FILE ON DEMAND - Scanned Retina · Web viewthe natural living woman and Secured Party Creditor c/o U.S.P.O. Postmaster, c/o temporary mailing location PO Box Nine-Zero-Four-Five-Two,

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HI&RH Empress Aubreé Dei Gratia©, Executrix, Sui Juris,the natural living woman and Secured Party Creditorc/o U.S.P.O. Postmaster, c/o temporary mailing location PO Box Nine-Zero-Four-Five-Two, near San Jose, at Santa Clara County, on California, [zip code exempt] DMM Reg., Sec 122.32, Public Law 91-375, Sec. 403Tel: 408-830-6266

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIASUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

Traffic Division, Admiralty Law FormMailing Address: 191 N. First St., SAN JOSE, CA 95113

Physical Address: 1095 Homestead Road, SANTA CLARA, CA 95050

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,Plaintiff,

vs.

ROSALIE GUANCIONE©Defendant

________________________________/

Note: Misconstrued Defendant Empress Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, the natural living woman, appears specially not generally and not voluntarily, pursuant to the UNITED STATES special rules of Admiralty Rule e(8).

Note: Misconstrued Defendant Empress Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, the natural living woman, was determined to be a Secured Party, with immunity to all state incorporated courts pursuant an official act of the STATE OF NEW YORK in 2009 under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 9(d), which must be recognized by this California court pursuant to Art. IV § 1, the Full Faith and Credit clause and Art. VI § 2, the Supremacy Clause of federal Constitution of 1787.

))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

State Ct. Case No. 7-09-TR-562668PEOPLE v. GUANCIONE©

Empress Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, Secured Party Creditor, gives:NOTICE OF MOTION and NOTICE OF MOTION and MOTION MOTION 1) TO VOID ORDERS OF DECEMBER 28, 2009, AND; 2) TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO ARRAIGN TIMELY (ROST MOTION, RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL);3) OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS ON THE BASIS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY;4) OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS ON THE BASIS OF WRONG PARTY IN INTEREST, FRCP rule 175) DECLARATION;6) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;7) Supporting Judicially Noticed Evidence: Exhibit A, Ticket with date 6-6-09Exhibit B, Minute Order from Arraignment, date 11/24/09Exhibits W, X, Y, Z, Secured Party Status and Standing of Defendant8) [Proposed] ORDER [FRCP Rule 60(b); Rost v. Municipal Court

Page 1 of 16PEOPLE v. GUANCIONE©; TRAFFIC DIVISION, CASE 7-09-TR-562668

Notice of Motion and Motion to Void Order of 12/28/2009 and To Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial

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)))))

(1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 507; Article I, § 15, of the California Constitution; Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution]

Hearing Date: 09/29/2015@1:30PMJudge(s): Commissioner Madden Dept: 56

NNOTEOTE TOTO C COURTOURT C CLERKLERK: 18 U.S. C: 18 U.S. CODEODE § 2071 – § 2071 – CCONCEALMENTONCEALMENT, , REMOVALREMOVAL, , OROR MUTILATIONMUTILATION GENERALLYGENERALLY

(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

(b) Whoever, having the custody of any such record, proceeding, map, book, document, paper, or other thing, willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; and shall forfeit his office and be disqualified from holding any office under the United States. As used in this subsection, the term “office” does not include the office held by any person as a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the United States.

NNOTICEOTICE OFOF M MOTIONOTION

TO: PLAINTIFF, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE WITHIN-NAMED COUNTY:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 29, 2015 at 1:30PM, Dept. 56, Commissioner Madden, or as soon thereafter as the may be heard, at the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, Traffic Court, 1095 Homestead Road, Santa Clara, California, 95050, Defendant will move the Court to void order of December 28, 2009 and for DISMISSAL of the above-entitled action, ab inito.

