Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 159
Cost Effective Outcomes fromFPSO Safety Case
ByBrendan Fitzgerald Managing Director Vanguard Solutions
Joe Patrick Managing Director Hunter Oil
Paul Breen Technical Director Vanguard Solutions
FPSO Congress September 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
22 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSO SafetyCase
bull Brief Historybull What is a Safety Case
bull The Management of Safety
bull Why do we need a Safety Case
bull Benefits of doing a Safety Case
bull Safety Cases ndash Lessons Learned
bull A suggested Blue Print for success
bull Conclusions
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
33 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull European Union Major Hazard Facilities ndashSeveso 1 (1982) amp Seveso 2 (1996)
bull UK Railways 2000 amp amended 2003
bull European Union Railway Safety Directive(200449EC)
bull Australia Major Hazard Facilities NationalStandard 1996 amp Updated 2002
Safety Cases are required in various
industries in Europe and Australasia
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
44 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case)Regulations 1992 amp Updated 2005
bull Australia Offshore Facilities 1992 1996 2005amp 2009
bull New Zealand Offshore Facilities 1993 amp 1999
bull Timor Leste Offshore Facilities - 2003
OFFSHORE SAFETY CASE REQUIREMENTS
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
55 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Defence Forces
bull Australian Defence Forces
bull Some oil companies apply Safety Caseworldwide eg BHP Shell and Woodside
OTHER AREAS OF SAFETY CASE USE
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
66 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull International Review panel ndash 2008
bull Bills amp Agostini ndash 2009
ldquoSafety Case still represents best meansof managing major hazards offshorerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
77 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
bull H Conlin et al Trans IChemE Part B July 2004
ldquoA consistent and coherent set ofarguments used to justify the safety of a
system at all stages in its lifecyclerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
22 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSO SafetyCase
bull Brief Historybull What is a Safety Case
bull The Management of Safety
bull Why do we need a Safety Case
bull Benefits of doing a Safety Case
bull Safety Cases ndash Lessons Learned
bull A suggested Blue Print for success
bull Conclusions
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
33 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull European Union Major Hazard Facilities ndashSeveso 1 (1982) amp Seveso 2 (1996)
bull UK Railways 2000 amp amended 2003
bull European Union Railway Safety Directive(200449EC)
bull Australia Major Hazard Facilities NationalStandard 1996 amp Updated 2002
Safety Cases are required in various
industries in Europe and Australasia
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
44 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case)Regulations 1992 amp Updated 2005
bull Australia Offshore Facilities 1992 1996 2005amp 2009
bull New Zealand Offshore Facilities 1993 amp 1999
bull Timor Leste Offshore Facilities - 2003
OFFSHORE SAFETY CASE REQUIREMENTS
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
55 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Defence Forces
bull Australian Defence Forces
bull Some oil companies apply Safety Caseworldwide eg BHP Shell and Woodside
OTHER AREAS OF SAFETY CASE USE
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
66 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull International Review panel ndash 2008
bull Bills amp Agostini ndash 2009
ldquoSafety Case still represents best meansof managing major hazards offshorerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
77 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
bull H Conlin et al Trans IChemE Part B July 2004
ldquoA consistent and coherent set ofarguments used to justify the safety of a
system at all stages in its lifecyclerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
33 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull European Union Major Hazard Facilities ndashSeveso 1 (1982) amp Seveso 2 (1996)
bull UK Railways 2000 amp amended 2003
bull European Union Railway Safety Directive(200449EC)
bull Australia Major Hazard Facilities NationalStandard 1996 amp Updated 2002
Safety Cases are required in various
industries in Europe and Australasia
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
44 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case)Regulations 1992 amp Updated 2005
bull Australia Offshore Facilities 1992 1996 2005amp 2009
bull New Zealand Offshore Facilities 1993 amp 1999
bull Timor Leste Offshore Facilities - 2003
OFFSHORE SAFETY CASE REQUIREMENTS
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
55 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Defence Forces
bull Australian Defence Forces
bull Some oil companies apply Safety Caseworldwide eg BHP Shell and Woodside
OTHER AREAS OF SAFETY CASE USE
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
66 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull International Review panel ndash 2008
bull Bills amp Agostini ndash 2009
ldquoSafety Case still represents best meansof managing major hazards offshorerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
77 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
bull H Conlin et al Trans IChemE Part B July 2004
ldquoA consistent and coherent set ofarguments used to justify the safety of a
system at all stages in its lifecyclerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
44 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case)Regulations 1992 amp Updated 2005
bull Australia Offshore Facilities 1992 1996 2005amp 2009
bull New Zealand Offshore Facilities 1993 amp 1999
bull Timor Leste Offshore Facilities - 2003
OFFSHORE SAFETY CASE REQUIREMENTS
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
