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STATCON GROUP DIGEST

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo

Literal Interpretation

CASE NO: 26

CASE TITLE: Bello v Court of AppealsDECISION DATE: March 29, 1974

PONENTE: Teehankee, J.

VOTATION: 10 concur, 1 dissenting

I. PETITIONER: JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO

II. RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of

Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

III. PARTIES IN THE CASE: Bellos (spouses), City Court of Pasay, Court of Appeals, Court ofFirst Instance, Atty. Prudencio de Guzman

IV. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

Bellos were charged of estafa before the City Court of Pasay because they allegedly

misappropriated the ladys ring they got from a certain Atty. Prudencio de Guzman with the

agreement that they would sale it on a commission basis. After the trial and prosecution,

they were found to be guilty and were sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of

prision correccional and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,000.00 with costs

of suit. The petitioners filed for a notice of appeal at the Court of First Instance but the

prosecutors moved that the appeal be dismissed because the petitioners should have filed

it directly at the Court of Appeals instead as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act,

Republic Act 296, as amended. Petitioners invoked Rule 50 Sec 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously

brought to it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with

a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor and prayed that the Court of

Instance that they send the appeal to the Court of Appeals so they can seek relief Court of First Instance did not send the appeal to the CA and dismissed it without informing

the petitioners.

Petitioners then filed motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals at the City Court ofPasay and asked the records be elevated to the CA.

The City Court, as with the Court of Instance, dismissed the petition without sending the

appeal to the CA. Petitioners filed for prohibition and mandamus against the People (note that this is

originally a criminal case so the People is a party) to prohibit the City Court of execution of

its judgment and to compel it to elevate the appeal the CA. The CA, in its decision, admitting that the "CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in

the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of Appeals"

but it however, dismissed the appeal because the CFI was not a principal respondent in the

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case filed by the Petitioners and therefore they cannot seek any relief. Subsequent motion

for reconsideration was also dismissed for lack of merit. Petition for review was at last, filed at the Supreme Court.

V. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED:

Rule 50, Section 3 of the Rules of Court (I think they have changed/amended this because I

can no longer find the provision in the present RC)

when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall

not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and

clear statement of the grounds therefor.

VI. DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES:

ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CONPRINCIPLES USED

(if applicable)

W/N the CFIshould have sentthe appeal to theCourt of Appeals

Yes. The CFI should have certifiedand endorsed the appeal tothe CA instead of remandingthe records to the City Courtfor execution of judgementsince the petitioners timelysought to correct the their

mistake of filing at the CFIinstead at the CA. Even if theRule cited was for the Court of

Appeals, the Court cannot seeany reason why this shouldnot apply to the Court of FirstInstance. The lack of expressed rule for wrongappeals filed at CFI should notbe a reason why thepetitioners should be deprived

of the right to appeal.

(Copied and pasted foremphasis since this is theheart of the case )This Court has in manycases involving theconstruction of statutesalways cautioned against

"narrowly" interpreting astatute "as to defeat thepurpose of the legislator" "and stressed that "it is of theessence of judicial duty toconstrue statutes so as toavoid such a deplorable result(of injustice or absurdity)" andthat therefore "a literalinterpretation is to be rejectedif it would be unjust or lead to

absurd results". In theconstruction of its own Rulesof Court, this Court is all themore so bound to liberallyconstrue them to avoidinjustice, discrimination andunfairness and to supply thevoid that is certainly withinthe spirit and purpose of theRule to eliminate repugnancy

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and inconsistency byholding as it does now thatcourts of first instance are

equally bound as the highercourts not to dismissmisdirected appeals timelymade but to certify them tothe proper appellate court.

(issue/s notreally related toStatCon)W/N Court of

Appeals actedwith grave abuse

of discretion bydismissing thecase on theground that thepetitioners didnot place the CFIas principal partyrespondent

Yes.Decisionof CA issetaside.

The court (or the judge) ismerely a nominal party andtherefore such can beoverlooked in the interest ofspeedy adjudication.

VII. OVERALL DECISION

Petition to prohibit City Court for executing judgment GRANTED City Court to elevate appeal to CA No costs

VIII. DISSENTING OPINIONS (IF ANY):

A. Esguerra, J.

ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STATCON PRINCIPLES

USED(if applicable)

W/N the provision isapplicable to the CFI Rule 50, Sec 3should not beapplicable to the CFI

Only the SupremeCourt and the Courtof Appeals arerequired to follow theprovision. Neither theCongress nor theRules of Court hasprovided for instances whenappeals areerroneously brought

Literal application ofthe law (?)

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to the Court of FirstInstance. The Courtcannot fulfil this

deficiency withoutformally promulgatinga rule regarding suchcircumstances.

CASE NO: 27

CASE TITLE: Salaria v Buenviaje

DECISION DATE: February 28, 1978

PONENTE: Guerrero

VOTATION: UNANIMOUS; All concur (Makasiar, Munoz Palma, Fernandez, Teehankee*Chair)

FIRST DIVISION

I. PETITIONER:a. Ramon Salaria- lessee of a piece of land situated in San Roque, Iriga City,

Camarines Sur and owned by Eliodoro Cailao

II. RESPONDENTS:a. Judge Carlos Buenviaje- Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines

Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City; Judge who denied Salarias motion to dismiss and set

the case for hearing in the City Courtb. Antonio Mendiola- husband of Ceferina Flores who subsequently bought the land

owned by Cailao and leased by Salaria; bought the land for P300.00

III. PARTIES IN THE CASE:

a. Petitioner Salaria and Respondents Judge Buenviaje and Mendiola

b. Ceferina Flores- wife of Antonio Mendiola who warned Salaria to vacate the

premises to avoid a suit that would be filed against the latter if he did not do such

IV. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:a. Salaria had been staying in the land of Cailao as a LESSEE since Sep. 18, 1930,

when he bought the house of Rufino Llagas which was constructed thereb. Salaria and Cailao agreed that Salaria would pay a MONTHLY rental of P6.00 (later

increased to P10.00), but they had NO AGREEMENT REGARDING ITS DURATIONc. December 1972: Cailao advised Salaria not to pay rent anymore and to vacate the

land because he was selling it to Ceferina Floresd. 1973: The land was sold to Flores and Mendiola (married) for P300.00.

