for identifying suitable relocation sites, proactively engaging in consistent dialogue and

negotiation with landowners, extending compensation to landowners and strengthening land

tenure systems as part of relocation plans, policies and laws needs to be provided to enable

cross-border relocation schemes in the future.1461 Many uncertainties in responding to the

criterion for land for cross-border relocation schemes still exist. The readiness of the Fijian

Government is not established against the criterion for the identification and acquisition of

land.

Criterion: The Role of Law in Relocation

The role that law can play in all phases of relocation schemes was recorded in the interview

data by a minority of participants (n=5). The participants recognised the development of laws

and regulations at the domestic level and cooperation between national governments facilitated

1459 Interview with NSA#4, above n 1084. 1460 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1461 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 35; see also ‘87% of the land is owned by traditional Fijian mataqali’s…this land is prohibited from being sold, exchanged or sub-let by the mataqali…the remainder being state and freehold...’ as cited in Charan, Kaur and Singh, above n 54, 19, 24; see also ‘purchase of the freehold land by Kiribati in Fiji was a current expression of the close historical ties linking the two countries together…to assist its neighbour with development opportunities, options for food security and the possibility to grant refuge to the inhabitants of Kiribati should the island ever be rendered uninhabitable’ as cited in Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 233, 248-9, 252.

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by bi-lateral arrangements as intrinsic to the role of law for relocation schemes. One state actor

pointed out:

… Fiji should be-ready-be-prepared in all aspects…it brings to the forefront the issue of two sovereign states. It raises pertinent legal questions about how does it affect our sovereignty and legal space and what is the legality around this issue? We need to start thinking about this in terms of: the legal space (constitution, legislation, and citizenship) and the socio-economic space… It will depend on the government of the day on how sorted/prepared the government is in terms of the policy space.1462

According to one non-state actor: ‘[A]s part of the legal preparedness…we need to look at our:

i) current laws, ii) land, iii) land use plans…’1463 One state actor commented that: ‘...the

Immigration Act is silent on cross-border resettlement…’1464 Another state actor highlighted

that: ‘For…cross-border resettlement, there has not been any discussions...there needs to be

bi-lateral arrangements in place…we have not been really engaged in any discussions at the

moment in terms of…bi-lateral arrangements that we need to put in place. But there is a need

for us to venture into that.’1465

Alongside the legal arrangements for communities of origin in the host state, a minority of

participants (n=3) referred to dual citizenship for the Banabans and Vaitupuans in Rabi and

Kioa respectively.1466 As one state actor pointed out: ‘…Rabi, they are Fijians, but they still

have Kiribati citizenship, so a lot we need to discuss and cross the bridge when we get

there.’1467 Similarly, one non-state actor commented: ‘Who do they become if they move here

(Fiji)?...They…retain their citizenships and identity.’1468

The evidence demonstrates that the role of law at the domestic level and between national

governments for relocation schemes has been insufficiently considered by the government of

the day. However, the evidence reveals that legal status determination specifically tailored to

dual citizenship is well established at the domestic level. The analysis reveals that relocation

schemes need to be underpinned by legal arrangements taking place through domestic laws,

regulations, and administrative rules, national relocation policies, the establishment of

institutions and agreements underscored by bi-lateral, memoranda of understating or goodwill

arrangements.1469 In addition, relocation schemes also need to embody protection mechanisms,

1462 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1463 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1464 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1465 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1466 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1467 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1468 Interview with NSA#4, above n 1084. 1469 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 48; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208.

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such as rights of communities to ‘health care, education, political participation, service

schemes, housing, land, resources’ and assistance arrangements such as compensation and

livelihoods restoration as part of the role law can play.1470 Likewise, relocation schemes need

to further integrate soft law principles, normative frameworks and international safeguards

embedded in international soft law instruments.1471 The analysis identifies support for legal

arrangements specific to dual citizenship. However, the analysis suggests that the state

machinery of the government of the day at the domestic and regional levels from the standpoint

of the role of law has so far been insufficiently considered.1472 For example, laws of Fiji such

as the Immigration Act 2003 and the iTaukei (indigenous) Affairs Act (Cap 120), to cite a few,

do not address migration and land issues emerging from cross-border relocation in the future.

This suggests that the criterion for the role of law for relocation schemes is not established.

Criterion: Institutional Capacity and Coordination of Local Government

There is widespread consensus among scholars in the field of development projects and studies

exploring sudden- and slow-onset environmental change that the relocation of communities

requires developing institutional support, harnessing and strengthening existing institutions

and the coordination and cooperation of national governments.1473 Capacity building was

recorded as an important issue by nearly half of the participants (n=8).1474 As one non-state

articulated: ‘[b]uilding capacity of government agencies/officers…civil society organisation

is a key outcome from the lessons learnt from the Vunidogoloa and Narikoso relocation

projects.’1475 Another non-state actor highlighted that: ‘Secretariat for the Pacific Community

(SPC)’s support…included providing training to…government ministries on cost and benefit

analysis…SPC…with CCU (Climate Change Unit) also supported the development…of an

integrated vulnerability assessment tool…through a series of consultations with government

officials.’1476 Likewise, another non-state actor reported that the ‘…Pacific Conference of

1470 Ferris, above n 12, 33, 35; see also Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 99; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48–9. 1471 See above n 1470 and accompanying text. See also ADB Report, above n 10, 55–9. 1472 See also The future dynamics of political leadership of Kiribati and Tuvalu to respond to climate change-induced migration as cited in KV20, above n 20 and accompanying text. See also Sopoanga, above n 22 and accompanying text. 1473 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 149, 151, 153; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–8; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 130–1. 1474 Interview with SA#1, NSA#2, above n 1110; see also interview with SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, SA#6, NSA#3, NSA#5, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1475 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1476 Interview with NSA#2, above n 1110.

