FM 9-15

8 MAY 1996

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:DENNIS J. REIMER

General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSONActing Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army01530

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-1lE, requirementsfor FM 9-15, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations (Qty rqr block no. 0850).

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996-728-027/40097

FM 9-15

PREFACE

This FM prescribes EOD doctrine for conducting EOD operations during war and OOTW. It develops anddefines the EOD perspective on the Army’s keystone warfighting doctrine described in FM 100-5. This manualidentifies the EOD mission, organization, roles, capabilities, and employment to support national security strategy.It serves as a guide for commanders and staff who will use EOD support for operations on conventional, chemical,nuclear, and improvised explosive ordnance. It also provides the EOD unit commander, staff, and personnelgeneral and technical guidance for conducting EOD unit operations.

FM 9-15 discusses several doctrinal changes: the implementation of the heavy and light EOD response teamconcept, the effect on EOD of the removal of the Army’s tactical nuclear weapons from its inventories, and the roleof Army EOD in the postnuclear Army. The contents of this manual are consistent with FM 100-5.

This publication implements the following STANAGs:

STANAG 2002, Warning Signs for the Marking of Contaminated or Dangerous Land Areas, CompleteEquipment, Supplies, and Stores, Edition 7.

STANAG 2079, Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control, Edition 4.

STANAG 2143, Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOR/EOD),Edition 4.

STANAG 2389, Minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel,Edition 1.

STANAG 2834, The Operation of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical InformationCenter (EODTIC), Edition 2.

STANAG 2929, Airfie!d Damage Repair (ADR), Edition 4.

STANAG 2957, International System (SI) used by Armed Forces in the Nuclear Field, Edition 3.

The proponent of this publication is HQ, TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form2028 (or in 2028 format) directly to Commander, USACASCOM&FL, Training Directorate, Attn: ATCL-AM, 801Lee Avenue, Fort Lee, VA 23801-1713.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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CHAPTER 1

THE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CHALLENGE

This chapter implements STANAGs 2079, 2389, and 2929.

EOD service helps preserve the commander’s combat power. It enables the commander to integrate and coordinatea variety of functions to prevent degeneration of combat power at the operational and tactical levels. The challengefor EOD is to help maintain the maneuver, firepower, sustainment, and protection functions across the full range ofArmy operations.

THE THREAT

The strategic environment, even after the ColdWar, is both dangerous and ambiguous. Increasedinstability in the world has resulted in regionalconflicts, civil wars, insurgences, terrorist attacks,drug trafficking, and a variety of attempts atintimidation. These challenges arise even duringtimes of relative peace. With this threat, UXO andIEDs will reduce the commander’s combat powerand national political, economic, military, and infor-mational power during OOTW.

Because of this threat, commanders at all levelsmust incorporate EOD support into their planningprocess. This will ensure commanders will be ableto respond to these worldwide strategic challengesacross a full range of operations as part of a jointteam.

The continuing development of foreign and UShigh-technology munitions that disperse numeroussubmunitions and area denial ordnance has led to theproliferation of UXO. These munitions are availablefor a range of weapon systems, including artillery,ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and bombs. Onthe battlefield, UXO can be conventional HE;chemical, biological, or nuclear ordnance; or IEDs.UXO limits battlefield mobility, denies the use ofcritical assets, and threatens to injure or kill soldiersat levels unprecedented in past wars. The vastamounts of UXO found in Iraq and Kuwait duringand atter Operation Desert Storm testify to theincreased proliferation.

All units in the Army must be able to cope withUXO on the battlefield. This calls for awarenesstraining for all soldiers and for procedures that limitthe effects of UXO on operations. Refer to FM 21-16 for more information on the UXO problem. At

times, EOD units will operate jointly with other non-EOD units, other services, or allied EOD units toperform counter-UXO operations.

ARMY OPERATIONS TENETS

Five tenets of Army operations are described inFM 100-5: initiative, agility, depth, synchronization,and versatility. How EOD relates to each isdescribed below.

Initiative

Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle byaction. It implies an offensive spirit in conductingall operations. Applied to the force as a whole, itrequires a constant effort to force the enemy toconform to our operational purpose and tempo whilekeeping our own freedom of action. Applied toindividual soldiers and leaders, it requires awillingness and ability to act independently withinthe framework of the higher commander’s intent. Asin the past, EOD must excel at independent action toprovide time-critical support across the entirespectrum of Army operations. EOD must anticipaterequirements and act before the needs are identifiedat higher echelons.

Agility

Agility is friendly forces acting faster than theenemy. It is a prerequisite for seizing and holdingthe initiative. Such greater quickness permits therapid concentration of friendly strength againstenemy vulnerabilities. EOD is task-organized toensure a rapid and focused response.

Depth

Depth is the extension of operations in space,time, and resources. High technology weapons andthe enemy’s capability to deliver them require EOD

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support throughout the theater of operations. EODprotects the commander’s freedom of action andconserves flexibility and endurance. EOD preservesoperational plans and coordination by eliminating orreducing the hazards of conventional, nuclear,chemical, and biological munitions and IEDs thatthreaten personnel, military operations, criticalfacilities, materiel, and whatever else is needed tosustain combat operations.

Synchronization

Synchronization uses time, space, andresources to maximize combat power at the decisivetime and place. It is both a process and a result.Synchronized activities (such as intelligencepreparation, logistics, and fires) coordinated withmaneuver forces lead to synchronized operations.EOD actions to neutralize the threat of conventional,nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions andIEDs serve both the synchronization process andresult by providing protection, mobility, firepower,security, and intelligence. EOD actions requireexplicit coordination among the various units andactivities participating in any operation. EOD plansits activities to quickly focus assets within othersynchronized activities such as maneuver, logistics,and intelligence. EOD commanders must ensure aunity of purpose. This requires anticipation, masteryof time-space-resource relationships, and completeunderstanding of the ways in which friendly andenemy capabilities interact.

Versatility

Versatility is the ability to shift focus, to tailorforces, and to move from one mission to anotherrapidly and efficiently. It implies being multi-functional, operating across regions throughout thefull range of military operations, and performing attactical, operational, and strategic levels. Versatilitydenotes performing in many roles during war andOOTW. It allows for the smooth transition from onemission to another. EOD is equally adept at clearingUXO from critical facilities, providing support to theUS Secret Service for presidential and VIPprotection, or examining, identifying, and reportingnew and unusual explosive ordnance for technicalintelligence purposes.

Versatility requires supported units and EOD tointerface on a consistent basis. This permits thetailoring of EOD support to the supported units’

mission/function. It also fosters an understanding ofeach other’s capabilities and limitations.

COMBAT POWER

Commanders generate combat power using thefour combat power elements of maneuver, firepower,protection, and leadership to anticipate futureoperations. These elements are supported by theeffects of battlefield functions, tactical units, andjoint operations and missions. Their effectiveapplication and sustainment with each other willdecide the outcome of campaigns, major operations,battles, and engagements. EOD performs animportant role in preserving the commander’scombat power.

Maneuver

Maneuver is the first element of combat power.It is the movement of combat forces to secure or tokeep an advantageous position. Moving andpositioning units during deployment to a theater andwithin a theater before operations are both forms ofmaneuver. They greatly influence the outcome ofbattles and campaigns. Maneuver depends uponmobility to mass forces, attain surprise, reducevulnerability, exploit success, and preserve freedomof action. It is concentrating forces at decisive pointsto achieve surprise, psychological shock, physicalmomentum, and dominance.

The positional advantages gained by groundmaneuver forces are unique to maneuver warfare.Seizing. holding, and denying terrain leads tovictory and the ultimate attainment of strategic ends.Since denial of terrain limits maneuver, UXO willthus have a large impact on operations.Furthermore. the enemy will attempt its ownmaneuvering to get our forces into disadvantageouspositions and subject to an ambush.

High technology weapons and the enemy’scapabilities to deliver them may severely restrictmaneuver. In addition. the availability of ICMs hasdramatically restricted maneuver on the battlefield.

EOD protects the freedom of maneuver. Teamsquickly respond to assist the maneuver element byidentifying, advising on. and (if necessary)neutralizing UXO, EOD can also provide technicalassistance to maneuver elements. including theengineers.

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The breeching of minefield is an engineermatter. The proliferation and advancing technologyof area denial submunitions and scatterable minesblurs the distinction between mines and UXO. EODunits will neutralize area denial submunitions andscatterable mines (UXO). All units must be able toapply countermine warfare techniques when facedwith these types of munitions. Any unit that cannotself-extract from scatterable minefield risks beingfixed in place and destroyed.

Firepower

Firepower is the second element of combatpower. It provides destructive force and destroys theenemy’s ability and will to fight. Our firepowerfacilitates maneuver by suppressing the enemy’s firesand disrupting the movement of forces. Used apartfrom maneuver, it can destroy, delay, or disrupt theenemy’s critical capabilities and uncommitted forces.The extended ranges and lethality of direct-fireweapons, precision-guided munitions, and accurate,massed fires make firepower devastatingly effectiveagainst troops, materiel, and facilities. Precisionfires enhance our own maneuverability, while areadenial fires reduce the enemy’s.

On the other hand, UXO and area denialmunitions generated by enemy fires may restrict thesteady supply of the proper munitions in quantitiesadequate to ensure that the enemy remainscontinuously vulnerable. To ensure that this steadyflow is not hindered, EOD acts to eliminate orreduce the hazards of munitions and IEDs thatthreaten personnel, military operations, facilities,and materiel. EOD can also restore thecommander’s firepower when dislodging a projectilestuck in an artillery tube.

Protection

Protection is the third element of combatpower. Protection conserves the fighting potential ofa force so that commanders can apply it at thedecisive time and place. It has four components --OPSEC and deception, soldier morale, safety, andfratricide prevention.

Operations Security. EOD counters the residualeffects of enemy firepower and maneuver. EODidentifies, provides recommendations on, conductstechnical intelligence for, and, if required,immediately neutralizes UXO and ICMs thatthreaten activities critical to maximum combat

power. The enemy firepower may be enhanced andour maneuver ability diminished through the use ofspecial operations forces or small groups trained toconduct raids against critical targets. These forcesmay utilize IEDs against such targets. EOD isprepared to locate, identify, and eliminate this threat.

Soldier Morale. High soldier morale means soldiersare healthy and able to maintain their fighting spirit.Tactical commanders take care of their soldier’sbasic health needs and prevent unnecessary exposureto debilitating conditions. EOD service helpsmaintain soldier morale on the battlefield in twoareas -- safety and fratricide prevention. EODprovides advice and training on UXO hazards to allsoldiers. Additionally, EOD reduces or eliminatesthe effects of UXO wherever found.

Safety. Safety is the third component of protection,Commanders must embrace safety in all they do.Safety in training, planning, and operations iscrucial to successful combat operations and thepreservation of combat power.

EOD ensures that safe training is performed bydisposing of UXO on dedicated impact areas andtemporary impact areas. During planning, EODtechnicians may advise the commander of thehazards associated with maneuver through an areacovered with ICMs and train his soldiers on UXOrecognition and counter-UXO procedures. Technicalintelligence tasks performed by EOD may providethe commander valuable insight concerning thethreat of new, first-seen foreign ordnance.

Fratricide Prevention. The fourth component ofprotection is preventing fratricide, the unintentionalkilling of our own soldiers by our own fire. Thepower and range of modern weapons and theintensity and tempo of battle increase the likelihoodof fratricide.

Limiting fratricide are strong command,disciplined operations, and detailed situationalawareness. With these mechanisms, commanderscan exercise positive control over fires, troopmovements, and operational procedures. The key isto lower the probability of fratricide while not overlyconstricting boldness and audacity in combat.

The threat of fratricide increases when friendlymaneuver occurs through areas where friendly firesusing ICMs have deposited a blanket of UXO. Allleaders and soldiers must be able to handle the threat

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presented by UXO. Soldiers also must be able torecognize and react to UXO that poses a threat sothat EOD can eliminate or neutralize it. EOD canassist a commander in training his soldiers onidentification and reaction techniques prior todeployment or mission. EOD service also helps thecommander identify, provide recommendationsconcerning, and (if required) neutralize UXO. SeeFM 21-16 for more on reacting to UXO.

Leadership

The fourth and most essential element ofcombat power is competent and confident leadership.Leadership provides purpose, direction, andmotivation in combat. The leader determines thedegree to which maneuver, firepower, and protectionare maximized, ensures these elements areeffectively balanced, and decides how to bring themto bear against the enemy. Thus, no peacetime dutyis more important for leaders than continuing togrow by studying their profession, becomingtactically and technically proficient, and preparingfor war. The regular study of military doctrine.theory, and history is invaluable in this regard.

THE EOD MISSION

This section implements STANAGS 2079 and2834.

The mission of EOD is to support nationalsecurity strategy during operations, in war orOOTW, which reduce or eliminate the hazards ofexplosive ordnance that threatens personnel,operations, installations, or materiel.

During war, preserving the commander’scombat power becomes more challenging for EODbecause of the increasingly complex and lethalbattlefield. EOD integration into staff planning mustbe sufficiently explicit to provide for battlesynchronization yet flexible enough to respond tochange or to capitalize on fleeting opportunities.EOD command and control itself must respondquickly and be flexible to the rapid changes on thebattlefield. UXO, to include ICMs, has greateremphasis now because of the possible critical impacton the commander’s combat power ICMs havesignificantly multiplied the work to be performed byEOD in order to preserve the commander’s combatpower. The increased use of special forces or

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sabotage groups increases the need for EOD assets toeliminate the threat of IEDs at critical facilities.

EOD FUNCTIONS

Army doctrine determines the nature of the fiveprimary EOD functions in the operationsenvironment -- mobility, survivability, logistics,security, and intelligence. Table 1-1 lists theprimary tasks under each function.

Mobility

EOD can help keep the routes of maneuveropen by reducing or eliminating the hazards ofUXO. EOD can also provide valuable informationconcerning the types of and hazards associated withUXO. This will allow the commander to makeinformed decisions concerning maneuver.

Survivability

On the battlefield, EOD neutralizes UXO thathinders the commander’s maneuver and increasesthe chance of fratricide. Range clearance operations,IED/UXO response. and realistic training scenariosreinforce this function in OOTW. Additionally,EOD can provide the commander with valuableinformation on the hazards associated with UXO,enabling him to make informed decisions on theprotection of personnel and equipment.

Logistics

Logistics includes disposition of supplies. EODmay help with the unit training on demolitionprocedures for the destruction of ammunition. AnEOD unit may also help with the routine destructionof ammunition stocks if there are no qualifiedammunition personnel available. It may also assistin the emergency destruction of ammunition.

Security

EOD operations protect against strategic,operational, and tactical threats to US securityduring war as well as OOTW. The CONUS is notexempt from hostilities even during periods ofrelative peace. EOD provides support to the USSecret Service and the US Department of State forpresidential and VIP protection. EOD service

FM 9-15

locates, identifies, and neutralizes IEDs across a role, activities, and structure of this group arewide variety of Army operations.

Intelligence

EOD provides the commander with anintelligence collection capability by examining,identifying. and reporting new and unusual explosiveordnance for technical intelligence purposes.Knowing the capabilities and lethality of enemyordnance may be critical to the commander whenplanning maneuver through areas that have beencovered by ICMs.

EOD ORGANIZATIONS ANDSTRUCTURES

In the following paragraphs, EODorganizations, their roles, and their structures aredetailed. Principles on operation will also bediscussed so that users of the EOD service betterunderstand how it works.

There are three types of EOD units, eachhaving its own mission and capabilities. The firsttwo, the Ordnance Group (EOD) and the EODBattalion, are command and control units. The thirdtype of EOD unit is the Ordnance Company (EOD).This unit provides the EOD mission response.Appendix A gives more information on each of theseunits.

Ordnance Group (EOD)

The primary functions of this group are theaterEOD planning and EOD command and control. The

detailed below.

Role and Acivities. This group provides commandand control for two to six EOD battalions, each with3 to 10 EOD companies (Figure 1-2, page 1-9).Additionally. the group provides staff planning forEOD operations throughout the entire TO, makingthe group EOD commander the EAC EOD staffofficer.

The duties and responsibilities of the EACEOD staff officer are important to the overall supportcapability of EOD. This officer advises the com-mander on organizing and using EOD assets. Hehelps establish work load priorities, but it is thetheater commander’s responsibility. through his staff,to prioritize assets and operations. It is also theEOD staff officer’s responsibility to work with theunit commander’s staff to ensure that provisions forEOD support are included in all orders and otherdirectives. Orders and directives should includesuch details as UXO reporting procedures andlocations of EOD companies and their areas ofresponsibility.

The EOD staff officer plays a key role inensuring technical intelligence from the battlefieldreaches EOD units in the TO. In dealing with first-seen ordnance, the EOD staff officer ensures thatcommand procedures are set up to screen EODreports. He works closely with the joint. general, orstaff intelligence officer (J2/G2/S2) to ensure properhandling of the materiel. He must be the point ofcontact for technical intelligence coordination.

The EOD command structure sets up a systemto screen the EOD company’s intelligence reports for

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important information about munitions and ordnance ensure that intelligence efforts are not duplicated inevaluation. After prompt and reliable evaluation, the the EOD community, the EOD command passes theEOD command sends the technical intelligence proper information down the chain to each EODreports to the proper agencies for exploitation. To company.

This section implements STANAG 2143. operations officer (G3) on EOD support androutinely interfaces with senior executives from

Structure. The Ordnance Group (EOD) directs andcontrols the activities of the Army’s EOD supporteffort. The group exercises command and control ofthe EOD service and special staff within a TACOM.It implements the TACOM commander’s prioritiesfor EOD service support of operations within thetheater.

The operations section is responsible for alloperations, plans, training, and intelligence effortswithin the group. This includes the commandwidedissemination of new developments (friendly andenemy) in munitions and the initiation andcoordination of training for all personnel. includingEOD and support personnel. The operations officercoordinates with the supported command’s

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DOE, FBI, and USSS. Additionally, he conductsexternal evaluations of subordinate EOD commandsand supervises the security and operations (S2/3)section.

EOD Battalion

The EOD battalion serves a command andcontrol function for EOD units in thecorps/AACOM. Its role, activities, and structureare detailed below.

Role and Activities. The EOD battalion providescommand and control for 3 to 10 EOD companies.An EOD battalion is allotted for each corps and

FM 9-15

TAACOM (Figure l-l). In a fully deployed corps,the EOD battalion has ten EOD companies. In theTAACOM, the EOD battalion has eight EODcompanies. The commander of the EOD battalion isthe EOD staff officer for the corps or TAACOM. Inthe corps, the EOD battalion operates out of theCOSCOM and provides a coordination team to thecorps RCP. The coordination team helps the corpsstaff prioritize and assign categories for UXOincidents by providing technical information to thecorps RCP.

Structure. The commander of an EOD battalion, asthe special EOD staff officer, monitors operationsand develops plans to meet the needs of thebattlefield. These plans are submitted to the corps orTAACOM.

The operations section of the EOD battalioninterfaces with corresponding operational levels ofother units, ensures the priorities of theTAACOM/corps commander are followed, and staysaware of the status of subordinate EOD companiesand the battlefield.

•

This section of the EOD battalion helps tocoordinate and operate the reporting system atlocations outside the EOD battalion. It helpsestablish EOD reporting procedures. troubleshootsincident reporting breakdowns, and coordinatesEOD support requirements with supporting units.The section also coordinates EOD operations that areisolated from the EOD battalion. It can set up andoperate a temporary field CP at critical ordnanceincident sites. Finally, the section helps subordinateEOD companies get external support for theiroperations.

Ordnance Company (EOD)

The primary function of the EOD company isto provide support for corps and TAACOM units. Itdoes this in a variety of ways. Its role, activities, andstructure are detailed below.

Role and Activities. EOD companies support corpsand TAACOM units. In the TAACOM, theyprovide DS missions to ASGs. EOD companiescover the ASG's area of responsibility and all unitswithin it. In return, the ASG provides all non-EOD-specific support to the EOD company. Any EOD

company not assigned to the DS support role will betasked by the EOD battalion to provide GS to theTAACOM. EOD companies in the GS role can becollocated with the EOD battalion to protect criticalCSS assets and LOC within the TAACOM.

In the corps, the companies are at the CSG andin the CSBs. Each division in the corps is supportedby a CSB. which will in turn be supported by EOD.The EOD company that supports the CSB can betasked to go forward to support operations in thedivision area. EOD companies not in DS to a CSBare tasked with GS responsibilities within the corps.The CSG or CSB that the EOD company supports inturn supports the company in all classes of supply,messing, billeting, and maintenance above unit level.GS EOD companies perform the following:

• Augment other EOD companies whenmanpower and time are critical.• Perform work on high-priority incidentsthroughout the TAACOM or corps.

Support units and special operations in a DSrole.

Whether in a TAACOM or corps, EODcompanies are assigned according to the needs of thebattlefield as seen by the EOD battalion commanderand, ultimately, the MACOM commander. Theflexibility of the EOD structure using METT-Tpermits the tailoring of EOD assets to support thecommander’s scheme of operations.

This section implements STANAG 2389.

Structure. A fully staffed EOD company has a mixof EOD personnel and support personnel. Thecommander of an EOD company has command andcontrol duties of leading the company. He must alsocoordinate and conduct liaison with varioussupported and supporting units, to include civilauthorities and other government agencies. He hasadditional responsibility as an EOD team leader.While his primary function is to command, he mustbe technically qualified to perform the EOD teamleader functions on any type of incident.

Each EOD company has an operations NCO.This NCO monitors EOD operations and helps the

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first sergeant establish and operate the CP. He canperform as an EOD response section NCO or as theEOD team leader, if required.

The EOD response team section NCO is thelink between the individual response teams and thefirst sergeant. This NCO is responsible for allaspects of the response teams operations,maintenance, and training. He acts as the EODheavy response team leader.

