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United Nations Vs. Regional Peace
Support Operations: A Comparative
Analysis of Four Case Studies from the
1990s
Seán Williams, BA (NUI)
13210161
Presented for the degree of Master of Arts in International Security &
Conflict Studies to the School of Law & Government, Dublin City University
Supervisor:
Professor Robert Elgie
September 2014
Declaration
I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of
study leading to the award of MA International Security & Conflict Studies is entirely my
own work, that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and
does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken
from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and
acknowledged within the text of my work.
Signed: _____________________________
ID No: _____________________________
Date: ___________________________
i
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Robert
Elgie, who has supported me throughout my research, allowing me the room to work in my
own way while also keeping my work in check. Your help was invaluable.
Secondly, I must thank all of the staff at the DCU School of Law &
Government whom I have worked with over the last year for contributing to my
understanding of the contemporary world, each in their own unique way. Each of you has
given of your time, energy, and expertise and I am richer for it.
Finally, this journey would not have been possible without the support of
my family, Niamh, Seán Snr, and Ciara, and my girlfriend Jana. Thank you for
encouraging me in all of my pursuits and inspiring me to follow my dream. I am especially
grateful to my parents, who supported me emotionally and financially. I always knew that
you believed in me and wanted the best for me. I dedicate this thesis, my first book, to you,
knowing that it is on your investment that I will now build my adult life. Quite simply, I
cannot thank you enough.
ii
Abstract
The UN response to situations of conflict around the world has, over the years since the
end of the Cold War, varied considerably and the UN Security Council, as the only legal
authority responsible for mandating peace support and humanitarian intervention missions,
has increasingly come under close scrutiny in this regard. At the centre of this issue is a
cumbersome UN structure, the lack of any uniform interpretation of the UN Charter and an
inability to circumvent the self-interest of individual member states in enforcing the human
rights ideals of its legal instruments. In contrast, regional actors, e.g. NATO, ECOWAS
and the African Union, as well as coalitions involving loosely aligned self-motivated allies,
because they have a higher stake in ensuring peace and security close to their own borders,
have been highly effective interventionists. Utilising a comparative case study approach
and a hypothetico-deductive model of investigation, this thesis examines four interventions
from the 1990s: UNOSOM in Somalia, UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, ECOMOG
in Liberia and INTERFET in East Timor. It calls into question the use of UN versus
regional entities in the composition of intervention forces, and discusses the impact of
mandates and resources on mission outcomes. The motivation behind this thesis is, not just
to identify the root causes of success and failure but, to point to an appropriate range of
defendable benchmarks that could influence future interventions for the better. The
overwhelming evidence of my study supports the view outlined in the literature that there
is considerable merit in having regional organisations partner the UN in peacekeeping
operations or, like INTERFET in East Timor, in acting as first responders to prepare the
ground for more long-term UN nation-building missions.
iii
Abbreviations
I-MEF – First Marine Expeditionary Force (United States Marine Corps)
ABC – Australian Broadcasting Corporation
AFL – Armed Forces of Liberia
AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan
ANZUS – Australia, New Zealand & United States Security Treaty
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU – African Union
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BSA – Bosnian Serb Army
CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (Australia)
EC – European Community
ECOMOG – ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
EU – European Union
FALINTIL – Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste
FRETILIN – Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
HI – Humanitarian Intervention
HRW – Human Rights Watch
HMAS – Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (Royal Australian Navy ship prefix)
IFOR – Implementation Force (NATO Force in Bosnia)
IMF – International Monetary Fund
iv
INPFL – Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
INTERFET – International Force East Timor
JNA – Yugoslav National Army
LAS – League of Arab States
LPC – Liberian Peace Council
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA – National Command Authorities (USA)
NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NSA – National Somali Alliance
OAS – Organisation of American States
OAU – Organisation of African Unity (Precursor of the African Union)
OIC – Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OSCE – Organisation for Security & Co-operation in Europe
P-5 – Permanent members of the UN Security Council
R2P – Responsibility to Protect Doctrine
RAR – Royal Australian Regiment (Infantry Formation of the Australian Army)
RUF – Revolutionary United Front of Liberia
SMC – Standing Mediation Committee (ECOWAS)
SNA – Somali National Army
TNI – Indonesian National Armed Forces
UDT – Timorese Democratic Union
ULIMO – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
ULIMO-J – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Krahn Breakaway)
ULIMO-K – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Mandingo
Breakaway)
v
UN – United Nations
UNAMID – United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNAMET – United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNDPKO – United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF – Unified Task Force
UNOMIL – United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM – United Nations Operation in Somalia (I & II)
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia)
UNPA – United Nations Protected Areas (Safe Areas in the Former Yugoslavia)
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UNSG – United Nations Secretary General
UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US – United States of America
USCENTCOM – United States Central Command (Military)
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
vi
Table of Contents
Declaration……………………………………………………………………………….....i
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………...ii
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………....iii
List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………...iv
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………...vii
CHAPTER 1: Introduction & Statement of Research Aims……………………………1
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review…………………………………………………………5
CHAPTER 3: Research Design & Methodology……………………………………….16
CHAPTER 4: Review of Case Study I – UNOSOM in Somalia…….………………...22
Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...22
The Intervention……………………………………………………………………....23
Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....28
CHAPTER 5: Review of Case Study II – UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia……………….32
Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...32
The Intervention……………………………………………………………………....34
Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....38
CHAPTER 6: Review of Case Study III – ECOMOG in Liberia……………………..42
Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...42
The Intervention……………………………………………………………………....44
Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....51
CHAPTER 7: Review of Case Study IV – INTERFET in East Timor……………….54
Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...54
The Intervention…………………………………………………………………........58
vii
Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....63
CHAPTER 8: Findings & Conclusions…………………………………………………66
Research Findings…………………………………………………………………….66
Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………...74
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..79
UN Documents, Publications & Resolutions………………………………………....79
Regional Organisation and Other Government Documents………………………….82
News Media Sources…………………………………………………………………82
NGO Publications…………………………………………………………………….83
Secondary Research Material………………………………………………………...83
viii
Chapter 1 – Introduction & Statement of Research Aims
Given the urgency that attends responses to humanitarian needs, it is
remarkable how UN debates can engender procrastination, provoke stalemate or render
ineffectual one of society’s most cherished values, the protection of human rights. In this
respect, Normand and Zaidi (2008) detail the significant complexity in legislating for
humanitarian intervention but among the many ideas they proffer, one has particular
relevance to my topic.
“Cultural practices that transgress conventional notions of human
rights may invite humanitarian intervention; states that deny the
universal validity of human rights may become international
pariahs subject to regime change. The ‘may’ is important, because
it is common knowledge that not all abuses and abusers are equal
in practice. The theory of impartiality is belied by the absence of
consistently applied legal mechanisms interpreted and enforced by
objective decision makers.” (Normand & Zaidi; 2008: 9).
This, to me, is the nub of the argument surrounding humanitarian intervention. Because
international law provides for action against human rights abuses (UN; 1945: Preamble),
even where these involve hostilities or the threat of them (Holzgrefe & Keohane; 2003:
18), one cannot presume any parity in the manner or scale of any humanitarian operation
with a comparable precedent.
There are three separate issues that feed into the debate on armed
humanitarian interventions and which determine their effectiveness. Firstly, the precarious
standing within international law of any form of intervention; secondly, the extent to which
self-interest by powerful states may be a motivating factor in the decision to intervene; and
1
finally, the incapacity of UN structures when faced with the need to respond timely and
decisively to gross violations of human rights. These three issues conspire to render
ineffectual the very institution whose mission it is to act as guardian of human rights in all
its forms.
The precarious nature of armed intervention within international law rests
on a fulcrum between two contrasting interpretations of the UN Charter. The
‘restrictionist’ point of view asserts “no justification for entertaining any interpretation
other than the exact meaning of the text” (Harhoff; 2001: 101). This doctrine is grounded
in the fear that should any deviation be permitted, it could create a precedent for states to
wage war in pursuit of their own ideals and ends (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 146). In
essence, restrictionists believe in the absolute sovereignty of all states, as a fundamental
and inviolable principle.
“The concept of international society privileges the state as the
sole repository of sovereign authority and is based on the
assumption that international order can be best maintained if states
respect each other’s sovereignty by adhering to the norms of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states” (Ayoob; 2002:
81).
In contrast, the ‘counter-restrictionist’ interpretation relies on a more
flexible attitude to wording, whereby humanitarian intervention may be deemed legal, even
under Article 2(4), if it does not seek to annex any territory or threaten a state’s
independence, and if humanitarian actions are undertaken exclusively for the purpose of
protecting human rights (Arend & Beck; 1993: 134). Here, the UN Charter may be
interpreted flexibly to meet the needs and particular context of an urgent or imminent
humanitarian crisis. For instance, when a state is in violation of its own citizens’
2
fundamental human rights, it can within international law be deemed to have reneged on
the most basic obligation of sovereignty and, in so doing, have a questionable claim of
sovereignty (Kolodziej; 2000: 127).
Under current international law, the UNSC exercises exclusive authority to
sanction (or not to sanction) humanitarian intervention and it is also the sole arbiter over
disputes relating to the legitimacy and/or legality of any external intervention in the
sovereign affairs of a member state. However, there are strong reasons to support the belief
that the UNSC may not be the optimal body to exercise exclusive authority in this matter
and the record shows in a significant number of cases that it has proved inept and ill-suited
to this task. The purpose of this thesis is to present an argument for rejecting the primacy
of the UNSC in this task and to explore a rationale for allowing regional organisations
greater autonomy to intervene, especially where nearby human rights abuses require an
immediate and resolute military response.
It is from these observations that my research question emerges: In
responding to gross violations of human rights, are regional organisations and/or ad-hoc
‘coalitions of the willing’ (led by either neighbour nations or nations with regional
influence) more effective than the UN? My overarching theory is that regional and/or
individual actors are better alternatives to the UNSC when it comes to authorising and
exercising peace enforcement measures in defence of human rights, especially in situation
where states fail to protect their own citizens. 1 From this, I have developed four pertinent
hypotheses to help focus my thesis (Baglione; 2007: 66).
The record of the UNSC in enforcing human rights ideals is poor.
The UNSC’s primacy in mandating intervention missions is obsolete.
1 In these circumstances, states can be deemed to have abnegated one of the primary responsibilities of state sovereignty and this then obligates the international community to intervene under the ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ doctrine.
3
In countering gross human rights abuses, decisive and robust peace enforcement is
more effective than issuing sanctions and/or mandating a peacekeeping presence.
Regional organisations, and/or ad-hoc coalitions are more effective than UN-led
mission at halting gross violations of human rights.
Given the considerable body of existing work devoted to the debate about
humanitarian intervention and the individual case studies that argue varying points of view,
I do not expect to uncover totally new insights. Although my research follows in the
footsteps of those cited in my literature review, my particular perspective offers a new way
of looking at the problem. The arguments and conclusions presented are relevant in today’s
world and I hope they will present not just reasoned argument but solutions to a problem
which continues to haunt UN interventions to this day. Nothing that I have read to date
recommends actions that might impact on the UNSC’s primacy in making decisions about
humanitarian interventions and this aspect of my research is entirely my own and will
hopefully contribute something new to the debate.
4
Chapter 2 – Literature Review
Since World War II, the UN has been burdened with mediating a growing
number of conflicts in various parts of the globe where intervention is required for the
purposes of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, nation-building, ensuring human wellbeing
and security and delivering humanitarian aid. Increased UN activism, has demonstrated the
extent to which the organisation has over-stretched its capabilities (Morris & McCoubrey;
2000: vii) and, because of this, the involvement of other actors in undertaking and
partnering operations of this nature has become necessary.
The UN’s legal authority to decide all matters concerning foreign
intervention is established in its Charter and in international law. However, there exists a
tension between the use of force by non-UN missions and the Charter’s cornerstone
principle of the non-use of force, embodied in Article 2(4). 2 Charney states that the
prohibition in Article 2(4) was meant to be essentially all encompassing and incorporates,
within its meaning, territorial integrity and political independence (1999: 1247). Charney’s
valid assumption poses difficulties for regional actors who, in assuming the role of
peacekeeping, usurp the prima facie fundamental right of the UN as the only legally
authorised agency to intervene and mediate foreign conflict or alleviate humanitarian need.
Article 24 of the UN Charter specifically confers “on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN; 1945: Article
24). Therefore, ipso facto, it is also contrary to international law (and specifically Article
24) to violate the sovereignty of another UN member state without the consent of or a
mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Charney; 1999: 1247). However, what
2 Article 2(4) of the UN Charters states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN; 1945: Article 2(4)).
5
has come increasingly into play here is the ‘restrictionist’ and ‘counter-restrictionist’
interpretations of the wording which, in debate, can be self-serving and unduly delay a
timely response to a grave situation. However, academic opinion is much more cohesive
on the subject of intervention. Bellamy & Williams assert that it is illegal to breach the
sovereignty of another country under the banner of humanitarian intervention in pursuit of
one’s own ideals and ends; such interventions are essentially wars of aggression, even
when they are accompanied by manipulative language suggesting the contrary as well as
an altruistic concern (2006: 146).
The UN Charter obligates states to resolve disputes by peaceful means (UN;
1945: Article 2(3)). Article 37 further requires states, once they have exhausted all
peaceful avenues, to refer unsettled disputes to the Security Council (Ibid: Article 37).
Cassese specifies that, even in the face of human rights abuses, failure to act through the
UNSC and/or by UNSC mandate is reprehensible, even if the Council confines its
attentions “to deploring or condemning the massacres, plus possibly terming the situation
a threat to the peace” (1999: 27). According to the Danish Institute Report (1999: 108),
“inaction on the part of the Security Council is generally accepted as an indispensable
condition for the legitimacy of [unauthorised] humanitarian intervention.” This report also
suggests that the concomitant of this condition is the requirement by states undertaking
unauthorised humanitarian intervention to “report to the Security Council on their plans of
intervention and its progress” (Ibid). In addition, Charney (1999: 1244) states that the
issue should also be formally brought before the General Assembly on an emergency basis
and, assuming the UNSC has failed to approve the necessary military intervention, and
neither the Council “nor the General Assembly adopts a resolution expressly forbidding
further action … recourse to a UN-based remedy will be deemed to be exhausted .” Cassese
6
asserts that an unauthorised intervention must have “the support or at least the non-
opposition of the majority of the Member States of the UN” (1999: 27).
From a ‘deontological’ moral perspective, 3 it is the individual, and not the
state, that lies at the centre of international law because, in a democracy, states receive
their legitimacy from the will of the people. Hence, sovereignty is not an inherent right of
states but, rather, derives from individual rights. There is also a reciprocal obligation on
states to protect its own people. Thus, when sovereignty comes into conflict with human
rights, it is the good of the people that must prevail. Fernando Tesón (1997: 173-4), a
leading proponent of the legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention, argues as
follows:
“The human rights imperative underlies the concepts of state and
government and the precepts that are designed to protect them,
most prominently article 2(4). The rights of states recognized by
international law are meaningful only on the assumption that those
states minimally observe individual rights. The United Nations’
purpose of promoting and protecting human rights found in article
1(3), and by reference in article 2(4) as a qualifying clause to the
prohibition of war, has a necessary primacy over the respect for
state sovereignty. Force used in defence of fundamental human
rights is therefore not a use of force inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations.”
The underlying assumption here is that human rights take precedence over the right to
sovereignty and that natural law and all aspects of the security of citizens have primacy.
3 On this view, the moral motives of the actor are relevant and acting on principle takes precedence over the consequences of the action. According to Thomas Donaldson (1993: 137), “it is common to define deontological theory as ‘agent-centred,’ i.e., as placing emphasis on an agent’s moral motives, and as allowing principles and precepts to override the consideration of consequences.”
7
Not unrelated to this topic is the question about who should be permitted or
assume authority to undertake a necessary, if unauthorised, intervention. Most writers
agree that, if only as a guard against self-interest, the intervention must be a multilateral
action. The Danish Institute Report (1999: 108) notes that an intervention by one state into
the sovereign affairs of another may still be considered legitimate “if the humanitarian
emergency is apparent, but no other state than the neighbouring state wants to make the
effort.” Also, even when an intervention is multilateral, this does not necessarily make it
legal; although where “more than one state has participated in a decision to intervene for
humanitarian reasons … [this reduces] the chance that the doctrine will be invoked
exclusively for reasons of self-interest” (Ibid: 108). Cassese advises that humanitarian
interventions should always be undertaken by a group of states or an ally rather than “a
single hegemonic power”, regardless of capability or the strength of its “military, political
and economic authority” (1999: 27). This guidance is convincing and points to the need to
decouple a state’s relative strength and resources from any decision about the leadership of
any coalition of willing intervention actors. However, from a practical perspective, this is
not always possible and the history of UN humanitarian interventions shows that
humanitarian campaigns are usually led by powerful states with the necessary military and
economic resources.