55 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Defence Forces
bull Australian Defence Forces
bull Some oil companies apply Safety Caseworldwide eg BHP Shell and Woodside
OTHER AREAS OF SAFETY CASE USE
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
66 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull International Review panel ndash 2008
bull Bills amp Agostini ndash 2009
ldquoSafety Case still represents best meansof managing major hazards offshorerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
77 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
bull H Conlin et al Trans IChemE Part B July 2004
ldquoA consistent and coherent set ofarguments used to justify the safety of a
system at all stages in its lifecyclerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
55 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull UK Defence Forces
bull Australian Defence Forces
bull Some oil companies apply Safety Caseworldwide eg BHP Shell and Woodside
OTHER AREAS OF SAFETY CASE USE
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
66 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull International Review panel ndash 2008
bull Bills amp Agostini ndash 2009
ldquoSafety Case still represents best meansof managing major hazards offshorerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
77 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
bull H Conlin et al Trans IChemE Part B July 2004
ldquoA consistent and coherent set ofarguments used to justify the safety of a
system at all stages in its lifecyclerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
66 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A Brief History
bull International Review panel ndash 2008
bull Bills amp Agostini ndash 2009
ldquoSafety Case still represents best meansof managing major hazards offshorerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
77 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
bull H Conlin et al Trans IChemE Part B July 2004
ldquoA consistent and coherent set ofarguments used to justify the safety of a
system at all stages in its lifecyclerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
77 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
bull H Conlin et al Trans IChemE Part B July 2004
ldquoA consistent and coherent set ofarguments used to justify the safety of a
system at all stages in its lifecyclerdquo
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
88 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
httpwwwnopsagovausafetyasp under the heading Safety Case Approach
bull Identifies the hazards and risks
bull Describes how the risks are controlled
and
bull Describes the safety management system
in place to ensure the controls areeffectively and consistently applied
A safety case is a document produced bythe operator of a facility which
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
99 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
What is a Safety Case
Safety case is a process not just a
documentbull It introduces a need for an audit trail with
documented decisions
bull Brings a greater awareness of hazards andtheir management
bull It always involves a culture change
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1010 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1111 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Commonly used modification from Heinrich
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1212 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Not holding the handrail
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
Serious Leak
Rig Explodes
We needanother
model
We needanother
model
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1313 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
PersonalSafety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1414 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
PersonalSafety
ProcessSafety
These are two differentprocesses
So management systems
must recognise they aretwo different processes
with different drivers
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1515 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of Safety
Different elements of safetymanagement systemsaddress personal safety fromthose that address processsafety
So it is not enough to saythat SMS addresses safety
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1616 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The Management of SafetyRecent observations suggest that industry focus is on
slips trips and falls hellip
Personal
Safety
Fall from Stairs
Fatal Fall
No Handrail
ProcessSafety
Rig Explodes
Serious Leak
Minor Leak
hellip with reducing attentionpaid to maintenance oftechnical integrity and majorhazard controls
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1717 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ldquoBut the more profound problem is a failure toput risks in perspective BP and othercompanies tend to measure safety andenvironmental compliance on a day-to-day
checklist basis to the point of basingexecutive bonuses on those metrics But evenif worker accident rates fall to zero that mayreveal nothing about the risk of a majordisasterrdquo
The Management of Safety
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1818 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
Traditional means of the management of safetyhas been prescriptive in nature
The Management of Safety
bull Quickly out of date as industry changes
bull Industry only performs to minimum ndash no incentive to
exceed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 1959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
1919 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Widely accepted failings of prescription include
The Management of Safety
bull Industry lets regulator work out what is needed andcomply verbatim ndash so operator fails to identify orunderstand the hazards and risks they aresupposed to manage ndash controls may be inadequateor inappropriate
bull Prescriptive regulations become a hurdle to be