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Churches [PCC] played a significant role particularly with…relocation of communities in

Vunidogoloa…PCC…facilitated discussions with communities…government

agencies…PCC was…instrumental in bringing all parties…National Disaster Management

Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Climate Change, Ministry of iTaukei (Indigenous)

Affairs…’1477

Similarly, one state actor pointed out that: ‘…key considerations in planning and resettlement

of communities requires concerted efforts by multiple agencies (national and other

institutions)…’ are one of the key considerations…’1478 Another state actor commented that:

‘It is important to ensure that roles are clearly demarcated in driving efforts…I hope all

agencies efforts are synchronised rather than working independently…important that we

understand each other’s work and that is how you can do your work better.’1479 Similarly,

another state actor reported that: ‘...in Vunidogoloa…The women were sent to Barefoot

College, India to undertake solar powered training program, when they returned they carried

out solar installation at their new relocation site.’1480

The evidence reveals that the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government

to resettle communities in Fiji have provided local government institutions with the tools to

build and strengthen institutional capacity and harness coordination efforts stemming from

these relocation experiences and lessons. The analysis suggests that the established capacity

and coordination strategies of existing local government institutions provide the first steps for

the Fijian Government to plan, design and implement relocation schemes for cross-border

relocation of communities to Fiji. The analysis also suggests that cross-border relocation

schemes may present a unique set of considerations, such as information and data exchange,

financing, infrastructure and legal facilities, which need to be acknowledged and integrated in

planning by the Fijian Government and between national governments. This further suggests

that the demands in terms of the context and scope of institutional support, cooperation and

technical assistance will be manifold. In acknowledging that the institutional capacity and

coordination for the internal relocation schemes is well supported, the relocation schemes for

cross-border of communities have not received substantial attention by the Fijian Government.

The readiness of the Fijian Government is not established against the criterion for the

institutional capacity and coordination.

1477 Interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1478 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1479 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1480 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084.

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Together, the analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the criterion for the role of law in relocation

shows that attention has been directed by the Fijian Government to dual citizenship

arrangements supported by domestic laws. The interview data relating to the relocation of the

Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji demonstrates the role that law can play relating

to citizenship rights. Moreover, further analysis shows the well supported capacity and

coordination arrangements of local government institutions underscored by the experiences

and lessons learned from the internal relocation schemes. The analysis for the set of criteria,

while preliminary, suggests the partially substantiated readiness of the Fijian Government for

cross-border relocation. However, the analysis also suggests that much uncertainty still exists

as the dimensions of the set of criteria have not been fully uncovered in the context of cross-

border relocation. Overall, the analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the set of criteria traversing

whole-of-community orientation at all phases, funding all phases, maintenance of cultural

identity, identification of suitable land, the role of law for relocation and the institutional

capacity and coordination of local government confirms that far too little attention has been

directed by the Fijian Government to be ready for climate change-induced human mobility.

The analysis further confirms that significant work lies ahead to achieve readiness against this

set of criteria.

7.6 Reform Perspective and Direction for Framework

The sources of data drawn from the analysis of the literature and field research are used to

guide the direction of reform spanning legal and policy dimensions. The reform perspective

offers insights that can provide the impetus for the Fijian Government to inform readiness for

climate change-induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji.

The existing arrangements traversing the legal, policy and institutional arrangements have not

received substantial attention from the Fijian Government, as detailed in the literature and field

interviews.1481 The case studies of the Banabans and Vaitupuans to Fiji show that the legal

status determination taking place through multiple citizenship and dual nationality is protected

by the ‘Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s 14 and complemented by the Fiji Constitution 2013

s 5(4).’1482 The provisions demonstrate that the identity of communities of origin from a legal

perspective relocating in the future is protected by Fiji. The arrangements for citizenship and

1481 McAdam, above n 10, 266–70. 1482 McAdam, above n 87, 301–3, 306–7, 313, 317, 319, 321; see also Connell, above n 75, 139.

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nationality provide the only detailed consideration by the Fijian Government of readiness to

date.

However, the areas where reform is necessary relate to the review of existing statutes to

underpin legal entry into Fiji on the grounds of climate change. For example, the Immigration

Act 2003 (Fiji); and the recognition of land ownership and rights such as the iTaukei

(indigenous) Affairs Act (Cap 120) (Fiji) can be used to settle communities on customary land,

or other types of land such as state or freehold land.1483 As recorded in the interview data, one

state actor reported that: ‘...the Immigration Act is silent on cross-border resettlement except

reference to Part 6, which makes provision for refugee status determination…re-define the

term “refugee” under the Immigration Act.’1484 One other state actor indicated that: ‘There has

to be review of our immigration legislation…we have to be flexible if we are to allow it (cross-

border)…also look at it from a human rights perspective in terms of some of the international

conventions…’1485 Moreover, the case study of the Gilbertese resettlement to Ghizo shows

that the Gilbertese were granted title to ‘four acres of freehold land and the right to acquire

further land.’1486 The sources of data highlight some of the areas for consideration as part of

readiness to respond to future relocation of communities. These include the revision of existing

laws pertaining to the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji) and the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap 120) (Fiji)

together with other laws related to land on land tenure and land acquisition by the state.