Charney (1999: 1244), on the other hand, suggests that any unauthorised
intervention is best undertaken by a relevant regional organisation. Regional organisations
constituted under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are prohibited from taking enforcement
action without the authorisation of the UNSC (Article 53(1)). Arguably, this prohibition,
although limiting, guards against self-interest and strengthens the case for dealing “with
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are
8
appropriate for regional action.” 4 In such circumstances, the involvement of a regional
organisation as the principal actor in a humanitarian intervention would enhance the
legitimacy of that intervention. Practically speaking, however, “most regional actors do
not have sufficient capabilities to undertake prolonged military operations” (Danish
Institute Report; 1999: 38).
Under the terms of Article 53(1) of the UN Charter, for a regional
organisation to legally engage in peace enforcement action, it must receive authorisation
from the UNSC. However, citing the UNSC treatment of ECOWAS after its pre-emptive
intervention in Liberia in 1990, a considerable body of academic argument concludes that
approval or commendation of an enforcement action after it has taken place sufficiently
satisfies this requirement, (Abass; 2004: 53-54. Ress & Brohmer; 2002: 865-866. Rostow;
1991: 515. Simma; 1999: 4).
In their analysis of the totally inadequate response to the conflict in Darfur,
Bellamy & Williams offer important conclusions about how future reactions by the
international community might be rendered more effective. The most compelling of these
suggests strongly that states might force the issue by rejecting the primacy of the UNSC
when decisions about intervention are to be made (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 157). Byers
concurs and furthers the argument by citing the example of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation’s (NATO’s) intervention in Kosovo. In this case, NATO, although initially
lacking UNSC authorisation, succeeded in acquiring a somewhat ‘ambiguous
authorisation’ post the event when the UNSC belatedly accepted that the situation
represented a grave threat to international peace and security (Byers: 2005: 40-51). The
4 Under Article 52(1) of the Charter, states may create regional bodies to deal “with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” O’Connell (2000: 63-67) notes a number of regional organisations that have UN status under Chapter VIII. The ECOWAS peacekeeping campaign in Liberia (ECOMOG) and its subsequent intervention in Sierra Leone were both approved after the fact by the UNSC under Chapter VIII of the Charter.
9
legitimacy of NATO’s action is established by the fact that, had it not occurred, it might
have resulted in the kind of genocidal atrocities reminiscent of Rwanda in 1994 and in
Srebrenica 1995. This concurs with Tesón’s view that moral imperative to act can
retrospectively confer legitimacy (Tesón; 1997: 173-4).
Buchanan (2001) further discusses the justification for foreign intervention,
especially intervention that might be deemed illegal under international law, and he
proposes a number of guidelines for assessing the morality of such acts. Because it is a
proposition of my research to reject the primacy of the UNSC as the sole authorising agent
for all humanitarian intervention, one of Buchanan’s guidelines is of particular interest to
my study. Buchanan’s ‘substantive justice’ guideline asserts since the pursuit of the
‘human rights for all’ agenda constitutes a core substantive justice, that justification for
intervention acts could be provided on these grounds. He advises the international legal
system to consider this when determining “whether illegal action is morally justifiable”
and that this concept “cannot be dismissed as the imposition of purely personal or
subjective moral views” (Buchanan; 2001: 699). He concludes by rejecting the very idea of
illegality in the field of humanitarian intervention because, not to do so is failing to
comprehend the complexities of the issue (Ibid: 704).
In discussing issues of consent and legitimacy, Glanville (2013) offers a
different perspective on the role of regional organisations in humanitarian intervention. He
proposes less dependence on the sovereign consent of the troubled state and a greater
reliance on consent from the relevant regional organisation when making UNSC decisions
about Chapter VII interventions, particularly where human rights abuses are relevant
(Glanville; 2013: 326). 5 In examining the route to the NATO intervention in Libya,
Glanville analyses the rhetoric emanating from organisations such as the League of Arab
5 Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the UNSC to act to restore peace and stability where it determines the existence of any threat to or breach of the peace or aggressive action to have taken place.
10
States (LAS), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the AU, all of which
helped procure the UN resolution authorising ‘all necessary means’ in response to gross
violations of human rights by Libyan government forces. He notes that, in their
submissions to the UN, these organisations demonstrated a deep understanding of the
nature of the Libyan conflict, the need for immediate military action and the necessity in
this particular case to transcend legal issues relating to sovereign consent (Ibid: 336).
Summarising, he concludes that the UNSC “should be guided by the opinions of relevant
regional organisations.” This example is crucial to my research because it reveals an
important precedent for allowing regional organisation a role in securing authorisation for
intervention. Even when regional actors lack the necessary military capability and
resources to intervene decisively in a neighbouring conflict, Glanville has shown that they
can exercise a crucial influence on events and this can be an important resource when
deciding the nature and strength of humanitarian interventions.
Pattinson (2008) describes the problems facing regional organisations,
individual nations and ad-hoc coalitions who undertake humanitarian missions without UN
sanction. While he accepts that many Western states have both the military capacity and
logistical support capability to deploy forces on a scale that are likely to be effective, he
draws attention to how humanitarian interveners are perceived and accepted within the
zone of need (Pattinson; 2008: 408). History reveals that most Western penetrations into
the global south and Middle East are likely to be faced with a large level of local
resistance. For example, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the US and Western democracies
generally “do not have the credibility in the eyes of the world to carry out humanitarian
intervention” (ibid). Similarly, ex-colonial powers intervening in former colonies run the
risk of being perceived as pursuing colonial self-interest. Pattinson’s point is convincing in
that a potential intervener must carefully weigh up whether or not it is likely to provoke an
11
escalation of a problem by creating more fighters than it disarms. In this respect, he sees
merit in using regional organisations but warns that, with the exception of NATO and the
EU, most others, such as the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), suffer from massive shortfalls in military funding and
equipment, rendering prolonged operations difficult (Pattinson; 2008: 409). He considers
the EU’s potential as an effective humanitarian actor but acknowledges that, currently, it
does not have agreed structures to allow it to rapidly deploy a large force off continent
(ibid). The capacity of NATO to conduct successful humanitarian operations has been
demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, and most recently, in Libya. However, since NATO is
primarily a defence pact, its deployment in humanitarian activities, especially outside of its
zone of influence, is often governed by self-interest (Pattinson; 2008: 408).
While Pattinson’s writings reveal a number of issues facing likely actors in
the field of humanitarian intervention, I think he misses the advantages that regional
interventions offer in comparison to more remote actors mandated by the UNSC. Some of
these advantages are considered by MacFarlane & Weiss (1994). Firstly, regional
organisations often have a “higher stake” in preventing and/or ending conflict within their
sphere of influence (MacFarlane & Weiss; 1994: 283). Member states within these spheres
feel the effects of regional conflict more acutely, such as population displacement, a
downturn in foreign direct investment from abroad and, in general, regional instability.
MacFarlane & Weiss explain that regional organisations have a higher stake in ensuring
near-neighbour stability and are more likely to act decisively in pursuit of these ends (ibid).
More persuasively, regional rather than remote international actors tend to best understand
the nature of strife and ethnic tension in their own immediate area, making them better
mediators of local conflicts (ibid). MacFarlane and Weiss conclude that, whereas regional
12
interventions have some obvious limitations, they convey humanitarian benefits more
efficiently and more effectively than non-regional actors.
The concept of hybrid peace operations (often a coalition between a
dominant lead nation collaborating with willing neighbour states) has emerged in recent
times. The steady expansion of regional interventions such as ECOWAS in Liberia, Guinea
Bissau and Ivory Coast, the AU in Darfur and Somalia, as well as the more publicised
interventions of NATO in the former Yugoslavia and Libya prompts questions about the
role and legality of regional actors. Also, it cannot go unnoticed that many UN
peacekeeping missions have been deployed concurrently with or immediately following
regional missions and, most recently, this has come under scrutiny in scholarly journals. As
the deployment of hybrid peace operations becomes more prevalent in the international
response to security and conflict, there seems to be tacit agreement about the practice,
notwithstanding the ambiguity about how it can be accommodated under the current
unwieldy UN framework (Yamashita; 2012: 166).
Yamashita conjectures that UN hybrid missions might occur under two
dominant models - the ‘subcontracting’ model and the ‘partnering’ model, both of which
focus on incorporating both regional and UN actors (Yamashita; 2012: 168). Firstly, ‘sub-
contracting’ refers to an arrangement whereby regional organisations and coalitions
undertake an active role in peace making and peacekeeping responsibilities and, under
international law, such contracting must be authorised, monitored and directed by the
UNSC. The subcontracting model then is a form of global cooperation in which regional
peace operations are, in essence, UN operations delegated to other organisations.
(Yamashita; 2012: 169). A recent example of the ‘sub-contracting’ approach is the UN
authorised NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Reacting to both excessive violence by
Libyan government forces on domestic opponents and under pressure from regional
13
entities in the immediate vicinity, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 authorising ‘all
necessary means’ to quell the bloodshed (UNSC; 2011). Almost immediately, NATO
established a no-fly zone and launched an aerial bombardment on government forces. After
seven months, Libyan opposition forces had conquered the country and ousted (and killed)
the former authoritarian ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. At the time, western media hailed
NATO’s intervention for averting a potential bloodbath and assisting in Libya’s transition
towards democracy (Kuperman; 2013: 105). Although open to debate, NATO’s Libyan
intervention is cited as an ideal implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
principle. Whereas it undoubtedly saved civilian lives and achieved its goals within a brief
timeframe, NATO’s intervention here has to be measured against more recent opportunity
in Syria where, in similar circumstances, the R2P principle failed to engage and resulted in
a very different outcome.
The ‘partnering’ model implies a more horizontal relationship to ‘sub-
contracting’ wherein the UN and regional organisations form a network of peacekeeping
partners with interconnected capabilities (Yamashita; 2012: 170). Institutionally, the
convergence of regional and UN peacekeeping is most clearly evident in the AU/UN
hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the first peacekeeping mission that is formally both
a UN and a regional operation. Morphing from its precursor, the solely AU AMIS mission
which was eventually rendered ineffective due to a lack of available troops and a weak
mandate, the formal transition to UNAMID took place on December 21st, 2007, with the
majority of AMIS troops being ‘re-hatted’ as UN peacekeepers (Yamashita; 2012: 502-
503). The AU and the UN jointly appoint UNAMID’s top officials and agree on its
composition, and the UN provides the mission’s ‘command and control structures and
backstopping’ as well as its funding (Coleman; 2011: 537). Sub-Saharan African states
form the bulk of UNAMID troops (71% in May 2011) because the Sudanese government
14
insisted on a predominantly African presence on its land (UNDPKO; 2011: 12-15). In this
way, the UN has overcome issues of misperception, circumventing the possibility that its
mission might be perceived in terms of a Western penetration into African affairs.
However, the situation on the ground in Darfur is still bleak and no reliable evaluation of
the partnering approach has yet occurred.
Chapter 3 – Research Design & Methodology
15
Comparative research belongs to a well-established research method that
has become popular in the social sciences since the mid twentieth century. In this thesis, a
comparative case study approach will be employed to argue that regional organisations
and/or coalitions of the willing have discernible advantages over the UN in conducting
humanitarian intervention missions. Comparative research methods, a subset of qualitative
research methods, are grounded in positive epistomology and are often used in the study of
international social and political issues, and international relations in general. There is, in
particular, a long tradition of cross-case studies involving humanitarian intervention and
this approach is particularly appropriate where one has to identify, analyse and explain
similarities and differences across a range of topics that transcend time, geopolitical and
cultural boundaries. Although, in qualitative research, the most common procedures for
collecting data are by means of interviews and observations, there is some scholarly
consensus that reviewing relevant documents can also be a valuable means of garnering
valid data. (e.g. Creswell; 2009: 175-176 & 193. Locke et al; 2010: throughout. Prior;
2003: 145ff.).
What matters here is the researcher’s own perceptions and the way he/she
can bring interpretation and analysis to bear on different texts by searching for meaning
across a number of themes that have been identified as useful for his/her purposes. Because
of the impracticality of generating original statistical field data from different theatres of
operation, comparative analysis has particular value in topics like mine, not least because
of the ready availability of a body of existing, relevant and reliable research literature from
which pertinent inferences can be derived. In this way, for my particular purposes,
comparing case studies has a particular relevance and advantage over other forms of
research.
16
Lijphart (1971) defines the comparative method as the analysis of a small
number of cases, entailing at least two observations, yet too few to permit the application
of conventional statistical analysis (Collier; 1993: 106). His case study approach has the
merit of providing a framework in which a scholar with modest resources can generate
useful and observable data on a certain scenario. However, in his approach, although
opportunities to systematically test hypotheses are far more limited than with other
methods such as experimental and statistical models (ibid), Lijphart insists that case studies
do make a valid contribution to testing hypotheses and building theory (1971: 691-693).
This is all the more true, given the magnitude of case studies in the area of international
security and conflict which, in my view, underlines the importance of comparative case
studies like mine, because of their value in promoting synthesis in existing knowledge and
understanding.
Another benefit of using the comparative case study method is that it allows
for deeper analysis of a small amount of cases. Because of the nature of the subject-matter,
the greatest challenge in using this approach is in devising an appropriate research tool for
measuring the extent of success and/or failure of humanitarian intervention by international
and regional organisations. Success and/or failure may be varingly interpreted depending
on one’s perspective and allegance.
Fortunately, Prior and others make a compelling case for the use of text
analysis in research, especially for topics like mine where the use of other research forms is
neither possible nor warranted. He asserts that
“documents usually appear only in so far as they serve as
receptacles of evidence for some claim or other … Consequently,
as researchers of the inert text, it would undoubtedly be of
considerable help to us if we could appeal to a set of generally
17
accepted rules about evidence to demonstrate that our scrutiny of
document content was done ‘in the right way’ and to the highest
standards – rules that would help us establish that our ultimate
claims are valid and reliable. Unfortunately, no such body of rules
exists. That is not to say that there are no rules (See for example
Platt 1981a, 1981b, Seale 1999), only that their status is always
contested.” (2003: 147).
According to Prior, positivism supplies the rules of document research and a central tenet
of this is “ the application of what is sometimes called the hypothetico- deductive method
of scientific discovery”, which emerged during the first half of the twentieth century.
“The method has many intricate features, but included among them
are the suggestions that science proceeds not on the basis of
making a lot of unconnected observations, but rather on the basis
of advancing theoretically-informed hypotheses – hypotheses that,
ideally, incorporate law-like statements” (Ibid: 148).
This provides the theoretical basis for what Prior describes as “systematic
review methodology” and its three central issues of concern, viz.(1) the selection of
evidence, (2) the scope and robustness of the data, and (3) data extraction (Ibid: 150). In
my research, I will only select primary resource documentary evidence extracted from
reports and existing published interpretations from reliable scholars. In this way, I hope to
secure the appropriate reliability and validity of the evidence on which to build meaning.
There remains the difficulties inherent in the data extraction process itself, where a number
of different narratives may emerge from different readings of the same document and
where “different individuals can often see different things in the same data set and read
18
different messages from the same document.” (Ibid: 157) Prior recommends a number of
key points that will safeguard the process of data extraction.
Researching the inert text requires one to attend to issues of reliability and validity.
Issues of reliability and validity in turn require that we state at the outset of the
research project what, exactly, we are seeking to achieve, and what is to be included in
the field of study.
Selection (and exclusion) of documentary material should be in accordance with the
principles established in the preceding point.
In those instances where documentary materials have to be sampled, a thorough
justification for the sampling procedures needs to be provided.
Indexing and coding of data need to be executed in a rigorous and unbiased manner.
