Feist Hirsch, Martin Heidegger and the East

Martin Heidegger and the EastAuthor(s): Elisabeth Feist HirschSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 247-263Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398306 .

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Elisabeth Feist Hirsch Martin Heidegger and the East

This paper is an attempt to relate Heidegger's philosophy to some major aspects of the philosophical traditions in the East. However, its theme is not

arbitrarily raised in connection with Heidegger's work, but rests on Hei-

degger's clearly stated interest in Eastern thinking. Between the two world wars Heidegger had many contacts with Japanese colleagues and students who attended his lectures and seminars and who in turn discussed with him their own intellectual background.'

William Barrett recounts the story of a German friend of Heidegger, who, when calling on him, found him reading some of Suzuki's essays. "If I understand this man correctly," Heidegger is supposed to have said to his visitor, "this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings."2 (Heidegger also refers occasionally to Lao-tzu, the Chinese thinker who lived about 500 B.C.)3

In 1959 Heidegger published a volume with the title Unterwegs zur Sprache [Underway Towards Language] which contains a "Dialogue Concerning Language" ("Aus einem Gesprich von der Sprache"). The "Dialogue" reveals the depth of Heidegger's interest in Eastern thinking. One can hardly assume that the "Dialogue" reproduces a real conversation in all its details, but the fact that Heidegger should select a Japanese as a partner for the

"Dialogue" (the "questioner" is, of course, Heidegger himself) cannot be

overemphasized as being indicative of his conviction that a common ground between East and West in matters of speech and consequently thought can be found. It is made clear in the following reflection from the "Dialogue": "...

whether, what I try to think as the essence of speech also satisfies the essence of East Asian speech, whether at the end, which would also be a beginning, an essence of speech may become an experience of our thinking [effort and] grant us the assurance that European-occidental and East Asian speaking entered into a dialogue which sings of that which springs from a single source."4

The Festschrift to Heidegger's seventieth birthday (Pfullingen: Giinther Neske, 1959) contains a contribution by the Japanese philosopher Hajime Tanabe. He is only represen- tative of Japanese thinkers who have shown much interest in Heidegger's philosophy.

For some references to Heidegger's remarks concerning Oriental thinking see Alexander Schwan, "Politische Philosophie im Denken Heideggers," in Neue Freiburger Beitrige zur Politikwissenschaft, ed. Dieter Obemd6rfer, 2 vols. (Opladen and Koln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1966), II, 108 and 160. See also "t)ber den Humanismus," in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), pp. 69-70, and "Zur Seinsfrage," ibid., p. 252. Also, "Grundsitze des Denkens," Jahrbuch fiur Psychologie und Psychotherapie VI (1958), 40. 2 William Barrett, ed., Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. xi. 3 See below, p. 254 and n.26. 4 ". . . ob, was ich als Wesen der Sprache zu denken versuche, auch dem Wesen der ostasiatischen Sprache genigt, ob am Ende gar, was zugleich der Anfang wiire, ein Wesen der Sprache zur denkenden Erfahrung gelangen kann, das die Gewihr schenkte, dass europiisch-abendlindisches und ostasiatisches Sagen auf eine Weise ins Gesprich



248 Hirsch

Although Heidegger has expressed special interest in Zen Buddhism, with Taoism following a close second, other Eastern philosophies and religions like Hinduism and Buddhism figure importantly in the treatment of our topic. The reason is simple. Zen Buddhism has its roots in the teachings of Buddha; and Buddha can be understood only by recognizing that he had certain traits in common with Hinduism at its earlier stage. Moreover, many Eastern philosophies and religions share in some measure the final goal: they strive to transcend the world of opposites and value judgments and aim their spiritual efforts at grasping true Reality (Being). However, neither the meaning of nor the path leading to the goal is necessarily identical. The means chosen to reach the end largely depend on how man's life on earth is evaluated. One ob- serves a development from a more or less negative to a completely positive stance toward the world. Hinduism shows a curious ambiguity in its appraisal of the human condition. On the one hand, the many rebirths into the world are considered punishment for previous "sins," preventing as they do the desired deliverance from the world. On the other, the social structure of castes, with duties arising from it for the individual, firmly ties the person to his earthly tasks. Buddha rejected the Hindu doctrine of salvation which envisioned a return to the source: Brahman. He concentrated his efforts on finding a way to avoid pain and suffering in the world rather than advocating an escape from it like the Hindus.5 Because Buddha insisted on the afflictions inherent in man's existence, his position is pessimistic but nevertheless less negative than that of the Hindus.

When Buddha's humanistic views were later developed into a religion by Mahayana Buddhism, they underwent significant changes. If Buddha considered an emotional withdrawal from all worldly affairs a necessary condition for the person's inner peace, Mahayana modified this aspect of Buddha's teachings. Compassion (karund) for all men, which Buddha had strongly recommended, conjoined with wisdom (prajni), became the center of the religion.6 From this followed the need for the Buddhist to be actively engaged

kiimen, in der Solches singt, das einer einzigen Quelle entstromt" (p. 94). Those scholars who are acquainted with Heidegger's writings will sympathize with the present writer's difficulties in translating Heidegger into English. In the translation of typical Heideggerian terms I have been guided by the American edition of Sein und Zeit and other translations of Heidegger's works. I have also consulted Professor William Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 2d ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967). 5 See Heinrich Zimmer, Indische Sphiiren (Munich, Berlin: R. Oldenburg, 1935), p. 233: "Buddha bringt Indien ein 'Heilsverfahren'. Ein Leiden wird festgestellt, die Ursachen des Leidens und die Heilbarkeit wie ein Arzt es tut." Also M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967), p. 73: "Early Buddhism is thus a gospel of hope, and not a gospel of despair as it is commonly represented to be." 6 See James Bissett Pratt, The Pilgrimage of Buddhism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928), chap. 11, "The Rise of Mahayina," pp. 218 ff.



