Forging Resilient National Social Contracts Ea… · MDC Movement for Democratic Change ... complexities in findings durable pathways for preventing violent conflict and achieving

ForgingResilientNationalSocialContracts:PreventingViolentConflictandSustainingPeace

DiscussionDocumentonEarlySummaryFindings

5December2017

PleasesharecommentswithProject/ResearchDirector,

[email protected],by15January2018

FORGINGRESILIENTNATIONALSOCIALCONTRACTS:PREVENTINGVIOLENTCONFLICTANDSUSTAININGPEACE

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

LISTOFACRONYMS 2

INTRODUCTION 3

SUMMARYPROJECTFRAMING 5Studyquestions,propositionsandresearch 5

Cross-cuttingissues 9

SUMMARYPROJECTFINDINGS 11Driver1:Inclusivepoliticalsettlementandaddressingcoreconflictissues 11

Driver2:Effective,fair,andinclusiveinstitutions 11

Driver3.Broadeninganddeepeningsocialcohesion 12

ANNEX–SUMMARYPROJECTFINDINGSWITHCASEEXAMPLES 14 Driver1:Inclusivepoliticalsettlementandaddressingcoreconflictissues 14

Driver2:Effectivefairandinclusiveinstitutions 21

Driver3:Broadeninganddeepeningsocialcohesion 26Cross-cuttingissues 32Resilientsocialcontractsandsustainingpeace 35

PROJECTWORKINGGROUP 39


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LISTOFACRONYMSANC AfricanNationalCongress(SouthAfrica)CA ConstitutionalAssembly(Nepal)CCIs CoreConflictIssuesCODESA ConventionforaDemocraticSouthAfricaCPA ComprehensivePeaceAgreement(Nepal)DAC DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(oftheOECD)DPA DaytonPeaceAccordEU EuropeanUnionFES Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungGBV Gender-BasedViolenceGCC GulfCooperationCouncilGNU GovernmentofNationalUnity(SouthAfrica)GNU GovernmentofNationalUnity(Zimbabwe)GPA GlobalPoliticalAgreement(Zimbabwe)GPC GeneralPeople’sCongress(Yemen)IDEA InstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistanceIFI InternationalFinancialInstitutionMDC MovementforDemocraticChange(Zimbabwe) NDC NationalDialogueConference(Yemen)NGOs Non-governmentalorganisationsNP NationalParty(SouthAfrica)ODA OfficialDevelopmentAssistanceOECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentOGC OsloGovernanceCentreONHRI OrganforNationalHealing,ReconciliationandIntegration(Zimbabwe)RDP ReconstructionandDevelopmentPlan(SouthSudan)SAIS JohnHopkinsSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudiesSeeD CenterforSustainablePeaceandDemocraticDevelopmentSPLA SudanPeople’sLiberationArmySPLM SudanPeople’sLiberationMovementTRC TruthandReconciliationCommission(SouthAfrica)UN UnitedNationsUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNGA UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyUNICEF UnitedNationsChildren’sFundUNMIN UnitedNationsMissioninNepalUNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilUS UnitedStatesofAmericaUSIP UnitedStatesInstituteforPeaceWB WorldBankZANU-PF ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion–PatrioticFront


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INTRODUCTIONThere is little doubt that inmany countries, but especially those affected by conflict and fragility, the socialcontractisindeepcrisis,and,thatthereisaneedtobetterunderstandwhatthismeansforstatesandsocietiesin different settings. Leaders and citizens across countries globally face extreme challenges and profoundcomplexitiesinfindingsdurablepathwaysforpreventingviolentconflictandachievingandsustainingpeace.Theinternationalcommunityisalsogreatlychallengedtofindwinningformulastosupportnationalactorsintheseendeavours,andtoagreeonbroader,collectiveapproachestopeaceandsecurity.Within thiscontext, thenotionof thesocialcontract is risingasaprioritypolicyareatorevitalise thinkingandpracticearoundhowto transformandpreventviolentconflictand forge lastingpeace incountriesaffectedbyconflictandfragility.LeadingpolicyactorsengagingwiththeconceptincludeUNDP,theWorldBank,2theUnitedStatesInstituteforPeace(USIP),andtheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD).Thesocial contract also lies at the heart ofmuch of thework of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and

1Thesesummaryfindingsweredevelopedprimarilybytheauthor,anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofthedonorsorworkinggroupadvisers.Severaladvisershavehoweverreviewedandcontributed(seep.40).Allentriesofcountrymaterial(intheannex)aredevelopedfromcountrycasesandhavebeenreviewedbyauthorsand/ordevelopedwiththeirsupport.2See2011speech,“ANewSocialContractforDevelopment”byWorldBankPresidentRobertZoellick(Zoellick,Robert.2011.TheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica:Anewsocialcontractfordevelopment.RemarksdeliveredatthePeterG.PetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomics,Washington,April16.)TheWorldBankalsohasanewmajorstudyunderway,onsocialcontractsinAfrica.

PROJECTANDDOCUMENTSUMMARY“ForgingResilientNationalSocialContracts”isatwelve-countryresearchandpolicydialogueprojectthataimstorevitalisethesocialcontractconceptincontextsaffectedbyconflictandfragility,inordertoadvancepolicyandpracticeforpreventingviolentconflictandachievingandsustainingpeace.Thecomparativefindingsaimtoelucidatehowthesocialcontractmanifests,adaptsto,andisunderstoodindifferentcontexts.Theprojectissupportedbyanesteemedgroupofscholars,policyadvisers,andauthors fromthecountriesexamined:Afghanistan,Bosnia-Herzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SierraLeone,Somalia,SouthSudan,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,YemenandZimbabwe.Theprojectactivitiestakingplacefrom2016-2018includetwelvecountrycasestudiesandaseriesofpolicyandscholarlydialogues.Theywillculminateinaseriespolicypapersoncross-cuttingandcritical themesemerging fromtheresearch,a scholarlybook focusedon thecasestudies,andpolicy-oriented publications on assessing and forging resilient national social contracts, to be launched inseveralsettingsinternationally.TheprojectgratefullyreceivessupportfromtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme (UNDP)/OsloGovernanceCentre (OGC), the Julian J. Studley Fundof theGraduateProgramofInternationalAffairsatTheNewSchool,andtheFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES),inBerlinandNewYork.ThisEarlySummaryFindingsReportintroducestheprojectanditsresearchframing,andsharesearlyfindingsemergingfromourcasestudies.1Nineofthetwelvehavesofarbeenincluded.Severalofthesecasestudiesarestillindevelopmentandrevision.Thesefindingswillbefurtherdevelopedandstrengthened,onthebasisoffeedbackandfurtherworkinggroupdialogue.Theywillbecomplementedwithpolicyrecommendationstargetinginstitutionalactorsatdifferentlevels.Findingswerefirstshared,andfeedbackgratefullyreceivedfromparticipants,ataworkshophostedbyUNDP/OGCinOslo,on1November2017.


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Statebuilding,andits“NewDealforEngagementinFragileStates.”AdrivingmemberofthisDialogue,theg7+intergovernmentalorganisationofcountriesaffectedbyconflict,isalsousingthetermtoguidethinkingonthetransformationofOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)andnationalpolicyapproachesintheircountries.The United Nations (UN) is presently revamping itsmandate, with 2016 twin UN Security Council (UNSC)/UNGeneralAssembly(UNGA)resolutionsthatplacepreventingviolentconflictandsustainingpeaceattheforefrontofefforts.Inemergingpolicydocumentsthenotionofthesocialcontractiscentrallyevident(thoughnotexplicit),inunderpinningsustainedpeace.Thetwinresolutionssuggestthatsustainingpeaceisbothagoalandaprocesstobuildacommonvisionofsociety,ensuringthatallneedsandsegmentsofthepopulationaretakenintoaccount.Sustainingpeace,accordingtothisnewvision,encompassesarangeofactivitiestopreventoutbreak,escalation,continuationandrecurrenceofconflictflowingacrossthethree, interlinkedandmutuallyreinforcingpillarsofdevelopment,peaceandsecurity,andhumanrights.This includes tackling the rootcausesofconflict.A2017WorldBank-UNpublication“PathwaystoPeace:InclusiveApproachestoPreventingViolentConflict”issimilarlycallingforarevitalisedglobalcommitmenttopreventingviolentconflict,notablybyaddressingsocietalgrievancesand investing in, and building societal resilience and inclusive, risk-informed development.3 Towards this end,inclusive,innovativeandsynergisticmechanismsthatbringactorstogether,areneeded.These developments are promising. Policy action, however, needs to befundamentallyguidedbyaclearerunderstandingand recognitionofwhata socialcontract looks like,andmeanstodifferentgroupsofpeople, indifferentcountriesaffectedbyconflictandfragility.Whiletheconcepthasdeeprootsacrosscivilisationsand is well established in political philosophy, its contemporary application tocountries affected by conflict and fragility is not well understood.4Over the lastdecadethescholarshipandpolicyresearchonstatebuildinghasinvestigatedtheroleofelite-basedpoliticalsettlementsinachievingstability,whichhasprovidedacriticalfoundation for this investigation. 5 The notion of the social contract, however,requirestranscendingelitebargains,andforgingandlinkingmoreinclusivepoliticalsettlements to durable arrangements for peace – notably, in institutions, andrelationships.Onthelatter,researcharoundhowrelationshipsarebuiltandrepairedincountriesaffectedbyconflictandfragilityisgrowing,revitalisingthetopicofsocialcohesion.6Thisresearchisusefullydiggingintothesocialandeconomicdimensionsof how states and societies, and groupswithin states, forge and sustain bonds. Consensus is still challengedhowever,onissuesofconceptualisationandmeasurement,andhowtheconceptandassociatedpracticescaneffectivelyengagepoliticsandtransformrootcausesofconflict.

3WorldBankGroupandUnitedNations,PathwaysforPeace:InclusiveApproachestoPreventingViolentConflict.2017.4Themes concern: i) its nature and purpose; ii) participants; iii) the mechanisms through which it is forged and fostered; iv) moralobligationsandconflictinginterests;and,v)wealthdistribution.5See,i.e.Menocal,AlinaRocha.2015.InclusivePoliticalSettlements.UniversityofBirmingham,June2015.6 See, i.e. Sisk, Timothy. 2017. Preventing Deadly Conflict in Ethnically Fractured Societies: International Development Assistance for“Bridging”SocialCohesion.BackgroundPaperfortheUnitedNations/WorldBankFlagshipStudy,PreventingViolentConflict(2017).

CASE STUD IES

Afghanistan Bosnia-Herzegovina

Colombia Cyprus Nepal

Sierra Leone Somalia

South Africa South Sudan

Tunisia Yemen

Zimbabwe


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Despite these promising research and policy trends, to date, there is precious little targeted, contemporaryscholarshipon the social contract that speaks to the varied, lived realitiesofpeople indifferent contexts, andnotably,wherepeopleareprofoundlystrugglingtoredefinetheirrelationswiththestatetoachieveandsustainpeace. These are key concerns driving the current inquiry of this twelve-country research and scholar-policydialogueproject,“ForgingResilientSocialContracts:PreventingViolentConflictandSustainingPeace,”supportedbyaninternationalWorkingGroupofscholarsandpolicy-advisers/makers.Thecomparativefindingsofthisworkaimtoelucidatehowthesocialcontractmanifestswithin,adaptsto,andisunderstoodindifferentcontexts.This,itishoped,will inspireandsupportsynergisticpolicydirectionsthatputnationalactorsinthedriver’sseatfordevelopingcommonvisionsandtrustedpathwaysforachievingandsustainingpeace.

SUMMARYPROJECTFRAMINGThisresearchandpolicydialogueprojectisfocusedoncountriesaffectedbyconflictandfragility,inspiredbythequestion:Whatdrivesaresilientnationalsocialcontract?–inshort–adynamicnationalagreementbetweenstate and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together. Project researchers areinvestigatingthreepostulated“drivers”ofaresilientsocialcontract,developedthroughin-depthexaminationoftherelevantbodiesofliteratureandextensivediscussionwithinourWorkingGroupofadvisors.Thesearethat:i)coreconflictissues(CCIs)andfragilityissuesareprogressivelyaddressedthroughanincreasinglyinclusivepoliticalsettlement; ii) the role of institutions in fostering inclusive results, and; iii) broadening and deepening socialcohesionbothhorizontally(betweenindividualsandgroupsinsociety)andvertically(betweenstateandsociety).We are also reflecting on cross-cutting issues, on inclusion/exclusion, the role of international actors, and“resilience capacities for peace” in and across our twelve case studies. This focus of our research broadlyencompasses core values and mechanisms associated with the social contract concept spanning time andgeographicalspace,yetwithattentiontothedynamismandadaptabilitythatcountriesintransitionfromconflictandfragilitydemand.TheroleofthesedriversinforgingresilientnationalsocialcontractsisreflectedoninBox1.

BOX1: RES IL IENT NATIONAL SOCIAL CONTRACTS

A resilient national social contract is a dynamic national agreement between state and society, includingdifferent groups in society, on how to live together, and notably, around how power is distributed andexercised. Itallows for thepeacefulmediationofdifferentdemandsandconflicting interests,anddifferentexpectationsandunderstandingsofrightsandresponsibilities(includingwithnestedand/oroverlappingsocialcontractsthatmaytranscendthestate),overtime,andinresponsetocontextualfactors(includingshocksandstressors),throughvariedmechanisms,institutionsandprocesses.

Thisworkingdefinitionbuildsuponpolicydiscussionsandanassessmentofwhatisuniquelyimportantaboutthesocialcontractincountriesaffectedbyconflictandfragility.Thisassessmentalsostemsfromadeepreviewofevidence-based literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, aswell as related, specific literature onstate-making,politicalsettlements,fragility,socialcohesion,andpoliticaltheoryonthesocialcontract.

STUDYQUESTIONS,PROPOSITIONSANDRESEARCH

Thisresearchexaminesthefollowingoverarchingquestions:


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• Whatdrivesaresilientnationalsocialcontract?

• How do social contracts evolve/adapt over time, in ways that facilitate and/or undermine achieving andsustainingpeace?(top-down,bottom-up;pathdependencies;sequencing;driverinteractions)

• Howdoweknowonewhenweseeone?

• Whataretheimplicationsforpolicyandscholarship,includinginrelationtothewaysinwhichinternationalactorscansupportnationally-ownedprocessesofsustainingpeace?

Thestudy’sresearchpropositionsare:• Aresilientnationalsocialcontractliesattheheartofpreventingviolentconflictandachievingandsustaining

peace.

• Strongmovementonthree“drivers”ofaresilientnationalsocialcontractholdsparticularimportance.Figure1showsthethreepostulated“drivers”ofaresilientsocialcontract:

BOX2: POSTULATEDTHREE“DR IVERS”OFRES IL IENT SOCIAL CONTRACTS

1. Coreconflictissues(CCIs)arebeingprogressivelyaddressedthroughanevolving,inclusive,politicalsettlementandrequisitespheresandmechanismsof“socialcontract-making.”

2. Increasinglyeffective, fair,and inclusive institutions (both formaland informalandencompassingstate,customary,othernon-stateandinternational)areperformingkeyfunctionswithresultsandbenefitssharedmorebroadly,andstatelegitimacyevolving.

3. Thereisbroadeninganddeepeningsocialcohesion,understoodastheformalandinformaltiesthatholdsocietytogetherbothhorizontally(acrosscitizens,betweengroups)andvertically(intherelationsbetweencitizens/groupsandthestate).


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Addressingcoreconflictissues

Thefirstdriverengagestheburgeoningliteratureontheneedforinclusivepoliticalsettlementstoachieveandsustainpeace:firstly,ontheneedfortherootcausesofconflicttobeaddressed;and,secondly,ontheneedforpeaceagreementstobewelldesignedandimplemented,withattentiononaddressingrootcausesofconflict,aswellashistoricgrievancesofgroups.7Specifically,theapproachtothisdriverispremisedontheneedforstrongermappingofthelinkagesandtransitionalpathways–bothconceptualandpractical–betweenpeaceagreements,underlying political settlements, and the forging of resilient social contracts. Towards this end, this researchdevelopsa typologyaround“institutionalspheresofsocialcontract-making” (seeFigure2). In thispartof theinvestigation, a limited number of CCIs are looked at – andwhether and how these are being progressivelyaddressed,inwaysthatareincreasingly,widelyowned.CCIsarechosenasissuesbroadlyagreedonbythemainpartiesandsocietyatlarge,todriveconflictanddiscord.Thesearedisputedinthepolicyarenaovertime,andideally,arereflectedinagreements.Thisapproachinvestigateshowissuesevolveandchangetherebyshapingresults,aswellashowownershipisreflectedandbuiltaroundeffortstoresolveandtransformthem.Italsooffersrichinsightintowhathasgonewell,andnotwell,inparticularsettings,andwhy.