Whilst drawing conclusions from data, always pay special attention to data that
apparently fail to confirm one’s claims and generalizations.” (Ibid: 163)
The forgoing advice is useful and provides important guidance for my
study. Whereas it is important in all of this to maintain an objectivity and an openness,
logic dictates that much will depend on structuring the data in such a way that will allow
the appropriate information to be extracted across a series of different documents. The
systematic review methodology described by Prior requires the researcher to establish
objectives and outcomes and primarily to declare from the outset what exactly he
understands by his title. Definitions of this type are necessary in utilising the hypothetico-
deductive method if only to avoid the possibility of conflicting interpretations infecting the
research. For the purposes of this research, then, intervention (whether by UN, a regional
organisation or a coalition of the willing) will be considered successful if the humanitarian
goals of the intervention are met. That is, most cases of humanitarian intervention have
objectives that are tightly circumscribed and limited in time, for instance, the ceasing of
19
hostilities or the ending of genocide. If those goals are met, the intervention can be deemed
successful. Other indicators, for instance, the reconciliation of internal differences within a
state, although important, are beyond the scope of my research. In my analysis, the
prevention of widespread egregious human rights violations by military intervention will
be regarded as a measure of success. Although this is a somewhat narrow definition, it is
necessary in the interests of time to keep the investigation on a clear and coherent track.
My choice of these particular four case studies (Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia
and East Timor) may seem random and unorthodox given the varying circumstances of the
four conflicts involved. However, there are good grounds for choosing these particular case
studies. All four occurred during the 1990s, a decade during which the UN had to deal
with several historic conflicts in different areas of the globe. All four, however, are
sufficiently dissimilar, especially in the nature and progress of the conflicts, to allow
comparative analysis to be made to suit the particular needs of my study. Both the Liberia
and the East Timor case studies involved a significant intervention from neighbour states
while, in the latter stages of the Bosnian conflict, NATO’s belated intervention is also
pertinent to my purposes. The UN interventions in Somalia and Bosnia drew its forces and
resources from a wide variety of states and therefore make good comparison with East
Timor and Liberia.
Also, there are sufficient similarities across all four case studies to allow me
make comparable findings over a range of obvious and pertinent criteria which I have
conveniently framed as questions. This gives considerable strength and robustness to my
findings and allows me focus my conclusions more authoritatively. My findings address
the following seven questions:
a) What was the composition of the intervening force?
b) Was the mandate strong enough to ensure success?
20
c) Were the resources adequate for the task?
d) Was the mandate fulfilled?
e) Did the intervention contain the conflict and bring an end to hostilities?
f) Did the intervention bring about a reduction in human suffering?
g) Did the intervention bring about normalization and a return to democratic rule?
The first question (a) examines the extent and impact of regional entities in
the composition of all four forces. Questions (b) and (d) examine different aspects of the
UN mandates involved in each case and this has particular significance to my study
(Druckman et al; 1997: 152). The resourcing of each mission is compared in question (c).
Finally, questions (d), (e), (f) and (g) address the outcomes of each mission.
The above analytical structure allows for good comparative judgments to be
made and is consistent with the hypothetico-deductive method. It provides an appropriate
range of defendable benchmarks with which to assess why some missions have ended in
catastrophe while others have succeeded. Although the small number of cases studies
involved may appear limiting, all four missions have a high degree of comparability and
there is sufficient justification for good conclusions to be deduced.
Chapter 4 – Case Study I: UNOSOM in Somalia
21
Background to the Conflict:
On 15th October 1969, when Somalia’s president Abdirashid Ali Shermarke
was assassinated, the army led by its commander Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in a
bloodless coup d’état, after which all democratic institutions were dissolved (Daniels;
2012: 12). Despite the undemocratic nature of his regime, Barre’s leadership remained
popular for some time, not least because of his espousal of the ideal of a Greater Somalia
that would incorporate the province of Ogaden, then a province within Ethopia. Barre
believed that a weakened Ethiopia would not be able to mount a successful defence of
Ogaden and in 1977, he waged war with the intention of annexing the province
(Cassanelli; 2001: 41). However, when Ethiopia was reinforced by the USSR and Cuba,
the Somali army lost ground and was eventually defeated (Lefort; 1983: 260). 6 As a result,
many ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden fled to Somalia and the Barre regime lost
popular support among the clans. 7
Then, when the Barre regime waged a brutally violent war against the clans,
it lost control of north Somalia to guerrilla clan groups operating there. Barre immediately
ordered retributions that “included aerial bombardment and brutal massacres of civilians,
including women and children” and, by 1991, the country had descended into civil war
(Hirsch & Oakley; 1995: 11). Because of their wider support base, rebel clans quickly
gained ground and this led to the toppling of Barre's regime, its expulsion from the Somali
capital, Mogadishu, and the disbandment of the Somali National Army (SNA). Such was
the intensity of the fighting that it destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and its
means of food production, thus causing severe food shortage and famine.
6 Ethiopia’s allies, USSR and Cuba, sent large amounts of weapons and a contingent of 13,000 Cuban troops to engage and repel the Somalis (Lefort; 1983: 260).7 Somali society is hierarchically based and follows a strict loyalty pattern from family, to sub clan, clan and country, the strongest bond being loyalty to family and allegiance to country is the weakest. Because Somalia’s six main clans have greater significance than political parties, there exists a natural polarisation between the country’s population and democratic politics.
22
With the ousting of Barre, the ensuing power vacuum, and the absence of
any national military to enforce law and order, rebel leaders fought among themselves in a
lengthy and bloodthirsty struggle for control of the country and its resources. By the end of
1991, the resulting human suffering left over 20,000 people killed or injured. Within two
years, it is believed that somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 people perished, either
as a result of the civil war or as a direct result of the famine, with another 3 million
affected in other ways (Ahmed & Green; 1999: 120-121). The ensuing broadcast images of
suffering Somalis shocked the Western world and pressured governments and the UN to
step up efforts to tackle the humanitarian crisis.
The Intervention:
Then, when the warring factions agreed to a ceasefire on 3 rd March I992, the
UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established under the provisions of UNSC
Resolution 751 on 24th April 1992 to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, to provide
security for UN personnel and supplies, and to escort humanitarian supplies to distribution
centres (UNSC; 1992b). However, UNOSOM’s humanitarian effort progressed slowly
because member states were reluctant to commit troops to the project. 8 This was because
“fighting and looting by various factions seeking to control ports and distribution routes
[had become] an important factor in the political economy of the militia” (Lewis &
Mayall; 1996: 108). With little regard for the starving population, the militias wanted the
food for themselves. UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, reported on 28 th August that
the main challenge was not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, but the protection
of convoys transporting these to warehouses and distribution centres.
8 It was envisaged that UNOSOM, at full strength, would have 4,000 troops contributed by Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. However, in its early days of operation, only 54 military observers and 893 military personnel were in place. International civilian and local staff also supported UNOSOM.
23
To counteract the action of the militias, UNSC Resolution 775 immediately
authorised an additional 3,000 security troops for UNOSOM (UNSC; 1992f). Under the
terms of this new resolution, the newly consolidated 4,219-strong UNOSOM was
mandated to provide humanitarian relief, to monitor the ceasefire, to provide security, to
carry out demobilisation and disarmament, and to assist in national reconciliation (Thakur;
1994: 388-389). However, even with the additional troops, UNOSOM was ineffectual
against strong and determined militia groups who considered plunder and robbery as
necessary for survival. In these circumstances, the UNOSOM mission floundered and, with
the broadcasting of graphic images of starvation and death among Somali civilians, the
Bush administration was pressured into ordering Operation Provide Relief in August 1992.
Under this terms of this order, US military air transports and some 400 personnel were
deployed with the intention of airlifting humanitarian aid to remote parts of Somalia,
thereby reducing the reliance on trucks to ferry the relief overland and denying the militia
groups any opportunity of looting aid. During the six months of Operation Provide Relief,
more than 48,000 tons of critically needed relief supplies were airlifted into Somalia
(Allard; 1995: 3).
However, in spite of this apparent success in aid delivery, the security
situation in Somalia, and most notably in the city of Mogadishu, grew worse and it was all
too apparent that the aid delivery strategy was unsustainable and was contributing little to
the peace effort. On 29th November 1992, Boutros-Ghali outlined five options to the UN.
The first was to continue to deploy UNOSOM under the established principles of
consensual, non-forceful UN peacekeeping but, given the scale of the humanitarian crisis,
this was clearly inadequate. The second option was to abandon UNOSOM's mission and
withdraw the force, but an admission of failure of this magnitude could not be
contemplated and would be unlikely to find support. The remaining three options involved
24
the use of force. UNOSOM could assume a more aggressive stance, particularly in
Mogadishu, in the hope of convincing lawless elements to stop abusing international relief
efforts. Alternatively, although deemed to be logistically impractical, the UN might launch
a countrywide enforcement operation under its own command and control. Finally, and
more realistically, the UNSC might authorise a group of member states to carry out such an
operation (Thakur; 1994: 394-395). The latter option was preferred and, when the US
informed Boutros-Ghali that it would be prepared to take the lead in organising a UN-
sanctioned forceful mission to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations
in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali agreed but insisted that the mission should be precisely defined
and limited in time in order to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-
conflict peace-building (Ibid).
On 3rd December 1992, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII, authorised the
use of ‘all necessary means’ to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of
Somalia (UNSC; 1992h). This sanctioning of the use of force for the first time in Somalia
grew out of a conviction that UNOSOM’s existing mandate was inadequate for the
challenge of alleviating mass starvation in an environment of total anarchy (Ibid). UNSC
Resolution 794 required a new response and promised joint, determined, and innovative
action by the UN in alleviating the hardship of an entire nation (Bellamy & Williams;
2010: 216). The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) headed by and under the command of the
US, was established in order to “feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the
way for political, economic and social reconstruction” (UN; 1993: 16). The mission was
intended to be short and was to pave the way for “the unique UN peace making military
administration” UNOSOM II, which would replace both UNITAF and UNOSOM (Lewis
& Mayall; 1996: 112).
25
Although the deployment of UNITAF significantly altered the terms and
raised the stake of American involvement in the Somalia at this time, it is difficult to form
any reliable assessment of its success or otherwise. That the effective delivery of aid was
both expedited and saved lives has to be acknowledged. However, in submitting
recommendations on 3rd March 1993 for effecting the transition from UNITAF
to UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General noted that, despite UNITAF, a secure environment
in Somalia was not yet established and it still had no effective functioning government or
local security/police force. He concluded, therefore, that, should the UNSC determine that
the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be
endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish a
secure environment throughout Somalia (UNDPKO; 1997). UNOSOM II would therefore
seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF of restoring peace and stability throughout
Somalia. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people
in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national
reconciliation and democratic rule (UNSC; 1993a). UNOSOM II was established under
UNSC Resolution 814 on 26th March 1993 and it formally relieved UNITAF, which was
dissolved, on 4th May 1993.
In spite of UNOSOM II’s Chapter VII mandate and its troop strength of
20,000, “there was a widespread Somali perception that the UN-led forces would be
weaker than those of UNITAF” (Hirsch and Oakley; 1995: 115). This perception
emboldened some Somali factions in Mogadishu, in particular the National Somali
Alliance (NSA) led by General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, to test the UN’s resolve. 9 Over
the summer of 1993, tension between Aidid and the UN forces increased, culminating in a
9 Although UNITAF had left, the US still maintained 4,000 troops in the country including a Quick Reaction Force.
26
number of incidents. 10 In response, US President Bill Clinton approved the deployment of
Task Force Ranger, a special task force composed of 400 US Army Rangers and Delta
Force operators to neutralise Aidid’s forces (Brune; 1999: 31). A decisive confrontation
occurred on October 3rd 1993 when Task Force Rangers, intent on capturing some of
Aidid’s top lieutenants, launched a raid into a hostile part of Mogadishu. In the ensuing
firefight, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and eighteen US soldiers were
killed along with countless Somali militia and civilians. What began as a judicious raid
turned into “the biggest firefight involving American soldiers since Vietnam” (Bowden;
1999: 481). Such was the intensity of US public anger engendered by the images of
American bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a cheering crowd of
Somalis that, four days after the incident, President Clinton announced a withdrawal of all
US troops from Somalia by March 31st 1994 (Lewis & Mayall; 1996: 234).
Although the UNOSOM II mission continued after the US withdrawal, it
did so in a much weaker state and, when France, Italy, and Belgium also discontinued their
participation, the nature of its mandate was revised so that it no longer operated under
Chapter VII. After that, UN forces withdrew from the countryside and confined their
operations to Mogadishu in preparation for a full withdrawal in March 1995 (Lewis &
Mayall; 1996: 122). After UN troops finally departed Mogadishu, the entire country again
descended into violence and chaos (Ibid: 121).
Case Analysis:
Over the period of UNOSOM I’s deployment, the situation on the ground in
Somalia had not changed substantially and, by the time of its departure, the problem of
10 On 8th August 1993, Aidid's militia detonated a remote controlled bomb against a US military vehicle, killing four soldiers. Two weeks later another bomb injured seven more (Bowden; 1999: 114).
27
clan rivalries and violence had not abated. As a result, both the humanitarian crisis and the
lawless, anarchic environment that is still characteristic of Somalia continued. UNOSOM
I’s failure to sustain any degree of societal cohesiveness makes the situation in Somalia
unique, while “Somalia’s inability to preserve even a minimal fig leaf of central
administration over twelve years puts it in a class by itself amongst the world’s failed
states” (Menkhaus; 2003: 407).
Logistically, the UNITAF operation in Somalia was an impressive success,
achieving its objective despite the prevailing political circumstances and the lawless
activities of the rebel clans. UNITAF’s principal strategic actor, the US, was precise in its
assessment of local conditions and the role to be played by its forces. The American
National Command Authorities (NCAs) and military commanders identified one clear,
measurable and attainable objective, to achieve a secure environment for the delivery of
humanitarian aid to the Somali people in the areas of greatest need. It is this that gave
focus and definition to UNITAF’s mission.
In pursuit of this single goal, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM)
responsible for UNITAF, retained approval authority and screened each potential
contributor, balancing capabilities and willingness to adhere to central operational control
and rules of engagement. The First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) headquarters
assumed the task of managing this multinational operation and became the nucleus of the
UNITAF command and control structure. Not only did this headquarters integrate and
employ 23 coalition member contingents, but it also met the liaison and coordination
requirements for the 49 different humanitarian agencies involved (Freeman et al; 1993:
61). Consequently, the USCENTCOM commander, General Joseph P. Hoar, noted that
both unity of command and unity of purpose was achieved (Hoar; 1993: 62). By March
28
1993, UNITAF had established nine humanitarian relief sectors in southern Somalia
(Cordesman; 1998: 20). 11
UNITAF’s success was due in no small measure to its realisation that, to
achieve its objective, it would need to avoid land transport as much as possible and, where
this was unavoidable, to dissuade and disarm, as necessary, rebel looters. 12 However, the
mission was plagued by disagreements between the UN and the US about the precise terms
of its mandate and, in particular, the interpretation of words such as ‘all necessary means’
and ‘security’, and the forceful disarming the Somali factions. It is to the credit of
USCENTCOM that it did not deflect from its own best judgement and directed the
operation in a manner necessary to ensure success. However, despite UNITAF's success,
tensions remained between US and UN agents surrounding the conduct of the mission and,
when this was conveyed back to UN headquarters, an early handover of responsibility back
to the UN was inevitable. The UN, wary of a lengthy deployment of US forces in the
region, had always perceived UNITAF as an interim force. Nevertheless, it was only too
glad to avail of US superior capability and, in preparation for the next phase of the
response, UNITAF set about disarming the factional militia forces more systematically in
advance of effecting the transition to UN command (Smith; 1996: 97). By March 1993,
USCENTCOM deemed that the level of security was sufficient to allow transition of the
operation to the UN. The longer-term UN nation-building efforts were left to UNOSOM II
whose broader mandate included political and economic rehabilitation.
11 Centred around major towns and feeding centres, these nine sectors were key to the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. When UNITAF handed over responsibility of these centres to UNOSOM II, France undertook responsibility for Oddur, Canada for Belet Uen, Italy for Gialalassi, Morocco for Baledogle, Australia for Baidoa, Belgium for Kismayo, and Botswana for Bardera (Cordesman; 1998: 20).12 Although not fully excluded under the terms of the mandate, General Hoar believed that disarming the rebels was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the mission. Instead, he limited the confiscation of weapons to “technical” arms (i.e. wheeled vehicles with mounted crew served weapons) and arms caches that were a clear threat to UNITAF forces (Hoar; 1993: 63).