cleared with the focus on the hurdle not onmanaging the hazard
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2020 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
The witnessesrsquo reliance on merely a qualitativeopinion showed in my view a dangerouslysuperficial approach to a major hazard
Piper Alpha Inquiry report Lord Cullen criticised attitudeto management of risk from a high pressure gas fire
The Management of Safety
hellip hellip I consider that management were remiss in notenquiring further into the risks of a rupture of one of
the gas risers and in such an event the risk ofstructural damage and injury to personnel
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2121 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Do we really understand our facilities
Here are some you may recognise
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2222 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
27 July 2005 Mumbai High North ndash 22 fatalities
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2323 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
August to November 2009 Montara ndash total loss ofWHP and rig - unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2424 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
20 April 2010 ndash Deepwater Horizon Macondo Blowout ndash
11 fatalities massive amp unknown environmental impact
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2525 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Thatrsquos all well and good ndash but what has
that got to do with FPSOs
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2626 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 August 2010 MT Gagasan Merak FSO
ndash Cargo tank explosion ndash 4 injured
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2727 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
2009 Formosaproduct Brick Product Tanker
ndash Ship Collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2828 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
28 August 2009 Tanker Elli breaks back in ballastingerror for tank entry
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 2959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
2929 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
Ship collisions donrsquot happen with
offshore facilities do they
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3030 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
11 August 2010 ndash Kodeco Platform ndash unknown vessel collision
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3131 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
8 June 2009 ndash Big Orange XVIII collision with Ekofisk Complex
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3232 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
ndash Nothing could possibly go wrongright
ndash Yoursquove carefully thought out all the angles
ndash It comes naturally to you
ndash Yoursquove done it a thousand times
ndash Youknow what yoursquore doing itrsquos whatyoursquove been trained to do your whole life
Why do we need a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3333 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Think Again
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3434 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Case
bull How do you demonstrate adequacy of safetymanagement to Company Board otherwise
bull ISO 9000 process amp ISO 31000 elements link directlyto the Safety Case process
bull So good quality management requires a Safety Case
bull Demands of duty of care ndash how do you demonstrateadequacy without a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3535 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Why do we need a Safety Casebull International companies ndash consistency of application
across assets ( eg Shell BP Union Carbide)
bull How do you demonstrate safety in design withoutSafety Case ndash Are standards Class enough
bull How else could hazards and the SMS be linked
bull HAZOP is an integrity assurance process ndash not hazardidentification
bull So if just apply codes and standards what other
hazards risk mitigation measures would bemissed
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3636 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learnedThe Enemies of Safety are
Complacency
Arrogance
Ignorance
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in ProcessSafetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3737 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Factors in Complacency
bull Discounting risk
bull Over-relying on redundancy
bull Unrealistic risk assessment
bull Ignoring low-probability high-consequence events
bull Assuming risk decreases over time
bull Ignoring warning signs
Reflecting on recent major accident events -does any of the above sound familiar
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo
Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3838 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Schedule
bull Cost
bull Performance
bull Safety
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell UserGroup Summit June 2007
Do we effectively put this into practice
Managing TradeoffsGood risk management requires
understanding the outcomes implicationsimpact and tradeoffs between
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 3959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
3939 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Example Schedule Pressure and Safety Priority
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
14
Safety Priority
S c h
e d u l e
P r e s s u
r e
Low High
Low
High
Overly aggressiveschedule enforcement haslittle effect on completiontime (lt2) amp cost but hasa large negative impact on
safety
Priority of safety activitieshas a large positive impact
including a positive costimpact (less rework)
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4040 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Cost
983111983141983150983141983154983145983139 983145983149983152983137983139983156 983151983142