This study considers howcommitmentsinthe“peacemaking”sphere at the national, politicallevel (e.g. through a peaceagreement) are linked to, andaddressed in other spheres(transitional, governance, theeveryday) and through relatedmechanisms. Examining how CCIsare addressed through these“social contract-making” spheresandmechanismsguidesinsightintohow a resilient social contract isforged, with greater inclusion ofsociety in both the process and

results. These spheres and related mechanisms can be defined as: “transitional” (i.e. sequenced dialogues,commissions,truthandreconciliationprocesses);“governance,”includingboth“official”(i.e.codifiedstructuresofgovernment, formal institutions,nationaldevelopmentplans,devolutionframeworks/policies)and“hybrid”(i.e.wherereligious/customary/non-stateactorandstatemechanismsinteract);andinthe“everyday”sphere(i.e. citizenactions,practices, norms,mores). Theeveryday spherealsoacts, in this study, as a litmus test toascertainwhetherhigherlevel,formalisedagreementsorprocesseseffectivelyrepresentwidersocietalviews.

7Evidencesuggestspeaceagreementfailureandwarreversionareduetothesheercomplexityoffactors,aswellaspoorsettlementdesignandimplementation.See, i.e.Mack,Andrew.2007.“GlobalPoliticalViolence:ExplainingthePost-ColdWarDecline.”CopingwithCrisisWorkingPaper Series.NewYork: InternationalPeaceAcademy,March3, 2007, and;UnitedNations,Reportof theAdvisoryGroupofExperts,“TheChallengeofSustainingPeace,”June29,2015,46.ThenewWorldBank-UNstudyonconflictpreventionhasrevivedinterestintheroleofgrievancesinconflictandtheneedtoaddressthemtopreventitsescalation.WorldBankGroupandUnitedNations,2017.PathwaysforPeace:InclusiveApproachestoPreventingViolentConflict.


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Increasinglyeffective,fairandinclusiveinstitutions

Theseconddriverrespondstotherisingawarenessinthestatebuildingliteratureoftheneedtobetterunderstandtherelationshipsbetweenaccesstoservices,andperceptionsofthelegitimacyandperformanceofgovernment.Theassumeddirectcausal relationshipcanno longerbetakenforgranted.8Theresearchonthissetof issuesseeks to provide context-rich and comparative analysis of the differentways inwhich key services are beingdeliveredandwhatactuallymatterstopeopleindifferentcontexts.Here,thefollowingissuesareexplored:

• performance(theeffectivenessandfairnessofdelivery,andoutcomes,especiallyfordifferentgroups);• expectations (of societyabout the rolesand functionsof thestateand its institutions,andhowthese

expectationschange,andinrelationtowhatfactors);and,• processes(theavenuesforqualityparticipation)andforgrievancerecourse(theexistenceof,desirefor,

andeffectivenessoftheseavenues).Wearealsoconsideringhowthese issuesaffect societalunderstandingsof the legitimacyof thestateand itsinstitutions incasecontext, inspiredby theOECDtypologyof legitimacy that suggests that thereare the fourfollowingtypes:input/process;output/performance;sharedbeliefs;and,internationallegitimacy.9Broadeninganddeepeningsocialcohesion

The third driver responds to the consensus evolving in the policy community around the need to betterunderstandsocialcohesion,thatis,howpeopleandgroupsbondinconstructivewaysthatsupportpeace.Thisisimperative in the context of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, as lack of social cohesion is linked toconflict.10Thereisaneedtoknowmoreabouthowrelationshipsacrosssociety(horizontally)andbetweenthestateandsociety(vertically)areforged,andthedynamismandinterplaywithinandbetweenthem,inparticularcontextsandinresponsetoeventsandpolicies.Thisclearlyliesattheheartoftheverynotionofasocialcontract,and,equally,atthecoreofthequestionofwhethertheinternationalsystemsofstateswillcontinuetosurvive,and inwhat form.Researchhasgrownover the last coupleof years in thisarea, yet is still atanearly stage.Consensusisgenerallylackingonhowtoconceptualisesocialcohesion,letalonehowtomeasureit.Figure3below illustrates thestudy’sapproach tosocial cohesionwhichexamines theways thatpeoplebondverticallyandhorizontallythroughthreedomainsgroundedintheliterature:belongingandidentification;trustandrespect;and,access,participationandrepresentation.Thisresearchaimstocontributetothinkingabouthowsocialcohesionadvancesand/orisunderminedasCCIsareaddressed(Driver1)andcorefunctionsareundertaken,and servicesdelivered (Driver2). Thiswill contribute toamoredynamic, adaptive conceptualisationof socialcohesionthatiscriticallyneededtoinformbetterpolicyandpractice.Thethreedriverscapturebothsubstantive,material aspects of the social contract, i.e. what needs to be delivered, and the rights, responsibilities andexpectationsaroundthese,aswellastheprocesselements,i.e.thenatureofparticipation,exclusionandinclusion,andformsofaccountability.Supportingthinkingaboutwhatconstitutesaresilientsocialcontract,theyendeavourtoinvestigateprocess,evolution,dynamismandadaptationinvirtuousways,i.e.thattransformrootcausesofconflictandpreventitfromrecurring,andmovingcountriestowardsachievingandsustainingpeace.

8SeeMallett,Richard;JessicaHagen-Zanker;RachelSlaterandGeorginaSturge.“Surveyinglivelihoods,ServiceDeliveryandGovernance:BaselineEvidencefromtheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,Nepal,Pakistan,SriLankaandUganda:WorkingPaper31,”ODI,2015.9OECD.2015.StatesofFragility2015:MeetingPost-2015Ambitions.OECDPublishing:Paris.10Sisk(2017)pointstoexamples,includingTurkey,Indonesia,Kashmir,Kosovo,andUkraine.


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CROSS-CUTTINGISSUES

Issuesofinclusionandexclusionareinvestigatedacrossthethreedrivers.Inmanycasesvariantsonthethemeofexclusionare in factCCIs. Inclusivity througheachof the social contract-making spheres is examined,withrespecttohowCCIsareaddressed.Attentionisalsogiventohowthisaffectstheadaptationsintheprocess,aswellastheresults.Inlookingatdeliveryofservices,authorshavebeenaskedtoexaminethewaysinwhich“whodelivers” matters, when and how participation matters and results (subjective and objective). In our socialcohesion research, inclusion is examined in different ways through the domains of investigation, includingexaminationofbothperceptionsandpracticeslinkedtowhatholdspeople,communitiesandsocietiestogether.Intersectingwiththesethreeareasarequestionsaroundtherolesofinternationalactorsandissuesinforgingresilient national social contracts. These cannot be overlooked given the major roles they play in today’stransitionalsettings,especiallyinrelationtopoliticalprocessesandpoliticalsettlements,inadditiontoongoingprocesses of peacebuilding, statebuilding and development. Greater reflection is needed on the roles thatinternationalactorscanplayin“accompanying”localactorsastheystrivetoforgeanunderstandingabouthowtoultimatelylivetogether,andhowthisaffectsunderstandingaboutthenatureanddurabilityofasocialcontract.Thequestionofhowinternationalactorsaddressandsupportsocietalefforts(directly)versusgovernmentefforts(directly), andprocesses that link them is key – thepolitics aroundhow this is doneand the implications forfosteringanationally-ownedsocialcontractthatservessustainablepeace,remainsprofoundlychallenging,andimportant.Finally, inadditionto investigatingselectCCIs,whatarereferredtoasresiliencecapacitiesforpeacearealsoexamined.11Thisresearchapproachisconsistentwithendeavourstounderstandhownationalactorscanbetterengagetheirendogenouscapacitiestoaddressconflict,aswellastounderstandwidershocksandstressors,inways that ultimately serve to uproot and transform the drivers of conflict and fragility, and foster new orrevitalised structures and systems that support peace. The authors here collectively reflect on how selectedresiliencecapacitiesaredirectlyorindirectlyengagedinthedesignandimplementationofpeaceefforts.Theyaskhow resilience capacities can better support, in virtuous ways, the achieving and sustaining of peace. Thesequestions andpropositions arebeingexamined throughbothexploratory andexplanatory researchmethods,through interviews, focus groups, and qualitativemethods, led by national authors. Across the three drivers,authorshavebeenaskedtoconsiderthedifferentconcernsandinterestsofsocialgroups,notablywomen,youth,andethnicandreligiousgroups.Whiletheemphasisofcasestudyresearchisqualitativeandcontext-rich,surveydataisbeingusedtobuttressresearchfindingsthroughout.Findingswillbevalidatedinnumerousways,notablythroughaseriesof scholar-policy“dialogues”and,eventually, through thedevelopmentofan“expert-based”scoringschemearoundthethree“drivers.”12Thiswillenrichthepotentialforcomparativepolicyfindings,servingasapilotfordevelopmentofapossiblesocialcontractindex.

11ThisapproachdrawsupononanInterpeacepaperthatlaysafoundationforconceptualisinga“resilienceforpeacebuilding”approach,distinguishingtheconceptwhich“hasevolvedfromamorenarrowlydefinednotionofasetofattributes,qualitiesorcapacitiesthatenableasocietyorcommunitytoendure,respondor‘bouncebackfromexternalshocks,’toamoreprocess-orientedandrelationalconcept,thatspeaksparticularlytotheagencyof individuals,groups,communities, institutionsandsocieties inshapingtheirenvironment, includingdealingwithstressorsandconflictwithinthecontextofcomplexadaptivesocialsystems.”McCandless,ErinandGraemeSimpson.2015.Assessing Resilience for Peacebuilding – Executive Summary. Interpeace, June 2015. http://www.interpeace.org/resource/assessing-resilience-for-peacebuilding-executive-summary-of-discussion/12Theanalysis’quantitativescoringdimensionwilldrawupontheauthor’squalitativeresearchaswellasavailablequantitativedata.


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BOX3: KEY DEF INIT IONS

Resilientnationalsocialcontract:Adynamicnationalagreementbetweenstateandsociety,includingdifferentgroupsinsociety,onhowtolivetogether,andnotably,aroundhowpowerisdistributedandexercised.Itallowsfor the peaceful mediation of different demands and conflicting interests, and different expectations andunderstandingsofrightsandresponsibilities(includingwithnestedand/oroverlappingsocialcontractsthatmaytranscendthestate),overtime,andinresponsetocontextualfactors(includingshocksandstressors),throughvariedmechanisms,institutionsandprocesses.Resiliencecapacitiesforpeace:Endogenouscapacitiestoaddressshocksandstressors(e.g.driversofconflictand fragility) in ways that minimally (adaptively) mitigate the effects of conflict and more maximally(transformatively)uprootdriversandfosterneworrevitalisedstructuresandsystemsthatsupportpeace.13Coreconflict issues(CCIs):Overtdriversofconflictanddiscord,eitherhistorical,orcontemporary innature,broadlyagreedby themainparties todriveconflictanddiscord, thatarebeingdisputed in thepolicyarenanationally,over time,andhaveresonance formost, ifnotallof thepopulation.Theyare ideally reflected informal agreementsormechanisms.14ExaminingCCIs should enable analysis of how the state and society atdifferentlevelsengagetheissuesandhowtheyadapt,overtime.

Politicalsettlements:Theconceptofa“politicalsettlement”iscontested,thoughgenerallyitisacceptedthatitconstitutes:• A consensus between political elites on the underlying rules of the game:A key aspect of a political

settlement is: “the forging of a commonunderstanding usually between political elites that their bestinterestsorbeliefsareservedthroughacquiescencetoaframeworkforadministeringpoliticalpower”;15

• Anongoingprocesscontainingspecificeventssuchaselitebargainsandpeaceagreements:i.e.“Politicalsettlementsareongoingpoliticalprocessesthat includeone-offeventsandagreements.Elitepacts,elitebargainsandpeaceagreementsarediscretepoliticalevents,ratherthandynamicprocesses.”16

“Everyday” social contract-making: Forms of “everyday” (or quotidian) social contract-making are beingconceptualisedas they constitutedaily-life social interactions, normsandagreements in social, political andeconomiclife.17Social cohesion: The formal and informal ties that hold society together both horizontally (across citizens,betweengroups)andvertically(intherelationsbetweencitizens/groupsandthestate).

13 Conceptualisation draws upon: McCandless, Erin and Graeme Simpson. 2015. Assessing Resilience for Peacebuilding – ExecutiveSummary.Interpeace,June2015.14Whilepolicyattentiontoaddressingrootcausesisgainingstrength,andthenotionofgrievancesisexperiencingarevivalthankstoanewWorldBank–UNreport(2017),anapproachfocusedonCCIsallowsforengagementofboth,butwithafocusonatangible,moreneutralexpressionoftheissuethatcanbeexaminedovertime,inthecontextofagreementsandpolicies.15DiJohn,JonathanandJamesPutzel.2009.PoliticalSettlementsIssuesPaper.GSRDC.16Schunemann, Julia and Amanda Lucey. 2015. Success and Failure of Political Settlements: Defining andMeasuring Transformation.PoliticalSettlementsResearchProgramme.2September2015,p9.17Whilethereisoftenaconflationbetweenthisconceptand“local”peacebuilding,inthisstudyitreferstoboth:a)theeverydayatanylevel,includingattheelitelevel,e.g.whatelitesactuallydooutsidetheformalagreements;and,b)theeverydayatlocallevels,assistinginexaminingtheseissuesinadeeperway,coretothenotionofthesocialcontract,effectivelylinkingthe“bottom”withthe“top.”


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SUMMARYPROJECTFINDINGSThefollowingearly,draftfindingsareemergingfromcasestudies(nineofthetwelvehavebeenincludedatthetimeofpublication).Severalcasesarestillindevelopmentandrevision,soweanticipatethatthesefindingswillbefurtherdevelopedandstrengthened.SeetheAnnexforafullerdescriptionoftheseearlyfindings.

Driver1:Coreconflictissues(CCIs)arebeingprogressivelyaddressedthroughanevolving,inclusive,politicalsettlementanddifferentspheresof“socialcontract-making.”

Ø D1.1Theearlystagesofthepeacenegotiations(andnotablythepeaceagreement)offerpossibilitiesforredefiningparametersforinclusionandexclusion,andpositioningofdifferentgroupsandissues,oftenwithlong-termeffectsandrepercussions(negativeorpositive)(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Ø D1.2Socialcontract-making“spheres”and“mechanisms,”whichareusefulfortracinghowcoreconflictissuesandgrievancesarebeingaddressed,areoftennotwelllinkedupinwaysthatpromotecoherentandeffectivepeaceagreementimplementationandthedevelopmentofanincreasinglyinclusivepoliticalsettlement(Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe;exception:Tunisia).

Ø D1.3ThereareconsiderablecommonalitiesofCCIsacrossthecases,reflectingissuesaroundpoliticalandeconomicexclusion,particularlybetweenidentitygroups.Notablycommonare:

~powerdistributionandpowersharing(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe);and,

~distributionoflandandresources(Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Ø D1.4CCIsareoftennoteffectivelyaddressedovertime,includingthroughpreviouspeaceprocessesandagreements,directlyunderminingtheinclusivenessofthepoliticalsettlement:

~intheagreementdesign(Yemen);

~duetoextantcontradictionsthatundermineagreements(Colombia,SouthAfrica);and,

~throughagreementimplementation(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Zimbabwe).

Driver2:Increasinglyeffective,fair,andinclusiveinstitutions(bothformalandinformalandencompassingstate,customary,othernon-state,international)areperformingkeyfunctionswithbroadlysharedresults.

Ø D2.1Stateinstitutions,whichcanbeseenasthehardwareforcarryingforwardpeaceagreementimplementationandinfosteringmoreinclusivepoliticalsettlements,areoftennotsufficientlyoreffectivelyengagedinaddressingCCIs,includingatsub-nationallevels(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Yemen).


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Ø D2.2Stateinstitutions(electoralbodies,administrativeandsocialservices,andinstitutionsdesignedthroughpeaceagreementstoaddressCCIs)areoftennoteffectivelydeliveringontheirrespectivemandates(duetolackofpoliticalwill,lackofcapacityandresources,andcorruption,allofwhichtendtoreflectinformaldynamicsandpowerrelationsamongactorsatdifferentlevels)(Allcountries).

Ø D2.3Societiesarereflectingdeepconcernabouttheeffectivenessofstateinstitutions(especiallyservicedeliveryandrelatedpovertyandinequality,aswellaswidergovernmentaccountability)throughprotest,illustratingalackoffaithinofficialgovernancemechanisms(forgrievancerecourseandmeaningfulinclusion)(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Ø D2.4Customary,informalandothernon-statestructuresandsystemsarecommonlyplayingimportant,thoughattimescontested,institutionalfunctions,particularlyatsub-nationallevels,yetareoftennotofficiallyorsystematicallyintegratedintoaninclusivepoliticalsettlement(Colombia,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Ø D2.5Statelegitimacy(andhowsocietalexpectationsfactorintothis),whichismulti-dimensionalgiventhemanyvariables(historical,cultural,social,economicandpolitical)atplay,oftenrelatestocitizenperspectivesaroundserviceprovision,corruption,avenuesforparticipationanddeliveryonpromises(BosniaandHerzegovina,Cyprus,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Driver3:Thereisbroadeninganddeepeningsocialcohesion–understoodastheformalandinformaltiesthatholdsocietytogetherbothhorizontally(acrossandbetweencitizensandbetweengroups)andvertically(intherelationsbetweencitizens/groups,andthestate).

