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The ninth annual Global Volatility Summit (“GVS”) is scheduled for Wednesday, March 14th, 2018 at Chelsea Piers in New York City. Alongside our featured volatility managers, we are excited to announce the addition of a Quantitative and CTA manager panel, featuring prominent portfolio managers in the space to share their views on the volatility markets and resulting impact on these strategies. 2018 MANAGER PARTICIPANTS 36 South Capital Advisors Argentière Capital Artemis Capital Management BlueMountain Capital Capstone Investment Advisors Capula Investment Management Dominicé & Co III Capital Management Ionic Capital Management JD Capital Man AHL Parallax Investment Advisors Pine River Capital Management True Partner
2017 Event Recap The 8th annual GVS featured fifteen volatility and tail hedge managers and hosted senior investment representatives from the largest global pensions, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, foundations, and insurance companies. The 2017 keynote speakers were the Founder of The Huffington Post, Ariana Huffington, and Bestselling Author, Daniel Gilbert.
Dear Investor, The Global Volatility Summit (“GVS”) brings together volatility and tail hedge managers, institutional investors, thought-provoking speakers, and other industry experts to discuss the volatility markets and the roles volatility strategies can play in institutional investment portfolios. The GVS aims to keep investors updated on the volatility markets throughout the year, and educated on innovations within the space. Artemis Capital Management has provided the latest piece in the GVS newsletter series. Cheers, Global Volatility Summit
February 2018 Newsletter
Questions? Please contact [email protected]
Website: www.globalvolatilitysummit.com
The following research paper is an excerpt from the 2017 Letter to Investors by Artemis Capital Management L.P. All rights reserved. If you wish to reproduce, reprint, or copy any part of this research paper you must request permission.
Artemis Capital Management L.P. | 98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 370 Austin, Texas 78701 | [email protected]
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Reflexivity in the Shadows of Black Monday 1987
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 1
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk The Ouroboros, a Greek word meaning ‘tail devourer’, is the ancient symbol of a snake consuming its own body in perfect
symmetry. The imagery of the Ouroboros evokes the infinite nature of creation from destruction. The sign appears across
cultures and is an important icon in the esoteric tradition of Alchemy. Egyptian mystics first derived the symbol from a real
phenomenon in nature. In extreme heat a snake, unable to self-regulate its body temperature, will experience an out-of-
control spike in its metabolism. In a state of mania, the snake is unable to differentiate its own tail from its prey, and will
attack itself, self-cannibalizing until it perishes. In nature and markets, when randomness self-organizes into too perfect
symmetry, order becomes the source of chaos (1).
The Ouroboros is a metaphor for the financial alchemy driving the modern Bear Market in Fear. Volatility across asset
classes is at multi-generational lows. A dangerous feedback loop now exists between ultra-low interest rates, debt
expansion, asset volatility, and financial engineering that allocates risk based on that volatility. In this self-reflexive loop
volatility can reinforce itself both lower and higher. In a market where stocks and bonds are both overvalued, financial
alchemy is the only way to feed our global hunger for yield, until it kills the very system it is nourishing.
The Global Short Volatility trade now represents an estimated $2+ trillion in financial engineering strategies that
simultaneously exert influence over, and are influenced by, stock market volatility(2). We broadly define the short
volatility trade as any financial strategy that relies on the assumption of market stability to generate returns, while using
volatility itself as an input for risk taking. Many popular institutional investment strategies, even if they are not explicitly
shorting derivatives, generate excess returns from the same implicit risk factors as a portfolio of short optionality, and
contain hidden fragility.
Volatility is now an input for risk taking and the source of excess returns in the absence of value. Lower volatility is
feeding into even lower volatility, in a self-perpetuating cycle, pushing variance to the zero bound. To the uninitiated this
appears to be a magical formula to transmute ether into gold… volatility into riches… however financial alchemy is
deceptive. Like a snake blind to the fact it is devouring its own body, the same factors that appear stabilizing can reverse
into chaos. The danger is that the multi-trillion-dollar short volatility trade, in all its forms, will contribute to a violent
feedback loop of higher volatility resulting in a hyper-crash. At that point the snake will die and there is no theoretical limit
to how high volatility could go.
Thirty years ago to the day we experienced that moment. On October 19th, 1987 markets
around the world crashed at record speed, including a -20% loss in the S&P 500 Index,
and a spike to over 150% in volatility. Many forget that Black Monday occurred during
a booming stock market, economic expansion, and rising interest rates. In retrospect,
we blame portfolio insurance for creating a feedback loop that amplified losses. In this
paper we will argue that rising inflation was the spark that ignited 1987 fire, while computer trading served as explosive
nitroglycerin that amplified a normal fire into a cataclysmic conflagration. The multi-trillion-dollar short volatility trade,
broadly defined in all its forms, can play a similar role today if inflation forces central banks to raise rates into any
financial stress. Black Monday was the first modern crash driven by machine feedback loops, and it will not be the last.
A reflexivity demon is now stalking modern markets in the shadows of a false peace… and could emerge violently given a
rise in interest rates. Non-linearity and feedback loops are difficult for the human mind to conceptualize and price. The
markets are not correctly assessing the probability that volatility reaches new all-time lows in the short term (VIX<9), and
new all-time highs in the long-term (VIX>80). Risk alone does not define consequences. A person can engage in highly
risky behavior and survive, and alternatively a low risk activity can result in horrible outcomes. Those who defend and
profit from the short volatility trade in its various forms ignore this fact. Do not mistake outcomes for control… remember,
There is no such thing as control… there are only probabilities (3)
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 2
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
The Great Snake of Risk
A short volatility risk derives small incremental gains on the assumption of stability in exchange for a substantial loss in
the event of change. When volatility itself serves as a proxy to size this risk, stability reinforces itself until it becomes a
source of instability. The investment ecosystem has effectively self-organized into one giant short volatility trade, a snake
eating its own tail, nourishing itself from its own destruction. It may only take a rapid and unexpected increase in rates, or
geopolitical shock, for the cycle to unwind violently. It is unwise to assume that central banks will be able to respond to
future financial stress with more stimulus if inflation is rising.
At the head of the Great Snake of Risk is unprecedented monetary policy. Since 2009 Global Central Banks have pumped
in $15 trillion in stimulus creating an imbalance in the investment demand for and supply of quality assets(4). Long term
government bond yields are now the lowest levels in the history of human civilization dating back to 1285(5). As of this
summer there was $9.5 trillion worth of negative yielding debt globally. Last month Austria issued a 100-year bond with a
coupon of only 2.1%(6) that will lose close to half its value if interest rates rise 1% or more. The global demand for yield is
now unmatched in human history. None of this makes sense outside a framework of financial repression.
Amid this mania for investment, the stock market has begun self-cannibalizing… literally. Since 2009, US companies have
spent a record $3.8 trillion on share buy-backs(7) financed by historic levels of debt issuance. Share buybacks are a form of
financial alchemy that uses balance sheet leverage to reduce liquidity generating the illusion of growth. A shocking +40%
of the earning-per-share growth and +30% of the stock market gains since 2009 are from share buy-backs. Absent this
financial engineering we would already be in an earnings recession. Any strategy that systematically buys declines in
markets is mathematically shorting volatility. To this effect, the trillions of dollars spent on share buybacks are equivalent
to a giant short volatility position that enhances mean reversion. Every decline in markets is aggressively bought by the
market itself, further lowing volatility. Stock price valuations are now at levels which in the past have preceded depressions
including 1928, 1999, and 2007. The role of active investors is to find value, but when all asset classes are overvalued, the
only way to survive is by using financial engineering to short volatility in some form.
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 3
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Volatility as an asset class, both explicitly and implicitly, has
been commoditized via financial engineering as an alternative
form of yield. Most people think volatility is just about options,
however many investment strategies create the profile of a short
option via financial engineering. A long dated short option
position receives an upfront yield for exposure to being short
volatility, gamma, interest rates, and correlations. Many
popular institutional investment strategies bear many, if not all
of these risks even if they are not explicitly shorting options.
The short volatility trade, broadly defined in all its forms,
includes up to $60 billion in strategies that are Explicitly short
volatility(2efg) by directly selling optionality, and a much larger
$1.42 trillion of strategies that are Implicitly short
volatility(2abcd) by replicating the exposures of a portfolio that is
short optionality. Lower volatility begets lower volatility,
rewarding strategies that systematically bet on market stability
so they can make even bigger bets on that stability. Investors
assume increasingly higher levels of risk betting on the status
quo for yields that look attractive only in comparison to bad
alternatives. The active investor that does his or her job by
hedging risks underperforms the market. Responsible investors are driven out of business by reckless actors. In effect, the
entire market converges to what professional option traders call a ‘naked short straddle’… a structure dangerously exposed
to fragility.
Volatility is now at multi-generational lows…
Volatility is now the only undervalued asset class in the world. Equity and fixed income volatility are now at the lowest
levels in financial history. The realized volatility of the S&P 500 Index collapsed to all-time lows in October 2017. The
VIX index also touched new lows around the same time. Fixed income implied volatility fell to the lowest level in its 30-
year history this past summer. The forward variance swap on the S&P 500 index is now priced lower than the long-term
average volatility of the market. In theory, volatility has nowhere to go but up, but lacks a catalyst given the easy credit
conditions, low rates, and excess supply of investment capital.