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in bringing salvation to his fellow man. After the Chinese had become ac-

quainted with Mahayana Buddhism, they took a further step toward a positive world outlook. Ch'an Buddhism, or Zen in its Japanese version, abandoned all the religious trimmings of Mahayana Buddhism and, focusing its attention on the concrete world, discovered the world as a stepping-stone for enlightment.7 Because Zen accepts the world as it is, avoiding both the Hindus'

negative and Buddha's pessimistic stance, it is best attuned to Heidegger's thinking.

Linking Heidegger with the world optimism of Zen may not be convincing to some interpreters of Heidegger's philosophy. They will point to Heidegger's stress on anxiety and death, both central themes in Being and Time; this, they will claim, classifies his thinking as pessimistic, if not nihilistic, and moves it close to Buddha, for whom death casts a deep shadow over man's existence. However, although it is true that Heidegger and Buddha are both

preoccupied with death, they approach the problem from quite different

angles. Buddha speaks of death as the merciless murderer "with his sword raised to kill."8 He blames death above all for the many frustrations man will

experience during his life-span. Death, nullifying life, is for Buddha the most

painful expression of the negative traits that accompany any positive quality. Heidegger could agree with Buddha's position that "nothing is purely positive,"9 but the fact of the matter is that Buddha is above all interested in the

psychological consequences of this truth, while Heidegger speaks of the

negative or death in an ontological context.

Considering the problem from an ontological viewpoint, Heidegger says death and finitude belong to the very essence of Being-there (existence; Dasein) and must be faced with resolve. It is characteristic of "people" (das Man) to push the thought of their own finitude into the background and to live as if death could not happen to them.'0 Heidegger argues that such

7 See Sir Charles Eliot, Japanese Buddhism (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1935), chap. 17, on Zen; also Barrett, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, pp. 41 ff. 8 Buddhist Scriptures, ed. Edward Conze (London: Penguin Books, 1959), p. 112. Also, Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, trans. H. H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958), p. 207: "The basis of this salvation-striving for Buddhism, as for the Indians in general, was not any sort of 'satiety' with the meanness of life but 'satiety' with death." In connection with Schopenhauer, Heidegger refers to Buddhism for whom, he states, man's liberation from willing is essential. See "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?," in Vortrige und Aufsiitze (Pfullingen: Gfinther Neske, 1954), p. 117. 9 See Ghanshamdas Rattenmal Malkani, Vedantic Epistemology (Amalner: Indian Insti- tute of Philosophy, 1935), p. 51. 10 See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 7th ed. (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), # 51. It is interesting to note that the Mahtbharata, the great Hindu epic, is similarly aware of the fact that human beings are inclined to ignore their own deaths but unlike both Buddha and Heidegger it is considered most "wonderful" that "no man, though he



250 Hirsch

"inauthentic" conduct brings into sharp focus its opposite, namely, authentic

Being-there, as free resolve toward death.1x The free resolve toward death of authentic Being-there creates a mood of anxiety with which Heidegger is concerned in Sein und Zeit. This mood of anxiety toward death, however, is not a negative force apt to paralyze human action; on the contrary the mood of anxiety is responsible for authentic Being-there to project itself into its own future. Realizing the "ontological possibility" of his existence, man listens to the "call of his conscience."12 Conscience calls authentic Being-there away from the inauthenticity of "das Man" to which it is always exposed. The call of conscience rests on the ontological fact that "Being-there is in its very Being care" (Sorge).13 In his later writings Heidegger develops still further the thought of anxiety toward death as a positive force. Anxiety toward death does not only result in a concern for one's true possibilities, but reveals

Nothingness as a transcendence toward Being.14 Nothingness, thus, is not

nothing, but insofar as in the mood of anxiety toward death beings and things vanish into nothing (so that there is no-thing) Being comes into focus.

Heidegger's analysis of Being-there was to serve the purpose of bringing to

light Being which illumines beings and the "world." The there of Being-there or "the world" is only in the clearing of Being.

As awareness of man's finitude and death plays a completely different role in Heidegger than in Buddha, so does the "world" as the "there" of Being- there. In contrast to Heidegger, Buddha, who is completely immersed in the

question of how to bring peace to the suffering soul, refuses to speculate as to the meaning of the world. Zen Buddhism, on the other hand, arrives at the conclusion that the world man lives in points to Buddhahood. Thus Zen

agrees with Heidegger's view to the effect that Being-there transcends toward

Being. Moreover, Being-there and Being stand in a reciprocal relation; that

is, one is not without the other. Being not only conceals or reveals itself in the "world" as what Heidegger calls epochal e-vents, but without the "world"

Being could not be spoken of; Being needs Being-there and Being-there needs

Being. Buddhahood, Zen asserts, may be grasped through the right meditation and concentration on worldly things. However, the process cannot be re-

sees others dying all around him believes he himself will die." Quoted in Aldous Huxley, introduction to the Bhagavad Gitd (New York: New American Library, 1951), p. 26. 11 See Sein und Zeit (7th ed.), # 50, p. 250: "Der Tod ist eine Seinsmoglichkeit, die je das Dasein selbst zu iibernehmen hat. Mit dem Tod steht sich das Dasein selbst in seinem eigensten Seinkonnen bevor." See also p. 254, n.l, where Heidegger refers to the famous story by Tolstoy, "The Death of Ivan Ilyich." 12 See Sein und Zeit, # 54. '3 Ibid., # 57. 14 See "Was ist Metaphysik?," in Wegmarken, p. 15: "Die Hineingehaltenheit des Daseins in das Nichts auf dem Grunde der verborgenen Angst ist das Obersteigen des Seienden im Ganzen: die Transzendens."



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versed, and it is not possible to say that Buddhahood, like Being, is only as far as the world is.