29
Although UNITAF had done everything possible to disarm the warring
clans in preparation for the handover to UNOSOM II, UN-US disagreements conspired to
make the transition rushed and uncoordinated. Also, the UNOSOM II mission, as
mandated under UNSC Resolution 814, was a significantly smaller and less capable
peacekeeping force than previous missions to the region. Furthermore, the slow and
incremental way in which UNOSOM II was assembled aggravated and delayed matters
while, at the same time, US forces were withdrawn on schedule. 13 When the formal
change of command occurred on 4th May 1993, UNOSOM II staff was at only 30 per cent
strength (Allard; 1995: 30) leaving the mission overwhelmed from the outset and unable to
avail fully of UNITAF’s valuable infrastructure. 14 Sensing the lack of coherence and
capability within UNOSOM II, the Somali warring factions became openly hostile and
defiant (Clark & Gosende; 1996: 42). 15
UNOSOM II’s mission eventually fell into disarray due to the fractured
nature of its deployment and the lack of a clear road map for nation building. In planning,
the mission gave little attention to the fundamental issues confronting Somalia (e.g. the
nature, prospects and timing of reconciliation that would be needed to rebuild Somalia’s
institutions, how to build consensus and disarm and demobilize the militias, etc.).
UNOSOM II’s leaders had no guidance other than their own judgement about any given
situation they encountered and, in their frustration, commanders on the ground had to react
as they saw best. This reaction increasingly involved ‘mission creep’ and the adoption of a
more offensive stance. It was becoming painfully obvious to the clan warlords, and most
13 UNOSOM II was formed incrementally from the voluntary contributions of member states and contingents were deployed as they arrived without the benefit of an overall strategic master plan.14 The Civil-Military Operations Centre, a UNITAF innovation, that liaised with and organised the many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian relief organizations involved in Somalia, was unable to function in these circumstances and was subsequently abandoned.15 Aidid perceived UNOSOM as a threat to his power because of its desire to disarm all militia factions. When his militia attacked Pakistani troops in Mogadishu, there were some 80 casualties. 18 US troops and more than 1,000 civilians and militia were killed in another attack during October 1993.
30
notably to Aidid, that UNOSOM II’s mission objectives were creeping from feeding to
fighting, and this set the peacekeepers more and more in direct confrontation with the
Somali clan warlords. With no end or solution in sight, the UNOSOM II mission withdrew
from Mogadishu on the 3rd March 1995, after suffering significant casualties. The only
valid assessment of the international intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 was
that it was “a horrible failure” (Kennedy; 2006: 96).
The UN intervention in Somalia prompts a number of important questions.
Firstly, is peace enforcement a realistic and viable option in a complex civil war
environment? Secondly, does the UN have the capacity to function as an effective military
manager in peace enforcement operations? Thirdly, how can humanitarian aid be delivered
with the appropriate security and protection? The humanitarian need in Somalia was so
great and its transmission around the world so graphic, that the UN was pressured to
respond with urgency. The UN intervention in Somalia shows what can happen when the
public demands instant response to a situation that has no easy answer. Given the nature of
this civil conflict and the absence of any effective political infrastructure to counter it,
there was never any basis for or hope of peace. The delivery of humanitarian aid in these
circumstances would need a level of security that could only be achieved by enforcement.
The warring factions in Somalia had no intention of capitulating to any force and, thus,
outside intervention to bring peace carried high risk and low probabilities of success
(Curtis; 1994: 311). Peace enforcement in such circumstances was never guaranteed
success, 16 although one has to admire the short-term success of the interim UNITAF force.
16 The former US Ambassador to Somalia, T. Frank Crigler, expressed his doubts about UN peace enforcement in this environment: “perhaps the fatal flaw lies in the very concept of peace enforcement, the notion that peace enforcement can be imposed on a reluctant and notoriously proud people at gunpoint and that the social fabric of their nation can be rewoven at the direction of outsiders” (Crigler; 1993: 67).
31
Chapter 5 – Case Study II: UNPROFOR in the Former
Yugoslavia
Background to the Conflict:
The crisis that led Yugoslavia into disintegration was prompted by the death
of Joseph Broz Tito in 1980 and the rise of nationalist sentiment among the different ethnic
regions. 17 Serbia, in particular, under Slobodan Milosevic, elected President in 1991,
pursued a ruthless nationalist agenda in support of the establishment of a Greater Serbia
that he hoped would replace the former Yugoslavia and hold together the various ethnic
regions. (Doder; 1993: 14). However, “Milosevic’s demagogic appeals to Serbian
nationalism led the Croats to elect an extreme nationalist of their own in 1990 – Franjo
Tudjman, a former communist and general” (Meisler; 1995: 314). The radicalism of both
men, and the sensitive question of the ethnic Serbs living in the Krajina region of Croatia,
18 combined and ratcheted up fears of impending ethnic cleansing. 19 Milosovic, acting in
support of the Croatian Serbs, proclaimed that all Serbs had the right to control the lands in
which they lived. In June 1991, Tudjman responded by seceding from the Yugoslav
Federation and declaring independence. Slovenia, another former Yugoslav Republic,
followed suit and, because over 95% of its population were ethnic Slovenians in favour of
independence, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) were powerless to
prevent it (Hudson; 2003: 89). Things would be different, however, in Croatia where the
17 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an amalgam of the eight federated ethnic regions including the six republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.18 Krajina was the self-proclaimed Serb state within the Republic of Croatia. The Krajina Serbs, although in 1991 they formed only about 12% of the Croatian population, held a sizable majority in the Krajina region.19 The Krajina Serbs had every reason to fear the possibility of Croatian oppression. During World War II, Ustaša, part of Axis-occupied Yugoslavia, was the scene of Croatian fascist genocide perpetrated against thousands of ethnic Serbs, Jews, Muslims and Roma peoples.
32
JNA joined with the Krajina Serbs and captured a quarter of the country’s territory (Ibid).
Between 1991 and 1995, open war raged in Croatia with atrocities and ethnic cleansing
perpetrated by both sides. However, in 1992, the UN brokered a ceasefire and established
international recognition for the pre-war borders of Croatia. A UN Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) was deployed to monitor the ceasefire and to establish security in
demilitarised United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) or ‘safe-haven’ zones. 20 Hostilities
were renewed in 1993, albeit intermittently until, eventually in 1995, Croatia launched two
major, conclusive offensives ending with total victory for its forces. Gradually, over the
coming years, the UNPAs were peacefully reintegrated into Croatia.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter referred to as Bosnia, was another former
Yugoslav Republic on the brink of political chaos. 21 Fearing that the civil war in Croatia
would spill over into Bosnia, its moderate Muslim President, Alija Izetbegovic, requested
the assistance of UN peacekeepers (Meisler; 1995: 315). 22 However, in February 1992,
after a referendum in which 64% of Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted in favour of
secession, Izetbegovic declared Bosnian independence in spite of a Bosnian Serb boycott
of the plebiscite. In response, the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic and supported
by Milosevic, declared the Bosnian Serb Republic’s independence (Judah; 1997: 202-203).
In April 1992, the JNA launched an offensive operation from Serbia in order to prevent the
secession of Bosnia but, following international pressure, it formally withdrew from
Bosnia leaving enough troops, material and leadership behind to support the newly created
Bosnian Serb Army (BSA).
20 UNSC Resolutions 743 (1992a), 762 (1992c) and 769 (1992d) govern the establishment and strengthening of UNPROFOR in Croatia.21 Bosnia’s population consisted of “40% Muslim, 32% Serb, and 18% Croat” and intermarriage between the different groups helped stabilise its society under communist rule (Meisler; 1995: 315). 22 The US ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992, Warren Zimmermann, backed the request in a cable to Washington but did not press for it as hard as he should have. When it came to it, the US did not support the request, assuming that the proper time for peacekeepers would be after the war (Meisler; 1995: 315).
33
The war in Bosnia began in earnest after the European Community (EC)
recognised Bosnia as a sovereign state on April 6th 1992 (Daniel et al; 1999: 45). The
warring factions were the Bosnian Serbs (supported by Serbia), the Bosnian Croats
(supported by Croatia) and the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims).
The Intervention:
On 25 September 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 713 called on all
countries to apply a general and complete arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia
(UNSC; 1991). The UN involvement in the Yugoslav civil war began with the deployment
of the 14,000-troop force UNPROFOR in Croatia. Its mandate included peacekeeping and
ensuring that former combat zones in Croatia remained demilitarised (UNSC; 1992). An
advance contingent arrived in the region on 8th March 1992 to monitor the withdrawal from
Croatia of the pro-Serbian federal army and Serbian irregulars (Cohen & Moens; 1999:
87). UN troops were, then, fully deployed by July and the UNPROFOR Headquarters was
set up in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo (Ibid). 23
In Bosnia, the UN faced a challenge of enormous proportions because,
unlike other missions, UNPROFOR was mandated to keep peace where there was no
declared peace to keep, nor was it likely that the warring factions would consent to peace
(Ibid: 88). At first, the UNSC was reluctant to expand UNPROFOR’s mandate to Bosnia,
but on the understanding that the troop contributors (Britain, France, Italy, and Canada)
would meet the additional costs, Resolution 776 was passed permitting its expansion to
over 23,000, the largest ever UN peacekeeping force. UNPROFOR’s mandate in Bosnia
was to support the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and to
23 UNPROFOR contributing nations as of 30 November 1994 were: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. The contingent was split between civilian police, troops, and military observers.
34
establish UNPAs to this effect (UNSC; 1992g). 24 Given the intensity of the conflict where,
to safeguard civilian refugees in UNPAs, lightly armed UNPROFOR troops were expected
to deploy between the unrelenting warring factions, this proved an impossible task from
the very outset.
In August 1992, such was the scale of the ethnic atrocity that the UNSC
approved a resolution calling on UNPROFOR to take “all measures necessary” to support
the humanitarian effort in besieged Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia (UNSC; 1992e), but
“the resolution was never implemented” and no action was taken against Serb aggressors
(Ziring et. al; 2000: 313). The situation became more desperate when Serb militia attacked
lightly armed UN forces and military observers operating in small units. UNPROFOR
personnel were easy targets for the warring factions, mainly the Serbs, who repeatedly
seized its troops and military observers declaring them to be prisoners of war (Morris &
McCoubrey; 1999: 44). 25
In autumn 1992, the UNSC prioritised the various functions of
UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR was required firstly to alleviating the human suffering caused
by the wars as far as possible, initially by operating the Sarajevo airport and by protecting
UNHCR convoys; secondly, it was mandated to contain the conflict within the territories
of the former Yugoslavia; and lastly, it was required to facilitate the efforts of the warring
parties themselves to reach a political settlement (Ziring et. al; 2000: 454). Arguably this
prioritisation gave better focus to the mission, although UNPROFOR’s inability to act
decisively and with appropriate force continued to impede its progress.
In spite of a growing international belief that the war was nearing an end,
hostilities continued unabated through 1993. Then, in June of that year, following debate
24 The six safe areas in Bosnia were Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa.25 In May 1995, several UN heavy-weapon collection points were overrun by Bosnian Serbs and, when NATO responded with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, the Bosnian Serbs immediately seized 350 UN peacekeepers, tied them to potential targets, and brought them before television cameras, forcing NATO to call off the air strikes (Daniel et al; 1999: 52).
35
about why its Bosnian mission was failing, the UNSC passed Resolution 836 under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, directing UNPROFOR to ensure the safety of UNPAs
(UNSC; 1993b). Co-sponsored by France and the UK, Resolution 836 empowered member
states “acting under the authority of the Security Council...[to take] all necessary
measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate”
(Manusama; 2006: 225). But this mandate also lacked teeth, in a situation where lightly
armed peacekeepers were dispersed in small numbers and expected to protect civilians
against a determined and heavily armed foe. Lacking in strength and resources,
UNPROFOR was unable to enforce its mandate and this failure led directly to a number of
well publicised ethnic massacres the most notable being at Srebrenica when, in July 1995,
some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims - mainly men and boys - were brutally killed by Serb armed
forces under the command of Ratko Mladić. The UN Secretary General described this
mass murder as the worst genocidal crime in Europe since the Second World War (Akashi;
1995: 314).
However, events elsewhere that would impact strongly on the work of
UNPROFOR were unfolding. Realising the UNSC stalemate that continually failed to
provide UNPROFOR with the necessary peace enforcement powers and resources to force
the war to a conclusion, the new US administration under President Clinton, with the help
of NATO allies, adopted a ‘lift and strike’ policy which entailed the partial lifting of the
arms embargo against the Bosnian government combined with airstrikes against Serb
targets throughout Bosnia (Berdal; 2004: 454). In August 1995, right after the Croatian
Army inflicted a humbling defeat over the Krajina rebel Serbs “and forced local Serbs to
flee in a massive ethnic cleansing operation,” (Nye; 2003: 152), the US, bypassing the UN,
launched a new diplomatic campaign, backed militarily by a large scale NATO air
36
campaign against Serb positions. Given the ferocity of the bombing, the Serbs agreed to a
ceasefire in October 1995. Peace talks began in early November in Dayton, Ohio, and a
peace agreement was signed by December, in Paris, by the Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian
leaders (Europe – Miscellaneous; 1995). Under the terms of the peace agreement, Bosnia-
Herzegovina would remain one country with an elected presidency, but its territory would
be divided between the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian-Serb Republic. Under
Article 53(1), of the UN Charter, the peace agreement was to be enforced by 60,000
NATO troops. 26 Although the UN had been excluded from the diplomatic process, it
would help rebuild the economy and resettle the area's hundreds of thousands of refugees,
as well as pursue those accused of war crimes and bring them before the war crimes
tribunal in The Hague (Microsoft Encarta Reference Library; 2004: 1995: United Nations).
After the agreement, the UNSC immediately lifted most economic sanctions
against Yugoslavia including the arms embargo against all six republics of the former
Yugoslavia. UN troops and observers were removed from Bosnia and Croatia in January
1996 and military authority for the region was transferred to NATO on December of that
year.
Case Analysis:
Of the factors that contributed to the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR, the
most significant were its weak mandate and the lack of appropriate resources to ensure
success. UNPROFOR’s initial deployment in Bosnia was authorised under Chapter VI of
the UN Charter, as was the initial UNPROFOR mission in Croatia, and because of this it
26 Article 53(1) states: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state” (UN; 1945: Article 53(1)).
37
was limited to engaging in conventional peacekeeping methods in a situation where there
was no peace agreement to police. The particular circumstances in Bosnia were such that a
strong Chapter VII mandate would have been more appropriate to allow for robust peace
enforcement measures to be undertaken. In fact, because there was no direct military
engagement permitted between UNPROFOR and any of the warring factions, it allowed
the war to proceed without any effective UN countermeasures.
“Bound by the traditional rules of engagement (fire only in self-
defence and only after being fired upon), UN troops never fought a
single battle with any of the factions in Bosnia that routinely
disrupted relief convoys. The rules of engagement led to the
appeasement of local forces rather than to the enforcement of UN
mandates” (Weiss et al: 2001: 89).
In these circumstances, “by the end of March 1995, 149 peacekeepers had
been killed and 1,366 wounded in the former Yugoslavia”, and the atrocities and suffering
inflicted on ordinary civilians remains to this day a testimony to the complete failure of
UNPROFOR (Meisler; 1995: 313).
Furthermore, the UN’s fortified safe area strategy had limited success, given
the lack of strength and resources that adversely impacted on UNPROFOR’s ability to
effectively protect the UNPAs. UNPROFOR was expected to safeguard the UNPAs
through its presence alone and, even then, when its commanders requested 34,000
additional troops to undertake the safe area operation, the UN only sanctioned 7,950
(Daniel et al; 1999: 56). It was common knowledge among the Bosnian warring factions
that UNPROFOR troops were permitted to use force only in self-defence and peacekeepers
were often forced to stand aside and allow Serbs inflict atrocities within the UNPAs.
Shocked by the genocide in Srebrenica, the nations who contributed troops to UNPROFOR
38
met in London and issued a strong warning that any attack on Gorazde, the only remaining
‘safe-area’, would be met with “a substantial and decisive response” (Ibid: 69). Had this
deterrent been issued earlier in the conflict, and acted upon, it might have prevented
considerable suffering and brought an end to the war much earlier.