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e. No rentals were collected anymore either by Cailao or Mendiola; Petitioner-Salaria

did not leave the premises and deposited P200.00 with the clerk of court for the

payment of such rental

f. May 16, 1974: Ceferina Flores wrote a letter to Salaria asking him to vacate thepremises until July 1974; otherwise, a suit would be filed against him

g. August 23, 1974: Antonio Mendiola filed a complaint for UNLAWFUL DETAINER

(act of maintaining possession without a legal right) against Salaria in Branch II

of the City Court of Irigah. Salaria filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the complaint states

no cause of action, as Presidential Decree No. 20 suspends the provision of

paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code and that the need of Mendiola of

the premises for his own use does not fall within the exception provided by the

said decree

i. Judge Buenviaje dismissed Salarias motion; the case was brought before theCity Court

j. Salaria in the trial:i. The lease was without a fixed periodii. Lease was not on a monthly basis but on a yearly basisiii. Admitted to receiving Flores letter but denied all other allegationsiv. Cause of action is suspended by P.D. 20v. City Court has no jurisdiction over the matter, there being no law to

support itvi. Mendiola knew that his filing of the action had no basis in law; therefore,

Salaria was exposed to actual and moral damages which Mendiola should

be liable fork. The City Court rendered a decision in favor of Mendiola:

i. Ordered Salaria to vacate within 3 months from receipt of decisionii. Salaria is excused from paying backrentals from January 1973 (selling of

land to Mendiola by Cailao) up to the time he vacates; P200.00 deposit to

the clerk of court is to be returned as consignation by himiii. No award for damages to Mendiola; counterclaim is dismissed for lack of

merit; Salaria ordered to pay the costs of the suit- Appeal to Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur: Decision of City Court was

AFFIRMED with modification: P200.00 may be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court

of the City Court by Mendiola- Case brought before the Supreme Court

V. PROVISIONS BEING CONTESTED:

A) Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 states that

Sec. 4. Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph(1) ofArticle 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer todwelling unit or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspendeduntil otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of

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Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict withthe provisions of this Act shall apply.

B) Article 1673 (and Article 1687) of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 1673. The lessormay judicially eject the lessee for any of the followingcauses:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration ofleases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;

(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;

(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;

(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any used or service notstipulated which causes the deterioration thereof-, or if he does not observe therequirements in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards the use thereof.

It appearing that no fixed period has been agreed upon for the duration of the lease betweenthe original owner of the subject lot and the petitioner, the case comes under the provision of

Article 1687 of the Civil Code, which states Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to befrom year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annually; from month to month, if it ismonthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rentis to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no periodfor the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after thelessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, thecourts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been inpossession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix alonger period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.

C) Memorandum Circular No. 970 issued by the Office of the President on March 15,

1977, clarifying Presidential Decree No. 20, which states:

WHEREAS, there have been many reports that many owners or lessors of residentiallands and buildings covered by Presidential Decree No. 20 have been ejecting, with thehelp of certain lower courts, theirtenants on the ground that the former or theirfamilies will use the leased property;

WHEREAS, in a long time of opinions rendered by this Office in the construction andinterpretation of Presidential Decree No. 20, personal use by the owners or lessorsor their families of covered dwelling units occupied by bona fide tenants is not arecognized cause for judicial ejectment of the latter, and

WHEREAS, to allow eviction of lessees for the reason alone that the premises are

needed by the owners or lessors or their familieswill open the floodgates for abuse

and circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 20 thereby setting to naught the intentand purpose of the President to protect and assist the low-income families comprisingthe bulk of rented dwelling place occupants;

WHEREFORE, it is hereby made clear for the benefit of all concerned that, except forthe causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in Article 1673 of the New CivilCode in relation to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359, as amended by PresidentialDecree No. 20, bona fide covenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are notsubject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of action thereof is personal use of theproperty by the owners or their families.

By Authority of the President:

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(Sgd.) RONALDO B. ZAMORA

Presidential Assistant for LegalAffairs

D) Previous Laws Designed to Protect the Low-Income Members of SocietySection 4 of Republic Act No. 6126 states that

The provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as theyrefer to dwelling units or land on which another's dwelling is located shall besuspended for the period of one year from the effectivity of this Act; but otherprovisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on leasecontracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shallapply.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359 reads -

Except when the lease is for definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) ofArticle 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on

which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended for two years from theeffectivity of this Act; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Courtof the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with theprovisions of this Act, shall apply.

Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6359 was later amended by Presidential Decree No. 20 whichchanged the phrase "shall be suspended for two years from the effectivity of this Act" to shouldbe suspended until otherwise provided."


ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT

CON PRINCIPLES

USED(if applicable)

W/N under the

provisions of

Presidential Decree

No. 20, Mendiola can

eject Salaria on the

ground that he needs

the lot for his own

use?

No. Mendiola cannot

eject Salaria because

of P.D. No. 20 which

suspends paragraph

(1) of Article 1673 of

the Civil Code

The decision

appealed from is

REVERSED (but

Mendiola is still

authorized to

withdraw the P200.00

from the Clerk of

Court of the City

Court)

1. It is CLEAR AND

EXPLICIT that

P.D. No. 20

suspends

paragraph (1) of

Article 16732. Personal use of

the propertybythe owners or

lessors is not

one of the

causes for

judicial

ejectment under

Article 16733. The construction

under

Focus on Ratio 1:

LITERAL

INTERPRETATION of

PD No. 20

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Salaria is ordered to

pay back rentals for

the period on his stay

on the land at the rateof P10.00 a month,

which is not covered

by the deposit

Memorandum

Circular No. 970

must be given

controllingweight as it

comes from the

branch of the

government

called upon to

implement the

law4. Even before P.D.

No. 20, there

have been

previous laws

designed to

protect the low-

income

members of

Society (RA

6126; RA 6359)

Valid in part, void in part

CASE NO: 28

CASE TITLE: Barrameda v Moir

DECISION DATE: August 8, 1913

PONENTE: TRENT, J.

VOTATION: UNANIMOUS, ALL CONCUR. (Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ.)

I. PETITIONER: Juan BarramedaII. RESPONDENTS: Percy M. Moir- Judge of First InstanceIII. PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner Barrameda and Respondent Judge Percy M. MoirIV. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

Original application for a writ of mandamus Petitioner was a defendant in a previous suit which was dismissed and prays that respondent

judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal.V. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED and RELATED STATCON PRINCIPLES

Act No. 2041, section 3

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Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of

title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in

litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds

two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of the peaceshall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance.

Act No. 2131, section 1, theabove provision was amended by substituting"exclusive

original jurisdiction" for "exclusive jurisdiction."

Acts No. 2041 and 2131 confer original jurisdiction upon justices of peace to trytitle to real estate and provide that it shall be exclusive in case where the value of the

property not exceed 200 exclusive- gives Court of First Instance original jurisdiction to try title to realestate , which means that it cannot permitted for another court to entertain jurisdiction

of such cases-applies whether exclusive or exclusive original jurisdiction is used

Act No. 136, sec. 56, par. 2.

The original jurisdiction of those courts extends to "allcivil actions which involve

the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein," except in

forcible entry and detainer cases. all-The Court of First Instance is authorized to hear and determine caseswithout restriction

VI. ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: Fill up only if the reading provides these. Eg. In Chinabank

vs. Ortega:ISSUE/S PETITIONERS

ARGUMENTSDEFENDANTSARGUMENTS

W/N Respondent Judge wascorrect in dismissing the caseof Barrameda?

Barrameda: YES. Petitioner relates that

he was a defendant ina suit brought before a

justice of peace to trytitle to a parcel of land

It was decidedadversely against him

He then appealed tothe Court of FirstInstance but uponmotion of the appellee,the judge of that courtdismissed the appealwith direction to theJustice of Peace toenforce judgment.

Moir: NO. Judge demurred to the

complaint on groundthat it did not statefacts sufficient toconstitute a cause ofaction.

Grounds used:

Acts Nos. 2041and 2131-conferring original

jurisdiction uponjustices of thepeace to try title toreal state, areinconsistent withand repugnant tothe Philippine Bill of

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July 1, 1902.