A typical EOD team is usually made up of aSSG as the team leader and one or two assistants.For nuclear incidents. the team leader must be anEOD-qualified officer. The EOD team leaderperforms RSPs on conventional, chemical, andbiological ordnance and on IEDs. Enlisted teamleaders help in the RSP on nuclear incidents as anEOD team member.

The heart of the company consists of heavy andlight response teams. The light response teams canhandle most conventional ordnance incidents. Theseteams can be detached individually for direct supportto requesting units. They can operate independentlyfrom the EOD company for up to 72 hours.Additionally, several light response teams can begrouped together to work on large multi-UXOincidents or other high-priority incidents.

The EOD heavy response team augments thelight response teams as necessary. This teamprovides special tools and equipment and augmentsthe light team with additional manpower as needed.Situations where the EOD heavy response teamwould be used include:

Any incident that involves multi-EOD teams orthat requires special tools and equipment or the one-of-a-kind items not normally carried by the lightresponse teams.

•

• Incidents involving nuclear weapons ormateriel.

• Chemical incidents beyond the capabilities ofthe light response team.

EOD LIMITATIONS

EOD units are small and have limited assets(weapons, vehicles, and personnel). This makesthem highly mobile but restricts their capability forsustained operations without support. Whendeployed they will require support above the operatorlevel in maintenance and in all classes of supply.This support must be provided by the units that aredesignated to support EOD. The only support thatwill come through EOD channels will be for EOD-specific tools and equipment and for replacementpersonnel. Additionally, EOD detachments havevery limited personnel available for base security andother miscellaneous details.

EOD COMMAND AND CONTROLCommand and control of EOD units depends

on the geographical location of the units. Thecommand and control structures for both CONUSand OCONUS units are described below.

CONUS

Command and control of EOD units in theCONUS is exercised by FORSCOM through the 52dOrdnance Group (EOD). The group commands fourEOD battalions which in turn command all EODcompanies in CONUS. The group is designated todeploy to any MRC to support operations. As such,the 52d Ordnance Group (EOD) has defactocommand of all EOD units worldwide.

OCONUS

Command and control of EOD units locatedOCONUS is through the respective MACOMs towhich the units are assigned. Under the MRCconcept. HQDA has divided the world into threethreat areas. These areas can be associated directlywith three current JCS unified commands--MRCWest in the PACOM. MRC East in CENTCOM, andMRC Europe in EUCOM. Ideally, each of thesecommands should have an EOD battalion assignedto the Army component command that supportsthem (Figure 1-2). The EOD units within thetheater would then be placed under the commandand control of this EOD battalion. The battalioncommander would act as the theater Army EOD staffofficer and ensure proper coordination withappropriate staff elements and commands.

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EOD PLANNING planning are anticipation of future events andpreparation for contingencies. EOD operations

The scope of all military planning covers planning and execution must incorporate agility forOOTW and war. The military may find itself not only combat missions but also those activitiesoperating in both these environments at once. All that happen before and after hostilities.military operational planning begins with theassignment of a mission or with the commander’srecognition of a requirement. It continues until the In the planning process EOD can assist themission is accomplished. The keys to successful commander in developing a risk analysis plan for

UXO that may be encountered in any type ofoperation. Working closely with the J2/G2 sectionand using METT-T. EOD can assess the enemy’spotential concerning UXO and develop plans tocounter it. Additionally, EOD can advise on theUXO problems that our own friendly fires cause andthen design strategies to mitigate them. With therisks identified early in the planning process, EODcan provide useful soldier training to reduce furtherthe effects of UXO on operations.

When planning for EOD support, commandersmust ensure that the most effective support isprovided with the limited EOD assets available.

Overall, the factors are the combat environment, theenemy, operational policies, and incidentclassification.

Combat Environment

Meeting the challenges of the combatenvironment includes human and physicalconsiderations. These are discussed in more detailbelow.

Human Factor. More specifically, the humandimension deals with soldiers’ physiological andpsychological needs and the challenges to leadership

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that these needs pose. Because EOD work isdangerous and exacting, fatigue can causeunnecessary loss of personnel and critical assets.Operational policy gives the EOD commanderultimate responsibility for the safety of the EODresponse teams. During high-density work loads, theEOD commander has to rotate teams to provide restperiods for them. Supported commanders must alsobe aware of the connection between rest and safety.With this in mind, low-priority UXO incidents mayhave to wait until they can be handled safely.

•

Physical Factors. The physical dimension consistsof three major elements: geography, weather, andinfrastructure. Each of these is defined below. •

Geography. In a TO, the terrain may varysignificantly. In the desert, there may not be manychoke points that could prevent EOD from reachingthe incidents quickly. But in the desert, units can bedispersed over a large area. This may mean a longdrive to reach some of the incidents. Aconsideration here would be the availability ofaviation assets to reach some high-priority incidentsquickly. The advantage of desert terrain is that itslack of population means units can easily bypassareas with heavy concentrations of UXO. Junglesand mountains cause greater restrictions on mobility.In these types of terrain, especially lacking muchinfrastructure, choke points can easily be exploitedby using obstructions, mines, and booby traps.

•

Weather. Weather plays an important part inmilitary operations. Commanders may have totailor operations to seasonal changes to preventweather from having a negative impact onoperations. The theater climate must be aconsideration in planning all operations.

Infrastructure. On a European-type battle-field, the Army will be crowded together because ofthe terrain and urban development. This limitsmobility and, with a highly developed infrastructure(with many important facilities), UXO will have agreater impact on operations. The demand for EODto "turn off" ordnance will be greater in any type ofbuilt-up or restricted terrain. These factors andenemy interdiction will cause many choke points,which can impact response time.

The EnemyHow well the enemy conducts operations on the

battlefield will affect EOD planning. The availa-

bility of high-technology weapons and the enemy’sability to deliver them must be integrated into EODplanning. Combine the enemy’s capabilities with theevaluation of his intentions to determine thedeployment of EOD assets. Other things to considerinclude the following:

How effectively can the enemy launch air strikesor conduct long-range attacks with missiles, rockets,or artillery. If the enemy can, the EOD work loadwill be multiplied many times. With ICMs availableto all the armies of the world, the UXO incidentscenario has changed dramatically.

Does the enemy have special forces in placewith small groups trained to conduct raids andsabotage? For example, in Viet Nam the enemystruck with terrorist methods, using IEDs in suchplaces as restaurants and hotels. They also usedsappers to infiltrate military bases with explosivecharges and booby traps. The lack of technology andother resources combined with the advantage ofrestricting terrain would force some other countriesinto this situation.

Advanced technology in ordnance developmenthas led to "smart munitions" that create an evengreater hazard on the battlefield. These types ofmunitions are rapidly becoming available to allcountries.

Operational Policies

EOD operational policies and planning will beinfluenced by a number of things, including enemyuse of minefield, EOD coordination requirements,and EOD-specific training. These are touched uponbelow.

Minefield. The proliferation and advancingtechnology of area denial submunitions andscatterable mines complicate and blur the differencebetween mines and UXO. EOD units will neutralizearea denial submunitions and scatterable mines(UXO) that threaten the commander’s combat power.While large-scale minefields are not specifically anEOD matter, EOD can provide technical assistancewhen needed. However, all units must be able toapply countermine warfare techniques when facedwith these types of munitions. Any unit that cannotself-extract from scatterable minefield risks beingfixed in place and destroyed. Countering area denialsubmunitions and scatterable mines may require

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support from various units along with EOD to copewith the quantity of scatterable mines expected.Refer to FM 21-16 and FM 20-32 for moreinformation.

Procedures between EOD and other supportingunits need to be established prior to war or conflict.See Chapter 2 for more information on coordinatingoperations.

EOD Coordination. All levels of command mustcoordinate with EOD staffs. EOD battalions, andEOD companies before hostilities. This will permitthe establishment of a logical and systematicapproach to EOD support. Giving proper considera-tion to the supported commander’s scheme ofoperations. EOD can anticipate the plan and providethe most effective support possible.

Training. EOD units must plan and train forbattlefield survival. In doing so, they mustremember that their mission is to preserve thecommander’s combat power. EOD does this bycoordinating, planning, and executing their ownmobility, survivability, and intelligence functions.Planning and training should emphasize those tasksthat support these functions. UXO operations andtechnical intelligence on foreign ordnance are thecritical EOD tasks that enhance the commander’scombat power.

Because the UXO threat can be foundanywhere, all soldiers have to be aware of andtrained in the proper procedures to help reduce it.EOD can assist other units in this area, either bytraining soldiers in basic soldier skills or trainingleaders on how to incorporate UXO considerations intheir planning.

This section implements STANAG 2143.

Incident Classification

Because there may be more UXO than availableEOD response teams, incidents must first becategorized by their potential threat and then by thearea commander’s priorities. Local and regional orcivil defense officials estimate potential damage ifitems were to detonate. Since these people may notknow the amount of damage that can be expected,their estimates may not be accurate. Still, local civildefense and military commanders use this

information to suggest the categories and prioritiesto be assigned.

Categories. Command decisions categorize EODincidents according to their potential threat.Categories may later be adjusted depending on thetactical situation. the target, any updatedintelligence. or field evaluation feedback from theEOD response team on site. Incident categoriesestablished in Annex E of STANAG 2143 are asdescribed below.

Category A. Category A UXO incidentsprohibit a unit’s maneuver and mission capabilitiesor threaten critical assets vital to the war effort.Category A is assigned to these incidents becausethey constitute a grave and immediate threat. Theseare incidents that can cause mass destruction,widespread contamination, major reduction ofcombat personnel, or loss of critical installations orfacilities. Category A incidents are to be givenpriority over all other incidents, and disposaloperations are to be started immediately regardless ofpersonal risk. This category correlates with theimmediate priority of the UXO report.

Category B. Category B is assigned to EODincidents that constitute an indirect threat. IndirectUXO incidents impair a unit’s maneuver and missioncapability or threaten critical assets important to themission. Items of technical intelligence value arenormally assigned to this category. Before EODoperations are begun, a safe waiting period may beobserved to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel.This category correlates with the indirect priority ofthe UXO report.

Category C. Category C is assigned toincidents that constitute little threat. Minor UXOincidents reduce a unit’s maneuver and missioncapabilities or threaten noncritical assets of value.These incidents can normally be dealt with by EODpersonnel after Category A and B incidents, as thesituation permits, and with minimum hazard topersonnel. The category correlates with the minorpriority of the UXO report.

Category D. Category D is assigned to EODincidents that constitute no threat at present. TheseUXO incidents have little or no effect on a unit’scapabilities or assets. No threat, however, does notmean that the UXO is not dangerous. It means theUXO does not threaten any critical assets importantto the war effort. UXOs in this category are still

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deadly. These incidents may be marked and left fordisposal as time permits. This category correlateswith the no threat priority of the UXO report.

Priorities. Most UXO incidents are routed to acentral operations center which passes theinformation to its supporting EOD company. In theTAACOM, this operations center is the RTOC of theASGs. In the corps, it is the RTOC of the CSGs.The operations center sets UXO-incident prioritieswithin its area of responsibility. Priorities areessential to keep limited EOD assets from beingwasted. These priorities are then coordinatedthrough the EOD battalion or the EOD company.UXO operations that require support from otherelements. such as the engineers. are coordinated atthis level.

Do not confuse categories with priorities.Categories are determined by both technical andoperational considerations. Priorities are defined byoperational considerations. The operations centermay decide, for example, that ASPs have priorityover POL storage sites because of the tacticalsituation. Therefore, a small projectile in an ASPposing little threat because of its size and distancefrom ammunition stocks would have a lowercategory than a large bomb with a long-delay fuzelocated in a POL storage area.

When there are too many incidents in acategory to handle at one time, they are prioritized inorder of importance. A numbering system is used.For example, Category B-10 stands for the tenthmost important incident in Category B.

Wartime Operations

Today’s tempo of operations has quickened.Campaigns during peace, crisis, and war cancoincide, overlap. and merge. OOTW and war itselfcan occur within the same TO. EOD commandersmust be prepared to conduct such operations at thesame time and to synchronize these seeminglydisparate efforts to bring about desired results. EODperforms a wide variety of tasks across the tacticalbattlefield in close and rear operations and duringOOTW. The EOD commander’s objective is toorchestrate all tasks to allow the supportedcommander to accomplish his mission.Deployment. A key mission of today’s Army isforce projection. This calls for units to be preparedfor rapid worldwide deployments in response to any

situation. In planning for deployments, a balance ofEOD assets needs to be programmed into the flow ofunits to the theater. The number of EOD companiesand when they are deployed will depend on theanalysis of IPB and METT-T.

In CONUS, all EOD units fall underFORSCOM command. While deployed, the unitsfall under the command of the operational theatercommand. In OCONUS, EOD units that are alreadyforward-deployed can be sent to other theaters, asthey were in Operation Desert Storm.

If an EOD staff office is not already inoperation, the operational theater should establishone as soon as possible. This office is to be staffedwith an officer and senior NCO assistants, all of whomust be EOD-qualified. The EOD staff officecoordinates all EOD activities. It should be able toanswer all questions regarding the deployment,utilization, and support requirements of the deployedEOD companies. The office should be establishedregardless of the number of detachments deployed.It is especially important if no EOD command unit,either a EOD battalion or the EOD ordnance group,is deployed. The EOD staff officer should remain asthe main point of contact for all EOD activities untilthe EOD companies have redeployed back to theirhome stations.

Another operational factor to be considered isthat once deploying units have been identified. theymay not be able to provide all the support for OOTWmissions. These missions include supporting thetraining bases and protecting the Army from terroristattacks. To keep this protection going, eithernondeploying EOD companies would take over orEOD Reserve and National Guard units would beactivated. In a fill-scale deployment, the Armymight have to give up EOD support responsibility forCONUS, restricting support to critical strategic basesand assets.

Operations. EOD staffs and unit personnel shouldbe familiar with close operations as well as rearoperations. EOD support for the maneuver andsurvivability functions will be provided throughoutthe TO. UXO reports in the rear area enter EODchannels through the RTOC or the RAOC. UXOreports in the rear area behind the corps enter EODchannels through the ASG RTOC. In the corps area,UXO reports enter EOD channels through the CSBor CSG.

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All EOD command headquarters manage EODoperations in their control areas. The EOD ordnancegroup headquarters operates the same as any groupheadquarters. while the EOD battalion headquartersoperates like a battalion headquarters.

EOD may be tasked to help train ordnancesoldiers (Ammunition Specialists) on ammunitiondemolition procedures. EOD may help with theroutine destruction of ammunition stocks if qualifiedammunition personnel are unavailable. Also, EODmay assist in the emergency destruction ofammunition to prevent it from falling into enemyhands. Commanders must remember, however, thatwhen EOD personnel are used in ammunitiondestruction they are being diverted from other jobs.There will be fewer response teams available tohandle UXO incidents and that could impact onassets or operations. Careful review of priorities isneeded to ensure the most benefit from the limitedEOD assets available. EOD may also be tasked totrain non-EOD soldiers, both US and allied, in

ordnance recognition, safety considerations, andother related tasks dealing with UXO.

Postconflict Considerations

EOD operations continue after the conflictends. EOD activities in support of OOTW mayinclude intelligence, security, and logistical support.Planning in this environment will require closecoordination with allied forces, other governmentagencies, and other military units. Battlefieldcleanup roles are determined by the US commandauthorities.

OOTW Considerations

The above EOD missions give some of thefactors that need to be examined in planning forEOD support on the battlefield, including somegeneral considerations for OOTW. For missions thatdo not involve the battlefield at all, see Chapter 4.

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CHAPTER 2

COORDINATED COUNTER-UXO OPERATIONS

SCENARIOS

EOD teams of a minimum of two soldiersusually operate independently to respond to UXOincidents scattered across wide areas of thebattlefield. These EOD teams have limited assets andmay require additional support in the clearance ofUXO. Additional personnel and heavy equipmentmay be provided by other units on the battlefield, toinclude engineer and ammunition units, whendirected by appropriate command authorities. Theseunits may provide valuable assets that act as an EODforce multiplier. However, they are not trained toperform the UXO mission.

Likely scenarios for EOD teams are multipleUXO clearances and disposal operations involvingMSRs, airfield recoveries. ASPs, and port facilities.Multiple UXO operations are best defined as thoseinvolving areas saturated with UXOs that threatenthe commander’s combat power functions ofmaneuver, mobility, survivability, and logistics.These types of operations are time sensitive andpersonnel intensive and may require external supportfor the responding EOD team or unit. Successfullypreserving the commander’s combat power from theeffects of multiple UXO may depend on acooperative association between supporting andsupported units. Chapter 5 has more details onmultiple UXO incidents.

EOD RESPONSIBILITIES

The EOD team must positively identify thehazards and provide safety guidance for allsupported units. It must render safe any UXO thatcannot be destroyed by detonation. The EOD teamleader prepares a plan of attack with concurrencefrom the supported unit commander. Beforeimplementing the plan, the EOD team briefssupported and supporting units on what EOD will bedoing so that everyone knows the safetyconsiderations. The EOD team leader will maintaincommunications with the EOD chain of commandand supported and supporting units’ OIC andNCOIC to ensure safety is always the first priority.When unsafe activities needlessly expose soldiers todanger, the EOD team leader may revert to a role of

only providing technical assistance. EOD teams andunits will--

• Coordinate with the supported unit and developa plan of action.

• Conduct an initial reconnaissance of the area.

• Provide positive ordnance identification andsafety guidance.

• Perform render safe and/or disposal procedures.

• Provide a dedicated technical advisor to the on-scene commander.

• Provide overall supervision of a consolidatedUXO demolition area that can be moved.

SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING UNITRESPONSIBILITIES

A large UXO operation will most likely requireaction by the RAOC or the unit’s G3 section.Mission parameters, such as timelines and priorities,have to be defined. While EOD can providetechnical analysis and develop a plan of attack,supported units will be responsible for overallmission planning and coordinating and executingthe plan.

In many situations the supported unitcommander or his representative is in overallcommand of the operation. The EOD team leaderprovides technical guidance and helps the supportedunit commander develop a plan of action. However,the location of the explosive ordnance, enforcementof safety measures, render safe procedures, andremoval of the explosive ordnance are theresponsibility of the EOD team leader.

Additional assets may be required which cannotbe provided by the EOD team or the supported unit.Multiple UXO incidents could take several days orweeks to complete, threatening critical assets andrestricting the commander’s combat power.Supporting units could provide additional personnelto build protective works or remove supplies and

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equipment. They could also provide equipment toassist in the operation. Additionally, host-nationsupport should be considered as a source of possibleassets. Engineers, QASAS personnel, militarypolice, transportation, ammunition, aviation assets,fire department, and medical personnel are somewho could support a large UXO clearance operation.

Supported and supporting units will coordinatewith the EOD operations section and develop a planof action. The plan of action will--

• Establish safe areas.

• Establish demolition areas as required.

• Establish all safety procedures and necessarySOPs.

• Identify all logistical requirements.

• Determine personnel and equipmentrequirements.

• Establish a realistic timeline for completion ofthe mission.

• Prepare an after-action report and send it through the chain of command of all supportingelements.

A supported unit may also provide the on-scenecommander as the situation demands. It may alsoprovide the necessary equipment (such as M-9armored combat equipment and trucks) and coor-dinate all necessary logistical requirements throughthe chain of command.

TYPICAL INCIDENT PROCEDURES

EOD units regularly assist ASPs duringpeacetime operations. For example, they mightsupport the routine destruction of unserviceableammunition by ASP personnel. They might alsosupport the emergency destruction of ASPs orpostattack cleanup. The following scenario showshow an EOD unit might respond to an incident at anASP.

An ASP has been attacked and large amountsof unexploded ordnance are scattered in a relativelysmall area. Substantial quantities of useableammunition remain. However, ASP operations are

severely restricted and existing ammunition stocksare threatened. Since combat power has beenjeopardized because of the reduced ammunition flowto combat units. this incident has been identified asthe number one UXO priority. Therefore, all assetsrequired for the incident should be directed tosupport UXO cleanup at the ASP.

UXO reports are sent to the area commanderthat has EOD in DS. The area commander and staffprocess the reports and analyze the situation and theimpact the UXO problem has on operations. Thecommander’s staff, which includes an EODrepresentative, recommends priorities. In deter-mining a course of action, the area commanderselects the highest priority (immediate) because theASP is a critical asset. Immediate priority requiresprompt EOD action to return the ASP to full missioncapability.

After examining the UXO reports from theASP, the EOD staff officer recommends that the areacommander requests additional EOD assets. Theseassets may include the use of other services or host-nation EOD personnel. However, these EOD assetsmay not be available because of other battlefieldUXO incidents. Therefore, other non-EOD assetsmay be required to support rapid recovery of theASP. Once available assets have been identified andtasked to support this counter-UXO operation, youwould concentrate on the actual steps of theoperation as described below.

Establish a RCP. Near the ASP, but outsidethe blast/fragmentation area, establish a RCP. TheRCP will be the support unit base and will act as thecoordinating point for all operations. The RCP is theentry point for access to the area.

Complete a map reconnaissance of the area.Assemble an overall safety plan and brief emergencyactions to all personnel. Then assign EOD teams toa grid for the hasty reconnaissance and immediateaction phases of this operation. Base the grid size onthe number and types of UXO, the overall size of theaffected area, supported unit commander’s priorities,type of terrain, the assets threatened by the UXO,and the manpower and equipment available. Takethese actions before any non-EOD personnel proceeddownrange. As the EOD teams start their hastyreconnaissance, the necessary support personnel andequipment should start arriving.

