Feb 23 Senate impeachment court record

8/2/2019 Feb 23 Senate impeachment court record

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2012 1

AT 2:19 P.M., THE PRESIDING OFFICER, SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

CALLED THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL TO ORDER.

The Presiding Officer. The continuation of the impeachment trial of Supreme Court Chief Justice

Renato C. Corona is hereby called to order.

We shall be led in prayer by the distinguished Senator from Aurora, Sen. Edgardo J. Angara.

Senator Angara.

Lord,

We convene here in search of truth and justice. May wrongs be made right

through the legitimate processes of law, not through men who, in their folly, think they

can wield it.

May fairness never be sacrificed in our search for what is just and true.

Remind us, Lord, that we would have to live with the decisions we make long after

this court has adjourned, and our country would have to live with these decisions

long after we have gone.

May the legacy we leave not be of rancor, but of unity. And with one mind and

heart, may we rebuild our nation based on genuine justice and equity.

Amen.

The Presiding Officer. The Secretary will please call the roll.

Republic of the Philippines

Senate

Record of the SenateSitting As An Impeachment Court

Thursday, February 23, 2012

Pasay City


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2 THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2012

______________

*Arrived after the roll call

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Edgardo J. Angara ............................................................... Present

Senator Joker P. Arroyo ................................................................... Present

Senator Alan Peter Compaero S. Cayetano ................................. Present*

Senator Pia S. Cayetano ................................................................... Present

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago .................................................... PresentSenator Franklin M. Drilon ................................................................ Present

Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada ....................................................... Present

Senator Francis G. Escudero ............................................................. Present

Senator Teofisto L. Guingona III ....................................................... Present

Senator Gregorio B. Honasan............................................................ Present

Senator Panfilo M. Lacson ................................................................ Present

Senator Manuel Lito M. Lapid ....................................................... Present

Senator Loren Legarda ...................................................................... Present

Senator Ferdinand Bongbong R. Marcos Jr. .................................. Present

Senator Sergio R. Osmea III ........................................................... Present

Senator Francis N. Pangilinan ............................................................ Present

Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III ........................................................ Present

Senator Ralph G. Recto .................................................................... Present

Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr. ..................................................... Present

Senator Vicente C. Sotto III ............................................................. Present

Senator Antonio Sonny F. Trillanes IV........................................... Present

Senator Manny Villar ......................................................................... Present

The President ..................................................................................... Present

The Presiding Officer. With 22 Senator-Judges present, the Presiding Officer declares the

presence of a quorum.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, may I ask the Sergeant-at-Arms to make the proclamation.

The Presiding Officer. The Sergeant-at-Arms is directed to make the proclamation.

The Sergeant-at-Arms. All persons are commanded to keep silent under pain of penalty while

the Senate is sitting in trial on the Articles of Impeachment against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

The Presiding Officer. The Secretary will please call the case.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer.The Floor Leader.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President. May I move that we dispense with the reading of the February

22, 2012Journal of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court and consider the same as approved.

The Presiding Officer. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the February 22,

2012Journal of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court is hereby approved.


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The Secretary will now call the case.

The Secretary. Case No. 002-2011, In the matter of the Impeachment Trial of Hon. Chief Justice

Renato C. Corona.

The Presiding Officer. Appearances, Floor Leader.

Senator Sotto. Yes. For the Prosecution, Mr. President.

Representative Tupas. Good afternoon, Mr. President. For the Prosecution panel, the House

of Representatives, same appearances.

The Presiding Officer. It is noted. The Defense.

Mr. Cuevas. For the Defense, Your Honor, the same appearance.

The Presiding Officer. It is noted.

Floor Leader.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, before the business for today which is the continuation of the cross-

examination of the witness, may we recognize Sen. Joker Arroyo for a manifestation.

The Presiding Officer. The gentleman from Makati and Bicol has the floor.

Senator Arroyo. Thank you, Mr. President.

Just a cautionary note. Yesterday, I asked the Prosecution whether Attorney Manuel, what is the

family name? Marlon Manuel is the lawyer of PALEA. Well, I ask this, anyone can answer, this is not

inquisitorial.

Representative Colmenares. Yes, Your Honor, Attorney Manuel is here, Your Honor.

Senator Arroyo. No. I am asking whether he is the lawyer of PALEA because you enlisted

his help.