Explicit Short Vol $60bn
(pension overwriting $45bn , VIX $5bn , vol
selling funds $8bn)
Implicit Short Vol $1.4tn
(Risk Parity $600bn, VarControl $400bn, Risk Premia
$250bn, CTAs $175bn)
Share buybacks $3.8tn since 2009
Glo
ba
l Ass
et
Pri
ce G
ain
s &
Lo
ss
Equity Prices
Macroeconomic Short Volatility Straddle
Breakeven
5
15
25
35
45
55
65
1
10
100
1000
10000
18
51
18
57
18
65
18
73
18
81
18
87
18
95
19
03
19
11
19
17
19
25
19
30
19
34
19
37
19
41
19
45
19
49
19
52
19
56
19
60
19
64
19
67
19
71
19
75
19
79
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
97
20
01
20
05
20
09
20
12
20
16
Re
ali
zed
Vo
lati
lity
An
nu
ally
(mo
nth
ly o
bs)
%
S&P
50
0 I
nd
ex
(Lo
g)
Volatility of Equity at Generational LowsS&P 500 index vs. S&P 500 Index Annual Volatility %
1851 to 2017
40
90
140
190
240
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
% V
ola
tilit
y
Fixed Income Volatility at Multi-Decade LowsMOVE Index (yield curve weighted vol)
1988 to 2017
Source: Global Financial Data, Artemis Capital Management LP
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 4
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Whenever volatility reaches a new low the financial media runs the same clichéd story over and over with the following
narrative 1) Volatility is low; 2) Investors are complacent; 3) Insert manager quote saying “this is the calm before the storm” (8). Low volatility does not predict higher volatility over shorter periods, in fact empirically the opposite has been true.
Volatility tends to cluster in high and low regimes.
Volatility isn’t broken, the market is… the real story of this market is not the level of volatility, but rather its highly
unusual behavior. Volatility, both implied and realized, is mean reverting at the greatest level in the history of equity
markets. Any short-term jump in volatility mean-reverts lower at unusual speed, as evidenced by volatility collapses after
the June 2016 Brexit vote and November 2016 Trump US election victory. Volatility clustering month-to-month reached
90-year lows in the three years ending in 2015. Implied volatility has also been usually reactive to the upside and downside.
In 2017, the VIX index has been 3-4x more sensitive to movements in the market compared to the similar low-volatility
regime of the mid-2000s and the mid-1990s (see red line in right chart).
What is causing this bizarre behavior? To find the truth we must challenge our perception of the problem... What we think
we know about volatility is all wrong. Modern portfolio theory conceives volatility as an external measurement of the
intrinsic risk of an asset. This highly flawed concept, widely taught in MBA and financial engineering programs, perceives
volatility as an exogenous measurement of risk, ignoring its role as both a source of excess returns, and a direct influencer
on risk itself. To this extent, portfolio theory evaluates volatility the same way a sports commentator sees hits, strikeouts,
or shots on goal. Namely, a statistic measuring the past outcomes of a game to keep score, but existing externally from the
game. The problem is volatility isn’t just keeping score, but is massively affecting the outcome of the game itself in
real time. Volatility is now a player on the field. This critical mis-understanding of the role of volatility modern markets
is a source of great self-reflexive risk.
Today trillions of dollars in central bank stimulus, share buybacks, and systematic strategies are based on market volatility
as a key decision metric for leverage. Central banks are now actively using volatility as an input for their decisions, and
market algorithms are then self-organizing around the expectation of that input. The majority of active management
strategies rely on some form of volatility for excess returns and to make leverage decisions. When volatility is no longer a
measurement of risk, but rather the key input for risk taking, we enter a self-reflexive feedback loop. Low volatility
reinforces lower volatility… but any shock to the system will cause high volatility to reinforce higher volatility.
Self-Canibalization of the Market via Share buybacks
The stock market is consuming itself…literally. Since 2009, US companies
have spent over $3.8 trillion on what is effectively one giant leveraged
short volatility position. Share buybacks in the current market have already
surpassed previous highs reached before the 2008. Rather than investing to
increase earnings, managers simply issue debt at low rates to reduce the
shares outstanding, artificially boosting earnings-per-share by increasing
balance sheet risk, thereby increasing stock prices. In 2015 and 2016
companies spent more than their entire annual operating earnings on share
buybacks and dividends. Artemis isolated the impact of the share buyback
phenomenon on earnings, asset prices, and valuations since 2009 and the
numbers are staggering.
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
19
31
19
33
19
35
19
37
19
39
19
41
19
43
19
45
19
47
19
49
19
51
19
53
19
55
19
57
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
17
CO
RR
ELA
TIO
N -
SPO
T T
O 2
1D
FW
D
Mean Reversion in S&P 500 Realized Volatility1-month correlations of S&P 500 index realized volatility (rolling 3-years)
1931 to 20170.52
0.57
0.62
0.67
0.72
0.77
0.82
0.87
0.92
0.97
1D 2D 3D 4D 5D 6D 7D 8D 9D 10D
Forw
ard
Co
rre
lati
on
Trading Days Forward
Mean Reversion in SPX Implied VolatiltiyVIX correlation to Fwd Vol
1990 to 2012 2013-2017
-27%
-17%
-7%
3%
13%
23%
33%
43%
-10% -5% 0% 5% 10%
3d
% M
ov
e In
VIX
3 Day % Move in SPX
SPX Implied Volatility Sensitivity to Market Moves
Volatility Index % Move (y-axis) vs. SPX 3d % Move (x-axis)
1990 to 2017
-27%
-17%
-7%
3%
13%
23%
33%
43%
-10% -8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
3d
% M
ov
e In
VIX
3 Day % Move in SPX
SPX Implied Volatility Sensitivity to Market MovesVolatility Index % Move (y-axis) vs. SPX 3d % Move (x-axis)
1990 to 20171990-1996
1997-1999
2000-2003
2004-2006
2007-2009
2010-2016
2017
Poly. (1990-1996)
Poly. (1997-1999)
Poly. (2000-2003)
Poly. (2004-2006)
Poly. (2007-2009)
Poly. (2010-2016)
Poly. (2017)
Source: Bloomberg, Artemis Capital Management
$3
77
bn
$4
87
bn
$6
26
bn
$3
60
bn
$2
28
bn $
30
2b
n
$4
49
bn
$3
94
bn
$5
04
bn $
57
4b
n
$5
77
bn
$5
48
bn
$2
61
bn
2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 Y T D
S&P 500 INDEX SHARE BUYBACKS BY YEAR
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 5
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
The later stages of the 2009-2017 bull market are a valuation illusion built on share
buyback alchemy. Absent this accounting trick the S&P 500 index would already
be in an earnings recession. Share buybacks have accounted for +40% of the total
earning-per-share growth since 2009, and an astounding +72% of the earnings
growth since 2012. Without share buybacks earnings-per-share would have grown
just +7% since 2012, compared to +24%. Since 2009, an estimated +30% of the
stock market gains are attributable to share buybacks. Without share buybacks the
S&P 500 index would currently trade at an expensive 27x earnings. Not
surprisingly, a recent study found a positive relationship between insider equity
sales and share repurchases, supporting the idea that buybacks are more about
managerial self-interest than shareholder value(9).
Share buybacks financed by debt issuance are a valuation magic trick. The technique optically reduces the price-to-earnings
multiple (Market Value per Share/Earnings per Share) because the denominator doesn’t adjust for the reduced share count.
The buyback phenomenon explains why the stock market can look fairly valued by the popular price-to-earnings ratio,
while appearing dramatically overvalued by other metrics. Valuation metrics less manipulated by share buybacks
(EV/EBITDA, P/S, P/B, Cyclically Adjusted P/E) are at highs achieved before market crashes in 1928, 2000, and 2007.
Buybacks also remove liquidity. Free float shares and trading volume in the S&P 500 index have collapsed to levels last
seen in the late-1990s, despite stock prices more than doubling.
Share buybacks are a major contributor to the low volatility regime
because a large price insensitive buyer is always ready to purchase
the market on weakness. The key periods are the two to three
weeks during and after earnings announcements, when the SEC
mandated share buyback blackout period officially ends. The
largest equity drawdowns of the past few years (August 2015 and
January-Feb 2016) both occurred during the share buyback
blackout period. Both times the market rallied to make back all
losses when the buyback restriction period expired. The S&P 500
index demonstrates an unusual multi-modal probability
distribution during years with high buyback activity. The market
flips between a positively or negatively skewed return distribution
based on whether the regulatory share repurchase blackout period
is in effect. In addition, 6 of the top 10 multi-day VIX declines in
history, all 4+ sigma events, have occurred during heavy share
buyback periods between 2015 and 2016. Share buybacks result in
lower volatility, lower liquidity, which in turn incentivizes more
share buybacks, further incentivizing passive and systematic
strategies that are short volatility in all their forms.
Like a snake eating its own tail, the market cannot rely on share buybacks indefinitely to nourish the illusion of growth.
Rising corporate debt levels (see page 11) and higher interest rates are a catalyst for slowing down the $500-800 billion in
annual share buybacks artificially supporting markets and suppressing volatility(2j).