The formulation of new laws can be tailored to underscore specific arrangements for

communities of origin in the host state that embody ‘land acquisition and rights, preservation

of cultural identity, economic opportunities, and the maintenance of distinct, self-governing

communities.’1487 These areas of focus for reform ought to be considered as part of readiness

of the Fijian Government. For example, as recorded in the interview data, one non-state actor

pointed out:

…develop…a separate piece of Act for resettlement…because of my experience for the intra-resettlement,…we nominate certain stakeholders…to facilitate…the communities because they have the legal basis or the Act that allows the community to approach them…the iTaukei affairs for instance, the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap 120)…non-formal communities go to…Ministry for Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management…the National Disaster Management Act…1488

1483 Interview with NSA#1, SA#4, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1484 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1485 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1486 Donner, above n 35, 195–6. 1487 McAdam, above n 13, 281–333; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35. 1488 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084.

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Likewise, the literature in the context of climate finance readiness presented by the case studies

of the ‘Asian sub-region and the Pacific sub-region’ reveals that the Asian countries’ readiness

performance was progressive.1489 This was achieved by establishing the ‘right domestic

environment’ through a ‘variety of financial instruments issued such as tax-free infrastructure

bonds for renewable energy projects, and the establishment of National Climate Funds (NCF)

to mobilise domestic and international climate finance.’1490 The case studies identify the need

for the role of law to underpin readiness. The sources of data offer insights to establish the

right domestic environment taking place through developing new laws and the capacity of

local government bodies.

The legal dimension of reform can also be extended to include arrangements between national

governments facilitated by bi-lateral agreements. As one state actor stated:

…go by way of bi-lateral arrangements. It is neater, easy to control and manage... and it does not open up “door” for misinterpretation or misunderstanding…With bi-lateral arrangements, you can put in place all the: i) conditions; ii) all the process that is to be criteria, all the factors one has to put in place; and iii) take into account all the different arrangements between the two countries…bi-lateral arrangements…is tight…it will acknowledge and make provision for the different situations and different circumstances…1491

The interview data identify the need for bi-lateral arrangements to curb potential uncertainties

emerging from future relocation schemes between the sending and host states. This approach

can also be considered to supplement the review of existing laws, or the formulation of new

laws as part of reform from a legal perspective.

Similarly, policy reform is an additional dimension by which to examine the readiness of the

Fijian Government. As recorded in the interview data, one non-state actor pointed out that:

‘...it (cross-border relocation) could begin as “cross-border guideline for resettlement” which

then…be developed into a legal policy for resettlement…’1492 One other non-state actor

reported that: ‘[I]n order to create enabling policies and…the legal approach (existing

legislative stipulations)…important to consider the whole landscape of the legislature…the

policy and the legislation, assess and synthesise and renovate…i.e. to renovate a policy

framework.’1493 Likewise, the readiness phase, as highlighted in the REDD+ literature for

developing countries to be able to participate in the REDD+ scheme, requires the development

of a national strategy, a national readiness policy, the formulation of project proposals with

1489 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200, 1203. 1490 Ibid. 1491 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1492 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084. 1493 Interview with NSA#5, above n 1084; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11; see also Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 652.

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the explicit inclusion of plans and legislative and regulatory reforms and the capacity

development support to implement REDD+ activities.1494 The sources of data demonstrate the

importance of the policy dimension for reform through the development of national policies

and strategies, which can be aligned with the national development plans and priorities of the

Fijian Government as part of readiness.

It is acknowledged that the sources of data provide first steps into areas of reform spanning

legal and policy dimensions as part of readiness by the host state for climate change-induced

human mobility. Against this background, national laws and policies, including agreements

and cooperation between national governments facilitated by bi-lateral agreements, underscore

the legal dimension that can be integrated into the framework for readiness. Moreover, the

framework also needs to recognise interconnected issues spanning social, cultural, economic

and political dimensions anchored by the legal dimension to ensure a well-rounded response

by the Fijian Government. The array of determinants to guide decision makers, policymakers

and law drafters with the direction of the framework ought to encompass the following:

1) establishment of legal facilities relating to ‘simplified cross-border trade travel, customs

documents, prior visa applications, customs excise duty and taxes’;1495

2) integration of soft law principles and normative frameworks anchored in ‘international

human rights laws and instruments such as right to adequate housing; right to land and

rights in land; right to security of person; and right to security of tenure’ for the

development of policies, programs and activities at the domestic level for all phases of

relocation;1496

3) integration of international safeguards and guidelines anchored in international

instruments and declarations, for example, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

Peoples (UNDRIP), including those formulated by international financial institutions and

intergovernmental agencies such as ‘free, prior, and informed consent guidelines (FPIC

Guidelines);’1497

1494 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Wil, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46. 1495 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210; see also Kalin, above n 15, 28. 1496 Leckie, above n 348, 18; see also Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–9. 1497 Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11.