VII. DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES:


CON PRINCIPLES

USED

W/N Respondent

Judge was correct in

dismissing the case

of Barrameda?

Yes, the Court

held that the judge

was correct in his

decision since the

provisions of Act

2041 and 2131

relating to a

change of

jurisdiction when

amount involved

is more than P200

and less than

P600 are

considered to

merelysupplemental

The Court of First

instance is

considered to

have exclusive

jurisdiction The difference in

the amount (200-

CFI; 200

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Disposition: Writ of Mandamus is DENIED

CASE NO: 29

CASE TITLE: Tatad v Secretary of the Department of Energy

DECISION DATE: November 5, 1997

PONENTE: Justice Reynato Puno

VOTATION: Divided court(8 concur Puno, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Vitug, Menodza,

Panganiban

2 dissent Melo, Francisco1 separate Kapunan1 on leave Narvasa)

VIII. PETITIONER:Senator Francisco Tatad

IX. RESPONDENTS:Secretary of Energy (the agency tasked with the implementation of the oilderegulation law)

X. PARTIES IN THE CASE: (see above)

XI. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

This is a very intricate case on whether or not the Downward Oil Deregulation Law(RA 8180) is constitutional or not. It tackles provisions in Article XII (NationalEconomy and Patrimony).

The law RA 8180 grants unto certain oil companies (The Big 3 Shell, Caltex, andPetron) specific benefits (i.e. significantly lower tax requirements when compared toother players).

XII. ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS

ISSUE/S HELD & RATIO (SC)

Whether the issue is justiciable Respondents (Department of Energy) submit thatthe said law should be given the presumption ofconstitutionality and that the policy of Congress isto impose the certain tariff rates on oil products.Petitioners, however, argue, that the Court has

jurisidiction over this case since the contention isthe constitutionality of a certain law.

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Whether the petitioners have legalstanding

Whether or not RA 8180 isconstitutional or not

The Supreme Court finally ruled that it has thepower to review statutes only on the basis of

whether or not the Legislature has committed graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction or if they pass a law that is repugnant tothe Constitution.

The Supreme Court not only possesses the rightbut also the dutyto settle issues of constitutionalityof a law. Respondents cannot hide beyond the veilof the doctrine of political question since the issueat hand is to assure the supremacy and faithfulnessof all laws passed by Congress to the supreme law

of the land.

Once the interpretation of the law on aconstitutional provision is raised before the court, itbecomes a judicial question with the scope of theSupreme Courts expanded power of review.

When the issue at hand is of transcendentalsignificance to the people, the court may brushaside hypertechnical requirements of locus standi

On the question of undue delegation of power, itCANNOT BE SAID that the law is unconstitutionalsince the law has provided for very specificstandards and policies, with which to guide theimplementing agency. The agency bestowed withthe power to implement the law was given veryspecific indicators that will cause the President toinitiate a series of actions to implement the said

law. This power is what is said to be contingentlegislation.

HOWEVER, the law is still unconstitutional for itviolates Article XII, Section 19 that prohibitsmonopolies. Since this law is partial to the olipoly ofthe Big 3, the law was struck down.

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XIII. LESSON FOR CONSTI In the case of Anak Mindanao vs Executive Secretary, locus standi (legal standing)

was defined as a party raising the issues must possess substantive or personal

interest in the issue.o he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury

because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;o the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and

o the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

The court may waive the requirement of a locus standi if the issue of transcendentalpublic importance.

CASE NO: 30

CASE TITLE: Dumlao v Comelec

DECISION DATE: January 22, 1980

PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera

SC Division: En Banc

VOTATION: 9 CONCUR, 1 DISSENT, 1 ABSTAIN

I. PETITIONER: Patricio Dumlao former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who filed his

certificate of candidacy forReelection (January 30, 1980)Romeo B. Igot taxpayer, a qualified voter and member of the BarAlfredo Salapantan, Jr. taxpayer, a qualified voter, a resident of San Miguel,

Iloilo

II. RESPONDENTS: COMELEC


PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents


Petitioner Dumalo questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 for itperceives to be discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process granted by

the Constitutiono Said provision is allegedly directed insidiously against him and that that the

classification are based on pure arbitrary grounds and therefor, class legislation Petitioner Igot and Salapantan, Jr questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pamba

nsa Blg. 51 Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and

void for being violative of the Constitution

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V. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED

Batas Pambansa Blg 52

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of theConstitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared asdisqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the

retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of

age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be

qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)Batas Pambansa Blg 51

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting tosubversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be acandidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan politicalactivity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall beconclusive evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal

after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.



USED(if applicable)

W/N BP 52, sec 4 isunconstitutionalbecause it is violativeof the equalprotection

No The claim that sec 4 of BP Blg. 42 isdiscrimintaory againsthim personally isbelied by the fact thatseveral petitions forthe disqualification ofother candidates forlocal positions basedon the challegedprovision have lareadybeen filed with the

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COMELEC. Hence, there is

no intentional or

purposefuldiscriminationto overthrowDumlao

The constitutionalguarantee of equalprotection of the lawsis subject to rationalclassification

If groupings arebased onreasonable andrealdifferentiations

Theclassification isgermane to thepurpose of thelaw and appliesto all thosebelonging to thesame class

The Solicitor Generalsaid that

a good policyof the law would be to

promote theemergence ofyounger bloodin our politicalelectiveechelons.

There was no clearand unequivocalbreach of theConstitution

Clear beyondreasonabledoubt must beestablished to

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declare a lawunconstitutional

Courts will not

set aside astatute asconstitutionaldefectionexcept in aclear case

W/N BP 51, sec 1 isunconstitutionalbecause it is violativeof the presumption ofinnocence

Partly Second paragraph of section 4 (which statesthat filing of charges ofthe crime stipulatedare primary facie

evidence of such fact)is violative of theconstitutionalpresumption of innocence guaranteedto an accused

Explicit is theconstitutional privisionthat the accused shallbe presumed innocentuntil the contrary isproved

An accusation is notsynonymous with guilt

Disqualifying acanddiate forthe ground thatcharges havebeen filed contravenespresumption ofinnocence

Valid in part, void inpart

VII. CONCURRING / SEPARATE OPINIONS (IF ANY):

A. Chief Justice Fernando

ISSUE/S HELD RATIO

W/N BP 52 isconstitutional (equal

- Age and receipt of retirement benefits arefactors that can enter into any legislative

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protection) determination of what qualifications toimpose.

Laws operate equally and uniformly on allpersons under similar circumstances or thatall persons must be treated in the samemanner.

Favoritism and undue preference cannot beallowed.

Equal protection and security shall be givento every person under circumstances, whichif not identical, are analogous.

W/N BP 51 isconstitutional(presumption of innocence)

- The opinion of the Court invoked theconstitutional presumption of innocence as abasis of being annuled.

Such constitutional right, is not a merformality that may be dispensed at will. Itsdisregard is a matter of serious concern. It isconstitutional safegaurd of the highest order.It is a response to mans innate sense of

justice.

B. (SO) Justice Teehankee


USED(if applicable)

W/N BP 52 isconstitutional (equalprotection)

No Sec. 4 imposesspecialdisqualification.