-5%
-3%
-1%
1%
3%
5%
7%
9%
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
Mar
-09
Sep
-09
Mar
-10
Sep
-10
Mar
-11
Sep
-11
Mar
-12
Sep
-12
Mar
-13
Sep
-13
Mar
-14
Sep
-14
Mar
-15
Sep
-15
Mar
-16
Sep
-16
Mar
-17
Sep
-17
EPS
Gro
wth
EPS
($B
N)
Earnings Per Share Growth with and without Share buybacks
EPS Growth%
EPS Growth% w/o Share-BuyBacks
Earnings Per Share
Earnings Per Share w/o Share-Buybacks12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
Pri
ce
S&P Index Price-to-Earnings Ratio & Adjusted Price with and without Share buybacks
S&P 500 P/E Ratio S&P 500 P/E Ratio w/o Share-Buybacks
6.5
7.5
8.5
9.5
10.5
11.5
12.5
13.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
EV/E
BIT
DA
Pri
ce t
o S
ales
Valuations Metrics not Influenced by Buybacks at 1999-2000 Levels
Enterprise Value/EBITDA
Price to Sales
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
8400
8500
8600
8700
8800
8900
9000
9100
9200
20
00
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
S&
P 5
00
In
dex
Sh
are
s
FREE FLOAT SHARES VS. S&P 500 INDEX
Source: Artemis Capital Management, Bloomberg
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
PR
OB
AB
ILIT
Y
SIGMA (1 = APPROX 1% SPX DAILY MOVE)
S&P 500 Index Probability Distribution Historic Average (Blue) compared to July 2015 to Feb 2016
(Gradient)
1990 to 2016
July 2015 to Feb2016
Source: Artemis Capital Management LP, Bloomberg
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 6
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Global Short Volatility Trade
The short volatility trade is any strategy that derives small incremental gains
on the assumption of stability in exchange for substantial loss in the event of
change, whereby volatility is a critical input to the allocation of risk. Short
volatility can be executed explicitly with options, or implicitly via financial
engineering. To understand this concept, it is helpful to decompose the key
risks. The investor holding a portfolio of hedged short options receives an
upfront premium, or yield, in exchange for a non-linear risk profile to four
key exposures 1) Rising Volatility; 2) Gamma or Jump Risk; 3) Rising
Interest Rates; 4) Unstable Cross-Asset Correlations. Many institutional
strategies derive excess returns by implicitly shorting those exact same risk
factors despite never trading an option or VIX future. As of 2017, there is an
estimated $1.18 to 1.48 trillion dollars(2) of active short volatility exposure
in domestic equity markets. In this paper we will focus on short volatility in
US equity markets, however the short volatility trade, in all its forms, is
widely practiced across all major asset classes. In world of ultra-low interest
rates shorting volatility has become an alternative to fixed income. For the
first time in history the yield earned on an explicit short volatility position is
competitive with a wide array of sovereign and corporate debt (see below).
Explicit Short Volatility are strategies that literally sell options to generate yield from asset price stability or falling stock
market variance. The category includes everything from popular short volatility exchange-traded-products to call and put
writing programs employed by pension funds. Despite the headlines, this is the smallest portion of the short volatility trade.
Explicit short volatility contains upward of only $60 billion in assets, including $45 billion in short volatility pension put
and call writing strategies(2g), $8 billion in short volatility overwriting funds(2f), $2 billion in short volatility exchange traded
products(2e), and another $3 billion in speculative VIX shorts(2e). Explicit short volatility strategies are active in the short
term, fading short and intermediate volatility spikes. Volatility spikes that mean revert quickly help the performance of
these strategies (August 2015). Explicit short volatility is most harmed by an extended period of high volatility that fails to
mean revert, such as in 1928 or 2008, or a super-normal volatility spikes such as the Black Monday 1987 crash.
Implicit Short Volatility are strategies that, although not directly selling options, use financial engineering to generate
excess returns by exposure to the same risk factors as a short option portfolio. Many investors, and even practitioners, are
ignorant or in denial that they are holding a synthetic short option in their portfolio. In current markets, there is an estimated
$1.12 to $1.42 trillion in implicit short volatility exposure, including between $400 billion in volatility control funds (2b),
$400 to $600 billion in risk parity(2a), $70-175 billion from long equity trend following strategies(2c), and $250 billion in risk
premia strategies(2d). These strategies are similar to a short option position because they produce efficient gains most of the
time, but are subject to non-linear losses based on variance, gamma, rates, or correlation change. The strategies tend to have
longer time horizons for rebalancing than explicit short volatility. In practice, exposure to equities is reduced based on the
accumulation of variance over one to three months.
The next few pages will focus on some of the hidden risks in the short volatility trade, both explicitly and implicitly.
-1%
1%
3%
5%
7%
9%
11%
13%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Yield on Selling S&P 500 Put Option vs. Traditional Fixed Income 1990 to 2017
Volatility Yield% (sell 1yr SPX put / -25% discount)US 10yr%Germany 10yr%Japan 10yr%France 10yr%UK 10yr%Aaa Corporate Bond Yield%Baa Corporate Bond Yield%
Source: Artemis Capital Management LP, LiveVol, Bloomberg
Explicit Short Vol $60bn
Implicit Short Vol $1.4tn
Ga
ins
an
d L
oss
es
Equity Prices
Implicit and Explicit Short Volatility Straddle
Breakeven
Volatility Targeting $400bn
Risk Parity$600bn
Risk Premia$250bn
CTAs$175bn
VIX ETPs$2bn
Spec. VIX$3bn
Pension Overwriting
$45bn
Option Funds $8bn
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 7
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Gamma Risk
Imagine you are balancing a tall ruler vertically on your palm. As the ruler tilts in any one direction, you must to
overcompensate in the same direction to keep to the ruler balanced. This is conceptually very similar to a trader hedging an
option with high gamma risk. The trader must incrementally sell (or buy) more of the underlying at a non-linear pace to re-
hedge price fluctuations.
A short gamma risk profile is not unique to option selling, and is a hidden component of many institutional asset
management products. The portfolio insurance strategy credited with causing the 1987 Black Monday Crash is a classic
example of a short gamma profile gone awry. When large
numbers of market participants are short gamma, implicitly
or explicitly, the effect can reinforce price direction into
periods of high turbulence. Risk parity, volatility targeting
funds, and long equity trend following funds are all forced
to de-leverage non-linearly into periods of rising volatility,
hence they have synthetic gamma risk. At current risk
levels, we estimate as much as $600 billion in selling
pressure would emerge from implicit short gamma
exposure if the market declined just -10% with higher vol (10). Many of these strategies rely on accumulation of one to
three month realized variance to trigger that de-leveraging
process. Hence the short gamma buying and selling
pressure operates on a time lag to the market. During the
drawdowns in the fall of 2015 and early-2016, share
buybacks helped the market rebound quickly minimizing
the effect of ‘short-gamma’’ de-leveraging. This further
emboldened explicit short volatility traders to continue to
fade any volatility spikes. If the first leg of a crisis is strong
enough to sustain a market loss beyond -10%, short-gamma
de-leveraging will likely kick-start a second leg down,
causing cascading losses for anyone that buys the dip.
Correlation and Interest Rate Risk
The concept of diversification is the foundation of modern portfolio theory. Like a wizard, the financial engineer is
somehow able to magically reduce the risk of a portfolio by combining anti-correlated assets. The theory failed spectacularly
in the 2008 crash when correlations converged. You can never destroy risk, only transmute it. All modern portfolio theory
does is transfer price risk into hidden short correlation risk. There is nothing wrong with that, except for the fact it is not
what many investors were told, or signed up for.
Correlation risk can be isolated and actively traded
via options as source of excess returns. Volatility
traders on a dispersion desk will explicitly short
correlations by selling the variance of an index and
going long the weighted variance of its
constituents. When correlations are stable or
decreasing, the strategy is very effective, but when
correlations behave erratically large losses will
occur. The graph to the right shows the collapse of
correlations between normal and stressed markets.