983148983137983156983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141 983151983150
983120983154983151983146983141983139983156 983139983151983155983156 983159983145983156983144 983156983145983149983141
Impact of Safety CaseTo influence Project Costs
Concept Construction Operations
983107983151983155983156 983151983142 983145983149983152983148983141983149983141983150983156983145983150983143983123983137983142983141983156983161 983107983137983155983141
983144983137983154983140983159983137983154983141 983139983144983137983150983143983141983155
DetailedDesign
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4141 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Blowdown philosophy set early with late applicationof safety case ndash identified problem resulting in
expensive change
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull People competence skills gaps ndash a major ongoingissue - with an ageing workforce how do we
effectively manage current and future projects andoperations
bull Managing the wrong thing ndash ie managing the detail
and overlooking the big picture (example is OHS vsMAE risk)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4242 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull The Myth of major shutdown In-Water Surveys withno time off riser ndash how many projects achieve it
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull But we build this into the design basis and hence intothe risk profilehellip
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4343 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor RelationshipsSafety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Typical contract arrangement gives minimalincentives for overall safe performance but generallypenalties for being unsafe
bull The FPSO Contractor is contractually incentivized to
keep producing - they generally lose money ifproduction stops ndash is there another way
bull The Safety Case can and should give the FPSO
Contractor a route to cost recovery
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4444 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
bull Lump sum low cost Safety Case v quality andunderstanding
bull The outcomes of the Safety Case are not known tillwell after the contract is signed ndash is lump sum a fairand realistic contract strategy
Oil Company and FPSO Contractor Relationships
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4545 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Quote from Conlin et al
Often the Safety Case is produced by following a prescriptive setof instructions which stifle true thought about whether definedactivities are as safe as they need to be because it is easier towrite a Safety Case that way and then to audit the Safety Caseagainst the internal procedure
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4646 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
And further from Conlin et alBecause of the practice of describing the organisationthat is in place rather than debating what options have
been considered the fact that safety science(engineering) has had insufficient input into thedesign is not being revealed
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4747 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases are not off-the-shelf production lineexercises in documentation
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
Just producing a book ticking a box does not meet
the intent
To be effective the safety case process must be
allowed to take its course to examine critically andinteract with the design and the organisation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4848 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Safety Cases ndash lessons learned
If you want a Ferrari but only specify something withwheels and an engine donrsquot complain when a secondhand Toyota needing maintenance work appears on
the driveway
Some problems with Safety Case implementation
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 4959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
4949 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Management leadership ndash must have this to work
bull Apply realistic schedule and budget
bull Develop and apply safety design philosophy
bull Do it early
bull
Embed experienced Safety Engineer in engineeringdesign team as interface to Formal SafetyAssessment team
bull Apply risk based decision-making process
bull Create an audit trail
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5059
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5050 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Successbull Safety Engineering will provide linkage across the
interfaces
bull Marine
bull Production
bull Mooring
bull Subsea
bull
Sub-surface
bull Expect amp support this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5159
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5151 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
A suggested Blue Print for Success
bull Operating envelope management of risk ndash ie theSafety Case should define the operating envelopeand hence allows you to understand the area inwhich your operational risk controls need to be
applied and are designed to work
bull How do you know you are operating outside theenvelope if you have not defined it or passed the
knowledge on to operations
For Operations
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5259
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5252 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
bull Manage carry forward of residual risk ndash the SafetyCase provides a means of doing this in a way that
allows the residual risk to be actively managedrather than forgotten
bull Basis for SMS ndash ie the Safety Case will provide ameans of linking the facility the hazards identified
the operations and the hazard and risk controlswhether via hardware or the SMS
bull Clarify and manage separation of OHS risk
(personal safety) and MAE risk (process safety) ndash thetwo triangles rather than one
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5359