Representative Colmenares. Your Honor, one of the prosecutors of Article III, Representative

Kaka Bag-ao, will be able to answer your query.

Senator Arroyo. No, no. My question is that there was a lawyer who appeared for the first time

to ask questions on Article III, more particularly when Mr. Javier of PAL took the witness stand.

Representative Colmenares. Yes, Your Honor.

Senator Arroyo. So, my question is, whether that lawyer whom I remember as Atty. MarlonManuel is a lawyer of PALEA?

Representative Colmenares. Frankly, Your Honor, I personally do not know the answer.

That is Article III, so we are asking Prosecutor Kaka Bag-ao.

Senator Arroyo. I am not talking about Article III, that is why I said this is a cautionary note.


Senator Arroyo. And I will say it now so that....

Representative Colmenares. Thank you, Your Honor.


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Senator Arroyo. I have been told by some respectable officials in the Department of Labor,

of course, confidentially thatyou know this proceeding is being watched in the national TV.

Oh, he is here. Is he not the one?

Representative Colmenares. Yes, Congresswoman Kaka Bag-ao, Your Honor.

Senator Arroyo. No, you better ask him.


Senator Arroyo. You ask him now. I am just going to ask.... That is a simple question.

Representative Colmenares. Presiding Officer, Mr. Marlon Manuel, Your Honor.

Senator Arroyo. No, the question is whether he is the lawyer....

Representative Bag-ao. Yes, Your Honor. He is the lawyer for PALEA.

Senator Arroyo. All right. Now, the Prosecution asked for subpoena duces tecum and

ad testificandum for the Supreme Court to produce and for some officers to testify on the PAL

case involving the labor union, FASAP.

The Supreme Court filed a return saying, in effect, that, We cannot do it because the case is

pending and also because there are some confidential matters which cannot be disclosed. Now, when

you hire, when you retain private counsel, perhaps it would be a better part of discretion that you do

not enlist lawyers who have vested interests, who have interests other than prosecuting the case. If the

Supreme Court brought the documents, then the lawyer of the labor union against PAL will see it while

PAL will not have access to it. That is what I am saying.

You know, I have been in the prosecution. Before we retain lawyers, we screen them and I think

you have been doing that. But, in this case, we accept, subject to the objection of the defense, any

subpoena, application for a subpoena. We do it and produce it if the subject agrees. So, I am justmaking a cautionary note because we do not know whether we are on the homestretch or we will still

go a long way. But that, in the case of lawyers being retained by the Prosecution, please screen them

so that there will be no statements or suspicions. That is all. I am not going to say that you have been

remiss or perhaps that is oversight. But, please be careful next time.

Representative Bag-ao. Your Honor, may I explain.

Senator Arroyo. Go ahead.

Representative Bag-ao. This is not an oversight, Your Honor.

First, let me tell this Honorable Court that Atty. Marlon Manuel is not a counsel for FASAP.He is a counsel for PALEA and those are two different labor unions. FASAP has its own set of

lawyers and PALEA is not involved in this case.

Second, Your Honor, we are very conscious of that fact. When we invited lawyers to be part of

the Prosecution team, we are very mindful of all these considerations. But we do not see any conflict

in terms of Atty. Marlon Manuel being part of the Prosecution, specifically to handle Article III

of this Impeachment Complaint.

Senator Arroyo. You do not see it but I see it. Because that is an obscurantist position.

The fact is that Attorney Manuels position is hostile to PAL whatever the case is. So, please, please

be careful next time. Thank you.


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The Presiding Officer. PALEA is Philippine Airlines Employees Association?

Representative Bag-ao. Yes, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. And the FASAP is....

Representative Bag-ao. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines,

Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. They have no affiliation?

Representative Bag-ao. No, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. The Floor Leader.

Senator Sotto. Thank you. Mr. President, may we now continue with the cross-examination

of witness, Secretary Leila De Lima.

The Presiding Officer. May we request the good Secretary of Justice to come to the witness

stand and testify under the same oath for cross-examination.

Thank you, Madam Secretary. The Defense Counsel has the floor.

Mr. Cuevas. Thank you, Your Honor. And with the kind permission of the Honorable Court,

may we be allowed to proceed.

The Presiding Officer. Proceed.

Mr. Cuevas. Good afternoon, Madam Secretary.