Many popular institutional investment strategies
derive excess returns via implicit leveraged short
correlation trades with hidden fragility
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
SPX 0% Vol≈5%
SPX -1% Vol≈8%
SPX -2% Vol≈10%
SPX -3% Vol≈13%
SPX -4% Vol≈15%
SPX -5% Vol≈18%
SPX -6% Vol≈20%
SPX -7% Vol≈23%
SPX -8% Vol≈25%
SPX -10% Vol≈28%
SPX -11% Vol≈30%
$ bi
llion
equ
ity
sale
s
Implicit Short GammaEstimated Equity De-Leveraging by % Move in S&P 500
Index and Volatility
Risk Parity Volatility Control CTAs
Source: Artemis Capital Management LP. Strategy AUM estimates derived from Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, UBS
XOM
MSFT
AAPL
PG
JNJ
IBM
T
JPM
GE
CVX
BAC
PFE
GOOG
WFC
CSCO
KO
HPQ
WMT
MRK
INTC
ORCL
PEP
VZ
CAT
GS
ABT
SLB
QCOM
COP
MCD
OXY
UTX
C
DIS
MMM
AMGN
UPS
HD
AXP
CMCSA
MDT
AMZN
CVS
MON
BMY
USB
MO
CL
KFT
BA
XOM
MSF
T
AA
PL PG JNJ
IBM T
JPM GE
CV
X
BA
C
PFE
GO
OG
WFC
CSC
O KO
HPQ
WM
T
MR
K
INT
C
OR
CL
PE
P
VZ
CA
T
GS
AB
T
SLB
QC
OM
CO
P
MC
D
OXY
UT
X C
DIS
MM
M
AM
GN
UPS HD
AXP
CM
CSA
MD
T
AM
ZN CV
S
MO
N
BM
Y
USB
MO CL
KFT
BA
Correlation Matrix of 100 Top S&P 500 Index Stocks21 day realized correlation / Nov 14, 2008
77 average correlation
0.50-1.00
0.00-0.50
XOM
MSFT
AAPL
PG
JNJ
IBM
T
JPM
GE
CVX
BAC
PFE
GOOG
WFC
CSCO
KO
HPQ
WMT
MRK
INTC
ORCL
PEP
VZ
CAT
GS
ABT
SLB
QCOM
COP
MCD
OXY
UTX
C
DIS
MMM
AMGN
UPS
HD
AXP
CMCSA
MDT
AMZN
CVS
MON
BMY
USB
MO
CL
KFT
BA
XOM
MSF
T
AA
PL PG
JNJ
IBM T
JPM GE
CV
X
BA
C
PFE
GO
OG
WFC
CSC
O KO
HPQ
WM
T
MR
K
INT
C
OR
CL
PEP
VZ
CAT G
S
AB
T
SLB
QC
OM
CO
P
MC
D
OX
Y
UTX C
DIS
MM
M
AM
GN
UPS HD
AXP
CM
CSA
MD
T
AM
ZN CV
S
MO
N
BM
Y
USB
MO CL
KFT
BA
Correlation Matrix of 100 Top S&P 500 Index Stocks21 day realized correlation / Mar 30, 2012
33 average correlation
0.50-1.000.00-0.50-0.50-0.00-1.00--0.50
Crisis Normal
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 8
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Risk parity is a popular institutional investment strategy with close to half a trillion dollars in exposure(2a). The strategy
allocates risk and leverage based on variance assuming stable correlations. To a volatility trader, risk parity looks like one
big dispersion trading desk. The risk parity strategy, decomposed, is actually a portfolio of leveraged short correlation trades
(alpha) layered on top of linear price exposure to the underlying assets (beta). The most important correlation relationship
is between stocks and bonds. A levered short correlation trade between stocks and bonds has performed exceptionally well
over the last two decades including in the last financial crisis. From 2008 to 2009 gains on bonds offset losses in the stock
market as yields fell. To achieve a similar benefit in a crisis today, the 10-year Treasury Note would need to collapse to
from 2.32% to -0.91%. This is not impossible, but historically there is a much higher probability that bonds and stocks rise
or fall together when rates are this low.
The truth about the historical relationship between stocks and
bonds over 100+ years is illuminating (please see our 2015 paper
“Volatility and the Allegory of the Prisoner’s Dilemma” for more
detail). Between 1883 and 2015 stocks and bonds spent more time
moving in tandem (30% of the time) than they spent moving
opposite one another (11% of the time)(11). Stocks and bonds
experienced extended periods of dual losses every 50 years. It is
only during the last two decades of falling rates, accommodative
monetary policy, and globalization that we have seen an
extraordinary period of anti-correlation emerge. At best the anti-
correlation between stocks and bonds may cease to be a source of
alpha, and at worst it may the driver of significant reflexive losses.
Volatility Risk
With interest rates at all-time lows shorting volatility has become an alternative to fixed income for yield starved investors.
The phenomenon is not new to Japan. For nearly two decades banks packaged and sold hidden short volatility exposure to
Japanese retirees via wealth products called Uridashi. Uridashi notes pay a coupon well above the yield earned on Japanese
debt based on knock-out and knock-in levels to the Nikkei index. In 2016 there was an estimated $13.2 billion USD in
Uridashi issuance(12). Now that low rates are global the short volatility trade is expanding to retail investors beyond Japan.
In the US short volatility has emerged as a get-rich-quick scheme for many of these smaller investors. The short VIX
exchange traded complex, at approximately $2 billion in listed assets, is the smallest but most wild segment of the global
short volatility trade. In the past you had to be a big Wall Street trading desk (‘Bear Stearns’) or hedge fund (“LTCM”) to
blow yourself up shorting volatility. Not anymore. The emergence of listed VIX products democratized the trade. A story
in the New York Times details the exploits of an ex-Target manager who made millions shorting a 2x leveraged VIX
ETP(13). Such stories harken back to the dotcom bubble of the late 1990s when day-traders quit their jobs to flip internet
stocks before the crash.
When everyone is on one side of the volatility boat, it is much more likely
to tip over. Short and leveraged volatility ETNs contain implied short
gamma requiring them to buy (sell) a non-linear amount of VIX futures
the more volatility rises (falls). The risk of a complete wipe out in the
inverse-VIX complex in a single day is a very real possibility given the
wrong shock (as Artemis first warned in 2015). The largest one day move
in the VIX index was the +64% jump on February 27, 2007. If a similar
move occurred today a liquidity gap would likely emerge. The chart to the
right estimates the volatility notional required for a +60% shock in the
VIX given supply-demand dynamic over the past five years. For a +60%
move in VIX we estimate ETPs would be required to buy $138 million in
vega notional in the front two contracts alone, equivalent to 142k VIX
contracts(12). This is over 100% of the average daily trading volume. In
this event, inverse-VIX products will experience an “unwind event”
resulting in major losses for scores of retail investor. Those shorting
leveraged VIX products will have unmeasurable losses. The products are
a class-action lawsuit waiting to happen.
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
18
83
18
87
18
90
18
94
18
97
19
01
19
04
19
07
19
11
19
14
19
18
19
21
19
24
19
28
19
31
19
35
19
38
19
42
19
45
19
48
19
52
19
55
19
59
19
62
19
65
19
69
19
72
19
76
19
79
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
93
19
96
20
00
20
03
20
06
20
10
20
13
20
17
Dangers of Shorting CorrelationBonds do not always move opposite Stock Prices
Relationship between 10yr UST Yield and Domestic Equity Earnings Yield3-year rolling correlation (monthly data) - 1885 to 2017
High Anti-Correlation (11% of observations)
Moderate Anti-Correlation (59% of observations)
High Correlation (30% of observations)
An
ti-c
orr
ela
tio
nC
orr
ela
tio
n
Source: Artemis Capital Management LP, Global Financial Data, Robert Schiller
-
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
J-1
2
A-1
2
J-1
2
O-1
2
J-1
3
A-1
3
J-1
3
O-1
3
J-1
4
A-1
4
J-1
4
O-1
4
J-1
5
A-1
5
J-1
5
O-1
5
J-1
6
A-1
6
J-1
6
O-1
6
J-1
7
A-1
7
J-1
7
O-1
7
Ve
ga N
oti
on
al (
mill
ion
s)
VIX ETP Vega Notional Required for Rebalance for a 60% move in the VIX Index
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
J-1
2
A-1
2
J-1
2
O-1
2
J-1
3
A-1
3
J-1
3
O-1
3
J-1
4
A-1
4
J-1
4
O-1
4
J-1
5
A-1
5
J-1
5
O-1
5
J-1
6
A-1
6
J-1
6
O-1
6
J-1
7
A-1
7
J-1
7
O-1
7
% o
f 1
0D
VO
LUM
E
VIX ETP Percentage of 10-day Volume required to hedge 60% move in VIX Index
Source: Bloomberg, Artemis Capital Management
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 9
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Shadow Risk in Passive Investing
Peter Diamandis, the entrepreneur and founder of the X
prize, said it best, “If you want to become a billionaire,
find a way to help a billion people”. The purpose of
efficient markets is to allocate capital to institutions that
add the most value. In a market without value, the only
thing left to do is to allocate based on liquidity. The
massive stimulus provided by central banks resulted in
the best risk-adjusted returns for passive investing in
over 200 years between 2012 and 2015. Today investors
are chasing that historical performance. By the start of
2018, 50% of the assets under management in the US will
be passively managed according to Bernstein Research.
Since the recession $2 trillion is assets have migrated
from active to passive and momentum strategies
according to JP Morgan.
Passive investing is now just a momentum play on
liquidity. Large capital flows into stocks occur for no
reason other than the fact that they are highly liquid
members of an index. All stocks in the index go up and
down together, regardless of fundamentals. In effect, the
volatility of the entire stock market can become
dominated by a small number of companies and
correlation relationships. For example, the top 10 stocks
in the S&P 500 index, comprising only 2% of index
membership, now control upward of 17% of the
variance of the entire market. The largest 20 companies,
or 4% of companies, are responsible for 24% of the
variance.
The shift from active to passive investing is a significant amplifier of future volatility. Active managers serve as a
volatility buffer, willing to step in and buy undervalued stocks when the market is falling, and sell overvalued stocks when
the market is rising too much. Remove that buffer, and there is no incremental seller to control overvaluation on the way
up, and no incremental buyer to stop a crash on the way down.
Shadow Risk in Machine Learning
Let’s pretend you are programmer using artificial intelligence (“AI”) to develop a self-driving car. You “train” the AI
algorithm by driving the car thousands of miles through the desert. AI learns much faster than any human, so after a short
period, the car able to drive at 120 miles per hour with perfect precision and safety. Now the car is ready for a cross-country
trip. The self-driving car works flawlessly, driving with record speed through the city, desert, and flatlands. However, when
it reaches the steep and twisting roads of the mountain the car drives right off a cliff and explodes. The fatal flaw is that
your driving algorithm has never seen a mountain road. AI is always driving by looking in the rear-view mirror.
Markets are not a closed system. The rules change. As machines trade against machines, self-reflexivity risk is amplified.