Ø D3.1Verticalsocialcohesion(relationsbetweenthestate,andsomegroupsandcitizens)isnotstronginthecasestudies,whichhelpsexplaintheweaknessofnationalsocialcontracts(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Ø D3.2Horizontalsocialcohesiontendstobestrongerwithingroupsthanbetweenthem,andweakerwhenpoliticalissues(ratherthanethnicorreligiousissues)aredominant(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

CROSS-CUTTINGISSUES

EXCLUSIONANDINCLUSION

Ø 4.1Inclusiveprocessesdonotautomaticallyorquicklytendtoleadtoinclusiveresults,giventhepotentialforotherinterveningfactors(politicalwill,misuseofpower,capacityandresources,poordesignand/orprocess,poororlackingimplementationframeworks)(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Yemen,Zimbabwe).


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INTERNATIONALACTORSANDISSUES

Ø 5.1Whiletheinternationalcommunityplaysvitalsupportingrolestocountriesintransition,attimespositionstakentosupportpeaceagreementsandthesocialcontract-makingmechanismsthatfollow,caninadvertentlyunderminetheabilitytotransformativelyaddressCCIs(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

RESILIENTSOCIALCONTRACTSANDSUSTAININGPEACE

Ø 6.1Whatisneededtoachieveamoreresilientnationalsocialcontract,andmovecountriesonapathtosustainingpeace?

~Virtuousmovementofeachofthesethreedrivers,andvirtuousinteractionofthedrivers(Cyprus,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

~CCIsattendedto,inandthroughsocialcontract-makingspheresandmechanisms,ininclusiveways(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

~Resiliencecapacitiesinsociety,mobilisedandsupported,towardspeace(Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Yemen,Zimbabwe).


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ANNEX–SUMMARYPROJECTFINDINGSWITHCASEEXAMPLES The followingdraft findingsareemerging from this study’s case studies (nineof the twelvehave so farbeenincluded).Severalofthesecasesarestillindevelopmentandrevision,soweanticipatethatthesefindingswillbefurtherdevelopedandstrengthened.Insharingcomparativesummaryfindingstherearelimitationstohowwellall factorscanbeaccountedfor,andcausalityprovedandexplained.Causality isalsochallengedacrosssocialscientificresearchgenerally,bytheveryrealityofmulti-causalsocialphenomenon.Thebestthatsocialscienceresearchcandoisworkforvalidityandtrustworthiness,bytriangulatingformsofdataandrigorousanalysis.Thisisexpectedfromalloftheauthorsofthisstudy.Thetwelvecasestudiesarealsobeingrigorouslypeerreviewed,bybothexternalandinternal(withinthisstudy’sworkinggroup)experts.Thefindingsarepresentedthroughtheprojectframing,inrelationtothethreeproposed“drivers”ofaresilientsocialcontractasdiscussedintheSummaryFindings,aswellasthroughanumberofcross-cuttingissues(inclusionandexclusion,internationalactorsandissues,andresilientsocialcontractsandsustainingpeace).

Driver 1: Core conflict issues (CCIs) are being progressively addressed through anevolving, inclusive, political settlement and different spheres of “social contract-making.”

Thereexistsburgeoningliteratureontheimportanceofinclusivepoliticalsettlementsintheinterestsofsustainingpeace,towhichthisresearchaimstocontribute.Thisstudy’sauthorsareseekingtomapthepathwaysfromthepoliticalsettlementstoresilientnationalsocialcontracts.Thefirst“driver”looksatinclusionthroughthelensofalimitednumberofCCIs,includingwhetherandhowthesearebeingprogressivelyaddressed,throughapproachesincreasingly,widelyowned.Thefollowingisconsidered:howcommitmentsmadeinthe“peacemaking”sphereatthenational,political level (i.e. throughapeaceagreement)are linked toandaddressed inotherspheresandthroughrelatedmechanismsofsocialcontract-makinginsupportofcomprehensive,societally-ownedaddressingof the issues (see Figure 2). These spheres and related mechanisms include: “transitional” (i.e. sequenceddialogues, commissions, truth and reconciliation processes); “formal governance” (i.e. codified structures ofgovernment, formal institutions, national development plans, devolution frameworks/policies); “hybrid” (i.e.wherecivilsociety/religious/customaryandstatemechanismsinteract);and,the“everyday”sphere(i.e.citizenactions,practices,norms,mores).Earlyfindingsinclude: ➢ D1.1 The early stages of the peace negotiations (and notably the peace agreement) offer

possibilities for redefining parameters for inclusion and exclusion, and positioning of differentgroupsandissues,oftenwithlong-termeffectsandrepercussions(positiveornegative)(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Earlyfindingsfromthecasestudiesillustratethatthisoccursthrough:

● Thecatalysingofmoreinclusivepolitics(Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia); ● The development of separate ethno-nationalist institutions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, South

Sudan); ● Citizens/groupsfeelingexcludedandbecomingspoilers(Yemen,Zimbabwe);and, ● The propensity for informal agreements that undermine the official agreement/process (Yemen,

Zimbabwe).


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Power-sharing (South Africa, Nepal, Zimbabwe) and transitionmonitoringmechanisms (Colombia), that havebroughtnewpartiesintotheequation,andpeacenegotiations(Yemen,Nepal)thathaveguaranteedparticipationof diverse actors, by opening up participation, have enabled the surpassing of historic impasses around coreconflict issues inmore inclusiveways. Advances however, are often difficult to sustain (Yemen,Nepal, SouthAfrica). In South Sudan and Zimbabwe where power-sharing arrangements were developed, these reflectedentrenchedelitepoliticalsettlementsandultimatelyfailed.

CYPRUSandBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA:Inbothsettings,ethno-national,sub-nationalsocialcontractshaveevolved and become entrenched through the peace process, creating strong structures of inclusion andexclusion(i.e.ofminorities).InCYPRUS,unsuccessfuleffortstoforgeapoliticalagreementthatwouldreflectamoreunifiedandinclusivepoliticalsettlementtoaddresscoreconflictissues,havebeenhamperedthroughan excessive focus on formal track 1 peace negotiations within a framework of “nothing is agreed untileverything is agreed.” In BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) has profoundlystructuredpoliticsandtheresultinginstitutionsalongethno-nationalistlines.Theprocessinvolvedonlyelitesandexcludedallminoritiesandcivilsociety,withlastingpolicyimplications. SOUTHSUDAN:TheArab-Islamichegemonicpoliciespursuedbythenorthernelitesinpost-independentSudanprovided the glue that united the people of South Sudan to fight for independence. The various peaceagreementssignedbetweenthecentralgovernmentandrebelgroupsinSouthSudansinceindependencein2011havehandedpowertotheex-combatantsandelitesofthetwomainethnicgroups(DinkaandNuer),throughpower-sharingagreementsthathaveside-linedsmallerethnicgroups.Theseprocesseshavefailedtoforgeanationallyownedsocialcontractresultingintheeruptionofcivilwarin2013. YEMEN: The transition process outlined by the 2011 UN backed Gulf Cooperation Council initiative (GCC)createdthepower-sharingagreementthat includedfactionsfromtheJointMeetingPartiesandtheformerruling party of the General People’s Congress (GPC). The subsequent National Dialogue Conference (NDC)aimed tobringpartiesunderoneunifiedumbrella todraft a constitution rooted in thevaluesof freedom,humanrightsanddemocracy,andultimatelystemtheconflict.ThevibrantNDCprocess–oftenreferredtoashighlyinclusive(see4.1)–originallyrestoredhopeinthetransitionalprocesstobringpositivechangeamongactivists.Whileitsobjectiveswerepartiallyachieved,theprocessfalteredwhena“federalism”proposalwasintroducedbyPresidentHadi’s committeewithout sufficientdebateor consensusamong theNDCworkinggroups,andfearsthatitcededmorefiscalpowerstoSana’a,thecapital.Thisproposalwascounterproductiveto the ideaofequal representationunder federalism.TheNDCalso lackedaclearmechanismtodealwithspoilers,andbackdoordealsbecamecommonamongstmanyparticipants,underminingthelegitimacyoftheprocess. ZIMBABWE:The2009GlobalPoliticalAgreement(GPA)fosteredaGovernmentofNationalUnity(GNU)power-sharingagreementbetweentheZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion–PatrioticFront(ZANU-PF,inpowerfor28yearsatthetime)andthetwoMovementforDemocraticChange(MDC)parties.TheGPAofferedhopeforamoreinclusivepathtoaddressingZimbabwe’shistoricgrievances(seeD1.3).Atthesametime,itwasultimately“anagreementtodisagree,”reflectingZANU-PFpositionsonland,theliberationstruggleandsovereignty,andMDCpositionsonconstitutionalreforms,humanrights,ruleoflaw,theimpartialityofchiefsandstateorgans,andfreepoliticalactivity.Thisultimatelymeantthatreformsexistedonpaper,resultinginweaktransitionalmechanisms, and resistance to GPA implementation. The 2017 coup andmass protests leading up to theoverthrow of the ZANU-PF’s leader of 37 years, RobertMugabe, illustrate the strong demand for amoreinclusivepoliticalsettlement.However,thereareconcernsthatthelackofmovementtowardsapowersharinggovernmentindicatebusinessasusual.


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TUNISIA: Elite compromise and power-sharing has proven to be an important component of Tunisia'stransition. Following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia's elite class, with the blessing of the then-interim PrimeMinister,createdtheHigherPoliticalReformCommission,whichbecamethede-factolegislativebranchuntilit was disbanded after the 2011 elections. Despite free and fair elections and progress toward the newconstitution, the country experienced severe stress in late 2013, as tensions between Islamist and secularpoliticalpartiesandsegmentsofsocietycametoahead,inthewakeoftheassassinationsoftwoprominentsecularpoliticalleadersandactivists.ThesetensionswouldhaveescalatedoutofcontrolhaditnotbeenfortheinterventionoffourmassmembershipcivilsocietyorganizationsknownasTheTunisianNationalDialogueQuartet. These twopolitical settlementprocesses, exemplary in their inclusiveness, culminated in Tunisia'swidelyadopted2014Constitution. COLOMBIA:The2016peaceagreementincludesprovisionstoaddressrootcausesofexclusionandviolenceattheheartoftheconflict.Theseincludelongstandingissuesinrelationtolanduseandownershipandeffectivepolitical participationofminority groups in thepolitical process. Transitional justicemechanismswerealsodesignedtocompensatethemorethaneightmillionvictimswithreparationsthatseektoaddressfundamentalsocialinequalities.Thefactthatanagreementhasfinallybeenreachedsuggeststhatawindowofopportunityhasemergedforamoreinclusivesocialcontractandthatthereissomeinstitutionallyembeddedsocialsupportforprofoundtransformation.Atthesametime,in2016,thepeaceagreementonlyhadthesupportof41%ofthepopulation.Thissuggeststhattherestillremainsaschismbetweentheambitionsofthosewhodraftedtheagreementandthepoliticalandsocialpreferencesoflargeportionsofsociety,whoarefearfulthattoomuchinclusionwillaffecttheirprivilegesandunderminetheirworldviews. NEPAL:Nepal’sdemocratisationandpeacebuildingprocessfrom2006-2015wasdesignedtocreatea“NewNepal” based on inclusivity, fairness, and remediation of historical injustices and inequalities. TheComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)providesanambitiousroadmapforthepeaceprocessincludingthe“restructuringoftheStateinaninclusive,democraticandprogressivewaybyendingitspresentcentralisedandunitarystructure,designedtoaddresstheconcernsofthemarginalisedgroups.”18WhilethisisseenasacommitmenttoincreasinglypromotingthenormofinclusioninNepal’spoliticalinstitutionsinordertoaddresshistoricalexclusionsandinequalities,therecontinuestobeentrenchedgrievances,ethnicmobilisation,anddivisivepoliticalmobilisationthatunderminestheresilienceofthenewlyemergingsocialcontract. SOUTHAFRICA:NegotiationsthatbeganwiththereleaseofNelsonMandela in1990andendedalongwithapartheidweredeemedsuccessfulinlayingapathforanew,democraticSouthAfrica.Despitethemoreradicalcommitments that would have addressed grievances and resulted in a transformation of the economyenvisagedbyanti-apartheidSouthAfricansandenshrined in theFreedomCharter, concessionsweremadeincluding to protect the individual property rights of the wealthy, that were embedded in transitionalagreements and laterpolicies.19Theseundermined theabilityof the state to transform thehighlyunequalrelationsanddealwithgrossviolationsofcollectivehumanrights,andresulted inafurtherpoliticisationofidentity.Thetransitionprocessalsofailedtocreatesafeguardstopreventwhatisnowcommonlyreferredtoaselitecapture,bytheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)government.Thishasalsocontributedtoadeficitininclusionidealstranslatingintoamoreinclusivepoliticalsettlement.

18ComprehensivePeaceAgreement,para3.5.19Thepursuitofthelatterwasfromtheonsetframedasnecessarybutlimitedbystateresources,whichwereinturnlimitedbysubsequenteconomicpoliciesthatprotecttheindividualpropertyrightsofthewealthy.Framingtransitionaljusticeinrelationtoindividualvictimsofgrosshumanrightsviolationsfurtherfailedtoaccountforthebroaderinjusticesexperiencedbydifferentidentitygroupsandcommunities,whichnowneedtohavetheirgrievancesaddressedthroughdevelopmentplans–whicharedependentonstateresources.


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➢ D1.2Socialcontract-making“spheres”and“mechanisms,”whichareusefulfortracinghowcoreconflict issues and grievances are being addressed, are often not well linked up in ways thatpromote coherent andeffectivepeaceagreement implementationand thedevelopmentof anincreasingly inclusive political settlement (Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe;exception:Tunisia).


● Missingorineffectivetransitionalmechanisms(Cyprus,Zimbabwe); ● Peaceagreementsthatcontainorevolveconflictingprovisions(Colombia,SouthAfrica),preventingthem

fromfundamentallyalteringpowerrelations;and, ● Successivesocialcontract-makingmechanismsnotmaintainingagreedapproachestoaddressissues(i.e.

constitutionalreformprocesses,Nepal),ornoteffectivelyincorporatedtowardsensuringamoreinclusivepoliticalsettlement(i.e.customarysystems,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

In some settings, inclusive constitutional reform and referendumprocesses positively contributed to buildinggreater inclusion inpolitical settlements, and inbuilding societal ownership aroundpolicydirections (Tunisia,Zimbabwe). Implementation of these has however broken down for reasons including lack of political will,resourcesandcapacity(Nepal,Zimbabwe).

InCYPRUS,whilegreatemphasisisbeingplacedonthepeacemakingsphereofsocialcontract-making,minimaleffortisbeinginvestedinneededtransitionalmechanisms.Fourdecadesfollowingthecessationofhostilities,neithertruthandreconciliationprocessnorformalpoliticalapologiestoaddressmutualsufferinghavebeeninitiated. The same is true inZIMBABWEwhere successivepolitical agreementshavemadenomeaningfulattemptatnationalreconciliationbyaddressingpastviolenceandabuses.Whilethe2009GPAheldpromise,rootedinapowersharingarrangement,thetransitionalmechanismdesignedtosupporthealing,theOrganforNational Healing, Reconciliation and Integration’s (ONHRI), was handicapped from inception. ParadoxicallyONHRIisheadedbyZANU-PF,perpetratorofthe1987Gukurahundimassacreasitsoughttobuildaone-partystate.Societalcallsforbothretributiveandrestorativejusticehavelargelybeenignored. Moregenerally,inZIMBABWE,the2013Constitutionalsoheldpromiseforitsbroadlysharedbuy-in,despiteitselite(politicalparty)drivendevelopmentthattookthreeyearsduetodisagreementsthatsometimesturnedviolent. Itpromised toaddresshistoricdemandsby civil societyand theopposition throughpower-sharingclauses,includingpresidentialtermlimits,anindependentjudiciaryandprosecutingauthority,and,itclarifiedtherolesoftraditionalauthorities.Despitebeingapprovedwitha98%“yes”votein2013,confirmingsocietalfaith in the path articulated, implementation has been greatly hindered by the end of the power-sharingagreementandaZANU-PF2013electionwin.SOUTHAFRICA:Thetransitionalnegotiations(1990-1996)betweentheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)andtheNationalParty(NP)includedformalnegotiationsoftheConventionforaDemocraticSouthAfrica(CODESA)I & II, the Interim Constitution, the Government of National Unity (GNU), the Truth and ReconciliationCommission(TRC),andtheadoptionofSouthAfrica’sexistingConstitutionin1996.Theradicaltransformationneededanddesired,assetoutintheANC’sguidingdocument,TheFreedomCharter,washoweverunderminedby the State’swill and capacity tomeet commitments (as indicated by post-transition revelations of poorgovernancepracticeandongoingcorruptionscandals).Parallelconcessionstowhite-ownedbusinessesatthetimealsocontributedtothecontinuedconcentrationofwealthinthehandsofthewhiteminority,althoughthisminorityhasraciallydiversifiedpost-1994.