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4) introduction of mechanisms to resolve ‘disputes, conflict and violence between relocating

communities and host communities emerging from resources availability and unequal

access to services;’1498

5) integration of the ‘economic, social cultural, and spiritual costs’ of relocating communities

in all relocation phases;1499

6) ‘preservation of cultural identity of relocating communities with the host communities

through language, religion, collection of dances, indigenous knowledge, traditional crops,

dance performances and costumes;’1500

7) maintenance of the relocating community’s ‘system of governance taking place through

village council’s with host communities;1501

8) ‘re-establishment and the restoration of livelihoods, transfer of property and assets’ of

relocating communities;1502

9) ‘respect for, protection of, and fulfilment of the rights’ of relocating communities taking

place through ‘access to resources, health care, education, and political participation’ in

the host state;1503

10) recognition and integration of ethical considerations such as ‘allocation of scarce

resources; equitable benefit sharing; and compensation’ across communities, including

marginalised groups;1504

11) recognition of land rights of landowners, including customary land rights; and negotiation

and compensation to landowners for land for relocation;1505

12) explicit inclusion and integration of communities in the host state, extending to

‘marginalised groups including ethnic minorities, elderly, and children’ in all phases of

relocation decision-making taking place through meaningful participation and

consultation by the host state;1506

13) determination of relocation costs for all phases of relocation in national plans and

policies;1507

1498 Kalin, above n 15, 28; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 88–99; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also McAdam, above n 10, 256. 1499 McAdam, above n 10, 256; see also Locke, above n 25, 178; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 47–8. 1500 Donner, above n 35, 195, 197–8: see also Vaha, above n 25, 237–8; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 111. 1501 Donner, above n 35, 193, 197–8; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1502 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19–20; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124. 1503 Ferris, above n 12, 33–5; see also Locke, above n 25, 178; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48. 1504 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 521, 524. 1505 McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 140; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9. 1506 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 327; see also Leckie, above n 348, 19. 1507 Connell, above n 75, 140.

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14) establishment of local government bodies, developing the capacity of local government

institutions, and delineating coordination roles, exercise of powers and functions of

implementing institutions to implement all phases of relocation;1508

15) development of capacity of local government institutions to access finance; to plan and

design the technical, operational and logistical aspects of relocation through laws, policies

and plans at the domestic level;1509 and

16) building of partnerships through international cooperation; and strengthening political

capacity of national governments to support and implement relocation schemes.1510

It is acknowledged that this set of determinants is not exhaustive. The analysis of readiness

uncovered from the sources of data contributes knowledge to developing a framework. The

framework embodies a range of dimensions including legal, social, cultural, economic and

political perspectives. The study has demonstrated for the first time, the determinants for the

framework for readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter set out to articulate the criteria for analysing readiness in the context of climate

change-induced human mobility. This chapter has shown that whole-of-community

orientation in phases for relocation, funding, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of

suitable land, the role that law can play and the development of institutional capacity and

coordination of local government bodies in all relocation phases are the set of criteria. The

criteria were uncovered by the synthesis and analysis of the different sources of data spanning

chapters four, five and six. The set of criteria for readiness in the context of climate change

induced human mobility answers the key research question (RQ1).

This chapter examines the level of readiness of the Fijian Government against the set of criteria

by using interview data to support the analysis. As this chapter shows, aside from the

constitutional and legislative provisions supporting multiple citizenship at the domestic level,

which partially suggests readiness against the criterion for the role of law, the remainder of the

criteria are not well advanced by the Fijian Government. Fiji’s readiness against the set of

criteria traversing whole- of-community orientation at all phases, funding all phases,

1508 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–5; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 130; see also Melde and Lee, above n 1402, 34. 1509 See above n 1508 and accompanying text. 1510 Ibid.

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maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land, the role of law for relocation

and the institutional capacity and coordination of local government is not established. Taken

together, the analysis has shown that much uncertainty still exists. This answers the second

research question (RQ 2), which enquires into the current state of readiness of the Fijian

Government to receive Pacific Islanders to Fiji as a result of climate change.

Finally, this chapter has identified some of the key areas within the existing laws and policy

where reform is needed. This chapter has also identified determinants spanning legal, social,

cultural, economic and political dimensions that guide the direction for decision makers,

policymakers and law drafters to carve the framework for readiness in the context of climate

change-induced human mobility. The next chapter delves into the conclusions and potential

directions for future from the in-depth analysis in this chapter. It also reiterates the significant

and original contribution to knowledge by the criteria articulated for analysing readiness for

change change-induced human mobility.

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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Directions for Future

8.1 Introduction

This final chapter presents the major findings of this thesis. The significance of these findings

and the original contribution to the growing body of research on climate change-induced

human mobility is also addressed. This chapter then provides potential directions for future

and highlights areas for further research before detailing the limitations of the study and

providing an overall conclusion.