90% of the world’s data across history has been generated over the last two years. It is very hard to find quality financial
data at actionable time increments going back past 20 or even 10 years. Now what if we give all the available data, most of
it extremely recent, to a machine to manage money? The AI machine will optimize to what has worked over that short data
set, namely a massively leveraged short volatility trade. For this reason alone, expect at-least one major massive machine
learning fund with excellent historical returns to fail spectacularly when the volatility regime shifts… This will be a canary
in the coal mine.
Source: Bloomberg, Artemis Capital Management
17%
83%
Top 10 Stocks contribution to S&P 500 Index Variance
Top 10 Stocks Remaining Stocks in Index
24%
76%
Top 20 Stocks contribution to S&P 500 Index Variance
Top 20 Stocks Remaining Stocks in Index
Source: Artemis Capital Management LP, Global Financial Data
1
10
100
1000
10000
-1.10x
-0.60x
-0.10x
0.40x
0.90x
1.40x
1.90x
17
93
17
97
18
01
18
05
18
10
18
15
18
19
18
23
18
27
18
31
18
35
18
39
18
43
18
47
18
51
18
55
18
60
18
65
18
69
18
73
18
77
18
81
18
85
18
89
18
93
18
97
19
01
19
05
19
10
19
15
19
19
19
23
19
27
19
31
19
35
19
39
19
43
19
47
19
51
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
69
19
73
19
77
19
81
19
85
19
89
19
93
19
97
20
01
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
17
S&
P 5
00
IN
DE
X (
LO
G)
RE
TU
RN
PE
R U
NIT
OF R
ISK
(S
HA
RP
E R
AT
IO)
Best Risk Adjusted Performance for Equity Beta in 222 years3 year Rolling Sharpe Ratio (LHS) vs. S&P 500 INDEX (RHS)
1793 to 2017
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 10
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Conceptual Mistakes in Shorting Volatility
“I can’t wait for the next crisis because I can sell volatility at even higher levels!” said one institutional
asset manager at a conference. This is a commonly held but very dangerous assumption. Many investors
compare shorting volatility to selling insurance. The option seller collects an upfront premium with frequent
gains but large negative exposure to uncommon events. It is typical to erroneously conclude that selling
volatility can never lose money if you keep systematically rolling the trade forward. The flaw in this logic
is the assumption risk events are independent and probabilities consistent. In markets this is never the case.
Let’s play a game. You get to bet on a rigged coin with a 99% probability of landing on heads in your favor. If the coin
lands on heads, you win +1% of your bankroll, but if it lands on tails, you lose -50%. Do you play? Yes, the game has a
positive expected return, and given the law of large numbers you will always succeed if you keep playing. Consider that if
the probabilities decrease to a 98% success rate, the game becomes a net loser. Remarkably, a 1% change in probability is
the only thing that separates a highly profitable strategy from cataclysmic loss (see the statistics below). Small changes in
probabilities have an outsized effect on the profitability of any strategy with small frequent gains and large infrequent losses.
The coin game is similar to a systematic short volatility strategy, except in life you
never know which coin, positive or negative, you are betting on at any given time.
Worse yet, in self-reflexive markets the probabilities between coin flips become
correlated based on outcomes. For each loosing coin flip, the likelihood for another
loss increases and vice versa! You start with 99% odds and a positive expected
strategy, but after the first loss, the odds reduce to 90%. After two losses in ten, the
odds fall to 50%. It is not the first loss, or leg down in markets that hurts you, but
rather the second and third. Systematic short volatility without accounting for
shifting probabilities is akin to doubling down at a casino into bad odds. Don’t fool
yourself… this is exactly how financial crises develop.
Shorting volatility, in of itself, is not necessarily a bad thing if executed
thoughtfully at the right margin of safety. In our 2012 paper “Volatility at World’s
End” we correctly argued, against our self-interest, for the overvaluation of
portfolio insurance in what we coined a “Bull Market in Fear’ between 2009 and
2012. At the time tail risk hedging was very popular and investors shorting
volatility had a high margin of safety. For the reasons detailed in this paper, we
believe the exact opposite today.
Intrinsic Value and Volatility
This past summer the ever-wise Jim Grant of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer asked for my thoughts on the low volatility
regime. In the middle of my explanation on the short volatility trade, out of nowhere, Jim says, “What does any of this have
to do with intrinsic value?” I was floored… I honestly didn’t know how to answer his question. The truth… the short
volatility trade is about the absence of value. In a bull market, when investors can’t find value in traditional assets, they
must manufacture yield through financial engineering. In a mania the system begins to devour its own tail.
The difference between risk and outcomes…
Imagine your friend invites you over for dinner. In his dining room is a barrel of highly explosive nitroglycerin.
You: “What is that barrel of explosive nitroglycerin doing in your living room!”
Friend: “Oh that, no big deal.”
You: “It’s DANGEROUS! That could blow up the entire block!!! Where did you even get that?”
Friend: “Calm down, the bank pays me good money to store it here, it’s the only way I can afford the mortgage.”
You: “WHAT! ARE YOU CRAZY? All it takes is a small fire to set that thing off!”
Friend “What fire? There is no fire. Look, it’s been here for five years without a problem.”
Risk alone does not guarantee any outcome, it only effects probabilities. The global short volatility trade, in all of its
forms, is like a barrel of nitroglycerin sitting in the market portfolio. It may or may not explode. What we do know is that
it can potentially amplify a routine fire into an explosion. The real question is what causes the fire?
Source: Artemis Capital Management
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 11
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
The death of the snake....
Volatility fires almost always begin in the debt
markets. Let’s start with what volatility really
is. Volatility is the brother of credit... and
volatility regime shifts are driven by the credit
cycle. Volatility is derived from an option on
shareholder equity, but equity itself can be
thought of as a perpetual option on the future
success of a company. When times are good and
credit is easy, a company can rely on the
extension of cheap debt to support its
operations. Cheap credit makes the value of
equity less volatile, hence a tightening of credit
conditions will lead to higher equity volatility.
When credit is easily available and rates are
low, volatility remains suppressed, but as credit
contracts, volatility rises.
In the short term we do not see the credit stress required for a sustained expansion of volatility, but this can change very
quickly. Storm clouds are gathering around 2018-2020, as rising interest rates, rich valuations, and corporate debt roll-overs
all converge as potential triggers for higher stress and volatility. The IMF warned that 22% of U.S. corporations are at risk
of default if interest rates rise. Median net debt across S&P 500 firms is close to a historic high at over 1.5x earnings, and
interest coverage ratios have fallen sharply(15). Between 2018-2019 an estimated $134 billion of high yield debt(16) must to
be rolled-over, presenting a catalyst for higher volatility in the form of credit stress.
Reflexivity in the Shadow of Black Monday 1987
Thirty years ago, to the day, financial markets around the world crashed
with volatility never seen before or equaled again in history. On October
19th, 1987 the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than -22%, doubling
the worst day from the 1929 crash. $500 billion in market share vaporized
overnight. Entire brokerage firms went bankrupt on margin calls as liquidity
vanished. It was not a matter of prices falling, there were no prices. You
couldn’t exit a position. Trading desks refused to pick up the phone. Black
Monday appeared to come out of nowhere as it occurred in the middle of a
multi-year bull market. There was no rational reason for the crash. In
retrospect, financial historians blame portfolio insurance, ignoring the role
of interest rates, inflation, and the Federal Reserve. The demon of that day
still haunts markets, and 30 years later the crash is still not well understood.
Black Monday 1987 was the first post-modern hyper-crash driven by
machine feedback loops, but it all started in a very traditional way.(17)
Be careful what you wish for... Today every central bank in the world is
trying to engineer inflation, but inflation was the hidden source of the 1987
financial crash. At the start of 1987 inflation was at 1.5%, which is lower
than it is today! From 1985 and 1986 the Federal Reserve cut interest rates
over 300 basis points to off-set a slowdown in growth. That didn’t last for
long. Between January and October 1987 inflation violently rose 300 basis
points. Nominal rates jumped even higher, as the 10-year US treasury rose
325 basis points from 6.98% in January 1987 to 10.23% by October 1987.
The Fed tried to keep pace by raising rates throughout the year but it was
not fast enough. The quick increase in inflation was blamed on the weak
dollar, falling current account balance, and rising US debt-to-GDP levels.
None of this hurt equity markets, as the stock market rose +37% through
August 25th, 1987. Then the wheels fell off.
5
15
25
35
45
55
65
-30
-10
10
30
50
70
90
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
201
4
201
6
Net % of Respondents Reporting Tightening on C&I Loans (Large/Medium) and S&P 500
Volatility
5
15
25
35
45
55
65
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
197
9
198
2
198
5
198
8
199
1
199
4
199
7
200
0
200
3
200
6
200
9
201
2
201
5
Delinquencies as % of Total Loans and S&P 500 Volatility
7
17
27
37
47
57
67
0
500
1000
1500
2000
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
200
9
201
1
201
3
201
5
Volatility and Credit are Brothers in Risk Commercial and Industrial Loans vs. S&P 500 Index Realized
Volatility1973-2017
Source: Bloomberg, Artemis Capital Management LP
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Jan-
87
Feb-
87
Mar
-87
Mar
-87
Mar
-87
Apr-
87
Apr-
87
May
-87
May
-87
Jun-
87
Jun-
87
Jul-8
7
Jul-8
7
Aug-
87
Aug-
87
Sep-
87
Sep-
87
Oct
-87
Oct
-87
Oct
-87
Nov
-87
Nov
-87
Dec
-87
Dec
-87
10yr
UST
Yie
ld %
CPI Y
OY
%
Inflation and Nominal Yields in 1987
CPI YOY % (monthly) 10yr UST Yield %
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
10
30
50
70
90
110
130
150
Jan-
87
Feb-
87
Mar
-87
Mar
-87
Mar
-87
Apr-
87
Apr-
87
May
-87
May
-87
Jun-
87
Jun-
87
Jul-8
7
Jul-8
7
Aug-
87
Aug-
87
Sep-
87
Sep-
87
Oct
-87
Oct
-87
Oct
-87
Nov
-87
Nov
-87
Dec
-87
Dec
-87
S&P
500
Inde
x
Vola
tility
Stock Market in 1987
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 12
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
First the fire, then the blast…In 1987 portfolio insurance was a popular strategy ($60 billion in assets) that involved
selling incrementally greater amounts of index futures based on how far the markets fell (see short gamma risk, see page
7). The WSJ ran an article on October 12th that warned portfolio insurance “could snowball into a stunning rout for stocks”
(17,18). Nobody paid attention.