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Perform the hasty reconnaissance andimmediate action phases (EOD operation). EachEOD team proceeds to its assigned grid, conducts areconnaissance, and completes immediate actionprocedures on the ordnance found. When finished,the EOD teams return to brief the RCP. Thesupported and supporting units and EOD then jointlydevelop a plan for the disposal phase. Based on theinformation from the EOD teams and the ASPcommander’s guidance, the RCP plots and thenprioritizes the ordnance for the render safe/disposalplan. At the same time. the supported unit should dothe following: examine the priorities of the UXO andthe supported and supporting units’ recoveryoperation, develop (with the recommendations ofEOD) an overall plan of attack to clear the mostimportant areas first, prepare a concept of operationto include safety considerations, and brief allpersonnel. Generally this will be a two-part brief,the supported and supporting units briefing theconcept while EOD briefs safety.

Prepare a plan of attack. The plan of attackmust be flexible. Each situation will be different andmay demand adaptation of methods and proceduresfor the best solution. Unforeseen problems maymean halting the operation and developing a newplan. Depending on the size of the areas to becleared and the priorities of clearance, all the actionscould take place at the same time or in verycontrolled phases. Except where stated, theseprocedures can be accomplished jointly.

Consider what areas to clean up first andwhat is essential to make the ASP operational.Give priority to the roadways and to those bunkers orstacks that are vital to the war effort. Demolition-trained ammunition personnel can be used to help atthe demolition range, under EOD supervision. Theycan also assist UXO destruction-in-place.

Perform hasty reconnaissance in order ofpriority. Each EOD team will conduct a hastyreconnaissance of its assigned area and perform anyimmediate action procedures. Once they havecompleted their reconnaissance they will return tothe RCP to plan the cleanup and disposal phases.

Take action. Build protective works for thoseitems that threaten assets. While building protectiveworks, sweep and mark other areas. Prepare andplace demolition charges upon completion of mark-ing. In another area, an EOD team may be ren-dering safe UXO that cannot be destroyed bydetonation. Many types of UXO may be destroyedby direct fire techniques using the basic guidelines inFM 90-13-1 and FM 20-32. Take UXO or residuesthat are safe to transport to a consolidated demolitionarea for disposal.

The steps above have been provided to giveguidance and understanding of some of the factorsinvolved when dealing with large, multiple UXOoperations. Every situation will be different, but theprinciples of teamwork, safety, and effectiveness staythe same.

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CHAPTER 3

EOD NBC OPERATIONS, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, ANDTECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

US forces can face many types of ordnance on the modern battlefield. These can include NBC weapons deployedby US, friendly, or threat forces. Unconventional warfare tactics or terrorist attacks may also include NBCmaterial or the use of IEDs. These weapons pose a serious threat to all operations. Usually thesemunitions/devices require immediate response by EOD and other supporting elements. This chapter will help thebattlefield commander choose the proper course of action to preserve combat power.

EOD NBC OPERATIONS

Armies engaged in modern combat will oftenhave access to (or have to deal with) a variety ofnuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Theseweapons, when introduced on the battlefield, willpresent special handling and disposal problems forthe battlefield commander and for supporting EODpersonnel. Some of these are touched upon below.

Nuclear Weapons

During hostilities, it is possible that US,friendly, or threat forces will have or use nuclearweapons. These weapons may not have functionedas designed or may have been captured from theenemy in various conditions ranging fromundamaged to extensively damaged. There is alsothe chance of a US or allied country nuclear weapontransportation accident in which US Army EOD maybe the first on scene. Whatever the reason, therecovery of a nuclear weapon will require theinvolvement of EOD and supporting elements. Out-lined below are some of the planning factorsinvolved. Refer to AR 50-5 for responsibilitiesinvolving nuclear weapon incidents/accidents.

If the weapon is a threat system, Army EOD isresponsible for preventing nuclear detonation or ahigh-explosive detonation. This includes identi-fication, detection, performing RSP, assisting in thegathering of technical intelligence information, andpreparing complete weapons or components forshipment.

If the weapon is a US system, the responsibleservice, either Navy or Air Force, will be notified.The specific service is ultimately responsible for anyrecovery actions required. Army EOD responsibilityfor the other service’s weapons is to prevent adetonation or the spread of contamination. Once the

other service’s EOD personnel arrive, Army EODpersonnel would help as needed and provide an EODliaison between the services.

If it is a weapon system of an ally, Army EODresponsibility is to prevent detonation or the spreadof contamination and to assist the friendly forces asauthorized by command authorities.

The nuclear weapon recovery process couldtake several days and would require support from alarge number of personnel. The area commandermust obtain the initial security and support elements.Refer to Chapter 5 for an in-depth discussion oflarge recovery operations. Some of the supportnecessary for the recovery operation includes:messing, engineer, RADCON and decontamination,transportation, security, aviation, and medical. Coor-dination with the other services and the host nation(if applicable) will also be needed to help in therecovery operation.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

CB weapons are considered weapons of massdestruction. They demand a rapid response by EODand other supporting units to reduce their effects.Army EOD personnel can render safe and dispose ofCB ordnance. The responsibilities of EOD personnelin CB incidents are to prevent the spread ofcontamination; prevent a detonation; and detect,identify, and contain or eliminate explosive and toxichazards. In the discussion that follows, chemicalincidents/accidents are cited because they are morecommon than biological. However, the proceduresare the same for biological, unless noted. For moreinformation on responding to chemical inci-dents/accidents, refer to AR 50-6.

Upon arrival at the site, EOD positions an EODCP to coordinate EOD and supporting unit

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operations. The CP supervisor coordinates with thedesignated area commander or chemical officer forupdated information and mission requirements. TheEOD CP provides information on the expected typeand extent of contamination. In an emergency, anEOD company can decontaminate EOD personneland equipment only. NBC-trained personnel mustsupplement the EOD personnel as soon as possible tocomplete the mission. The area commander mustprovide all decontamination, resupply, medical, andsecurity support.

The supported unit’s commander or chemicalofficer handles the disposition of NBC munitions.This disposition is based on information provided byEOD and on the current tactical situation. Chemical(and biological) weapons of intelligence value mustbe rendered safe and removed to the rear area forexploitation by intelligence agencies. The areacommander must coordinate with requiredsupporting elements to secure the items andtransport them to the designated area for release totechnical escort personnel.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Unconventional warfare or terrorist activities ina TO can include the extensive use of IEDs. TheseIEDs are mostly conventional high-explosivecharges, also known as homemade bombs. However,there is the threat that a CB agent or even nuclearmaterial can be included to add to the destructivepower and psychological effect of the device.

Usually, IEDs are of crude design. However,terrorist groups have been known to producesophisticated devices. Since these devices arenonstandard. there are no specific guidelines forEOD personnel to use to positively identify orcategorize them. Highly sophisticated IEDs havebeen constructed from arming devices scavengedfrom conventional munitions or from easilypurchased electronic components. The degree ofsophistication depends on the ingenuity of thedesigner and the tools and materials available.Today’s IEDs are extremely diverse and may containany type of firing device or initiator, plus variouscommercial, military, or contrived chemical orexplosive fillers.

EOD personnel are trained in the render safeand disposal of IEDs. The addition of NBC material

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into an IED will require additional support as statedin the other situations above. As with othermissions. the EOD CP provides the area commanderwith an assessment of the situation and of supportneeded to complete the mission.

This section implements STANAG 2834.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Munitions captured or found on the battlefieldcan be of intelligence value. Commanders mustallow for the evaluation of unidentified or modifiedmunitions. FM 34-54 outlines the procedures forreporting this information through commandchannels to the intelligence agencies.

EOD personnel are trained to perform technicalintelligence evaluations on first-seen ordnance itemsand to report the required intelligence information.This can include the render safe and transportationof the items to the rear area.

If the mission permits, secure the area untilintelligence personnel or EOD determines what theitems are and what the intelligence interests mightbe. If the mission requires that the area be leftunsecured, certain considerations must be taken intoaccount. Prior to the destruction of capturedammunition to prevent opposing force recapture, apositive identification of the munitions type andfiller should be made by EOD personnel. Destroyingammunition when the contents are unknown canresult in the possible release of nuclear, biological, orchemical contamination. EOD personnel arerequired to do this because it is not always possibleto identify ordnance types by color codes or outsidemarkings. Many countries use various markingsdepending on the type of ammunition involved.Some countries do not use standard markings for anykind of ammunition. Previous intelligence reports orinformation can be of some help. These reports candescribe the type of munitions and may even provideenemy ammunition marking information.

The mission and current tactical situationdictate the action taken, but the commander mustconsider all factors before destroying unknownammunition. Therefore, the more data that can beamassed about unknown ammunition, the moreinformed will be the decision maker.

FM 9-15

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

OVERVIEW

The primary focus for the Army is to fight and winthe nation’s wars. However. Army forces also functionaround the world in operations other than war. OOTWsupport US interests through the use of political andmilitary actions that serve to deter war, resolve conflict,and promote peace.

OOTW happen in peace and conflict. EODsupports the five combat functions in OOTW both in theTO and in the CONUS. When planning andorganizing EOD service, the following must be kept inmind: the available equipment and soldiers’ skills, thearea to be covered, and the degree of responsivenessneeded. EOD has various tasks regularly performed inOOTW. Among these tasks are the following:

• Providing EOD support to the USSS and otherfederal agencies for presidential and VIP protection.

• Advising and assisting civil authorities in theremoval of military ordnance that threatens publicsafety. See AR 75-15 for authorization information.

• Examining, identifying, and reporting new andunusual explosive ordnance for technical intelligencepurposes.

• Supporting nuclear and chemical weaponsshipments.

• Conducting range clearances. EOD supportsrange clearance operations by disposing of UXO onimpact areas.

• Destroying ammunition. EOD personnel mayhelp with unit training on demolition procedures for thedestruction of ammunition. An EOD unit may also helpwith the routine destruction of special ammunitionstocks in the absence of qualified ammunitionpersonnel. It may help with emergency destruction ofammunition too, provided the tactical situation demandssuch measures to prevent capture of ammunition by the

enemy and there is a command decision that the EODunit must help.

• Neutralizing governrnent-owned ordnance ship-ments. If federal agencies or civil authorities ask forassistance in the interest of public safety, EOD technicalassistance may be provided for the salvage, demolition.neutralization, or other disposition of government-owned shipments in transit. Approval for this supportcomes through command channels.

• Responding to IEDs. An EOD unit responds todevices or suspected devices when military or civilianlaw enforcement authorities request help with anincident that threatens public safety or when ordered todo so by the Army commander.

• Removing stuck rounds. For stuck rounds inartillery tubes and other large caliber weapons, the usingunit must first do the downloading procedures stated intheir technical manuals before requesting EODassistance. When explosive methods are used by EODpersonnel to remove stuck rounds, the EOD unit willnot guarantee the weapon will be undamaged.

• Advising on mines and minefield clearance.Mines and minefield are not specifically an EODmatter. In addition, all troops must be able to applyland mine wartime techniques to counter enemy landmines. Even though all branches and services mustclear land mines and booby traps. EOD personnel maygive technical advice and assistance when asked andwhen priorities allow. Large-scale minefield breachingis an engineer function. The proliferation andadvancing technology of area denial submunitions andscatterable mines complicate the issue. As a result,EOD and engineers must combine their skills and assetswhen the situation demands.

• Supporting the cleanup of UXO from formerlyused defense sites and active installations. Thesecleanup operations are those conducted under theDERP. EOD support to these cleanup operations isrequired only when an item of UXO is deemed toohazardous to move or when it cannot be blown in placedue to proximity of inhabited areas. In these instancesEOD support is needed to render the UXO item safe sothat it may be transported to a demolition range fordisposal by the cleanup contractor. These cleanup

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contractor personnel are normally ex-EOD personnel.They are authorized to perform normal detection,recovery, and disposal, but as civilian EOD techniciansare not authorized to perform RSPs.

• Providing instruction to host or allied nationmilitary or civilian EOD personnel on UXO hazardsand disposal techniques.

EOD ROLE

EOD plays a major role in OOTW, during bothperiods of conflict and peace. During operations inboth peacetime and conflict, EOD participates insecurity and advisory assistance, antiterrorism,counterdrug operations, training, ordnance disposal,arms control, treaty verification, and support todomestic civil authorities. Many of these roles areroutinely performed within CONUS.

Compared to war, the threat to US forces isdiminished during operations involving conflict. TheEOD role during conflict is the same as in operationsduring war. During conflict, EOD maybe engagedwith an increased antiterrorism role, such asresponding to the threat posed by IEDs.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control of the EOD function andEOD units depends upon their geographical location.The CONUS and OCONUS command and controlstructures are described below.

CONUS

Command and control of EOD units in theCONUS is exercised by FORSCOM through the 52dOrdnance Group (EOD). The group commands fourEOD battalions which in turn command all EODcompanies in CONUS. The structure is set upexactly as stated in Chapter 1. The group isdesignated to deploy to any MRC to supportoperations. As such, the 52d Ordnance Group(EOD) has defacto command of all EOD unitsworldwide.

OCONUS

Command and control of EOD units locatedOCONUS is through the respective MACOM thatthe units are assigned to. Under the MRC concept,HQDA has divided the world into three areas ofmost likely conflict. These areas can be associated

directly with three current JCS unified commands:MRC West in the PACOM, MRC East inCENTCOM, and MRC Europe in EUCOM. Ideally,each of these commands should have an EODbattalion assigned to the Army component commandthat supports them (Figure 1-2). The EOD unitswithin the theater would then be placed under thecommand and control of this EOD battalion. TheEOD battalion commander would act as the theaterarmy EOD staff officer and ensure propercoordination with appropriate staff elements andcommands.

To ensure ease of transition in wartime, eachOCONUS MACOM should execute an MOU withFORSCOM and the 52d Ordnance Group (EOD) toensure that standardized policies and procedures arefollowed worldwide. This should allow theOCONUS commands to maintain highly trainedunits that know how to fight under the wartimecommand.

Under this doctrine, OCONUS MACOMsretain the capability to provide EOD support forlesser regional contingencies and coordinate MRCresponse with organic EOD assets. Although astovepipe command is not created, close ties with thewarfighting command are established through anMOU.

IED INCIDENTS

The following paragraphs provide informationon handling IED incidents in OOTW settings.Whether the incident is on an Army installation oroff post in support of a local law enforcementagency, the principles remain the same.

Finding IEDs

When a bomb threat has been called in or issuspected, the building supervisor evacuates the areaand coordinates search teams. Refer to FM 19-10 forthreat and search procedures. The designated searchteams for that building or area are responsible forsearching for IEDs. Military police and EODsoldiers do NOT search for reported explosivedevices in barracks. community areas, buildings, andoffices. This is because they are not familiar withthe area and its contents. The individual or group ofindividuals searching should work in that buildingand, if possible, have had training in systematic

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search procedures. (The local EOD company canassist in providing search training.) The EODcompany normally will not respond until a suspectedbomb has actually been found.

Once the search teams find a suspected IED,they should not be touch or handle it in any way. Theperson in charge should contact the local civilianpolice if not on a military or federal installation.They will be responsible for contacting the militarypolice who will. in turn, notify the nearest militaryEOD team. The search team leader should remainin the area so that EOD personnel can interview himupon their arrival.

Planning IED Operations

Once the incident is received, the commanderor the company NCO will select a response team.This usually consists of a team leader and anassistant. More EOD assistants may be added ifneeded. Once the EOD response team arrives at theincident, it must be determined who is to be theincident-scene officer. In the Army, this normally isa command decision. The senior ranking person orhis designated representative is in charge. If theincident is not on a military installation, theincident-scene officer can be the building securityofficer, the office manager, or anybody in authority.The individual designated as the incident-sceneofficer should have training in this subject area. TheEOD team leader can provide technical informationand advice to the incident-scene officerthese matters.

Conducting Operations

When the EOD team arrives, theyon all available information by the incident-scenecommander or senior military police representative.The EOD team leader ensures that a complete andlogical plan is developed according to guidanceoutlined in this manual and applicable EODtechnical manuals. The EOD team leadercoordinates with the area commander, militarypolice, medical personnel, fire department, andengineers on matters concerning safety, commandand control, and logistical needs. It is recommendedthat the PAO be notified so that he or she canrespond to questions from the media.

Once the incident-scene officer coordinateswith support personnel and the recommendations or

plan of attack is approved, EOD operations maybegin. The EOD response team may make anattempt to use RSP or to move the item by remotemeans in accordance with current Army EODpublications. Since there is a chance during theRSP that the IED may detonate, there must beextensive coordination between the incident-scenecommander, police, and the EOD team leader. Inparticular. the EOD team leader must includedetonation in his plan and be prepared to minimizedamage and casualties.

Police (military or civilian) will be needed tocontrol the flow of personnel in and out of thehazard area. Their duties may include stoppingtraffic and clearing buildings within the hazard area.Police should provide a 360-degree securityperimeter around the area at a distance of at least300 meters initially (if possible). This fragmentationzone can be adjusted after the initial reconnaissance.

Once an IED has been rendered safe by theEOD technician, the responsible law enforcementagency may want all of the components associatedwith it. This agency is usually the military police orCID, if the item is on a federal installation.

FORMERLY USED DEFENSE SITES

As US military forces continue to downsize andinstallations close or revert to civilian use, more andmore FUDSs will be identified. This presents achallenge to EOD now and in the future. ManyFUDSs are being cleared by civilian contractors whoare using EOD resources to dispose of ordnanceitems they find. The challenge to EOD is to handleboth the day-to-day EOD mission and the increasingnumber of these FUDSs.

The EOD unit may be called on to handle anytype of ordnance at a FUDS. Most of the ordnancethat is found is old and may not be found in the 60-series TMs. Even if the ordnance is found in thesepublications, there may not be an RSP listed. Thecollective experience of the company will have to beused to handle these situations. Many of the FUDSsmay contain chemical ordnance or suspectedchemical ordnance. This makes the problem evenmore complicated because the EOD company isalready dealing with an environmental problem. TheEOD officer must have liaisons with the localenvironmental office, technical escort personnel,local PAO. local law enforcement, and local Army

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command staff. The EOD company shouldremember that it is not just their problem. Theentire community is interested in its resolution. TheEOD officer must keep all concerned personnelinformed of the operation and any problems thatdevelop.

Cleanup of FUDSs will be with EOD for manyyears to come, so EOD must make the solution partof its day-to-day mission.

POSSE COMITATUS ACT

The Posse Comitatus Act defines dealing withcivil authorities or the public when Army EODassistance may involve civil law. United States Code(18 USC 1385 (1964)) states that: "Whoever, exceptin cases and under circumstances expresslyauthorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Forceas posse comitatus (authority of the country) orotherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not morethan $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years,or both."

The term execute the laws includes conductingor assisting in criminal investigations or appre-hending accused persons. The Posse Comitatus Actdoes not apply where such action is authorized by theConstitution or by an Act of Congress. The PosseComitatus Act applies to EOD when the gathering ofevidence is requested for the purposes of a criminalinvestigation. Generally, the act does not apply toEOD when a request regarding safety is involved(for example, for suspected IEDs and the recovery ofhazardous items) as long as it is in the interest ofpublic safety.

Under the Constitution and laws of the US, theprotection of life and property and the maintenanceof law and order within the territorial jurisdiction ofany state are primarily the responsibilities of localand state governments. Authority to enforce thelaws is vested in the authorities of thosegovernments. This act does not apply in foreigncountries. Congress has authorized a military justicesystem, the UCMJ, for the armed forces. Therefore,law enforcement actions within the UCMJ do notviolate the Posse Comitatus Act. As a generalprinciple therefore, Army personnel do not violatethe act in the performance of properly authorizedduties even if violation may indirectly or by chanceaid federal, state, or local authorities.

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DA policy regarding Army EOD use is to assistpublic safety and law enforcement agencies indeveloping a capability to deal with the IED threatand, when necessary, to provide EOD service in theinterest of public safety. Army EOD personnel willnot participate in bomb or IED search operations(except for VIP support operations) or assist in theenforcement of civil law. The normal response byUS Army EOD to federal, state, and local requestsfor EOD service is based on the protection of publicsafety. Because of the nature of an IED threat, theEOD service response must be efficient andimmediate to protect public safety effectively. USArmy EOD personnel will respond to such requestswhen a suspected or actual device has been locatedand when the responsible agency has no EODcapability or its capability is overextended. Theymay function as technical consultants or advisorsand assist in or perform disposal of hazardousresidue. Under emergency conditions, EOD mayattempt an RSP (in accordance with AR 75-15). Fora particular situation, the advice and assistance of alegal officer are necessary.

EPA AND OSHA CONSIDERATIONSIN EOD

Many federal, state/local, and host-nation lawsnow hold commanders legally responsible forenvironmental damage caused by inadequateplanning or supervision of operations or training.This could mean fines and/or imprisonment ifconvicted of environmental violations.

To avoid adverse environmental impact whenplanning or executing operations, refer to TC 5-400and the Commander’s Guide to EnvironmentalManagement. Also, be familiar with the provisionsand requirements of ARs 200-1 and 200-2.

Many EOD operations, such as those involvedin supporting civil authorities with IED response orconducting a post range clearance, presentenvironmental and safety challenges, A generaldiscussion of these is provided below. Specificquestions on policy or regulations must be addressedto the appropriate specific agency.

In today’s changing world, protection of theenvironment has become a top priority. In the dailypeformance of EOD duties, EOD soldiers are asked

FM 9-15

to eliminate hazards in the community. In theremoval of these hazards, EOD teams may violateenvironmental protection laws. This applies whetherthe military ordnance is picked up and taken to asafe holding area or it is disposed of on site.

It is vital that EOD soldiers understand theenvironmental protection laws of the area they areworking in. There are federal as well as state lawsthat must be met. The individual soldier may beheld responsible for his actions under these laws.This means that the individual soldier may be finedand serve time in prison for environmental lawviolations. Many of the actions that EOD took a fewyears ago are now questionable or illegal under EPArules and regulations.

