Federal Aviation Administration NAS Enterprise Information System Security (NEISS) Vic Patel, FAA ICAP, ACP WG-I May 28 th – 30 th 1

Federal AviationAdministration

NAS Enterprise Information System Security (NEISS)

Vic Patel, FAAICAP, ACP WG-IMay 28th – 30th

1

2Federal AviationAdministration

ICAO ACP WG IBucharest, May 28th to 30th

Agenda

• Why do we need NEISS

• NEISS described

• Current status/activities

• Future plans



Introduction• The NAS Enterprise Information Systems

Security (NEISS) Program– Seeks to implement a NAS Security Architecture that

is based on Enterprise or “Common” Controls rather than the current system-by-system controls

– All NAS and NextGen Programs interface to and use the Common Controls to gain the mitigation benefits

– The five Common Controls that comprise NEISS



Changing Environment Increases Cyber Security Risks to the NAS

Today’s NASLimited inter-connectivity

Greater use of Internet Protocol (IP) and greater connectivity within the NAS requires an effective Enterprise Information System Security Architecture

Greater use of Internet Protocol (IP) and greater connectivity within the NAS requires an effective Enterprise Information System Security Architecture

• Planned NAS improvements

– Moving to net-centric operations

– Moving from custom to commercial software

• Cyber threats on the increase

• Planned NAS improvements

– Moving to net-centric operations

– Moving from custom to commercial software

• Cyber threats on the increase

NextGenSignificant inter-connectivity

Cyber risk

ExternalNAS

Sensors

ExternalNAS

Sensors

Externalusers

Externalusers Aviation

PartnerNetworks

AviationPartner

Networks

IPSWIM

SWIM

IPServices

IPServices

Externalusers

Externalusers

IP



Potential Impacts to NAS Are Serious

• Major disruption of NAS services possible

– Malware can enter the NAS accidently

– The NAS can be targeted

• Disruption can cause substantial economic loss

• Loss of public confidence in the NAS

• NAS disruption can interfere with logistical support of military missions



The Threat• Cyber exploitation activity has

– Grown more sophisticated– More targeted – And more serious

• The intelligence community has concluded that nation states– Have the technical capabilities to

• Target and disrupt elements of the US information infrastructure

• Collect intelligence information for future use against the US

• StuxNet – Specifically targeted an Industrial Control System similar to NAS



The Challenge

It’s hard to keep them out

When they get in, it’s hard to find them

When we find them, it’s hard to get them out



What Can We Do?

• Lay a solid foundation – Develop core Enterprise Solutions that position the NAS to deal with an

ever increasing problem

• Be agile– Develop techniques and approaches useful for defending and

countering cyber attacks

– Developing and enforcing Enterprise Solutions that can quickly adapt to the changing threat environment and apply to all NAS systems

• Be resilient– Adopt approaches for continued operations during cyber attacks

• Understand the threat– Characterize the NAS cyber threat environment

– Identify tools, techniques, and procedures used by adversaries



The Plan:NAS Enterprise Information System Security

•NAS ISS architecture was developed to provide a foundational cyber infrastructure for NAS enterprise security beginning now and continuing through NextGen

•Doable in five years- Enterprise-wide solutions- Minimal end-system changes- Expand existing program solutions where applicable

•Flexible and Scalable - Security solutions can vary over time.

•NAS ISS architecture will allow:- Improvements in security technology- New security features



01101

01101

The NAS ISS Architecture

Identity & Key Management

Internal Policy Enforcement

Incident Detection and Response

Certified Software Management

External Boundary Protection

T&E

Crown Jewels

Secured NASSecured NAS

Keep the bad stuff out

Protect the softwaresupply chain

If they get in, find themand deal with it

Know whom you’re talking to

Minimize damage and don’t let it spread



NEISS Design Principles

•Create a Cyber Security Infrastructure

• Enterprise wide

• Monitor NAS data flows

• Apply cyber security controls to data flows

•Majority of implementation involves infrastructure, rather than end-systems

•Modify enterprise controls, as new threats & controls warrant it

• Ongoing R&D effort

• Present controls represent 5 year timeline Minimize the damage once

in and don’t let it spread!

