For Digest 6.28

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 175846 July 6, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.ROSILA ROCHE, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need for applicant for original registration of title to prove that the land appliedfor is alienable or disposable land of the public domain.

The Facts and the Case

On December 5, 1996 Rosila Roche applied for registration of title1of her 15,353-square-meter landin Barrio Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,2denominated as Lot 8698, before the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Roche alleged that she inherited the land in 1960 from herfather, Miguel, who in turn had held the land in the concept of an owner when Roche was only aboutsix years old. She was born on that land on January 10, 1938 and had helped her father cultivateit.3Roche had also paid the realty taxes on the land, which had an assessed value of P490,000.00.

To support her application for registration, Roche presented, among others, a certified true copy ofthe survey plan of the land,4its technical description,5a Certification from the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in lieu of the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,6

taxdeclarations,7and real property tax receipts.8She also presented certifications that the LandRegistration Authority (LRA) and the National Printing Office issued to show compliance withrequirements of service of notice to adjoining owners and publication of notice of initial hearing .9

As proof of her open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the land, Roche presentedManuel Adriano, a former resident of Napindan who owned an unregistered property adjoining Lot8698. Adriano testified that he had been a resident of the place where the land was located from1949 to 1996 when he moved to Pampanga.10He drew a sketch showing the location of Lot 8698 inrelation to his own and identified the owners of the other adjoining lots.11He claimed to have knownRoches father since the latter had been cultivating vegetables and rice on the land.12

The Republic of the Philippines (the Government), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),opposed the application on the grounds a) that neither Roche nor her predecessor-in-interest hadoccupied the land for the required period; and b) that the land belonged to the State and is notsubject to private acquisition.13The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) alsoopposed14Roches application on the ground that, based on technical descriptions, her land waslocated below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters and, therefore, may be deemed partof the Laguna Lake bed under Section 4115of Republic Act (R.A.) 4850.
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On September 7, 1999 the OSG filed a manifestation that, since Roche failed to prove that the landwas part of the alienable land of the public domain, the Government did not need to presentevidence in the case. It also adopted LLDAs opposition.16

On September 30, 1999 the RTC rendered judgment,17granting Roches application. The RTC heldthat Roche had proved continued adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner since

June 12, 1945 or earlier, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1959. Assuming that the land waspart of the public domain, Roche and her predecessors occupation and cultivation of more than 30years vested title on her, effectively segregating it from the mass of public land.18Moreover, theLLDA did not prove by substantial evidence that the land was inalienable and part of the LagunaLake bed.

On appeal by the Government,19the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.20TheOSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, prompting the Government tofile the present petition.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue the petition presents is whether or not the land subject of Roches application isalienable or disposable land of the public domain.

The Ruling of the Court

The Government insists that the subject land forms part of the lake bed and that it has not beenreleased into the mass of alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As such, Rochecannot register title to it in her name.21

Roche points out, on the other hand, that the lot could not possibly be part of the Laguna Lakes bedsince it has always been planted to crops and is not covered by water. R.A. 4850 provides that theLake is that area covered with water when it is at the average maximum lake level of 12.50 meters.

This presupposed that the lake extends only to lakeshore lands. The land in this case does notadjoin the Laguna Lake.22

An application for registration of title must, under Section 14(1), P.D. 1529, meet three requirements:a) that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; b) that the applicants bythemselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the land; and c) that such possession is under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.23

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and the latter is thesource of any asserted right to ownership in land. Thus, the State presumably owns all lands nototherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption,incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration is

alienable and disposable.241avvphi1

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of theland.25In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classificationstatus issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)26or theProvincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)27of the DENR. He must also provethat the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienableand disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENROor PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
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DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These factsmust be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.28

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienableor disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technicaldescription of the land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not

bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate governmentagency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title underSection 14(1) of P.D. 1529.29

Since Roche was unable to overcome the presumption that the land she applied for is inalienableland that belongs to the State, the Government did not have to adduce evidence to prove it.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals datedAugust 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV 65567 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of PasigCity in LRC N-11330 dated September 30, 1999 and DENIESrespondent Rosila Roches applicationfor registration of title over Lot 8698 located in Barrio Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, withoutprejudice to her proving by appropriate evidence her right to registration of the same at a future time.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47331 June 21, 1983

SPOUSES PABLO DE LOS REYES and ALEJANDRA DE LOS REYES, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, andCARMEN R. CANTOS, respondents.

Leon Gonzaga, Jr. for petitioners.

Mario D. Ortiz for private respondent Cantos.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The right sought to be vindicated in this certiorari proceeding by petitioners, plaintiffs in the lowercourt, arose from the undisputed fact that they are bona fide holders and possessors since 1949 of aparcel of land consisting of 6,163 square meters whereon they built that same year their residence.They still have a pending miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands for such
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property. They thereafter discovered that their house occupied five meters of the adjoining lot, at thetime of the construction in 1949 still public land but subsequently applied for in a miscellaneoussales application by private respondents, defendants in the court a quo, who were granted a patentonly in 1972. Thus arose the conflict over the five meters in question.

The action was for reconveyance with damages. Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint on the

ground that the action should have been filed by the Bureau of Lands on behalf of the Republic. Withtheir sales application still pending, the lot in question is still public. That is to conform to a ruling ofthis Court that an action for reversion in such cases "shall be instituted by the Solicitor General orthe officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of thePhilippines." 1 This doctrine was affirmed expressly in Magay v. Estiandan, 2where this Courtreiterated that where "the land in question is still part of the public domain, then the appellant is notthe proper party to institute the reversion of the land but it must be the Solicitor General in the nameof the Republic of the Philippines." 3 From the standpoint then of strict law, what was done by thelower court cannot be characterized as a violation of controlling legal principles. Still there areequitable considerations that call for this Court resolving the question raised.

It is undoubted that there is a dispute appropriate for judicial determination. The contending partiesare before the court. For petitioners, it is vital that their claim to the disputed five meters be passedupon. Their good faith is quite clear. As of the time their house was built, they were bonafide possessors, thereafter applicants for the sale of such parcel of land including the five meters.Unfortunately, the patent granted to private respondents twenty-three years after the construction oftheir residence included the same five meters. 'Mere is justification then for equity to set mattersright.