This motion to void the order of December 28, 2009 is made on the jurisdictional ground that a case should be arraigned timely on the grounds of a speedy trial of the 6th Amendment, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rule 60(b) for void orders or voiding orders issued without jurisdiction. In the alternative, the motion to void the order of December 28, 2009 is made on the basis of sovereign immunity recognized by the STATE OF NEW YORK, under Article IV, § 1, the Full Faith and Credit clause and Article VI, § 2, the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution of 1787, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rule 60(b) for void orders or voiding orders issued without jurisdiction. Further in the alternative, the motion to void the order of December 28, 2009 is made on the basis that the prosecuted Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia is not the real party in interest ROSALIE GUANCIONE©, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rule 17.



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This motion is made on the ground that Defendant has been denied a right to a speedy trial under Article I, § 15, of the CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION and the Sixth Amendment of the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

This motion is based on the pleadings, records, and files in this action, the accompanying Declaration and Points and Authorities, and on oral and documentary evidence to be presented at the hearing on the motion, and judicially noticed evidence submitted with the instant motion.

Date: August 28, 2015 By: _/s/____ Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© ____ HI&RH Empress Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©,

the natural living woman Secured Party Creditor and Misconstrued Defendant

ROSALIE GUANCIONE©

Dated: August 28, 2015 ___/s/____ Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© _____ Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, Executrix, Attorney –In-Fact, Authorized Signer, UCC 3-419

DECLARATION OF HI&RH Empress Aubreé Regina DeiDECLARATION OF HI&RH Empress Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©,Gratia©,

the natural living woman.the natural living woman.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )) subscribed and sworn DECLARATION OF TRUTHDECLARATION OF TRUTH

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA )

Comes now HI&RH Empress Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, the natural living woman, also

known in commerce as Aubreé Guancione©, the natural living woman, who, who, being over the

age of 18, makes these statements under oath and after first being duly sworn according to

law, and states that she is your Declarant, and she believes these facts to be true to the best

of her belief based upon first hand knowledge, and states as follows:

1. Your Declarant makes this declaration in the CITY OF SAN JOSE, COUNTY OF

SANTA CLARA, on August 28, 2015.



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2. Your Declarant states that the facts described herein are true, complete and not

misleading

3. Your Declarant states that the undersigned has first hand knowledge of all the facts

stated herein.

4. Your Declarant states that the facts described herein describe events that have

occurred within the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA.

5. Your Declarant states Aubreé Dei Gratia©, also known in commerce as Aubreé

Guancione©, is a non-corporate, real, mortal, sentient, flesh and blood, natural born woman,

who is living, breathing, a non-combatant and a live being on the soil, with clean hands,

rectus curia.

6. Your Declarant states that your Affiant makes these statements freely, without

reservation.

7. Your Declarant states that if your Declarant is compelled to testify regarding the facts

stated herein that the undersigned is competent to do so.

Challenge to Jurisdiction 1Challenge to Jurisdiction 1: Sovereign ImmunityRecognition by STATE OF NEW YORK in Official Acts

Judicially Noticed Evidence, Exhibits W, X, Y, Z

Challenge to Jurisdiction 2:Challenge to Jurisdiction 2: Prosecution Against Wrong Party in Interest, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, rule 17

Distinct Difference Between Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, the natural woman, and ROSALIE GUANCIONE©, maritime trust

Recognition by STATE OF NEW YORK in Official ActsJudicially Noticed Evidence, Exhibits W, X, Y, Z

8. Your Declarant states that the jurisdiction of the court may be raised at any time.

9. Your Declarant states that the undersigned Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© is

misconstrued as the Defendant in the instant action.

10. Your Declarant states that the true Defendant is the trust, known as ROSALIE

GUANCIONE©.

11. Your Declarant states that the ROSALIE GUANCIONE© has been recognized as a

legal fiction by the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.

12. Your Declarant states that the ROSALIE GUANCIONE© has been issued a tax

Employer Identification Number (EIN) by the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.Page 4 of 16

PEOPLE v. GUANCIONE©; TRAFFIC DIVISION, CASE 7-09-TR-562668Notice of Motion and Motion to Void Order of 12/28/2009 and To Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial

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13. Your Declarant states that the undersigned is the attorney-in-fact for the ROSALIE

GUANCIONE©, Estate trust.

14. Your Declarant states that the undersigned has immunity to state court jurisdiction

due to her status and standing as a Secured Party.