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COLOMBIA:The2016peaceagreementaccurately setsout toaddress themain challenges for sustainablepeaceinthecountry,suchasruralreform(includingimprovingpossibilitiesforlandownership,productivity,andcompetitivenessforpoorfarmersandsmall-scalepeasants),illicitcrops,politicalparticipationofminoritygroups, and transitional justice. Some transitionalmechanisms, such as theConstitutional Court-mandatedsystem, respond to the needs of the forcibly displaced population or the executive agency in charge ofreintegrating former combatants. These have gained international acknowledgment. Yet competing visionsabout how tomanage land use and ownership and illicit crops are an obstacle to a smooth unfolding oftransitional justicemechanisms and the extent to which they can redress structural conditions related tovictimisation.Thereisalsolittlecoordinationamongandwithinstateinstitutionspromotingimplementationofthepeaceaccords,especiallyatthesub-nationallevel. NEPAL:Despitethecommitmenttoa“NewNepal”(seeD1.1),transitionhasbeenepisodic,“non-linear,”andfraught with instability (through the CPA, the interim period, the first and second constitution-makingprocesses, and most recently through the reconstitution of local authorities). The second ConstitutionalAssembly(CA-II)electiontookplacein2013andtherepresentationofthehistoricallymarginalisedgroupsintheCA-Iwas reduced.Further, thevisionof“ANewNepal”disappeared frompoliticaldiscourse.The2015Constitutionreversedmanyoftheachievementsguaranteedbythe2007InterimConstitution,accordingtoexcludedgroups.Forexample, it resulted inanelectoral systemthat left thegroups fromtheTaraiunder-representedinthenationallegislature,whilethefederalboundarieswerecarvedoutinamannertosuittherulingelite.Thisledtoviolentprotestsanddeathsin2015(seeD2.3). YEMEN:The2011GCCagreementwasintroducedtoendthedeadlockinYemen’spoliticaltransitionaftertheArab Spring and begin a transition period whereby the National Coalition Government (General People’sCongressand itsallies)andtheNationalCouncil (JointMeetingPartiesandpartners)wouldsharepower ingoverning the country under Abdo RabuMansour Hadi’s presidency for two years (February 2012-2014).However,theNDCprocesslackedsocietalbuy-inasitside-linedsub-nationalplayersandfailedtoincorporatesub-nationalmechanismscapableofaddressingissuesatlocallevels.Ultimatelyitwasseenasapowershuffleamong competing parties, turning theNDC into an intellectual, capital-driven exercise. Yemenis registeredgreatdissatisfactionwiththeprocessthroughprotests,strikes,andsit-insthatdemandedtheremovalof(nowlate) ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s family members and affiliates from influential positions within thesecurity apparatus, governmentandpublic institutions.Publicdiscontentover the roleof state institutionsdemonstratedafundamentaldisconnectbetweenthespheresofsocialcontract-makingandtheaspirationsofpeople. Although the political settlement was a compromise geared towards preventing conflict, Yemenicitizensresistedsubmittingtoaprocessthatsimplyreshuffledpoweranddidnotchangethesystem. TUNISIA: Several key post-revolution initiatives (formal and informal) can be viewed as a series of socialcontract-makingmechanismsstrugglingtoforgeanationally-ownedsocialcontract.Theseincludeahigh-levelnational dialogue, a forward-looking constitution adopted by broad consensus, and multiple participatorycommissionslaunchedtoexamineandresolvechallengingissues,includingfightingcorruptionandcomingtoterms with the painful legacies of past human rights violations. Of particular importance is the 2014Constitution, hailed as amodel forwhat consensus-based politics, dialogue, and compromise, can achievebetween Islamists and secularists. Key drivers of its success were: inclusivity, participation, transparency,consensus,nationalownership,andtheAssembly'searlydecisiontorequireatwo-thirdsmajorityforadoptingthefinaltextoftheconstitution,ratherthanasimplemajority.Thedevolutionofpowertosub-nationallevelshowever,whichisaconstitutionalprovision,issluggish,resultinginongoingexclusionandneglect,notablyinnorthernandinteriorregions.


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➢ D1.3 There are considerable commonalities of CCIs across the cases, reflecting issues aroundpoliticalandeconomicexclusion,particularlybetweenidentitygroups.Notablycommonare:

~powerdistributionandpower-sharing(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe);and,

~distributionoflandandresources(Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe). Theseare conceptualised slightlydifferently, in the case studies, ashighlightedbelow (D1.4). TheuseofCCIsprovides a lens to see how the issue is understood in a more inclusive manner, addressing grievances andperspectivesofdifferentpartiesandstakeholdersovertime,andthroughinstitutionsandsectors. ➢ D1.4CCIsareoftennoteffectivelyaddressed,andhaveoftennotbeeneffectivelyaddressedover

time, including through previous peace processes and agreements, directly undermining theinclusivenessofthepoliticalsettlement:

~intheagreementdesign(Yemen,Zimbabwe);

~duetoextantcontradictionsthatundermineagreements(Colombia,SouthAfrica);and,

~throughpooragreementimplementation(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Zimbabwe).

Inmany cases these CCIs have existed through a significant part of the country’s history and not effectivelyaddressed through consecutive political agreements and social contracts (Bosnia andHerzegovina, Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Zimbabwe).

YEMEN: The main question surrounding CCIs (unequal distribution of power and service delivery) is notwhethertheyhavebeenaddressed,butratherhow.ThetransitionenvironmentoutsideoftheNDCwasnotattendedto,whichaffectedthetransitionalgovernment's legitimacy.Duringthetransition,servicedeliverycontinued to be unequal, favouring the capital. Power distribution was described as “a game of musicalchairs,”20asmanyactorswhowereengagedinactivitiesthathadinstitutionalisedthestate'smalfunction,werenowmembersofthenewsystem.Whilefederalismwasintroducedtoenableregionalcommunitiestomanagetheir resourcesbetter, asnoted inD1.1, this proposalwasnot supportedand resulted inundermining theoutcomesofthedialogue. COLOMBIA: The 2016 Colombian peace agreement accurately sets out to address the main, historicimpedimentsforsustainablepeaceinthecountry, includingtheCCIs(landissuesandillicitcrops).WhetherColombiaprogressestowardsamoreinclusivesocialcontractwillrequireconfrontingthedeeplyentrenchedinterests and structural conditions that operate beyond the control of the state and ensuring institutionsfacilitateneededtransformations. SOUTH AFRICA: CCIs (service delivery and economic participation) were depoliticised, along with othercontentious issues classifiedas “reconstructionanddevelopment” concerns.21However, like approaches toothercontentiouspoliticalandstructural issues (landdistribution, theaccumulationofwhitecapitalduringapartheid),thisapproachignoredthefoundationsandintractabilityofwhiteprivilegeandwealth(operatingin

20InternationalCrisisGroup.2012.“Yemen:EnduringConflicts,ThreatenedTransition.”Report125,3July2012.https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-enduring-conflicts-threatened-transition21AfricanNationalCongress.1994.ReconstructionandDevelopmentProgram.AfricanNationalCongress.


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socioeconomicandstructuralrealms)thatcouldonlybetargetedthroughstate-ledeconomictransformation,distributivejustice,andredressforhistoricalinjusticeandinequalityofgroupsdisadvantagedunderapartheid. ZIMBABWE: Zimbabwe’s CCIs (distribution and exercise of political power and the land question) havechallengedpeaceagreementsandtheabilitytoforgeaninclusivepoliticalsettlementsincethecolonialera.While the 2008 GPA represented the first formal agreement that addressed these CCIs in potentiallytransformativeway, implementation has been hindered by reduced politicalwill in the absence of power-sharingarrangements.DuringtheGPAperiodmodalitiesofpoliticalpowerwereexploitedbyZANU-PFpartnersinthegovernment,includingpoliticalviolence,impunity,lackofrightsandfreedoms,andover-securitisationoftheState.Despiteconvergenceamongthepartiesonthelandquestion,whichwasstrengthenedduringthepower-sharingperiod,implementationhasbeenslow.Newproblemsandassociatedgrievancesareemergingsuch as the diminishing powers of traditional authorities, difficulties in accessing land in peri-urban areas,challengesinaccessingrestorativejustice–thelackoffundingandthecomplexitiesofthelandissuearebeingincreasinglyentangledwithmining.ThepopularsupportforthecoupagainstMugabeandhiswife,illustrateswidespreadconsensusacrosspoliticaldividesarounddistributionandexerciseofpoliticalpowerasaCCI. BOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA:CCIs(profounddiscrepanciesbetweentheboundariesofthepoliticalcommunityand the rights of citizenship within that community and an ethnically based governance system) wereaddressedintheDPAinawaythatsatisfiedeachparty'sminimaldemandsandgrievances.Thishoweveralsoset-uptheconditionsfornationalists’dominanceduringtheagreement’simplementation.Elitesdidnothaveaninterestinresolvingtheethnicgovernanceissuebecauseitwouldstripthemoftheirpower.Asaresult,theelite social contract involves the stubborn instrumental attachment to each party’s respective nationalistpoliticalpositions,andtheirelectoralsuccessistightlyconnectedtotheirnationalistpoliticalobjectives. NEPAL:TheCPAsoughttoaddressNepal’shistoricCCIs(politicalandeconomicexclusion)throughacompletereformof theState,making itmore inclusiveandofferingredress for longstandingoppression,neglectanddiscriminationbasedoncaste,class,regionandgender.However,theCPAdidnotsucceedduetothefailureoftheGovernmenttoimplementcommitments,duetomistrustbetweenthepoliticalparties,powerstrugglesamong them, and disagreement over the constitution of 2015, especially over electoral representation,constituencydelineation,andcitizenship-relatedclauses. SOUTHSUDAN:Thegrowingsenseofethnicandsub-nationalaffiliationcanlargelybeattributedtothreeCCIs(politicalpowerstruggles,socialexclusion,andeconomicinequality).Theseareallhistoricalgrievancesheldbydifferent groups, as evidenced in the narratives of Southerners seeking secession. Successive agreements(beforeandafterindependence)thatsoughttoaddressexclusionweredishonoured.SouthSudan’sCPA(2005-11)ultimatelydeliveredafragilenationthatitsnewgovernmentwasnotabletounite,andtheAgreementontheResolutionofConflictinSouthSudan(2015)hasbeenunderminedbyelites’self-interests. TUNISIA:TheGovernment'sfocusonpoliticaltransitionhasneglectedtheeconomyandfailedtoaddresstheCCIs(polarisationinsocietyandeconomicdesperation).Theresultsareanuntaxedandunregulatedinformalsector(nowaccountingfornearly50%oftheeconomy),adowngradingofthecountry'screditrating,severaltimessincetherevolution,and40%ofTunisiansoutofwork,athirdofwhomholdauniversitydegree.22Statesubsidiesofoil-and-gasproductsandfoodstuffshasgrownrapidly(by270%duringthedifficultearlytransitionyears after the 2012 Constituent Assembly) and the tourism sector has been crippled as a result of terrorattacks.23Thereisdeepconcernthatthefragiledemocraticgainsmadesincetherevolutionwillbederailed.

22Gall,Carlotta.2016.“TunisiaSeeksForeignInvestmenttoCementDemocraticGains.”NewYorkTimes,November30,2016.https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/africa/tunisia-investment-arab-spring.html23Ghiles,Francis.2016.“SomethingisRottenintheStateofTunisia.”OpenDemocracy,January29,2016.https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/francis-ghil-s/something-is-rotten-in-state-of-tunisia


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Driver2:Increasinglyeffective,fair,andinclusiveinstitutions(bothformalandinformalandencompassingstate,customary,othernon-state,international)areperformingkeyfunctionswithbroadlysharedresults.

Thisresearchseekstoprovidecontextualisedandcomparativeanalysisofthedifferentwaysinwhichkeyservicesarebeingdelivered, includingonwhatactuallymatters topeople indifferent contexts. Issuesofperformance,including theeffectivenessofdeliveryandoutcomes, especially fordifferentgroups, are explored. Inaddition,societies’ expectations about the roles and functions of the state and its institutions, how these expectationschange,andinrelationtowhatfactors,areconsidered.Theresearchalsolooksatprocessesincludingtheavenuesforqualityparticipationandforgrievancerecourse,suchastheexistenceof,desirefor,andeffectivenessoftheseavenues. In considering how these issues affect societal understandings of the legitimacy of the state and itsinstitutions, theauthorswereallowed to reflecton legitimacy in context, inspiredby theOECD’s four-prongedtypologyoflegitimacy:24input/process;output/performance;sharedbeliefs;and,internationallegitimacy.Earlyfindingsinclude: ➢ D2.1Stateinstitutions,whichcanbeseenasthehardwareforcarryingforwardpeaceagreement

implementationandinfosteringmoreinclusivepoliticalsettlements,areoftennotsufficientlyoreffectivelyengagedinaddressingcoreconflictissues(CCIs),includingatsub-nationallevels(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Yemen).


● ThestrengtheningofinstitutionsinwaysthatundermineorexacerbateCCIs,i.e.throughthedevelopmentof ethno-national, segregated, polarising institutions (Bosnia andHerzegovina, Cyprus, Yemen), or, byover-supportingsecurityinstitutionswithoutsufficientattentiontodevelopmentalneeds(Tunisia);

● Failingtolinkpeaceagreementcommitmentstoformalgovernanceinstitutions,especiallyatsub-nationallevels,ordilutingcommitmentstodoso(Colombia,Nepal,Tunisia,SouthAfrica,Zimbabwe);and,

● Corruptionandpoorgovernanceofinstitutions(SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Zimbabwe). Seealso,examplesinDriver1,keymessage2[D1.2] CYPRUSandBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA:Ethno-national,separateinstitutionsareperpetuatingpolarisationand discrimination, and moving both societies away from acquiring resilient national social contracts andachievingsustainablepeace. ~InCYPRUS,separateinstitutionsareevolvingovertime,gaininglegitimacyintheeyesoftheirowncommunitywhiletheyperpetuatediscriminatingpoliciesagainsttheothercommunity'smembersintheirterritory.Suchpoliciesincluderighttoaccessproperty,freedomofmovementandsettlement,accesstohealthcare,votingrightsandethnicprofilingatcheckpoints.ThismeanstheyarenotaddressingCCIs,norpower-sharinginwaysthathonourthevisionofnationalinstitutionsthatrespectallcitizens’rights. ~InBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA,noattentionwasgiventoeitherthefunctionalityoftheinstitutionsor,moregenerally,theimplementationoftheDPA.Thenewcomplexinstitutionalstructureswenttogetherwiththecreationofanunwieldyadministrativeapparatus.Notonlyhasthissystemcreatedaninefficientandcorrupteconomy,but ithasalsohandedoverthecontrolof jobs inthebloatedpublicsectortonationalistpoliticalparties,andestablishedalargebureaucracyloyaltothem.

24OrganisationofEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.2010.TheState’sLegitimacyinFragileSituations:UnpackingComplexity.OECD,p27.


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YEMEN:DespitetheNDC'sbesteffortsinmovingtowardsamoreinclusivepoliticalsettlementandagreedwayforward,severalhurdlesexistintermsofimplementation,namelythehistoric,chronicweaknessofYemen'spoliticalinstitutions.TheNDCfederalismproposalintheorybroughtgovernmenthardwareintothepicturebutitwasnotwellreceived,anditbecameachiefreasonforthecollapseoftheNDC.Inadditiontotheproposalintroduction being made without sufficient warning, the regional districting that was to be conducted toimplementtheproposalwasconsideredarbitrary,puttinggovernoratesthatwerenotkeenoncooperatingwithinthesamefederalzonesandnotrequiringbuy-infromtheleadersortheircommunities.PoliticalactorsintheNDCprocessfailedtoconsiderissuesofsocialcohesioninconsideringhowfederalismcouldbebeneficialtodifferentregionsandwhatco-operationwouldlooklikeundersuchcircumstances.The2013transitionalgovernmentwasultimatelyviewedascomplicitinstiflingmeaningfulchangeandreinforcingthestatusquo.Ongoingpervasivecorruptionandmismanagementofbasicserviceprovisionfosteredadeepsenseofexclusionandfrustrationbythosewhowereaffectedbytheinstitutionalmaladiesofthestate. TUNISIA: Despite constitutional commitments to decentralisation, which entails greater localised budgetautonomy, progress has been sluggish on the devolution of power from the national to sub-regional andmunicipal levels.Due to the failure to implementdecentralisationmeasures, residentsof thenorthernandinteriorregionscontinuetoexperienceexclusionandneglect.WhileState institutionsaremakingprogress,particularlywithregardstofightingcorruptionandstrengtheningeducation(andparticularlyciviceducation),there is concern that anoveremphasison security isworking to thedetrimentof addressing theCCIs. Thesecuritybudgethastripled,inordertofightterrorism,whilemanybelievethatdifferentapproaches(suchasprevention-oriented economic incentives) may mitigate the very conditions that gave rise to terrorism,particularlyinmarginalisedbordercommunities. NEPAL:Nepalsawaremarkablecommitmenttoredressinghistoricalexclusionsandinequalitiesthroughthefostering of the norm of inclusion through representation during the CA-I elections of 2008, and throughaffirmative action policies and related political institutions that followed (i.e. through quotas in education,public employment and political representation), to addressing historical exclusions and inequalities. ThesecondConstitutionalAssembly(CA-II)election in2013,however,sawtherepresentationofthehistoricallymarginalisedgroupsreduced.Whilethisprocessdrewupboundariesforsevenstatesendingthecentralisedunitarystatestructure,theMadhesiandTharuandothergroupshowever,feelthattheprocesswasrushedthroughanddilutedthecommitmentstomeaningfulfederalism. SOUTHAFRICA:DespitethenotionsofinclusivenesswrittenintotheFreedomCharter,andwidercommitmentsvoiced in post-transition development policies to alleviating the socio-economic deprivations of particulargroupsinheritedfromtheapartheidpast,parallelconcessionsagreedtoduringthetransitionhaveunderminedthesegoals(seeD1.1).Campaigningunderthebannerof“abetterlifeforall,”the1994ReconstructionandDevelopmentPlan (RDP) sought to reconfigure thehuman rightsabusesand inequalitiesasdevelopmentalpriorities with some elements of reconstruction, particularly for local communities disenfranchised duringapartheid.Yettheprogrammewascriticisedforlackingsubstanceandthepracticalstepstoachievebroadlyoutlined egalitarian objectives. The promotion of business through neo-liberal trade laws ultimatelycontributed to long-termeconomic instability and constrained the capacityof the State to implementpro-labourreform.Whilesuccessfulatarticulatinganinclusiveinstitutionalandpolicyframework,thechallengesand technicalitiesof linkinganation-buildingagendaas represented in thepolitical settlement, tobroaderpolicyreformsinemploymentandservicedelivery,wereunderestimated. ZIMBABWE:WithrespecttothepoliticalquestionCCI(seeD1.4),devolution,aHumanRightsCommission,aPeace and Reconciliation Commission and an independent judiciary among others have been achieved onpaper,butnotinreality.Withrespecttothelandquestion,aLandCommissiontoensuretransparencyandfairness now exists. However, contradictions and challenges persist including perceptions that opposition