To specificallyand peculiarly

ban a 65-yearold previouslyreitred electivelocal officialfrom runningfor the sameelective officepreviously heldby him andfrom which he

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has retired isarbitrary,oppressive,

andunreasonable Persons

similarlysituated arenot similiarlytreated(because thedisqualificationis for theretiree to runfor same officebut if notreelection maystill run even ifnot 65)

The classification isnot rational nor reasonable

They aredisqualifiedonly when theyhave receivedpayment of theretirementbenefits whichthey areentitled underthe law

Young or new blooddoes not mean thathe would be moreefficient, effective andcompetent than amature 65-year old.

W/N BP 51 isconstitutional(presumption of innocence)

Yes (same as majority)

Such judgmentconviction must befinal andunappealable (beforedisqualification fromoffice may be aground not just mere

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charges

Addendum

January 21 - There appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements January 23 - However, such majority have been dissipated that the action to nullify such

second paragraph (Sec 4 of BP 51) is premature and has not properly submitted for

adjudication under the strict procedural requirements

Ambiguity, construed against party who caused it

CASE NO: 31

CASE TITLE: Reyes v dela Cruz

DECISION DATE: March 30, 1959

PONENTE: J. Montemayor

VOTATION: Judgment of lower court affirmed 6 concur, 1 concurs in the result

I. PETITIONER: Atty. Arsenio R. Reyes: Lawyer of the respondents whom was hired to expedite the

partition of properties the respondents were to inherit from the deceased Ansemlo S.

Hilario

II. RESPONDENTS: Marcial, Asuncion, Eugenio, Lucia and Alfonso dela Cruz: heirs of the deceased

Arnsemlo S. Hilario

III. PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner and respondents

IV. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Spetember 26, 1950: Respondents hired plaintiff under a contract of services

o Probate court had already odered partition at this time but it was taking long so

they hired Atty. Reyes (the plaintiff) to expedite the said partition

No date: Properties were partitioned and adjudicated to each of the five heirs No date: Plaintiff filed action to recover his fees; 5% market value of all said proprties,

PHP 10,000 consequential damages, PHP 10,000 attorneys fees No date: Lower court denied damages and attorneys fees and ruled that the 5% refers

to the assessed value not the market value Reyes appeals that he be awarded 5% of market value, not assessed value

V. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Directly lift / quote the provision/s in question. Do not

forget the Number of the provision and its title, e.g. in Chinabank vs. Ortega:

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We are hiring your services to represent us in Special Proceeding No. 7501, Court of FirstInstance Manila, in such a way that we will be given all due share arising out of the will and ofthe law. You will exercise duties of an attorney to preserve and defend our rights until the

project of partition is approved by the court.

For and in consderation of the services which you are going to render to us in the said case,we will pay you 5 per cent of the amount adjudicated to us. You will not be paid in cashby us for the time being that the case is pending in court. We have no money to pau. You willonly be paid of your servcie when the case is terminated and our respective shares aredelivered to us by order of the court.

VI. ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: Not explicitly provided in the case.



CON PRINCIPLESUSED

(if applicable)

W/N market value orassessed valueshould be used in thecompuation of the 5%of properties

Use MARKET valuenot assessed value

Two reasons areprovided:

1. There is atendency forreal estatevalue to riseover time. Thismay tempt the

lawyer to workfor the delay ofthe case.

2. Lawyer-plaintiffprepared thecontract. Heknew themeaning andvalue of everyword or phrase

used in thesaid contract.He could haveavoidedambiguity anduncertainty.

For (2):If there is ambiguityor obscurity in theinterepretation andmeaning of acontract, the sameshall not favor thepaert who cause

such ambiguity orobscurity.

CASE NO: 32

CASE TITLE: ILDEFONSO v. SIBAL

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DECISION DATE: September 30, 1959

PONENTE: Gutierrez David

VOTATION: Unanimous (En Banc)

I. PETITIONER: Lucio Ildefonso- Appellant; party who, through his counsel, constructed the

Compromise Agreement; party tasked to be the exclusive agent of Sibal in the purchase and

sale of real property for 2 years with liability to pay Php 2,000 in case of breach.

II. RESPONDENTS: Ernesto Sibal- Appellee; party who was looking to purchase real estate

within Manila for the expansion of his business of selling books and school supplies


-Petitioner-Appellant: Lucio Ildefonso

- Respondent-Appellee: Ernesto Sibal

IV. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:- During the pendency of a civil case under the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ildefonso

(plaintiff and appellant) and Sibal (defendant and appellee) reached a compromise agreement

and thereafter filed a joint motion to dismiss the case. Ildefonso was the one who crafted the

agreement.- The court granted the motion and dismissed the case.- The compromise agreement, which was later reduced to writing but was not presented to the

court for approval, reads:COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

For and consideration of the mutual covenants herein set forth, the parties hereinabove

named agree:

1. That the plaintiff agrees to dismiss the above-entitled case on the ground of amicable

settlement, this Compromise Agreement, on the consideration of the promise and

covenant of the defendant, to wit:

2. That the defendant promises and covenants that:

a. That the defendant shall pay the plaintiff this date the amount of ONE

THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;

b. That the defendant promises THAT WITHIN TWO (2) YEARS FROM THE DATE

HEREOF, HE SHALL COURSE THROUGH THE PLAINTIFFAS REALTOR THE FORMERS

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE OR TRANSACTION AND SHOULD HE (DEFENDANT) FAIL

THEREOF, THAT IS, TO MAKE SUCH REAL ESTATE PURCHASEAND TO COURSE THE

SAMETOTHEPLAINTIFFASSAID REALTOR, THEDEFENDANT ISLIABLEFURTHERTO

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PAY THE PLAINTIFF AN ADDITIONAL SUM OF TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)

PESOS.

c. That the defendant further agrees to dismiss his Counterclaim in the above-entitled case on the ground of his amicable settlement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands this 15th day of

October, 1953, at the City of Manila.

(Sgd.) ERNESTO Y. SIBAL (Sgd.) LUCIO R. ILDEFONSO

- Pursuant to the agreement, Sibal commissioned Ildefonso to sell some of his real properties

in Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City within the 2 year period- After the lapse of the 2-year period , Sibal sold the same properties himself at a higher price

than that quoted to Ildefonso

- During the same 2-year period, in line with Sibals intention to buy property worth Php

400,000 within the commercial district of Manila for the expansion of his business of selling

books and school supplies, Ildefonso offered to sell 3 properties (The Great Eastern Hotel for

Php 1,300,000, the Borja Building for Php 1,500,000) and a 157 square-meter lot along Rizal

Ave. for Php 190,000).- Sibal rejected the offers claiming that the 2 buildings (The Great Eastern Hotel and Borja

Bldg.) were not only beyond his means but also inappropriate and inadequate to his business

and that the lot in Rizal Ave. was too small for his expansion plans- Ildefonso filed a case against Sibal to recover the penalty of Php 2,000 (plus legal interest

and attorneys fees and costs) provided in the compromise agreement because Sibal failed

and neglected to make the purchase of real estate within the 2-year period as provided in the

same agreement- Sibal admitted the execution of the agreement but denied liability, alleging that liability upon

him would arise only if he buys or sells real estate without coursing the same through the

plaintiff and NOT because of his failure to buy and sell real estate during the period, which he

claims was entirely due to Ildefonsos inability to sell the lands (Sta. Mesa, QC) he offered for

sale and to obtain real properties which would be profitable for him to purchase and suitable

to his business- The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgement in favor of Sibal; ordered Ildefonso

to pay attorneys fees (Php 500)- Case brought to the Supreme Court


Compromise Agreement (#2)