The "world" of man in Heidegger's terminology points to the specific quality of an era which determines the thinking of a generation or generations. The character of the present age of science and technology whose history starts in the seventeeth century is circumscribed by the concealment of Being. Why is this so? The scientifically oriented man (and this refers not only to natural scientists) clings to objects in nature without being able to reach the

ground or root of all that is. It is ironic that a generation engaged in space trips should have so little awareness of the "wholeness" of the cosmos. Instead we are all educated to look at nature primarily in quantitative terms and to think in a dimension which will not bring the "isness" of nature into focus.'5 It is hard for us to realize that nature always is more than what a specific science tells us about it. Is the flower that is known as an object of scientific research the whole flower? Is it not true that the fragmentary approach to

nature-necessary as it may be-represents not a wrong but certainly an

incomplete picture of nature? If I understand her right, it seems to me that Gertrude Stein with her famous nonsaying "a rose is a rose is a rose" tried to evoke the "isness" (wholeness) of the rose. Heidegger's philosophy of Being attempts a similar result. Heidegger does not tell us to abandon the path of

science; this in any event does not depend on man's will alone-but he asks us to cultivate besides the scientific a reflective approach to nature. To achieve the latter stance it is necessary that modern man relate himself to nature not

aggressively but rather in a mood of detachment. Detachment may have a

negative ring for the Hindus; Heidegger, however, claims that detachment will enable man to establish a direct and immediate experience with nature.

Only then will the "isness" (whole) of nature speak to man. In this aspect of his philosophy Heidegger is fully supported by a long tradition of Zen Bud- dhist teaching. In Suzuki's words: ". . . Nature cannot be conceived as a

merely passive substance upon which Man works. Nature is also power and

energy. Nature reacts to human calls. When Man is agreeable and in con-

formity with Nature's way, it will cooperate with Man and reveal to him all its secrets and even help him to understand himself."16

For Heidegger as well as for Zen, even the little things in nature may reveal the invisible (Being or Buddhahood), given the right attitude toward nature. One need only read what Heidegger has to say about Adalbert Stifter, a German poet of the nineteenth century, who, in his judgment, had a special gift to "listen" to nature. Referring to Stifter's "Icestory," Heidegger finds the poet's greatness in his ability "to show the truly great in the small

15 See Martin Heidegger, Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1962). 16 See Barrett, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, p. 233.



252 Hirsch

[things], to point to the invisible through the obvious and ordinary of the human world; to let the unspoken ring in the spoken word-this kind of

speech constitutes the power of Stifter's work."'7 Moreover, it is known that

Heidegger is deeply attached to his native country, the Black Forest region, where, in a cabin at a mountainside overlooking the wide expanse of moun-

tains, woods, streams, and valleys, he has written many of his books. In addition, in a little pamphlet called Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens [From the

Experience of Thinking] Heidegger allows us some insight into the inspiration he received from nature. On the left side of the pages in the small volume, a sentence or two depicts an often unassuming natural scene to which thoughts are related on the right side. We read, for example, left: "When the early morning light silently waxes above the mountains . . ." and right: "The

darkening of the world never touches the light of Seyn [Being]." Or left: "When in early summer scattered daffodils bloom hidden in the meadow and the mountain rose shines under the maple . . ." and right: "The splendor of the simple."18

"The splendor of the simple" also fascinates Zen artists. Who does not think

immediately of the brush paintings executed by Zen monks? How they capture the very essence of a beautiful flower, a lovely bird, or a tree with a few strokes of the brush! What is so appealing to a Western observer is the artist's ability to reproduce the "whole" thing as he grasped it in a single moment. Haiku poetry achieves a similar result in evoking and suggesting certain scenes with just seventeen syllables. Zen artists see man in union with nature; it is rare for a human scene not to be put in a natural setting. Nowhere do Zen artists succeed in this as well as in some charming Japanese drawings of the fifteenth century which accompany an ancient Chinese story of an oxherd who is in search of his ox (meaning his heart or true self).l, The story of the oxherd as it unfolds before the reader, together with the comments to the text and the drawings, could in its major aspects serve as an illustration of some of Heidegger's thoughts.

17 See Martin Heidegger, "Adalbert Stifters 'Eisgeschichte'," in Elisabeth Brock-Sulzer et al, Wirkendes Wort (Zurich: Schweizerische Bibliophilen-Gesellschaft, 1964), p. 37: "Das Zeigen des wahrhaft Grossen im Kleinen, das Zeigen in das Unsichtbare, und zwar durch das Augenfillige und durch das Tigliche der Menschenwelt hindurch, das Horenlassen des Ungesprochenen im Gesprochenen-dieses Sagen ist das Wirkende im Wort des Dichters Adalbert Stiffer." 18 See Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (Pfullingen: Giinther Neske, 1965), pp. 5-6 and 12-13. Also, Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 533. 19 See D. T. Suzuki, Manual of Zen Buddhism (New York: Rider, 1950). However, we have used a German edition entitled Der Ochs und sein Hirte (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1958), because it contains comments by a modem Zen master who, we are told, seldom speaks in public. Hartmut Buchner, a former student of Heidegger, together with a Japanese is responsible for the translation into German. Heidegger is very fond of the story.