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supporterswereexcluded.ThereareongoinglandoccupationsandeventhreatsbyZANU-PFyouthstooccupyfarmsownedbysomeseniorZANU-PFpoliticians.PoorimplementationoftheGPAledtomissedopportunitiesto utilise the land issue to redress grievances around fairness of process and results. Furthermore, anopportunitywasmissedtoillustratethatinstitutionscandeliverinwaysthatrespondtosociety’sexpectationsandbuild trust, andultimately tobuild social cohesionbetweengroups that feelmarginalised through theprocess. COLOMBIA:Colombiawasalreadymakingimportantprogressthroughstateinstitutionsinstrengtheningsocialandeconomicconditionsbeforethepeaceagreementwassigned,i.e.throughimprovingaccountabilityandfiscal capacity. However, extremely uneven urban-rural economic and political development has persisteddespiteongoingdecentralisationeffortssincethe1980s.Localelitesandillegalarmedactorshavedominatedandcapturedregionsandrents.Thishasproducedvariousformsofhybridity,withnational-levelinstitutions–suchasthetaxsystem–competingforallegiancewithsub-national,clientelisticnetworks–suchascriminaland insurgent rent-seekers.Agreement implementationhas largelybeenanational-level responsibility andendeavour. Sub-national authorities have been spectators or clients, more than proactive actors oftransformationintheirrespectiveregions.Asaresult,itisunlikelythattheagreementwillhavethedesiredeffectofincludingruralandmarginalisedurbancommunities,forexampleinrelationtotheirintegrationintoregionalandnationalnetworksforemploymentandproduction,accesstoqualityhealthcareandeducationservices,representationandparticipationinthepoliticalprocess,andovercomingsystemicinequality. InSOUTHSUDAN,withpowerbeinghandedoverin2011totheSudanPeople’sLiberationMovement(SPLM),withitsweakinstitutionsandstrongethnicandtribalaffiliations,thesmallerethnicgroupsbecameincreasinglyexcluded,andnepotismandpatronagealongethniclinesbecameprevalent.Whenviolentconflicteruptedinthe national capital Juba in 2013, it immediately assumed ethnic dimensions. As violent conflict continuesunabated,thesesub-nationalidentitiesposeathreattotheunityofSouthSudan.Weakinstitutions,combinedwiththeSPLM’ssenseofexclusiveentitlementtopoliticalpowerandeconomicresources,haveresulted inrampantcorruption.Thishascontributedtothelackofemploymentopportunitiesandlimitedtheprovisionofbasicservicestothepeople.

➢ D2.2 State Institutions (electoral bodies, administrative and social services, and institutionsdesignedthroughpeaceagreementstoaddressCCIs)areoftennoteffectivelydeliveringontheirrespectivemandates(duetolackofpoliticalwill,lackofcapacityandresources,andcorruption,allofwhichtendtoreflectinformaldynamicsandpowerrelationsamongactorsatdifferentlevels)(Allcountries).

Allofthecasesstudiesreportdissatisfactionwithstateinstitutionsandthedeliveryofpublicservices.DatafromtheFragileStatesIndexonaccesstoandadequacyofpublicserviceprovisionalsostronglyreflectsthis.

➢ D2.3Societiesarereflectingdeepconcernabouttheeffectivenessofstateinstitutions(especiallyservicedeliveryandrelatedpovertyandinequality,aswellaswidergovernmentaccountability)through protest, illustrating a lack of faith in official governance mechanisms (for grievancerecourseandmeaningfulinclusion)(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).



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● Expressionofdeepfrustrationwiththestate’sabilitytodeliverbasicservices(allcases);and, ● Theresortingtoactivism(Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen),andevenviolence(Nepal,SouthAfrica),

asameanstoexercisepressureuponthestate,intheabsenceofresponsiveformalstatemechanisms.However, repressionand fearcancircumscribe formsofprotestand fuelmore innovativeapproaches(BosniaandHerzegovina,Zimbabwe).

Resistancemeasuressuchasprotestcanbeviewedasanimportantindicatorofexpectationsembeddedinthesocialcontractnotbeingmet.Whileprotestillustratessocietalwillingnessandcapacitytomakedemandsuponthestate, itdoesnotautomaticallysuggestaresilientsocialcontract.Thelatterdependsonthenatureofthestate’sresponse.Governmentresponsesareoftennotconducivetoresolution,withtheuseofviolenceresultinginheightenedcivilsocietyoutcry(Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia)oracoup(Yemen). Inothercases,governmentbacklashcreatesfearofprotesting(BosniaandHerzegovina,Zimbabwe).

YEMEN and TUNISIA: InYEMEN, service delivery historically favoured regionswith strong alliances to thestate. 25 Marginalised communities developed their own systems and suffered further discrimination andviolations at the hands of the state. The 2011 Arab Spring, which was led by multiple disenfranchisedmovements,soughttoremedyinstitutionalissuesandbringreformsensuringthatallcitizenswouldbenefitequallyandfairly fromstate institutions.Evenasthepoliticalsettlementprocessbecamemore inclusiveofpoliticalpartiesandcivilsocietyi.e.throughtheestablishmentoftheNDC,Yemeniscontinuedtoregistertheirdiscontent through protest, strikes and sit-ins. The Government’s unresponsiveness to citizens’ protests,includingmassivedemonstrationsagainsttheremovaloffuelsubsidiesinJuly2014,createdawidenationalsupport base for theHouthimilitia to intervenemilitarily. InTUNISIAgrievances around thewidening gapbetweenpeople'sexpectationsandtheState'sabilitytodeliver,resultingineconomicdisempowermentandexclusivedevelopment,gaverisetothestrikesanddemonstrationsthatfuelledthe2011revolution. INNOVATIVEFORMSOFPROTEST,INZIMBABWE,SOUTHAFRICAandBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA: ~InZIMBABWEprotestinthestreetshavehistoricallybeenviolentlyrepressedbytheState.Publicoutcryoverthelavishsalaries,lifestyles,andpublicspendingbyeliteshasrisenoverthelastdecade.Displaysofeverydayresistanceareconsistentwithapathytowardsofficialplatformsforcitizen-stateengagement.Newformsofsocialorganisationhaveemergedfromtheever-expandinginformalsector.

~InSOUTHAFRICA,highlevelsofpovertyandinequalityhavefuelledpoliticalprotestsandviolentconflict,particularlypertainingtoservicedeliveryandattimesxenophobicprotests.Apartheid-erastrategiesarebeingrevitalisedbyawiderangeofmarginalisedactorswhoarechallengingformalavenuesofpoliticalexpression,e.g.the#FeesMustFallstudentproteststocheckStatemisconduct,andprotestsabout“landgrabs”and“illegaloccupations”relatingtoabusesoflandandhousingrights.26Initially,theseengagedwithformalstructuresandprocessesbyapproachinglocalcouncillorsandotherlocalgovernmentinstitutionsforexample.However,theyescalated into collectivemobilisation that has culminated in the destruction of property, vigilante justice,violentclasheswiththepoliceand,inrecentyears,xenophobicviolence.

~InBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA,grassrootsandinformalcitizengroupshavechallengedrulingelitesandtheirlegitimacy,groundedinethnicmistrust,bymobilisingtodemandchange.The2014protestsinvolvingprimarily

25ThesouthernregionwasalienatedaftertheNorth-South1994civilwarcausingamountingsenseofinjustice.Inasimilarvein,theZaydiareasoftheNorthweremarginalisedafterthe1968revolutionleadingtothedevelopmentofastrongsupportbaseforZaydieliteswhoseself-governancemadethemathreattotheState.26Omar,A.2016.SocialContractInterview;VonHoldt,Karl,MaloseLanga,SepetlaMolapo,NomfundoMogapi,KindizaNgubeni,JacobDlamini,andAdeleKirsten.2011.TheSmokethatCalls:InsurgentCitizenship,CollectiveViolenceandtheStruggleforaPlaceintheNewSouthAfrica.CentrefortheStudyofViolenceandReconciliation,Society,WorkandDevelopmentInstitute,July28,2016.Retrievedfromhttp://www.diversityjoy.nl/downloads/files/thesmokethatcalls.pdf


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areasintheFederationwithaBosniakmajority,butsupportedbyamajorityofthepopulation,regardlessofethnicbackground,weremotivatedbydubiouspost-warprivatisationdealsthatresultedinheavyjoblossesandcontributedtohighunemploymentrates,ontopofalreadypoorworkingconditions.27The2014protestswerereportedtohavesparkedalong-termshiftincivicconsciousness,includinganincreasinginclinationtouse violence to achieve political change.28Fear of losing jobs or facing financial penalties made the anti-governmentmomentumdifficulttomaintain.Thewidespreadpracticeofštela–thelocallyacceptedpracticeofgrantingandreceivingfavoursorbribes–alsohighlightspeople'sself-relianceintheabsenceofeffectivepublicinstitutions. NEPAL: The eruption of violence in following the passing of the 2015 Constitution also illustrated deepfrustrationswiththeState'sinabilitytoaddressthepolitical,economicandsocialexclusionofparticulargroups.MadhesisandTharuslivinginthesouthernpartofNepal(Tarairegion)launchedaprolongedagitationfromSeptember 2015 until February 2016 against the implementation of the new Constitution,which they feltmarginalised the Tarai community. They argued that the constitutioneroded their political representation,reframedcitizenshipprovisionsandgerrymanderedfederalprovincesinawaywhichhurttheinterestsoftheMadhesiandTharuspeople.Theprotestsresultedinthedeathofatleast50people,withviolencestemmingfromprotesters and theGovernmentalike.Many inNepalblame India (whohaveaMadhesiminority) forquietlysupportingtheMadhesiprotesters;achargeNewDelhidenies. COLOMBIA: Popular protests have increased in recent years. All protests have been related to unsolvedproblemswiththeState’sprovisionsofbasicservices,fromthefailuretoaddresschallengesintheagrariansector,inthepubliceducationsector,andwithinfrastructure.Intheaftermathofthe2016referendum,whichhandedvictorytothecriticsoftheagreementduetothe“no”vote,aseriesofmassivedemonstrationstookplaceinsupportofadjustingtheagreementandprotectingtheprogressthathadalreadybeenachieved(asreflectedindeclininglevelsofviolence).

➢ D2.4 Customary, informal and other non-state structures and systems are commonly playingimportant,thoughattimescontested,institutionalfunctions,particularlyatsub-nationallevels,yet are often not officially or systematically integrated into an inclusive political settlement(Colombia,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Inmany countries, especially in transitional but also developing country contexts, customary authorities (i.e.kinship-basedandreligiousauthorities,chieftainships),andothernon-stateactorswithstrongconstituencies,(i.e.associations linked to insurgent groups), hold the allegiance of local populations and may be playing keyinstitutionalfunctions(i.e.deliveringservicesintheabsenceof,orinprotestagainst,thestate).Theirinclusioninpoliticalagreements,linkedinstitutionsandpolicies,isimportanttoensureimplementationandwidereffectivegovernance. Earlyfindingsfromthecasestudiesillustratethat:

● Customarystructuresandotherparallelinstitutionsthathaveevolvedthroughconflicttorepresentlocalpopulations,oftenholdconsiderable(butalsouneven)support.Thisistruegiventheirproximitytolocalpopulations, and because the statemay be absent and lacking capacity and/or legitimacy (Colombia,

27AuthoritiesintheSerbRepublicwereabletoavoidsimilareventsbypresentingprotestersasenemiesoftheirgovernmentandbyrepressinginternaldissent.28CeraMurtagh.2016.“CivicMobilizationinDividedSocietiesandthePerilsofPoliticalEngagement:BosniaandHerzegovina’sProtestandPlenumMovement.”NationalismandEthnicPolitics,22(2):149-171.


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SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe).Supportforthesestructuresandinstitutionscanbeunevenforreasonsincluding their co-opting by particular groups, or the state itself (Zimbabwe), and their potential topromote conservative norms that conflictwith human rights and other norms, i.e. women’s equality(Yemen);and,

● Theyareoftenside-linedinpoliticalprocesses,particularlyatthenationallevel,evenwherecommitmentstoinclusivepoliticalsettlementsareinplace(Colombia,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

➢ D2.5Statelegitimacy(andhowsocietalexpectationsfactorintothis),whichismulti-dimensional

giventhemanyvariables(historical,cultural,social,economicandpolitical)atplay,oftenrelatestocitizenperspectivesaroundserviceprovision,corruption,avenuesforparticipationanddeliveryonpromises(BosniaandHerzegovina,Cyprus,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Early findings from the case studies support the emerging literature on rebuilding/strengthening of statelegitimacyincountriesaffectedbyconflictandfragility,whichsuggestitishighlycontextspecific,andthatmanynarrativesexist. Theyare also in general agreementwith theODI findings around complexitywith respect toservicedelivery,expectationsofthestateandsatisfaction(thatcausallinkagesarenotclear).Thisstudy’sfindingshowever,areemergingasmoremixedontheassumptionthathowwellservicesarerunismoreimportantthanaccess (andmoreover, there isacase tobemade that thesearenot reallyde-linkable).Notably,our findingssuggestthat:

● Citizensgenerallydowantthestatetodeliverservices(asevidencedbyprotestsacrosscountries(seeD2.3),althoughexpectationscanbedimmed(orlost)throughnegativesexperienceofthestatevis-a-visthedeliveryofservices(poorornon-existent,discriminatory,rent-seeking),(SouthAfrica,Zimbabwe);

● Populationscanrecognisemultipleformsoflegitimacywithrespecttogovernment.Whileoneformoflegitimacy might weaken (e.g. around service delivery performance), another can be sustained (e.g.sharedbeliefswithcharismaticleaders),orstrengthenedinthecontextofpoliticalprocesses(BosniaandHerzegovina,Zimbabwe);and,

● Involvementofinternationalactorsandtheallegiancetointernationalnormscanundermineorenhancethe legitimacy of local institutions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen,Zimbabwe;See5.1formoredetails).

Driver3:Thereisbroadeninganddeepeningsocialcohesion–understoodastheformaland informal ties that hold society together both horizontally (across and betweencitizensandgroups)andvertically(intherelationsbetweencitizensandgroups,andthestate).

In“driver3”onsocialcohesion,theresearchexaminesthewaysthatpeoplebondbetweenandacrosspolitical,economic and social spheres, at different levels and in different settings i.e. vertically, and horizontally. Thisresearchaimstoexplorehowthese interact,driveand/orundermineoneanother,contributingtoconflictandpeace. Here it is considered what domains are most important and why, in different contexts, across threeprominent areas: 1) belonging and identification; 2) trust and respect; and, 3) access, participation andrepresentation.Earlyfindingsinclude:

➢ D3.1Verticalsocialcohesion(relationsbetweenthestate,andsomegroupsandcitizens)isnotstronginthecasestudies,whichhelpsexplaintheweaknessofnationalsocialcontracts(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Consideringverticalsocialcohesion(throughthefollowingthreedomains:1)belongingandidentification;trustandrespect;and,3)access,participationandrepresentation),earlyfindingsfromthecasestudiesillustratethat


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poorverticalcohesion,evidencedthroughopinionpollsandsurveys,lowvoterturnout,protest,andmeasuresofpublicparticipation,occursthrough:

● PoorprogressinDriver1(achievingamoreinclusivepoliticalsettlementthatincreasinglyaddressescoreconflictissues);and,

● PoorprogressinDriver2,includingdecliningtrustinstatesandtheirinstitutions,and/ordissatisfactionwithperformance(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Tunisia,Yemen, Zimbabwe). Notably this is linked with forging a common national identity (Bosnia andHerzegovina,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Yemen).