Petitioners are thus entitled to the remedy sought, namely, ownership of the five meters in question,upon payment of just compensation to respondents to be determined as of the time the patent wasgranted in 1972.

1. This conclusion finds support in Armamento v. Guerrero. 4 In that case, property covered by anoriginal certificate of title pursuant to a free patent was granted by the Director of Lands on July 20,

1961 in favor of defendant Guerrero. In that case as well as here, there was a claim by plaintiffs thatit was acquired through fraud and misrepresentation, their allegation being that they were in actualpossession thereof as actual occupants as far back as 1955. Thereafter, a homestead applicationwas made in 1959, resulting in a grant to them in 1964. It turned out that in the meanwhile, as it didlikewise happen here, a free patent was if sued to defendant. Under such circumstances, this Court,stated: "The particular circumstances obtaining herein impel us to exercise our equity jurisdiction tothe end that substantial justice may be dispended to the party litigants. To affirm the trial Court'sOrder of dismissal would leave the present controversy unresolved and pending investigation at theadministrative level. Aside from the length of nine it would probably take for the case to reach thehighest administrative authority, any final adjudication rendered by the latter may eventually beraised to the appellate Courts for judicial review. This circuitous and tedious process can beeliminated for the sake of speedy administration of justice by remanding the case to the trial Courtfor determination on the merits of the issue of validity of the issuance of Free Patent No. V-19129and of the title which followed as a matter of course." 5

2. Nor is it necessary that this case be remanded to the trial court on the question of the validity ofthe patent obtained by respondents. As of the time the house of petitioners was built in 1949, theywere in actual possession of the lot for which thereafter a miscellaneous sales application wassubmitted to the Bureau of Lands. Unfortunately, the patent granted to petitioners in 1972 includedfive meters thereof. It would be unduly-time consuming, if there being no claim to the rest of theproperty included in such patent to the respondents, the question of the alleged fraud would still

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have to be inquired into. Under the circumstances that can be avoided by an outright determinationthat upon payment of the five meters in question, petitioners are entitled to be recognized as theowners thereof.

3. As far as the Bureau of lands is concerned, there seems to be no thought of reclaiming theproperty from respondents. There is, therefore, an express grant which justifies such acquisition. In

Lee Hong Kok v. David,6

reference was made to the Regalian doctrine to the effect that no publicland can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from thegovernment. 7 The government, therefore, as the agent of the state is, in the language of Gonzaga v.Court of Appeals, 8 "possessed of the plenary power as thepersona in law to determine who shall bethe favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted suchprivilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise wouldbe ordinary acts of ownership?" 9

4. The relevant facts thus justify the ruling that this litigation, presenting as it does an issue betweenthe contending parties as to the disputed five meters, can. be resolved by this Court exercising itsequity jurisdiction to award the same to petitioners upon payment of the due compensationdetermined as of the date when respondents acquired their patent.

Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioners are entitled to ownership of such disputed portion uponpayment by them of the just compensation to respondents for such five meters on the amount to bebased on the value thereof as of the time the patent was granted on March 14, 1972.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of September 20,1977 is reversed and the case remanded tothe lower court for the purpose of determining the compensation due private respondent Carmen R.Cantos for the five meters of the lot in question, upon payment of which plaintiffs would become theowners of such five meters. No costs.

Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24661 February 28, 1974

BENJAMIN RABUCO, VENANCIO G. GUIRNALDA, LEODEGARIO ALOBA, ELEUTERIOIBAES, ROGELIO ARAGONES, ASENCIO ABANCO, BENEDICTO BAUTISTA, MAXIMOAQUINO, PAULINA DALUMIAS, NENITA RAMOS, GUILLERMO VARIAS, EMELDA ARELLANO,PEDRO BILBAO, ERNESTO BONBALES, ROSITA OCA BAUTISTA, TERESITA ESTEBAN,JOSE BENJAMIN, LORENZO BELDEVER, LEODEGARIO TUMLOS, PATRICIO MALATE,ANSELMO CORTEJOS, ANACLETA ADUCA, SALOME BARCELONA, ENRICO CELSO, IRENECAMBA, MARIA COLLADO, RUFINO CANTIL, ANANIAS CANILLO, MAXIMO DE CASTRO,

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CEFERINO SALAZAR, PATRIA ANAYA, FELISA VELASCO, IGNACIO SARASPI, FLAVIODINAGUIT, REMEDIOS BAROMETRO, PEDRO GEBANIA, RUBEN GEGABALEN, EMETRIOEDAO, LUCIANO ARAGONES, ADRIANO ESTRELLADO, BONIFACIO EVARISTO, ISIDOROEDORIA, TIMOTEA ECARUAN, BIENVENIDO COLLADO, CENON DAJUYA, RAFAELAFERNANDEZ, ALFONSO FAUSTINO, AVELINO GARCIA, RICARDO GUIRNALDA, FRANCISCOHENERAL, CARMEN KIONESALA, FELICIANO LUMACTOD, DOLORES VILLACAMPA,

NARCISO LIM, EUFEMIO LEGASPI, MATILDE MABAQUIAO, EULOGIO VIA, MACARIOANTONIO, JEREMIAS DE LA CRUZ, MARTIN MANGABAN, SIMEON MANGABA T., CARIDADMER MILLA, FELIX MAHINAY, NAPOLEON MARZAN, ISAIAS MANALASTAS, JOSEFACORVERA, JOSE APRUEDO, ARSENIO REYES, EUGENIA A. ONO, CORNELIO OPOLENCIA,SEDECIAS PASCUA, ABUNDIO PAGUNTALAN, ESPERANZA DE QUIROS, CRESENCIOSALEM, MOISES FERNANDEZ, FORTUNATO GONZALES, SOCORRO R. VALEN, RODOLFOCOLLADO, VENERIO CELSO, GREGORIO DE LA CRUZ, CELSO ALCERA, NICOLASARAGONES, JOSEFINA MANANSALA, ADELAIDA CALASIN , JOSE AGUSTIN, TOMASJOSEPH, MANUEL DADOR, SERGIO LIPATON, ERNESTO SUMAYDING, MARCELINO DIOSO,MIGUEL ALCERA, CRISANTA ENAMER, JUAN VIADO HILARION CHIOCO, EUROPIACABAHUG, VICTORIA DUERO, CONSORCIO ENOC, MAMERTO GAMONIDO, BONIFACIOSABADO, MARIA INTROLIZO, HENRY ENOLBA, REYNALDO LIM, FORTUNATO LIPON,ERNESTO MALLOS, FLORENTINA PATRICIO, MAMERTO PALAPALA, RAMON DE PERALTA,