During peacetime, there are two difficultchallenges that EOD units must face. One is toprotect the environment while performing the EODmission. The other is to follow OSHA rules andregulations.

Environmental Protection and Compliance Policy

This section defines Army policy andprocedures for complying with the RCRA (42 USC3251, 21 Oct 76), DOD Directive 7310.1, and AR200-1. Section 6001 of the RCRA states thefollowing: "Each department of the FederalGovernment . . . engaged in any activity resulting inthe disposal or management of solid or hazardouswaste shall be subject to, and comply with, allfederal, state, interstate, and local requirements, bothsubstantive and procedural (including anyrequirements for permits and reporting)."

This section helps explain the requirements forcomplying with the federal requirements of theRCRA and the OSHA Act (29 CFR 1910.120 and1200) as they apply to the management, handling,transportation, storage, and disposal of conventionalexplosive ordnance. AR 200-1, paragraph 6-2, statesin part that all Army activities must “be fully awareof and comply with all applicable Federal, State, andlocal laws and regulations, both substantive andprocedural, for generating, treating, storing,disposing, and transporting solid and hazardouswaste, including the terms and conditions of Stateand Federal solid and hazardous waste permits andproviding reports to Federal. State and localregulatory agencies.”

RCRA Compliance

40 CFR 270.1(c) states that a RCRA permit isrequired for the owners and operators of any facilityfor the “treatment, storage, and disposal” of any solidor hazardous waste. The definitions of solid andhazardous waste are outlined in 40 CFR 270.2.

AR 200-1, paragraph 6-3, requires theinstallation commander to enter into complianceagreements and consent orders to achieve RCRAcompliance. Army installations will obtain a RCRApermit to treat, store, and dispose of solid andhazardous waste (paragraph 6-4d). The IC will beconsidered the hazardous waste generator as definedin 40 CFR 260.10 for the purposes of signing RCRAreports and records and for getting an EPAidentification number as outlined in 40 CFR 262.12(paragraph l-25.f(7)).

All personnel involved in solid or hazardouswaste operations or activities must be trained IAW40 CFR 264.16 and 29 CFR 1910.120. This trainingmust be documented and updated at least annually,unless otherwise stated as part of the RCRA permit.Currently, IAW the guidance from DA Office forEnvironment, Safety. and Occupational Health,completion of EOD school meets the requirements of40 CFR 264.16 and 29 CFR 1910.120.

Under RCRA, a generator of a hazardous wasteis responsible for that waste from its “cradle to itsgrave.” A generator, as defined in 40 CFR 260.10,is “any person whose act or process produceshazardous waste identified or listed in 40 CFR 261,or whose act first causes a hazardous waste tobecome subject to regulation.”

In accordance with DA policy and guidance of1 November 1993, all generation, transportation,storage, treatment, or disposal of conventionalexpIosive ordnance designated as hazardous waste issubject to RCRA requirements. Conventionalexplosive ordnance will be considered hazardouswaste under the following conditions:

• An authorized official records in writing adetermination that the conventional explosiveordnance will be discarded; and

• Custodians of the conventional explosiveordnance receive this written determination--that the

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conventional explosive ordnance is to be discardedand. therefore, subject to RCRA regulation.

NOTE: Prior written authorization is notrequired if safety or other considerations precludegetting such. Examples are an emergency responseconducted by an EOD unit and a response tomitigate an immediate hazard.

The authorized official must take intoconsideration the facts and circumstances applicableto each situation in making a determination todiscard. The following guidelines should be used inmaking this determination:

• First, a determination to discard excessconventional explosive material that is safe andstable in normal logistical environments by militarystandards may be made only after al1 efforts havebeen exhausted to reuse, recycle, recover, or sell suchmaterial.

• Second, a determination to discard conventionalexplosive ordnance that may be unsafe or unstable tostore or transport should be made by an authorizedofficial after conducting appropriate testing orinspection, if conditions allow, or if it is readilyapparent that there is no reasonable alternative todiscarding the material.

Generally, conventional explosive ordnancemanufacture, assembly, testing, training, intendeduse, or range management do NOT constitutehazardous waste as regulated by RCRA. However,some wastes generated by these operations may besubject to RCRA regulations.

According to the above guidance, conventionalexplosive ordnance that is safe for transportation andhas not been classified as a hazardous waste can betransported according to DOT and DA guidelines.

In accordance with RCRA regulations (40 CFR261.3(c)(1)), once a waste has been identified as asolid or hazardous waste, it will remain a hazardouswaste until--

• It no longer exhibits a hazardous waste charac-teristic as described in 40 CFR 261, Subpart C.

or• It has been specifically excluded by regulation(such as being delisted).

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Section 2692 of Public Law 98-407 (10 USC2692) states:

a. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section,the Secretary of Defense may not permit the use ofan installation of the Department of Defense for thestorage or disposal of any material that is toxic orhazardous material and that is not owned by theDepartment of Defense.

(2) The Secretary of Defense shall define byregulation what materials are hazardous or toxic forthe purpose of this section. including specificationsof the quantity of a material that serves to make ithazardous or toxic for the purposes of this section.The definition shall include materials referred to insection 101 (14) of the CERCLA of 1980 (42 USC9601(14)) and materials designated under Section102 of the Act (42 USC 9602) and shall includematerials that are of an explosive, flammable, orpyrotechnic nature.

b. Subsection a. does not apply to the following:

(1) The temporary storage or disposal ofexplosives in order to protect the public or to assistagencies responsible for federal law enforcement instoring or disposing of explosives when noalternative solution is available, if such storage anddisposal is made per an agreement between theSecretary of Defense and the head of the federalagency concerned.

(2) The temporary storage or disposal ofexplosives in order to provide emergency lifesavingassistance to civil authorities.

Permit and Record Keeping Requirements

Army installations that generate, transport,treat, store, or dispose of solid or hazardous wastesas described in 40 CFR 261, Subpart C, must applyto local, state. or federal regulatory agencies for anEPA identification number as described in 40 CFRParts 262, 263, 264, or 265, depending oninstallation requirements.

In accordance with AR 200-1, the installationcommander submits any requests for permitsrequired for the installation.

An EOD unit that uses a specific range fordisposing of ammunition and explosives, explosive

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residue, or ordnance that has been classified ashazardous waste must have a thermal treatmentfacility permit IAW Subpart P, 40 CFR 265.370-383,Section 382, which covers open burning/opendetonation of explosive material and residue.

EOD units must submit the requiredinformation to the installation commander or hisdesignated representative for completion of theSubpart X permit process. This information includesall material that is used on the EOD demolitionrange.

The installation will be required to submitcertain reports and keep certain records IAW 40CFR. The following reports are required forinstallations that are permitted on-site treatment,storage, or disposal: Biennial Report (40 CFR265.75) and additional reports as noted in 40 CFR265.77.

The installation is also required to keep anoperating record as described in 40 CFR 265.73.This record must be kept for as long as the facility islicensed and operating. The EOD incident reports(DA Form 3265-R) on any regulated solid orhazardous waste as defined in DA guidance areconsidered part of the operating record. Theseincident reports, or at least copies of them, must bemaintained as official records and handled IAW filenumber 200-1c, Hazardous Material ManagementFiles, as prescribed in AR 25-400-2.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations

The following policy and guidance was setforth by Headquarters, Department of the Army, on 1November 1993. This policy supersedes paragraph6-7, AR 200-1, and is in effect until issuance of aunified DOD policy or promulgation of themunitions regulations required under the FederalFacilities Compliance Act. This guidance does notsupersede any local or state requirements that mayapply to any installation. The EOD unit shouldcoordinate with state and local agencies through theinstallation environmental office. An MOU shouldbe prepared for all local and state agencies. Asample (Figure 4-5, page 4-12) is provided at the endof this chapter.

Generally speaking, EOD personnel conductemergency response operations to protect life andproperty and to return military conventional

ordnance discovered off-installation to DOD control.The EOD emergency response actions include on-and off-site treatment and transportation asnecessary to minimize the immediate threat. Forexample, if conventional explosive ordnance isdiscovered at a civilian site, EOD personnel wouldprovide support to the civil authorities off-installation and also to on-installation authorities ifor when the conventional ordnance is returned to theDOD facility.

EOD emergency response actions required tominimize an immediate safety threat to personnel orproperty are specifically excluded from the standardsand requirements IAW 40 CFR 264.l(g)(8) and270.1(c)(3).

Some state and local environmental regulationsmay require an emergency interim permit fortransportation or thermal treatment of conventionalexplosive ordnance that does not present animmediate threat to human life or property. Theguidelines for this permit are in 40 CFR 270.61. Theagency requesting EOD support is required to getwhatever permits are required.

For on-installation emergency responseoperations, EOD actions are those associated with acall for immediate action by EOD personnel orcivilian munitions destroyers to render safe con-ventional explosive ordnance. These emergencyactions might involve destruction of the conventionalordnance in-place or removal to a safer location. Forexample, an item of explosive ordnance may be sodamaged because of an accident or normal use that itposes an imminent threat to life, property, or theenvironment. In these cases, EOD units oftenrespond to render assistance in mitigating the threat.

On-installation emergency actions include thetreatment and transportation necessary to minimizeimmediate threats to human health and theenvironment. On-installation emergency actions tocontain or treat conventional explosive ordnance arenot subject to the TSDF standards or the permitrequirements of RCRA regulations. Figure 4-1(page 4-9) shows an on-installation responseflowchart that indicates when RCRA regulationsapply.

Response to any conventional ordnance item onan intended-purpose range can be treated in placewithout a permit and its requirements. If an item isnot on an intended-purpose range, it should be

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transported to a licensed EOD open burning or opendetonation site. If it cannot be transported, aninterim permit must be obtained for thermaltreatment in place, IAW 40 CFR 270.61.

For off-installation response operations, EODpersonnel may be called upon by federal or civilauthorities to help with emergency responsesinvolving conventional explosive ordnance off themilitary installation. These incidents may involveall types of conventional ordnance, including US andforeign military ordnance and IEDs.

Off-installation emergency actions include thetreatment or containment activities needed tominimize immediate threats to human health and theenvironment. Off-installation emergency actions totreat or contain conventional explosive ordnance arenot subject to the standards or permit requirementsof RCRA regulations. The EOD team leader’sdetermination of an emergency situation means theimmediate response exception is in effect under40 CFR Sections 264. l(g)(8) and 270. l(c)(3).Figure 4-2 shows an off-installation flowchart andindicates when RCRA regulations apply. If theconventional explosive ordnance is not safe fortransportation but does not present an immediatedanger to life or property, an interim permit isrequired for the transportation and treatment of theordnance. If the local law enforcement agency has alicensed open burning or open detonation area fortreating explosive material, that area should be used.

The authority or agency asking for help shouldnotify the environmental protection authority of theemergency situation before the EOD unit arrives onscene. Notification and reporting required by thestate or local regulatory authorities are theresponsibility of the requesting agency. To theextent practical, EOD personnel should ensure thatthe authority or agency that requested assistancecomplied with applicable regulatory notificationrequirements.

Conventional explosive ordnance that is safe totransport IAW DOT and DOD regulations is notclassified as a hazardous waste, and transportation isauthorized for the purpose of returning the item toDOD control. Once back in DOD control, anauthorized official must determine the finaldisposition IAW the RRDA guidelines.

EOD units that receive requests for assistancewith the treatment or storage of non-DOD ordnance

or explosive items should refer to 10 USC 2692 orearlier portions of this section. A sample MOU foroff-installation cooperation with civil authorities andenvironmental regulatory agencies is at the end ofthis chapter.

Demilitarization Operations

Demilitarization is a necessary step in the lifecycle of the management of conventional explosiveordnance. Conventional explosive ordnance thatmay be demilitarized will be managed in the RRDAammunition account. This account is an asset-tracking system that ensures the appropriatedisposition considerations are made. Demilitariza-tion is only one of those considerations.

Placement of conventional explosive ordnanceinto the RRDA does not mean that it will bedemilitarized. This ordnance should be consideredfor use in such programs as domestic and foreignmilitary sales, EOD training, RDTE missions, andinstallation recovery and recycling programs, or itshould be reworked to meet original or modifiedspecifications for reuse.

Conventional explosive ordnance in the RRDAthat an authorized official has decided to discard istransferred to the BHW account for accounting andmanagement purposes until treatment or disposal.All conventional explosive ordnance that is in theBHW account is subject to the regulatoryrequirements of RCRA for transportation, treatment.storage, and disposal. Figure 4-3 (page 4-10) showsa flowchart for demilitarization and indicates whenRCRA regulations apply.

Storage

Sometimes it is necessary to hold temporarilyrecovered conventional explosive ordnance instorage for a purpose other than treatment. Thesesituations include its use as evidence in lawenforcement proceedings and accident investigationsand technical evaluations by EOD technicians orRDTE personnel. Storage of non-DOD ordnance orexplosive material for other federal or civilauthorities is subject to 10 USC 2692 (refer to earlierportions of this chapter). After the conventionalordnance or explosive material is no longer to bestored for any reason, it will be evaluated by anauthorized official on whether it is to be used or

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discarded. If a decision is made to discard thematerial, it becomes subject to all RCRA regulations.

Storage of hazardous material is authorized fora period not to exceed 90 calendar days. Any storagepast that time must be in a licensed and permittedstorage area. Material stored in the EOD holdingarea should be treated as soon as possible after itsaccumlation.

Training and Testing

Specific training required to develop andmaintain proficiency in the use of special EODprocedures, tools, and explosives is done atdesignated demolition training ranges, also referredto as EOD training areas. Except, for basic EODtraining, the amounts of explosives used at theseranges are small. These training operations are notconsidered waste treatment. They represent the useof conventional explosive ordnance for its intendedpurpose and, therefore, are not subject to RCRAregulations.

EOD training can only be conducted on a EODrange that is licensed for thermal treatment. Noordnance can be transported to any other range anddisposed of without having a permit for thermaltreatment. This violates the intended purposecriteria for range areas.

Conventional explosive ordnance firing andexplosive activities considered conventionalexplosive ordnance used for its intended purposeinclude the following: personnel training andproficiency maintenance, safety testing, RDTE,range clearance, and quality control. Theseactivities are not considered waste treatment ordisposal operations and are not subject to RCRAregulations.

During some artillery and mortar live firetraining exercises, not all propellant charges orincrements are used. Because excess propellantspresent a safety threat in real combat situations, theirelimination by open burning is considered part of thetraining exercise and is, therefore, not subject toRCRA regulations.

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EOD training cannot be conducted using personnel safety or may lead to environmentalordnance that has been placed in the BHW or contamination.hazardous waste category.

Range Management

During the use of conventional explosiveordnance, a percentage is expected to fail to explodeor otherwise malfunction. Range managementactivities include the collection and treatment ofconventional explosive ordnance. This clearance isconducted by EOD personnel or civilian munitionsdestroyers to remove or treat propellants, explosives,and pyrotechnic materials that may threaten

Conventional explosive ordnance that is treatedon the spot or consolidated and treated on the samerange is considered being used for its intendedpurpose and, therefore, is not subject to RCRAregulations.

Conventional ordnance that is accumulatedduring a range clearance and for some reason cannotbe treated on site is considered hazardous waste andis subject to RCRA regulations for transportation,treatment, storage, and disposal.

RDTE material that is collected and transportedfor research or evaluation purposes off its initial

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range area will be considered hazardous waste after • Second, on-installation transportation as long asevaluation and research has been completed. Thismaterial is then subject to regulations of RCRA fortransportation, treatment, storage, and disposal.Figure 4-4 above shows a flowchart of when theitems become redated by RCRA.

TransportationTransportation of a hazardous waste is

regulated by RCRA (40 CFR 263.11 and 263.31) andDOT (49 CFR 171 through 179). Any transportationof a hazardous waste must be completed by alicensed EPA transporter having an EPA permit. Thefollowing three exceptions apply for EOD responseand transportation requirements:

• First, transportation of conventional explosiveordnance to a DOD facility from an off-installationresponse for the purpose of determining if theordnance should be discarded, returned to theinventory, or further studied.

the installation is a RCRA permitted site. This isconsidered transportation within the licensed facilityand is not regulated, except by the owner/operator(DOD, DA, and local regulations and policies).

• Third, emergency response actions that requiretransportation to a remote site for immediatedestruction.Transportation on-installation is regulated by RCRArequirements if the transportation route crosses orinvolves any public access route.

Occupational Safety and Health AdministrationThe OSM is another organization that has

created a challenge for EOD. The EOD companymust find a way to implement the OSHA regulationsinto its daily operations. While many of theseregulations may seem to be unduly restrictive, theyare written to make the work places in the UnitedStates safer. EOD companies may receive an OSM

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inspection without warning. EOD operations are ideas to make EOD operations safer. EODinherently dangerous, and EOD leaders should be personnel must become familiar with thedoing all that can be done to make them safer. requirements that affect the daily EOD mission.Leaders should look to the OSHA regulations for

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CHAPTER 5

EOD UNIT OPERATIONS

EOD supports the national security strategy during peacetime, conflicts, operations-in-war, and OOTW. The EODmission is to reduce or eliminate the hazards of domestic and foreign conventional, nuclear, chemical, bioiogicaland improvised explosive ordnance that threatens personnel, operations, installations, or material. During war,EOD preserves and protects the commander’s combat power. During OOTW, EOD supports national securitythrough security, antiterrotism, counterdrug, and domestic civil authority operations. ThiS chapter discusses someof the ramicaticins of and requirements for providing this support.

Section I

General Considerations

FORCE PROJECTION

Entry into the area of operations (deployment)is not enough to accomplish the mission; it is just thefirst step. Force projection is a complex process.Each action, from the first on, impacts many others.The transition from one phase of deployment to thenext is more obscure because of simultaneousplanning and execution of other phases in thedeployment process. Successful force projectiondepends on fully trained, well-led, and properlyequipped and sustained units.

EOD AND FORCE PROJECTION

EOD has to execute multiple concurrentactivities. For example, EOD may have to supportboth deployed forces and the CONUS support base.Whether in support of a humanitarian relief mission,a peacekeeping mission, or an actual wartimeoperation, EOD plays an important role in providingsupport to the deployed force.

READINESS

Anticipation demands that a unit expect alertsand deployments. Meeting the physical and mentalchallenges of anticipation depends on thepreparedness of the EOD company. Physical pre-paredness includes the following:

Creating load plans for all movementcontingencies.

• Conducting EDREs.

• Having tested load plans.

• Conducting liaison with commands that deploythe unit.

• Conducting liaison with units designated fordeployment.

• Preparing plans that identify command,intelligence, and other support relationships.

• Ensuring soldier and equipment readiness.

Mental preparedness comes with understanding theArmy is more than a job and that its mission is to beable to respond to any situation worldwide. Mentalpreparedness includes:

• Receiving briefings by MILPO personnel, ArmyCommunity Services, and other agencies to deal withdeployment issues.

• Including dependents in these briefings.

• Conducting liaison with the installation for reardetachment support during a deployment.

If the EOD company establishes a rear detachmentor has backstop personnel provided, an SOP shouldbe prepared and the dependents of deploying soldiersgiven a briefing on its contents.

•

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TRAINING

The EOD company must cooperate with allArmy units to be effective. This cooperation isreinforced by including the EOD company in generaltraining exercises. These exercises can providemany benefits (for example, the display of EODcapabilities and support requirements). As a result,the Army commander learns how an EOD unitoperates, and the EOD soldier learns how non-EODunits operate. The interaction provided by trainingexercises increases total effectiveness on thebattlefield. Since conducting training exercises withevery unit is impossible, regular contact at thecommander and operations levels is important. Itleads to better understanding, trust, and cooperation.

RESPONSE TEAM DEVELOPMENT

The EOD mission demands much of theresponse team leader. He must make many importantdecisions on his own. He is responsible both for hisown life and the lives of his team members.Additionally, the team’s actions could have a largeimpact on battlefield operations. Consider theinformation below when organizing and deployingresponse teams.

Spread the experience to all response teams.Consider experience and past job performance when

assigning personnel to response teams. The bestresponse team leader should have the leastexperienced team members. Conversely, the teamleader who has the least experience should have themost experienced team members. This results in abalanced performance from all teams.

Do not have the response teams specialize.Teams must be able to handle any situation. Theymay not get to pick the incident to which they areassigned. Some situations may demand a moreexperienced team be dispatched. However, in mostcases the team initially dispatched must accomplishthe mission.

Build strong teams by making the responseteam leader responsible for his team. The key towell-trained and motivated teams is the team leader.Given proper supervision and guidance, the teamleader should be held responsible for the condition ofthe team’s equipment, training, and morale.

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Ensure response teams are used mostefficiently. The battlefield dictates the activities ofEOD. Being able to handle high incident rates is thegoal of each EOD company. To do this, the CP mustcarefully monitor the work load of the responseteams. The CP must also ensure each team performswith minimal personal risk and maximumeffectiveness.

METL

Unit mission-essential task lists must includeappropriate mobilization (for the National GuardEOD companies) and deployment (both active andNG companies) tasks that support force projection.

SAFETY

Safety, including risk assessment and accidentreporting, is an inherent duty at all levels ofcommand. This is especially true for units andpersonnel engaged in EOD-related activities. Thefollowing discussion provides safety-related guidanceof both a general and EOD-specific nature.

Responsibilities

We must all strive for safety in the workplaceand in day-to-day operations. Each of us mustensure that we maintain a proactive posture towardssafety and that this is evident to those in our charge.Specific responsibilities, from commander to indi-viduals, are detailed below.

Commanders. Safety is a command responsibilies atall echelons. Commanders must take an active andaggressive leadership position toward safety. Theyneed to appoint a safety officer or NCO IAW AR385-10 and DA Pamphlet 385-1. They must deter-mine the causes of accidents and take necessarycorrective measures.