With the failure of a European Union peace plan in late 1993, it took
another year and a half before all three warring parties met to negotiate a peace settlement
(Ginsberg; 2001: 63). Eventually, in December of 1995, after countless UNSC
Resolutions, and a ruthless bombing campaign by NATO, the Balkan War officially ended
with the Dayton Accords. It is pertinent to this study that the Dayton Accords were
negotiated and policed by NATO, not the UN, and it was a NATO-led Implementation
Force (IFOR) that relieved UNPROFOR of its military duties in the region (Europe –
Miscellaneous; 1995)
UNPROFOR’s peacekeeping mission had no real design and it was
expected that its vague mandate could be stretched to cover changing circumstances in the
region (Rikhye; 2000: 45). Also, the indecisive, hesitant and reactive nature of UNSC
responses throughout the Balkan Wars clearly added to UNPROFOR’s problems on the
ground. The membership of the UNSC reflects post World War II strategic interest in
countries like the former Yugoslavia, and UNSC decisions in the 1990s reflected this fact.
Although the US had no longer any strategic interest in the region, its NATO allies in
Europe clearly had desires to bring the Balkans into the European sphere of influence.
Because this would not have gone unnoticed by Russian (and/or Chinese) members of the
UNSC, they exercised their veto when there were demands for strengthening
UNPROFOR’s mandate. Also, the non-aligned members of the P-5 lacked the muscle to
compel American acquiescence in politics that had an exclusive European focus
(Simmons; 1995: 83).
39
Furthermore, with the presumption that the war was near the end of its
course and that peace was “just around the corner”, the UNSC believed that a stronger
mandate would only exacerbate matters and prolong the conflict. Although the US and
Germany did question the assumptions on which UNPROFOR’s mandate had been
assigned, there was no real appetite among the P-5 for enforcement action in Bosnia, and
the Americans and Germans had no desire to commit their own troops to such a mission
(Berdal; 2004: 454). In issuing directions to UNPROFOR, it was clear that the Western
members of the UNSC could not separate their national foreign policy goals from what
was best for the mission and this is clearly visible in the debate that led to UN Resolution
836 and the catastrophic consequences on the ground that emerge from this decision
(Berdal; 2004: 454).
In failing to understand the need to enforce peace prior to maintaining
peace, especially in circumstances where no effective peace exists or is possible, the UN
showed a lack of resolve which hindered rather than helped peace building in Bosnia. Late
in the conflict, when the “use of any means necessary” was authorised, it proved confusing
and ineffective for UNPROFOR troops on the ground (Berdal; 2004: 460). It was not until
NATO became involved and forced the peace, and the US in conjunction with other
nations became involved in strategic negotiations, that there was any clear progress
towards peace. The lesson to be learned from the singular failure of UNPROFOR is that, in
escalating war zones, the success of UN mandated peacekeeping missions depends largely
on the ability to act timely and with sufficient strength and decisiveness to ensure an
imposed peace exists prior to building on that peace. This clear purpose must be
underpinned by a clear mandate. Only then will there be any secure basis for delivering
humanitarian aid and rebuilding states.
40
The mission in the former Yugoslavia remains one of the most controversial
in UN history. Furthermore, when a ceasefire was finally brokered, it was NATO (not the
UN) that negotiated the peace. An ineffectual UN needed the assistance of a regional
organisation (NATO) to bring an end to the savage and bloody Balkan conflict.
Responsibility for the ineffectiveness of the mission rests with the UN’s cumbersome
organisation as a whole, but more specifically, with the stubborn positions of the UNCS’s
five permanent members and it is they who must bear the blame for UNPROFOR’s failure
in the former Yugoslavia. 27
Chapter 6 – Case Study III: ECOMOG in Liberia
Background to the Conflict:
The geographic area that encompasses the West African state of the
Republic of Liberia has been inhabited since at least the 12th century (Runn-Marcos and
27 The UNSC has 5 permanent members (P-5) and 10 rotating members. The P-5 include Russia, UK, US, France and China. Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, UNSC decisions on substantive matters require the assent of 9 members, but any member of the P-5 can exercise a veto, thus preventing the adoption of any proposal. In practice the P-5 vote divides along east-west lines, with the US, UK and France against China and Russia and vice versa, thus rendering ineffectual any major decision that acts against the self-interest of one side or the other.
41
Kolleholon; 2005: 5). Its foundation in 1820 by the American Colonisation Society was
achieved by establishing a colony of freed slaves in the area in the aftermath of the
American Civil War. Because of strong US affiliations and identity, the newly arrived
‘Americo-Liberians’ asserted their influence and this alienated the existing indigenous
populations and upset the established ethnic and cultural balances and in the region. Moran
(2006: 2) states that whereas “Liberia was never formally colonised”, the reality was that
“its relationship with the United States has always resembled that between colonised and
coloniser” (Ngovo; 1999: 45). Wegmann (2010: 7-8) elaborates on this point, insisting that
native Liberians were banned from the “highest echelons of settler society”, which resulted
in the strong perception of a divided and aggrieved society. This was manifested
particularly when the descendants of freed slaves became the political elite and through
nepotism and corruption favouring the ‘Americo-Liberians’ left the indigenous ethnic
tribes marginalised. The political dissatisfaction was augmented by Liberia’s three
crippling economic problems during the 1970s:
i. Depressed rubber prices, Liberia’s major export (Verité; 2012: 12).
ii. Government plans to increase rice prices from $22 per hundred-pound bag to $26
(Global Security; 1985).
iii. The drastic increase in oil prices from $1.80 a barrel in 1960 to $35.69 a barrel in
1980 (US Energy Information Administration; 2001).
The seeds of unrest having been sown finally culminated on the 12 th of April
1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel Doe led a coup d’état against the ruling ‘Americo-
Liberian’ ascendency. This, however, did not lead to better outcomes for all Liberians
because other ethnic minorities, and not least the outgoing ascendancy rulers, experienced
the harsh discrimination of Doe’s tribally biased autocratic rule. Doe’s presidency merely
replaced one form of ethnic suppression for another.
42
Despite the horrendous human rights record of Doe’s regime, Liberia was
receiving more US aid than ever during the 1980s (RAD-AID; 2009). Doe’s close
relationship with the US antagonised some regional players, particularly Libya. Libya’s
Muammar Qaddafi, desiring to exercise a greater influence on regional affairs, wanted to
replace Doe’s rule with Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
(Mgbeoji; 2003: 42). With Libyan help, the NPFL, alongside mercenaries from The
Gambia, Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso, came across the border from Cote d’Ivoire on the
24th December 1989 and attacked Butuo in Nimba County (Hoffman; 2004: 214-215). The
AFL with the support of the Mandingo tribe fought back, but ethnic tensions escalated
further when Mandingo tribesmen attacked Gio and Mano tribe members because of their
support for the NPFL invasion (HRW; 1990a). With the memory of the ethnically
motivated purging of Doe’s political opponents the conflict spiralled into a horrendous
tribal vendetta (HRW; 1993).
In spite of this and by the end of 1990, Taylor’s NPFL was in control of the
whole of Liberia bar its capital, Monrovia, but in the process, the conflict had inflicted
considerable humanitarian hardship. Amnesty International (1996) reported that 700,000 of
Liberia’s 2,150,000 citizens had fled the country. This included some 80,000 from the
minority Krahn tribe whose pre-conflict population was estimated to be just 125,000
(HRW; 1990b).
Alerted by the huge displacement of people and the alarming escalation of
the conflict over 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
established the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), a multilateral armed force that relied heavily on Nigerian armed forces and
resources. Its purpose was to intervene and stabilise the peace in Liberia.
43
The Intervention:
ECOMOG’s intervention was timely, given the reluctance (or inability) of
major powers strategically interested in the country to become involved in Liberia and the
danger of the conflict spilling over into neighbouring countries. Although the US had
vastly more ties to Liberia than did any African country, it maintained a strictly limited
involvement. Having assisted initial mediation efforts, Washington never seriously
considered military intervention in Liberia. 28 The Soviet Union, once a major player on the
African continent, was by then in the process of disintegration, and was unable to act
further in the region. Similarly, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) - Africa's major
continent-wide organisation - paid scant attention to Liberia's suffering. 29 Nor did the UN
show any real interest and when, in July 1990, Liberia's UN ambassador tried to have the
UNSC consider the crisis, he failed. Not until January 1991, some thirteen months into the
civil war and five months after the establishment of ECOMOG, did the UNSC publicly
comment on events in Liberia (Wippman; 1993: 165).
By contrast, Anglophone Nigeria was the leading supporter of providing a
West African force for Liberia. In April 1990, at the urging of Nigeria's President Ibrahim
Babangida, a group of five ECOWAS member states established a Standing Mediation
Committee (SMC) to help resolve Liberia's conflict peacefully. 30 For three weeks during
July an inclusive and fully representative group drawn from all Liberian protagonists
attempted and failed to obtain a peace settlement leading to elections. By August 7 th, with
no peace settlement in sight, and fearing a bloodbath in Monrovia in the event of further
28 At this time, US public and political opinion was mainly focussed on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and by late summer 1990 military intervention in the Middle East seemed inevitable.29 The OAU has always opposed military interference in the internal affairs of another African state except by invitation. It also opposed non-African intervention in general because of past colonial experience and the fear of resource exploitation.
30 Three Anglophone states (Nigeria, Gambia, and Ghana) and two Francophone states (Mali and Togo) comprised the SMC. The three Anglophone states would become heavily involved in ECOMOG, whereas the two Francophone states did not.
44
delay, the SMC recommended setting up the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group,
ECOMOG, while at the same time continuing to press for a political resolution. The SMC
also called for the establishment on an interim basis of an agreed, broadly-based Liberian
government that would rule until internationally supervised elections could be held under
more favourable conditions.
ECOMOG received a broad mandate that encompassed both peacekeeping
and peace enforcement. 31 ECOMOG was “to conduct military operations for the purpose
of monitoring the ceasefire, restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for
free and fair elections to be held in Liberia,” and to aid the “release of all political
prisoners and prisoners of war.” (ECOWAS; 1990, cited in Weller; 1994: 68).
ECOMOG’s intervention in the Liberian conflict falls into four different
time frames that often overlap depending on map reference location. Olonisakin (2000:
166) describes these under the headings: peacekeeping, enforcement, stagnation and
enforcement again, and it is possible to identify a set of specific actions under each
heading. Peacekeeping, for instance, prompted various attempts to forge consensus but
ended in political impasses. The period of stagnation is categorised by failed attempts at
diplomacy and political infighting. Olonisakin describes the two periods of enforcement as
explicitly useful (2000: 116) and, for my purposes, they merit deeper consideration.
The numerical strength of the ECOMOG force in Liberia varied between
6,000 and 11,000 troops; according to other sources 14,000 troops were deployed (BBC;
1992) and these consisted of army, naval and air force components (Molnár; 2008: 58).
31 Adeleke states that when it comes to peacekeeping, “…the application of force may be deemed necessary or in fact inevitable if the situation on the ground calls for it” but he adds that “…the empowering authority may include peace enforcement in a force’s mandate” (1995: 570). Given the ethnic nature of the Liberian civil war and the murderous actions of its main protagonists, not least Charles Taylor, it is reasonable to assume that a peacekeeping mandate alone would not have been strong enough to ensure any hope of success. In this respect, the peace enforcement aspect of the mandate seems a sensible precaution.
45
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone initially contributed to the force and
they were later joined by troops from Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda. 32
In mid-August of 1990, ECOMOG deployed to Sierra Leone, Liberia’s
western neighbour where they set up the force’s forward operating base. The three warring
factions in Liberia reacted predictably. Prince Yourmie Johnson’s INPFL eagerly offered
cooperation, as did the AFL, while Charles Taylor’s NPFL artillery quickly zeroed in on
ECOMOG’s forces. INPFL’s and AFL’s cooperation was, of course, self-serving since
both were too weak to challenge ECOMOG directly, but each could benefit from
ECOMOG’s protection and from any destruction ECOMOG could inflict upon Taylor’s
forces. INPFL’s initial cooperation gave it special privileges, the most obvious being
unhindered armed access to ECOMOG headquarters and Howe reminds us that this was
contrary to ECOMOG’s overall strategy (Howe; 1996: 154). ECOMOG’s overall strategy
was to suppress through intimidation all three warring factions and, by this means, provide
an opportunity for an interim government to resolve differences through political activity
in advance of peaceful elections.
On August 27th, the SMC convened the All Liberia Conference of seventeen
political groupings and parties. This conference endorsed the SMC’s peace plan and
elected as interim president Professor Amos Sawyer as well as an interim legislature. By
ensuring Liberian political independence and its sovereignty, ECOWAS hoped to avoid
being perceived as an army of occupation.
32 Molnár (2008: 58) details the formidable strength of the ECOMOG forces in Liberia. The Army consisted of 1 infantry company from the Gambian Armed Forces, 1 battalion from the People’s Republic of Guinea Armed Forces, 1 battalion from the Nigerian Armed Forces with a platoon of reconnaissance, an artillery battery of 105mm Howitzer, a troop of engineers and a squadron of signals, 1 battalion from the Ghanaian Armed Forces with its support weapons including a reconnaissance platoon, 1 battalion from the Republic of Sierra Leone Army. The Navy consisted of two fast attack crafts and two merchant ships from the Ghanaian Navy and two fast attack crafts, two mine countermeasure vessels, one landing ship tank, one oil tanker, one tugboat, and three merchant ships from the Nigerian Navy. The Air Forces of Ghana and later Nigeria also contributed assets when necessary.
46
ECOMOG’s overall commander, General Quainoo, 33 perceived his role as
peacekeeper rather than peace enforcer and, to this end, preferred at first to move slowly
against the NPFL (Ibid). This approach, however, merely demonstrated ECOMOG’s
inexperience and the inadvisability of fraternising with the enemy’s enemy. Following a
surprise attack, NPFL forces almost overran ECOMOG’s headquarters. Then, when on
September 9th, INPFL forces murdered seventy Doe bodyguards at ECOMOG’s
headquarters and Doe himself nearby, ECOMOG itself was suspected of complicity in the
killings. In reprisal, AFL soldiers torched sections of Monrovia (Ibid: 155). Soon
afterwards, the INPFL detained a platoon of Nigerians and forced ECOMOG to swap two
105mm howitzers in exchange for the freed Nigerians. This profoundly embarrassed the
Nigerians and demonstrated that ECOMOG’s strategy was not working. Fearing the
ultimate failure of the mission, Nigeria asserted its dominance over ECOMOG by having
Dawda Jawara, Chairman of ECOWAS’s Authority of Heads of State and Government,
replace Quainoo with the more aggressive Major-General Joshua Dogonyaro of Nigeria
(Iweze; 1993: 233).
The change in leadership prompted a shift, albeit temporarily, from
peacekeeping to peace enforcing. 3,000 additional troops, more offensive weaponry and
some offensive air capability were supplied by Nigeria and Ghana, thus enabling
ECOMOG to undertake an offensive posture and enforce compliance. By October,
Dogonyaro was using Nigeria’s 77th Airborne Battalion and the two Ghanaian battalions
to outflank the now-retreating Taylor (Howe; 1996: 155). This military pressure succeeded
in forcing Taylor to sign a ceasefire at Bamako, Mali, on November 28 th. ECOMOG’s
peace enforcement approach had succeeded and following the Bamako ceasefire, it
reverted to its previous role as peacekeeper. However, the overall position in Liberia
remained largely unchanged; ECOMOG controlled Monrovia and Taylor’s NPFL 33 Lieutenant-General Arnold Quainoo was a senior officer in the Ghanaian Army.
47
controlled what he termed ‘Greater Liberia’ practically all the remainder of the country
(Ibid).
The Bamako ceasefire certainly saved thousands of lives by preventing a
factional battle for Monrovia and allowing essential food and medical supplies to be
delivered. Although unstable at times, the ceasefire lasted for two years and provided the
necessary breathing space for negotiations. Sadly, the lull in fighting also allowed
adversaries the space and time to rebuild themselves militarily. 34
The re-emergence of a state of war allowed new factions to form and the
conflict spread beyond Liberia to Sierra Leon. 35 None of these groups took ideological
positions but voiced instead some ethnic defensiveness or personal dislike of an opposing
faction leader. They were motivated by self-enrichment and supported themselves by
looting national resources that were then sold to international middlemen. Their prevailing
belief was that war was more rewarding than peace and Human Rights Watch/Africa
reported that their human rights records ranged “from suspect to abysmal” (Fleischman &
Whitman; 1994: 9).