JOSE PARRAS, APOLINARIO YAP, JUAN ROQUE, FELIX ROQUE, GLICERIA SALAZAR,MIGUELA SABIO, AGAPITO SAYAS, PAULINO SARROZA, PACIFICO JUANICO, LIBERADOTULAWAN, LIGAYA LAUS, ERNESTO VERZOSA, LEOPOLDO BERNALES, JAIME VISTA,ISAIAS AMURAO, BENITA M. BARENG, and BRIGIDA SANCHEZ,petitioners,vs.HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OFMANILA, HON. LADISLAO J. TOLENTINO, City Engineer of Manila, their agents, employees,assistants and all persons acting under them; HON. BENJAMIN GOZON, Administrator, LandReform Authority substituted by HON CONRADO ESTRELLA as Secretary of the Departmentof Agrarian Reforms and his agents, employees, assistants and all persons acting under hisorders, respondent. 1

G.R. No. L-24915 February 28, 1974

BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al., (the same co-petitioners in L-24661), petitioners,vs.HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OFMANILA, et al., (the same co-respondents in L-24661), respondents.

G.R. No. L-24916 February 28, 1974

BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al. (the same co-petitioners in L-24661), petitioners-appellants,vs.HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OFMANILA, et al., (the same co-respondents in L-24661), respondents-appellees.

Manuel D. Melotindos and Ricardo M. Guirnalda for petitioners.

Second Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

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The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of theestablished doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the nameof the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installmentbasis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constituteinfringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution butoperates simply as a manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State

property.

The origin and background of the cases at bar which deal with the decisive issue of constitutionalityof Republic Act 3120 enacted on June 17, 1961, as raised by respondent mayor of Manila inresisting petitioners' pleas that respondent mayor not only lacks the authority to demolish theirhouses or eject them as tenants and bona fide occupants of a parcel of land in San Andres,Malate 2 but is also expressly prohibited from doing so by section 2 of the Act, may be summarizedfrom the Court of Appeals' 3 certification of resolution of May 31, 1965 as follows:

Case L-24916involves petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals 4 from the decision of the Manilacourt of first instance dismissing their petition for injunction and mandamus to enjoin the demolitionof their houses and the ejectment from the public lots in question and to direct respondentadministrator of the Land Authority (now Secretary of Agrarian Reform) to implement the provisionsof Republic Act 3120 for the subdivision and sale on installment basis of the subdivided lots to themas the tenants and bona fide occupants thereof, and instead ordering their ejectment.

Case L-24915involves petitioners' independent petition for injunction filed directly with the Court ofAppeals January 29, 19655 to forestall the demolition overnight of their houses pursuant to the orderof demolition set for January 30, 1965 at 8 a.m. issued by respondents city officials pending theelevation of their appeal. The appellate court gave due course thereto and issued the writ ofpreliminary injunction as prayed for.

The two cases were ordered "consolidated into one" since they were "unavoidably interlaced." Theappellate court, finding that the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 was "the dominant andinextricable issue in the appeal" over which it had no jurisdiction and that the trial court incorrectly

"sidetracked" the issue, thereafter certified the said cases to this Court, as follows:

The validity of Republic Act 3120 which was seasonably posed in issue in the courtbelow was sidetracked by the trial court, thus:

The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 need not be passedupon as the principal question in issue is whether the houses of thepetitioners are public nuisances, which the court resolved in theaffirmative. As a matter of fact even if the petitioners were already theowners of the land on which their respected houses are erected, therespondent city officials could cause the removal thereof as they wereconstructed in violation of city ordinances and constitute public

nuisance.

It is significant to note, however, that what is sought by the respondent City Mayorand City Engineer of Manila is not only the demolition of the petitioners' houses in thepremises in controversy, but their ejectment as well. Moreover, Republic Act 3120does intend not only the dismissal of the ejectment proceedings against thepetitioners from the land in controversy upon their motion, but as well that anydemolition order issued against them shall also have to be dismissed. The law says:

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respondents city officials "from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance ofherein petitioners' possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City ofManila" as safeguarded them under the Court's subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965.

The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar, as correctly perceived by the appellate court is theconstitutionality of Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together with

another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable oralienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure

Administration" for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale oninstallment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof6and expressly prohibited ejectmentand demolition of petitioners' homes under section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court'scertification resolution, supra.

The incidental issue seized upon by the trial court as a main issue for "sidetracking" the decisiveissue of constitutionality, to wit, that petitioners' houses as they stood at the time of its judgment in1965 "were constructed in violation of city ordinances and constituted public nuisances" whoseremoval could be ordered "even if petitioners were already the owners of the land on which theirrespective houses are erected" has become moot with the burning down of the petitioners' houses inthe fire of April 19, 1970.

If the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for constituting deprivation of property without due process oflaw and without just compensation as contended by respondents city officials, then the trial court'srefusal to enjoin ejectment and demolition of petitioners' houses may be upheld. Otherwise,petitioners' right under the Act to continue possession and occupation of the premises and to thelifting and dismissal of the order of demolition issued against them must be enforced and the trialcourt's judgment must be set aside.

Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be stricken down as unconstitutional fordepriving the city of Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lotsto bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is untenable and withoutbasis, since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in

its publicand governmentalcapacity and are therefore public property over which Congress hadabsolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it inits private orproprietarycapacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without

just compensation.7

Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communalproperty" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale insmall lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifyingState property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not beinterfered with by the courts.

The case ofSalas vs. Jarencio 8 wherein the Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act 4118

whereby Congress in identical terms as in Republic Act 3120 likewise converted another city lot (Lot1-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of Manila also in Malate) which was reserved ascommunal property into disposable land of the State for resale in small lots by the Land Tenure,

Administration to the bona fide occupants is controlling in the case at bar.