Safety Officer/NCO. Typical duties of the safetyofficer or safety NCO include:

• Preparing a unit safety program and a fieldsafety SOP geared towards proactive safetyawareness (instead of reactive safety reporting).

• Reviewing regulations and TMs for changes,recommendations, and procedures for increasingsafety in unit operations and EOD responseoperations.

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Recommending safety-related suggestions to thecommander for review and adoption and inclusion,as necessary, in unit SOPs.

Leaders. Leaders must ensure that soldiers performtheir duties safely by--

• Keeping soldiers aware.

• Stressing safety in operations.

• Halting unsafe operations.

• Preventing accidents through proactive planningand preparation.

Team leaders. EOD team leaders--

• Retain ultimate responsibility for the safety oftheir team members.

• Must be knowledgeable of both EOD andtactical operations.

• Inform the supported unit on safety issues of theordnance involved. The supported unit isresponsible for the safety of its personnel andequipment, based on the information provided by theteam leader.

Individuals. As individuals, we retain some degreeof personal responsibility for ensuring our ownsafety. This includes--

• Being familiar with the Army’s general safetypolicies, including policies for ammunition,explosives, and related operations (AR 385-64 andTM 9-1300-206).

• Knowing explosive ordnance specific safetyprecautions for ammunition and explosive operationscovered in TMs 60A-1-1-22 and 60A-1-1-31.

Safety SOP

Each unit should have on hand a current,detailed (as much detail as needed) safety SOP. Thissafety SOP should include:

• Safety education and promotion plans.

• Safety requirements and training frequency.

• Procedures to detect potential safety violationsand ensure that corrections are made.

• Provisions for periodic updating sessions andbriefings conducted by the unit command on newordnance items and technical intelligence reports.This is an effective method of keeping soldiersinformed and the safety awareness level high.

Risk Assessment and Management

Risk management is a decision-making processthat balances operational demands against risks.Doing risk assessment and then applying riskmanagement should become fully integrated parts ofoperational planning and execution. A good ex-ample of risk assessment and management ispresented later in this chapter.

Identification of hazards and the effects theymay have is called risk assessment. Leaders mustlearn to assess risks during training events and thenapply the same techniques during combat operations.During combat risks must be taken, but only after themission is evaluated and weighed as practiced duringtraining.

Team leaders must use the risk assessmentprocess in both their EOD operations and their safetybriefing to the supported unit.

The supported unit must use the riskassessment process when faced with a UXO hazard.The EOD team leader will provide the commanderwith accurate information on the hazards or risks. Itis the supported unit that must make the finaldecision on acceptable risks based on its current andprojected tactical mission load.

Risk management is taking steps to eliminate,reduce. or control the amount of risk. It allowsleaders to execute more realistic training scenariosnot otherwise possible because of the highprobability of accidents.

Accident Reporting

In addition to the recognition and control ofsafety hazards, it is essential, at every level, that thecauses of accidents be determined. This will help toidentify accident trends, unsatisfactory workperformance, personnel losses, and property damage.

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Therefore, all accidents resulting in injury orproperty damage must be reported.

DA Form 285 is the primary means ofreporting accidents. For information on preparingthis form, see AR 385-40.

When an accident happens, it is important togather all essential information for reports andpossible corrective action, the following infor-mation should be recorded:

• Who was injured or what damaged.

• Time and place of the accident.

• Severity and cost (in personnel or material) ofthe accident.

• Nature of the accident or injury.

• How and why the accident occurred.

Corrective action is based on specific factsabout the accident or injury. Corrective actions canbe in the form of removing hazards, improving

operations, or training personnel. Moreover, thecorrective action must be supplemented by propermanagement on the part of the unit leadership toensure that familiarity with operations does not leadto complacency or contempt for safety awareness.

COMMAND POST SETUP

Two main factors--communications and theneed for 24-hour service--govern the setup andoperation of the CP. The only standard is that theunit be able to provide EOD support effectively. Thefact that EOD supports larger units may dictate thelocation of the EOD CP. However, the supportedunit may be flexible in other factors of setup andoperation.

Communications is the most important factorin establishing a CP. The CP must have communi-cations with the supported CP, with its own HQ,and with the rest of the company. The com-munications should be a combination of radio andland lines. During periods of nonmovement, the CPshould link into the ACUS. This allows EOD rapidand direct communication within the theater. Be-cause of the importance of communications, therecommended location of the EOD CP is near thesupported unit’s CP.

Section IIThe EOD Response

ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DEFINED

Every time EOD responds to a reported UXO,it is an incident. Most incidents are caused byaccidents, thus the two are commonly thought oftogether, as in accident/incident. Each EODincident is unique because minor changes in tactics,variations in IED or UXO construction, fuzingdesign characteristics, human error, and the type oftarget and its surroundings can affect the situation. Itis impossible to insist on the application of inflexiblerules for an accident/incident. It is possible,however, to develop a technique that identifiesimmediate threats to safety. This enables the EODteam leader to make a thorough evaluation of thesituation and to execute the plan with the greatestchance for success.

RESPONSE PLANNING

The rules and guidance provided below willhelp increase the chances of developing a realistic,safe plan of attack. They must always be kept inmind when conducting EOD operations. Togetherwith the information provided in the followingparagraphs, they give EOD personnel a sound basison which to plan operations.

• Do not perform an RSP when a disposal can beperformed.

• Always consider protective works, evacuation, or other procedures to reduce the category of theincident.

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• Establish safe approach and exit routes for bothremote and manual attacks. This is most importantfor manual attacks because of the possibility ofsecondary hazards such as trip wires, pressure mats,or other hidden devices.

• Resort to a manual approach only if a remoteapproach is not possible and only after waiting theminimum wait time (for Category A incidents waittimes do not apply). If a technician makes a manualapproach, he should try to take all tools andequipment needed and make only one approach.This will limit his exposure time. During a manualapproach, take all personal protective measuresavailable that will not physically interfere with thesafe application of procedures. Perform all actionspossible in a safe area to reduce time exposed todanger. Exposure time begins when the EODtechnician steps from protective cover and lasts untilhe regains cover.

• Do not move an item, manually or remotely,until the item has been identified and the effects ofmovement (detonation or contamination, forexample) have been estimated.

• If a RSP is to be performed, a separate memberof the team should then perform a secondreconnaissance to ensure a positive identification ofthe UXO. Some UXO situations may present anunacceptable risk in performing a second recon. Thismight occur if long-delay or influence-type fuzing isinvolved.

RSP TACTICS AND PLANNING

A number of factors should be consideredbefore implementing a RSP. The first question theEOD team leader should ask is, “Can I do the RSPremotely?” If the answer is yes, consider all possibleremote methods of attack. This thought processentails listing every weapon in the remote attackarmory and asking of each:

• What is the best that can happen?

• What is the most likely thing that can happen?

• What is the worst that can happen?

If the worst that can happen carries anunacceptable risk, choose another method to reducethe risk. Only when every remote method has been

considered. and improvisations thought about, canthe team leader make the final choice. The methodgiving the best chance of success and the minimumrisk is the best choice. Do not accept the decisionwithout double-checking the whole process. If thesecond decision matches, proceed with the detailedplanning. Consider a manual approach only whenyou have exhausted all avenues of remote attack.

Implementation of the RSP through remote ormanual methods may need to be reevaluated aftermaking the initial approach to the device. The EODteam leader should ask if the proposed RSP is stillfeasible. New factors may make it impossible for theteam to implement the original plan. The EOD teamleader must then consider other options.

If the EOD team leader ever feels that he isspending too much time at the incident scene, it ismost probably true. It may indicate some weaknessin the plan or implementation of the plan. The EODteam leader should stop, reevaluate, and developanother plan.

The EOD team leader should continuously askif any action is likely to disturb the device. Heshould be sure the robotics equipment is placed togive the best results. If it is not, the EOD teamleader must take corrective action.

The EOD team leader must never totallycommit to one plan but should remain flexible,keeping safety paramount. Develop a contingencyplan as a backup should it be necessary to abandonthe initial plan.

MULTIPLE-UXO RESPONSE

The new UXO scenario is not just one EODresponse team working on one bomb. It is multiple-team operations on dozens of UXO items withsupport from non-EOD units. Multiple-UXOincidents can happen in many situations: ASPs,FARPs, ammunition convoys, aircraft accidents,airfield recovery, and ordnance left after combinedarms operations, both friendly and enemy. Theparagraphs below provide useful information forEOD on procedures dealing with multiple-UXOscenarios.

It would be impossible to cover every scenarioan EOD unit could face. Instead, the generalmethodology for conducting EOD operations at a

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multiple-UXO incident is described. This metho-dology can be applied to all multiple-UXOincidents with only a slight tailoring to fit eachsituation.

In the past, EOD units have handled multiple-UXO incidents without any solid written guidance.While on the whole EOD units and teams haveexcelled in one-on-one ordnance incidents. themultiple-UXO incident presents new challenges. Thefollowing paragraphs of this chapter will establishprocedures for the execution of the different phasesof a multiple-UXO incident. The three generallyrecognized phases include: the initial planningphase. the hasty recon/immediate action phase(HRIAP), and the RSP/disposal phase.

The information presented here should be usedas a guide by EOD units and teams involved inmultiple-UXO incidents. Applicable proceduresfrom this FM can be used as is or can be extracted.expanded, or modified to fit each multiple-UXOincident. A multiple-UXO procedural checklist isprovided at the end of this chapter (Table 5-1 ).

Initial Planning Phase

The initial planning phase of a multiple-UXOincident includes gathering critical information.identifying and coordinating necessary support,determining equipment and personnel requirements,receiving area priorities, establishing an RCP, andgridding the affected area. Since initial planning isso important to success, it requires commandemphasis within the EOD company. The companycommander and NCOs must effectively interfacewith the division or area support group or highercommands and their affected units and supervise theoverall operation.

Gathering information. Unlike single ordnanceincidents, the multiple-UXO incident requires anextreme amount of legwork in gathering accurateinformation. Initial information is likely to be sentby radio to the division or area support group andthen to the EOD company. However. this infor-mation may be very vague and not too useful.

If information and EOD communications arelimited, the EOD commander, company NCO, oroperations NCO may have to coordinate (through thedivision or area support group communicationssystem) back to the affected local area commanders

to get more information. It is essential to getinformation such as size, location, and markings ofthe UXO: approaches; protective works; andproximity to vital facilities. Depending on theamount of ordnance and number of affected units,this information may have to be gathered by theindividual EOD teams who respond.

The type of information requested for single-ordnance incidents should also be requested formultiple-UXO incidents. However, the possiblemagnitude of the ordnance and affected areas mayrequire an extensive information-gathering process.This information will require in-depth correlationand evaluation to be understandable for later use bythe RCP and EOD team leaders. Additionalinformation may need to be asked for, such asordnance stores lists from aircraft, inventory of whatwas stored in the ASP, or ordnance types beingtransported in the convoy.

Determining area priorities. The division or areasupport group should be the primary prioritizationauthority for multiple-UXO incidents because theseincidents may affect not only large areas but alsoseveral combat elements within the division or areasupport group. Since all the units may claim to bethe most important to the war effort, EODcommanders and senior NCOs must closelycoordinate with the division or area support group onwhat the actual priority is.

Responding teams may receive secondarypriorities from the affected subordinate or local areacommanders who have been identified by thedivision or area support group. For example: Thedivision has identified the 4/7th Cavalry’s area ashaving the first priority because it needs to move to avital forward location. When six EOD soldiersarrive at the battalion headquarters, the battalioncommander tells the EOD team leader that he needsA Troop’s area cleared first so it can do a route reconfor the battalion.

It is important for the EOD company com-mander, company NCO, and the RCP supervisor toremember that, while the division or area supportgroup sets the priorities by area or unit, the EODcompany also has to factor two things into theprioritization: the ordnance encountered and itshazards to EOD personnel during the RSP/imple-mentation phase (discussed later).

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Coordinating support. Coordinating support for amultiple-UXO incident is a multiechelon task sharedby the CP, RCP, and EOD team leaders. Some typesof support can be obtained by the on-site EOD teamor by coordination with the affected local areacommanders, such as aerial reconnaissance byhelicopter. Teams must be able to request additionalsupport, going through the RCP to the CP. The CPmay more easily obtain the requested support fromthe division area support group. Teams should knowthat if the local area commander cannot provide therequested support, the division or area support groupmight.

Determining equipment and personnel needs. Eachmultiple-UXO situation requires different levels ofpersonnel and equipment. If the incident is too largefor the EOD company to handle alone, it mustcoordinate through the EOD battalion for additionalEOD resources.

When the incident is within the EOD companycapability, the commander and senior NCOsdetermine the best number of soldiers to deploy.Many times multiple-UXO incidents require all ofthe company’s available personnel resources and alarge amount of its equipment. The number of EODsoldiers and the amount of EOD equipment deployedis based on the type of ordnance expected to beencountered, the amount of ordnance, scheduled restfor soldiers, and the size of the affected area.However, EOD commanders and senior NCOsshould be aware that the level of EOD soldier andequipment resources required may change as theincident goes through the HRIAP to theRSP/disposal phase.

Setting up the RCP. Setting up a RCP close to theaffected area, yet outside the blast/fragmentationradius, is a must. Considering the amount ofordnance and the area covered, the commandershould decide the proper manning requirements forthe RCP. An incident may require the commanderto remain at the division or area support group forcoordination while the company NCO and recorderestablish the RCP, with all remaining assetsdeployed to affected areas. Decisions will be basedon the various factors previously discussed.

The RCP will be the center of information forthe HRIAP and RSP/disposal phase. It is also thecoordination point for all EOD teams involved in theoperation. It must be the focal point in the planning

and implementation of the next two phases. It isalso the intermediary between the teams, EODbattalion, division or area support group, and, inmany instances, the local area commanders. Externalpressures placed on the RCP are considerable andmust be handled so that EOD response teams cancontinue their missions. The RCP supervisor mayhave to visit the affected areas if information is toounclear. He then can adjust plans and overlays andpass on accurate information to the division or areasupport group and other involved parties.

Establishing grid system. Once all the planning iscomplete, the RCP and EOD team leaders shouldprepare some type of grid system to help organizeand control response to the incident. This grid maybe an overlay.

The grid is based on the size of the affectedarea, quantity of ordnance, number of respondingEOD soldiers, and area priorities. The numbers ineach grid correspond with the division or areasupport group priority and provide the RCP with acontrol, planning, and reference measure. Forinstance, an airfield is designated number 1, whichmeans its clearance is the division or area supportgroup’s first priority. Each successive number is thenext priority. The RCP may also use the overlay toplot approximate ordnance locations. There may bemany separate elements within an affected area. Ifthis is the case. the RCP might decide to use allteams, two teams on the airfield and one team eachin the remaining areas for the HRIAP.

When the grid has been established, the RCPneeds to make EOD personnel assignments for eachsection of the grid. Included should be an overallteam leader for each grid. The RCP supervisorshould also conduct a briefing for all EOD soldiersinvolved in the operation. The briefing shouldinclude all available information and safety factors.The grid should be used throughout the operation,with the RCP making any necessary adjustments tothe overlay as they occur. The grid and briefingshould be available in writing at the RCP for allpersonnel working the incident. An important andmandatory part of the briefing is the safety plan forthe site. This plan must include all known safetyproblems and other mitigating factors. Allpersonnel, not just EOD, must be briefed and show

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they understand the situation before they are allowedonto the site.

Hasty Recon and Immediate Action Phase

Once the RCP is operational, the RCP andEOD team leaders should develop the overall planfor the conduct of the HRIAP. This plan should beput into writing at the earliest opportunity to ensurecontinuity of the operation. The purpose of theHRIAP is to do a quick visual recon, to determinethe need for any immediate action, and to classifythe ordnance and fuzing by type and function.

Responsibilities. The RCP supervisor, grid teamleaders, and individual team members all havespecific duties and responsibilities during theHRIAP. These are covered in some detail below.

RCP Supervisor. The RCP supervisor mustassign EOD personnel to each of the grids. He mustensure that each grid has an overall team leaderdesignated as more than one staff sergeant may beassigned to it. He needs to maintain a log (by name)of who is operating in what grid. He also needs toensure that all tools, both EOD-peculiar andcommon, are evenly distributed among the differentgrids. Where these tools are needed will depend onthe ordnance being reported. For example, alienwrenches for fin removal will be needed wherebombs are being reported.

The RCP supervisor must establish an effectivecommunication system among himself, the EODsoldiers, affected local area commanders, and thedivision or area support group. It may require someexternal support from the area commander to beeffective. If the RCP or EOD teams need moreradios, the RCP supervisor should request them fromeither the affected local area commanders or thedivision or area support group. The consequence offailure to provide such support should be clearlymade known.

The RCP supervisor sets reportingrequirements from the grid team leaders. Followingcommonsense battlefield procedures, radio trafficshould always be kept to a minimum. The RCPsupervisor establishes who will communicate withthe affected area commanders. This could be a jointresponsibility shared by the RCP and grid teamleaders. In any event, the RCP leader should provide

as much of a buffer as possible between externalelements and the teams working the grids.

Grid Team Leader. The grid team leaderconducts a detailed briefing for all team membersworking in his grid. He should paint the “bigpicture” with all the information that is available.Ideally, this information includes reported ordnancelocations, types of ordnance expected, safetyprecautions. size of grid, who is assigned to thatgrid, and the plan of attack. Grid team leaders mayget more information from any guides provided bythe affected local area commanders.

Grid team leaders may choose to break downtheir grid into smaller subgrids to make individualteam member assignments. A rally point should beestablished where all team members will meet whenthey complete their area’s HRIAP. Other than forany required “immediate action,” no other hands-onprocedures should be performed.

The grid team leader, along with the RCPleader. may establish a marking system for theordnance encountered. This system may simply be tomark all ordnance with red flags and those that havehad an immediate action peformed with a yellowflag. Just remember to make the marking systemsimple enough so that it will not be confusing to theteam members. Even with a marking system, theteam leader must require team members to keep anaccurate notebook or log of what type of ordnancethey encountered and where. This is so he can putall the information together at the rally point andgive the RCP leader an accurate picture of thesituation in each grid.

The grid team leader must establish thecommunications system for his grid. This systemmay include hand-held radios, verbal signals, orhand signals. The type of communication neededwill vary based on the size of the grid. If handsignals are to be used by team members close to eachother, they should be standardized so that allmembers can understand them.

The team leader sets up contingency plans forall potential problems the team members mayencounter. These should include the plan of action ifa member encounters an immediate action fuzewhile other members are close by. The answer maybe to give verbal or hand signals to those membersclose by to seek the best available cover immediately.

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Also included should be the plan of action in case adetonation in the grid causes the death or injury of ateam member.

The grid team leader shoulders most of theresponsibility for the incident’s successor failure. Hemust be flexible enough to modify plans of attackbased on the actual situation once he getsdownrange. He needs to be an effectivecommunicator, organizer, leader, and technician.

Team Members. Team members operating inthe HRIAP perform independently. These soldiersmust have skills normally associated with those ofthe team leader.

Team members are the workhorses of theoperation. They will, however, have greater respon-sibilities in a multiple-UXO incident than in thenormal EOD single incident. These responsibilitiesinclude maintaining their own logs and drawings.performing hasty recon, deciding if an immediateaction is required, performing that immediate action,and marking the ordnance.

To keep an accurate log and drawings, the teammember must be able to make quick, accurate notesand drawings about the type of ordnance heencounters. These notes should include theordnance type by function, fuze type by function. andany immediate action applied. The team membermust also be able to make an area sketch showingthe location of the ordnance.

When an immediate action is required. theteam member must be able to do it quickly. He mustbe aware of his environment and of any other teammembers close by. If other team members are closeby, they must all communicate according to theprearranged system.

Finally. the team member must mark theordnance item using the method established in theplan for the HRIAP.

Implementation. Once the RCP supervisor issatisfied that all the planning is complete, hedispatches the teams to their assigned grids to beginthe HRIAP.

Upon arrival at the RP, the grid team leaderdeploys all team members to their assigned area ofresponsibility. He makes certain that the team

members know to return and wait at the rally pointwhen they have surveyed their areas.

When all team members have completed theirhasty recon and immediate actions and have returnedto the RP, the grid team leader and team membersconsolidate all the logs and sketches and add mentalnotes to the log. From this information, the teamleader updates his grid overlay. He may add suchfeatures as new pieces of ordnance and theirlocations, ordnance classification type by function,and actual locations of reported ordnance. Newordnance should be photographed for the reconreport to the RCP. Before returning to the RCP, thegrid team leader should ensure that he and his teamhave made the picture of their grid as detailed aspossible. This sketch and the other grid sketches arekey to planning the last phase of the operation.

RSP and Disposal Phase

The ultimate goal of multiple-UXO incidents isto complete the RSP/disposal phase. This phaseincludes three steps: assembling all information fromthe HRIAP, planning, and implementing.

Gathering information. Once all the grid teamleaders have returned (from the HRIAP) to the RCP,the RCP supervisor and grid team leaders will needto plot all gathered and researched information tomap the entire affected area.

The RCP plots the location of all ordnancefound on the overlay and devises a system to identifythe ordnance and fuze by type and by function. Thismay be as simple as numbering the ordnance on theoverlay and making a log using those numbers toidentify the ordnance. During this period, the teammembers research UXO to positively identify asmuch of the ordnance as possible. Photographs ofthe ordnance found will help speed this process.

As planning progresses, team members fromthe various grids should be reporting the positiveidentification of as many pieces of ordnance aspossible. Some pieces of ordnance may not bepositively identified. If not, a second recon is neededto positively identify the UXO. The other teammembers must also know the exact situation of theUXO in order to fully advise and assist the teamleader. This follows the old adage “Two heads arebetter than one.” Team leaders may still accept asingle recon in extremely hazardous situations.