Although equity markets continued to rise into the summer, the credit
markets began to suffer from a liquidity squeeze. The spread between
interbank loans and Treasury Bills spiked 100 basis points in the month of
September alone, and then rose another 50 basis points in October leading
up to the crash. Corporate yields exploded 100 basis points the month
leading up to the Black Monday crash, increasing of over 200 basis points
since earlier in the year. By the late summer the equity markets got the
memo. Between August 25th and October 16th, the S&P 500 index fell -
16.05%. S&P 100 volatility moved from 15 in August to 36.37 on October
16th. That was just the beginning.
On Black Monday the market lost one fifth of its value and volatility
jumped to all-time highs of 150 (based on VXO index, predecessor to the
VIX index). In total, from August to October 1987 the market lost -33%
and volatility exploded an incredible +585%. Black Monday is best
understood as a massive explosion that occurred within a traditional fire.
Rising inflation started a liquidity fire in credit, that spread to equities, and
reached the nitroglycerin of computerized trading before exploding
massively. Central bankers were not able to cut rates at the onset of the
crisis to stop the fire due to rising inflation. The same set of drivers exist
today, but on steroids. Higher rates combined with $1.5 trillion in self-
reflexive investment strategies are a combustable mix. It is important to
realize that the 1987 Black Monday crash was comparable to any other
market sell-off until it wasn’t. The only difference… in 1987 volatility just
kept going higher and markets lower. The chart to the right shows the
movement in volatility leading up to crises in 1987, 1998, 2008, 2011,
2015. The point is that if you are a volatility short seller, how do you know
whether you will get a 2015 outcome, when markets rallied, or a 1987
outcome? You don’t! In 1987 inflation started the volatility fire, but
program trading amplified that fire into a cataclysmic conflagration. The
$1.5 trillion short volatility trade, in all its forms, can play a very similar
role now if rising inflation causes tighter credit conditions, but also limits
central banks from reacting.
Melt-up Risk. Never underestimate the will of global central banks to risk overvaluation in asset prices to achieve inflation.
For this reason, a speculative melt-up in prices on par with the late 1990s dot-com bubble is possible if policy makers
support markets perpetually amid low inflation and growth. In fact, one
legitimate argument for raising rates is simply so they can lower them
before the business cycle turns. High volatility and high equity returns
often coincide in the final phases of a speculative market. Very few
investors realize that between 1997 and 1999 the stock market experienced
both rising volatility and returns at the same time. For example, during this
period the S&P 500 index was up close to +100% but with over five times
the volatility we are experiencing today. The recent stock market bubble
in China also was an example of high volatility and high returns. Yes,
stocks are overvalued, but if rates stay low coupled with dovish monetary
policy and supply-side tax reform it could touch a frenzy in speculation.
For this reason alone, sitting on the sidelines presents business risk for
professional managers.
9.5
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
12.5
0.4
0.9
1.4
1.9
2.4
2.9
3.4
Jan
-87
Feb
-87
Feb
-87
Mar
-87
Mar
-87
Mar
-87
Ap
r-87
Ap
r-87
May
-87
May
-87
May
-87
Jun
-87
Jun
-87
Jun
-87
Jul-
87
Jul-
87
Au
g-87
Au
g-87
Au
g-87
Sep
-87
Sep
-87
Sep
-87
Oct
-87
Oct
-87
Nov
-87
Nov
-87
Nov
-87
Dec
-87
Dec
-87
Dec
-87
BB
B Y
ield
%
Inte
rban
k Le
ndin
g%
Interbank Lending & Corporate Yields in 1987
Interbank Lending Yield Corporate BBB Yield
10
30
50
70
90
110
130
150
S&
P 1
00
Vo
lati
lity
%
Black Monday 1987 Volatility Movement comparison to other Crises
1987 (Aug-Oct)
2015 (Aug-Sept)
2011 (Jul-Sep)
2008 (Aug-Oct)
1998 (Aug-Oct)
Source: Bloomberg, Artemis Capital Management LP
Source: Artemis Capital Management LLC, Bloomberg
Asian Crisis-11% DD
38 VIX High
Russia Crisis -21% DD
46 VIX High
1997 SPX
+28%
1998 SPX
+23%
High Volatility and High Returns in late-1990s
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 13
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
How does an investor survive the Ouroboros?
The markets are not correctly assessing the probability that volatility reaches new all-time lows in short term (VIX
<9 in 2017), and new all-time highs in the long term (VIX > 80 in 2018-2020)
Reflexivity in both directions is very hard to conceive. Volatility is low and can go
lower this year absent any catalyst. Rising interest rates, wage inflation, and credit
issuance are very real catalysts in the long-term. Between 2018 and 2020 high yield
issuers will re-test markets by rolling over $300 billion in expiring debt(16). U.S.
average hourly earnings are rising at fastest pace since pre-recession putting pressure
on inflation. If these debt-roll overs occur into rising inflation and higher rates this
could easily be the fire that sets off the global short volatility explosion.
If you are going to short volatility, do it with a long-volatility mindset, namely a
limited loss profile. Short-dated VIX put options that payoff with the VIX below 10
are currently 5-10 cents. Forward variance out one year is cheap and should be bought
into any period of rising interest rates, inflation, or credit stress.
Fixed income volatility is at all-time lows at a time when the Federal Reserve is raising rates
Something must give, inflation or deflation, but you don’t have to be smart enough to know what if you bet on the volatility
of fixed income.
Active Long Volatility and Stocks will outperform over the next five years
Long volatility is a bet on change, as opposed to direction. At a time when
central banks are removing stimulus, the world has never been more
leveraged to the status quo. For this reason, long volatility combined with
traditional equity exposure is an effective portfolio for the new regime.
Historically a 50/50 combination of the CBOE Long Volatility Hedge Fund
Index and the S&P 500 Index outperformed the average hedge fund by +97%
since 2005. The inclusion of long volatility reduced equity drawdowns from
-52% to -15% in 2008 while improving risk-adjusted returns.
The value-add of active long volatility management is to minimize losses in
stable markets while making portfolio changing returns in the event of a
market crash. The smart long volatility fund can offer protection at a limited
or even positive cost of carry. The combination of active long volatility and
equity has historically protected a portfolio from a deflationary crash like
2008, but can also profit if high volatility and high equity returns co-exist in
melt-up like 1997-1999. Long volatility may be your only line of defense if
stock and bonds decline together. At this stage in the cycle, you want to
position yourself on the other side of the global short volatility trade.
Risk cannot be destroyed, it can only be shifted through time and redistributed in form.
If you seek total control over risk, you will become its servant.
There is no such thing as control… there are only probabilities.
Christopher R. Cole, CFA
Artemis Capital Management LP
Artemis Vega Fund LP
98 San Jacinto Blvd, Suite 370
Austin, TX 78701
www.artemiscm.com
0.75
0.95
1.15
1.35
1.55
1.75
1.95
Jan
-05
Au
g-0
5
Ma
r-0
6
Oct
-06
Ma
y-0
7
De
c-0
7
Jul-
08
Feb
-09
Sep
-09
Ap
r-1
0
No
v-1
0
Jun
-11
Jan
-12
Au
g-1
2
Ma
r-1
3
Oct
-13
Ma
y-1
4
De
c-1
4
Jul-
15
Feb
-16
Sep
-16
Ap
r-1
7
Va
lue
of
$1
sin
ce 2
00
5
Historical Outperformance of Long Volatility Hedge Funds + Equity Exposure
2005-2017 (volatility normalized)
CBOE Long Volatility Hedge Fund Index + Equity Exposure 50/50
S&P 500 Index Fund
HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index
Source: Bloomberg, Artemis Capital Management LP
5
30
54
93
12
6
17
7
16
4
0
15
35
74
15
1
16
7
22
7
2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 3
MA
TU
RIT
IES ($
BN
)
HIGH YIELD DEBT ROLL-OVERS
Bonds Loans
Source: Bank of America
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 14
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
VOLATILITY IS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRUTH
Volatility as a concept is widely misunderstood. Volatility is not fear. Volatility is not the VIX index. Volatility is not a
statistic or a standard deviation, or any other number derived by abstract formula.
Volatility is no different in markets than it is to life.
Regardless of how it is measured, volatility reflects the difference between the world as we imagine it to be and the world
that actually exists.