15. Your Declarant states that this court must recognize the status and standing of the

undersigned, due to the recognition by the STATE OF NEW YORK, of the status and

standing of the undersigned as a Secured Party.

16. Your Declarant states that the Full Faith and Credit Cause of the federal Constitution

of 1787 requires the recognition by one state of the union, of the official acts and papers of

any other state.

17. Your Declarant states that in an official act pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, rule 9(d), STATE OF NEW YORK has recognized the status and standing of the

undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia as a Secured Party. See

supporting evidence, judicially noticed evidence, Exhibits W, X, Y, Z.

18. Your Declarant states that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution of 1787

requires this court to recognize the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

19. Your Declarant states that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Supremacy

Clause requires this court to recognize the official act of the STATE OF NEW YORK that

recognizes the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© is a

Secured Party.



recognizes the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© is a

Sovereign.



recognizes the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© is Without

the UNITED STATES (an official IRS tax term for tax exempt).



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22. Your Declarant states that the standing of the Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé

Regina Dei Gratia as a Secured Party, is a standing that is above that of this court.

23. Your Declarant states that the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina

Dei Gratia© has immunity to jurisdiction by this court.


Dei Gratia© does not waive her immunity to this court.

Challenge to Jurisdiction 3:Challenge to Jurisdiction 3: Failure to Arraign TimelyTicket Date 06/06/2009; Arraignment Date 11/03/2009

Judicially Noticed Evidence, Exhibits A, B

25. Your Declarant states that all aforementioned statements are incorporated herein by

reference as if fully incorporated herein.

26. Your Declarant states that a failure to arraign timely is a jurisdictional issue that may

be raised at any time.

27. Your Declarant states that on June 06, 2009, the undersigned Misconstrued

Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© was travelling ‘non-commercially’ in a household

good.

28. Your Declarant states that the undersigned was travelling in the household good, as a

guest.


Dei Gratia© was not aware of any exigent circumstance requiring the traffic stop of a

private citizen.

30. Your Declarant states that there was no probable cause for the traffic stop of the

privately travelling household good.


Dei Gratia© was given a citation for ROSALIE GUANCIONE.

32. Your Declarant states that the household good was being operated non-commercially.

33. Your Declarant states that the citation was issued by a California Highway Patrol

officer under color of law for a violation of § 27315(e) of the California Vehicle Code.

34. Your Declarant states that California Vehicle Code § 27315(e) applies to a

‘commercial passenger’.



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35. Your Declarant states that the citation was a misapplication of a law regulating

commercial use, to a natural woman travelling privately in a household good as a ‘guest’.

36. Your Declarant states that the citation reads ‘non-commercial’.

37. Your Declarant states that California Insurance Code case law establishes that it is

the use of the conveyance at the time that determines whether it is being used commercially

or non-commercially:

11580.9, subdivision (b) of the Insurance Code: “the predominate factor

which determines whether a vehicle is “commercial” is apparently the use

the lessee makes of the vehicle.”

Government Employees Ins. Co. v Carrier Ins. Co. (1975), 45 Cal. App. 3d 223

38. Your Declarant states that in the instance in question, the conveyance was being used

for non-commercial “travel”, and that did not involve commercial “driving”, nor a

commercial fare, nor commercial freight hauling.


Dei Gratia© was presented a copy of the Notice to Appear in this action by the citing

officer.

40. Your Declarant states that the citation #79982 specifies a citation date of 06-06-09.

See judicially noticed evidence, Exhibit A.

41. Your Declarant states that Exhibit A is not a confessed judgment.


Dei Gratia© submitted an Affidavit into the court docket file for the instant case which

stated that the undersigned WAS wearing a seatbelt properly during the operation of the

household good.

43. Your Declarant states that the operator of the household good, Defense witness

William Stewart, submitted an Affidavit into the court docket file for the instant case which

stated that the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© WAS

wearing a seatbelt properly during the period of time the household good was in motion.



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44. Your Declarant states that Defense witness, William Stewart, is not related to the

undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© by either blood nor by

marriage.