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When a more detailed recon is needed becauseof the priority of the area where the ordnance is orwhen vital facilities are nearby, the RCP leaderdispatches a team to the ordnance to get a positiveidentification. This may be done while planning forthe RSP/disposal continues or during itsimplementation, depending on the situation. Beforea team actually departs to conduct a more detailedrecon, the RCP leader should ensure that the teammember who did the hasty recon has actually seenpositively identified ordnance. It is very possiblethat while one team member cannot identify acertain piece of ordnance, another may be able to.This is especially true in multiple-UXO incidents.

The grid team leaders should tell the RCP ofany new information they have that could affect theplanning of the RSP/disposal phase. This infor-mation would include any unit movements that mayhave occurred within the grids, locations of vitalfacilities not previously identified, or anything elsethat helps provide an accurate picture of thesituation.

Planning. Planning the RSP/disposal phase againrequires the RCP leader and grid team leaders towork together. Planning should include pri-oritization, resources needed, additional detailedrecon needed, simultaneous operations projected,and any outside support necessary. This planningshould take less time than planning for the HRIAPbecause such things as communication, grids, andother considerations have already been set up.

Should the size and terrain of the affected areamake simultaneous operations possible, the RCPsupervisor briefs the team leaders who will bepeforming those operations. This briefing includesthe specific details of how the operation will becarried out. The topics of team location, the type ofordnance and fuzing involved, the type ofRSP/disposal to be performed, safety factors. and thelocation of facilities around the operations area mustbe included. The RCP supervisor should make itclear that he is the central point of control and thatall teams should coordinate their actions through theRCP. If the plan of attack is to set up two or threeRSPs simultaneously and perform them separatelybut in a sequence, team leaders need to understandexactly what the sequence is and how they are to beprompted to proceed. The RCP should alsocoordinate between the affected area commandersand the teams.

Prioritizing. At this point, the RCP supervisor mustset priorities. These priorities are based on anyadditional guidance received from the division orarea support group, the information received fromthe HRIAP, area priorities assigned by the divisionor area support group, and the hazards of theordnance found. The guidance received from thedivision or area support group and their areas ofpriority will be straightforward and easy to use. It isthe ordnance-related information that requires somethought as to what to attack first. The RCPsupervisor needs to identify ordnance item by item inthe sequence of the plan of attack. Doing this, heneeds to consider which items of ordnance are themost hazardous and which pose little or no realhazard to the area.

Distances between the various pieces ofordnance must be considered. For example: Thereis an item in an area that the division or area supportgroup has identified as the number one priority. Butanother item has been found in an area identified asthe group’s priority number two. The second itemhas a fragmentation radius covering item one andcontains a more hazardous fuzing, such as clockworkor delay. In this case, the RCP supervisor wouldattack the priority two item first. Any such EODdecision that seems to contradict the group’s priorityneeds to be explained to the group.

Based on the size of the affected area, the RCPsupervisor may decide to attack more than one pieceof ordnance at a time. The teams can performsimultaneous operations provided they are outsideeach other’s areas of responsibility and there isadequate cover between them. These simultaneousoperations may be in the same or in different areas ofpriority. The RCP supervisor also decides how manyteams are necessary for the mission. In mostsituations, the RCP supervisor can release someteams back to the division or area support group, buthe should not do so until the RSP/disposal phaseteams have departed. This is done so that allnecessary information is passed on to thoseremaining and the RSP/disposal phase teams haveall the equipment they need. It is ill-advised to haveonly one team complete the entire RSP/disposalphase of the operation unless only a few UXOrequire RSP or disposal. If multiple teams are toperform procedures simultaneously, they may haveto swap various EOD tools between them.

Determining additional support. The RCPsupervisor needs the grid team leaders to determine

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required support. This should include the additionalEOD and non-EOD support they will need to dealwith each piece of ordnance they will encounter.

The RCP supervisor also needs to determinewhat specific types of external support are needed forthe RSP/disposal phase. Additional non-EODsupport should be requested from the areacommander. Careful analysis of the total operationis needed to ensure that valuable support assets arereleased back to the area commander as safely andquickly as possible.

The RCP supervisor must plan how and whento use the support he has requested. Most likely,engineer support will be needed for the constructionof protective works. To be effective, the support planhas to go hand in hand with the prioritization andsimultaneous operations plans.

The RCP supervisor must determine the mosteffective use of the limited external supportpersonnel and equipment. The first thing to beconsidered is keeping exposure of support personnelto the bare minimum. Using external support iscomplicated when two or more external support unitsin different areas are used at the same time. Tosimplify the situation, team leaders can coordinatethese elements’ actions to coincide with the plan forsimultaneous operations.

Some support needs more time and manpowerthan others. The RCP supervisor, team leaders, andsupport element leaders must coordinate to estimatesupport completion time. This factor must beincluded in the overall plan to have an effectiveoperation.

The RCP supervisor ensures that each supportelement is aware of any special hazards andprotective equipment required.

Implementing. Once the RCP supervisor finishesthe plan, he should begin to implement it. Duringimplementation, there are two areas of emphasis--command and control and team operations.

The RCP must exercise command and controlof the deployed teams. To do this, the RCP must be-come a proactive element. If teams remain out ofcontact for long periods of time without explanation,the RCP makes contact with them to verify theirstatus. This is extremely important when implemen-ting simultaneous operations. Team leaders often be-

come so engrossed in their operations that they for-get communications with the RCP. However, teammembers should operate the radios and update theRCP as necessary. The RCP updates the affectedarea commanders on progress and keeps acting as abuffer for the team leaders. Also, the RCP providesthe division or area support group with regularupdates.

Unlike in the HRIAP, the implementation ofthe RSP/disposal phase must use the normal teamoperation concept. Team members not workingmust stay in the safe area outside the fragmentationradius with adequate frontal and overhead cover.Once the RSP/disposal has been attempted. the teamleader must check the results. One team membershould perform as the RTO to keep the RCP leaderup-to-date. The only variation from normal teamoperations is the requirement to stay incommunication with the RCP. All other aspects ofthis phase are done as with conventional incidents.

Completing. After the teams have completed theRSP/disposal of the required ordnance, they shouldagain rally at the RCP. The RCP supervisor shouldthen conduct an outbriefing to be sure his after-action report accurately describes the incident’sresults.

The RCP supervisor should then inform theaffected area commanders that EOD operations intheir areas are finished. He should also identify theexact locations and precautions for any ordnance leftin the area. The RCP should ensure that anyordnance not disposed of is clearly marked. If allpieces of ordnance reported and found were takencare of, the RCP should advise the affected local areacommanders accordingly with the warning that otherordnance may still be in the area.

The RCP supervisor should then update thearea commander and establish a plan of dispositionfor any remaining ordnance. This could includeordnance that was RSP’d but not taken to a safeholding or disposal area. The RCP supervisor mustreadjust the category of any remaining ordnance thathas been RSP’d and left in place or any otherhazardous residue left in place. The RCP must thendetermine the new priority of these items IAWprocedures in Chapter 1. If they remain at a higherpriority than other incidents that have been reportedto the CP, the RCP supervisor and his teamscontinue to reduce the hazards of the ordnance.

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CHAPTER 6

AREA CLEARANCE AND ROBOTICS

Section I

Area Clearance

DEFINITION

Area clearance deals with transportation accidents,ammo plant accidents, and accidents at a storagefacility. These accidents can happen during war orOOTW. When area clearance is required, EOD maybetasked to return the accident site to a safe condition.These accidents may require the team leader to workand coordinate with local authorities, civiliantransportation authorities. the EPA, and other federa1agencies.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Upon receiving an area-clearing tasking, EODpersonnel need to take a number of factors intoconsideration. Regardless of the type of inci-dent/accident they are responding to, EOD personnelneed to consider the following:

• Number of Teams. Will a single EOD team beenough or will a forward CP and WPs be needed?Follow-on EOD response may be need for additionalsupport.

• Transportation. Select the best mode of trans-portation. An MOU between the military post and theEOD unit for air supprt, if needed, should expeditearrival at the incident/accident site.

• Publications. Determine which publications will beneeded. Make sure they will be available.

• Equipment. Does everyone have the personalequipment and response kits needed for the initialresponse? Follow-on response can transport moreequipment. Done this way, the initial response team isin transit more rapidly.

• Explosives. How much will be necessary? Theamount taken will depend upon the incident.

• Public Affairs. Is the press likely to be at the site?If so, contact the PAO. He or she may want to send arepresentative.

• Communications. Are concerned parties com-municating with each other? The initial response team,and subsequent EOD teams on-site, need tocommunicate with higher headquarters reguarly.

Once the initial response team arrives at theaccident/incident site, it needs to coordinate with thearea commander or civilian authorities on the following:

• Priorities. What needs to be done and in whatorder? For example, remove the wounded and fatalities,act to prevent loss of life and property damage, andremove hazardous munitions or explosives.

• Area Security. What needs to be done to preventfurther loss of life or injury? To secure publications,explosives, and procedures?

• Medical Support. What is needed?

• Fire Fighting Support. Will fire fighting support beneeded?

• Other. What else is needed? Is there a need forheavy equipment, access equipment protective works,or communications?

Transportation accidents/incidents may presentadditional hazards normally not associated with anEOD incident. Fuels, battery acids, and electricalcomponents are all hazards that should be factored intothe plan of attack.

Ammo plant and storage facilities may presentadditional factors or hazards that need to be considered.Explosive dusts, high voltages, high-pressure bottles,gases, chemicals, hydraulic lines, and security and firesystems are some of the hazards or factors that mayneed to be considered in the plan of attack.

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RESPONSE PROCEDURES

When involved in an area-clearing operation,EOD teams should first perform a hasty recon.Guidance from the area commander and the situationitself will dictate how immediate hazards are to beminimized and how any wounded or fatalities arehandled. A good overall view of the down-rangesituation is needed for further planning.

Accident investigators may want the incident siteleft basically “as is.” If so, EOD may be asked to guidethe investigators downrange. Make sure hazards havebeen minimized to a point that investigators can safelygo downrange. EOD helps the investigators andsupplies them with information.

After the hasty recon is finished, the RCPsupervisor formulates the overall plan of attack. Thesenior EOD representative briefs the area commanderon the situation downrange, types and numbers ofmunitions, and how best to conduct the clearance. Thearea commander (with input from EOD, police,investigators, and other sources) decides the priorities.The plan of attack should include a systematic way of

prioritizing the munitions and how they are to be dealtwith. Other factors that may need to be included are:

• Adjustment and readjustment of exclusion area asnecessary.

• Safe holding area site.

• Safe disposal site.

• Transportation of munitions to holding or disposalsites.

• Transportation of personnel.

• Sleeping and messing arrangements for personnel.

• Custodian of accident site and munitions.

• Security of tools and equipment restrictedpublications, and explosives.

Once the RCP supervisor determines that there isno longer a hazard on site, the senior EODrepresentative notifies the area commander, militaryrepresentative, higher headquarters, and the on-sitecivilian authorities.

Section II

ROBOTICS

REMOTE ATTACK PHILOSOPHY

Life is irreplaceable. When planning an attackupon an IED or UXO, there is one overridingconsideration. Simply stated: Except when faced witha Category A incident, the safety of the EOD soldieris the first consideration. In all categories ofincidents, the first aim will be remote neutralization.

Robotic systems minimize the exposure of theEOD soldier to IEDs and UXO. Use them as much aspossible when performing remote recon and render safefictions. A well-trained operator and goodquestioning techniques are the keys to the succesfulemployment of EOD robotic systems. Use robotics asthe tool of first choice.

EOD robotic systems have explosively actuatedtools (semiautomatic disrupter; .50 caliber dearmer) andthe ability to place explosive charges. Attach a clearly

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visible red streamer to an antenna or other fixture whenthe EOD robotic system is configured with explosivelyactuated tools.

When use of robotic systems is not possible, EODsoldiers use body armor to the maximum extent. Theteam leader may determine, under extremecircumstances, that the level of body armor bedowngraded. Extreme circumstances include:handicaps that make continued wear inherentlydangerous (fogging face shield, for example) or an IEDthat is inaccessible while wearing the body armor.Regardless of the incident or the size of the ordnance,EOD teams must wear, as a minimum flack vesthelmets, and eye protection until all dangers areneutralized or eliminated.

ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES

EOD response team success in dealing with anIED or UXO will depend on an accurate and logical

FM 9-15

assessment of the situation. This requires the EODteam leader to do the following:

• Extract all information from all sources at thescene. Good questioning techniques will be useful here.

• Make a realistic assessment of the result if the IEDor UXO was to function.

• Ask valid questions that will help him decide if theNP can be remotely accomplished and that will serveto reduce personnel risk to the absolute minimum.

QUESTIONING TECHNIQUES

Interview witnesses individually because peopletend to conform to the group. Above all, be firm andfriendly and show no hostility. Do not ask questionsuntil the witness finishes his story. Fully exploit eachanswer. Ask direct questions, but do not ask questionsthat may make the witness withhold information.

Answers and statements do not always provide allthe information EOD needs. The EOD team leadermust determine what other information is required. Hemust then ask the appropriate questions to get thatinformation.

The team leader will probably need to ask manyquestions to get all relevant information. Thus, it isalways in the EOD soldier’s interest to develop a goodquestioning technique. As a minimum, ask thefollowing questions:

• Where is the item?

• What is it?

• When was it placed thrown. dropped, launched, orprojected?

• Why was it placed, throw dropped, launched orprojected?

• Was anything seen or heard?

Each of these lines of questioning is more fullydeveloped below.

Where is the item? It is not unusual for deployedsecurity forces to be too close to the device. For thisreason, “Where is it?” is the first question asked. Thiswill allow the security cordon to be moved back if

necessary. The general location may already be firmlyestablished before EOD arrives at the scene. However,in certain circumstances the precise location of thedevice may be required so that the EOD soldier candetermine if robotics can be used (are doorways wideenough, are there any steps to negotiate?). The preciselocation is required in a manual approach, too, so thatthe least time is spent searching. A useful way topinpoint the precise location is to have a diagram drawnand have it confirmed in detail during independentquestioning of witnesses.

A subsequent, related question should be: “Hasanyone been up to and returned from the device?” If so,they have inadvertently established cleared paths forEOD to use. If the answer is yes, did they noticeanything unusual on the path taken (wires, boxes,disturbed ground, bomb fins, baseball-sized objects, ordead animals)? It may also be necessary to find out theposition of the device. Is it near any material that istoxic, flammable, or of a chemical nature (petroleumoil, lubricants, fertilizers. or hazardous waste)? If it is,this material may add to the effect of the device should itfunction.

What is it? Specific evacuation action oftendepends on the device’s size and the amount ofexplosives present. Witnesses may be able to tell whatthe device is constructed of. This may also help youselect the EOD tools to use.

When was it placed, thrown, dropped,launched, or projected? The EOD team leader maywish to base the waiting time on this information. If hecannot accurately establish the true time of the IEDplacement or the impact of the UXO, the EOD teamleader must begin the waiting period from when thesecurity forces got on site and can guarantee that no onesince has tampered with the device. If security forceshave no input. use the time the EOD team was notifiedor arrived at the incident site.

Why was it placed, thrown, dropped, launched,or projected? The answer to this question may indicatethe source of the device. If it is an IED, it may indicatethe method of operation and degree of sophisticationused in the construction of the device. If the item is aUXO, the answer may indicate the country of origin, themethod of delivery, or if the UXO is a practice device orexplosively filled and fuzed. The reason for targeting(why) may indicate the IED’s likely method ofoperation. Remember though, the IED may be a trap

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with the real target being the EOD response team.Inspect the safe area for the possibility of a secondarydevice.

Was anything seen or heard? Witnesses to IEDplacement or UXO impact may be able to give anaccount of what was seen and heard. Remember,however, eyewitness accounts are not always reliable.

Witness accounts can often aid the EOD teamleader in deducing what type of fuzng is in the IED.For example, an account that a terrorist left the roomand was away for a few minutes could indicate that theterrorist placed another device somewhere in thebuilding in addition to the device placed where thewitnesses stated. Often in this situation the terroristgives only a warning without specfics. In this case, thesecurity forces would enter the building after the firstdevice functions to investigate. They are at risk becausethere may be a second, unreported device.

Witness accounts of military aircraft crashes andsurface transportation accidents (including overturned

trucks and derailed trains) can help the EOD teamleader reduce or eliminate the hazards.

LIMITATIONS

Robotic systems of EOD application promisecapabilities never before imagined. Systems designedspecifically for the EOD mission have proliferated in themarketplace. Unfortunately, most have limitedcapabilities that restrict them to peacetime scenarios. Nocurrently available commercial robotic system isbattlefield-capable. The first EOD robotic systems thatcan operate under battlefield conditions are still underdevelopment.

Robotics have great potential for the EODcommunity, but there are limitations. It is envisionedthat robots will assist in solving some of the critical anddangerous tasks facing EOD. The key word is “assist”;robotics is a force multiplier and not a forcereplacement.

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CHAPTER 7

NBC OPERATIONS

Section I

Nuclear Incidents

OVERALL RESPONSIBILITIES

The headquarters having administrativecontrol of the EOD company provides the location ofthe incident, identification of the explosive ordnanceitems, radiological survey and contaminationinformation, and the name and location of theindividual authorized to grant access to the incidentsite. It must also identify security and evacuationmeasures being enforced and provide positiveidentification of the person authorized to receive theexplosive ordnance items.

When the EOD company is assigned a nuclearaccident/incident, it prepares to go to the scene bythe fastest means. The team notifies the EODbattalion and coordinates with the NAIRA officer. Ifthe EOD team leader is the first militaryrepresentative on-site, he will assume control. TheEOD commander (or senior EOD person present) isresponsible for the safety of EOD personnel whenthey enter the hazard area.

Either the on-site commander or the NAIRAofficer is responsible for the management of nuclearincident operations. In hostilities, the on-sitecommander may assume all responsibilities of aNAIRA officer (IAW AR 50-5). Resources availableto the NAIRA officer for supporting operationsinclude at least the following:

• Communications equipment (civilian andmilitary).

• NBC teams (survey and decontamination).

• Transportation (including air).

• Medical teams and facilities.

• Engineer personnel and equipment.

• EOD personnel.

• Security forces (military and civilian).

• Military police.

EOD OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES

How the EOD officer handles the incidentdepends on resources available. It also depends onthe current tactical situation, directives from theheadquarters having operational control of thedetachment, and quantity and type of weaponsinvolved. Specific responsibilities of the EODofficer include:

• Locating a potential CP site. If the area isknown to be free of contamination, it may beapproached from any direction. There is no need tomonitor the route or CP area. Suspect areas must beapproached from upwind. If contamination issuspected, the area must be checked with an alphasurvey meter and a low-range gamma survey meter.The alpha survey meter may be used for spot checks,but the gamma survey meter must be usedcontinuously. Surveys should begin at least 1 milefrom the proposed CP site.

• Designating the CP supervisor.

• Designating a recorder.

• Assigning an equipment specialist.

• Assigning available personnel to work for theCP supervisor.

• Designating the IEP members (at least two EODpersonnel trained in NWs).

• Designating the work party members. The WPmust consist of at least an NW-trained EOD officerand another NW-trained soldier (officer or enlisted).The most common WP includes an NW-trained

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officer as team leader, two NW-trained enlistedpersonnel as workers, and one NW-trained personresponsible for tools and communications.

• Assigning an ECCS supervisor.

• Selecting the communications system to be used.

• Determining respiratory protection required.

• Preparing the IEP/WP to enter the incident site.

• Determining and implementing EMR precau-tions as necessary. The NAIRA officer or on-scenecommander must be notified of any EMR. Thisofficer, in turn, notifies the support elements.

COMMAND POST SETUP ANDRESPONSIBILITIES

The EOD response team goes to the site as fastas possible. Once at the site, they must set up a CP.The EOD officer must consider several factors whensetting up the CP:

• The area must be free of contamination and, ifpossible, have advantageous terrain features IAWFMs 3-21 and 20-3.

• The mode of transportation to be used to go tothe incident site must be considered.

• If the item is unknown. an initial HE exclusionarea with at least a 610-meter fragmentation radiusplus a 50-meter ECCS distance must be established.

The CP site must be upwind of the incident siteor suspected contaminated area. It must also beclose to, but separate from, support elementoperations. No other element should be establishedcloser to the incident site than the EOD CP.

CP Supervisor

The CP supervisor organizes the CP for on-siteoperations and maintains contact with the head-quarters having operational control of the EODcompany. The CP supervisor is responsible for thefollowing:

• Keeping the NAIRA officer informed of theincident progress.

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• Inspecting the WP to ensure proper dress outand equipment setup.

• Ensuring dosimeters and film badges are wornproperly. Dosimeters must be in the breast pocket ofgarments with pockets or on the upper arm of thosewithout pockets. Film badges must be worn on theupper chest with the beta window uncovered andfacing out.

• Adjusting the exclusion area as new informationis received and making recommendations to theNAIRA officer or on-scene commander.

• Requesting disposition instructions for thecontaminated waste. classified components, andother contaminated items.

• Notifying the survey team or decontaminationteam, or both, of the type and amount of radiologicalcontamination.

• Protecting classified information in the CP andmaking sure all classified materials are accounted forafter the incident is completed.

• Preparing required reports and closing out theCP as required.

• Supervising the recorder, equipment specialist,and ECCS supervisor.

• Documenting radiation exposure using aradiation work permit IAW AR 40-14. Informationfrom the RWP must be entered on the individual’sDD Form 1141 or automated dosimetry record. TheRWP should fit the needs of the situation and beproduced locally. Figure 7-1 is an example. TheRWP must include the following:

• • • •

• • • • • •

Potential hazards.Protective clothing to be used.Special equipment requirements.Names and SSNs of individuals working atthe site.Serial numbers of personnel dosimeters.Film badge numbers.Time entering the site.Time departing the site.Initial dosimeter readings.Final dosimeter readings.