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In the first picture we see a landscape enveloped in mist and the oxherd

standing "discouraged under the trees at the bank of the waters." Lost in the high grass, the oxherd engages in a long search for his ox, whom he

finally discovers after hearing his voice first. When the oxherd captures the animal, he is unruly and wants to return to the wilderness. After the oxherd has succeeded in taming the ox, he is seen riding on his back for the trip home. Once at home, the ox disappears and the oxherd kneels in the grass before his hut with his hands folded in a praying gesture, while his eyes be- hold a mountain peak in the distance and behind it a golden moon just breaking through the clouds. At this moment the oxherd and nature lose their separate existences and merge. At such heights of achievement the oxherd finds "access to the deepest secret." The deepest secret is the Void or

Nothingness (Being). The next drawing, therefore, symbolizes the fact that the world is empty of things: A large circle is sprinkled with dark spots and bordered at the periphery by a black band. Because the oxherd has grasped the true Being of things, nature will never be the same. A tree which ap- peared in previous drawings only now discloses its treeness: in the drawing that follows the oxherd's enlightenment the inner pulse of a tree-trunk, its true being, has come to the surface; a branch winds its way through space like lightning speeding toward the earth, and the blossoms have never looked as tender as now. The meaning, of course, is that he who has experienced the Void or Being has gained insight into the "isness" or "suchness" of the world. Being in turn shines after beings have vanished into nothingness.

Dr. Ohtsu's comments to the oxherding story help us to understand better what is involved if we try to achieve oneness with nature. He says, for ex-

ample: "The true world is that world which lets me say: I look at the flower and the flower looks at me."20 In such a relation to nature we are no longer outside but very much a part of nature. If scientists use nature as an object of their investigations, the Zen Buddhist has a primary contact with nature and sees in nature a Thou rather than an It. At the same time our spirits become free to encompass the whole world. Dr. Ohtsu expresses this thought beautifully: "In one single toll of the bell, for example, are gathered together, if we truly listen to it, innumerable lessons. In hearing in such a way we leap into a dimension where heaven and earth are gathered together on the tip of a finger."21

Compare with this what Heidegger says about the essence of an object.22

2o "Ich schaue die Blume an und die Blume schaut mich an." Ibid., p. 75. 21 "In einem einzigen Glockenschlag zum Beispiel versammein sich, wenn wir in wahrhafter Weise horen, alle unziihligen Lehren. In einem solchen Horen springen wir in einen Bereich, in dem sich Himmel und Erde auf der Spitze eines Fingers versammein." Ibid., p. 81. 22 See "Das Ding," in Vortrdge und Aufsiitze (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1954), pp. 163-181.



254 Hirsch

It is possible, for instance, to regard a pitcher as a man-made thing (Ding) designed to hold so much of a liquid; the empty space inside the pitcher is then what counts. However, in this way we have abstracted from the concrete situation which makes a pitcher a pitcher. In the context of a concrete situation the pouring out of the liquid from the pitcher expresses a more important aspect of its essence than its emptiness or size. If we consider the true reason for its being, namely, to give a drink of wine or water, for example, the pitcher, like Ohtsu's bells, opens to our insight a whole world. The pitcher cannot be separated from the wine or water that it may contain; wine and water, on the other hand, form part of a world where heaven and earth are

joined together. Heidegger thus says:

In the water of the spring the marriage of heaven and earth is present. This marriage is present in the wine which is the gift of the fruit of the vine; in the fruit the nourishing earth and the sun in the sky are joined together in marriage . . . The gift of that which flows from it is the essence of a pitcher. In the essence of the pitcher are [present] heaven and earth.23

The emptiness of a pitcher pointing to the liquid to be poured out from it has become the springboard from which we leap into a world encompassing both heaven and earth. Similarly, Lao-tzu claims that from a vessel's hollow arises its utility and by the empty space of a house (no doors and windows) we are served.24 Chuang Tzu, the most famous follower of Lao-tzu's Way, has this to say about the suggestive power of emptiness: "You have heard about the knowledge that knows, but you have never heard of the knowledge that does not know. Look into that closed room, the empty chamber where brightness is born! Fortune and blessing gather where there is stillness. Let

your ears and eyes communicate with what is inside and put mind and

knowledge on the outside."25 Like the empty pitcher, the empty chamber or the uncluttered mind opens insight into the "brightness" of the whole. That which unifies everything is called by Lao-tzu Tao.28 It is not surprising that

Heidegger finds in Tao a concept not unlike what he wants to denote with

23 " rIm Wasser der Quelle weilt die Hochzeit von Himmel und Erde. Sie weilt im Wein, den die Frucht des Rebstocks gibt, in der das Nahrende der Erde und die Sonne des Himmels einander zugetraut sind .. Das Geschenk des Gusses aber ist das Krughafte des Kruges. Im Wesen des Kruges weilen Himmel und Erde." Ibid., p. 171. 24 See Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao Te Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), chap. 11. 25 See The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 58. Heidegger also mentions Tao in connection with his concept of Ereignis in Identitit und Differenz (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1957), p. 29. 26 See Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power, introduction, p. 30: "Finally in a particular school of philosophy whose followers ultimately came to be called Taoists tao meant 'the way the universe works .. .'"



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Being. Tao, he comments, "could be the path along which everything may move; that which may make it possible for us to think the primordial meaning of reason, spirit, mind and logos, that is, what these [terms] say according to their true essence."27 Compare with this what Lao-tzu says about Tao: "The ways of men are conditioned by those of earth. The ways of earth by those of heaven. The ways of heaven by those of Tao, and the ways of Tao

by the Self-so."28 And furthermore, Tao is "Something formless yet complete, / That existed before heaven and earth, / Without sound, without substance, Dependent on nothing, unchanging, / All pervading, unfailing."29 Tao the "formless yet complete" recalls the Void in the story of the oxherd and the latter in turn was beyond doubt inspired by Buddha's concept of nirvana. It will be shown later that nirvana, since like the Void it lacks all attributes, can only be described by its effect.3 In the "Dialogue Concerning Language" Heidegger says about the Void: "The void then is the same as the Nothing, namely, that Being which we try to think as the other to all that which comes or does not come into presence."31 To this the Japanese partner in the

"Dialogue" remarks: "For us the void is the loftiest name for that which

you want to say with the word 'Sein' [Being]."32 Ancient Hindu thought had already hinted at the connection between