ECOMOG at various times provided sympathetic militia factions with arms,
ammunition, intelligence, transport, and free passage as best suited its purpose of pressing
the war against Taylor. 36 These cooperative efforts were mutually beneficial to both sides.
For ECOMOG, they lessened financial costs, allowed for its goals to be met more
34 During the Bamako ceasefire, Joshua Iroha of Nigeria was ECOWAS’s special representative trying to negotiate a lasting peace settlement with the warring factions. However, during protracted negotiations, Burkina Faso resupplied Taylor’s forces. During this time, the enterprising Taylor also built his own resource base by extorting resources from several large businesses and by selling gold, diamonds, and hardwoods to commercial middlemen.35 Taylor armed dissident Sierra Leoneans who formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Liberians displaced in Sierra Leon formed themselves into the United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy (ULIMO). Soon ULIMO was skirmishing with RUF and, by February 1992, had crossed into Liberia. Howe (1996: 156) tells us that, by 1994, ULIMO had split into two separate militias: the mostly Mandingo ULIMO-K and later the mostly Krahn ULIMO-J. Many AFL soldiers defected to ULIMO-J or another Krahn faction, George Boley’s Liberian Peace Council (LPC), which operated in southeast Liberia.36 For example, Howe (1996: 156) reports that in 1990 it provided ammunition to the INPFL and to the AFL.
48
effectively and, should casualties be sustained, they would not incur political repercussions
among participating countries.
The Liberian civil war dragged on until 1996 and produced many failed
attempts in negotiating peace agreements. Those held in Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire,
between July and October 1991, were typical in that they provided for a ceasefire,
disarmament, encampment, an interim government and various steps towards elections.
Although the Yamoussoukro ceasefire held throughout much of 1992, the militia groups
continued to skirmish in the countryside outside Monrovia. Then, in late April 1992, in
compliance with the Yamoussoukro accords, ECOMOG soldiers began dispersing
throughout much of Liberia in an attempt to quell the skirmishing. Yet events on the
battlefield were beginning to undermining conference agreements. Taylor refused to
disarm and there were also reports that he mistreated ECOMOG peacekeepers arriving in
his areas of operation (Weller; 1990: 217). Then, on October 5 th 1992, in open defiance of
ECOMOG and the Yamoussoukro ceasefire agreement, Taylor’s NPFL mounted
"Operation Octopus", a two-month siege of ECOMOG-held Monrovia. ECOMOG's
departing Field Commander, General Ishaya Bakut, reflected ECOMOG's, and especially
Nigeria's, disenchantment with Taylor: “I now realise that I was wrong about Taylor's
intention. It is quite clear that Taylor is not sincere about disarmament nor is he willing to
let anything stand between him and the Executive Mansion” (Howe; 1996: 158). Taylor's
aggression had again pushed ECOMOG into peace enforcement that would last for five
months until, by late December, ECOMOG's General Adetunji Olourin had pushed the
NPFL out beyond Monrovia's suburbs. By April, ECOMOG had taken the major towns of
Harbel and Kakata and then the port of Buchanan, 90 miles from Monrovia (Ibid). By mid-
1993, Taylor was retreating throughout much of Liberia and was losing his economic base.
Africa Confidential observed that Taylor “is in the difficult position of leading a guerrilla
49
force which has to hold vast swatches of territory on a sharply declining revenue base”
(Ibid: 158-159).
It was ECOMOG’s aggressive peace enforcement that once again forced
Taylor and the NPFL to the negotiation table. 37 In July 1993 a meeting in Cotonou, Benin,
agreed yet another ceasefire, a coalition interim government, and free elections within
seven months of the ceasefire. Attempting to assuage on-going worries about the narrow
make-up of the force and the likelihood of bias due to Nigerian-domination, the Cotonou
agreement, approved the expansion of ECOMOG to include participation by troops from
east African states and assented to monitoring by UN observers (UNSC; 1993). 38 To this
end, the UN dispatched 368 observers to Monrovia in early 1994. Under the title United
Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), these observers were mandated “to
monitor the ceasefire, to monitor the UN and ECOWAS arms embargo, to assist in the
disarmament and demobilization of combatants, to observe and verify the election process,
to help with coordination of the humanitarian aid effort [and] to report on human rights
violations” (UNSC; 1993c). About the same time, a battalion of Tanzanian and a battalion
of Ugandan troops, under ECOMOG command and financed by the United States also
arrived in Monrovia (Brown et al; 2001: 281).
ECOMOG’s attempts to demobilise warring factions in spite of the Cotonou
Agreement was not successful and the war rumbled on for another year in this manner with
no real prospect of any decisive outcome. In early January 1996, opposing factions fought
at Tubmanburg and ECOMOG’s attempt to quell the fighting resulted in the deaths of
some fifty of its soldiers. Then in April 1996, fighting broke out in Monrovia and resulted
37 This Liberian Civil War was characterised by quite a number of failed peace talks, the most notable being: the Banjul Agreement (October 1990), Bamako Ceasefire Agreement (November 1990), Banjul Agreement (December 1990), Lomé Agreement (February 1991), Yamoussoukro Peace Agreement (October 1991), Geneva Agreement 1992 (April 1992), Cotonou Peace Agreement (July 1993), Akosombo Peace Agreement (September 1994), Accra Agreements/Akosombo clarification agreement (December 1994), Abuja Peace Agreement (August 1995) (UPPSALA Conflict Data Program; n.d.). 38 The Cotonou agreement was the first time that the UN cooperated with a non-UN peacekeeping force.
50
in the destruction of some areas of the city and the deaths of an unknown number of
civilians. This plunged Liberia back into that hopelessness encountered over the six years
of ECOMOG’s involvement in Liberia (Howe; 1996: 159). Sporadic fighting continued
until after Charles Taylor’s election as President of Liberia on 19 th July 1997. 39 By the end
of 1998, all ECOMOG troops had withdrawn from Liberia.
Case Analysis:
The Liberian conflict was similar in experience to other conflicts during the
1990s. Its impact on civilian life was enormous, with over 10,000 civilian fatalities,
600,000 refugees, and 1.5 million (i.e. one-half of Liberia’s population) displaced persons
(Ofuatey-Kodjoe; 1994: 262). However, as with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999,
ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia set a number of important precedents. (i) ECOMOG
was the first regional military force deployed within a third world state; (ii) ECOMOG was
the first military mission with which the UN agreed to work as a secondary partner, albeit
as a provider of logistical and humanitarian support only (Howe; 1996: 146); and (iii) this
was the first time that the overall command and control structure of an intervention mission
was authorised and mandated by a regional authority, rather than the UNSC, and this
represented a major change in approach to international conflict resolution. Howe reports
that this was one of the first conflicts where the UN and a major regional organisation (i.e.
ECOWAS) redefined traditional notions of peacekeeping intervention into another state’s
territory by an external body. However, given the extent and complexity of the
humanitarian aspects of the intervention, UN logistical support was integral to the overall
success of the mission.
39 With an election turnout of 89%, and despite his penchant for violence, Taylor was elected with 75% of the votes (Inter-Parliamentary Union; 1997 and Independent Elections Commission; 1997). It is widely believed that his victory occurred out of a fear that if he did not win, the country would slide back into war, as he was the only candidate in a position to continue fighting (Harris; 1999: 452).
51
Although largely an economic organisation for promoting trade and self-
reliance through trade liberalisation, ECOWAS had been observing Liberia’s deteriorating
conditions with trepidation. Because it included all sixteen states in the region, ECOWAS
had a vested interest in maintaining peace within the region. Primarily, it feared the
consequences of the Liberian conflict spilling over into neighbouring states and threatening
economic activity and sovereignty throughout the region. Prior to this, it never before
deployed a united military force, although it had defence plans for mutual protection
should the need arise (Ibid: 150).
Cognisant of the UNSC practice of issuing restricting mandates, carefully
scripted to accommodate the self-serving views of East-West political adversaries,
ECOWAS issued a broad mandate to ECOMOG, 40 including peace enforcement as well as
peacekeeping components. Allowing for the possibility of deteriorating conditions, this
mandate permitted ECOMOG to engage in hostilities in pursuit of its overall objective
should that need arise. Over the first six to eight months, ECOMOG used considerable
peace enforcement measures, most notably when, during November 1990, Nigeria and
Ghana sent 3,000 additional troops to reinforce those engaged in controlling insurgency in
Monrovia. Then, with Monrovia under its control, ECOMOG used its considerable military
presence to force a ceasefire on the warring factions (Ero; 1995). Significantly, Charles
Taylor, who had been unwilling to sign previous ceasefire agreements, was essentially
coerced militarily into signing the agreement in November.
Notwithstanding these successes, the ECOMOG mission was always under-
resourced and underfunded. Also resentful of Nigeria’s insistence on exercising control
40 The most conspicuous example of a limiting UNSC mandate was UNSC Resolution 872 (1993) which provided the legal framework for the operations of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). This mandate was so weakly framed that even the commanders of the peacekeeping force were unsure about the legal basis of any decision to use force in defence of civilians. Then, when on 6 th April 1994 a plane carrying the Hutu President of Burundi was shot down over Kigali, and suspicion fell on extremist Tutsi army officers, UN peacekeepers were forced to stand idly by for 100 days while the ruling Hutus hacked to death with machetes between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus.
52
over the mission, some of its contributing countries provoked organisational difficulties
that compromised its command structure. Given the plethora of warring factions and the
fact that so many peace agreements failed, ECOMOG’s inability to manage the Liberian
civil war’s many layers of complexity is, to some extent, exposed.
However, regardless of these failings, ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia
achieved considerable success in the way it was able to protect civilian populations. Unlike
the Rwandan civil war, there was no ethnic cleansing or genocide in Liberia. While the
ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention in Liberia is not without its problems, its achievement
can be gauged chiefly from a humanitarian perspective.
Chapter 7 – Case Study IV: INTERFET in East Timor
Background to the Conflict:
The island of Timor is situated in Southeast Asia about 650km northwest of
Australia. The Portuguese first colonised the eastern part of the island around 1520 and a
Dutch settlement was established in the western part in the early 1600s. Territorial disputes
between Portuguese and Dutch settlers were commonplace until the mid-nineteenth
century when the Portuguese made territorial concessions in the western half of the island,
thus formalising the current border that now exists between present day Indonesian West
53
Timor and independent East Timor. Following Indonesia’s independence in 1949, West
Timor became part of the Indonesian province of Nusatenggara. 41 East Timor remained a
Portuguese dependency until 1974 when, following a coup in Lisbon, independence was
granted to all Portugal’s overseas colonies, including East Timor (Ooi; 2004: 1130).
In 1975, two new political parties in East Timor, the conservative Timorese
Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
(FRETILIN), a leftist party with Communist connections, formed an unstable ruling
coalition. In July 1975, however, the UDT, fearing the impact of Communist ideology,
launched a coup against FRETILIN and, in the process, perpetrated a civil war. Concurrent
with these events the Indonesian military, fearful of the influence of Communism in the
region, launched a covert operation designed to generate unrest in East Timor. Then, with
the outbreak of civil war in East Timor, the Indonesians invaded with the support of
Indonesian migrants and those East Timorese who were reliant on Indonesia for
employment and education (Breen; 2001: 1). FALINTIL, 42 FRETILIN’s paramilitary
wing, put up unexpectedly-effective opposition to the invasion, causing pro-Indonesian
forces to extract considerable retribution on East Timorese civilians and, altogether, this
conflict cost the lives of some 200,000 East Timorese, (about 30% of the population) and
about 10,000 Indonesian soldiers. Eventually, the East Timorese succumbed and, on 17 th
July 1976, East Timor was formally annexed by Indonesia and was governed as a police
state under military occupation (Crawford & Harper; 2001: 11-20).
Throughout the period of the Cold War because of his strong opposition to
Communist influences, Indonesian President Suharto’s power grip strengthened both
domestically and internationally with the tacit support of non-communist states. However,
41 Indonesia was formed from the colony previously known as Dutch East Indies. West Timor, also a Dutch colony, had greater economic and cultural affinities with the new Indonesia than with the Portuguese colony of East Timor.42 FALINTIL was formed after the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975 and drew its manpower from the demobilized Portuguese garrison on the island.
54
renewed criticism of Indonesia’s oppressive annexation of East Timor emerged in
February 1997. At this time, Kofi Annan, the newly elected UN Secretary General,
appointed Ambassador Ramsheed Marker as his personal representative for East Timor
(Durch; 2006: 394). Marker was mandated to revive the negotiations between Portugal and
Indonesia over East Timorese independence. However an Indonesian economic downturn
resulting from the wider Asian financial crisis of 1997 intervened and was the principal
cause of the fall of the Suharto regime. Suharto’s replacement, however, B.J. Habibie,
offered a “special status” for the territory, which would entail autonomy in most areas of
government except defence, foreign affairs and monetary policy (White; 2008: 71) but this
led to renewed violence by pro-integration militia with the support of elements of the
Indonesian military.
On December 1st 1998. Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard and
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer sent a letter to Habibie urging him to include in his
‘special status’ proposal “a future act of self-determination” (Howard; 2010: 341).
However, Habibie’s reaction to this letter was distinctly negative as is obvious from an
interview recorded some years later:
“Howard suggested that I have to solve East Timor as other friends
have solved their colonies [said with emphasis], prepare them for
10 years or whatever and then after that give them their
independence. So as I read that I was upset. It is John Howard
[said with emphasis], who makes me make a quick decision!”
(ABC; 2008: 6:30 mins).
Habibie’s indignation, however, was ameliorated by the exigency of doing
something to lessen international pressures in the face of ongoing violence in East Timor.
Finally, in October 1999, he agreed to a temporary administration by the UN Transitional
55
Administration of East Timor (UNTAET) and announced that there would be a UN-
monitored referendum in six months offering the Timorese the choice between autonomy
within Indonesia or complete independence (Durch; 2006: 395). 43 However, such was the
intensity of the conflict, it was clear that neither side wished to compromise. FALINTIL
continued waging a pro-independence insurgency against Indonesia and the Indonesian
Army (TNI) had sponsored the growth of a number of anti-independence militia groups.
With these events, the stage was set for intervention, as the only way of resolving the
situation and restoring normality.
By April 1999, Australian concerns were increasing about the extreme
levels of violence and prospect of having another impoverished and conflict ridden country
on its doorstep (White; 2008: 75). Then, on April 6th 1999, when anti-independence
militias attacked a church compound in Liquica, killing at least thirty of the estimated
2,000 local people, Prime Minister Howard arranged a meeting with Habibie to
recommend deploying an international peacekeeping force to East Timor prior to the
ballot. Habibie, however, forcefully rejected Howard’s suggestion (Durch; 2006: 399),
stating that his position would become domestically “untenable” if he accepted an
intervention, as it would humiliate Indonesia and particularly the Indonesian military.
Indonesia, he felt, was well capable of taking care of the situation. However, in clandestine
cooperation with the UN, Australia secretly planned Operation Spitfire - an evacuation
operation of all Australian, UN and other international personnel from East Timor – in the
event of a collapse in security during or after the ballot (White; 2008: 80).
UNAMET, the UN mission to administer the East Timor ballot, deployed on
June 11th 1999 (UNSC; 1999a). In compliance with Habibie’s wishes, this was a totally
civilian mission, consisting of UN staff and a small police force of approximately 270
43 White (2008: 73) reports that, to this date, it remains unclear to what extent Habibie’s decision to hold a referendum was caused by Howard’s letter and there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that a re-reading of Howard’s letter in late January provided the final spur.
56
officers. The East Timor ballot was held on August 30 th 1999. 44 Overall, this UN
supervised plebiscite in East Timor resulted in an overwhelming vote for independence
with an overall turnout of some 98.6 percent of the electorate. (Nevins; 2005: 97). Five
days later, on September 4th 1999, the results were announced; 78.5 percent voted for self-
determination. Almost immediately after the announcement, the anti-independence militias
unleashed a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation, forcing thousands of East
Timorese to flee into the hills. Such was the destruction that, in a matter of a few days,
most of the buildings, utilities, and agricultural infrastructure throughout the territory were
destroyed; almost the entire population was displaced, with over 250,000 transported by
the TNI or anti-independence militias to West Timor, the part of Timor that was still under
Indonesian control (Durch; 2006: 407). Australia responded immediately by activating
Operation Spitfire and, as well as its own citizens, it also evacuated UNAMET staff,
foreign media personnel and some 1,900 East Timorese (Ibid) amid what was full scale
and widespread civil unrest.