Ms. De Lima. Good afternoon, Sir.

Mr. Cuevas. Now, yesterday, you dealt very lengthily on the dissenting opinion of theHonorable Justice Sereno.

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Your Honor.

Mr. Cuevas. And in the course of your testimony, you dealt on a lot of alleged infirmities or

irregularities in the matter of issuing the restraining order involved in the case decided by them?

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Sir, not just the issuance but also the legal status or efficacy of the TRO.

Mr. Cuevas. And will you be kind enough with the permission of the Honorable Court to kindly

state again those infirmities that you found in the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Justice Sereno?

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Sir, but in doing so, can I also have the copies of the dissenting opinions?

The Presiding Officer. You may refer to the copy of the dissenting opinions.

Ms. De Lima. Thank you. I beg your indulgence of me being a little lengthy. And I thank you

for your question, Sir, to provide me or give me an opportunity to further expound on what I was talking

about yesterday.

Clearly, the November 15 TRO was conditional because there were three conditions stated therein.

So that the time that it was issued, that was before six oclock in the evening of November 15, there

has been no compliance yet. Not even with respect to the payment of the bond and even with respect


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to the appointment of a legal representative with the corresponding SPA. But it was issued even before

thatclearly conditional TRO. But it was made to appear that it was already immediately executory.

And that is why, in the evening of the same day, the former President wanted to leave. It was

announced by the spokesperson that, ....there is this TRO, the former President could already leave

Now, well, that is one.

Mr. Cuevas. That is one. All right, the second one is?

Ms. De Lima. Because the spokesperson had the apparent authority from the Chief Justice to

already announce those things. The next....

Mr. Cuevas. No, but I am referring, with your permission, Madam Secretary, I was referring

to the alleged infirmity or irregularity that you picked up from the dissenting opinion of the Honorable

Justice Sereno.

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Your Honor. I am just laying down these things so that it would be clearer.

November 18, they met again. Now, remember, November 18 is a Friday or was a Friday and

they do not ordinarily hold a hearing or a session, but it was called precisely to tackle the matter aboutthe nonimplementation of the TRO, since the TRO was not honored by us on account of the reasons

that I stated yesterday: no formal notice yet as of November 15 and no compliance yet with the three

conditions. They had to tackle that immediately on November 18 and there was this special session

on a Friday.

Now, it would appear, Your Honor, from the letter of Justice Carpio to the Chief Justice that the

very important points discussed on November 18 were never reflected in the November 18 Resolution

which was also immediately released on the same day. That is why, there was, again, an announcement

that the former President would be leaving, would try to leave again the country.

Mr. Cuevas. No, may I interrupt you, Madam Secretary.Ms. De Lima. Yes, Your Honor.

Mr. Cuevas. I am only asking you about the various enumerations that you stated you found in

the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno. I am not asking for an explanation, Your Honor.

Ms. De Lima. May I beg your indulgence, Sir, and Your Honor, that for a clearer picture, I need

to say this first, to narrate these things.

Mr. Cuevas. The picture is very clear to us. All we wanted to know is what are those alleged

infirmities that you found based on the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Justice Sereno. We will ask

you about your explanation and probably about your justification if we need it. But in the meanwhile,we are limiting ourselves to the alleged infirmities and irregularities which you said you found in the

dissenting opinion of the Honorable Justice Sereno. One of them is, as you mentioned, there was a

TRO issued, given?

Ms. De Lima. This is a conditional TRO but it was made to appear that it could already be

implemented on November 15.

Mr. Cuevas. The second one is?

Ms. De Lima. The second one is the exact voting on the matters voted upon on November 18

were not duly reflected in November 18.


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Mr. Cuevas. And the third one is?

Ms. De Lima. The third is, they wanted towell, because of that, Justice Carpio asked for a

Clarificatory Resolution in order to clarify the November 18 Resolution because it was never stated in

the November 18 Resolution that there was no compliance yet of the conditions and that it is not

deemed, or it is deemed suspended until compliance with the condition.

Mr. Cuevas. Now, with your permission, I am not referring to the dissenting opinion of Justice

Carpio. I am limiting myself to the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Justice Sereno.

Ms. De Lima. That matter is....

Mr. Cuevas. The third one is?