Nothingness (Void) and Being. During the Vedic period, dating back to the second millennium, this theme was foreshadowed in a deep but isolated speculation like the following: "Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden ... And sages searching in their hearts discovered in Nothing the connecting bond to Being" (Rg Veda X. 129). Later, when the Upanisads were

composed, Indian thinkers showed a remarkable preoccupation with the

question of the meaning of Reality (Being). The highest state of being in the Hindu religion is, of course, Brahman, the Real. However, the role Brahman

plays in his relation to the world is far from being unequivocal. In one sense Brahman, as saguna Brahman or Isvara, represents (and this would agree with the god of the West) absolute truth and perfection beyond the human world. In another sense Brahman is nirguna, the only Reality; the world consequently being an illusion (maya). Both thoughts are represented in the

27 "Das Wesen der Sprache," in Unternegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1959), p. 198: "Indes konnte der Tao der alles be-wegende Weg sein, dasjenige, woraus wir erst zu denken vermogen, was Vernunft, Geist, Sinn, Logos eigentlich, d. h. aus ihrem eigenen Wesen her sagen michten." 28 Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 174. As to the meaning of Self-so, Waley comments: "The 'unconditioned', the 'what-is-so-of-itself'." 29 Ibid. 30 See below p. 260. 31 "Die Leere ist dann dasselbe wie das Nichts, jenes Wesende niimlich, das wir als das Andere zu allem An- und Abwesenden zu denken versuchen" (p. 108). 32 "Fir uns ist die Leere der h6chste Name fur das, was Sie mit dem Wort 'Sein' sagen mochten.. . ." Ibid., p. 109.



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Hindu tradition, but the nondual concept is more suggestive of Heidegger's philosophical endeavors.

For the nondual tradition of Hindu philosophy no one has been more im-

portant and influential than Sarhkara, a Hindu philosopher of the eighth and ninth centuries A.D., who wrote, among other things, extensive commentaries on the Upanisads. Although there are wide areas of disagreement between Sarhkara and Heidegger, it is surprising to note that they share some basic

thoughts. Heidegger has made his position clear that as a philosopher he is not con-

cerned with religious problems, while Sarhkara is typical of many Indian thinkers in that he does not separate in his mind religious and strictly philosophical speculations. Speaking in a religious context, Sarhkara calls Brahman the "Lord of the Universe" and states that "knowing" him leads to the

person's bliss; in an ontological perspective, on the other hand, Brahman stands for true Reality (Being). Brahman as "true Being" makes the truth of the "world" possible, but once the whole truth (Brahman) is known the "world" is extinguished. Like the dream world which contains its truth until we awake from the dream, the truth of the world, Sarhkara argues, lasts until man realizes in his heart the true Self (Atman) which is identical with the one Reality, Brahman.u3

Like Buddha's world as a place of sorrow, Sarhkara's concept of the world as an illusion has nothing to do with the sense of "world" in Heidegger's philosophy. The "world," Heidegger says, is the e-vent of Being or, worded

differently, the e-vent (das Ereignis) that gives Being.34 Being and e-vent

("world") are linked together so closely that Being is as finite as the "world" of man. This latter thought is in complete contradiction to the qualities of "eternal" and "unchanging" which Sarhkara ascribes to Brahman.35 On the

33 Sarhkara states: "In this manner the Vedinta-texts declare that for him who has reached the state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist." Brahma- sutrabhdSya II. 1. 44, as given in A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, ed. S. Radha- krishnan and Charles Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 531. For a discussion of this point see also A. Berriedale Keith, The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), chap. 28, ? 7. This writer decided not to treat Heidegger's religious views in this study. References to God or the gods as they appear especially in his Holderlin interpretations are really too scanty to allow a full evaluation. In any event, God in Heidegger's view would be quite different from Brahman; he would form part of the "world" but unlike man stand in the full light of Being. Another interesting question is why theologians have made such wide use of Heidegger, but this topic is outside the scope of the present study. 34 See Martin Heidegger, "Zeit und Sein" [Time and Being], originally a lecture delivered at Freiburg University in 1962 and later published in L'endurance de la pensee. Pour saluer Jean Beaufret (Paris: Plon, 1968), pp. 16-68. Heidegger warns that e-vent as that that "gives" Time and Being must not be understood as a happening of a distinct content. Rather, e-vent indicates the givenness of Time and Being on the ground of which historical epochs come into being and can be distinguished. 3a See Brahmnasatrabhadya I. 1. 4.



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other hand, when Samhkara reflects on the Reality of Brahman in philosophical terms, Heidegger's notion of Being immediately comes to mind. Because

Being is no-being (no-thing), it cannot be described as such or such. Similarly, Sarhkara quotes from the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, where it is said: "That Self [Brahman or Atman, the latter being the true Self which, when realized, leads to union with Brahman] is to be described by no, no."36 Surendranath Dasgupta elaborates on this point: "Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous and has no form; it cannot therefore be the object of any other consciousness that grasps it."3T This sounds close enough to Heidegger's view, but when we read Radhakrishnan's comments to Samkara's interpretation, the similarity between Heidegger and Sarhkara strikes home with still more compelling force. Radhakrishnan states: "As it

[Brahman] is opposed to all empirical existence, it is given to us as the

negative of everything that is positively known. Sarhkara declines to char- acterise it even as one ... but calls it non-dual, advaitam.... It is non-being, since it is not the being which we attribute to the world of experience."38 Since both Brahman and Being must be distinguished from objects in the world, "knowing" the former does not mean the same as "knowing" the latter. The logical mind may be capable of dealing with many problems related to man and his environment, but it cannot penetrate to a dimension of thought that circumscribes the reality of both Being and Brahman. Knowledge of the world, Sarhkara asserts, is ajnana (indefinite), knowledge of Brahman

jiana (wisdom) and nonobjective. Because Brahman cannot be objectified, Sarhkara states (quoting from the Bhagavadgita) that Brahman is "knowledge enveloped in ignorance."39 It is impossible to define the knowledge of Brah- man given in an intuition, and as far as this is true man is "ignorant" of Brahman. Radhakrishnan has this to say about the meaning of intuition: "Anubhava [intuition] is not consciousness of this or that thing, but it is to know and see in oneself the being of all beings, the Ground and the Abyss."40