The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source orclassification of land in the possession of a municipality, exceptingthose acquired with its own fundsin its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of itsinhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to

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the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it asan agentfor the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision orinstrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is thesame as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use" 9 and stressed that "theproperty, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds inits private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this

title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of theterritory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." 10

There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and RepublicAct 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitutionand the government program of land for the landless and that they were not"intended to expropriatethe property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal landof the State and to makeit available for disposition by the National Government: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyaneof the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does notoperate asan exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1,subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, 11 but simply as amanifestation of its rightand powertodeal with state property." 12

Since the challenge of respondents city officials against the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120must fail as the City was notdeprived thereby of anything it owns by acquisition with its private orcorporate funds either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of theConstitution, the provisions of said Act must be enforced and petitioners are entitled to the injunctionas prayed for implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment and demolition of theirhouses.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court (in Case No. L-24916) is hereby set aside,and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued on August 17, 1965 is hereby made permanent. Therespondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform as successor agency of the Land Tenure Administrationmay now proceed with the due implementation of Republic Act 3120 in accordance with its termsand provisions. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino,JJ., concur.

Fernandez, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J ., concurring:

It is undoubted that the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Teehankee, with his customarylucidity and thoroughness, is in accordance with our past decisions on the matter. Reflection on the

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innovation introduced by the present Constitution on local government, did, however, give rise todoubts on my part as to the continuing authoritativeness ofProvince of Zamboanga del Norte v. Cityof Zamboanga 1 and Salas v. Jarencio, 2 the two principal opinions relied upon, both of whichdecisions were promulgated before the effectivity of the new fundamental law. Hence this separateopinion setting forth the reasons why I join the rest of my brethren.

1. In the declaration of principles and state policies3

it is specifically provided: "The State shallguarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure theirfullest development as self-reliant communities." 4 What was succinctly expressed therein was mademore definite in the article on local government. 5 Its first section reads: "The territorial and politicalsubdivisions of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barrios." 6 Then comesthis provision: "The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafterbe amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive andaccountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among thedifferent local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for thequalifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials,and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, anychange in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of thevotes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 7 After which there is this limitation on the power oflocal government: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established inthe local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscitein the unit or units affected." 8 The autonomy of cities and municipalities is guaranteed in thesewords: "(1) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities andmunicipalities with respect to component barrios, shall ensure that the acts of their component unitsare with the scope of their assigned powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities, as determined bystandards established in the local government code, shall be independent of province." 9 Thencomes the last section: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sourcesof revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." 10

The objective is thus crystal-clear and well-defined. The goal is the fullest autonomy to local

government units consistent with the basic theory of a unitary, not a federal, polity. It is the hope thatthereby they will attain "their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 11 It is more than justthe expression of an aspiration as attest by one of the articles of the Constitution devoted to such asubject. 12 It was not so under the 1935 charter. On this point, all that appeared therein was: "ThePresident shall ... exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided bylaw ... . 13 According to Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil, 14 "the deliberation of the ConstitutionalConvention show that the grant of the supervisory authority to the Chief Executive in this regard wasin the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body, mainly between thehistorical view which recognizes the right of local self-government ... and the legal theory whichsanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local governments .. . The result wasthe recognition of the power of supervision and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwisewould be an imperium in imperio to the detriment of a strong national government." 15 For the aboveprovision starts with the vesting of control in the President "of all the executive departments,

bureaus, or offices," as distinguished from "general supervision over all local governments as maybe provided by law." 16 The difference in wording is highly significant. So it was stressed by the thenJustice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion in Pelaez v. Auditor General: 17 "The power of control underthis provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as maybe vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the nationalgovernment, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is deniedby the Constitution to theExecutive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamentallaw permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments orthe officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President

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cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope oftheir authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused topass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it thatthe corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may hevote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, nomatter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular

municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of thecorresponding provincial board." 18

2. So it was that under the 1935 Constitution, the national government when acting through theexecutive had only such general supervisory authority as was provided by statute. There was norestriction, however, on the legislative body to create or to abolish local government units. What wasmore, the powers vested in them could be expanded or diminished depending on the will ofCongress. It could hardly be assumed therefore that under the previous charter, they could justifiablylay claim to real autonomy. For so long as the legislation itself took care of delineating the mattersthat were appropriately within the scope of their competence, there could be no objection to itsvalidity. No constitutional problem arose. Things have changed radically. We start with the declaredprinciple of the State guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of local government units. 19 Wehave likewise noted the earnestness of the framers as to the attainment of such declared objectiveas set forth in the specific article 20 on the matter. It is made obligatory on the National Assembly toenact a local government code. What is more, unlike the general run of statutes, it cannot beamended except by a majority vote of all its members. It is made to include "a more responsive andaccountable local government structure with an effective system of recall," with an expressedreference to "qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties oflocal officials, [as well as] all other matters relating to the organization and operation of localunits." 21 Mention is likewise made of the "powers, responsibilities, and resources," 22 items that areidentified with local autonomy. As if that were not enough, the last sentence of this particularprovision reads: "However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effectuntil ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 23 To the extent thatthe last section requires that the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of a boundary of aprovince, city, municipality, or barrio, must be in accordance with the criteria established in the local

government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in suchunit or units, the adherence to the basic principle of local self-government is quite clear. 24Equallysignificant is the stress on the competence of a province, city, municipality or barrio "to create itsown sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations as may be provided bylaw." 25 The care and circumspection with which the framers saw to the enjoyment of real local self-government not only in terms of administration but also in terms of resources is thus manifest. Theirintent is unmistakable. Unlike the case under the 1935 Constitution, there is thus a clearmanifestation of the presumption now in favor of a local government unit. It is a well-nigh completedeparture from what was. Nor should it be ignored that a highly urbanized city "shall be independent"not only of the national government but also of a province. 26 Would it not follow then that under thepresent dispensation, the moment property is transferred to it by the national government, its controlover the same should be as extensive and as broad as possible. Considerations of the above naturegave rise to doubts on my part as to the decisions in the Zamboanga del Norte and Salas cases still

retaining unimpaired their doctrinal force. Would this be a case of Republic Act No. 3120 beingrendered inoperative by virtue of its repugnancy to the present Constitution? 27