The Intervention:
Such was the scale of the violence and because the UN was not yet ready to
deploy a full-scale peacekeeping force, it was decided to send a short-term interim force
(White; 2008: 82). Australia was the logical candidate to lead an ad hoc peace enforcement
operation but, given the extent of the unrest and Indonesian atrocities in East Timor, the
Howard government feared the military and political consequences of an intervention of
this kind (Coleman; 2007: 244-245). Intervening in East Timor would effectively mean
going to war with the most powerful country in South-East Asia, Indonesia and Australia’s
44 Overall, the East Timor referendum was a remarkable event. At 5.30 a.m., an hour before the polls were schedule to open, would-be voters, dressed in their best attire and were already waiting in long lines at the polling stations. By 2.30 p.m., most of the polling stations were empty; most people already had cast their votes. Those Timorese who had fled their villages and towns bravely returned to the places where they were registered to vote, then quickly returned to their places of refuge.
57
defence forces were not prepared for such an undertaking 45 (White; 2008: 82). Canberra
then turned to the US for help, but the Clinton government was ambivalent about the
prospect of becoming embroiled in the conflict. Howard was manifestly taken aback by
this. “Whenever the Americans had been involved in a major operation, they had always
turned to Australia seeking a contribution. We had been willing to make it,” Prime
Minister Howard argued (Howard; 2010: 346). “This was a violation of the ANZUS
alliance. Australia was being dumped” (Kelly; 2009: 508). 46 Portugal also exerted
diplomatic and political pressure on the US in support of Howard’s view. 47 Ultimately,
Howard’s view prevailed and Clinton relented and agreed to make a “tangible
contribution” (Kelly; 2009: 509). 48 The US would provide strategic airlift, intelligence
support and logistics and, most importantly, it would throw all its diplomatic clout behind
Australia in support of what would become the International Force for East Timor
(INTERFET) or, as Prime Minister Howard later recalled “an all-out diplomatic effort in
support of what Australia wanted” (Howard; 2010: 347). This diplomatic effort was vital
to Australia’s need to obtain Indonesia’s acquiescence to the deployment of a multinational
force to East Timor (Howard; 2010: 347) since, on several occasions, Indonesia had made
it clear that any international military operation would be considered an invasion (DFAT;
2001: 84). 49 However, when the consequences of opposing were outlined, the US
diplomatic leadership managed to persuade Indonesia to accept INTERFET (Robinson;
45 Indonesia had an army of over 200,000 soldiers, 25, 000 of which were stationed in East Timor. 46 ANZUS, is an acronym and refers to the Australian, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, signed in 1951. It originally pledged co-operation on defense matters in the Pacific. However, today the treaty covers conflicts in any part of the world. 47 The Portuguese Prime Minister, Antonio Guterres, telephoned Clinton and threatened to pull Portuguese troops out of Kosovo if he refused to help the Australian peacekeeping force in East Timor. To make his point crystal clear, Guterres prevented sixteen US military flights from departing the Portuguese airbase in the Azores and this helped concentrate US minds on the East Timor need (Greenlees & Garran; 2002: 246).48 One senior US official famously described the Clinton’s U-turn on East Timor with the following words: “We don’t have a dog running in the East Timor race, but we have a very big dog running down there called Australia and we have to support it” (Fernandes; 2008: 94).49 An Indonesian government statement read: “If the Security Council deployed troops against Indonesia’s wishes, they would be going as peace enforcers and would be met by the Indonesian armed forces.”
58
2010: 196 and White; 2008: 83 and Fernandes; 2008: 94). 50 The diplomatic and economic
pressure on Indonesia eventually produced results. On September 13, 1999, Habibie
informed Annan that he was willing to invite a peacekeeping force of ‘friendly nations’ to
East Timor (Edwards & Goldsworthy; 2001: 249).
Australia began a speedy search for coalition partners for INTERFET.
Canberra’s preference for recruiting member states from the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as countries that had Muslim populations was clearly to
assuage Indonesian feelings about the intervention. In addition, countries with previous
peacekeeping experiences and adequately trained militaries were preferred over
inexperienced countries. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs was asked to work
through its embassy network and supply a list of potential contributing countries (Connery;
2010: 37). In this way, the final complement of 11,000 troops from 22 different countries
contributing to INTERFET was decided (Horner; 2001: 9). 51
On the 15th September the UNSC unanimously agreed Resolution 1264
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorising the establishment of a multinational force
under a unified command structure to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and
support UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations (UNSC; 1999b).
50 The World Bank was instructed to freeze US$ 300 million that had been scheduled for disbursement the following week to aid Indonesia economic recovery. The IMF was told to postpone a mission to Indonesia for discussions on its economic recovery programme. That meant in essence that the IMF would not disburse some US$ 6 million as planned in mid-Sept 1999 (Robinson; 2010: 196).51 Australia, as the lead nation, provided the commander, 5,500 troops, hardware and equipment; New Zealand sent the next largest contingent of 1,100 troops. Altogether some 22 nations contributed to INTERFET. Its complement of including Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States of America. In 1999, Irish officers were sent to East Timor as part of the UNAMET observer group (Timorese Independence Referendum). Later in the year, a platoon of Rangers (1 IRCON) were sent as part of the INTERFET peacekeeping force. The Army Ranger Wing (the Army's Special Forces unit) was deployed in East Timor alongside the Australian Special Air Service Regiment for a four-month tour. This marked the second time that the Irish Army's elite forces were officially deployed operationally outside of the Irish state, the first being to Somalia in 1993. INTERFET handed over to UNTAET during 2 IRCON's tour in 2000.
59
Once INTERFET deployed, Indonesia withdrew its troops from East Timor
leaving it without any civil administration or justice systems and this left INTERFET and
its accompanying humanitarian agencies to function in what was effectively a collapsed
state. In this environment, INTERFET assumed responsibility for civil order, although it
was not resourced for this task. Also, despite careful screening, a considerable number of
INTERFET troops arrived in Australia pre-deployed with “pretty much . . . nothing”
(Ryan; 2000: 107). This posed a significant threat to the mission because, unless the
indigenous East Timorese population who fled the violence in the aftermath of the
plebiscite on independence was secure and had access to humanitarian aid, public
confidence in INTERFET would erode and intransigent factions might seize the initiative
and deny the possibility of a return to normal life (Mack; 1999: 23).
On 19th September, INTERFET’s overall commander, Major General Peter
Cosgrove, flew to Dili for discussions with Major General Kiki Syahnakri, the senior
Indonesian officer in East Timor, to facilitate the transfer of power. Then, at dawn the
following day, Dili’s Comoro airport was secured by troops from Australia, New Zealand
and Britain, after which INTERFET forces began arriving by C-130 Hercules. The Second
Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR) was first to arrive and it immediately
deployed around Dili. Then on 21st September, the Third Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment (3RAR) arrived at Dili port on board the fast catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay, and
22 light armoured vehicles from C Squadron 2nd Cavalry Regiment were landed from
HMAS Tobruk. The same day, twelve Black Hawk helicopters self-deployed from Darwin
to Dili Heliport to provide air mobility.
With Dili secured, Australian, New Zealand and British (Ghurka) forces
began rounding up and disarming Indonesian militia groups. On 27th September, an
airmobile operation was conducted in Liquica, a town 30 km west of Dili. 52 Then, in early 52 Liquica was the scene of some of the worst militia violence both before and after the referendum.
60
October, the main towns near the border with West Timor were secured in airmobile
operations supported by amphibious landings of armoured vehicles and other equipment.
This was the key phase in the operation because, once the border was secure, militia
entering East Timor could be intercepted and denied the freedom to operate at will from
sanctuaries within West Timor. However, INTERFET operations in and around Suai on the
south coast met with significant resistance. In one incident, when a militia truck convoy
attempted to break through a roadblock, Australian troops opened fire wounding six
militia. Then, later the same day, a patrol escorting detainees from this incident was
ambushed, and two militiamen were killed in the ensuing firefight. On 22nd October a
further airmobile operation was undertaken to secure the coastal enclave of Oecussi which
is isolated from the rest of East Timor. Because of its location surrounded on three sides by
Indonesian West Timor, militia violence here had been particularly acute and continued
right up to the arrival of INTERFET. Almost the entire population of 50,000 had been
displaced as a result of the violence. INTERFET’s fast and professional deployment in
operations of this nature and throughout East Timor generally, and its effectiveness in
disarming the Indonesian militia groups and restoring law and order, enabled up to 500,000
refugees to return to the relative safety of their looted homes from the hills where they
were in danger of dying from lack of food and clean water.
INTERFET’s easy progress in disarming and disbanding the rogue militia
groups around the country was impressive and won the immediate admiration of the
international community. However, the situation around Dili, where the militia were more
organised and stubborn, required a more persistent approach. In Dili, the soldiers from the
2nd Battalion Royal Ghurka Regiment, eschewing mundane and static tasks, justifiably
attracted considerable positive media attention for the manner in which they dominated
their area of operation by means of a high visibility patrol programme. Less attention was
61
given to the Filipino battalion in the eastern town of Baucau who were active in
undertaking necessary humanitarian tasks (Mack; 1999: 23-24).
The INTERFET operation formally concluded on 23rd February 2000, when
authority was transferred to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
although, initially, it was units of the INTERFET mission who constituted the new
UNTAET peacekeeping force (UNSC; 1999c).
Case Analysis:
In its brief existence, INTERFET demonstrated that, in the initial
stabilisation period, it had succeeded in bringing about a significant measure of order,
direction and specialist assistance to a traumatised and failed society (Ibid: 25). Two weeks
into the operation, East Timor had pulled back from the brink of widespread renewed
violence and chaos. On arrival, INTERFET showed an ability to adapt to the needs of the
moment and fill a number of essential civil, security and humanitarian roles successfully.
INTERFET is an enduring example of a successful peacekeeping mission with a strong
peace enforcement mandate. Its success gave sufficient time for UNTAET to deploy
successfully with the full authority of the UNSC. Because of INTERFET’s success,
UNTAET’s mandate for peace building and nation building was made significantly more
manageable. 53
The success of INTERFET can be gauged by its fulfilment of the UNSC
mandate to provide a basic level of security that would allow the safe transition to
UNTAET. In this respect it was an ‘outstanding success’ (Smith & Dee; 2006: 421).
However, pivotal in INTERFET’s success was the choice of Australia as the lead state for
53 UNTAET was given overall responsibility for the interim administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice (United Nations Security Council; 1999c).
62
the mission. Australia had a significant interest in ensuring security and peace in its nearest
neighbour and it understood more than most the sensitivities involved as well as the need
to bring high-ranking diplomacy to bear in conjunction with armed intervention. Also,
Australia’s careful scrutiny and selection process for the various armed contingents that
comprised INTERFET was crucial to the success of the enterprise. There was also a
heightened degree of cooperation between troop contributing countries, especially between
Australia, several ASEAN states, South Korea, Fiji and Britain who contributed most of
the forces. INTERFET also had a unified and fully briefed command and control structure
with a strong sense of mission.
Notwithstanding its resolute and purposeful resolve, INTERFET had to
overcome significant challenges in East Timor, e.g. with over 40 percent of the population
displaced, a considerable amount of its time was spent persuading fearful refugees to return
home and providing the necessary security for this to happen. Also INTERFET had to
achieve this in a situation where there was practically no transport or communication
infrastructure outside the country’s capital, Dili (Smith & Dee; 2003: 53). By 2002, nearly
a quarter of a million displaced Timorese had returned to their homes and, in May of that
year, sufficient normality had returned to East Timor to allow independence to be
formalised. Under Xanana Gusmão as its first president, East Timor was formally admitted
as a full member of the UN on 27th September 2002.
Smith and Dee (2006: 421-2) argue that INTERFET holds four important
lessons about peacekeeping. Firstly, peace support operations must have a capable
lead/pivotal state and comprise adequate forces with good war-fighting skills. With
Australian troops making up the largest individual contingent of INTERFET, the mission
had sufficient expertise in all ranks to fulfil its mandate. Secondly, successful
peacekeeping depends on appropriate host-state support. In the case of INTERFET, it was
63
the cooperative effort between neighbouring Australia and the high-powered diplomatic
skills of the US that persuaded Habibe to acquiesce to its deployment. Thirdly, peace
support operations are large and expensive and require adequate funding. Adequate
funding was readily available to INTERFET and contributing nations never left the
mission under resourced. Finally, peacekeepers must be able to assume civilian functions
until such time as civilian agencies themselves have the necessary capacity. Civilian
capacity takes longer to deploy than military capacity and, in peacekeeping, good civilian
capacity is at least as important as good military capacity. The East Timor mission was
never wanting in good civilian support.
Restoring security to East Timor would not have been possible without the
threat or use of force from INTERFET troops. Although the mission was predominantly
peacekeeping in nature, it regularly encountered situations that necessitated a
demonstration of INTERFET’s capability of responding forcefully to violence.
The INTERFET mission in East Timor was, in many ways, an object lesson
in how UN interventions should be conducted. Its disarming of the unknown number of
Indonesian aligned militias responsible for murdering hundreds, if not thousands, of East
Timorese was essential to the overall success of its mission. Although, the militias had
little resolve to fight in the face of overwhelming opposition, INTERFET won the respect
of the international community by the professionalism, speed and alacrity with which it
went about the business of disarmament. The militia quickly succumbed to INTERFET’s
greater professionalism and resolve.
64
Chapter 8 – Research Findings & Conclusions
Research Findings:
Given the complex circumstances in which they take place, any assessment
of the success or failure of a humanitarian intervention is difficult, but the task becomes
considerably more tenuous where, as in this study, one is trying to make comparative
assessments across a number of different interventions. I have identified the following
pertinent questions that will provide a framework for my findings and allow me make
comparative judgements across all four very different case studies.
a) What was the composition of the intervening force?
b) Was the mandate strong enough to ensure success?
c) Were the resources adequate for the task?
d) Was the mandate fulfilled?
e) Did the intervention contain the conflict and bring an end to hostilities?
f) Did the intervention bring about a reduction in human suffering?
g) Did the intervention bring about normalization and a return to democratic rule?
a) What was the composition of the intervening force?
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This question has particular relevance to my study. The consensus and
logical view is that the wider the international participation in intervention missions, the
greater the safeguard against self-interest. However, one would expect neighbouring
countries to have a greater interest in supporting humanitarian efforts close to their own
borders and preventing civil strife from spilling over into their own countries. Also,
intervention by neighbour countries is more acceptable and has a greater prospect of
success because of their better understanding of the social, religious and cultural
sensitivities of the effected nation. For these reasons, the UN urges “states in proximity to
emergencies […] to participate closely with the affected countries in international efforts,
with a view to facilitating, to the extent possible, the transit of humanitarian assistance”
(UNGA; 1991). The Table below shows the extent to which this guideline applied in my
case studies.
Table showing the number of troop contributing countries by continent:
Europe Asia Africa America Oceania
UNOSOM I 5 4 3 1 3
Somalia 54 UNITAF 10 7 5 2 2
UNOSOM II 13 12 6 2 3
Bosnia UNPROFO 22 8 6 4 2
Liberia ECOMOG 0 0 8 0 0
East Timor INTERFET 7 8 1 3 2
54 Although UNITAF’s personnel were drawn from five continents about 25,000 of its 37,000 personnel and most of its logistics and resources were contributed by the US. UNOSOM II included troops and logistic and civilian staff drawn from 36 different countries. To protect UNOSOM II, the US contributed a quick reaction force on board US ships off the coast of Somalia.
66
Although both UNOSOM missions involved participation by a wide number
of nations, the dominance of countries from the west might reflect their relative affluence
and a greater logistical ability to subscribe to the missions. The overwhelming strength of
the US in the short UNITAF mission merely indicates its greater capability to react quickly
with strength and numbers under an experienced and unified command. However, the
failure to allow UNITAF follow up on the gains it made, ultimately led to the overall
failure of UNISOM II.
The numerical strength of European states in UNPROFOR, the dominant
influence of Australia and New Zealand in INTERFET, and the exclusive presence of West
African states under Nigerian leadership in ECOMOG is noteworthy and demonstrates the
greater likelihood of success when regional forces with a greater stake in ensuring peace on
their borders assume lead roles in humanitarian interventions.
b) Was the mandate strong enough to ensure success?