Heidegger also says about Being that it is the ground and the abyss of all human understanding, but the full Truth of Being is not accessible even to the highest form of insight. Because the Truth of Being is forever hidden from us, Being in the last analysis remains a secret. Sarhkara, on the other

38 Brahmasitrabh.sya III. 4. 52. 37 A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1963), I, 444. 38 S. Radhakrisnan, Indian Philosophy, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), II, 535-536. It is worth noting that the Katha Upanisad, for example, speaks of Brahman as the one "alone shining, everything shines after; through His lustre all this shines." Quoted by Swami Madhavananda, "A Bird's Eye View of the Upanishads," in The Cultural Heritage of India, ed. S. Radhakrishnan et al. (Calcutta: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1958), p. 359. Heidegger, it will be remembered, often speaks of the Light of Being, or clearing of Being which brings Light 39 Brahmasutrabha;ya II. 1. 14. 40 Indian Philosophy, II, 512.



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hand, believes that the full truth of Brahman can and will be realized when the

person realizes Atman. Sarhkara denies a causal nexus between Brahman and the world on the ground that the effect, the world, is a mere appearance (vivarta) of the cause. Heidegger also rejects the thought of Being as the cause of the world. For Sarhkara as well as for Heidegger cause and effect, if one uses such concepts at all in this context, are intertwined, albeit not in the same manner (due to the fact that in their respective attitudes toward the world Heidegger and Sarikara are far apart).

Being, as was pointed out before, always reveals or conceals itself for

Being-there. In a letter addressed to the poet Ernst Jiinger, Heidegger has formulated this thought thus:

Therefore we ask more accurately now whether "das Sein" is something by itself and whether it turns in addition and at times toward man. Presumably, such turning toward, although still hidden, is that which we call rather in frustration and indefinitely, "das Sein" [Being]. . . . We say of "Being in itself" always too little, if, when saying "Being" we leave out the being present for a being like man and we thus fail to recognize that this being helps to constitute "Being."41

Because the "world" is necessary in order that Being may be spoken of at all, the world is not less positive than Being. This will never hold true for Sarhkara.

In his Mysticism East and West Rudolf Otto compares Sarikara with Meister Eckhart and makes the following point: "For Sarhkara, the world remains world, painful and miserable, to be fled from and denied. . . . But Eckhart says 'I would gladly remain here until the last day.' "42 Heidegger, of course, sides with Eckhart whom, by the way, he calls a "masterful thinker."43 Furthermore, if Sarhkara's goal is eternal life in Brahman, Heidegger stresses the fact that the e-vent "gives" Being and Time simul-

taneously, Being is "presence" as Time-Space "happening." Heidegger's concept of Time will be dealt with presently. At this point it is important to realize that, because Being and Time are linked together in the e-vent, Being is process or in Heidegger's terminology "historicity."44 (Historicity must

41 See "tOber die Linie," a contribution to the Festschrift for Ernst Jiinger on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday (1955), republished in Weginarken under the title "Zur Seins- frage," p. 235: "Darum fragen zeir jetzt gemdsser ob 'das Sein' etwas fiir sich ist und ob es ausserdem und bisweilen auch sich den Menschen zuwendet. ... Wir sagen vom 'Sein selbst' immer zuwenig, wenn zwir 'das Sein' sagend, das An-wesen sum Menschenwesen auslassen und dadurch verkennen, dass dieses Wesen selbst 'das Sein' mitausmacht." 42Trans. B. L. Bracey and R. C. Payne (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 210. 43 See "Das Ding," in Vortriige und Aufsiitze, p. 175; also Der Sats vom Grund (Pfullin- gen: Gunther Neske, 1954), p. 71. 44 "Weil man iiberall das Seins-Geschick nur als Geschichte und dieses als Geschehen vorstellt, versucht man vergeblich, dieses Geschehen aus dem zu deuten, was in 'Sein und Zeit' iiber die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins (nicht des Seins) gesagt ist." "Zeit und Sein," p. 32.



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be distinguished from history and historiography because the latter are possible only on the ground of the Historicity of Being.) Being thus is as dynamic as the "world" while Brahman, it will be recalled, is "unchanging" and "absolute." On the other hand, if Being is process in Time, Heidegger shares the view with Sarhkara that the truth of the world is never the whole truth, but he opposes any supposition of absolute truth.

When Heidegger calls man the "shepherd of Being,"45 he wants to indicate the special relation Being-there has to Being. Sarhkara, following Hindu tradi-

tion, also raises man beyond all living creatures because he alone is endowed with the capacity to envision Brahman. Moreover, when "knowledge" of Brahman is attained, man is freed from the wheel of endless rebirths

(sarsara) and unites with Brahman. For most Eastern thinkers the moment of supreme enlightment is a leap into eternity; religiously speaking it is salvation.