Identity & Key Management

Internal Policy Enforcement

Incident Detection and Response

Certified Software

Management

External Boundary Protection Know who’s who

Keep the bad stuff out

When they get in, find themand deal with the problem

Only approved software

Secured NAS



Under the Hood:What’s Happening in NEISS



Why a NAS Enterprise Information System Security (ISS) Architecture Is Needed (I)

• Growing and evolving cyber security threats– Cyber terrorism, cyber crime, cyber vandalism, cyber espionage, cyber war

• Evolution to support and enable NextGen – Increased levels of network connectivity (from point-to-point to net-centricity)– Newer technologies (satellite-based surveillance and navigation)– Increased complexity from interoperability needs (legacy systems and

NextGen implementation)

• Security is based around individual systems– Non-uniform security, the weakest link paradigm applies– Costly to implement

– Individual system security never intended to mitigate the advanced threats



Why a NAS Enterprise Information System Security (ISS) Architecture Is Needed (II)

• Architecture Provides– Uniform and enterprise cyber security capabilities– Layered cyber security capabilities (defense-in-depth)– Robust, resilient, agile and scalable cyber security capabilities

– Incremental approach



Why a NAS Enterprise Information System Security (ISS) Architecture Is Needed (III)

NEISS will be responsible for the implementation of the NAS EA ISS roadmap

• Benefits– Protect the NAS from malware and advance cyber threats

Organized crime, terrorist organizations, foreign governments

– Provide better opportunities to leverage net-centric services for security

– Greater network connectivity, newer technologies, greater complexity

– Provide uniform enterprise cyber security capabilities• Reduce complexity, weakest link paradigm

– Reduce implementation costs• One enterprise implementation vs. each system’s implementation



External Boundary Protection (EBP)

AddedApplication

Gateway

EBP consolidates all NAS level security controls that are applied to data that transit the NAS security boundary



External Boundary Protection (EBP)

FTI MATRIX



External Boundary Protection (EBP) Status

• Developing AMS artifacts supporting EBP• Working with SWIM and FTI to implement

early capability centered around the NAS Enterprise Security Gateway (NESG)

• Conducting the Operational Safety Assessment

• Future Activities:– Transition strategy– Governance– Guidance– FY13 Legacy NAS

transition candidates



Identity and Key Management (IKM)

The IKM capability allows users and machines to be identified and provides key services for authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation; wherever these functions are needed.



Identity and Key Management (IKM) - cont• Status: Actively Developing Requirements• Implementer: SWIM• Accomplishments:

– Defined IKM requirements in SWIM S2 FPR, – OSA data collection complete, – Leading implementation of IKM in SWIM Segment 1+

• Future Activities: Implement in test bed the four phase approach regarding integration with legacy systems.

• Issues: – Need clarity on allocation of some IKM functions, including Security Token Service– Selection of early adopters– Policy/Standards needed



Internal Policy Enforcement (IPE)

IPE mitigates the impact of security incidents within the NAS by dividing NAS systems and networks into enclaves and providing internal boundary protection (IBP) security mechanisms at the boundaries between enclaves.



Internal Policy Enforcement (IPE) - cont

• Status: Engineering new environment• Implementer: NEISS• Accomplishments: Defined Enclave Environment• Future Activities:

– Prototype IPE in test bed.

– Implement IPE in legacy environment utilizing a four step approach.

– Solicit support from different lines of business to test IPE design in and design secondary network for data transmission if enclave is compromised.

• Issues: Concern with cost for possible secondary form of data transmission.



Certified Software Management (CSM)

Potential Reference Model Based on SWIM SOA Potential Reference Model Based on SWIM SOA Software Acquisition/VerificationSoftware Acquisition/Verification

ScanBuildVerify

DigitalSignature

(IKM)

Authentication CheckHave vendor sign software

Integrity scan(Veracode)

per order1370.109

EBP

Progress/FUSERepository

Off-lineRepository

Internet

VerificationReport

TestRepository

SWIMWiki

Release & snapshot

Project ObjectModel

SWIMProductionRepository

Available forDownload

Located inMaintenance Enclave

Located in DMZ

The Certified Software Management capability ensures that malware does not enter the NAS via the software supply chain. CSM authenticates the source of the software, controls it’s entry into the NAS, provides secure retrieval, transfer, and integrity guarantee utilizing the IKM capability.