The thesis set out to identify the criteria for assessing readiness in the context of climate

change-induced human mobility to assess Fiji’s readiness using these criteria. It set out to

provide a reform perspective and identify key areas within existing laws where possible reform

is needed by the state machinery.1511 Additionally, the thesis set out to identify a set of

determinants to guide decision makers, policymakers and law drafters in developing a

framework to inform climate change-induced human mobility.

This chapter draws together the significant findings based on the comprehensive synthesis and

analysis of the experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of the historical

resettlement of Pacific Islanders, the body of experience on the phenomenon of readiness

documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives spanning disaster

preparedness, climate finance readiness, international humanitarian assistance preparedness,

public health preparedness, REDD+ readiness—and the empirical findings of the experiences

and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government.

Together, these provide the foundation to articulate the criteria of readiness.

8.2 Summary of Key Findings

The overall findings of this thesis confirm that a whole-of-government approach for the

climate change-induced mobility of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji spanning

1511 Hutchinson, above n 63, 23.

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legal, social, cultural, economic and political dimensions is not well advanced by the Fijian

Government. There are several possible explanations for this result.

The extensive body of research and various published reports demonstrate that the existing

international legal framework to respond to mobility dimensions from slow-onset

environmental change—and in particular, the movement of populations across international

borders in the context of climate change—has proved largely unsatisfactory in international

global policy fora and under international law, as indicated in chapter three.1512 Furthermore,

there is widespread consensus among scholars, migration practitioners and intergovernmental

agencies that reveals growing consideration and recognition of non-binding international legal

instruments underpinned by a human rights framework synonymous with a human rights-

based approach as means by which the assistance and protection of people facing mobility as

a result of climate change can be extended.1513 A major critique of much of the literature on a

protection framework is that far too little attention has been directed to uniformly and

consistently implementing protection measures (as was highlighted in chapter three).1514

Alongside the noted gap in protections at the international level, a closer examination of the

developments at the Pacific regional level reveals that regional cooperation and protection

arrangements of Pacific Island governments to facilitate and manage the relocation of Pacific

Island communities to neighbouring islands to protect against the debilitating risks of climate

change remain grim.1515 Moreover, numerous case studies documenting the relocation of the

Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji have provided a basis for understanding some of

the salient issues and challenges that large-scale population relocation of Pacific Island

communities may potentially present in future in the context of climate change (as outlined in

chapters three and four).1516

The main research question (RQ1) asked: What are the criteria for readiness in the context of

climate change-induced human mobility? This thesis has articulated the need for a whole-of-

community orientation in all phases of relocation, as well as adequate funding for all phases.

All phases includes planning, implementation and post-implementation. The set of criteria for

1512 Kalin, above n 178, 5–7; see also Zetter, above n 505, 62–3. 1513 See above n 1512 and accompanying text; see also McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 13–19; see also Ploeg and Vanclay, above n 397, 34–52. 1514 Ploeg and Vanclay, above n 397, 34–52; see also Smyth and Vanclay, above n 397, 65–80; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 55–9; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 4, 54–5; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 665, 1–55. 1515 Burson and Bedford, above n 665, 1–55; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30–2; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–34. 1516 See above n 1515 and accompanying text; see also Donner, above n 35, 191–201.

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assessing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility includes the

maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land, the role that law can play and

the development of institutional capacity and coordination of local government bodies in all

phases of relocation. These are key determinants gleaned from the experiences and lessons

learned from the case studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders and the body of

experience on readiness documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives.

Research Question 1(a) asked: What can we learn from the historical experiences of human

mobility across the Pacific Islands regions? The experiences and lessons learned from the

case studies from the perspective of both communities of origin and the host communities

inform the criteria of readiness for all phases of relocation to inform climate change-induced

human mobility. These include meaningful consultation and the inclusiveness of all

community members in all ‘planning, negotiations and execution’ phases of relocation

decision-making of communities of origin, including the receiving community,1517

identification of suitable land and the availability of land to provide food security and restore

livelihoods of communities of origin in the host state,1518 and ‘sustained and sufficient

financing’ of all phases of relocation (both social and physical costs) related to communities

of origin in the host state.1519 Other key determinants include the ‘maintenance of ancestral

ties to place, cultural identity, religion and indigenous knowledge’ of communities of origin

in the host state.1520 The legal status recognition of communities of origin in the host state

underpinned by the domestic laws that deal with dual citizenship, nationality and political

participation—including the legal recognition of the descendants to citizenship and political

participation at the origin and/or traditional homeland,1521 ‘retaining control over land and

marine resources’ by relocating communities at ‘their original home island (origin)’1522 and

‘equal access to common resources and services’ (fishing, land, health, education, social

welfare) at the host state are also key determinants.1523

1517 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 64, 68, 75, 76–8. 1518 Ibid 58, 63–70; see also Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4. 1519 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 319; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also McAdam, above n 642; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Edwards, above n 35, 69, 74–5; see also ADB Report above n 10, 61-2. 1520 Farbotko, above n 732; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 3, 11, 23, 25; see also McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43–55; see also ‘identity, culture, community and livelihoods are deeply interwoven in the historical and cultural fabric of communities’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 23, 25 and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 53. 1521 McAdam, above n 13, 283–4, 307, 319, 326, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 140. 1522 See above n 1521 and accompanying text; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1523 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also Locke, above n 25, 178.