We will only prosper if we relentlessly search for nothing but the truth, otherwise the truth will find us through volatility.
Artemis Capital Management L.P. is an investment management firm that employs systematic, quantitative, and behavioral based
trading models to generate returns from long volatility exposure.
The philosophy of Artemis is to profit from turbulence in markets and regime shifts without the substantial negative bleed associated
with traditional hedging products. Artemis seeks to provide long volatility exposure that, when combined with traditional assets like
stocks and bonds, can improve the risk adjusted performance of an institutional portfolio. The flagship Artemis Vega Fund L.P. was
established in 2012 and is a founding member of the CBOE Long Volatility Hedge Fund Index.
Artemis Capital Management L.P. and Artemis Capital Advisers L.P. were founded and associated portfolios managed by Christopher
Cole, CFA. His decision to form a fund came after achieving proprietary returns during the 2008 financial crash trading volatility futures
and options (as verified by independent auditor).
Artemis Capital Management is registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) as a commodity pool operator
(“CPO”), with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and is a member of the National Futures Association (“NFA”).
For more information please contact info@artemiscm.
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 15
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Additional Material
Research http://www.artemiscm.com/welcome#research
Volatility and the Allegory of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: False Peace, Moral Hazard, and Shadow Convexity – Q3 2015
Dorothy Thompson once said “peace is not the absence of conflict”. Never forget there is a form of peace and stability reinforced by
a foundation of underlying volatility. Game theorists call this the paradox of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and it describes a dangerously
fragile equilibrium achieved only through brutal competition. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is the most important paradigm for
understanding shadow risk in modern financial markets at the pinnacle of a multi-generational debt cycle unparalleled in the history
of finance. The paper argues that institutions should utilize a barbell approach to targeting the return distribution going forward
http://www.artemiscm.com/s/Artemis_Q32015_Volatility-and-Prisoners-Dilemma-x71i.pdf
Volatility at World’s End: Deflation, Hyperinflation, and the Alchemy of Risk – Q1 2012
This thought piece launched Artemis in the institutional derivatives community and was credited for shifting the pricing of long-
dated skew in S&P 500 index options. The premise argued that the left tail of the equity return distribution was dramatically
overvalued, while the right tail remained inexpensive when compared to the potential of reflation, particularly far out on the volatility
term structure.
http://www.artemiscm.com/s/Artemis-Capital-Q12012_Volatility-at-Worlds-End-4aim.pdf
Volatility: The Market Price of Uncertainty – CFA Journal January 2014
Artemis publication in the Chartered Financial Analyst journal that outlined the philosophy for ‘crisis alpha’ and volatility trading.
https://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/products/publications/cp/Pages/cp.v31.n1.1.aspx
Market Views http://www.artemiscm.com/ market-views
Star Wars Convexity – January 2017
The directing and writing deal that George Lucas negotiated for Star Wars in 1976 is an excellent case study for how a long convexity
position can be held at neutral to positive carry.
http://www.artemiscm.com/s/Artemis_Star-Wars-Volatility.pdf
Dennis Rodman and the Art of Portfolio Management – April 2016
Dennis Rodman’s ability to rebound a basketball made him, statistically, one of the most valuable players in NBA history. Even
though he couldn’t score, his six sigma rebounding dramatically improved the offensive efficiency of the players around him helping
his teams win five championships. Long volatility exposure offers a similar benefit to the institutional portfolio.
http://www.artemiscm.com/s/Artemis-Research_Dennis-Rodman-and-Portfolio-Optimization_April2016-efr3.pdf
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 16
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
References
All rights reserved. If you wish to quote or reprint portions of this article you must contact the author for permission.
Special thanks to Akshobhya Mann for her illuminating ideas on control, probability, and quantum physics which greatly informed the ideas presented in this paper.
Artwork
1. “Volatility and Alchemy of Risk” artwork by Bredan Wiuff based on concept created by Brendan Wiuff and Christopher Cole
2. Early alchemical ouroboros illustration with the words "ἕν τό πᾶν" ("one is the all") from the work of Cleopatra the Alchemist (c. third century, Egypt). | Wikipedia | “Ouroboros”
3. New York Times on October 19th, 1987
4. Roman Coin from Wikipedia
5. A copy of a 1478 drawing by Theodoros Pelecanos, of an alchemical tract[1] attributed to Synesius | Wikipedia | “Ouroboros”
Footnotes & Citations
1. “Ouroboros” Wikipedia | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ouroboros
“Ouroboros” Token Rock | https://www.tokenrock.com/explain-ouroboros-70.html
2. Artemis Capital Management LP gathered estimates for exposure to the “short volatility trade” from a variety of different sources deemed reliable including money center banks, research,
and data services. The exact numbers are extremely difficult to discern given the breadth of participants and required knowledge of the operations for thousands of private institutions. To
that effect, the results provided are a best efforts compilation based on reputable sources.
Implicit Short Volatility Exposures
a. Risk Parity exposure estimated at $500 billion by J.P. Morgan Cross Asset Derivatives Research Teams between 2015 and 2016 based on research notes by Marko Kolanovic.
$400-600 billion estimate is provided by the Financial Times as of 2016. “Little Known Trading Strategy Exacerbates Market Turmoil” Financial Times October 14, 2016 /
Wigglesworth.
b. Volatility Control Funds/Variable Annuity Funds exposure estimated at $400 billion in 2015 by Equity UBS AG Equity Derivatives Research Notes as distributed by Davide
Montoni. J.P. Morgan Cross Asset Derivatives Research Teams estimated this exposure at $200-$300 billion in 2015-2016 based on research notes by Marko Kolanovic.
c. Managed Futures equity exposure estimated at $70-175 billion based on May 2017 research note by Bank of America. “If Vol-Nuetrals are Finally Liquidating, Could They
Crash the Market? Here is the Math” http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-05-17/if-vol-neutrals-are-finally-liquidating-could-they-crash-market-here-math
d. Low Vol Risk Premia strategies exposure estimated at $250 billion by Rob Arnott of Research Affiliates based on 2017 interview in Grant’s Interest Rate Observer.
Explicit Short Volatility Exposures
e. $2 billion in VIX exchange-traded-product AUM, $2 billion in VIX short interest, and $3-4 billion in speculative VIX shorts based on data compiled from the CFTC, Bloomberg,
and calculations by Artemis Capital Management.
f. $8 billion in exposure from option writing funds estimated by Macro Risk Advisers in April 7, 2017 derivatives research by Pravit Chintawongvanich.
g. $45 billion in pension short volatility overwriting programs estimated as of 2017 from Deutsche Bank as distributed in 2017 Tail Risk Monitor. $32 billion estimated as of
2012 from Financial Times (via Deutsche Bank) “Search for yield leads to derivatives funds” Financial Times September 24, 2012 / Wigglesworth and Makan.
Share buybacks
h. Data provided by Bloomberg.
i. $780 billion in 2017 share buybacks estimated by David Kostin of Goldman Sachs, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/share-buybacks-will-return-with-a-vengeance-next-
year-2016-11-21
3. Special thanks to Akshobhya Mann for her illuminating ideas on this concept.
4. “Major central banks to turn up policy heat despite low-burn inflation” Reuters, July 20 2017 / Karunakar https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-economy-poll/major-central-banks-
to-turn-up-policy-heat-despite-low-burn-inflation-reuters-poll-idUSKBN1A50FQ
5. Global Financial Data
6. “The world is awash in $9 trillion of bonds that are guaranteed to lose money” Quartz June 14, 2017 https://qz.com/1005720/negative-interest-rates-the-world-is-awash-in-9-trillion-of-
bonds-that-are-guaranteed-to-lose-money/
7. Bloomberg
8. The author has been made this mistake, probably more than once.
9. “Managerial Self-Interest and Strategic Repurchases: Evidence from Equity Vesting Schedules” by David Moore / University of Kentucky 2017
10. Gamma estimated are best efforts based on analysis of rebalancing strategies employed by Risk Parity, CTAs, and volatility control funds. Author referenced the following papers for
guidance “Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity” by Asness, Frazzini, and Pederson Financial Analysts Journal 2012, “Portfolio Rebalancing Common Misconceptions” by Huss and
Maloney AQR Capital Management LLC
11. Global Financial Data / Robert Shiller
12. “High-Risk Investments Make a Comeback in Japan” by Kim and Vaghela, Bloomberg March 28, 2017
13. “Day Trading in Wall Street’s Complex ‘Fear Gauge’ Proliferates by Landon Thomas Jr. / New York Times August 28th, 2017
14. Based on models derived by Artemis Capital Management LP from Bloomberg Data.
15. International Monetary Fund Global Stability Report “Getting the Policy Mix Right” April 2017
16. Estimated by Bank of America
17. “A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with Discussion of Federal Reserve Response” by Carlson / Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-2013
18. “A Demon of Our Own Design” by Richard Bookstaber / Wiley and Sons 2007
Notes & Data
Global Financial Data utilized for historical time series data going back as far as 1200.
Security price data from Bloomberg
Options data from Market Data Express with calculations executed by Artemis Capital Management LP
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 17
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
Global Financial Data Notes:
www.globalfinancialdata.com
Long term government rate index: Data on government bond yields from several different sources. Data from 1285 to 1303 and from 1408 to 1500 uses the Prestiti of Venice. Data from 1304 to
1407 uses the Consolidated Bonds from Genoa; data from 1504 to 1515 uses the Juros of Spain; data from 1520 to 1598 uses the Juros of Italy; data from 1606 to 1699 uses General Government
bonds from Netherlands; data from 1700 to 1728 uses the yield on Million Bank stock; data from 1729 to 1918 uses the yield on the British Consol and data from 1919 to date uses the 10-year
US Government Bond.