Vertical cohesion appears to benefit from strong national identity (Zimbabwe), regardless of poor stateperformance,includingwhenformalchannelsofcommunicationbetweencitizensandthestateexist(Tunisia).

ZIMBABWE:Amixedpicture isevident inZimbabwe.People tendtoallywithanational identitybeforeanethnicone(thoughnotalways).Perhapsthisisaresultofabsorbingthenationalistvision.ZimbabweancitizenspollhighinbelievingtheStateshouldbeobeyed,yetnotintrustingstateinstitutions,norinengagingtheirleadersatdifferentlevels.Theyalsopollhighindissatisfactionwithservicedelivery(whichhasworsenedsincetheGPA).29Thecontradictionsmightbeexplainedbyfearofstateviolence,andthebeliefthatactionswillnotproduce results.The2017massuprising in supportofa coup to topple thenow formerPresidentMugabeillustratethispoint.Oncethecoup leaders (Zimbabwe’smilitary)allowedtheprotest totakeplace, tensofthousandsofZimbabweans,acrossthepoliticaldivides,seizedtheopportunityandwentintothestreets. WhileinCYPRUS,theverticalcohesion,whileincreasinglypresentwithineachcommunityseparately,isalmostnon-existent across the two communities. Given the solidification of two separate ethno-national socialcontracts,inBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA,despitethepresenceofnationalistinstitutions,thesituationismorecomplex.Bosniansdisplayalowattachmentleveltoboththeirhomelandandtheir(State)citizenship,butwithsomesignificantdifferencesbetweengroups.30Assuch,Bosniannationalitydoesnotconstituteanidentityforallcitizens(reflectingthecoreconflictissueoverpoliticalboundaries,andallegiancetoneighbouringCroatiaandSerbia).Trusttowardsinstitutionshasdecreasedconsiderablysince2008,whenaGalluppollfoundthat70.3%ofcitizenshad littleornotrust ingovernment.31Inaddition,almostnineoutoftencitizens,withnosignificantvariationbetweendifferentethnicgroups,believethatpoliticalelitesrepresentthemajorprobleminthecountry.32Thedistancebetweencitizensandtheformalpeaceimplementationprocessisreflectedinthe general lack of interest at the popular level in constitutional issues, the technicalities related to theimplementationoftheDPA,andthelowlevelofinterestinpoliticsingeneral(bestreflectedinthedeclineinvoterturnoutovertheyears). SOUTH AFRICA: Despite the strong rainbowism discourse (which draws from the common refrain of the“RainbowNation”usedtodescribepost-apartheidSouthAfrica), in“recognisingthehistoricalobligationforredress,”andamending thedivisionswroughtby settler colonialism, theefforts spearheading thisnationalprojecthavefocusedonsportsandrecreation,failingtoadequatelyaddressthestructuraldriversofinequality.Ubuntu(atermfora“sharedsenseofhumanity”)enjoyshighsupport,butamountstoasuperficialapproach

29Afrobarometer.3082%ofBosniaksprivilegethefactofbeingaBosniaandHerzegovinacitizen,followedby60%ofCroats.Bycontrast,forSerbstheirethnicidentityismostimportant.UnitedNationsResidentCoordinator'sOfficeinBosniaandHerzegovina.2015.PublicOpinionPollResults.Sarajevo:UN,p45Ringdal,Kristen,OlaListhaugandAlbertSimkus.2013.“BosnianValuesinaEuropeanContext.”InOlaListhaugandSabrinaP.Ramet,eds.,137-157,Bosnia-HerzegovinaSinceDayton.CivicandUncivicValues.Longo:Ravenna.31Reportavailableatwww.gallup.com.32UnitedNationsResidentCoordinator'sOfficeinBosniaandHerzegovina.2015.PublicOpinionPollResults.Sarajevo:UN,p15.


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tosocialcohesionthatsomefearisvulnerabletopoliticalcapturebytherulingANC.ThetrustofthepopulationinStateinstitutionsisdeclininginthepost-politicalsettlementera.33 NEPAL:Nepalisamulti-lingual,multi-racial,multi-culturalandmulti-religiousnationStatethathasyettoforgeacommonidentityandcommondestiny.InNepal,thereisagreatdealofstate-drivendiscriminationbasedonsocially-constructed hierarchies, values and beliefs. These prevent some groups from performing certainactivitiesorfromparticipatinginthepublicarena.Theissuesofethnic,religiousandcasteidentities,naturalresourceuseanddistribution,andpoliticaldifferencesanddivisions,haveresultedinalackofsocialcohesionandthreatentodisruptthe(limited)socialcohesionthathasemergedfromthepoliticalsettlement. COLOMBIA:Colombianshaveastrongnationalidentitybutarecynicalandcriticalofnationalstatecapacity,inpartduetotheineffectivenessofStateinstitutions(characterisedbylowperformance,widespreadimpunityandcorruption).Thereislittleengagementinpoliticsandageneraldislikeofformaldemocraticinstitutions(suchaspoliticalpartiesandCongress).TheColombianpopulation'ssatisfactionwithdemocracyhasdeclinedsince2004.Trustinthegovernmenthasalsodeclinedbetween2004and2010.34 TUNISIA:TappingintoTunisia'sreservoirofcitizen-driven,socialcohesionhasnotonlyhelpedtoavoidviolenceduring the transition but has also ensured a more inclusive public dialogue throughout the policymakingprocess, thus reducing public scepticism about new laws and plans, increasing buy in, and aidingimplementationoflawsthatarepassed.Citizen-driven,socialcohesionhasalsohelpedtoempowerordinarypeople,transformingthemfromsubjectsintocitizens.Activechannelsofcommunicationbetweencitizensandthe State, i.e. through serviceprovision andby joining international opengovernance initiatives, have alsoincreasedtrustandrespectfortheState.However,despitetheinclusivenatureofTunisia'stransition,asurveyconductedaspartofthisstudyrevealedawidespreaddisengagementwithnationalpolitics,asmoreandmoreTunisians question whether the Government can deliver the promises of the revolution. This trend ispredominantinyoungpeople(aged18-25),amajorityofwhomdidnotvoteinthe2014parliamentaryandpresidentialelections.Theresultsofasurveyofyoungpeoplerevealhighlevelsofyouthdissatisfaction:42%aredissatisfiedwiththeprovisionofjusticeandtheruleoflaw;45%withpublicserviceandstateinstitutions;and,50%witheffortstoaddresstheeconomyandpoverty.YEMEN:BecausetheGovernment isoperating inavolatileenvironmentand is incapableofprovidingbasicservicesto itscitizens,variousgroupshavebecomeincreasinglyconfrontationalregardingitsauthority.TheSouthernersunwaveringdemandsforsecessionandtheHouthis’removalofthetransitionalPresidentHadi(onthebasisofcorruptionandmismanagementofYemen'saffairsandresources),demonstratesadeepfracturebetweentheStateandsociety.MuchofthismistrustisdrivenbytheinstitutionalweaknessoftheStateanditscontinuedappeasementofpatrimonialnetworks,botholdandnew.Atthenationallevel,35.2%believethattheYemeniarmydoesnotworkenoughto fightterrorism inYemen.35Asdescribed inD2.4,manyYemenisplacetheirtrustincustomaryauthorities. SOUTH SUDAN: The survey for this study revealed low citizen trust in formal institutions and a sense ofdisempowerment, including in terms of participation in political processes, followed independence. This is

3312%trustedthecourts“alot”in2000,afigurewhichpeakedat35%in2004andhasdeclinedsteadilyagainto24%in2015,while9%trustedthepolice“alot”in2000,peakingat28%in2004,anddecliningatasimilarratetothecourts,to14%in2015.Sibusiso,N.2016.SouthAfrica'ssocialcohesion–inequality,interpersonal/institutionaltrust,identityandtolerance:FindingsfromAfrobarometer’sRound6surveysinSouthAfrica.PresentedattheOECD’sDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)NationBuildingandSocialCohesionWorkshop,CapeTown:June.34ObservatoriodelaDemocracia.2014.DemocraciaeInstituciones.https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/democracia-e-instituciones/tendencias?question_id=9106&year_from=2004&year_to=2016#js_topic_graphic35YemenPollingCentre.


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attributed to the centralised systemof governance adopted after independence in 2011. In terms of civil-military relations, the relationship between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and citizensdeterioratedandsouredafterindependencein2011.Thelackofanationalvisionforforgingaunifiednationalidentity, coupled with weak institutions, resulted in the strengthening of sub-national affiliations afterindependence.

➢ D3.2 Horizontal social cohesion tends to be stronger within groups than between them, andweakerwhen political issues (rather than ethnic or religious issues) are dominant (Bosnia andHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Consideringhorizontalsocialcohesion(throughdomainsofbelongingandidentification,trustandrespect,andaccess,participationandrepresentation),earlyfindingsfromourcasestudiesillustratethatthisoccursthrough:

● horizontal social cohesion being stronger within groups, than between them, reflecting polarisationtrendswithanelitedrivencomponent(BosniaandHerzegovina,Cyprus,Yemen,Zimbabwe);

● daily interactionsbetweengroups, suchas livingasneighbours.Theseareoftennotaproblem,whilepoliticalissuestendtoprovoke,catalyse,and/orenhancegroupdivisions,whetherbydesignorchance.Thisisthecaseespeciallywherethereareperceptionsthatsomegroupsarefavouredbythestate,overothers(Colombia,SouthAfrica,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe);and,

● state designed horizontal cohesion initiatives not being very effective (SouthAfrica, Zimbabwe,whilecitizen-initiatedonesseemtoholdpromise(BosniaandHerzegovina,Nepal,Tunisia).

ZIMBABWE:There is fairly strong horizontal cohesion in Zimbabwe. At an interpersonal level, 93%-94%ofZimbabweanswould“strongly like,”“somewhat like,”or“notcare”about livingasneighboursofpeopleofdifferentreligions/ethnicgroups.Thissuggeststhatthemainfaultlinesarepartlypolitical.Rather,ethnicandtribaldifferences tend tomanifest throughpolicy choices, access to services, andallocationsofposition inpoliticalparties.Thereisasensethatsomeethnicgroupsareprioritisedoverothers. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: Surveys indicate that the distance between ethnic groups does not play animportantroleinpeople'slives,butitcontinuestobeimportantinpoliticalrelationsanddecisions.WhileformsofsocialcohesioninBosniaandHerzegovinaremainpredominantlyintra-ethnic,andopinionpollsshowhowsocialtrustisparticularlylowinheterogeneousmunicipalities,someactorsfavourthedevelopmentofgreatercross-ethniclinkagesandco-operation.Atthesametime,ethnicidentityisstillpoliticallymobilised;nationalistpoliticianseffectivelyutiliseeachgroup'sseparate“politicsofmemory”inthepursuittheirpoliticalpriorities.BeyondtheState,citizen-ledeconomicandsocialco-operationfacilitateformsofconstructiveinteractionandsharing,despitedifficulteconomicconditions.Workersacrossnationalgroupsaredevelopingnewformsofsolidarityinthefightfortheirrights,asevidencebytheBosniaandHerzegovinaCommerceandServicesTradeUnion-drawingmembersfrombothadministrativeentities–theFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina,andtheSerbRepublic. TherolesthatDIASPORASplayinhorizontalcohesion,aswithverticalcohesion,ariseinimportantwaysacrosscasesbutrequirefurtherexaminationandreflection. InZIMBABWE, forexample,thoughdiasporasplayanimportanteconomicrole(intermsofremittances),theyareexcludedfrompoliticalprocesses,andarethuslessinclinedtoco-operatewiththerulingparty-ledState.InBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA,thediasporacontributestofinancialflows,transferofknowledge,technology,andhumancapital.Theyalsoplayanincreasingroleinsocialserviceprovisionwhichhasimplicationsfortheverticaldimensionofthestate-citizensocialcontract.Focusgroupspointedtothediasporaasapotentiallypositiveplayerwhoseinfluence,however,ishinderedby


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both the lack of responsiveness of local politicians, and by the lack of clear legal avenues for diaspora toparticipatefullyinBosnianpolitical,economicandsociallife. CYPRUS: Given the solidification of two separate ethno-national social contracts, horizontal and verticalcohesion,whileincreasinglypresentwithineachcommunityinternally,isalmostnon-existentacrossthetwocommunities. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, driven by negative stereotypes of the other alongwithperceptionsofinjusticeduetoinstitutionaldiscrimination,experienceinter-communalrelationsthat,underasuperficialveneerofcivility,arecharacterisedbydeepmistrust. YEMEN:Trust and respect among somegroupsworsened considerably after theArab Spring.At this time,SouthernYemeniswhohadsufferedfromdiscriminatorypoliciesandwerecollectivelypunishedandoppressedfollowingthecivilwarof1994,retaliatedagainsttheirNorthernneighboursaftertheousteroftheiroppressivegovernment.ThiscreatedanunsafeandhostileenvironmentforNorthernersintheSouth.Similarly,theHouthirebelswhohadsufferedadecadeofprejudiceagainsttheiridentityandideologyatthehandsofotherYemenigroups, retaliated with confrontation and violence as their power increased. Ultimately, inter-communalrelations remained volatile and sub-national identities gained paramount importance for the majority ofgroups,sincemanygroupsfelttheywereunabletotrustthatthecentralgovernmentwouldtreatthemfairlyorconsiderneedsandinterests.TheNDCdidnot,problematically,concernitselfwithrepairingandfosteringhorizontalsocialcohesion. SOUTHSUDAN:MostofthekeyinformantsinthisstudyconsideredthattheleveloftrustandrespectbetweendifferentethnicgroupswasstrongerduringthetransitionperiodoftheCPA(46%)thanafterindependence(13%)in2011.Despitethis,dailyinteractionsbetweengroupswererecognisedbymostkeyinformants(62%)to be helpful in reducing fear, anxiety, mistrust and negative stereotypes. In gauging the perception ofrespondents in relation to what would make them identify with being more South Sudanese than beingmembersoftheirtribes,nationalelements(49%)andethnicelements(41%)playedanalmostequalroleinprojectingnationalidentityandthefeelingof“Southerness.”36 SOUTHAFRICA:Horizontalsocialcohesionpresentsamixedpicture.While92%ofSouthAfricansembracethespiritofubuntu,37suchacommitmenttonon-violenceandhumanismhasdonelittleforSouthAfricanwomen.SouthAfricanwomensuffersomeof thehighest income inequality in theworld,and1 in5womenwillbevictimsofsexualviolenceduringtheirlifetimes.Trustinfellowcitizensisdeclining38andperceptionsthatracerelationsareimprovingaredeclining.39Thereissomeevidenceofinter-racialsocialisation,butitisprimarilylimitedtomiddleincomeandwealthySouthAfricans.Thereisnotmuchfaithininitiativespromotingsocialcohesion, since they do not address the power dynamics between groups, which underlie structuralinequalities. COLOMBIA:Violence,aggression,anddistrustishighamongColombians,incontrastwithotherLatinAmericancountries, probably as a consequence of the protracted civil war. This represents a challenge for nationalreconciliation.Whileresearchpointstovictimsandperpetratorsashavingapragmaticapproachtolivingwith

36Author'sownsurveyconductedforthisstudy.37DeKock,Petrus.2016.SouthAfrican2015DomesticPerceptionSurvey.PresentedattheNationBuildingandSocialCohesionWorkshop,CapeTown:June.38Asurvey,runfrom2000to2011,askedSouthAfricans,“,wouldyousaythatmostpeoplecanbetrustedorthatyoumustbeverycarefulindealingwithpeople?"Thefigureanswering,“mustbeverycareful”hasgrownfrom76%in2000to81%in2011.Sibusiso,N.2016.SouthAfrica'ssocialcohesion–inequality,interpersonal/institutionaltrust,identityandtolerance:FindingsfromAfrobarometersRound6surveysinSouthAfrica.PresentedattheDACNationBuildingandSocialCohesionWorkshop,CapeTown:June.39DepartmentofPlanning,MonitoringandEvaluation.2014.DevelopmentIndicators2014.RepublicofSouthAfrica.


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others,40membersofthegeneralpopulationreveallowlevelsoftrustinformercombatants.Forexample,45%ofthegeneralpopulationwasunwillingtohavedemobilizedfightersasneighbours.41Trustofex-combatantisalsolowinpolitics.Despitethelowlevelsofhorizontalsocialcohesionreflectedinpractice,Colombiansareoptimistic about the results of demobilization. This is reflected in a 2016 survey inwhich themajority ofrespondentsexpecteddemobilisationtoresult inamoreinclusivesociety(49.2%)andtoseeanincreaseintolerance(46.1%). TUNISIA:Thereissocialmistrustamongcitizengroups,largelydelineatedbyregion,aspeoplefromtheNortharemistrustfulofpeoplefromthecoast–thelatterwhohavedisproportionatelybenefittedfromtheState'sinvestmentsintourismandinfrastructure.Theleveloftolerancebetweendifferentethnic,linguistic,religious,andsocioeconomicgroupswithinthecountryismeasuredtobe3.1outof5,whichisthesameasColombiaand 0.1 higher than Bosnia and Herzegovina. 42 Continuing economic disempowerment and unequitabledevelopmentcontinuetofuelthesesentiments,asemploymentopportunitiesforyoungpeoplearescarceandeducation is generally regardedasdisconnected from the skills needed for the jobmarket. Still, the activevigilance and creative contributions of a number of NGOs (non-governmental organisations), women’sorganisations,andcitizennetworksarepositiveexamplesinagenerallypoorgovernancelandscape(seeD3.1). NEPAL:Inter-ethnicdiscriminationasaresultofthecastesystemcontinuestothisday,includingentrenchedgender subordination.However, the 2015 earthquake resulted in a senseof solidarity andmutual supportamongneighboursandanoutpouringofgoodwillfromtheinternationalcommunity.Unlikeinsimilardisasterselsewhere,therewerenomajorincidentsoflooting,pilferingofhumanitarianaid,violenceorbreakdownsoflawandorder.