The leap into eternity ends the cycle of life-death-life which the Hindus conceived not only as a basic characteristic of the human condition but as a cosmic principle. Hegel was quite impressed with this concept of eternal re- currence typical of Eastern thinkers. In his essay Reason in History he comments: "But then we pass on to another thought just as intimately connected with the idea of change, the positive fact, namely, that ruin is at the same time emergence of new life, that out of life arises death, but out of death life. This is a great thought which the orientals fully understood and which is the

highest thought of their metaphysics."46 It seems to me that the Hindus are less enthusiastic about what Hegel called "a great thought." They desire

nothing more than to end the cycle of life-death-life and to return to their

origin: Brahman. Similarly, Lao-tzu considers the world with its laws and established values an unhappy degeneration from the "natural" way, that is, the way of Tao. When he says "In Tao the only motion is returning,"47 Lao- tzu thinks of a movement back to an original inner state of unspoiled good- ness and truth. Zen Buddhists strive to achieve satori (Buddhahood) in a flash of insight. This is how one of the great Zen masters described his

enlightenment: "O friends, while under Jen the Master I had a satori (wu) by just once listening to his words and abruptly saw into the original nature of suchness."48 Although Zen Buddhists do not aim at renouncing the world, at the moment of enlightenment time is eclipsed and the spirit, having com-

pleted its search for truth, comes to rest in the Way of the Buddha.

45 See "Brief iiber den Humanismus," in Wegmarken, p. 162: "Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins." 46 Reason in History, trans. Robert Hartman (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1953), p. 88. 47 See Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 192. Also, E. V. Zenker, Geschichte der Chinesischen Philosophie, 2 vols. (Reichenberg: Gebriider Stiepel, 1926), I, 107 ff. 48 See Suzuki, Zen Buddhism, p. 185.



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Heidegger's concept of time stands in sharp contrast to that of the East.

Time, that is, primary time, cannot be annihilated since time, like Being, is

given in the "world" as e-vent (historicity) and as such never a static Now. Furthermore, time as e-vent cannot be located as a point on a line because as movement it is not here or there. Primary time brings past and future into "presence," the latter being an open four-dimensional time-space con-

cept. If in every-day-life we measure time, as for example clock-time, this follows from the fact that there is primary time.49

Time is thus the great watershed that stands immovable between Heidegger and the East. Since time, like Being, is a process, the notion of eternity or a return to the source has no place in Heidegger's thinking. This major disagreement has, as we have seen, important consequences. Nevertheless, paradoxical as this may sound, when Eastern thinkers reach enlightenment, they have an experience which in the course of time has become one of Hei- degger's major concerns. It involves the question of language.

Eastern philosophers have a profound understanding of the fact that ordinary languages are ill-suited to describe the essence of Reality. The same

applies to Being. Roughly speaking, languages serve to organize, clarify, classify, and to make distinctions necessary for communication. It cannot be denied that the structure of ordinary languages best satisfies the goals of those disciplines which take a fragmentary approach to their subject matter. All languages show their limitations when the question arises of how to

capture a whole. One of Buddha's famous teachings concerned the doctrine of Not-Self. The great Buddhist philosopher Nagasena tried to explain this

concept to Milinda, King of the Bactrian Greeks, with whom he had lengthy conversations. In a kind of Socratic dialogue Nagasena led the king step-by- step to the awareness that just as a chariot can only be described in its parts, not as a whole, the "ultimate reality" of a person cannot be put in words.0 When Milinda asks Nagasena to tell him what nirvana is like, he compares it to the wind which is there, although it has no color or shape or any other

qualities and thus defies description. "Just so your majesty," Nagasena con- cluded, "there is nirvana, but one cannot point to nirvana, either by its color or shape."5' Nirvana is beyond words. Heidegger refers to Goethe's famous

poem "tber allen Gipfeln ist Ruh" [Above all Tree Tops is Quiet] in order to make the point that Being, like quiet in nature, is, although it has no qualities and cannot be depicted like an object.62 Lao-tzu claims the same of Tao: "The Way that can be told of, is not an Unvarying Way; the names that can named are not unvarying names."53

49 In "Zeit und Sein" [Time and Being], Heidegger develops this thought at length. 50 See Buddhist Scriptures, pp. 147 ff. King Milinda ruled from 125-95 B.C. 51 Ibid., p. 159. 52Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik (Tfibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), p. 68. 53 See Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 141, Confucius, it may be added, says about



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Like the wind or quiet in nature Being, nirvana or Tao are and "speak" to us in a silent voice, as it were. Western tradition has trained us to consider as "real" what is given to the senses. It is difficult, therefore, to speak of a silent voice, which cannot be perceived, as real. On the other hand, we all know that silence among people may "say" more than many words. Can the silent voice of Being or Tao not speak to us in a similar way? In 1959

Heidegger wrote for a Swiss newspaper some observations entitled "Notes from a Workshop" in which he had this to say about a silent voice: "Hearing is the guarded anticipation of an utterance which wrests what is to be said from the unspoken."54

When the Hindu realizes the identity of Atman with Brahman words cannot express the state of oneness with Brahman. The Mandukya Upanisad speaks of a "silent sound." The sound is the syllable Om (A-u-m), signifying the three stages of consciousness, which consist of the dream world, empirical existence, and ultimate reality. Hidden in Om, however, is a fourth state: silence. Heinrich Zimmer warns us not to separate Om from silence, but to consider the two as a unity: "AUM, therefore, together with its surrounding silence, is a sound symbol of the whole of consciousness and at the same time its willing affirmation."55 Although a phrase in the Maitrf Upanisad reads "by sound we go to silence," which seems to establish a time-sequence from sound to silence, another passage in the same Upanisad-"God is sound and silence"

-proves that this is not the case. In God there is no before or after.56 The Katha Upanisad expresses this thought thus: "Words and thoughts cannot reach him [Brahman] and he cannot be seen by the eye. How can he then be

perceived except by him who says 'He is' ?"57 One is reminded of God in the Old Testament, who tells Moses "I am who am." Of him who simply is nothing can be said. Indian thinkers are fully aware of the fact that silence is the best

approach to Brahman. "In India," Nakamura states, "the various religions refer to the sage and to the religious aspirant as 'Muni,' which means he who

Heaven that it does not speak. See The Analects of Confucius, ed. A. Waley (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), XVII. 19. Bodhisattva Maiijiusri, when asked about the attainment of Buddhahood answered: "Where there is neither word nor speech, neither revelation nor consciousness. Such a state of mind is called the attainment of the un- equalled truth of Buddhism." Quoted in Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan, ed. Philip P. Wiener (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964), p. 57. 54"Horen ist das zuriick-haltende Zuvorkommen eines Vorsagens, das dem Ungesagten das zu-Sagende ent-sagt." Neue Ziricher Zeitung, September 27, 1959. 55Heinrich Zimmer, Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 154. See also Swami Nikhilananda, The Upanishads, 4 vols. (New York: Harper, 1952), II, 245-246. According to tradition Gaudapada was the teacher of Samtkara's teacher. 56Juan Mascaro, ed. and trans., The Upanishads (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 102. 57 Ibid., p. 66.