USA 10-year Bond Constant Maturity Yield: Richard E. Sylla, Jack Wilson and Robert E. Wright, Price Quotations in Early U.S. Securities Markets, 1790-1860, Hunt's Merchants Magazine
(1843-1853), The Economist (1854-1861), The Financial Review (1862-1918), Federal Reserve Bank, National Monetary Statistics, New York: FRB, 1941, 1970 (annually thereafter); and
Salomon Brothers, Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads, New York: Salomon Brothers, 1995
Notes: Current yields on the 6s of 1790 are used from 1800 through August 1820, and the 5s of 1821-1835 are used from September 1820 to 1834. The Federal government completely paid off
its debt in the 1830s, so New York State Canal 5% bonds are used from 1835 to June 1843. US Government 5% bonds are again used from July 1843 to 1852 and 6% bonds are used from 1853
to 1865. From 1866 to June 1877, the 5/20s are used and from July 1877 to January 1895, the 4% U.S. Government Bonds of 1907 are used, and from February 1895 until September 1918, the
4% U.S. Government Bonds of 1925 are used. Where no trades were recorded during a given month, the previous month's yield was used. The source for this data is William B. Dana Co., The
Financial Review, New York: William B. Dana Co. (1872-1921) which reprinted data published by The Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Beginning in 1919, the Federal Reserve Board's
10-15 year Treasury Bond index is used. 10 year bonds are used beginning in 1941. Data for 1872 through 1918 are taken from the Financial Review. The interest rate series dating back to
1919 are taken from the Federal Reserve, National Monetary Statistics, New York: Federal Reserve Board which was published in 1941, 1970 and annually since then. The Commercial Paper
data for 1835 through 1871 are taken from Walter B. Smith and Arthur H. Cole, Fluctuations in American Business, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1935, and the Broker Call money data
are taken from F. R. Macaulay, The Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yield, and Stock Prices in the United States since 1856, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938. Yields
on Treasury nominal securities at 'constant maturity' are interpolated by the U.S. Treasury from the daily yield curve for non-inflation-indexed Treasury securities. This curve, which relates the
yield on a security to its time to maturity, is based on the closing market bid yields on actively traded Treasury securities in the over-the-counter market. These market yields are calculated from
composites of quotations obtained by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The constant maturity yield values are read from the yield curve at fixed maturities, currently 1, 3 and 6 months and
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 20 years. This method provides a yield for a 10-year maturity, for example, even if no outstanding security has exactly 10 years remaining to maturity. Similarly, yields on
inflation-indexed securities at 'constant maturity' are interpolated from the daily yield curve for Treasury inflation protected securities in the over-the-counter market. The inflation-indexed
constant maturity yields are read from this yield curve at fixed maturities, currently 5, 7, 10, and 20 years. Yields on treasury securities at constant, fixed maturity are constructed by the treasury
department, based on the most actively traded marketable Treasury securities. Yields on these issues are based on composite quotes reported by U.S. government securities dealers to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. To obtain the constant maturity yields, personnel at treasury construct a yield curve each business day and yield values are then read from the curve at fixed
maturities.Although the bond yield calculated by the Fed uses a constant maturity bond which is always exactly ten years from maturity, because the Fed does not provide the coupon on the
underlying securities for their constant maturity yield, it is not possible to provide the duration.
S&P 500 Composite Price Index: The Standard and Poor's Composite combines a number of different indices. From 1791 to 1801, GFD has calculated an equal-weighted index using data from
7 banks (Union National Bank of Boston, Massachusetts National Bank of Boston, the First Bank of the United States, Bank of the State of New York, Bank of Pennsylvania, Bank of South
Carolina, and the Bank of America), 3 insurance companies (New York Insurance Company, Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, Insurance Co. of North America) and two transport companies
(Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Company and Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company). Using Walter B. Smith and Arthur H. Cole, Fluctuations in American Business, 1790-1860,
Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1935, the index combines the monthly price indexes of Bank stocks (1802-1815, Bank and Insurance Stocks (February 1815-December 1845), and Rails (1834-
1862) from Smith and Cole, ibid.: and Railroads (1863-1870) from Frederick R. Macaulay, The Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States Since 1856, New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938. Where these indices overlap, the indices have been weighted according to the number of stocks included in the indices. Beginning in 1871,
the Cowles/Standard and Poor's Composite index of stocks is used. The Standard and Poor's indices were first calculated in 1918, and the Cowles Commission back-calculated the series to 1871
using the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. For more information, see Standard and Poor's, Security Price Index Record, New York: Standard and Poor's, 2000 and Cowles Commission
for Research in Economics, Common-Stock Indexes, 2nd ed., Bloomington: Principia Press, 1939. The 90-stock Composite was calculated from 1926 through February 1957 when S&P
introduced the S&P 500 stock average including 425 industrials, 25 rails and 50 utilities, weighting the index substantially in favor of the industrials. S&P did not calculate the 500-stock index
prior to March 1957, but used the old 90-share index (as well as the old 50 industrials, 20 rails and 20 utilities indices) to extend the data back to 1928. The daily closes listed in the Security
Price Index Record consist of the 90 stock averages adjusted to the new 1941/43 base from 1926 through February 1957, and the 500 stock averages starting in March 1957. Similarly, the
weekly/monthly data for these indices uses the 90 stock average, rather than the more extensive indices of industrials that included 400 stocks, and were calculated on a weekly rather than a
daily basis.High-low-close are available since January 1930 except for 1/2/41-7/30/46, 2/28/47-3/5/47, 10/24/47-10/28/47, 3/5/48-3/10/48, 5/6/49-5/11/49, 12/23/49-1/23/52, 6/27,30/1952,
9/5,8,9/1952. The indices were revised again in July 1976 when the rail index was dropped, and was replaced by the Transportation index, and a Financial Index was added. Until that time,
financial shares had been excluded from the S&P 500 because many were over-the-counter stocks making it difficult to calculate exact prices for the averages. The components were changed
from 425 industrials, 60 utilities and 15 rails to 400 industrials, 40 utilities, 20 transportation and 40 financial stocks in 1976. On April 6, 1988, exact numerical allocations were abandoned
allowing the sectoral composition of the S&P 500 index to change as new stocks were removed and added to the S&P 500. Data for the S&P 500 index is theoretical through 1983 and actual,
real-time data from January 3, 1984 on. Where possible, we have included high-low-close data for the indices, which meant readjusting the data for the period prior to March 1957 to the old
indices. High-low-close are currently available for 1930-1941, September 1946-December 1949, and beginning in January 1956. Other dates have the close only. The primary sources for these
data are Standard Statistics Corp., Base Book, New York: Standard Statistics Corp., 1931, Standard and Poor's Security Price Index Record, New York: Standard and Poor's (1940, 1941, 1948,
1955, 1957, 1962, and biannually since then), Standard and Poor's, Outlook, New York: Standard and Poor's (published weekly) and Standard and Poor's, Statistical Service, New York: S&P.
For a detailed history of the components of both the 90 and the 500 stock averages see the current and past issues of the biannual Security Price Index Record published by Standard and Poor's.
S&P has recently introduced two new versions of the S&P 500. The S&P Equal Weight index gives equal weight to each index rather than weighting the indices by capitalization. The O-Strip
index is an index of all the stocks in the S&P 500 that are listed on the NASDAQ.
The original 500 share indices included 90-95% of the capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange providing the most comprehensive index of stocks then available; however, the rapid
expansion in Nasdaq and growth in the NYSE has meant that the S&P indices now represent a smaller proportion of total market capitalization than in the past. The Wilshire 5000, Russell 3000
and Investor's Business Daily 6000 all cover substantially more shares than the S&P 500. Nevertheless, the S&P 500 still represents about 75% of the stock market's capitalization. To update
their index, S&P introduced a 400-share Mid-cap index (which was calculated back to 1981), in June 1991, and then introduced a Small Cap 600-share index in October 1994, which was
calculated back to December 31, 1993. The 1500-share Supercomposite was introduced in July of 1995 and calculated back to December 31, 1993. In January 2002, S&P introduced the S&P
1000 which includes all the stocks in the S&P 400 Midcap and S&P 600 Small Cap Index. Beginning in March 2004, S&P began adjusting their indices so they would reflect the free float on
their stock indices rather than the total capitalization. The free float method reduces the influence of stocks such as Wal-Mart for which 40% of the stock is privately held and not publicly traded.
Volume data are for the stocks traded on the NYSE, not for the S&P 500 stocks.
Volatility and the Alchemy of Risk Page 18
Artemis Capital Management L.P. October 2017
This research paper contains information and data compiled from sources the sender has deemed reliable. Artemis Capital Management LP and its subsidiaries are not responsible for errors or omissions in this information. The research presented is for informational purposes only and represents the opinions and views of the author. Artemis Capital Management LP and its subsidiaries are not responsible for investment results or actions taken based on any recommendations or viewpoints presented in this paper. This is not an offering or the solicitation of an offer to purchase an interest in Artemis Vega Fund, L.P. (The Partnership). Any such
offer or solicitation will only be made to qualified investors by means of a confidential private placement memorandum and only in
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Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN. IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR TO ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.