Certified Software Management (CSM) Status

• Actively developing requirements• Implementer: SWIM

– Augments existing CM process.– CSM will add

• Authentication Check - Vendor will Digitally sign software to be downloaded.• Integrity scan - Per order 1370.109 Software Assurance Policy• Digital Signature - Utilizing IKM to Digitally sign software approved for

distribution.

• Accomplishments:– Functional Analysis– Use cases– Started safety OSA

• Future Activities:– Determine process to authenticate with COTS SOA software provider



Incident Detection and Response (IDR)

NAS cyber security incident reporting, communications, monitoring, and maintenance




• Status: Policy Development

• Update of CONUSE and Functional Analysis Documents

• Implementer: NEISS IDR

• Accomplishments:• CEMWG was established to formalize/combine process of handling

NAS cyber events • Drafted IDR Policy and SOP • OSA draft complete




Future Activities: • Completion of Policy and SOP • Continuous update of the supporting documents as we evolve • Validation of SOPs

• Issues:• AMS process time – Training and resources needed • Technology – Tech changes and advancements • Use of automated tools for data and traffic flows to detect anomalies



Governance and Policy

SUBJ:National Airspace System (NAS) Enterprise Information System Security Architecture 1. Purpose of This Notice. This notice establishes the requirements for use of FAA National Airspace System (NAS) Enterprise Information System Security Architecture for National Airspace System (NAS) systems, including NAS performance-based service contracts. It also establishes the requirements for use of NEISSA enterprise common controls that provide security services to multiple NAS systems.

Establishing policy, procedures, roles and responsibilities for implementing the NAS Enterprise Information System Security (NEISS) Architecture



Governance and Policy - cont

• Status: Actively Drafting Policy– Extending Notice JO 1370.44 to include enterprise ISS and current NIST guidance – Working with FAA’s CIO Offices on incorporating ISS in AMS life cycle

• Accomplishments: Annotated outline

• Future Activities: – First full draft expected early January 2011

– Identify and integrate Enterprise ISS in JRC checklist

• Issues: Balancing specificity and clarity against length



NEISS Challenges• Disposition of the NAS Enterprise ISS

requirements– Need a way to resolve and approve changes (particularly deletion)

and implementation of NEISS requirements• Conveying an understanding of the NEISS

– Threat/risk motivation – Understanding capabilities– Programs need to be clear on when and how to adapt to NEISS

• Schedule, Funding, Requirements • ISS architecture governance

– What are the Rules (Policy)?– Who are the Gatekeepers?

• Establishing NEISS priority and importance – Urgency– Early funding

• Coordinating across the many stakeholders– Nearly everyone in the NAS/NextGen is a stakeholder– All need attention





Backup Slides



NEISS Implementation Alternatives*

Alternative Alt #1 - Distributed Alt #2 - Centralized Alt #3 - Hybrid

Description ISS capabilities assigned to selected existing NAS programs

Single entity to manage, implement and maintain enterprise cyber security controls

Centralized entity to manage, implement and maintain SOME of the enterprise cyber security controls

Benefits •Takes advantage of selected NAS program domain knowledge and experience

•Could minimize impact on current organizational structure

•May reduce time delay and new program start-up costs by using existing NAS programs infrastructure and organization

•Focus on securing NAS, clear responsibility and accountability

•Increased ability to define priorities, manage, and coordinate NEISS implementation

•Synergies with other enterprise programs (data center consolidation, enterprise services, etc)

•May reduce impact and resistance to organizational changes

•Increased flexibility to take advantage of program domain knowledge (distributed) or focus on cyber security (centralized)

Risk, Issues, Challenges

•NEISS implementation will depend on selected NAS programs

•Increased levels of management and coordination across programs

•Potential security accountability gap

•Selected NAS programs will need to acquire cyber security skills

•Requires a significant organizational and cultural change

•Requires additional infrastructure, environment, and funding stream for new program office

•Blend of Risks, Issues, Challenges from Distributed and Centralized alternatives

*Complete details provided in the NEISS Concept of Operations, v0.5