2. That the defendant promises and covenants that:

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a. That the defendant shall pay the plaintiff this date the amount of ONE

THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;

b. That the defendant promises THAT WITHIN TWO (2) YEARS FROM THE DATEHEREOF, HE SHALL COURSE THROUGH THE PLAINTIFFAS REALTOR THE FORMERS

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE OR TRANSACTION AND SHOULD HE (DEFENDANT) FAIL

THEREOF, THAT IS, TO MAKE SUCH REAL ESTATE PURCHASEAND TO COURSE THE

SAMETOTHEPLAINTIFFASSAID REALTOR, THEDEFENDANT ISLIABLEFURTHERTO

PAY THE PLAINTIFF AN ADDITIONAL SUM OF TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)

PESOS.

c. That the defendant further agrees to dismiss his Counterclaim in the above-

entitled case on the ground of his amicable settlement.

VI. ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES:

ISSUE PETITIONERS

ARGUMENTS

DEFENDANTS

ARGUMENTS

Whether or not Sibal has

violated the compromise

agreement by not purchasing

the 3 properties offered by

Ildefonso within the 2-year

period?

Under par. 2 (b) of the

agreement, Sibal was under

the obligation to make a real

estate purchase through

Ildefonso within the 2-year

period

Sibal was only obligated to

make Ildefonso his exclusive

agent in the purchase and

sale of property within the 2-

year period through the

agreement, with liability topay the Php 2,000 penalty in

case of breach


ISSUE HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT

CON PRINCIPLES

USED(if applicable)

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Whether or not Sibal

has violated the

compromise

agreement by notpurchasing the 3

properties offered by

Ildefonso within the 2-

year period?

No. Sibal is not liable

for the Php 2,000

penalty

1) There is nothing in

the disputed paragraph

that can be construed

to mean that Sibalbound himself to

actually purchase real

property from Ildefonso

and to pay the penalty

in case he failed to do

so

2) The paragraph only

provides that Sibal

promises that within 2years from the

agreement date, he

shall make Ildefonso

his exclusive agent in

the buying and selling

of real property

3) It is hard to believe

that a man of Sibals

business acument and

stature would give his

consent to an

agreement wherein he

is under compulsion to

buy real estate which

may be inadequate for

his business and

beyond his means

4) There is ambiguity in

par. 2 (b) of the

agreement as a result

of the clause (that is,

to make such real

estate purchase and to

course the same to the

plaint off as Realtor)

inserted after the

Focus on Ratio 4):

Ambiguity is construed

against the party who

caused it

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phrase should he fail

thereof which follows

the statement of

appellees obligation.Following the rule that

ambiguities or

obscure clauses in

contracts cannot

favor the one who

has caused them

(article 1377, new Civil

Code), and it appearing

that the compromise

agreement was drawn

by appellant through

his counsel, with the

paragraph in dispute

creating an obligation

in his favor, the

ambiguity found therein

must be construed in

favor of herein

appellee, Sibal.

CASE NO: 33

CASE TITLE: Qua Chee Gan V. Law Union And Rock Insurance Co., Ltd.

DECISION DATE: December 17, 1955

PONENTE: REYES, J. B. L., J.

VOTATION: Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ.,

concur.

I. PETITIONER: Qua Chee Gan

II. RESPONDENTS: Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd.


Qua Chee Gan merchant in Albay Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd Insurance Company


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Petitioner Qua Chee Gan was a merchant from Albay. He had four (4) warehouses

(referred to in the case as bodegas), stocked with copra and of hemp, baled and

loose. He had these bodegas insured, as well as their contents, with the

Respondent. In 1940, a fire broke out, its reason and origin undetermined, that lasted for a week,

and completely destroyed bodegas 1, 2, and 4. The stocks inside these bodegas

were destroyed as well. Petitioner informed the Respondent of the fire via telegram. The next day, Respondent had the place examined and the incident thoroughly

investigated. Petitioner was claiming a total of P398,562.81 (but reduced to the full

amount of the insurance, P370,000). Insurance company refused to pay the

Petitioner, alleging violation of conditions and warranties and claimed that the fire

was intentionally caused by Petitioner to be able to claim the insurance. Petitioner, with his brother and other employees, were tried for arson but the Trial

Court acquitted them. Petitioner filed a case in the Court of First Instance against the Insurance Company

and the court granted their claim to the insurance money. Respondent appealed directly to the Supreme Court.


(Not really a provision but parts of the contract between the Petitioner and Respondent)

Memo. of Warranty. - The undernoted Appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the

premises insured hereby, and it being declared and understood that there is an ample and constantwater supply with sufficient pressure available at all seasons for the same, it is hereby warranted that

the said appliances shall be maintained in efficient working order during the currency of this policy, by

reason whereof a discount of 2 1/2 per cent is allowed on the premium chargeable under this policy.

Hydrants in the compound, not less in number than one for each 150 feet of external wall

measurement of building, protected, with not less than 100 feet of hose piping and nozzles for every

two hydrants kept under cover in convenient places, the hydrants being supplied with water pressure

by a pumping engine, or from some other source, capable of discharging at the rate of not less than

200 gallons of water per minute into the upper story of the highest building protected, and a trained

brigade of not less than 20 men to work the same.'


ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STATCON PRINCIPLES USED

(if applicable)

W/N Petitionerviolated the

1. No2. No

The Respondent,upon issuing the

(Copied and pasted foremphasis since this is

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contract andwarranty.

1. Thepetitioneronly had 2fire hydrantsand not 11,as stipulatedin the memo

2. Petitionerviolated"HempWarranty"provisions ofPolicy No.2637165because onthe day ofthe fire,gasolinewas storedin BodegaNo. 2

contract andwarranty, alreadyknew that the

petitioner onlyhad 2 firehydrants installedand theknowledge did notstop the issuanceof said contract.Such assertionwill make theassumption thatthe contract andwarranty willmake any futureclaims of thepetitioner invalid.

And even thoughthe companyalready hadknowledge of theexisting facts,they still collectedfrom thePetitionerpayments for theinsurance.

It must be notedthat gasolinewas not amongthe articles listedin the HempWarranty. Theterm invoked bythe Respondent isoil. Oil does notnecessarily equalto gasoline. TheCourt cannot finda reason why theterm gasolineshouldnt be usedif it the prohibitionin the warrantywants gasoline tobe included in the

the heart of the case )Taking into account thewell known rule that

ambiguities or obscuritiesmust be strictlyinterpreted against theparty that causedthem, the "memo of warranty" invoked byappellant bars the latterfrom questioning theexistence of theappliances called for inthe insured premises,since its initial expression,"the undernotedappliances for theextinction of fire beingkept on the premisesinsured hereby, . . . it ishereby warranted . . . " ,admits of interpretation asan admission of theexistence of suchappliances whichappellant cannot nowcontradict, should theparol evidence rule

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list.