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Research Question 1(b) asked: What can we learn from the experiences and lessons learned

from the internal relocation of communities in Fiji? The empirical findings identified through

the interview data of participants (n = 18) in chapter six showed key considerations in

relocation schemes to be the recognition of land tenure-ships, maintaining dual citizenship and

nationality, allocation of funding and accessing financial resources internationally—including

pragmatic responses to state sovereignty.1524 The interview data also showed that relocation

schemes should recognise a number of additional considerations. These include the cultural

identity of communities of origin in the host state, the explicit inclusion of host communities

in the levels of action and relocation phases, intervention of faith-based organisations as

intermediaries between communities and implementing authorities, respect for human rights,

the role of the education sector—particularly tertiary institutions to deliver programs oriented

to climate change—maintaining a people-centred approach and the consideration of the notion

of regionalism to garner support and cooperation between the host country and countries of

origin. The interview data, together with the analysis of the literature and published reports

have identified that issues around land, funding, sovereignty and regionalism present major

challenges for national governments. This thesis has identified proactive measures that could

be adopted to ameliorate these to some extent.

Research Question 1(c) asked: What can we learn from the literature on other forms of mobility

or other contexts of readiness? The analysis of readiness from the multidisciplinary literature

spanning disaster preparedness, climate finance readiness, international humanitarian

assistance preparedness, public health preparedness and REDD+ readiness shows that capacity

development support, the role of law and a whole-of-society orientation are three

interdependent elements central to what it means to be ready.

Research Question 2 asked: What is the current state of Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale

mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change? The set of criteria articulated in

RQ 1 used to analyse Fiji’s overall readiness comprised a whole-of-community orientation at

all phases, funding of all phases, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable

land, the role of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and coordination of local

governments. The analysis of the Fijian Government’s position shows that far too little

attention has been directed towards addressing the challenges arising from the climate change-

1524 See above n 1523; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 60–2, 67, 70–1; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 90, 95, 99; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326–7; see also McAdam, 354, 10; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 380.

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induced mobility of Pacific Island communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. However,

the analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the criterion for the role of law in relocation does show

that as first steps, the legal status recognition of individuals through dual citizenship

arrangements are well supported by domestic laws. Moreover, further analysis showed well-

supported capacity and coordination arrangements by local government institutions

underscored by the experiences and lessons learned from the previous internal relocation

schemes.

The set of criteria relating to the role of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and

coordination of local government, while preliminary, is shown to partially substantiate the

readiness of the Fijian Government for cross-border relocation. However, the analysis also

shows that much uncertainty still exists, as the dimensions of the set of criteria have not been

fully uncovered in the context of cross-border relocation. Overall, the analysis of Fiji’s

readiness against the set of criteria traversing whole-of-community orientation at all phases,

funding of all phases, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land, the role

of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and coordination of local government shows

that the readiness of the Fijian Government across the host of areas is lacking for climate

change-induced human mobility. It also demonstrates that significant and extensive work lies

ahead in order to achieve readiness against the set of criteria.

Research Question 3 asked: What reforms are necessary to ensure that Fiji is ready to receive

Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change? The reform perspective shows that the revision

of existing laws pertaining to the: Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji) and the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap

120) (Fiji), together with other laws related to land such as land tenure and land acquisition by

the state provide a starting point. Moreover, the formulation of new laws tailored to underscore

specific arrangements for communities of origin in the host state that embody ‘land acquisition

and rights, preservation of cultural identity, economic opportunities, and the maintenance of

distinct, self-governing communities can be considered.’1525 Furthermore, arrangements

between national governments facilitated by bi-lateral agreements are additional

considerations. Similarly, the reform perspective highlights the importance of the policy

dimension through the development of national policies and strategies aligned with the

national development plans and priorities of the Fijian Government as part of readiness.

1525 McAdam, above n 13, 281–333; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35.

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8.3 General and Specific Contribution

This study advances the understanding of readiness in the context of climate change-induced

human mobility. It identifies that while readiness has been explored throughout

multidisciplinary fields of study, as demonstrated by the review of multidisciplinary literature

in chapter five, no single study as yet exists that has specifically addressed the phenomenon

of readiness and conceptualised the criteria instructive for readiness in the context of climate

change. As discussed in chapter seven, the criteria for readiness was applied as an analytical

framework to gauge Fiji’s level of readiness. There are several important areas where the

analysis of readiness traversing the experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of

the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders, the body of experience of readiness

documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives and the empirical findings of

the experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian

Government make a significant and original contribution to the body of knowledge. These can

be categorised as general and specific contributions.

The findings from this study make a general contribution to the large body of work on human

mobility from sudden- and slow-onset environmental change, including the substantial body

of relevant experience on relocation arising from non-climatic factors. Moreover, the findings

add to a growing body of research on climate displacement and migration in the Pacific region.