Cross-cuttingIssues

EXCLUSIONANDINCLUSION

➢ 4.1Inclusiveprocessesdonotautomaticallyorquicklytendtoleadtoinclusiveresults,giventhepotentialforotherinterveningfactors(politicalwill,misuseofpower,capacityandresources,poordesign and/or process, poor or lacking implementation frameworks) (Bosnia and Herzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Theemergingconsensusonthevalueofinclusivepoliticalsettlementsandpeaceprocessesmorebroadly,beingdeeplyconnectedtosustainingpeace,iswelcome.Thisresearchlooksatinclusionandexclusionthroughthethreeabovedrivers,atdifferentphasesandlevelsoftransition,withattentiontoprocessandresults–bothsubstantivepolicyresultsorinstitutionalpractices,and,implementationofthesetoproducemoreinclusiveoutcomes.

40Dailyrelationshipsamongthesegroupsaregenerallypeaceful,althoughmarkedbypastexperiencesofconflictandeconomicprecariousness.Prieto,JuanDiego.2012.“Togetherafterwarwhilethewargoeson:Victims,ex-combatantsandcommunitiesinthreeColombiancities.”InternationalJournalofTransitionalJustice,6(3):525-546.41 Ofthegeneralpopulation,asimilarpercentage(around45%)wouldlettheirchildrenattendthesameschoolsasthechildrenofdemobilisedparamilitarymembersorguerrillas,orwouldgiveformerguerrillasajob.Thiscontrastswith79%ofrespondentswhowouldlettheirchildrensharetheirschoolwithvictims.Tobeneighboursofdemobilisedfighterswouldbeacceptableto36%ofthepopulation(incontrastwith83%forvictims).(Surveydonebystudy'sauthor). 42PositivePeaceIndex2015.


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Earlyfindingsfromthecasestudiesillustratethattranslatinginclusiveprocessesintosustained,inclusiveresultsrequires time. In addition, in support of other research findings, it requires steadfast commitment to ensureprocessestargetandcreatepoliciesthatarethenimplemented.43Tunisiaillustrateshowacommitmenttoforginganinclusivesocialcontractthroughmyriad,inparticularcitizen-drivenprocessesforgreaterinclusion(ofdifferentgroupsandcitizensgenerally),isproducingsubstantiveresultsandmeaningfuloutcomes.Thisincludesprocessesacrosssocialcontract-makingspheresandmechanisms,aswellassectors. Challengesintransmissionbetweeninclusiveprocessesandresultsoccursbecauseofthefollowing:

● Alackofpoliticalwilland/orabuseofpower(Zimbabwe,SouthAfrica,Colombia); ● Poor,unsupportiveprocessesand/orsuperficialcommitments(Yemen,Zimbabwe); ● Commitmenttoquotasbeingunderminedbypolitics(BosniaandHerzegovina,SouthAfrica);and, ● Violentbacklashes(Nepal)nottranslatingintoenvisagedresults.

FindingD1.1discusseshowtheearlystagesofpeacenegotiationsofferpossibilitiesforredefiningparametersforinclusionandexclusion,andpositioningofdifferentgroups.Insomecases,thishascatalysedmoreinclusivepolitics (TUNISIA, NEPAL, SOUTH AFRICA, COLOMBIA). Yet concrete results can be difficult to sustain,particularlyifpower-sharingdoesnotremaininplace(YEMENandTUNISIA). D1.3 Illustratesthepropensityforexclusiontomanifest indifferentways,asaCCI (SOUTHAFRICA,NEPAL,BOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA,COLOMBIA).Manifesting largescalepolicychange toproduce transformativeinclusive results to provide redress for serious horizontal, regional, rural/urban inequalities requires asupportivegovernanceandpolicyenvironment.Thiscanbeblockedorunderminedbycompetingconcessionsintransitionalagreements(SOUTHAFRICA,ZIMBABWE,COLOMBIA),asillustratedinD1.4. YEMEN:Despitethepushforanall-inclusiveinstitutionalprocess,positiveresultsdidnotmaterialiseduetothe short timelineof theNDCcoupledwithcorruption,poorgovernance,andhuman rightsviolations.Theprocesswashasty,recommendationsrushedandpartieswereunabletocometoaconsensusattheendofthedialogue.Inreality,‘inclusion’waslittlemorethanwindow-dressingthatmaintainedthemodusoperandiofthedysfunctionalstate.WhiletheNDCiswidelyconsideredtobehighlyinclusiveof delegatesfromdifferentpolitical parties, regions and social groups, the NDC failed to consider sub-national elites, local councilmembers,andarepresentativeparliamentaryandcivil societythatrepresentsdisadvantagedcommunities.Thesearevitalplayersinensuringsocietalbuy-inatalllevels. NEPAL:TheCPApromisedacompletereformoftheStateinadirectionitcalled“progressive,”makingitmoreinclusiveandofferingredressforwhatitdescribedasoppression,neglectanddiscriminationbasedoncaste,class,regionandgender,includingagainstDalit,JanajatiandMadhesigroupsandwomen.However,itisunclearthatthenewpoliticalinstitutionsatnationalandlocallevelswillproveresilientovertime.Therecontinuetobedeep-seatedgrievances,ethnicmobilisationanddivisivepoliticalmobilisationthatunderminetheresilienceofthenewlyemergingsocialcontract.Thepost-transitionpoliticalinstitutionsremainfragile.Inparticular,thelackof stateeffectivenessand responsiveness in thedevelopmentand security sectorsmeans that a ‘NewNepal’remainselusive. SOUTHAFRICA:IntegratedDevelopmentPlansweredesignedtofostercollaborativegovernancethatincludesmultipleactors(theState,business,labour,andcivilsociety)workinglocallytoimplementnationalpoliciestodeliverservicesandaddressgrievances.However,unresponsivenessandinaccessibilityoflocalcouncillorsand

43Donais,TimothyandErinMcCandless.2016.“InternationalPeacebuildingandtheEmergingInclusivityNorm,”ThirdWorldQuarterly,38(2).


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associatedgrievanceshasoftenledtocommunitymobilisation,andsometimesviolenceandthedestructionofproperty,asastrategytogarnermediaattentionandaresponsefromtheState. TheuseofQUOTAScanencounterchallengesintransmittingintentionsintoresults,andinsomecases,resultinadeepeningpoliticisationofidentity.InBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA,thequotasystem(whichdesignatesaset number of elected seats in political and administrative positions to each ethnic group) has created aninefficientandcorrupteconomy,handedoverthecontrolof jobs inthebloatedpublicsectortonationalistpoliticalparties,andestablishedalargebureaucracyloyaltothem.Thishassupportedthedevelopmentofadegreeofacquiescenceandapathyamongthegeneralpopulation,whosewell-beingfrequentlydependsuponpoliticalparties’handingoutofjobs,perksandbenefits.InNEPAL,theStatehassoughttofostermoreinclusiveinstitutionssincetherestorationofdemocracyin1990.TheInterimConstitutionof2007validatedaffirmativeactionasamatteroffundamentalrights.Groupsthattraditionallyhadbeenmarginalisedorexcludedfromstatepower(ethnicandreligiousgroups,butnotwomen)weredesignatedforproportionalinclusion,mostlythroughquotas(‘reservations’),ineducation,publicemploymentandpoliticalrepresentation.Whileexistingproblemsarenotresolvedcompletely,newissueshaveemerged,mostnotablyaroundthecoredemandsofafederalstructure,powersharingandamendmentstothe2015Constitution. InSOUTHAFRICA,advances ingender equality are occurring through measures to increase the percentage of women in legislativerepresentation(24.5%in1994,to42.5%in2014),butthishasnottranslatedintomeaningfulresultsinrelationtoinequalityandGender-BasedViolence(GBV).Thus,while92%ofSouthAfricansembracethespiritofubuntu,accordingtothe2015BrandSA(SouthAfrica)study,suchacommitmenttonon-violenceandhumanismhasdonelittleforSouthAfricanwomen.Theysuffersomeofthehighestincomeinequalityintheworldandmorethan1in5willbethevictimsofsexualviolenceduringtheirlifetime.44 TUNISIA: Tunisia can claim to have pulled together the most progressive rights and freedoms of anyconstitution in the Arab world, both in terms of the rights-oriented content and the inclusiveness of theprocessesthatgavebirthtoit(seeD1.2).Ithasalreadyservedasacriticalpointofreferenceinsettlingtensionsanddisputes, given thebroad-based legitimacy it enjoys. Still, the framersof thenew constitutiondidnotabolishallformsofdiscriminationagainstwomen,particularlyonissuesofinheritanceandchildcustody.Thesemattersarestillgovernedbysharialaw,althoughrightsadvocatesandwomen’sassociationsareturningtheirattentiontotheseissuesnow.Followingtherevolutionandtheadoptionofthe2014Constitution,citizensaremore aware of their rights and responsibilities that enable them to participate in the creation of amoreinclusivesocialcontract,notablythroughanawarenessoftheirdutytostandfortheirrightsandchallengetheGovernment.Tunisianscontinuetocallformoreinclusionandtoinstitutionalisecitizenengagement.Thiswillcontinuetobedonethroughinformalinstitutions,aslongasstateinstitutionsarestillnew,orperceivedasincompetentoruntrustworthy.

INTERNATIONALACTORSANDISSUES

➢ 5.1Whiletheinternationalcommunityplaysvitalsupportingrolestocountries intransition,attimespositionstakentosupportpeaceagreementsandthesocialcontract-makingmechanismsthat follow, can inadvertently undermine the ability to transformatively address core conflictissues(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

This research is intentionally focused on national actors and processes, and thus does not seek to identifyinternationalactors’promisingorproblematicpractices.This is consistentwith the international community's

44DeKock,2016.


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expressed intention to support the national ownership of peacebuilding, statebuilding, development and thesocialcontract.Somefindingsemergedinrelationtothethreedriversaroundtherolesofinternationalactorsintheprocessesofpoliticalsettlementthatarenoteworthy.

Theseearlyfindingssupportmuchofthefamiliarcritiquesintheexistingliteratureincludingthat:

● InternationalFinancialInstitution(IFI)policyrequirementsofmemberstatesoftenservetounderminepoliticalsettlementcommitments(SouthAfrica,Zimbabwe);and,

● Internationalactorsareperceivedasnon-neutral,and/orfuellingconflictdynamicsinthewayparticularprocessesarepromotedorfacilitated(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Cyprus,Nepal,Yemen).

ZIMBABWE and SOUTHAFRICA:Both Zimbabwe and SouthAfrica illustrate the international community'senforcement of IFI conditions, in ways that undermined the ability of the government to meet politicalsettlementcommitmentsneededtotransformtheeconomyandsocialrelations.InSOUTHAFRICA,theANCdepartedfromtheFreedomchartertoalignwithIFIconditions.InZIMBABWE,theinsistencebytheIFIsonstructural adjustment policies less than a decade after independence undermined Mugabe's ability totransformtheeconomy,particularly in thecontextofhighlyunequaldistributionof landandresources–asituation not effectively addressed in the 1980 Lancaster House Agreement that ushered in Zimbabwe’sindependence. CYPRUS:“EuropeanisationoftheCyprusproblem”couldhaveprovidedanopportunitytobridgethetworivalsub-nationalsocialcontracts.Insteaditcreatedatriangleofdissonancebetweenthem,initsfailuretotreattheTurkishCypriotsocialcontractaslegitimate,anditsfailuretofosteraninclusiveapproach.Positively,thedesire forgreateracceptancebythe internationalcommunity (EuropeanUnion(EU)membershipforGreekCypriots,greaterinternationalrecognitionforTurkishCypriots)reinforceseachcommunity'srecognitionthattheycannotpersistwithdiscriminatoryinstitutions(towardstheothercommunity'smembers). NEPAL:Internationalinvolvementwaspivotal,butlackinginscale,scope,consistencyandresults.Forexample,a United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) special mission to assist in CPA implementation was deniedenforcement capacity by the Nepali government, and thereby limited to drawing attention to unfulfilledcommitmentsandurgingpoliticalpartiestohonourthem.Thismissioneventuallywithdrew.Inaddition,whilefederalismwasnotaninternationaldonor-drivenagenda,donorssuchastheUNandInternationalInstituteforDemocracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) worked to support marginalised groups (addressing the CCIs),facilitatingdialogueandprovidingtechnicalexpertiseonpolicyandlegaloptions.ThisaffectedtheirneutralityintheeyesoftheGovernmentandcausedabacklash. COLOMBIA:Internationalactorshaveplayeddiverserolesinrelationtothearmedconflict.ThecountryhasbeenanallyoftheUnitedStateofAmerica(US)intheregionfordecades.TheUSWaronDrugshasimpactedColombia’speaceprocessinvariedways.Ontheonehand,ahugemilitarypackageknownasPlanColombiaaimedtofightdrugsbutequippedtheColombianarmedforcessufficientlytoenablethemtoturnthetideagainsttheguerrillas.ThisturnedpublicopinioninfavouroftheStateandfacilitatedtheinitiationoftalks.Onthe other hand, the emphasis on eradication of coca – directly related to theUSmandate – has curtailedGovernmentautonomyinpursuinganapproachthatmightyieldmoreeffectivedevelopmentalresults,e.g.through emphasis on alternative crops and sources of income. At the same time, the internally-backedinstitutionalscaffoldingforpeace,buttressingthenationally-drivenpeaceprocess,isvaluedbyColombians. BOSNIA ANDHERZEGOVINA:Despite the fact that international actors have frequently clashedwith localnationalists,theyhaveguaranteedtheethnically-basedpoliticalorderwhichemergedintheaftermathofthe


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war.Manycivilsocietyactors,whodependonfundingfrompoliticalelitesandinternationaldonors,are,toasignificantextent,partofthiselitesocialcontract. YEMEN: The international and regional community played a leading role in assisting Yemen to design theprocessoftheNDCandextendedtechnicalassistancewhennecessary.MuchoftheNDCprocesswasdesignedandheavilymentoredbytheseexternalactors.45However,threefundamentalproblemswereevident:firstly,externalactorswereheavilyinvestedinthesuccessoftheNDC,somuchsothatanyobjectivecriticismabouttheprocess(suchasthe lackofhorizontalcohesionbetweenthegroups)wasdismissedandnottakenintoaccount;secondly,regionalactors’desirestoinfluenceYemen'sinternalaffairswerelargelydrivenbysecurityconcerns and fears of a sectarian Shia/Zaydi spill-over outside of Yemen's borders; and, thirdly, pushing alimitedtimeframe(sixmonths)toachieveapoliticalsettlementthroughtheNDC,repeatedmistakesofthepasti.e.asimilarlyhastyeffortduringthe1990unificationthatunwittinglysparkedconflictissuesleadingtothe1994civilwar. TUNISIA: External support to the process was instrumental for the writing of Tunisia's 2014 Constitution,includingnumeroussymposiaonconstitution-making,highlightinghistoricalandcontemporarylessons,thatwerehostedbylocalNGOswiththesupportofexternaldonors.Technicalandfinancialsupportfromexternalactors proved crucial to completing the momentous task. At the same time, international funding andassistancehas largely, and increasingly focusedon security in the context of concern for extremism in theregion.Thishastendedtocompeteforandcrowdoutlimitedpeaceanddevelopmentfunds.Theapproachoftheinternationalcommunityonstrengtheningthestate,givenlessonselsewhere,alsorequiressensitivityinthecontextofTunisia’sauthoritarianhistory.

RESILIENTSOCIALCONTRACTSANDSUSTAININGPEACE

Whilethetopicofsustainablepeacehaslongheldvalue,ithasalwayssufferedfromalackofpolicyconsensusaroundmeaningandapproach.There isrevitalisedenergybroughtwiththenewglobalagendasonsustainingpeaceandconflictpreventionandtheAgendaforTransformation2030.Thisstudyaimstosupportthinkingaroundcoreprioritiesforsustainingpeacewithintheseagendas,notably,ontheroleofaddressingrootcauses,buildingnationalvisions,andfosteringinclusionaroundkeyissuesinordertodrivepeaceforward. Whiletherehasbeenmuchinvestigationintostate-societyrelationsontheonehand,andevolvingsocialcohesionresearchon theother, insufficientattentionhasbeenpaid tohowprocesses linked tobuilding trustandmorepeacefulrelationshipsandensuringinclusivity,relatetosubstantiveagreementsbeingkept.Lessisknownabouthowthesetransmitintoresults(e.g.consideringinstitutionsandpoliciesthatconcretelyaddressgrievancesthatledtoconflictinthefirstplace,and/orthatprovideongoingandtrustedmeansforaddressinggrievances).Makingandmeasuringprogresson sustainingpeace requires thoughtful, engaged reflection that is rooted in rigorousexaminationofparticularcases,focusingonthelinkages, interactionsandoutcomesoftheseprocesses.This iswhatthisresearchaimstoachievethroughtheframeworkofthethreedriversandexaminationofcross-cuttingissues. ➢ 6.1Whatisneededtoachieveamoreresilientnationalsocialcontract,andmovecountriesona

pathtosustainingpeace?