VII. OVERALL DECISION Decision reaffirmed Costs against appellant

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CASE NO: 34

CASE TITLE: Villacorta v Insurance Commission

CASE FACTS PERTINENT LAWS / JURISPRUDENCE ISSUES and RULINGS RELEVANCE TO

STATCON

VILLACORTA v .INSURANCE

COMMISSION

October 28, 1980

PETITIONER:

Jewel Villacorta

RESPONDENT:

Insurance Commission

(Respondent agency) and

Empire Insurance Company

(Respondent company)

PONENTE:

(Acting) Chief Justice

Teehankee

GIST:

Unwitting car owners leave their

Lancer with an auto repair shop

for a check-up, not knowing that

two days later, six employees

would take it for an ill-fated joy

ride.

A couple left their 1976 model Colt Lancer for a check-up at the

Sunday Machine Works, Inc. auto repair shop.

Without their knowledge or consent, six employees took the car for

a joy ride in Montalban.

The Lancer figured into an accident, leaving two dead (including the

driver Benito Mabasa) and four injured. The car was also

extensively damaged.

Luckily, the cars insurance policy covered Own Party damage (i.e.

kapag natanga yung driver), Theft and Third Party Liability (i.e.

kapag nadali ka ng ibang motorist), so the couple filed a claim for

total loss with their insurance company under the first two grounds.

When the company denied their claim, the couple filed a complaint

with the Insurance Commission. The respondent agency dismissed

their petition, upholding respondent insurance companys defense

that:

1) The accident did not fall under Own Party coverage

since there was no compliance with the Authorized

Driver provision (full text in the next column) of the

insurance policy

This provision provides that an insurance claim will only be

honored under two conditions: First, that the driver is the

insured policy holder himself/herself, or second, that the driver

was driving on the insureds order or with his/her permission.

1) Authorized Driver clause in

the Empire Insurance Company

car insurance policy:

AUTHORIZED DRIVER:

Any of the following:

(a) The insured

(b) Any person driving on the

Insureds Order, or with his

permission; Provided, that the

person driving is permitted, in

accordance with the licensing or

other laws or regulations, to drive

the Scheduled Vehicle, or has

been permitted and is not

disqualified by order of a Court ofLaw or by reason or any enactment

or regulation in that behalf.

[Villacorta vs. Insurance

Commission, 100 SCRA

467(1980)]

2) Article 308 of the RPC,

defining theft

1) Whether or not the damage on

the Lancer incurs insurance

coverage from Own Party damage

YES, the Lancer is covered by Own

Party insurance.The shop owner of anestablished car service and repair shop and his

employees are presumed to be authorized

drivers. When the car owner entrusts his car

and keys to them, he basically gives them

permission and authorization to use or drive the

car for repair/maintenance purposes.

The purpose of the Authorized Driver clause

is that a person who drives the car on the

insureds order (such as his regular driver), or

with his permission (such as a friend or

member of the family or the employees of a car

service or repair shop) must be duly licensed

drivers and have no disqualification to drive a

motor vehicle.

Thus, the Authorized Driver clause is not

violated, so long as the employee who drove is

qualified to drive, even if he did use it for an

illicit purpose. The recovery for loss or damage

of car is not barred by the illegal use of the car

by the repair shop employees.

The situation is compared to a regular or family

driver, who instead of carrying out the owners

order to fetch the children from school takes

out his girl friend instead for a joy ride and

Ambiguity is construed

against the party who

caused it.

- Liability lies with the

insurer, because their

own rules caused the

ambiguity

Insurance contracts,

being contracts of

adhesion where the only

participation of the other

party is the signing of his

signature or his

adhesion thereto,

obviously call for greater

strictness and vigilance

on the part of courts of

justice with a view of

protecting the weaker

party from abuse and

imposition, and prevent

their becoming traps for

the unwary.

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The car rammed into a parked

truck, causing great damage and

two deaths and leaving four riders

injured.

Petitioners filed a claim for total

loss with their insurance company

but was denied, so they filed a

case with the Insurance

Commission.

The respondent agency

dismissed the petition because

the Authorized Driver provision of

the insurance policy was not

complied with (more details in the

next column).

In this case, the SC overturned

the decision of the Insurance

Commission.

The respondent agency affirmed the defense of respondent

insurance company, reasoning that if the person driving is other

than the insured, he must have been duly authorized by the insured

to drive the vehicle to make the insurance company liable for the

drivers negligence.

Since Mabasa drove without the order or permission of Villacorta,

the Insurance Commission ruled that he cannot be considered an

authorized driver. Therefore, the condition in the insurance policy

was violated and the benefit (i.e., the insurance claim) could not be

honored.

2) The accident did not fall under the coverage for

Theft

(T)he element of taking in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code

means that the act of depriving another of the possession and

dominion of a movable thing is coupled with the intention, at the

time of the taking, of withholding it with the character of

permanency.

In other words, there must have been shown a felonious intent

upon the part of the taker of the car, and the intent must be to

permanently deprive the insured of his car.

Such was not the case in this instance. The fact that the car was

taken by one of the residents of the Sunday Machine Works, and

the withholding of the same, for a joy ride should not be construedto mean taking under Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If at all

there was a taking, the same was merely temporary in nature. A

temporary taking is held not a taking insured against.

Theft is committed by any person

who, with intent to gain but without

violence against or intimidation of

persons nor force upon things,

shall take personal property of

another without the latters

consent.

instead wrecks the car. There is no question of

his being an authorized driver which allows

recovery of the insurance money although his

trip was for a personal or illicit purpose without

the owners authorization.

2) Whether or not the damage on

the Lancer incurs insurance

coverage from Theft

YES, the Lancer is covered by Theft

insurance. The Lancer entrusted to therepair shop was unlawfully and wrongfully

taken without the owners consent or

knowledge this is enough to constitute theft,

and is enough to affirm petitioners claim for

total loss dues.

Further, the Court held that in cases of theft,

there need be no intent to permanently deprive

the insured of his car. Intent to gain is enough.

Intent to gain is evident when the thief derives

utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure

from the stolen object.

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CASE NO: 35

CASE TITLE: Baylon vs. Court of Appeals

DECISION DATE: August 17, 1999

PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J.

VOTATION: 4 CONCUR

I. PETITIONER: PACIONARIA C. BAYLON

II. RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division) LEONILA TOMACRUZ-co-manager of petitioners husband at PLDT


ROSITA B. LUANZON-engaged in business as a contractor for twenty years

IV. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Petition by way of certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the

decision of RTC. Petitioner introduced private respondent to Luanzon and invited her to lend Luanzon

money at a monthly interest rate of five percent (5%), to be used as capital for the

latter's business. Private respondent was assured by petitioner that Luanzon's business was stable

and by the high interest rate, agreed to lend Luanzon money in the amount of

P150,000. On June 22, 1987, Luanzon issued a postdated check and signed a promissory note

acknowledging receipt of the P150,000 from private respondent and obliging herself

to pay the said amount on or before August 22, 1987. Petitioner affixing her signature in the promissory note under the word "guarantor." Respondent made written demand for payment but Luanzon did not heed and filed a

case against her and the petitioner but summons were never serve upon Luanzon. The trial court ruled against petitioners and the decision was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals.