As highlighted by chapter three, the existing body of research on cross-border relocation in

the context of climate change under international law is less well established and perfunctory

in policy fora at both international and Pacific regional levels.1526

Likewise, the analysis undertaken in this thesis provides a new understanding to inform

readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility. The criteria for analysing

readiness articulated in chapter seven, that is, the whole-of-community orientation at all

phases, funding of all phases, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land,

the role of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and coordination of local government

provide a significant and original contribution to the growing body of existing readiness

literature. Similarly, the overarching determinants in chapter seven present as first steps to

guide the development of a framework spanning legal, social, cultural, economic and political

dimensions for climate change-induced human mobility provide a significant and original

contribution to the field of human mobility studies.

1526 McAdam, above n 10, 15, 237–266.

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The findings of this thesis also make a specific contribution via the research questions. The

findings arising from RQ 1 provide a new understanding to inform the criteria for analysing

readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility. More specifically, the findings

arising from RQ 1(b), which was directed towards participants’ experiences and lessons

learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government, provide useful

insights into the considerations that need to be addressed in cross-border relocation schemes

and what it means to be ready by the state machinery and the community sector. Both the

empirical findings from RQ 1(b) in this study and the empirical observations in the literature

by scholars into the internal relocation projects contribute additional evidence to enhance the

understanding of readiness for relocation schemes. In addition, this is the first empirical study,

underscored by RQ 2, that has appraised Fiji’s position in responding to climate-induced cross

relocation following the announcement delivered by the Fijian Government at the COP 21 in

2015. The findings provide the impetus for sustained dialogue, cooperation and the

development of arrangements at both the local government level and between national

governments to implement relocation schemes. Together, the contribution to knowledge and

the empirical findings add to the various considerations that need to be taken into account to

effect relocations schemes specific to the Fiji context.

8.4 Limitations of Study and Further Directions

A number of caveats need to be noted in terms of the data generated from the field research to

inform readiness and the application of the criteria as an analytical framework to appraise

Fiji’s position for readiness. First, participant recruitment was confined to senior state

representatives and non-governmental organisations and agencies, which excluded the private

sector in Fiji. Second, a randomised selection of community members relocated through the

internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government did not form part of the

recruitment process or participant list. Third, the communities of the Banaban and Vaitupuan

diasporas on the islands of Rabi and Kioa of Fiji respectively, could not be included as part of

the participant recruitment list. Finally, participant recruitment could not extend to include the

full suite of governmental and non-governmental authorities and agencies in Kiribati and

Tuvalu as the countries of origin for relocation to the host country Fiji. Moreover, the practical

resource constraints involved in traveling to the islands of Rabi, Kioa, Kiribati and Tuvalu to

undertake field research within the required timeframe of three years was a further limitation

in bolstering the empirical data of this study, as this is the first study representing targeted

research on readiness in the Fiji context.

272

Re-engaging the Qualitative Empirical Design to Widen Participant Pool

Further research by re-engaging and incorporating the qualitative empirical design adopted in

this study to gather perspectives and attitudes on cross-border relocation and what it means to

be ready is suggested. This research should span the legal, political and socio-economic

dimensions as identified by participants from the islands of Rabi and Kioa, and the island

nations of Kiribati and Tuvalu. Participant recruitment for the wider study could be extended

to include local communities in addition to local governmental bodies and non-governmental

institutions. Further research encompassing broader participation would be beneficial in

offering the full spectrum of perspectives on climate migration readiness across jurisdictions

and a whole-of-government approach by the host country and countries of origin.

Moreover, similar studies that replicate the methods employed in the present study should be

conducted for countries of origin to help establish a greater degree of accuracy on what it

means to be ready from a whole-of-government response encompassing all countries involved

in potential cross-border relocation of communities in the future. It is suggested that targeted

research on all countries involved will provide a strong foundation to articulate appropriate

policies, plans, programs to inform nuanced frameworks spanning legal and governance

arrangements to implement all phases of the cross-border climate change-induced relocation

schemes effectively.

Orienting towards a Cohesive Whole-of-Government Response

The analysis of Fiji’s position to respond to climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Island

communities across sovereign borders to Fiji presented in chapter seven confirms that Fiji is

insufficiently ready. At first glance, a holistic interpretation of the analysis suggests that the

set of criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility needs to be

considered in its entirety so as to address intersecting considerations and issues to achieve a

whole-of-government response. Upon closer examination, as demonstrated through the

experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific

Islanders, the empirical findings of the experiences and lessons learned from the internal

relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government, state sovereignty and the notion of

regionalism present complex and contentious dimensions at policy fora at both the Pacific

273

regional and international levels.1527 Evidence of the complex issues was clearly identified

from the testimonies of participants. For example, one state actor stated that: ‘…whole

discussions of…submerging of their (Kiribati and Tuvalu) basepoints is sovereignty… So,

who has right over that? So that is the big legal question at the international level… do we go

through…strict interpretation of a definition of an island in UNCLOS (United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea).’1528 One other state actor commented that: ‘Regionalism

doesn’t recognise borders and sovereignty…very soon we will lose our sovereignty…’1529

Similarly, sustained finance and the availability of, and access to, land for relocation also

present as significant areas of debate, encompassing issues such as landowners’ rights, local

government bodies, compensation and access to resources.1530 As noted by one state actor:

‘…they (Kiribati and Tuvalu) need to buy their piece of land and realise in their own

security…it is not our (Fiji) responsibility…’1531 Echoing similar sentiments, another state

actor stated that: ‘…for us (Fiji), the issue really is the availability of land…means not that we

have something physical there that one can just move to but it’s about “availability” as in one

has to look into land ownership issue and whether it is something landowners can give…’1532