45. Your Declarant states that each of the Affidavits previously submitted to the instant

case, by the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© and

separately by the defense witness, William Stewart, are considered evidence under the

evidence code.


Dei Gratia© appeared at the office of the clerk of the traffic court, multiple times to file

motions and to file evidence, into the instant case.

47. Your Declarant states that the deputy clerk to whom the undersigned Misconstrued

Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© spoke, refused to assign the undersigned

Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© a court date, stating that the case file

was not ready yet and that the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei

Gratia© would be notified by mail of a court date.

48. Your Declarant states that the deputy clerk informed the undersigned Misconstrued

Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© that I would be unable to obtain a court date until I

had received a “courtesy notice” in the mail.


Dei Gratia© again appeared at the office of the traffic court on 09/25/2009, and requested a

court date for Arraignment.

50. Your Declarant states that this was already 111 days since the traffic ticket citation

issuance.

51. Your Declarant states that on 9/25/2009 the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant

Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© was required by the deputy clerk C. Kha, Legal Process Clerk,

to sign a new promise to appear on 11/03/2009 at 6:00PM, in Department 56 for

Arraignment.

52. Your Declaration states that when the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé

Regina Dei Gratia© appeared for arraignment on 11/03/2009, this was already 150 days



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since the traffic ticket citation issuance. See supporting evidence, judicially noticed

evidence, Exhibit B.


Dei Gratia© has established in official records recognized by the STATE OF NEW YORK,

that ROSALIE GUANCIONE©, is distinct from, and a debtor to, the undersigned, in 2009.

See supporting evidence, Exhibits W, X, Y, Z.


Dei Gratia has a lien on all assets of ROSALIE GUANCIONE© under the Uniform

Commercial Code (UCC), recorded with the STATE OF NEW YORK since 2009.


Dei Gratia has the first priority lien on all assets of ROSALIE GUANCIONE©.

56. Your Declarant states that any entity or debt collection agency or 3rd party debt

collector, who seeks to make a claim against ROSALIE GUANCIONE©, is making a claim

for which relief cannot be granted.


Dei Gratia was handed a traffic citation in the name of ROSALIE GUANCIONE©, on June

06, 2009.

58. Your Declarant states that the citation in the name of ROSALIE GUANCIONE©

was an attempt to make a claim that is a lower order of precedence than a UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE lien, as possessed by the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant

Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia.


Dei Gratia© was arraigned by Commissioner Penelope Paul, in Department 56 of the

Traffic Division, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

(Santa Clara Courthouse) on November 03, 2009, one hundred and fifty days after the

issuance of the ticket.

60. Your Declarant states that the arraignment was performed by a Commissioner who

later admitted to an earlier self recusal in an unrelated case, in which the undersigned was a

party. See supporting evidence.



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61. Your Declarant states that the arraignment was performed by a Commissioner who

later admitted to lifetime bar to hearing cases involving the undersigned Misconstrued

Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, in an unrelated case in which the undersigned was a

party. See supporting evidence.

62. Your Declarant states that Commissioner Penelope Paul entered the plea of ‘not

guilty’, for the Defendant in the instant case, WITHOUT CONSENT by the attorney-in-fact

of Defendant, to the charges pending against the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant

Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia on November 03, 2009.


Dei Gratia© NEVER waived her right to a speedy trial.


Dei Gratia© NEVER waived the right to a speedy trial for the ROSALIE GUANCIONE©,

Estate trust.


Dei Gratia© refused to stipulate to a hearing by a Commissioner instead of an elected judge.

66. Your Declarant states that at the time of arraignment the court no longer had

jurisdiction to issue or enter any orders in the instant case.

67. Your Declarant states that Commissioner Penelope Paul DID NOT have jurisdiction

over the undersigned Misconstrued Defendant Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, pursuant to a

previous self recusal in an unrelated case involving the undersigned as a party in 2008, that

was discovered in March 2013 and admitted in April 2014. See supporting evidence.


Dei Gratia© did not waive time for trial under Section 1382 of the Penal Code.


Dei Gratia© is now prejudiced against in obtaining a fair trial, because due to the delays, so

much time has elapsed that one of the witnesses has gone on with their life and moved away

from the area to Stockton, California.