ART. 2058 of the Civil Code, which provides that The guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has

exhausted all the property of the debtor, and has resorted to all the legal

remedies against the debtor.

VI. ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES:

ISSUE/S PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS

W/N there was a loan and not an

investment?

BAYLON: NO. Claimed that she it was not a loan

but rather an investment citing the

testimony of the respondent of using

the words investments, dividends

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and commission

W/N the Petitioner is liable to pay for the

obligations of Luanzon?

BAYLON: NO. She is not liable as a guarantor

because the respondent has not

exhausted property of the principal

debtor before his own can be levied

upon (ART. 2058 Civil Code).



CON PRINCIPLES

USED(if applicable)

W/N there was a

loan and not an

investment?

YES. Both parties do not deny the

due execution and authenticity

of the June 22, 1987

promissory note. All of petitioner's arguments are

directed at uncovering the realintention of the parties in

executing the promissory note The clear terms of the

promissory note establish a

creditor-debtor relationship

between Luanzon and private

respondent.

If the terms

of a contract

are clear and

leave no

doubt as to

the intentionof the

contracting

parties, the

literal

meaning of its

stipulation

shall control.

W/N the Petitioner is

liable to pay for the

obligations of

Luanzon?

NO. The liability of the guarantor is

only subsidiary. The creditor may hold the

guarantor liable only after

judgment has been obtained

against the principal debtor is

unable to pay It is premature to hold

petitioner liable because there

was no judgment obtained

against the principal debtor

Rosita B. Luanzon because nosummons where served upon

her, therefore the courts have

no jurisdiction against her.

STATCON

PRINCIPLEAmbuiguity,

construed against

party who caused it-When the

stipulations of the

contract are clear,

the party claiming

ambiguity against it

will be prejudiced

because there canbe no doubt as to the

literal meaning which

should be applied.

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Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish

CASE NO: 36

CASE TITLE: Robles v Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al.

CASE NO: 37

CASE TITLE: Colgate-Palmolive Philippine, Inc. vs. Gimenez

DECISION DATE: January 28, 1961

PONENTE: J. Guttierez David

Theme: Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish

VOTATION: En Banc

I. PETITIONER:Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. manufacturer of toilet preparations and houseold

remedies

II. RESPONDENT:Hon. Pedro Gimenez Auditor GeneralIsmael Mathay Auditor of the Central Bank of the Philippines

III. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Colgate-Palmolive imports from abroad materials such as irish moss extract, sodium

benzoate, sodium saccharinate, etc. for stablizers and flavoring for their dental cream.o For every importation, it paid 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used

for the payment of the cost pursuant to RA 601 Exchange Tax Law March 14, 1956 Colgate filed for 3 applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it

paid to the Central Bank for a total of P113,343.99. Based on:

Sec. 2, RA 601

o foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other

charges incident to the importation into the Philippines ofstabilizer and flavors

shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof

of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to

section seven thereof.o After their applications were processed by the Exchange Tax Administration of the

Central Bank, the official advised them that P23, 958.13 is the amount to be

refunded. Mathay, the Auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass its claim for refund

because he said that toothpaste stablizers and flavors were not exempt under Sec. 2 of the

Exchange tax law.

December 4, 1958 Auditor General (Gimenez) affirmed the ruling of Mathay that it wasnot under those exempted because Sec. 2 only refers to those in preparation or

manufacture offood or food products. Petitioner brought the petition to the SC.

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Note: What is excise tax?o Tax imposed on goods manufactured for domestic sale or consumption or any other

disposition. Also imposed on things that are imported.

IV. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED:

SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the paymentof the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice,flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup,tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, referencebooks, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established publicor private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in the publicationof books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for

the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to theGovernment under contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to becertified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films,laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary forcompounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, inquantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applyingtherefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines asmay be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect the health ofthe people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, uponsatisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuantto section seven thereof."

V. ISSUE:

ISSUE/S PETITIONERS

ARGUMENTS

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS SC (HELD and RATIO)

WONtheimportsofColgatewhichtheyclaim tobesubjecttorefund isunderthe 17%

specialexcisetaximposedunder

Sec. 2, RA 601 NO.

Stabilizer and flavors in Sec. 2refers to those used in thepreparation or manufacture offood and food products, notmanufacturing of toothpaste.

Based on: General Terms rule inStatCon.

General terms may be restrictedby specific words, with the resultthat the general language will be

limited by the specific languagewhich indicates the statutesobject and purpose.(Statutody Construction byCrawford)

YES. Decision is reversed.Colgate-Palmolive are tobe refunded for the amountof P23,958.13

Though the argument ofthe Respondents is basedon the General Terms rulein Statcon, SC said thatthis rule is only applicableto cases where all theitems in an enumerationbelong to or fall under onespecific class.

The terms fertilizer andpoultry also do not belongto the same category offood products and yet it is

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Sec. 2of RA601?

included in the exemption.

In the same way, RA 814

which amends Sec. 2 ofRA 601, it added industrialstarch which also doesnot refer to food for humanconsumption.

StatCon Principle: Ubi lexnon distinguish nec nosdistinguire debemos =where the law does notdistinguish, neither do we

distinguish.(Ligget & Myers TobaccoCompany vs. Collector ofInternal Revenue)

STATCON PRINCIPLES USED:

Where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish

- We must construe them in their general sense since it did not distinguish between stablizer

and flavors for food and those for manufacturing- Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black: The rule of construction

that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used

in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is

intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken

in connection with other rules of construction.

Case no: 38Case Title: Guevara v InocentesDecision date: March 15, 1966

Ponente: Angelo Bautista, J

Petitioner: Onofre GuevaraRrespondents: Raoul Inocentes, Office of the Solicitor General

Facts :Nov 18, 1965- The petitioner, Onofre Guevara, was extended as ad interim appointeeUndersecretary of labor by the outgoing President.

Nov 25, 1965 He took his oath of office.

Jan 23, 1966 The incumbent President issued Memorandum Circular No 8 declaring that all adinterim appointments made by the former Pres lapsed with the adjournment of the special sessionof the Congress at the midnight of Jan 22, 1966. On the same day, the respondent, Raoul

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Inocentes was appointed ad interim Undersecretary of Labor by the incumbent President. Guevarathen filed a petition seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to the said Office of theUndersecretary.

Provision Being Contested:Article VII, Sec10 of the ConstitutionThe President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, butsuch appointments shall be effective only until disapproval of the Commission on Appointments oruntil the next adjournment of the Congress

Issue Petitionersargument

Respondentsargument

Held

1. WON, thepetitioners

contentionregarding thenextadjournmentof theCongressspecificallyprovide forregularsession only

Petitioners adinterim appointment

was valid and shallonly becomeineffective upon CAdisapproval or adjournment ofregularsession

Petitioners adinterim appointment

lapsed whencongress adjournedits last specialsession.

No. It is the clearintent of the framers

of our Constitutionto make recessappointmentseffective only until(a) the disapprovalof the CA or (b) untilthe nextadjournment of theCongress, andnever a day longerregardless of thenature of thesession adjourned.