3. Nonetheless, such doubts were set at rest by two considerations. The opinion of JusticeTeehankee makes reference to the ratio decidendiofSalas v. Jarencio as to the trust characterimpressed on communal property of a municipal corporation, even if already titled. As set forth in theopinion: "The Court [in Salas v. Jarencio] reaffirmed the established general rule that 'regardless ofthe source of classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired withits own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the

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benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such landssubject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes itscreation to it as agent for the performance of a part of its public work, municipality being but asubdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legalsituation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use' andstressed that 'the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila

with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name registered title is notquestioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land coveredthereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." 28

This is a doctrine which to my mind is unaffected by grant of extensive local autonomy under thepresent Constitution. Its basis is the regalian doctrine. It is my view that under the Constitution, aswas the case under the 1935 charter, the holding of a municipal corporation as a unit of state doesnot impair the plenary power of the national government exercising dominical rights to dispose of it ina manner it sees fit, subject to applicable constitutional limitations as to the citizenship of thegrantee. An excerpt from Lee Hong Hok v. David29 is relevant: "As there are overtones indicative ofskepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between thegovernment authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept ofsovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matterfurther. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter ofdominium. The use of thisterm is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In suchcapacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, includingtheir disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion thatexisted during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence ofres

publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was arecognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that'Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from theCrown ... .' That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by thepresent Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the headthereof." 30

4. Much more compelling is the reliance on the opinion of Justice Teehankee on the even morefundamental principle of social justice, which was given further stress and a wider scope in thepresent Constitution. According to the opinion of the Court: "There as here, the Court holds that the

Acts in question (Republic Act 4118 in Salasand Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intendedto implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for thelandless and that they were not 'intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirmits character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the NationalGovernment: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to theoccupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminentdomain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of theConstitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property." 31 It istrue of course, that a local government unit, if expressly authorized by statute, could make use of itsproperty in the same manner. It does appear, however, that there was no such grant of authority.

Moreover, the national government is not only in a better position to make a reality of the socialjustice principle but also is subject to less pressure on the part of the affluent, at least where thedistribution of state property is concerned. It is thus a more efficient instrument than a province, cityor municipality to attain this highly desirable goal. In an economy essentially based on capitalism,where the power of concentrated wealth cannot be underestimated, the countervailing force exertedby a strong national government sensitive to the needs of our countrymen, deeply mired in themorass of poverty, the disinherited of fortune, can make itself much more effectively felt. If only forthat cogent reason then, I am prepared to ignore whatever doubts or misgivings I did entertain at theoutset.

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Hence this concurrence.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J ., concurring:

It is undoubted that the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Teehankee, with his customarylucidity and thoroughness, is in accordance with our past decisions on the matter. Reflection on theinnovation introduced by the present Constitution on local government, did, however, give rise todoubts on my part as to the continuing authoritativeness ofProvince of Zamboanga del Norte v. Cityof Zamboanga 1 and Salas v. Jarencio, 2 the two principal opinions relied upon, both of whichdecisions were promulgated before the effectivity of the new fundamental law. Hence this separateopinion setting forth the reasons why I join the rest of my brethren.

1. In the declaration of principles and state policies 3 it is specifically provided: "The State shallguarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure theirfullest development as self-reliant communities." 4 What was succinctly expressed therein was mademore definite in the article on local government. 5 Its first section reads: "The territorial and politicalsubdivisions of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barrios." 6 Then comesthis provision: "The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafterbe amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive andaccountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among thedifferent local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for thequalifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials,and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, anychange in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of thevotes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 7 After which there is this limitation on the power oflocal government: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established inthe local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscitein the unit or units affected." 8 The autonomy of cities and municipalities is guaranteed in thesewords: "(1) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities andmunicipalities with respect to component barrios, shall ensure that the acts of their component unitsare with the scope of their assigned powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities, as determined bystandards established in the local government code, shall be independent of province." 9 Thencomes the last section: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sourcesof revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." 10

The objective is thus crystal-clear and well-defined. The goal is the fullest autonomy to local

government units consistent with the basic theory of a unitary, not a federal, polity. It is the hope thatthereby they will attain "their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 11 It is more than justthe expression of an aspiration as attest by one of the articles of the Constitution devoted to such asubject. 12 It was not so under the 1935 charter. On this point, all that appeared therein was: "ThePresident shall ... exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided bylaw ... . 13 According to Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil, 14 "the deliberation of the ConstitutionalConvention show that the grant of the supervisory authority to the Chief Executive in this regard wasin the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body, mainly between thehistorical view which recognizes the right of local self-government ... and the legal theory which

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sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local governments .. . The result wasthe recognition of the power of supervision and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwisewould be an imperium in imperio to the detriment of a strong national government." 15 For the aboveprovision starts with the vesting of control in the President "of all the executive departments,bureaus, or offices," as distinguished from "general supervision over all local governments as maybe provided by law." 16 The difference in wording is highly significant. So it was stressed by the then

Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion in Pelaez v. Auditor General:17

"The power of control underthis provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as maybe vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the nationalgovernment, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is deniedby the Constitution to theExecutive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamentallaw permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments orthe officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the Presidentcannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope oftheir authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused topass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it thatthe corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may hevote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, nomatter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular

municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of thecorresponding provincial board." 18