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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the STATE OF CALIFORNIA that the

foregoing is true and correct.



ROSALIE GUANCIONE©

Dated: August 28, 2015 ___/s/____ Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© _____ Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, Executrix, Attorney – In-Fact, Authorized Signer, UCC 3-419

Nothing else follows on this page//////



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POINTS AND AUTHORITIESPOINTS AND AUTHORITIESARGUMENTARGUMENT

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IS SELF-EXECUTING AND IS NOT LIMITED OR RESTRICTED BY STATUTE.

Although the various provisions of Penal Code Section 1382 constitute the Legislature’s implementation of the constitutional right to speedy trial after arraignment, that implementation does not necessarily encompass all the constitutional protections. The courts have held that the constitutional provision for speedy trial is “self-executing.” In Barker v. Municipal Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 806, the California Supreme Court stated: “It is unnecessary that petitioners, in asserting their constitutional rights to a speedy trial, rely on specific statutory provisions.”

Citing Barker, the court in Zimmerman v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 56, stated that certain Penal Code Sections (§§ 686, 802, 1050) “are merely ‘supplementary to and a construction of’ the Constitution [citation omitted]. So, too, are Sections 1381, 1381.5, 1382, and 1389 establishing maximum periods within which defendants must be brought to trial.”

In People v. Flores (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 313, the Court held that “(e)xcessive, unexcused delay is a ground for dismissal of a criminal charge, even though the particular delay is not specifically covered by a statute requiring mandatory dismissal. The defendant … repeatedly insisted upon the prompt disposition of this cause.” (In the instant case, defendant did precisely this, but was thwarted by court personnel at every turn.)

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL ATTACHES AT THE TIME AN ACCUSED IS STOPPED ON THE HIGHWAY AND CITED FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION.

The People will perhaps argue that, even for constitutional purposes, the right to a speedy trial runs only from the date of filing of a criminal complaint. This often cited rule, however, is only an example of the general principle that the time begins to run when a person becomes an accused (see Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239). When an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, this will always be the case. But virtually all arrests arising out of traffic violations occur before any complaint is filed. In traffic infraction cases, an arrest occurs when the officer determines there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and begins the process of citing the violator to appear in court (People v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200).



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In the case of In re Mugica (1968) 69 Cal.2d 516, THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT stated, “The basic policy underlying the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial is to protect the accused from having criminal charges pending against him an undue length of time.” The interest in not prolonging the pendency of criminal charges requires that such time should begin to run when the defendant is unequivocally informed that a criminal charge will be brought. This is what a Notice to Appear does. It is issued in conjunction with an arrest, and constitutes a statutory substitute for a complaint (Vehicle Code § 40513(b)). This being so, an arraignment within a reasonable time of arrest is still required, even when the accused is not in custody. Therefore, an unreasonable delay between the time of issuance of a Notice to Appear on a traffic violation and the time the accused is allowed to appear at arraignment will require dismissal upon the making of a timely motion.

III. A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE CAUSED BY THE DELAY IS NOT REQUIRED.

A five-month delay from the time Defendant was cited to the time she was permitted to request arraignment for a traffic citation is not reasonable, and has prejudiced her ability to present her case; a potential witness has moved away. However, such prejudice need not always be shown. Rather, it is only one of four factors that a court must consider.

The UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, in Moore v. Arizona (1973) 414 U.S. 25, 26-27, rejected the requirement of a showing of prejudice to one’s defense as a necessary element in reversing a conviction for an unconstitutional abridgment of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, stating:

The state court was in fundamental error in its reading of Barker v. Wingo and the standard applied in judging petitioner’s speedy trial claim. Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial ...

* * * * * *

Moreover, prejudice to a defendant caused by delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense in those proceedings. Inordinate delays may ... create anxiety in him, his family, and his friends ... (quoting Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514).

In Barker v. Wingo, supra, the court listed four factors to be considered in evaluating a speedy-trial motion: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the prosecution’s justification for it, (3) the defendant’s insistence on a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to



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defendant’s case, a factor not determinative if the other three militate in favor of dismissal.

In Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, the California Supreme Court, citing Moore, stated, “The defendant need not establish actual prejudice as a prerequisite to a hearing at which the evidence relevant to this balancing process is heard.”

Finally, it makes little difference whether the delay is the fault of court personnel or the prosecution itself. People v. Kerwin (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 466, 469.

And accordingly, the within action should also be dismissed under the Rost

Rule, in People v Rost, where as the timelines drop from 12 months to 4 months that a case must be heard and if not heard then it is dismissed for lack of speedy prosecution.

PRAYERPRAYER

The undersigned prays that the Traffic Division will issue an order to:

1. void the void order issued on December 28, 2009 in the instant case pursuant to

FRCP rule 60(b), and;

2. void the subsequent administrative suspension of the driver license for ROSALIE

GUANCIONE© made by the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

(DMV) for failure to pay the fines and fees assessed in the void order of December 28,

2009, which was void ab initio (from the beginning), and;

3. void the collection action initiated by either the Court or the DMV to the

CALIFORNIA STATE FRANCHISE TAX BOARD for the fines and fees of the void order

of December 28, 2009 in the instant case.

VERIFICATIONVERIFICATION

The undersigned certifies that the aforementioned facts are true, and regarding this

motion:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;



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(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by

a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for

establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will

likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or

discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so

identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.



ROSALIE GUANCIONE©

Dated: August 28, 2015 ___/s/____ Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© _____ Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©, Executrix, Attorney –In-Fact, Authorized Signer, UCC 3-419



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HI&RH Empress Aubreé Dei Gratia©, Executrix, Sui Juris,the natural living woman and Secured Party Creditorc/o U.S.P.O. Postmaster, c/o temporary mailing location PO Box Nine-Zero-Four-Five-Two, near San Jose, at Santa Clara County, on California, [zip code exempt] DMM Reg., Sec 122.32, Public Law 91-375, Sec. 403Tel: 408-830-6266

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIASUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

Traffic Division, Admiralty Law FormMailing address: 191 N. First St., SAN JOSE, CA 95113

Physical Address: 1095 Homestead Road, Santa Clara, CA 95050PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff, vs.ROSALIE GUANCIONE©

Defendant

)))))

State Ct. Case No. 7-09-TR-562668PEOPLE PEOPLE VV. GUANCIONE. GUANCIONE

[proposed][proposed] ORDER ORDER

The Court finds that the STATE OF NEW YORK in an official act has recognized the SECURED PARTY standing of Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia©. The Court finds that the STATE OF NEW YORK in an official act has recognized the standing of Aubreé Regina Dei Gratia© as a Sovereign. The arraignment in the instant case was conducted on 11/03/2009, without a probable cause hearing. The date of Arraignment was 150 days after issuance of the traffic citation on 06/06/2009. No party gave any waiver of time. The arraignment was not delayed thru any fault of any party. The delay in arraignment of 150 days constitutes a denial of 6 th Amendment right to speedy trial. The issue of a failure to arraign timely is a jurisdictional issue.Good Cause Appearing, these orders are made in the interests of justice: the trial verdict of 12/28/2009, is declared void ab initio pursuant to FRCP rule 60(b), and; the entire case is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Penal Code § 1382, and the 6th Amendment of the federal Constitution of 1787; and the sentence and all fees and all fines are set aside effective 12/28/2009; and the DMV is ordered to reinstate the drivers license that was administratively suspended for ROSALIE GUANCIONE© effective on the date on which it was suspended, and DMV records shall reflect that the drivers license was never suspended. The drivers license suspension, for failure to pay fees and fines of the void order, was made in error. The order dated 12/28/2009 was issued without jurisdiction and is void. The STATE FRANCHISE TAX BOARD is ordered to cease and desist any collections actions for debt based on the void order issued on 12/28/2009 in the instant traffic ticket case.

Date: ___/___/____ ____________________________ SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE



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FILE ON DEMAND - Scanned Retina · Web viewthe natural living woman and Secured Party Creditor c/o U.S.P.O. Postmaster, c/o temporary mailing location PO Box Nine-Zero-Four-Five-Two,