With regards to finance, one state actor highlighted that: ‘…finance is very critical for us in

the region…Because this (climate change) is not something Pacific Island nations

created….Resettlement will amount to huge funding. We just rely on the international

community.’1533 According to one non-state actor: ‘Money/funding for resettlement is quite a

contentious agenda item. People do not like to fund relocation. That is a big “no-no” for

donors.’1534 As established in chapters three, four and six, issues surrounding: state

sovereignty, regionalism, availability of—and access to—land, and sustained finance present

layers of complex issues that require extensive sustained dialogue, cooperation and negotiation

between the host country and countries of origin, including interventions by the international

community. The complexity of the issues may further delay and potentially inhibit cross-

border relocation schemes because these issues traverse many levels and are interconnected

with a suite of areas of focus. Further research is needed to explore the policy deliberations

beginning with Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu as a starting point at the Pacific regional level. This

could be enhanced by extending to include the potential intervention of the international

1527 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 163. 1528 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1529 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1530 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 327. 1531 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1532 Ibid. 1533 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1534 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084.

274

community as a basis to uncover the support and assistance spanning financial, technical and

legal dimensions.

Moreover, domestic laws and policy need to be articulated in preparation for cross-border

relocation schemes. The domestic legal and policy arrangements could be tailored in one of

two ways. First, by the formulation of specific laws and regulations and the development of a

new policy on cross-border relocation—such as cross-border relocation guidelines and cultural

plans for example—as identified in chapter six. Second, domestic legal and policy

arrangements could be tailored by the revision of existing laws and regulations—such as the

immigration and citizenship laws—and the explicit inclusion of measures and mechanisms in

existing national policy documents, such as the national development plan, land use plan and

national green growth framework as discussed in chapters five, six and seven. More research

is needed to determine the legal and policy arrangements in all the phases for relocation, such

as respect for human rights and the protection of—and assistance to—communities,

recognition of land rights and tenure-ship, and rights and principles embedded in soft law

instruments such as (FPIC, ESB, for example).1535 Further research could access the due

process mechanisms to uncover the social integration, recognition of cultural identity,

livelihood restoration and access to services dimensions as detailed in chapters four, five and

six.

The operational and logistical aspects associated with relocation, such as consular services,

dual citizenship arrangements, infrastructure development and other issues identified in

chapters four, five and six must also form an integral part of the process.1536 It is incumbent on

the government of the day to establish an effective and enabling environment that is secure,

stable and sustainable in order to achieve readiness for all phases of the relocation schemes.1537

More broadly, research is also needed from the regional perspective to determine the policy

deliberations instigated by the governments of Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu to tailor flexible and

tenable arrangements through bi-lateral arrangements or memoranda of understanding, as

detailed in chapters four and six. The intricate details between the national governments on

access to land, sharing of natural resources, citizenship, rights and benefits, among others,

throw up many questions in need for further investigation.

1535 See above n 4 and accompanying text; see also above n 8 and accompanying text. 1536 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 681; see also Barber, above n 160; see also above n 853 and accompanying text. 1537 See above n 1536 and accompanying text.

275

It is envisaged that the governments of the day of the host country and countries of origin

acknowledge the growing recognition of the need for consideration of the complex areas

pertaining to finance, sovereignty, regionalism and land availability before implementation

takes place. If cross-border relocation is to be effected between Pacific Island nations, a

comprehensive and nuanced understanding of readiness needs to be developed in order to

implement cross-border relocation projects successfully. Further research would therefore be

beneficial in significantly assisting policy makers by informing relocation policy decisions and

enabling the formulation of appropriate and effective regulatory measures and mechanisms to

implement cross-border relocation projects at both domestic and Pacific regional levels.

8.5 Overall Conclusion

The major objective of this thesis was to investigate the readiness of the Fijian Government to

respond to climate-induced cross-border relocation of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu

to Fiji following the announcement delivered by the Fijian Government at the COP 21 in 2105.

The findings from this study demonstrate that Fiji is insufficiently ready on the whole gamut

of issues spanning legal, government policy, socio-economic, political and economic

dimensions. Further, the protection and assistance arrangements under international law on the

mobility of populations across international borders on grounds of climate change is not well

established, apart from the explicit references and usefulness of normative principles and

standards traversing non-binding soft-law instruments, as detailed in chapter three.1538 This

thesis has established that what it means to be ready for cross-border relocation of populations

in the context of climate change also remains underdetermined.

Moreover, this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by identifying and

articulating the criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.

It is suggested that the government of the day of the host country and governments of countries

of origin collectively take proactive and pragmatic measures to address cross-border relocation

schemes that are underpinned by a balanced approach and responsive to communities and

people at the centre of all phases of relocation decision-making. Together, the findings of this

thesis identify what it means to be ready for climate change induced mobility, including a set

of criteria that provides the first step to articulating a framework for readiness. This thesis also

identifies the issues and methods by which further empirical investigation and robust policy

1538 McAdam, above n 10, 15, 237–66.

276

deliberations critical to successfully implementing relocation schemes across sovereign

borders.

 

277

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