Statcon:UBI LEX NONDISTINGUIT BECNOSDISTINGUEREDEBEMUS (whenthe law does not

distinguish, weshall notdistinguish)Until the nextadjournment ofCongress does notmake any referenceto any specificsession of thecongress---regularor special. It Is

safe to concludethat what theframers of the 1935Constitution usedthe word

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adjournment hadin mind either regular or special

sessions2. WON

Congress isstill incontinuoussession

There has been noadjournment of theCongress becausethe aforesaidspecial session wassuspended by theHouse on Jan 22,1966 (Saturday)tobe resumed onMonday; while the

adjournmentapproved by theSenate is notadjournmentcontemplated in ArtVII sec 10(a).Therefore, thesession at theCongress wascontinuous withoutany interuption

Ad interimappointment ceasesto be valid aftereach term of congress, sopetitionersappointment musthave lapsed already

No. the fact thatSenate adjournedsine die at midnightof Jan 22, 1966, theadjournment of oneof its houses isconsideredadjournment of theCongress as awhole.

Separate Opinions:1. Concepcion, J - concurring

Petitioner maintains there has been no adjournment of the Congress because theaforementioned special session had commenced on January 17, 1966 and although theSenate had adjourned, the House of Representatives merely suspended its session.Petitioner concludes therefore that the Congress has been in continuous session withoutany interruption. This pretense is clearly devoid of merit for:a. Senate has admittedly adjourned at about midnight of Jan 22-23,1966. In as much as

the House of Rep is only part of our Congress, and not Congress itself, it followsnecessarily that Congress cannot be said to have been in session.

b. Not even the House of Rep was in session on Jan 23-24, 1966.It was next contended by the petitioner that the clause next adjournment of theCongress refers to adjournment assembled in regular session. This is unacceptablebecause:a. To do so would entail a judicial legislation by the insertion of the word regular in said

provision.b. Neither can we adopt the petitioners theory without amending the Constitution.

CASE NO: 39

CASE TITLE: Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court;

Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. and Dominador Cacpal, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila

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DECISION DATE: May 29, 1987

PONENTE: Gancayco, J.

VOTATION: Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., concur;

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

I. PETITIONER:

Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. surety of Varian Industrial Corporation

II. RESPONDENTS:

Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court; Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. and Dominador

Cacpal, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila

III. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate

Court granting Sycwin Coating and Wires (private respondent) motion for execution

pending appeal and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the

counterbond to lift attachment by the petitioner.

The pertinent facts of the case that resulted to this matter are:

Herein private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against

Varian Industrial Corporation (VIC). During the pendency of the suit, respondent was

able to attach some of the properties VIC upon posting a supersedeas bond. VIC,

through the its surety, herein petitioner (Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.),

posted a counterbond amounting to P1.4M to release the attached properties. On December 28, 1984, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a decision in favour of

Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., ordering the petitioner to pay the principal amount of

P1.4M plus interest, damages and other costs. Such decision was appealed by the petitioner to the Intermediate Appellate Court

(public respondent). Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal, which on July 5, 1985 was

granted. The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the

previously attached personal properties upon demand.

IV. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED:

Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. The officer executing the order shall

without delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the

properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the province, not

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exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the

applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of

the court from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the

applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an

amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be attached, to

secure payment to the applicant ofany judgementwhich he may recover in the

action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit and

bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found within

the province.

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time

after an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has

been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonablenotice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge

of the court in which the action is pending, for an order discharging the

attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing,

order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-

bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party,

with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in an amount

equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure

the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the

action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be

served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an

attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the property

attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party

making the deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the

property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or

become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional

counterbond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.

SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond.

If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety orsureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to

secure the payment of the judgmentshall become charged on such counter-

bond, and bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due

under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or

sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis

supplied.)

V. DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES:


USED

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(if applicable)

Whether or not anorder of execution

pending appeal of ajudgment maybeenforced on thecounterbond.

Yes, the rule is thatthe counterbond to lift

attachment that isissued in accordancewith the provisions ofSection 5, Rule 57, ofthe Rules of Court,shall be charged withthe payment of anyjudgment that isreturned unsatisfied.It covers not only afinal executor

judgment but also theexecution of ajudgment pendingappeal.

Under Sections 5and 12, Rule 57

above reproducedit is provided thatthe counterbond isintended to securethe paymentof"anyjudgment"thatthe attachingcreditor mayrecover in theaction. Under

Section 17 of same rule itprovides thatwhen "theexecution bereturnedunsatisfied inwhole or in part"it is only then that"payment of thejudgmentshallbecome chargedon suchcounterbond."

Neither the rulesnor the provisionsof the counterbondlimited itsapplication to afinal andexecutory

judgment. Thus, the only

logical conclusionis that anexecution of anyjudgment includingone pendingappeal if returnedunsatisfied maybecharged againstsuch a

counterbond.

It is wellrecognized rule

that where the lawdoes notdistinguish, courtsshould notdistinguish. Ubi lexnon distinguishnec nosdistingueredebemos.

"The rule, foundedon logic, is a

corollary of theprinciple thatgeneral words andphrases in astatute shouldordinarily beaccorded theirnatural andgeneralsignificance.

The rule requiresthat a general termor phrase shouldnot be reducedinto parts and onepart distinguishedfrom the other soas to justify itsexclusion from theoperation of thelaw.

In other words,there should be nodistinction in theapplication of astatute wherenone is indicated.

For courts are notauthorized todistinguish wherethe law makes nodistinction. They

should insteadadminister the lawnot as they think itought to be but asthey find it and

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without regard toconsequences.

CASE NO: 40

CASE TITLE: BAYAN v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora

DECISION DATE: Oct. 10, 2000

PONENTE: Buena, J.

VOTATION: 10 Concur; 3 Dissent; 1 In the Result, 1 No Part

I. PETITIONERS:

Note: This is a consolidation of FIVE (5) petitions.

Petitioners are various anti Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) parties; to name a few:o Bayan first case;

o Phil. Constitutional Assoc. second case;

o Teofisto Guingona, Raul Roco and Sergio Osmea (senators) third case;

o IBP fourth case;

o Jovito R. Salonga fifth case.

II. RESPONDENTS:Note: This is a consolidation of FIVE (5) petitions. Primary Respondents:

o Ronaldo Zamora Exec. Secretary;

o Domingo Siazon DFA Secretary;

o Orlando Mercado DND Secretary.

Other Respondents:o Marcelo Fernan Senate President;

o Various other senators; and

o All other persons acting their control, supervision, direction and instruction in

relation to the VFA

III. PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioners and respondents only.

IV. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: March 14, 1947: RP and US forged a Military Bases Agreement. which formalized,

among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military

personnel. August 30, 1951: To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, RP and

US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to

respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels,

and aircraft. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, RP

and US negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. September 16, 1991: Phil. Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,

Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US

military bases in the Philippines. With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases

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Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the two countries were

held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the

Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense

Treaty. July 18, 1997, the US, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia

Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by DFA Undersecretary

Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the

United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed,

among other things, the possible elements of the VFA. Feb. 10, 1998: President FVR approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by DFA

Sec. Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. October 5, 1998: President Estrada, through respondent DFA Sec., ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998: President Estrada, acting through respondent Exec. Sec. Ronaldo

Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of

the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the

1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign

Relations, chaired by Sen. Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and

Security, chaired by Sen. Rodolfo G. Biazon. May 3, 1999: The two Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443

recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a

Le

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