2. So it was that under the 1935 Constitution, the national government when acting through theexecutive had only such general supervisory authority as was provided by statute. There was norestriction, however, on the legislative body to create or to abolish local government units. What wasmore, the powers vested in them could be expanded or diminished depending on the will ofCongress. It could hardly be assumed therefore that under the previous charter, they could justifiablylay claim to real autonomy. For so long as the legislation itself took care of delineating the mattersthat were appropriately within the scope of their competence, there could be no objection to itsvalidity. No constitutional problem arose. Things have changed radically. We start with the declaredprinciple of the State guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of local government units. 19 We

have likewise noted the earnestness of the framers as to the attainment of such declared objectiveas set forth in the specific article 20 on the matter. It is made obligatory on the National Assembly toenact a local government code. What is more, unlike the general run of statutes, it cannot beamended except by a majority vote of all its members. It is made to include "a more responsive andaccountable local government structure with an effective system of recall," with an expressedreference to "qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties oflocal officials, [as well as] all other matters relating to the organization and operation of localunits." 21 Mention is likewise made of the "powers, responsibilities, and resources," 22 items that areidentified with local autonomy. As if that were not enough, the last sentence of this particularprovision reads: "However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effectuntil ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 23 To the extent thatthe last section requires that the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of a boundary of aprovince, city, municipality, or barrio, must be in accordance with the criteria established in the local

government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in suchunit or units, the adherence to the basic principle of local self-government is quite clear. 24Equallysignificant is the stress on the competence of a province, city, municipality or barrio "to create itsown sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations as may be provided bylaw." 25 The care and circumspection with which the framers saw to the enjoyment of real local self-government not only in terms of administration but also in terms of resources is thus manifest. Theirintent is unmistakable. Unlike the case under the 1935 Constitution, there is thus a clearmanifestation of the presumption now in favor of a local government unit. It is a well-nigh completedeparture from what was. Nor should it be ignored that a highly urbanized city "shall be independent"

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not only of the national government but also of a province. 26 Would it not follow then that under thepresent dispensation, the moment property is transferred to it by the national government, its controlover the same should be as extensive and as broad as possible. Considerations of the above naturegave rise to doubts on my part as to the decisions in the Zamboanga del Norte and Salas cases stillretaining unimpaired their doctrinal force. Would this be a case of Republic Act No. 3120 beingrendered inoperative by virtue of its repugnancy to the present Constitution? 27

3. Nonetheless, such doubts were set at rest by two considerations. The opinion of JusticeTeehankee makes reference to the ratio decidendiofSalas v. Jarencio as to the trust characterimpressed on communal property of a municipal corporation, even if already titled. As set forth in theopinion: "The Court [in Salas v. Jarencio] reaffirmed the established general rule that 'regardless ofthe source of classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired withits own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for thebenefit of its inhabitants, whether it be governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such landssubject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes itscreation to it as agent for the performance of a part of its public work, municipality being but asubdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legalsituation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use' andstressed that 'the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manilawith its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name registered title is notquestioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land coveredthereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." 28

This is a doctrine which to my mind is unaffected by grant of extensive local autonomy under thepresent Constitution. Its basis is the regalian doctrine. It is my view that under the Constitution, aswas the case under the 1935 charter, the holding of a municipal corporation as a unit of state doesnot impair the plenary power of the national government exercising dominical rights to dispose of it ina manner it sees fit, subject to applicable constitutional limitations as to the citizenship of thegrantee. An excerpt from Lee Hong Hok v. David29 is relevant: "As there are overtones indicative ofskepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between thegovernment authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of

sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matterfurther. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter ofdominium. The use of thisterm is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In suchcapacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, includingtheir disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion thatexisted during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence ofres

publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was arecognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that'Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from theCrown ... .' That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by thepresent Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the headthereof." 30

4. Much more compelling is the reliance on the opinion of Justice Teehankee on the even morefundamental principle of social justice, which was given further stress and a wider scope in thepresent Constitution. According to the opinion of the Court: "There as here, the Court holds that the

Acts in question (Republic Act 4118 in Salasand Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intendedto implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for thelandless and that they were not 'intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirmits character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the NationalGovernment: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to theoccupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent

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domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of theConstitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property." 31 It istrue of course, that a local government unit, if expressly authorized by statute, could make use of itsproperty in the same manner. It does appear, however, that there was no such grant of authority.Moreover, the national government is not only in a better position to make a reality of the social

justice principle but also is subject to less pressure on the part of the affluent, at least where the

distribution of state property is concerned. It is thus a more efficient instrument than a province, cityor municipality to attain this highly desirable goal. In an economy essentially based on capitalism,where the power of concentrated wealth cannot be underestimated, the countervailing force exertedby a strong national government sensitive to the needs of our countrymen, deeply mired in themorass of poverty, the disinherited of fortune, can make itself much more effectively felt. If only forthat cogent reason then, I am prepared to ignore whatever doubts or misgivings I did entertain at theoutset.

Hence this concurrence.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131501 July 14, 2004

FRANCISCO ZARATE, petitioner,vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRECIOSA T. DAVILA, REGALADO TORIAGA, PATRIA TORIAGA,RENATO TORIAGA, ROSALINDA TORIAGA, RYL TORIAGA, PROBO TORIAGA, JOSE

CORPUS, MARCELINITO HONORIO, JOSE MELO, LOLITO TALAGA, FELIPE VILLANUEVA,DOMINADOR TAGBALAY, MAXIMO VILLANUEVA, and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.28241 affirming the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, in LandRegistration Case No. 273.

The Antecedents
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As gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the factual backdrop and antecedentalproceedings are as follows:

This is an application for registration of title filed by appellant Francisco Zarate on 27December 1976 to have his three parcels of land brought under the operation of the LandRegistration Act. The subject parcels of land contain a land area of 68.2787 hectares and

10.5135 hectares, located at Dumatiad, Tangalan, Aklan, and of 3.8500 hectares, located atAfga, Tangalan, Aklan. The said parcels have been subdivided into six (6) lots.

Appellant claims that the first two parcels of land which formed only one parcel of landconsisting of about 78.7922 hectares originally belonged to the spouses Solomon Tirol andVenancia Hontiveros. When they died in 1905 and 1913, respectively, the said parcels ofland were inherited by their children Gregorio, Ignacio, Lamberto, Eleanor and Carmen, allsurnamed Tirol.

On 26 May 1923, they donated said parcel to Josefino Tirol, son of Gregorio, and AngelesArcenas in consideration of their marriage (Exhs. (sic) "Z"). Said land was later subdividedinto two, one with an area of 68.2787 hectares and the other 10.5135 hectares which was

later sold to herein appellant on 7 January 1976 (Exh. "HH"). The third parcel (with an areaof 3.8500 hectares) was inherited by Gregorio Tirol, father of Josefino, from his ancestors.When Gregorio died, Josefino inherited the same. He later sold the said land to hereinappellant on 11 March 1976.