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maintains silence. They believe that truth is equivalent to silence."58 Suzuki asserts that the experience of enlightenment in the East occurs at a height of

insight where words no longer apply.69 In the "Dialogue," which was pre- viously mentioned and to which we return now, Heidegger claims the same about primordial speech: "... Who is able to be silent about silence? This would be true speech ...."80

The conversation in the "Dialogue" focuses on the Japanese N6 drama as an

outstanding example of speech in the mode of silence. The empty stage of a traditional N6 indicates the void (Being). The actor must concentrate on the void and make his audience understand that he is signifying something specific on the ground of the void. Whatever he wants to communicate will be con-

veyed by means of a gesture, not by words. The Japanese partner in the conversation states: "If, for example, a mountainous landscape is to appear, the actor slowly lifts the open hand and quietly holds it over the eye on a level with the eyebrows."61 Heidegger realizes the difficulty for Europeans to make sense of such a gesture, untrained as they are to "listen" to silent speech. On the other hand, the gesture together with the void is suggestive for what Hei-

degger has in mind with Being in relation to beings and things. Being (the void) is the other to all that is (like the landscape, for example); at the same time, Being is the dimension where every thing or being is gathered together whole.62

In order to bring into still sharper focus what is meant by the void (Being) that lets things be, Heidegger finally engages his partner in a discussion of koto ba, the Japanese word for speech. "Ba names leaves, especially petals. You may think [the Japanese suggests] of cherry or plum blossoms."63 And "Koto, the e-vent being the illuminating message of that which is favored to come into being."64 Speech then is "petals springing from Koto."65 This latter statement embodies another essence of speech than is indicated by such terms as 'language', 'lingua', etc. 'Koto' like 'Being' is understood as the e-vent

through which things and beings are. Both terms indicate the realm of primordial speech. For a long time he has searched, Heidegger tells his Japanese partner, for a word to distinguish primordial from other kinds of speech. He

58 Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples, p. 59. 59 Zen Buddhism, pp. 252 ff. 60 "Wer vermochte es, einfach vom Schweigen zu schweigen? Dies miisste das eigentliche Sagen sein .. ." (p. 152). 61 "Wenn z.B. eine Gebirgslandschaft erscheinen soll, dann hebt der Schauspieler langsam die offene Hand und hiilt sie in der Hihe der Augenbrauen still iiber dem Auge." Ibid., p. 107. 62 Ibid., p. 108. 63 "ba nennt die Blitter, auch und zumal die Bliitenbliitter. Denken Sie an die Kirschblite und an die Pflaumenbliite." Ibid., p. 142. 64"Koto, das Ereignis der lichtenden Botschaft der hervorbringenden Huld." Ibid., p. 144. 65 Ibid. ". . . Bliitenbliitter, die aus Koto stammien."



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has finally found it in die Sage (primary utterance), derived from the ancient German word sagan, meaning "to show, to let be, see and hear."66 Die Sage precedes all ordinary languages because before man utters words he receives a message of or is "shown" what "is." Speech captures precisely that which has come into being and "speaks" in the silent mode of primary utterance. This is what Heidegger sees in koto ba.67

Of course, there are areas of thought where Heidegger and Eastern thinkers cannot agree, but their far-reaching understanding in the question of language reveals a deep kinship in philosophical outlook. This explains why the East, especially Japan, has had enthusiastic students of Heidegger's philosophy for several decades before the West, outside of Germany and France, took notice of him. In recent years, however, conferences dedicated entirely to Heidegger, as well as the many translations of his writings into English and the large number of books written about him, indicate a change in attitude toward

Heidegger's philosophy in the Western hemisphere. Is it a pure accident that, while many people in the United States look for inspiration to the East, Heidegger's popularity is steadily growing? I do not think so.

The present generation (not only the young) is getting tired of the frag- mentation and mechanization of modern life. Like many Eastern thinkers Hei-

degger provides an answer to a longing for new ideals, arising from different motives, that is manifest in various circles. A major reason for the malaise felt by so many must be seen in our alienation from the very root of our existence. Heidegger joins Eastern thinkers in opening an avenue leading modern man in a direction where he will gain a new awareness of his belonging as a

partner to a world much larger than himself. This awareness will rescue him from his isolation and at the same time give him a deeper comprehension of his own being.

In an age of constantly narrowing distances between nations it is most im-

portant that East and West not only come to a deeper appreciation of their

respective intellectual commitments, but that they communicate with each other in the true sense of the word. With the latter goal in mind it was the purpose of this study to call attention to the fact that Heidegger may indeed serve as a bridge between East and West, leading to a dialogue which he himself considers "inevitable."68

66 Ibid., p. 145, and "Der Weg zur Sprache," in Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 252, from where the quotation in the text is taken: "'Sagan' heisst: zeigen, erscheinen-, sehen- und horen-lassen." 67 See also Martin Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 54, "The Etymology of the Word 'sein'," where Heidegger also refers to a Sanskrit word for ist: "asus" [sic]. 68 See "Wissenschaft und Technik," in Vortrige und Aufsiitze, p. 47.



Documents

Feist Hirsch, Martin Heidegger and the East