Ms. De Lima. Let me just answer, Sir. That matter was reflected in the dissenting opinion of

Justice Sereno. In fact, Justice Sereno quoted verbatim the letter of Justice Carpio.

Mr. Cuevas. So that is the third one.

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Sir.

Mr. Cuevas. Any other infirmity that you discovered upon a perusal of the dissenting opinion of

Justice Sereno?

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Sir. The supposed Clarificatory Resolution of November 18, the

Clarificatory Resolution of November 22 as assigned to Justice Velasco for the drafting and again,

Justice Carpio noted that instead of clarifying the exact voting and matters voted upon on November

18, it only served to compound the error because the Chief Justice produced his own version of the

November 22 Clarificatory Resolution which did not reflect the correct voting.

Mr. Cuevas. Be that as it may, Madam Secretary, are there other observations that you

discovered in that alleged dissenting opinion of the Honorable Justice Sereno?

Ms. De Lima. Yes, the attempt to suppress, or the suppression, in fact, of the December 2

dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno.

Mr. Cuevas. I see. And what else, if there are any? Nothing more?

Ms. De Lima. There are more, if only I have the opportunity to really explain.

Mr. Cuevas. You are not prepared to deal with them as of today?

Ms. De Lima. I can deal with them.

Mr. Cuevas. Please do so. With the permission of the Honorable Juror.

The Presiding Officer. Proceed, Madam Secretary.

Ms. De Lima. Well, as I was saying....

Representative Daza. Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer. Yes?

Representative Daza. May I request that the witness be given a couple of minutes to go over

the thick dissenting opinion to which the distinguished Defense Counsel refers and on which the Defense

Counsel bases his question.


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Mr. Cuevas. I will have no objection, Your Honor, if request to that effect is made. But I was

on the assumption that the brilliant Secretary of Justice is very much in a position to go ahead or

proceed with her testimony.

The Presiding Officer. If Madam Secretary will request it, I will give her all the time.

Mr. Cuevas. Thank you, Mr. President.The Presiding Officer. Madam Secretary?

Ms. De Lima. Thank you, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. How many minutes do you need to....

Ms. De Lima. Two minutes, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. You have five minutes.

The Presiding Officer. The trial is suspended for five minutes if there no objection.

[There was none.]

The trial was suspended at 2:36 p.m.

At 2:37 p.m., the trial was resumed.

The Presiding Officer. The trial is resumed.

Ms. De Lima. Thank you, Your Honor.

Another questionable or irregular act on the part of the Respondent Chief Justice Corona is the

failure to correct all the misleading and inaccurate disclosures of the spokesperson, including the

misrepresentation that the voting was 9-4, when, in fact, it was 7-6; including the misrepresentation that

as of November 15, and even as of November 18, the TRO was not yet effective.

Mr. Cuevas. This is on the basis of your examination, or reading of the dissenting opinion of the

Honorable Justice Sereno.

Ms. De Lima. Of the Honorable Justice Sereno and Justice Carpio. Yes, Sir.

Mr. Cuevas. No, I am limiting myself only to Justice Serenos dissenting.


Mr. Cuevas. Anything more? Something that is substantial.

Ms. De Lima. These are very substantial.

Mr. Cuevas. Yes, Your Honor.

Ms. De Lima. Especially, the changing of the draft from the drafter of the November 22, the

alteration of the draft of the November 22 Resolution, from the statement that there was no compliance

of the conditional TRO to there was substantial compliance with the conditions of the

conditional TRO.

Mr. Cuevas. Are you now through?



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Mr. Cuevas. My understanding based from your answer....

The Presiding Officer. Just to clarify. Who was the drafter in particular?

Ms. De Lima. It was assigned, Your Honor, to Justice Velasco by Chief Justice.

The Presiding Officer. And he drafted the resolution.

Ms. De Lima. He drafted the November 22.

The Presiding Officer. Resolution.

Ms. De Lima. Resolution. Yes, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. And there were changes.


Mr. Cuevas. May I now proceed, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. You may proceed.

Mr. Cuevas. Thank you, Your Honor. Now, based on your answer now, I gather the impression

that all the matters you stated a while ago came from your perusal or reading of Justice Serenos

dissenting opinion.


Mr. Cuevas. So much so that they are not from your own personal knowledge.

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Sir. I am not a member of the Supreme Court.