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• Requesting and coordinating support needed forsuch things as protective measures, evacuation,medical, decontamination, and tactical security.

• Ensuring the RSP is completed.

Recorder

The recorder keeps a complete and accuraterecord of all actions and maintains communicationwith the WP. He also relays information received tothe CP supervisor and ensures that classifiedpaperwork generated in the CP is properly markedand safeguarded.

Equipment Specialist

The equipment specialist is in charge of toolassembly, equipment checkout, respiratory apparatussetup, preoperational and operational checks ofequipment, and charging pocket dosimeters. He alsoassists the WP in putting on protective clothing andstarting equipment. He also keeps a log of allequipment that is missing, broken, used up, ordestroyed. Finally, he loads the tools and equipmentfor return to the unit.

EOD Officer

When the team is ready to leave the CP, theEOD officer briefs all personnel on the following:

• Identification and number of weapons involved,publication requirements, and location of theincident. He also briefs on the mode of travel, routeof march, and assessment of the threat to the localarea.

• Tool and equipment requirements.

• Any special instructions from the EOD battalionon-scene commander or the NAIRA officer. Thesemay include additional instructions, issue of stripmaps or overlays (if appropriate), review ofpublications about the weapons, and requests formilitary or civilian police escort (if required).

IEP/WP FUNCTIONS ANDRESPONSIBILITIES

Since nuclear weapons can cause massdestruction, EOD personnel must consider safetyfirst. Safety considerations include the two-personconcept and contamination control. The following

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extract from AR 50-5 summarizes the two-personconcept:

“At least two authorized persons, each capableof detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedureswith respect to the task being performed and who arefamiliar with applicable safety and securityrequirements. Both persons will be present duringany operation that affords access to a nuclearweapon. The concept prohibits access to a nuclearweapon by a lone individual. Two authorizedpersons will be considered to be present when theyare in a physical position from which they canpositively detect incorrect or unauthorizedprocedures with respect to the task or the operationbeing performed. When the two-person conceptmust be applied, it will be enforced constantly by thepersons who are the team while that team isaccomplishing the task or operation assigned.”

The IEP acts to contain and control the nuclearincident safely while conducting its IEP tasks. Somecircumstances require the IEP to assume thefunctions of the WP. For this reason, when the WPis mentioned in this chapter, it includes the IEP aswell.

The WP prevents nuclear detonation andprevents nuclear contribution to a high-explosivedetonation. The response team must also identify,detect, and contain or eliminate explosive,radiological, and toxic hazards associated withnuclear weapons.

Before Response

Response to the incident involves severalplanning operations. These include gatheringinformation, planning the route, and selecting thepersonnel, equipment, and procedures for theoperation.

The EOD team should carry, as a minimum,detection equipment, first aid materials, a means ofcommunication, and EOD tools and equipment.

Protective clothing and equipment require-ments must be planned before the team arrives at thesite. Information available about the situation helpsthe EOD team leader plan. If the extent ofcontamination is unknown, the EOD team leadermust take the maximum protection possible without

unnecessarily restricting operating efficiency. Nearlyall situations require respiratory protection. TheEOD team leader must use this information andcarefully monitor personnel to prevent casualties.

During ResponseThe WP monitors for alpha, beta, and gamma

radiation on the way to the incident site as well as onthe item and in its immediate vicinity. The WP mayuse drop cloths to prevent the spread ofcontamination.

The WP sets up and maintains constantcommunication with the CP. They report to the CPthe monitor instrument readings. The WP alsoobserves fuze precautions for the munitions involved.The WP must report all activities to the CP as theyoccur. This includes RSP steps and any deviations.They make sure that classified information is passedon by secure means.

Some circumstances may require the WP todeal with criticality, fire, or other life-threateningproblems prior to the RSP.

The WP identifies, or confirms the identity of,the weapons, components, or both, and tries to verifythe serial numbers. The EOD officer designated torespond to the nuclear incident determines the EODrender safe procedure to use and supervises itsconduct to conclusion. EOD render safe proceduresmay be started only in the presence of an NW-trained EOD officer. The WP then reports thephysical appearance of the weapon to the CP andperforms the RSP prescribed in the applicablenuclear EOD publication. The WP will not deviatefrom the published RSP without NAIRA officeragreement, except in case of emergency.

Then they systematically search the area torecover, identify, and segregate components ofweapons. They separate recovered components intothese categories: nuclear, nonnuclear, hazardous,classified, and explosive. This is done IAW TM 9-1185-240 and other TMs.

EOD may perform preliminary packaging if theweapon is contaminated or damaged. Moreextensive packaging for off-site shipment requiresadditional support from the NAIRA team. It isimportant that security measures IAW AR 50-5 beenforced when weapons and components areprocessed through the contamination control station.

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Upon CloseoutTo close out operations, the WP moves the

weapons, tools, equipment, publications. andpersonnel to an area with the lowest radiationpossible. Before departing. it places hazard markersIAW STANAG 2002. The WP must maintainsecurity of the weapons and components untilproperly relieved by NAIRA-sponsored agents. TheWP then returns to the CP after being processedthrough the contamination control station (ifrequired).

Performing the EOD procedures on a weaponinvolved in an accident/incident does not constituteor imply change of custody of the weapon. Afteremergency procedures have been completed, custodyof the weapon remains with the courier or custodian.Custody may be transferred, as directed by the on-scene commander, from the courier or custodian inorder to make further transport easier. If custody istransferred, EOD personnel must give technicaladvice on weapon condition and the presence orabsence of components.

ECCS SETUP AND OPERATIONS

Personnel and equipment entering and exitingthe incident site must take the route least likely tocause exposure to or spread contamination.Therefore, all personnel and equipment returningfrom a contaminated area must proceed through acontamination control station. When there is nodecontamination support, this is usually an ECCS setup and run by the EOD team. The EOD unitcommander may establish an ECCS for limitedcontamination control and limited decontamination.When the nuclear emergency team arrives, it sets upa contamination control station and relieves EOD ofthis requirement.

The ECCS must be between the CP and theincident site and outside the fragmentation range ofthe munition. It must be set up in an area free ofcontamination, upwind of the incident, and at least50 meters downwind from the CP.

A critical feature of the ECCS is the hot line. Itis an imaginary line separating the contaminatedarea from the contamination reduction area. The hotline should be as close to the item as possible butoutside its fragmentation radius (610 meters forunknown nuclear weapons). All personnel andequipment entering and leaving the incident area

must process through the control point on the hotline.

The CCL separates the contaminationreduction area from the redress area. Personnel donot cross into the redress area until they are free ofcontamination or have acceptable levels ofcontamination. The CCL also prevents personnelfrom entering the contamination reduction areawithout wearing proper protective clothing.

The ECCS should be protected from theweather, if possible. It must be run by at least oneEOD soldier dressed in the proper protectiveclothing from the time personnel depart for theincident site until all personnel have been processedout. See Figure 7-2 (page 7-6).

The contamination reduction area may becontaminated by personnel returning from theincident area. Therefore, once decontaminationoperations begin, the contamination reduction area isconsidered contaminated.

The operation of the ECCS should be turnedover to an NBC team (the nuclear emergency team)on its arrival. If EOD operations are completedbefore the NBC team arrives. team members andother personnel should go through the ECCS. TheECCS team must be prepared to turn over theoperation to the incoming decontamination team(part of the NBC team). The contaminationreduction area must be marked with contaminationmarkers until the area is decontaminated (seeAppendix B).

There is no need to process through an ECCS ifno contamination was encountered. There is oneexception: personnel who handle or come in contactwith nuclear components must wash their hands andface using hot soapy water and rinse them with clearwater.

DEPLETED URANIUM INCIDENTS

Accidents/incidents involving ammunition orarmor containing DU components pose special prob-lems. Guidance for all personnel in dealing with DUis found in Chapter 6 of TB 9-1300-278. The chapteraddresses EOD personnel protection and procedures.EOD soldiers should be familiar with its contentsbefore responding to any incident that may involvedepleted uranium.

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Section II

Chemical And Biological Incidents

Because chemical agents are the most likely threat to be encountered, the word “chemical” is used in the followingdiscussion. However, the possibility of biological agents being used must always be considered. All CB weaponshave the same purpose--to spread contamination. Therefore, the EOD approach to deal with them is the same.

OVERALL RESPONSIBILITIES

The headquarters having administrativecontrol of the EOD company provides the location ofthe incident, identification of the explosive ordnanceitems, survey and contamination information, andthe name and location of the individual authorized togrant access to the incident site. It must also identifysecurity and evacuation measures being enforced andprovide positive identification of the personauthorized to receive the explosive ordnance items.

When the EOD company is assigned achemical accident/incident, it sends a response teamto the scene by the fastest means. The team notifiesthe EOD battalion and coordinates with the CAIRAofficer. In some cases, the EOD team leader may bethe first military representative on-site and willassume control. The EOD team leader is responsiblefor the safety of EOD personnel when they enter thehazard area.

Either the on-site commander or the CAIRAofficer is responsible for the management ofchemical incident operations. In hostilities, the on-site commander may assume all responsibilities of aCAIRA officer (IAW AR 50-6 and DA Pamphlet50-6). Resources available to the CAIRA officer forsupporting operations include at least the following:

• Communications equipment (civilian andmilitary).• NBC teams (survey and decontamination).• Transportation (including air).• Medical teams and facilities.• Engineer personnel and equipment.• EOD personnel.• Security forces (military and civilian).• Military police.

The light EOD response team handles theincident based on the resources available, the current

tactical situation, directives from the headquartershaving operational control of the EOD company,quantity and type of weapons, and types of agents.The team may be able to complete the incidentwithout additional support from the EOD company.

However, the situation may change and thelight EOD response team leader may need to requestassistance from the CP. The light EOD team leadermust determine if his team can handle the incidentby asking--

• How much contamination is present and howlikely is gross contamination?

• How many ordnance items are involved andwhat are their fuze conditions?

• What procedures will be used on the ordnance(RSP or blow in place)?

• Can the unit being supported help the responseteam with additional personnel or equipment?

If additional support is requested, the EODofficer will first locate a potential fragmented CPsite. If the area is known to be free of contamination,it may be approached from any direction. There isno need to monitor the route or CP area. Suspectareas must be approached from upwind, and teammembers must put on protective clothing in a cleanarea. If contamination is suspected, the area must bechecked with detector paper/kits. Surveys shouldbegin at least 1 mile from the proposed CP site. Theteam must take samples of suspect contaminationduring the approach to be sure the area upwind ofthe CP site is contamination free. If contaminationis found at the proposed site, personnel mustdecontaminate themselves and select another site.

The EOD officer will also need to do thefollowing:

• Designate the CP supervisor (usually the com-pany NCOIC) and assign available personnel towork for him.

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• Designate a recorder.

• Assign an equipment specialist.

• Designate the IEP members (at least two EODpersonnel). These would include an SSG or above tobe the IEP team leader, an EOD specialist to be theIEP assistant, and any available person trained toprovide “buddy aid” for NBC casualties to be thesafety observer.

• Designate the WP members. The same selectioncriteria are used as for the IEP.

• Assign an SSG or above to be the EPDSsupervisor and two EOD specialists to be EPDSassistants.

• Select the communications system to be used.

• Determine protective clothing requirements.

• Prepare the IEP/WP to enter the incident site.

• Determine the need for and implement (ifnecessary) EMR precautions. The CAIRA officer oron-scene commander must be notified of any EMR.This officer, in turn, notifies the support elements.

COMMAND POST SETUP ANDRESPONSIBILITIES

If necessary, the proposed site for the CP willbe checked for possible contamination. There mustbe enough checks made to convince the EOD teamleader that the entire CP area is free ofcontamination. If all tests are negative, he can usethe unmasking procedures in FM 3-4. Since currentfield tests cannot detect biological agents, an area isnot considered free of biological contaminationunless intelligence information or physical evidenceconfirms it. If biological agent contamination issuspected, take samples and send them to alaboratory for identification.

When selecting a site for the CP, you mustconsider the mode of transportation to be used to getto the incident site. You will also have to establishan exclusion area as for conventional ordnance, withtwo exceptions. When there are no explosivecomponents, you can reduce the exclusion area to a50-meter radius. This is done with concurrence of

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the CAIRA officer or the on-scene commander.When the team has not yet determined what types ornumbers of explosive components there are, theminimum exclusion area must have a 450-meterfragmentation radius plus a 50-meter EPDS distance.

A downwind hazard area must also beestablished. If the type of agent or its amount isunknown, the hazard area must extend 2,000meters downwind from the incident site (Figure7-3, page 7-9). TM 60A-1-1-11 gives detailedprocedures for establishing the downwind hazardarea. Evacuate all unprotected personnel from thehazard area or require them to wear chemicalprotective clothing. The on-scene commandershould ensure the personnel conducting theevacuation also wear protective clothing.

The CP site must be upwind of the incident siteor suspected contaminated area and be close to, butseparate from, support element operations. No otherelement should be established closer to the incidentsite than the EOD CP.

CP Supervisor

The CP supervisor organizes the CP for on-siteoperations. He maintains contact with the head-quarters having operational control of the EODcompany as well as the company HQ or EODbattalion. In addition, the CP supervisor isresponsible for the following:

• Keeping the CAIRA officer informed of theincident progress.

• Advising the commander on WP procedures andoperations.

• Checking the WP methods and advising themon alternative courses of action.

• Directing research in support of the team.

• Monitoring log entries.

• Coordinating for external support.• Inspecting the WP to ensure proper dress outand equipment setup.• Adjusting the exclusion area and downwindhazard area as new information is received andmaking recommendations to the CAIRA officer oron-scene commander. He posts this information tothe situation map.

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• Requesting disposition instructions for thecontaminated waste, classified components, andother contaminated items.

• Notifying the survey team and decontaminationteam of the type and amount of radiologicalcontamination.

• Protecting classified information in the CP andmaking sure all classified materials are accounted forafter the incident is completed.

• Preparing required reports and closing out theCP as required.

• Supervising the recorder, equipment specialist,and EPDS supervisor.

• Requesting and coordinating support needed forsuch things as protective measures, evacuation,medical, decontamination, and tactical security.

Recorder

The recorder keeps a complete, accurate record

WP, relays information received to the CPsupervisor, and ensures that classified paperworkgenerated in the CP is properly marked andsafeguarded.

Equipment Specialist

The equipment specialist is in charge of toolassembly as well as the preoperational andoperational checks of equipment. He also assists theWP in putting on protective clothing and startingequipment. He keeps a log of all equipment that ismissing, broken, used up, or destroyed. Finally, heloads the tools and equipment for return to the unit.

Team Leader

When the team is ready to leave the CP, theEOD team leader briefs the team on the following:

of all actions, maintains communication with the area.

• Identification and number of weapons involved,publication requirements, and location of theincident. He also briefs on the mode of travel, routeof march, and assessment of the threat to the local

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• Tool and equipment requirements.

• Any special instructions from the EODbattalion, on-scene commander, or CAIRA officer.These may include additional instructions; issue ofstrip maps or overlays, if appropriate; review ofpublications about the weapons; and requests formilitary or civilian police escort, if required.

The EOD team leader must be prepared to takecontrol of the situation on his arrival. There may becofusion at the site as to what protective measuresare required and who is responsible for the variousjobs. The EOD team leader must direct protectivemeasures, evacuation, and coordination for othersupport personnel.

IEP RESPONSIBILITIES

Safety measures are the foremost responsibilityof EOD personnel because of the lethality of CBagents. Safety measures include the two-personconcept, the exclusion area, the downwind hazardarea, and contamination control. The two-personconcept applies while any work is done on theordnance. Chapter 3 of AR 50-6 provides details onthis concept.

The IEP must determine the location, number,and condition of the munitions involved. They mustalso determine the fuzing and its condition, thepresence or absence of agent leakage, and theweather conditions at the site. If rescue operationsare required or there is a serious public healthhazard, the IEP must quickly evaluate the situationand take emergency measures. This may mean theIEP will depart before the CP or EPDS is completelyset up.

Performing the RSP and performing contami-nation control and decontamination are the two mainfunctions of the WP. If the situation dictates,combine the EP and WP functions. This is onlyadvisable when the exact situation is known.

Before Response

Response to the incident involves severalplanning operations. These include gatheringinformation, planning the route, and selecting thepersonnel, equipment, and procedures for theoperation.

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The EOD team should carry, as a minimum,detection equipment, first aid materials, a means ofcommunication, EOD tools and equipment, andlimited amounts of decontaminants. Use TM 60A-1-1-11 to help select the appropriate decontaminants.

The size and number of the munitions involvedwill determine equipment requirements. If totalagent disposal cannot be done on site, the items mustbe packaged suitably for transportation andsubsequent storage and neutralization.

Protective clothing and equipmentrequirements must be planned before the teamarrives at the site. Information available about thesituation (type and amount of agent) will help theEOD team leader plan. If the type of agent andextent of contamination are unknown, the EOD teamleader must take the maximum protection possiblewithout unnecessarily restricting operatingefficiency. See Table 7-1 (page 7-11 ) for recom-mended protective clothing.

Nearly all situations require respiratoryprotection. Refer to TM 60A-1-1-11 for themaximum wearing time of impermeable clothing.The EOD team leader must use this information andcarefully monitor personnel to prevent casualties.

During Response

The IEP should approach by the most directroute, keeping upwind and avoiding heavyvegetation if possible. The team should look forobvious contamination, such as agent deposits(liquid or powder) in the area and people or animalsshowing symptoms of agent exposure. If suspectliquids are present, the team should check them withM8 or M9 paper. When the team is close to theincident site, the team leader should survey the areaand situation and decide where best to place thesafety observer. The safety observer must be able towatch the other team members and operate thecommunications equipment.

The IEP sets up and maintains constantcommunication with the CP. The IEP also observesfuze precautions for the munitions involved. TheIEP must report all activities to the CP as they occur.They make sure that classified information is passedon by secure means.

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The shuffle pit is used for controllingcontamination at the incident site. It is made from amixture of three parts earth and two parts STBspread out on the ground in an area about two feetsquare. All personnel entering or leaving theincident site area must shuffle through the pit.

The IEP must determine the location, number,and condition of the munitions involved. It mustalso determine the fuzing and its condition. presenceor absence of agent leakage, and the weatherconditions at the site. The IEP will take thefollowing actions for leaking munitions:

• Separate the nonleaking munitions from theleakers, if fuze conditions permit.

• Test suspect liquids with either M8 or M9 paper.If the test is positive and there has been no decon-taminant use, this check is adequate.

• Complete a vapor check if the paper test wasnegative and contamination is still suspected. Beforebeginning vapor tests, try to collect vapors. Drape aplastic bag or other impermeable material over theUXO and wait a few minutes. Stick the M18detector tubes under or through the bag and test forcontamination.

• Try to limit any spread of contamination. Placeequipment on drop cloths, not the ground. Ifprotective clothing becomes contaminated,decontaminate and rinse immediately. As an extraprecaution, you can spread decontaminant on theground around the UXO to neutralize agent that mayhave already leaked.

• Begin the RSP if the procedure itself will notspread contamination. If munition and fuzeconditions permit, act to limit agent leakage. Place atemporary or permanent plug on the munition unlessit means taking unnecessary risk. You may alsoposition the munition so that the leak area isuppermost.

• Return to the CP upon completion of IEP dutiesor assume the duties of the WP. Performing the RSPand performing contamination control anddecontamination are the two main functions of thework party.

WORK PARTY RESPONSIBILITIES

When possible, the WP will complete the RSPfor the explosive components before decontami-nation starts. This will prevent the possibility of adetonation in case of accidental UXO movement. Insome cases. the fuze and fuze condition may allowsome decontamination while preparing for the RSP.The EOD team leader decides the safest method forthe situation. In some cases it may be possible todetonate the UXO in place (for example, a heavilycontaminated area or an isolated area). In all cases,the EOD team leader must have concurrence of theon-scene commander or area commander. In-placedetonation is not a suitable option for nonhostilesituations. After items are rendered safe, the workparty will proceed with the leak-sealing, packaging,and disposal operations.

Leak-Sealing

Try to separate nonleakers from leakers, if notalready done. Leak-seal (and package) the muni-tions before they are moved to the disposal area.Packaging is not required for on-site disposal.

If liquid leakage is not visible, move the itemsto a clean area for further checking and packaging.Decontaminate and rinse the items before makingvapor checks. Check items for vapor leaks awayfrom ground contamination and concentrations ofdecominants. Do this by placing the items inplastic bags or placing plastic sheets over them tocollect vapors. Allow a few minutes for the vaporsto collect before making the check. Nonleakingitems require only a check to ensure they are cleanfor transportation to the EPDS.

If items are leaking, attempt to stop or reduceagent leakage by positioning the items with the leakuppermost. After identifying and controlling leaks,but before detailed leak-sealing or packaging, thor-oughly decontaminate the items. TM 60A-1-1-11details these procedures. Complete leak-sealingbefore final packaging of an item. There are manydifferent ways to leak-seal the munition; see TM60A-1-1-11 for details. Before packaging, ensurethe seal is holding and that handling has notcontaminated the item. Decontaminate and rinsegloves before beginning packaging procedures. Placethe item on a clean drop cloth away from obviouscontamination.

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Packaging and Marking

The first step of the initial packagingoperation is to make one more vapor check. This isdone as follows:

• Place the UXO in a plastic bag and close ittemporarily to allow vapor collection. If the UXO istoo large for a bag, wrap it in plastic or place it in anairtight container.

• Open the bag or container slightly after 5-10minutes and recheck. If the check is negative, sealthe bag or container.

If, however, the check is positive, it indicatesthe UXO still has contamination on its surface. Inthis case, proceed as follows:

• Remove it from the bag or container.