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5353 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Identifies low probability high consequence eventsand assists to understand and manage them
bull Provides an Audit Trail for quality safetydevelopment and risk management deliverables
bullDo it early enough and you should get optimumdesign (from safety risk amp cost viewpoint)
bull Without Safety Case would you ever have a blastwall
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5459
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5454 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
Benefits of Doing a Safety Case
bull Enable targeted maintenance ndash ie to safety
critical elements through performance standards
bull Culture change ndash always occurs with safety caseprocess always positive
bull So the Safety Case should allow you to efficientlyfocus resources ndash ie manage the right thing
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5559
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5555 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
1 The Safety Case is not a silver bullet cure for all ills Itdoes offer however the best means available foreffective management of major hazard risks andprocess safety
Conclusions
2 Effective development and implementation of theSafety Case process requires significant effort by any
organisation This effort is well worthwhile as it candeliver
ndash Cost benefits in project performance
ndash Increased performance in operations due to greater reliability in
plant equipment and resources
ndash Improved communication of hazard management for the lifetimeof the facility (ie a corporate memory)
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5659
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5656 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
3 Safety Case provides a competent and auditableprocess for senior management to demonstratemanagement of development project andoperational risk to satisfy corporate requirements
Conclusions
4 There is a trend that our industry may be focussingon occupational HSE with diminished attention tomanagement of residual and process risk Safety
Case provides management focus to overcome this
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5759
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5757 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
5 Quality and quantity of risk assessment combinedwith industry shortages of skilled personnel is a
concerning issue going forward
Conclusions
6 With ongoing cost schedule and implementation
pressures there are better ways to contract andmanage the preparation of Safety Cases
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5859
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5858 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References1Seveso I 1982 Directive 82501EEC on the control of industrial major accident hazards involving dangerousgoods 1982 European Economic Community
Seveso II 1996 Council Directive 9682EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involvingdangerous substances European Community
Control of Major Hazard Facilities ndash National Standard NOHSC1014(2002) National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission declared under s38(1) of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985Commonwealth of Australia
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Statutory Instrument 2005 No 3117 London HMSOISBN 0 11 073610 9
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Schedule of Specific Requirements as to Offshore Petroleum Exploration
and Production 1992 Commonwealth of Australia
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996 Statutory Rules1996 No 298 as amended made under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 Commonwealth of Australia
Draft Petroleum Regulations 1993 Petroleum Inspectorate Ministry of Commerce New Zealand made under theHealth and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 1999 made under the Healthand Safety in Employment Act 1992 Department of Labour New Zealand
Offshore Petroleum (Safety) Regulations 2009 made under Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act2006 Commonwealth of Australia Interim Regulations issued under Article 37 of the Interim Petroleum MiningCode Specific Requirements as to Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation in the Joint Petroleum DevelopmentArea Timor Sea Designated Authority for the Joint Petroleum Development Area Dili Timor Leste
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
7242019 FPSO Safety Case
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullfpso-safety-case 5959
Cost Effective Outcomes from FPSOSafety Case
5959 FPSO Congress 2010 Singapore
References2
Railway Safety Directive 2004 Directive 200449EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April2004 on safety on the Communityrsquos railways and amending Council Directive 9518EC on the licensing of railwayundertakings and Directive 200114EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of chargesfor the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification
Future Arrangements for the Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Safety ndash Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety CaseReview 2001 Department of Industry Science amp Resources Commonwealth of Australia
Bills K and Agostini D 2009 Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation ndash Better practice and the effectiveness of theNational Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia
H Conlin PG Brabazon amp K Lee Exploring the Role and Content of the Safety Case Trans IChemE Part B July
2004HW Heinrich Industrial Accident Prevention A Scientific Approach 1931
Jop Groeneweg Leiden University 2010 APPEA Safety Conference
Andrew Hopkins Energy Bulletin 10 May 2010
Lord Cullen 1990 The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster Department of Energy London HMSO ISBN0 10 113102
Professor Nancy Leveson MIT ldquoFuture Trends in Process Safetyrdquo Honeywell User Group Summit June 2007