Applicant claims that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in peaceful possessionand usufruct of the property for over eighty (80) years, religiously paying the taxes thereon.Nobody disturbed their possession and usufruct for more than fifty (50) years, untiloppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpuz, Dominador Tagbalay, Marcelinito Honorio,Lolito Talaga, Felipe Villanueva and Jose Molo, entered and occupied portions of the landsometime in 1970.

Oppositors Preciosa Tirol Davila, on the other hand, contends that Lot 1, Plan Psu-06-

000253 with an area of 530,310 sq. meters situated in Tangalan, Aklan, owned by her, waspreviously the property of Ignacio Tirol, her father. When Ignacio died, the said lot wasentrusted to Josefino Tirol, who was his lawyer and first cousin. She did not have any taxdeclarations because Josefino assured her that he would be responsible for them. Preciosadenied that the said property was donated by his father to Josefino and that the signatureappearing on the deed of donation was forged.

Oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines gave another version. It claims that thequestioned lots are owned by spouses Valeriano Molo and Lutgarda Molo. The said parcelwhich consists of about 190,922 square meters located at Afga, Tangalan, Aklan, wasmortgaged to the bank. When the couple failed to pay their indebtedness, the mortgage wasforeclosed and the land became the property of the bank in whose name the land is now

declared for taxation purposes.

Oppositors Regalado, Patria, Renato, Rosalinda, Ryl and Probo, all surnamed Toriaga,likewise, contend that the land claimed by them which is about 4 hectares in area andsituated in Afga, Tangalan, Aklan, originally belonged to Eulalio Tanasa, who possessed itbefore 1949. When he died, the land was inherited by his daughter Prima who was marriedto Probio (sic) Toriaga. Prima continuously resided on the land until her death in 1977. Theland passed to her son, Regalado Toriaga, Sr., husband of oppositor Patria and father of theother oppositors. The said land is declared in the name of the Toriagas.

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All the oppositors claim that the land applied for by appellant was unoccupied and coveredwith wild trees and cogon. They cleared the land, built their houses and planted mangoes,casoy, jackfruit, bananas, camote, and cassava. Neither Josefino Tirol nor Francisco Zaratepossessed the land nor enjoyed the products thereof.

Oppositor Republic of the Philippines, for its part, claims that the subject land was timberland

or unclassified forest. In 1970, at the time ofoppositors occupation, the lands were coveredwith wild trees and thickets and was (sic) released as alienable and disposable under LandClassification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A only on 16 April 1973.

Since there were many claimants, the trial court commissioned a geodetic engineer todetermine the different portions claimed by the applicant and the oppositors. Thecommissioners report shows the following claims:

Regalado Toriaga, et al. - 4.1444 hec.

Maximo Villanueva - 4.3572 "

Jose Molo - 3.7575"

Jose Corpuz - 6.3555"

Marcelino (sic) Honorio - 7.5123"

Dominador Tagbalay - 2.6496"

(pp. 1,310-1,313, Vol. IV, Record)

Oppositor DBP also claimed an area of 19.092 hectares while Preciosa Davila is also claiming anarea of 53.0310 hectares of Lot 1.

After the contending parties presented their evidence, the trial court on 26 April 1990 renderedjudgment dismissing the application of title filed by applicant Francisco Zarate, and the claims ofprivate oppositors.

Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, applicant filed this appeal assigning the following errors:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ADVERSE CLAIMS OFOWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THEPHILIPPINES AND ALL THE OTHER OPPOSITORS ARE FALSE AND FRAUDULENTWITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND LAW.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPLICANT-APPELLANT,INCLUDING THE POSSESSIONS AND USUFRUCTS OF HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST, HAS BEEN IN POSSESSION AND USUFRUCT OF THE LANDS SUBJECTMATTER OF THIS PROCEEDING FOR OVER 80 YEARS AND FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL

AND HE, THEREFORE, ACQUIRED VESTED RIGHTS THEREON.

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III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPROVING THE APPLICATION FORREGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LAND WHICH THE APPLICANT BROUGHT (sic) TO HAVEHIS THREE PARCELS OF LAND BROUGHT UNDER THE OPERATION OF THE LANDREGISTRATION ACT AND TO HAVE THE TITLES THERETO IN THE EXCLUSIVE NAME

OF THE APPLICANT REGISTERED AND CONFIRMED.3

On February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trialcourt.

The applicant-appellant, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review contending that:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONYOF GEODETIC ENGINEER RONDARIO AND RESPONDENT (OPPOSITOR) MAXIMOVILLANUEVA AND NOT TO THAT OF THE PETITIONER (APPLICANT) AND HIS

WITNESSES, RELATIVE TO THE TRUE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT PARCELSOF LAND.

II

THE CLAIMS OF THE RESPONDENTS (OPPOSITORS) ARE RIDDLED WITHINCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES, WHICH INCONSISTENCIES ANDIMPROBABILITIES ONLY STRENGTHEN PETITIONERS (APPLICANTS) CLAIMS.

III

A STRICT APPLICATION OF THE RULE REGARDING THE RELEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS

AS EMBODIED IN THE CASE OF VALLARTA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,151 SCRA 679 (1987), WOULD WORK SERIOUS AND IRREPARABLE INJUSTICE TOTHE PETITIONER APPLICANT).4

The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence and probative weight to thetestimony of Geodetic Engineer Jose Rondario and his Certification that the subject property waswithin the alienable and disposable area of Tangalan, Aklan, certified and released as such underLand Classification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A on April 16, 1973. He asserts that the appellatecourt should have considered his testimonial and documentary evidence, that the property subject ofhis application hardly comes close to being a forest or timberland, and that there were hardly any bigtrees on the property. The petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest even planted bananas,cassava, coconut trees, and camotes on the property.

The petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Vallarta vs. Intermediate AppellateCourt,5should not be applied so as to prejudice his vested rights over the subject property. Thepetitioner asserts that for a period of eighty years before 1973, he and his predecessors-in-interesthad been in public, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession of the property. He cites the rulingof this Court inAnkron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands to fortify his plea.6

On the other hand, the trial court declared that:
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To find out the real nature of the lands, the Court examined the testimony of the witnesses

Witness Jose Rondario, for the oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines, and surveyorof the lands of the applicant, testified as follows:

ATTY. TEJADA:

Q You stated that you have gone over the property that you have surveyed for ValerianoMolo, can you tell the court what [were the] improvements, if there are (sic) any, during thesurvey in 1974?

A When I execute[d] my survey, I found out that there is no(t) any (sic) plant only kaingin.

x x x

Q When you conducted the survey for Valeriano Molo in 1974, were you approached by anyperson?

A There is (sic) nobody questioning me during my survey because actually there was a(were) people making kaingin there I think that (sic) was the tenant of Valeriano Molo."(Tsn, Melgar, November 5, 1987, pp. 7 and 13).

Witness Maximo Villanueva (one of the oppositors) declared:

ATTY. TAPLAC:

Q When you first occupied this land in question, what was the condition of the land?

A Filled with thickets and second group forest.

Q How big are (sic) the trees found when you first occupied this land?

A Some were big trees because we used to get (sic) our materials in building our house.

Q Were there signs of occupation when you first entered the land?

A There was no sign that there was a previous occupation (sic)."

x x x

COURT:

Q What kind of trees were existing on the land when you occupied it?

A Wild trees not planted by people.

Q There were no coconut trees existing at the time you occupied the land?

A No, Your Honor." (TSN, Peniano, January 31, 1990, pp. 9-10 and 17).

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Witness Agustin Bautista, an employee of the Forest Management Sector of the CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Office, Kalibo, Aklan, testifying for the oppositor Director ofLands, averred:

ATTY. TORRE:

Q In this land classification map 10-A, which is described as alienable and disposable, wouldyou mind informing this Court as to what is the status of this Project No. 10-A previouslyclassified as alienable and disposable?

A That is timberland. Previously, it is not being classified alienable and disposable.

x x x

Q But previous to April 16, 1973, what is (sic) the status of the land then?

A It is (sic) timberland. It is (sic) not classified as alienable and disposable." (Tsn, Gonzales,February 1, 1990, pp. 3 and 5).

Evidently, the three parcels of land in question were forest lands. The applicants predecessor-in-interest, Josefino Tirol, and the private oppositors, who claimed possession over the area did notand could not have acquired ownership over the said lands considering that the area was theninalienable and non-disposable.

In the present case, the lands applied for title were released as alienable and disposable only onApril 16, 1973 (Exhs. "5-RP" and "6-RP") as per Project No. 10-A, Land Classification Map No. 2779.The application for registration was filed on December 27, 1976. Since the applicant, and likewise,the private oppositors, possessed the land from the time of release on April 16, 1973, for only three

(3) years and eight (8) months prior to the filing of the application, the thirty (30) year possessionrequired by law was not complied with.7

Moreover, to warrant registration, proof of possession must be "conclusive" (Municipality of Santiagovs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734), or "well-nigh incontrovertible" (Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61SCRA 146). The applicant was not able to prove such possession. The bulk of the evidencesubmitted revealed numerous occupants on the lands. The survey plan submitted by ReynaldoLopez, a geodetic engineer commissioned by the Court to determine the different portions claimedby the applicant and the oppositors (Records, p. 1,314), showed that of the three parcels of land witha total area of eighty one (81) hectares, the private oppositors claim the following:

Regalado Toriaga, et al.(Lot A);

- 4.1554 hectares

Maximo Villanueva(Lot B);

- 4.3572 hectares

Jose Molo(Lot C);

- 3.7575 hectares
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Jose Corpus(Lot D);

- 6.3556 hectares

Marcelinito Honorio(Lot E); and

- 7.5123 hectares

Dominador Tagbalay(Lot F).

- 2.6496 hectares

The evidence likewise showed that Valeriano Molo, now substituted by the Development Bank of thePhilippines, claims 19.092 hectares, and oppositor Preciosa Tirol Davila, 53.0310 hectares. Theaforementioned oppositors claim that they are in actual, physical possession of their respectiveportions. It is admitted by the applicant in his amended application and in his evidence presentedduring the trial that oppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpus, Marcelinito Honorio, JoselitoHonorio, Dominador Tagbalay, Jose Molo, Valeriano Molo (now substituted by the DevelopmentBank of the Philippines), and the heirs of Regalado Toriaga, Sr., occupy portions of the land through"illegal entry, unauthorized squatting or usurpation." More than one-half (1/2) of the total area appliedfor registration not being in the possession of the applicant, he cannot, thus, claim exclusive and

notorious possession under claim of ownership, nor can he support his claim of title throughacquisitive prescription.

The Court, therefore, holds that the applicant, as well as the private oppositors, failed to prove bysufficient evidence that they have complied with the requisites provided by law to warrant registrationof title to the three (3) parcels of land.8

The Court of Appeals concurred in toto with the findings of the trial court and cited the ruling ofthis Court in Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court9in ruling against the appellants.

We find the petition to be barren of merit.

The decisive issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming theappealed decision dismissing the petitioners application, on the ground that he failed to proveownership of the three parcels of land subject of his application under Section 48(b) ofCommonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

The question raised by the petitioner, whether the parcels of land subject of his application are forestlands, and whether the petitioner, by himself, and his predecessors-in-interest were in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for at leastthirty (30) years immediately preceding his application in 1976, are questions of fact which the trialcourt and the Court of Appeals resolved in the negative. Such factual findings are generallyconclusive in this Court and will not be reviewed on appeal.10This Court is not a trier of facts in acase appealed to it under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There are, to be sure,exceptions to this rule. However, we have carefully reviewed the records and find no justification todeviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts that the subject property was, before April16, 1973, forest land, and that the petitioner failed to prove his claim of title over the parcels of landsubject of his application under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and thelegal conclusions based on their findings.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State isthe source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of suchpatrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
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private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11Consequently, the burden of proof toovercome the presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying forregistration.12Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to aprivate person, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.13

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the publicdomain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not beenperfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where theland is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of titletherefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,c

Documents

For Digest 6.28