45Externalactorsreferstothe“FriendsofYemen,”whichencompassedtheneighbouringGulfstates,theUS,theEU,theUK,andotherbilateralandmultilateraldonors.


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~Virtuousmovementofeachofthesethreedrivers(allcountries),andvirtuousinteractionofthedrivers(Cyprus,Tunisia,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

~CCIsattendedto, inandthroughsocialcontract-makingspheresandmechanisms,ininclusiveways(BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,Nepal,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

~Resiliencecapacitiesinsociety,mobilisedandsupported,towardspeace(Cyprus,Nepal,SouthAfrica,Yemen,Zimbabwe).

Early findingsfromthecasestudies illustrate(boththroughpositiveandnegativeexperience) that importantelementsformovingacountrytowardsaresilientsocialcontractlikelyinclude:

● Virtuousmovementofeachofthesedrivers,asfindingswithineachofthethreedriverssuggest; ● Understandinghowtheinteractionsofdriverscanmoveatransitioninbetterdirections(e.g.Tunisia)or

worse (e.g. vicious cycles of cascading failure across the three drivers such as in Cyprus, Yemen,Zimbabwe),and,promotingtheformerwhileworkingtopreventthelatter;

● Giving steadfast attention to addressing CCIs through different social contract-making spheres andmechanismsbyensuringthat: ● Political settlements are rooted in official, transparent, and inclusive agreements that accurately

articulate and set out to address CCIs, with power-sharing to enforce implementation (Yemen,Zimbabwe);

● Constitutions are in place and supported, with clear provisions that support agreed movementtowardstransformingCCIs(BosniaandHerzegovina,Nepal,SouthAfrica);

● Institutions are factored intopolitical/peace agreement implementation, including at sub-nationallevels(Colombia,Nepal,Yemen,Zimbabwe);and,

● There isengagementand integration (whereappropriate)of informalandcustomarysystemsandinstitutions intopeaceanddevelopmentprocesses(BosniaandHerzegovina,SouthSudan,Yemen,Zimbabwe);and

● Activating resilience capacities, i.e.: active, engaged citizens (SouthAfrica, Zimbabwe,) and fosteringacultureofdialogue(Cyprus,Nepal,Yemen),strongsenseofnationalidentity(SouthSudan,Zimbabwe).

TUNISIA: From addressing core sources of conflict to building inclusive institutions and fostering socialcohesion,Tunisia'sStateandcitizensareevolvingtheirsocialcontract.Theyaredoingthisthroughaseriesofsocial-contractmakingmechanismstomovethegoalsoftherevolutionforward,amideffortstorehabilitatethe State. This means building bridges and mending fences, vertically and horizontally, and shielding thecountryfromnewandenduringchallenges.However,aslongaseconomicandgovernancechallengesarenotfullyaddressed,theresilienceofthesesocialcontractswillbetested.Resiliencecapacitiesasacross-cuttingissue(acrossthedrivers)isvitalforunderstandingwhatworks(i.e.howTunisianshavewithstoodviolence)andliesatthecoreofunderstandingTunisia'sabilitytoforgearesilientsocialcontractandsustainpeacefromthebottomup.Asaresultofitsopennesstodiversityduetoitshistory,Tunisiahasaparticularresiliencecapacityforrestoringitssocialcohesionwhenitisunderduress.Itdoesthisbydrawingonitscultureofadaptation,negotiationandcompromise.Anotherresiliencecapacitylinkstoitseffortsandachievementstowardsgenderequality.Thepresenceofwomenat theministerial level,asparliamentary representativesandasheadsoftransitioncommissions,bolstersTunisia's inclusivegovernanceandprospects forsustainingpeace.Withoutfurtherpolitical,economicandsocialreforms,suchgainsmay,however,notreachtheirfullpotential.

CYPRUS:Theinabilitytomakeprogressonallthreedriversofthesocialcontractandthenegativeimpactsandinteractionsthatareensuing,createsaviciouscycleoffailureacrossthethreedrivers.Thefailureofthepoliticalprocess(driver1)andinstitutionaldiscrimination(driver2,aresultofthefailureofdriver1)hasresultedinafailuretodeliverservicestoallcommunities,andworsenedhorizontal(inter-group)cohesion.Notattendingto


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socialcohesionmakesthecoreconflictissuesallthemoredifficulttoresolve.Thisisevidencedinquantitativestudies that show a direct association between inter-group prejudice and insisting on national securityguarantees following a settlement – a demand that is unlikely to permit attainment of common groundbetweenthetwocommunities.ThecaseofCyprusconfirmstheimportanceofattendingtoallthreedriversofthesocialcontractineffortstopreventconflictandsustainpeace,notablybybroadeninganddeepeningthepoliticalprocess,byfosteringmoreinclusiveness in institutions,andbybuildingtrustasfollows: i)betweencitizens of the two communities; ii) between citizens of each community and the institutions of the othercommunity;and,iii)betweenallcitizengroupsandthepoliticalprocessthatismeanttoleadtotheforgingofanationalsocialcontractforCyprus.Societalcapacitiesforresiliencecanbebetterengagedforpeace,notablysociety’saversiontouseofpoliticalviolence,andawillingnesstoengageinpoliticaldialogueandunderstandtheperspectivesoftheothercommunity.ZIMBABWE:Theendingofthe2009powersharingagreementin2013whichreinstalledZANU-PF’sonepartyrule,andwithittheendofpoliticalwilltoimplementtheGPAand2013Constitutionalprovisionspresentsakey impediment to Zimbabwe’s peaceful transition. Reinforcing these findings, Zimbabweans across thepolitical divide following the 2017 coup are calling for renewed power-sharing, but ZANU-PF so far isdeterminedtomaintainaone-partyruleafterPresidentMugabe’sforcedresignation.TheGPAandthe2013Constitution,reflectingstrongsocietalbuy-inacrossparties,stillprovideabasisformovingforward.Balancingpoliticalpowerbetweencontestingparties,andconnectingtheseagreementstoinstitutionalreform(driver2)andtransparent,practicalpoliciesandaccountabilitymechanismstoensureimplementation,willbuildtrustvertically andhorizontally. Thiswill strengthen social cohesion (driver 3),which in turnwill undermine theabilityofelitestofuelpolarisationanddevelopinformalagreements(driver1).Itwillalsogeneratedemandsforbettergovernance.ThemainfaultlinesinZimbabwearepolitical.Whilethesefaultlinesmustbeaddressedpolitically, the primary focus on political reform,managed by elites, simply has not worked. Zimbabweanresilience capacities include a strong sense of national identity and strong civic culture, a highly educatedpopulationandacultureofsocio-economicresilience(inspiteoftheeconomicdecline),asevidencedbythepervasiveinformalsector.Thesecapacitiesneedtobebetterengagedtocatalysevirtuousmovementtowardsaresilientsocialcontract.YEMEN:Forsocialcontract-makingtoachievesustainableresultstowardslastingpeace,strongerengagementbetweentheStateandsocietyisrequiredatsub-nationallevel,andamongvariousgroups.Thiswillalsosupportamoretransparent, functionaland inclusivepoliticalsettlement.Yemen’scultureofdialogue isaresiliencecapacity for peace thatwill support this engagement. The strengthening of vertical andhorizontal societalcohesionovertimeandthroughinstitutionsshouldbeafoundationalobjective.Restorationofbasicservicesisvital for solidifying trustandco-operationamongandbetweengroupmembers,andgroupsand theState.Buildingoncustomarymechanisms,Yemenisneedtobetterengagetheirprimaryresiliencecapacity–asaconsensusbasedsociety,withastrongtraditionofconsultation–iftheyaretoachieveandsustainabroad-based,societallyownedpeace.CapitalisingonYemen’sprivatesector,includingsmallbusinesses,andstrongcivilsocietywhichhasmobilisedmassivelyduringtheconflictasacounterweighttotribalism,willbekey. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA is a State commonly viewed as always about to collapse, yet it does not.Challengestoaresilientsocialcontractinclude:legalisedethnicandspatialdivisionsthatsupportanationalisthegemonic order; one of themost cumbersome administrative apparatuses per capita in the world, withoverlappinggovernancestructuresthatfosteropportunitiesforethnicoutbidding;policyparalysis; informalnetworksandcorruption;and,soaringlevelsofunemployment,thehighestinEurope.Theelitesocialcontractremainsdecisiveinconstrainingtheboundarieswithinwhichaneverydaysocialcontract,moreamenabletocivic notions of citizenship, can take root.A revisionof the constitution to support the emergenceof civicidentity (notably consociational elements which should enable co-operation across ethnic divides) and tosimplify the governance system, could contribute substantially tomove the country beyond a conditionof


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negative peace. Bosnia andHerzegovina's resilience capacities for peace, including the large diaspora (seeD3.2),andcivicgroupsandinformalnetworks,cansupportthegrowthofcivicconsciousnessandwiderformsofco-existenceandcooperation,particularlyaroundtheeconomy.Theyshouldbenurtured. NEPAL:AtrulyresilientsocialcontractinNepalisfornowelusive.Continuedprogressisneededtoaddressthecoreconflictissues,tobuildamorecapableandeffectivestate,andtobuildpeaceamongNepalisatthelocallevel,inparticular,toreaffirmacommonnationalidentityandsenseofcollectivedestiny.Nepalishavevaluableresilience capacities that need continued engagement, including the ability to pursue dialogue to bridgedifferences.Amendingthe2015Constitution isalsoneededtomeettheaspirationsofdifferentethnicandmarginalisedcommunities.Ifachieved,thiscanserveasafoundationforanewsocialcontractforlastingpeaceandreconciliation. COLOMBIA: Whether Colombia’s peace agreement is providing space to reshape existing political powerdynamics, yet is conditional on processes of institutional and social consolidation that exceed what theagreementcanachieveonitsown.Two(related)factorsareessentialforbuildinganinclusivesocialcontract.Thefirst involvesstrengtheningstate institutionsatthenationalandsub-national levelstofacilitateservicedelivery.Thisinvolvesaddressingdeep-seatedinequalitiesinrelationtoland,liftingmoreofthepopulationoutof poverty, and designing effective instruments to enable the State to fulfil its developmental functions –processesthatstartedbeforethepeaceagreementandwilllastlongafteritsimplementation.Second,trustmustbebuiltamongColombiancommunitiestopromotereconciliationthatlaysafoundationforacommonvision forsociety.Resiliencecapacitiesneedtobeengagedand leveragedtosupport the inclusivenessandresilience of Colombia's social contract. These include Colombia’s vibrant civil society, state-sponsored“institutionalscaffoldingforpeace,”andlegalframeworkforrespondingtohumanitariancrises(i.e.forciblydisplacedpopulations).Reintegratingformercombatants,reparationprocessesforvictims,thedevelopmentoftransitionaljusticemechanismsandhistoricalmemorymechanismsalsoneedongoingsupport. SOUTHAFRICA:Activecitizenship–aprimaryresiliencecapacityofSouthAfricans–assistedbytheintegrityofthecourtsandtherightsenshrinedintheConstitution,hasintroducedavibrancyintoSouthAfrica’ssocialcontract.Drawingonalonghistoryofsocialaction,andavisionofamoreequalanddecolonisedsociety,theconfrontationsbetweencitizensandtheStateholdtheprospectforamoredurablesocialcontractgroundedinlivedexperienceandongoingtransformation.Particularlyatthemicro-level,thisactivistculturehasforcedtheSouthAfricanStateintogreaterresponsiveness–requiredforaresilientsocialcontractthatcansustainSouthAfrica'shard-wonpeace.Thisengagementbetweencivilsociety,informalcommunitymovements,andgovernmenthascreatedspacefordemocracyanddevelopmenttobeshapedbycommunities,evenifinwaysthat are conflictual. These serve to challenge the state infrastructure to create and effectively implementpoliciesthattakeintoaccountthelegitimateneedsofcitizens,framedintermsofdignityratherthanintermsofminimumaccesstoservicesandemployment.Theseprocessesarealsoservingtoplacepositivechecksonstatemisconductand forgedamore responsive state–vital for stronger state-society relations.Additionalresiliencecapacities,includingaconstitution-affirmingjudiciary,watchdogmedia,andastate-ledbroadsafety-netofsocialgrants,aresupportingthistransformation.


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WorkingGroupofCaseStudyAuthorsandAdvisers46

CaseStudyAuthors

● Afghanistan:Dr.OrzalaAshrafNemat,SchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies;SusanneSchmeidl,UniversityofNewSouthWales,Australia

● Bosnia-Herzegovina:JasminRamovic,UniversityofManchester;RobertoBelloni,UniversityofTrento ● Colombia:AngelikaRettberg,UniversidaddelosAndes ● Cyprus:AlexandrosLordos,CenterforSustainablePeaceandDemocraticDevelopment(SeeD)* ● Nepal:SubindraBogati,NepaliPeacebuildingInitiative;TimothyD.Sisk(seebelow) ● SierraLeone:DavidFrancis,UniversityofBradford ● Somalia:DeqaHagiYusuf,IIDAWomen’sDevelopmentOrganisation ● SouthSudan:LukaBiongDeng,UniversityofJuba ● SouthAfrica:HugovanderMerweandMasanaNdinga,CentreforStudyofViolenceandReconciliation ● Tunisia:YoussefMahmoudandAndreaÓSúilleabháin,InternationalPeaceInstitute ● Yemen:FatimaAboAlAsrar,BasementFoundation ● Zimbabwe:ShowersMawowa,SouthernAfricanLiaisonOffice;ErinMcCandless(seebelow)

ScholarandPolicyAdvisers

● AlinaRochaMenocal,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,UnitedKingdom* ● Marie-JoelleZahar,UniversityofMontreal,Canada* ● MaryHopeSchwoebel,NovaSoutheasternUniversity ● Mohammad-MahmoudOuldMohamedou,TheGraduateInstituteGeneva,Switzerland. ● SethKaplan,JohnsHopkinsSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies(SAIS),US ● TimothyD.Sisk,JosefKorbelSchoolofInternationalStudies,UniversityofDenver,US ● NevenKnezevik,UnitedNationsChildren’sFund,Kenya. ● HabibUrRehmanMayar,g7+GroupofCountriesSecretariat,Timor-Leste. ● Henk-JanBrinkman,UnitedNationsPeacebuildingSupportOffice,US ● SarahLister,OsloGovernanceCentre,UNDP,Norway.

ResearchandProjectDirector:Dr.ErinMcCandlessisanacademicandpolicyadviserwithovertwodecadesofexperienceworkingonandinconflictaffectedsettings,onissuesofpeacebuilding,statebuilding,governance,developmentandresilience,aswellastheirintersections.Sheisapart-timefacultymemberatTheNewSchool’sGraduatePrograminInternationalAffairsinNewYork,anHonorarySeniorLecturerattheUniversityofKwazuluNatalinSouthAfrica,andFounderandCo-ExecutiveEditoroftheinternational,refereedJournalofPeacebuildingandDevelopment.ShealsoservesasacivilsocietyCo-ChairoftheNewDealImplementationWorkingGroupofInternationalDialogueonPeacebuildingandStatebuilding.Dr.McCandlessconsultswidelyacrosstheUNsystemandwithotherinternationalorganizations,conductingresearchandevaluation,andfacilitatingstrategicprocessesandtrainings.Sheisauthorofmorethanfiftypublications,includingthreebooksandseveralpolicyandprogram-shiftingUNreports.Moreinformationcanbefoundonherwebsite:www.erinmccandless.net

ProjectSupportSeniorResearcher:RebeccaHollender,TheNewSchoolDigitalStrategiesSpecialist:GabrielleBelli

46Whileallworkinggroupmembersareactiveinthedesignandreviewofthisresearch,thosewithanasterisk(*)aremethodsteammembers,whoareplayinganelevatedroleinadvisingonresearchdesignandrelatedreviewofcasestudiesandsynthesisfindings.


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FollowourProjectProgress

Website:socialcontractsforpeace.orgTwitter:@SC4Peace

Report written by Research and Project Director, Erin McCandless

Thankyouto:➢ RebeccaHollender,forinvaluableresearchandeditorialsupport ➢ MaryHopeSchwoebel,forsubstantiveadvisingon,andeditingofthereport ➢ Projectadviserswhosupportedthedevelopmentoffindings,AlexandrosLordos,AlinaRochaMenocaland

Marie-JoelleZahar ➢ Allprojectauthorsandadvisorswhocontributedtothedevelopmentofcontentthathasinformedthe

developmentofthesefindings ➢ GabrielleBelliforlayoutofthedocument ➢ JuliaLevinforresearchassistanceanddiagramdevelopment ➢ MarkNotarasforcopyediting

Documents

Forging Resilient National Social Contracts Ea… · MDC Movement for Democratic Change ... complexities in findings durable pathways for preventing violent conflict and achieving