UNOSOM I’s mandate allowed for (i) monitoring the ceasefire in
Mogadishu, (ii) providing protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and
supplies, and (iii) escorting deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres in
the Mogadishu and its immediate environs (UNSC; 1992b). In limiting involvement
exclusively to these tasks, its mandate failed to address the true situation in Somalia in
early 1992 where armed factions looted the aid after the departure of escorting troops.
UNSOM I’s mandate was deficient in this respect and should have authorised its troops to
disarm and suppress militia units and, where necessary, to prevent looting and the secure
distribution of the aid to those for whom it was intended.
The only real success in Somalia occurred during the five months of
UNITAF’s operation and this was facilitated largely by its ‘all necessary means’ mandate
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which permitted troops to use force to secure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. With
UNITAF, the UN operation finally began to make an impact. However, fearing the
strength of US control and influence over the mission, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN
Secretary-General, hampered the operation diplomatically and eroded US military resolve
to continue. UNOSOM II’s mandate also contained an ‘all necessary means’ provision for
its first year (UNSC; 1993a). However, when this was withdrawn in February 1994, it
signalled a UN weakness and lack of resolve (UNSC; 1994). Left devoid of any effective
punch, UNOSOM II was rendered as inept as UNOSOM I had been.
The UNPROFOR mandate was a first generation peacekeeping
mandate, more suited to post-conflict zones where a ceasefire was already in place. Its
provisions included (i) delivering humanitarian assistance throughout Bosnia, and (ii)
establishing UNPAs for refugees around the region (UNSC; 1992e & 1992g). Authorised
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, it permitted no peace enforcement measures.
Essentially, the UNPROFOR mandate only facilitated peacekeeping in circumstances
where there was no agreed peace to keep. For this reason, it was inadequate and offered no
prospect of stabilising Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On the other hand, ECOMOG’s broad mandate encompassed both
peacekeeping and peace enforcement and allowed ECOMOG to engage, as necessary, in
hostilities to defend humanitarian efforts in Liberia. Its strong military presence, especially
during its first six to eight months, allowed ECOMOG to enforce peace and, by November
1990, it had taken control of Monrovia and established a ceasefire (Ero; 1996). Over its
seven years in Liberia, ECOMOG’s overwhelming military presence helped re-establish
order and avoid the awful prospect of humanitarian disaster.
68
INTERFET’s UNSC mandate to provide a basic level of security and allow
the transition to UNTAET was also clear and unambiguous, and allowed the use force in
pursuit of its goals (UNSC; 1999b). Because of this, it achieved complete success.
c) Were the resources adequate for the task?
Resources in this context include human resources as well as equipment and
logistics. UNOSOM I was initially designed to consist of 4,000 troops. However, because
member states were slow to commit, the initial force involved 54 military observers and
893 troops as well as international civilian and local staff. When the humanitarian effort
stalled, UNSC Resolution 775 authorised the immediate deployment of an additional 3,000
security troops (UNSC; 1992f). From the outset, UNOSOM I did not possess the human
resources to successfully fulfil its functions of providing humanitarian relief, monitoring
the ceasefire, providing security, carrying out demobilisation and disarmament, and
assisting in national reconciliation (Thakur; 1994: 388-389). Within months of its
deployment, it was obvious that it would not succeed.
Although UNITAF’s strength of 37,000 fully equipped and resourced troops
made it highly successful for the limited period of its deployment, its successor, UNOSOM
II possessed only 22,000 troops and 8,000 logistic and civilian staff drawn from 36
different countries. Also, UNOSOM’s lack of a strong central command and control
rendered it incapable of carrying out its mandate efficiently or effectively, and this led to
its eventual withdrawal.
UNPROFOR had a complement of 39,000 troops. However, it was its weak
mandate rather than any deficiency in its strength or resources that most contributed to its
failure.
69
Considering the area of Liberia, ECOMOG’s deployment of 14,000 troops
was adequate for its task. At no point was the ECOMOG force found wanting in terms of
presence. Nigeria, acting as the backbone of the force, supplied most of the troops, the
military materials and command structure. ECOMOG established a strong presence
throughout the country and succeeded in maintaining a constant pressure on the
belligerents.
INTERFET was authorised only when Australia agreed to act as the lead
nation. Australia provided some 5,500 troops, military hardware and equipment and a
command structure for the mission. New Zealand contributed some 1,100 troops, the
second largest contingent with other nations contributing significantly less to the mission.
d) Was the mandate fulfilled?
UNOSOM I failed to fulfil all aspects of its limited mandate. As a result, the
ceasefire crumbled and the humanitarian crisis increased; convoys carrying aid supplies
were routinely attacked and looted by militia groups and less aid was reaching those who
needed it most. UNITAF’s mandate was fulfilled but its premature withdrawal before it
could consolidate its success will always remain controversial. With the departure of US
marines, emboldened militia groups quickly resumed their looting and warring activities.
UNOSOM II’s mandate, although strong, was not achieved due to lack of resources and a
weak central command.
In prohibiting the use of coercion, UNPROFOR’s mandate lacked the teeth
to compel compliance among warring factions. As a result UN peacekeepers could not
command respect nor enforce the protection of the UNPAs. UNPROFOR troops, rendered
helpless in deterring hostilities and atrocities, failed in their mandate.
70
Despite obstacles, ECOMOG fulfilled its mandate and completed its
mission in Liberia. It imposed a lasting ceasefire, disarmed warring parties, protected and
evacuated civilians as necessary, and created an environment conducive to free and fair
elections. What was most impressive about the ECOMOG mission was its commitment to
its goals, probably because its troops were drawn from regional countries.
INTERFET, no doubt, helped by the clarity of its UNSC mandate, was
quickly able to restore stability to East Timor. Its rapid deployment and effective action
against the hostile militia enabled, within six months, conditions conducive to the transfer
of authority to UNTAET. In all facets of its mandate, INTERFET was a resounding
success.
e) Did the intervention contain the conflict and bring an end to hostilities?
UNOSOM I failed to contain or reduce violence in Somalia for reasons
stated earlier. Its successor UNITAF created a brief lull in violence and more stable
conditions that aided the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. However, its premature
withdrawal and the transfer of its authority to UNOSOM II ended all hopes of a permanent
end to violence.
At no point did UNPROFOR contain the conflict in Bosnia. Only when
NATO, a regional organisation, became involved and bombed Serb paramilitaries were
there any gains made in safeguarding vulnerable communities and ending hostilities in
Bosnia.
In the beginning of its deployment in Liberia, ECOMOG seemed to have
had an effect on containing the violence and was especially successful in preventing a
factional battle for the capital city, Monrovia. Its tenacity in maintaining pressure on the
belligerents over seven long years eventually succeeded in ending the violence, albeit until
71
the beginning of the Second Liberian Civil War two years later, after which ECOMOG
mediators eventually succeed in negotiating a peaceful settlement.
INTERFET’s intervention was, by all accounts, hugely successful in
containing conflict and ending hostilities in East Timor. Its timely and robust deployment
and its considerable diplomatic support brought peace and stability to the region.
f) Did the intervention bring about a reduction in human suffering?
In Somalia, both UNOSOM deployments were too weak and ineffective to
bring about any reduction in human suffering. UNITAF’s success in preventing
humanitarian disaster and delivering aid did, for a time, end human suffering, but its
premature replacement by UNOSOM II returned the country to the hopeless state it was in
prior to intervention.
The massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 is only one example of UNPROFOR’s
inability to guard civilians and bring about an end to human suffering. Its lack of authority
and its weakness in the face of warring factions left its safe havens vulnerable to attack and
human rights abuses.
In Liberia, ECOMOG did have some impact on reducing human suffering
by containing the civil war and enforcing peace. However, when thousands of displaced
civilians formed themselves into militias, ECOMOG failed to address the widespread use
of child soldiers. Whereas ECOMOG did not directly focus on the suffering of civilians, its
robust actions brought about an earlier peace than would otherwise have happened. In that
sense only, ECOMOG lessened human suffering.
72
Within a short period after initial deployment, INTERFET managed to
establish the safe conditions that allowed many displaced refugees return home. In addition
to establishing and maintaining order, INTERFET provided logistical assistance to civilian
agencies, rebuilt roads and public utilities, protected air warehouses and supported aid
convoys. These activities enabled humanitarian agencies to provide much needed food,
water, shelter and medical supplies and care (Seybolt; 2007: 90). By the end of 1999, there
were some 40 humanitarian organizations working in East Timor. In these ways,
INTERFET’s deployment did reduce human suffering.
g) Did the intervention bring about normalization and a return to democratic rule?
Somalia, in spite of the efforts of UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNISOM II,
did not returned to democratic rule and it remains to this day one of the world’s most
unstable zones. Recent interventions offer some hope of a return to stable government.
UNPROFOR failed to return Bosnia to democracy. However, with the
intervention of NATO and its brokering of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina
agreed to adopt a federal system of rule with two separate entities based largely on the
territories held by each side at the end of the conflict. Only since then has democracy in
Bosnia stabilized.
ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia did bring peace in 1995 and returned
some semblance of democratic rule with the election of Charles Taylor as President in
1997. However, it did not succeed in establishing permanent democratic institutions.
Taylor’s election perpetrated a second civil war two years later and it was not until his
resignation in 2003 and the intervention of the UN Mission in Liberia that the country
began to return to democratic rule.
73
INTERFET placed a high priority on assisting civilians. In the absence of an
indigenous judicial system, it established a military ‘quasi-judicial’ regime to temporarily
detain suspected criminals, though it lacked the authority to try criminal suspects (Bull:
2008: 191). In establishing and maintaining order, INTERFET created a secure
environment for handing over authority to UNTAET and for the early return of democratic
and civilian rule.
Conclusions:
The above findings confirm my initial theory. It is apparent, from my
analysis of the four case studies that, during the 1990s, the UN’s record of successfully
enforcing human rights ideals was poor. Both cases in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia
presented the international community with widespread human rights abuses in complex
situations of conflict. Yet, as an organisation, the UN proved to be ambivalent in
understanding the nature of these conflicts and ensuring that appropriate tools and
resources matched their situational needs. This is particularly true in the cases of
UNPROFOR and UNOSOM whose interventions failed with disastrous consequences. It
was only with the entry of NATO in Bosnia and the US-led UNITAF in Somalia
respectively that the humanitarian relief efforts in both theatres of operation achieved any
degree of momentum although, in the case of Somalia, this momentum was not sustained.
Under the guidance of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Bosnia and Somalia were
not isolated failures as is evident from other failed UN interventions, e.g. Rwanda, Darfur
and Sudan. 55 The inference is that the UN is not the best institution to enforce human
55 The UN was heavily criticized for not pre-empting the Rwandan genocide (1994), in spite of the overwhelming evidence to that effect and for failing to strengthen the force and the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) once the genocide had begun. Although the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and Sudan (2003 onwards) is technically outside of the time-span of my study and occurred under Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s watch, the UNSC has been reproached for failing to act decisively and timely in spite of warnings by Annan that these regions were at risk of another genocide.
74
rights ideals because it places too much importance on the restrictive legal discourse
surrounding intervention and sovereignty. Buchanan’s ‘substantive justice’ guideline about
there being no higher moral justification for intervention than human rights and Tesón’s
‘deontological’ moral perspective that the good of the people takes precedence over the
sovereignty of the state have particular significance here and reinforce my overall
conclusion on this topic (Buchanan; 2001: 699-704 and Tesón (1997: 173-4).
A second consideration arises out of the UN’s primacy as the only
legitimate agency for issuing legal intervention mandates in circumstances where the self-
interest of permanent UNSC members can often unduly influence the terms and strength of
each mission. While it was recognised that both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia
necessitated a strong intervention, neither mission was afforded a mandate that was robust
enough to ensure effectiveness on the ground. The mandates of UNOSOM and
UNPROFOR were more suited to situations where a ceasefire was already declared but,
instead, they were obliged to keep the peace in situations where there was no effective
peace to keep. This explains in large measure why both missions failed.
In contrast, UNITAF’s short but robust mandate in Somalia (December
1992-May 1993) and NATO’s unilateral incursion into Kosovo (1998-1999) offer some
insight into what can be achieved with appropriate resolve and support. 56 Both these
examples highlight the need for decisive and robust peace enforcement measures when
warranted. Similarly, the mandates for ECOMOG in Liberia (1990-1998) and INTERFET
in East Timor (September 1999 - February 2000), provided for the lawful use of peace
enforcement measures and their troops were able to confront belligerent actors decisively
in defence of human rights. In both these situations the interventions were successful
56 US strength of purpose and commitment of resources was hugely influential in bringing about UNITAF’s success. NATO’s action in Kosovo was also highly successful. Although it acted without UN mandate and was technically illegal, NATO’s action was retrospectively deemed to be legitimate under the R2P doctrine (Independent International Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 289).
75
because, as outlined in my literature review, the rights of civilians took precedence over
sovereignty issues.
My analysis of the case studies also shows the wisdom of involving troops
from regional states in lead roles in areas of conflict. The literature shows that even when
regional actors lack the strength and resources necessary to play leading roles, their
influence on the ground can be crucial to the overall success of the mission (Glanville;
2013). Both ECOMOG and INTERFET interventions convey what can be achieved when
neighbouring states are utilised in this way. Both these cases show that neighbouring states
can be highly effective when conducting large scale humanitarian intervention missions, if
for no other reason than they have a higher stake in ensuring peace in their own region and,
with their comparative better understanding of the nature of the conflict, are more likely to
ensure the necessary military personnel and resources are available for the success of the
mission. The writings of MacFarlane & Weiss concur with these conclusions (MacFarlane
& Weiss; 1994: 283).
Another issue which impacts on my hypothesis, as shown by the UN
missions in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is that in spite of early warnings of
impending genocide, neither the UNSC nor the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) are capable of responding timely and with appropriate force. On the
other hand, regional organisations like the AU, NATO, ECOWAS, ASEAN, etc. could
deploy more readily and with greater understanding within their own geographical areas.
Both ECOMOG and INTERFET interventions are cases in point.
This assertion, however, comes with a number of caveats. Because the UN
has considerably greater experience in mounting complex peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions, albeit with little success, this expertise cannot be ignored. Also, some regional
organisations may not have the political will or the necessary resources with which to
76
deploy effectively. Whereas NATO can command significant military resources, other
regional organisations (e.g. the EU) have no military capability because they are essentially
economic and political entities. Others (e.g. ASEAN) may be ambivalent about human
rights issues. 57 My hypothesis, therefore, cannot be universally applied but should be
applied selectively as best suits each particular case. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo,
deemed retrospectively to have been ‘illegal but legitimate’ (Independent International
Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 289), is often cited in defence of controversial and self-
serving incursions into neighbouring countries, e.g. the recent Russian ‘reclaiming’ of
Crimea in support of its Russian-speaking population. However, the substantive argument
against the Russian annexation of the Crimea is that the Russian-speaking population there
was never in any danger, nor was it under any discernible threat of danger whereas, in
Kosovo, NATO’s intervention was undertaken where human rights abuses were real and
blatant. The justification for a ‘restrictionist’ interpretation of the UN Charter cited in my
introduction also feeds into this debate (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 146 and Ayoob; 2002:
81).
Notwithstanding these caveats, regional actors offer real advantages that
others could not be expected to possess and my study shows that, when they are involved
either in lead roles or in coalition with international partners, humanitarian interventions
have a better prospect of success. UNITAF’s impressive intervention in Somalia, which
was overwhelmingly drawn from the US military, is an obvious exception to my overall
thesis although, even here, the mission included small contingents from five different
African nations. Pattinson points out what can happen when western powers get involved
in humanitarian missions in the Middle East and in Africa, even though they possess more
57 ASEAN has been criticised recently for its soft approach to promoting human rights in Burma and its failure to act in the face of corruption and large-scale abuses of human rights in Cambodia.
77
capability to fund and resource these than non-western nations (Pattinson; 2008). Hybrid
missions involving regional actors are more advisable in today’s post-colonial world.
The overwhelming evidence of my study supports the view outlined in the
literature that there is considerable merit in having regional organisations partner the UN in
peacekeeping operations (Yamashita; 2012) or, like INTERFET in East Timor, in acting as
first responders to prepare the ground for more long-term UN nation-building missions.
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