• Inspect the leak seal, and repair it as necessary.

• Repeat decontamination and packaging.

If after two attempts you cannot achieve anegative check, place the item in a second bag andtreat the bagged item as a unit. Check the baggeditem as the UXO itself was. After achieving anegative check, seal the second bag.

To perform final packaging at the site, use asturdy container that will hold the entire munitionand provide a vaportight seal. This reduces thepossibility of damaging the seal and plastic bag orspreading contamination on the way to the EPDS.Standard shipping containers and propellant chargecans are examples of suitable containers. Check thecontainer for seal integrity prior to bringing it to thesite. When packaging the munition, keep thefollowing in mind:

• Do not use water. This creates a bigger problemfor those who unpack the item since the water willhave become contaminated too. In addition, thecombined weight of the UXO, the water, and thecontainer can make the package unmanageable.

• Package the munition with the leak uppermost,if practical.

• Support the munition in the container usingsome shock-absorbing material. This prevents move-ment and damage to the seal.

• Seal the container tightly to prevent vaporleakage.

While at the hot line, clearly mark thecontainer with the following information: classi-fication, munition nomenclature, filler, decontami-nant used, “This End Up,” fuze condition, explosivecomponents, and any other information useful topersons handling the container or disposing of theitem. Do final decontamination and checking at thehot line, just before moving the item across.

Post or mark the immediate area around theleaking munition IAW STANAG 2002 and plot it ona situation map. Forward the map to higher head-quarters for future cleanup.

Disposal

Preparing for disposal is the next step in thechemical accident/incident. After the containers aredouble checked on the clean side of the hot line anddecontaminated as required, take them to thedisposal site or designated collection area. AR 75-15lists the peacetime requirements for transportationand final disposal.

During extensive operations, immediate finaldisposal may not be feasible. In these situations, usedesignated collection points within the area ofoperations. Mark these collection points IAWSTANAG 2002. Do not leave CB weapons orclassified UXO at collection points without meetingsafety and security requirements.

This FM is a guide for disposal procedures; donot use it as authority for the disposal of any quantityof CB agents. The CAIRA officer grants specificauthority for disposal of toxic CB agents and UXObefore disposal operations are conducted.

Chemical and biological ordnance can bedisposed of on the battlefield if it will not increasethe contamination of the area and would allowoperations to continue immediately. When CBordnance threatens operations or critical assets, therendering safe of the ordnance may be required toallow asset recovery or mission continuation. Criticalassets or areas that require immediate access mayneed additional EOD support. TM 60A-1-1-11 cites

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methods for disposing of chemical munitions. FM3-7 cites methods for biological agent disposal.

Personnel conducting disposal operations mustwear protective clothing that provides adequateprotection against the agents. This protection isrequired only while actually working with the items.Set up the disposal area without protective clothingif the area is contamination free.

Before selecting the disposal site, consider thefollowing:

• Direction of prevailing winds. Knowing this isimportant in keeping the vapor cloud from driftingover populated areas.

• Elevation and openness of the terrain. Anelevated and open terrain will allow the agent vaporclouds to disperse.

• Distance from any ammunition storage points,inhabited areas, training areas, highways, railroads.and airports. Consider fragmentation hazards aswell as agent vapor cloud travel.

• Availability of an area of 60-meter radiuscleared of combustibles. Label the area as arestricted area. Fence and post the area for regularusage with both visible and audible warningdevices. Establish an exclusion area to preventunprotected persons from exposure to agent vaporsor clouds. Predetermine the size of the area and theamount of agent to be disposed of. Consider a 100percent dissemination of agent and explosives whencomputing an exclusion area.

• Other features at the site, such as an aid station.EPDS, fire-fighting equipment, and a bunker orrevetment for personnel protection fromfragmentation. Also, communications between thedisposal site and fire fighting and medical personnelis vital.

• Weather conditions which play an importantrole in disposal operations. Planners must be awareof the weather factors that affect disposal operations.For further information. see TM 60A-1-1-11.

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EMERGENCY PERSONNELDECONTAMINATION STATION

Personnel and equipment entering and exitingthe incident site must take the route least likely tocause exposure or spread contamination. All per-sonnel and equipment returning from a contami-nated area must proceed through a decontaminationstation. The EOD team must prepare to provide itsown hasty decontamination or use an EPDS asshown in Figure 7-4 (page 7-15) or in Figure 7-5(page 7-16). The EOD unit commander mayestablish an EPDS for limited contamination controland limited decontamination. If NBC supportarrives, it sets up a decontamination station orrelieves EOD of this requirement. The lack of adecontamination team or EPDS should not delay theIEP response. Decontamination facilities may be setup after the IEP or the WP has begun operations.

The EPDS must be between the CP and theincident site and outside the fragmentation range ofthe munition. It must be set up in a contamination-free area clear of brush, trees, and other suchvegetation. It must be upwind of the incident and atleast 50 meters downwind from the CP.

A critical feature of the EPDS is the hot line. Itis an imaginary line separating the contaminatedarea from the contamination reduction area. Itshould be as close to the item as possible but outsideits fragmentation radius. All personnel and equip-ment entering and leaving the incident area mustprocess through the control point on the hot line. Ifthe EOD commander or team leader considers itnecessary, a shuffle pit should be established at thehot line.

The CCL separates the contamination reduc-tion area from the redress area. Personnel do notcross into the redress area until they have beendecontaminated. The CCL also prevents personnelfrom entering the contamination reduction areawithout wearing proper protective clothing. Decon-taminate everything before crossing the contami-nation control line.

The EPDS should be protected from theweather, if possible. It must be run by at least oneEOD soldier dressed in the proper protective cloth-ing from the time personnel depart for the incidentsite until all personnel have been processed out.

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The contamination reduction area may becontaminated by personnel returning from the inci-dent area. Therefore, once decontamination opera-tions begin, the contamination reduction area isconsidered contaminated. Make all efforts to controlthe spread of this contamination.

Upon completion of work at the site,decontaminate all exposed personnel. The extentand scope of the decontamination will depend uponthe size and scope of the operation. The decon-tamination for a three-man team is much lesselaborate than for an entire company. Follow theEPDS fundamentals (explained later) regardless ofunit size.

How you arrange the EPDS will depend on theamount of agent involved, the scope of the operation,and the terrain. Plan the EPDS to meet theserequirements. Ensure personnel follow these fourprinciples when using the EPDS:

• Move into the wind as undressing progresses.

• Decontaminate and remove the most heavilycontaminated items of clothing first.

• Remove all articles of clothing worn at the inci-dent site.

• Remove the mask and hood last before washing.

The EOD company should decontaminate asmuch of its own personnel protection items andmission-essential equipment as it can. Supportpersonnel should decontaminate both the land in thearea and nonessential equipment. When finished,EOD must mark the contaminated area of the EPDSfor further decontamination.

The operation of the EPDS should be turnedover to an NBC team on its arrival. If EODoperations are completed before the NBC teamarrives, team members and other personnel shouldgo through the EPDS. The hot line team must beprepared to turn over the operation to the incomingdecontamination team (part of the NBC team). Thecontamination reduction area must be marked withcontamination markers until the area isdecontaminated (see Appendix B).

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APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND MISSIONS OF EOD UNITS

This appendix gives information on the organization, structure, and missions of the TOE organization describedand cited in this mmual. These organizations (Figures A-1 through A-4) and the individuals thereof can assist inthe coordinated defense of the unit’s area or installation. They depend on appropriate elements of theater, corps,separate division, or installation for food service, health, religious, legal, finance, and personnel and administrativeservices and for unit maintenace on COMSEC equipment.

ORDNANCE GROUP (EOD)TOE 09627L000

Mission

To command and control assigned or attachedOrdnance Battalions (EOD).

Assignment

To a Theater Army (TA).

Capabilities

The group provides command, control, andstaff planning for two to six Ordnance Battalions(EOD) (TOE 09446L000). It provides technicaldirection for the EOD mission operations ofsubordinate units. The group also disseminatestechnical intelligence information throughout thecommand and to other selected organizations. The

group commander acts as the EOD SW officer forthe Theater Army Command.

In addition to the dependencies cited at the topof this page, this unit is dependent on HHC, TA(TOE 51001L000) for maintenance support fororganic vehicles and equipment and for food servicesupport.

Basis of Allocation

One per theater of operation.

Mobility

This unit is required to transport 50 percent ofits TOE equipment with organic vehicles in a singlelift.

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ORDNANCE BATTALION (EOD) direction for the EOD mission operations ofTOE 09446L000 subordinate units. The battalion also disseminates

technical intelligence information throughout theMission command and to other selected organizations. It

provides S1 support to its subordinate OrdnanceTo command and control assigned or attached Companies (EOD) (TOE 09447L000).

Ordnance Companies (EOD) (TOE 09447L000).Basis Of Allocation

AssignmentOne per theater, one per corps, and one per

To an Ordnance Group (EOD) at theater, corps, division operating independent of a corps.or division.

Capabilities Mobility

The battalion provides command, control, and This unit is required to transport 100 percent ofstaff planning for three to ten Ordnance Companies its TOE equipment with organic vehicles in a single(EOD) (TOE 09447L000). It provides technical lift.

ORDNANCE COMPANY (EOD) CapabilitiesTOE 09447L000

This company provides EOD service on an areaMission basis for a maximum incident response capability as

follows:To reduce or eliminate the hazards of • 50 routine incidents (less than 2 hours in

munitions and explosive devices. duration) based on five light teams and 10 incidentsper team per day. Up to 70 routine incidents a day

Assignment can be handled if no nonroutine incidents occur.• 8 nonroutine incidents (more than 2 hours in

To an Ordnance Battalion (EOD) (TOE duration based on two heavy teams and four09446L000) at theater, corps, or division. incidents per team per day.

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Additionally, this company may provide thefollowing services:

• Exploitation of technical intelligence materialby submitting reports on first-seen ordnance.

• Share EOD service with other services andforeign governments as directed by Status of ForcesAgreements and Host-Nation Support Agreements.

• Response to civilian requests for EOD support.

• Assistance to public safety and law enforcementagencies (civil authorities) in developing a capabilityto deal with the IED and terrorist threats.

• Support to other federal agencies, such as theUSSS and the FBI, as outlined in DOD directives.

• Support to installations for the clearance ofranges and destruction of unserviceable ammunition.

In addition to the dependencies cited previously(page A-1, top), this unit is dependent on theOrdnance Battalion (EOD) (TOE 09446L000) for S1support.

Basis Of Allocation

Eight per Ordnance Battalion (EOD) (TOE09446L000 at theater level. Ten per OrdnanceBattalion (EOD) at corps level. Four per OrdnanceBattalion (EOD) supporting an independentdivisional operation.

Mobility

This unit is required to transport 100 percent ofits TOE equipment with organic vehicles in a singlelift.

ORDNANCE COMPANY (EOD)(CONUS SUPPORT)

TOE 09747L000

Mission

To reduce or eliminate the hazards ofmunitions and explosive devices throughout thecontinental United States.

Assignment

To FORSCOM.

Capabilities

This company provides EOD service on an areabasis for a maximum routine incident responsecapability of 120 incidents per day (based on 12teams and 10 incidents per team per day).Additionally, this company may provide thefollowing services:

• Response to civilian requests for EOD support.

• Assistance to public safety and law enforcementagencies in developing a capability to deal with theIED and terrorist threats.

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• Support to other federal agencies, such as theUSSS and FBI, as outlined in DOD directives.

• Support to installations for the clearance ofranges and destruction of unserviceable ammunition.

• Support to the intelligence community for theexploitation of technical intelligence material.

Basis of Allocation

Three companies in CONUS.

Mobility

This unit is required to transport 100 percent ofits TOE equipment with organic vehicles in a singlelift.

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APPENDIX B

MARKING OF CONTAMINATED OR DANGEROUS LAND

This appendix implements STANAG 2002.

PURPOSE The shape of the sign is a right-angled isoscelesThis appendix discusses the marking of land triangle (see Figure B-1). The base of the triangle is

areas that have become dangerous because of radio- approximately 11 1/2 inches (28 centimeters) andactive or CB contamination, chemical minefield, the opposite sides are approximately 8 inches (20minefields other than chemical, booby-trapped areas, centimeters) each. These dimensions may be variedand unexploded bombs. These dangers are marked to suit local material. Composition may be wood,by triangular signs, unless the area is to be plastic, or whatever at hand is best suited. Existingabandoned to the enemy. The front of each sign stocks of colored triangular signs of slightlymust face away from the contaminated or dangerous divergent shapes and sizes may be kept and usedarea. until stocks are exhausted. Signs may be locally

procured or built. The Minefield Marking Set,SIZE, SHAPE, AND COMPOSITION Contamination (NBC), may also be used.

OF SIGNS

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COLOR AND WORDING OF SIGNS

The nature of the contamination or danger ofthe contaminated area is told by the colors andwording of the signs. The primary color is used forthe background of the front and for the entire back ofthe sign. The secondary color is used for additionalmarkings and inscriptions on the front. Colorcoding for various dangers is shown in Table B-1.The language to be used for the inscriptions isselected by the forces erecting the sign. Theseinscriptions are written parallel to the longest side ofthe sign (see Figure B-1).

In addition, when practical, details of CB orradioactive contamination are written on the front ofeach sign. For biological contamination and forpersistent or moderately persistent chemical agents,the name of the agent used (when the agent isknown) and the date and time of detection arerequired. In case of radioactive contamination, thefollowing information is put on each sign: the doserate, the date and time of reading, and the date andtime of the detonation that produced thecontamination (if known).

MARKING OF AREAS

“Gas Mines” can be assumed to include high-explosive mines or booby traps. Mined and booby-trapped areas are fenced and marked on the friendlyside to warn friendly troops. Two strands of wire,preferably barbed wire, are used. The lower strandof wire is placed at ankle height, and the upperstrand is placed waist high. Fencing on the flankand enemy side may be added when required forprotection of friendly troops. Marking simulatedcontaminated areas is exactly the same as markingthose that are real.

Signs, right-angled apex downward, should beplaced on fences, trees, rocks, or poles or should bestuck in the ground. They should be stuck in theground only if there is no other way to place them,because they are hard to see in the ground and can beeasily knocked over. Signs must be placed IAWNATO standards, at least one sign every 15 meters.

NIGHT SIGNING

There is no standard for lighting signs. Eachunit provides lighting or reflective devices wherenecessary. Lit or reflecting markers should be facedaway from dangerous areas.

Areas that contain more than one type of con-tamination must be marked with as many relevantsigns as necessary placed near each other. The sign

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APPENDIX C

US MUNITIONSThis listing is not complete, but it does include the principal US munitions of concern to EOD personnel.

With this list, EOD personnel will likely be able to assess quickly the potential hazard of foreign chemicalmunitions. By comparing the characteristics of a foreign munition with those of the items listed in the followingtables, you may be able to arrive at a rough estimate of the hazard involved.

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APPENDIX D

EOD CANDIDATE ACCEPTANCE GUIDE

This appendix will assist personnel involved inthe recruitment, evaluation, and acceptance ofsoldiers requesting MOS 55D/9lE training orassignment. The references used for this process areARs 50-5, 600-8-10, 611-105, and 614-200 and DAPamphlet 351-4.

Because of the nature of EOD work, it isextremely important that selected candidates behighly motivated personnel of good character. EODcandidates must be thoroughly screened to ensurethat they meet the standards required of this MOS.Potential EOD candidates may be IET soldiers ormay be identified from in-service recruiting.Whether the EOD candidate is IET, in-service,ARNG, officer or enlisted, all must be thoroughlyscreened and meet current standards.

The most important part of the initial screeningprocess is the letter of acceptance. An EODcandidate can obtain this letter by being screenedand interviewed by qualified EOD personnel Theinterview can be conducted by an EOD officer orsenior EOD NCO. The interviewer must determinethat the candidate possesses the necessaryqualifications and that he does not have anydisqualifies that would prevent him from becominga fully qualified EOD soldier. The interviewer mustalso assess the motivation of the individual, hisability to learn, and his understanding of the hazardsinherent in EOD duty.

Soldiers desiring to become EOD-qualifiedneed to be made aware that they must meet severalgeneral requirements even prior to start of the initialscreening process. They should be aware that theymust--

• Possess normal color vision.

• Have a physical profile serial code (PULHES) of111111 or 111121.

• Have achieved a GM score of 105 or higher onthe ASVAB.

• Be capable of receiving a SECRET clearancewith a background investigation.

None of these general requirements can be waived.Once a soldier determines that he can meet theserequirements, he should arrange to receive a TAPsuit test and an EOD interview from the nearestEOD company.

The interview checklist appearing on thefollowing pages (Figure D-1) will assist EOD per-sonnel involved in the screening process. The check-list should be followed closely to maintain uniformstandards in the interview process. Information thatis surfaced or obtained during the interview processmay eliminate the waste of funds in training EODsoldiers who are later found unqualified.

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APPENDIX E

ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORTING

This appendix implements STANAG 2143.

EOD DOCUMENTATION

Correct and properly prepared documentationof EOD accidents/incidents will serve as a record ofitems reported, personnel responding, disposition,and references used. Such data will be useful in caseevidence information is requested of EOD personnel.This data will also be useful for unit historical datapurposes.

Initial information on and documentation of anaccident/incident at the first echelon level is usuallyreceived from a unit or individual by way of a UXOspot report. This report is discussed in some detailin FM 21-16 and in the supplemental informationsection of the Signal Operating Instructions.

Once an accident/incident is reported (bywhatever means) through EOD channels, EODpersonnel will transcribe relevant information onto aDA Form 3265-R. This form, formally titled“Explosive Ordnance Incident Report,” thenbecomes the official record of actions taken by EODpersonnel in response to the reportedaccident/incident.

DA FORM 3265-R

A reproducible copy of this form is provided atthe back of this field manual. It should locally bereproduced on 8 1/2- by 11-inch paper. The formcan also be computer generated. Information shouldbe entered in either blue or black ink. The reverseside can be used as a continuation for any of theinformation blocks on the front. When doing so, besure to clearly identify (by block number and/orletter) the block being continued. Figure E-1 depictsa sample of a properly completed DA Form 3265-R.Instructions for completing the form follow.

Heading Information

The top of the form contains four blocks forheader information--unit number, control number,and incident category (unusual or routine).Complete these blocks as folIows:

Unit Number. The unit number consists of the unitdesignation, numerically sequenced incidentidentifier, and year of the incident. For example, 49-003-95 would mean that the 49th OrdnanceCompany (EOD) has had its third incident for 1995.

Control Number. The control number (as assignedby the EOD battalion) is entered.

Unusual (block 3) or Routine (block 4). Thisreflects the incident category as determined by theEOD unit commander according to policyestablished by the EOD Battalion. An “X” is put inthe appropriate box.

Section A: Initial Information

Use Section A (blocks 5 through 11) to enterthe following initial information received concerningthe incident: Date/Time Reported, Reported By,Phone Number, Address, Incident Location, Point ofContact. and Item(s) Reported. Complete theseblocks as follows:

Date/Time Reported. Enter the date and time theincident was reported to the EOD unit. List all timesZulu. Use the world map shown as Figure E-2 todetermine the appropriate Zulu time.

Reported By. Enter the name of the personreporting the incident.

Phone Number. Enter the phone number of theperson cited in block 6. This information, whichmay be a call sign and frequency, may be classified.If information is classified, the report must besecured IAW AR 380-5 and DOD 5200.2-R.

Address. Enter the address of the person cited inblock 6.

Incident Location. In block 9, enter the street, city,state, coordinates, or landmarks as appropriate.

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Point of Contact. Enter the name, location, andphone number (or call sign) of a person who knowsthe way to the incident site. You may need to addadditional information for EOD team linkup withthis individual.

Item(s) Reported. In block 11, tentatively identify ordescribe the items being reported. This block canalso be used to list any protective measures taken bythe person reporting the incident.

Section B: Action By EOD

Use Section B (blocks 12 through 18) to enterthe following information concerning action taken

by the EOD unit or team in response to anaccident/incident: Personnel Dispatched, Date/Time,Travel Data, Work Hours, Confirmed Identification,Disposition, and Incident Narrative. Complete theseblocks as follows:

Personnel Dispatched. In block 12, enter the nameand grade of all persons dispatched to the incidentsite.

Date/Time. In the appropriate portion of block 13,enter the time the EOD team departed the unit area,the time the team arrived at the incident site, and thetime the EOD team returns to the unit area aftercompletion of the incident response.

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Travel Data. In the appropriate portion of block 14,enter the time spent in aircraft traveling to and fromthe incident site (if appropriate) and the totalmileage for any vehicles used in traveling to or fromthe incident site.

Work Hours. In the appropriate portion of block 15,enter the total work hours spent traveling to andfrom the incident site and the actual work hoursspent in responding to an incident (from time ofdeparture from the unit area to completion ofdisposal) excluding travel time.

Confirmed Identification. In block 16, enter modelnumber (include lot number when available) forstandard items for which you have confirmedidentification. For nonstandard items, enter adescription.

Disposition. In block 17, enter information con-cerning the disposition of the item. For example,

E-4

was the item rendered safe, placed in a safe holdingarea, or destroyed? This information may include areference citation (including specific paragraphnumber) if appropriate.

Incident Narrative. Use this block to cite significantactions and details as well as any problemsencountered. If classified information is entered, thereport must be secured IAW AR 380-5 and DOD5200.2-R.

Section C: Authentication

Section C (blocks 19 through 21) is used torecord (typed or printed) the name and grade of theEOD unit commander and his authenticatingsignature, the unit telephone number, and the date ofsignature.

Glossary-1

FM 9-15

Glossary-2

FM 9-15

Glossary-3

FM 9-15

INDEX

Index-1

FM 9-15

Index-2

FM 9-15

Index-3