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Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP Foundation OWASP http://www.owasp.org Financial Real-Time Threats: Impacting Trading Floor Operations Dr Yiannis Pavlosoglou OWASP Project Leader Information Risk Management [email protected] September 6 th , 2007

Financial Real-Time Threats: Impacting Trading Floor Operations

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Financial Real-Time Threats: Impacting Trading Floor Operations. Dr Yiannis Pavlosoglou OWASP Project Leader Information Risk Management [email protected]. September 6 th , 2007. Outline. Background Motivation Architecture Findings Scenario Conclusions. Background. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Financial Real-Time Threats: Impacting Trading  Floor Operations

Copyright © The OWASP FoundationPermission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License.

The OWASP Foundation

OWASP

http://www.owasp.org

Financial Real-Time Threats: Impacting Trading Floor Operations

Dr Yiannis PavlosoglouOWASP Project LeaderInformation Risk [email protected]

September 6th, 2007

Page 2: Financial Real-Time Threats: Impacting Trading  Floor Operations

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Outline

Background Motivation Architecture Findings Scenario Conclusions

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Background

PhD in Information SecurityEmergence in Designing Routing Protocols

UK Security ScientistDefCon 2007, IEEE, IEE, BCS, CISSP

Java Developer Background J2SE, JEE

OWASP Project Leader JBroFuzz

Employer: Information Risk Management, UKwww.irmplc.com

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Motivation

“the cash desk, the derivatives desk, the program desk … bring them all together”

“ Do you have trading technology that allows you to trade across every asset in every country? ”

“Our traders can trade across multiple asset classes simultaneously”

“We offer you the ability to trade from your PDA”

How long can you be out of the market for?

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Motivation

How long can you be out of the market for?

Regulatory requirements

Business loss opportunities

Liability issues regarding prices

Increase in number of people on the floor

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The Freakonomics of Security and Personel Scenario: Member of Staff A, holds a

password of ‘operational importance’ Technical Attack Approach

Password is stored in the form of a 128 bit hashThe cost of obtaining the hash would require an insider’s presenceTo check for a single value would cost: $0.00000000001To check for more than half of the values: ≈$ 184 million

Human Attack Approach

Clerical A Staff Salary pays: $ 40 K / YearA successful career of, say 25 yearsTotal Earnings: ≈ $ 1 million

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Trading Floor Security Testing Architecture

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Trading Floor Security Testing Architecture

Penetration TestApplication Security TestSoftware Product ReviewApplication Architecture Assessment

Console Audit TestApplication AssessmentNetwork Assessment

Secure Development TrainingApplication AssessmentNetwork AssessmentVPN / RAS Test

Firewall ReviewVPN / RAS TestMessaging System Audit

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Typical Assessment Findings

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Scenario

Operational System

Risk Assessment Initiated

Initial Internal Assessment

External Penetration Test

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Scenario Results

External Penetration TestA1: Cross Site ScriptingA2: Cross Site Request ForgeryA4: Web Application DoSA7: Weak Session CookiesA9: Insecure Communications

Final Risk Assessment

A1: Non Internet Facing Application A2: Scarce Data Manipulation Attacks A4: Application recovers successfullyA7: Users not technical enough A9: Internal Switched Network

Fun and Profit Enterprise Attack

A4: Cause a Web Denial of ServiceA1: Mass Internal Phishing Email A2: Manipulate Data being on the flyA7: Hijack administrator’s data A9: Bounce data off mail gateway

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Conclusions

Complex “Enterprise Level” applications will experience “Enterprise Level” attacks

An application, subsystem or component must be able to withstand a targeted specialized attack

Simplicity is key for a Secure System Implementation