Mr. Cuevas. In other words, what you have told us insofar as you are concerned are merely

purely hearsay because they do not come from your own personal knowledge.

Representative Daza. Objection, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. What is the ground for the objection?

Representative Daza. The question is misleading. The dissenting opinion is a matter of judicial

notice. In fact, we have marked this dissenting opinion as an exhibit for the Prosecution.

Mr. Cuevas. That is not the subject of the examination, Your Honor. Go ahead, please,

I am sorry.

Representative Daza. The question is leading in form but it is misleading in substance because

the question is, all that you have said or what you have testified to is hearsay, which is not so, which

is misleading because as she testified and as the question called for, she was reading from the dissenting

opinion which, as I said, is a matter of judicial notice.

Mr. Cuevas. That is precisely the basis of my question. What the witness told the Court is merely

what she gathered from the dissenting opinion and not from her own personal knowledge.

The Presiding Officer. The Secretary may answer.

Ms. De Lima. Based on an official document officially released to the parties.


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Mr. Cuevas. All right.

The Presiding Officer. I would like to clarify the reason for this ruling so that the people will not

misunderstand because we are dealing with the rules of evidence. The Secretary, indeed, read the

dissenting opinion, and by reading that dissenting opinion she has knowledge of the facts stated in that

dissenting opinion. But to the extent of the truth or falsity of what is being stated in that dissenting

opinion, if there is any falsehood is hearsay as far as the witness is concerned because she is not presentin the proceedings of the Supreme Court. That is why I allowed the Secretary to answer.

Representative Daza. Mr. President, I only objected to the use of the word hearsay.

The Presiding Officer. Yes.

Representative Daza. I objected to it because....

Mr. Cuevas. Sa Tagalog hindi galing sa inyong sariling kaalaman. Because you said

hearsay, so I am elucidating on that.

Representative Daza. No, I just objected, tumutol po ako, Ginoong Pangulo, doon sa paggamit ng Kgg. na Tagapagtanggol ng salitang hearsay sapagkat ang hearsay po ay may

kahulugan sang-ayon sa ating rules of evidence.

The Presiding Officer. Naiintindihan po ng Presiding Officer iyan. Pero ang ating testigo

dito ay hindi pangkaraniwang testigo. Siya ay tanyag na abogado, alam niya ang ibig sabihin

ng hearsay at intelihenteng testigo ang ating Kalihim. Puwede niyang sagutin iyon, kaya ang

ruling ng Presiding Officer: She must answer. [The Presiding Officer banging the gavel.]

Representative Daza. Tinatanggap po namin iyon, Ginoong Pangulo.

Mr. Cuevas. May we be allowed to proceed, Your Honor.


Mr. Cuevas. All right. Now, you also made us understand that the basis of the information you

revealed to this Honorable Court on the issue of alleged infirmity or irregularity is solely on the basis

of the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno, am I right?

Ms. De Lima. On the basis of the dissenting opinions, not just of Justice Sereno but of Justice

Carpio, Sir.

Mr. Cuevas. You are referring to the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio?

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Sir, also....

Mr. Cuevas. I have read the dissent of Justice Carpio and Justice Carpio never mentioned about

the dates you had mentioned. For instance, the schedule of oral argument, the deliberation made, the

voting and so on. His dissent is solely on the basis of the character or the conditions imposed.

According to him, since they were not complied with, then the restraining order should not be made

effective or enforceable. Am I not right?

Ms. De Lima. Yes.

Mr. Cuevas. There is nothing in his dissenting opinion which deals with the matters dealt with in

the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno as you have narrated to this Court.


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The Presiding Officer. Counsel for the Defense, I think to be fair to the witness, if you have the

dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio, this is an effort to confront the witness, then I think it is only fair

that the document, as a basis of confrontation, must be shown to her.

Mr. Cuevas. I would have done that, Your Honor. But I was given the impression that the

Honorable Secretary of Justice had them in her possession.

Ms. De Lima. I have a copy, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. All right, she has a copy. The Secretary may answer.

Mr. Cuevas. Will you kindly indicate that particular portion in that dissenting opinion of the

Honorable Justice Carpio dealing with the dates you mentioned, the irregularity and in the infirmity which

was the subject of his dissent?

(Witness examining document).

Ms. De Lima. Not on those matters directly because, as you correctly stated, Sir, his dissenting

opinion primarily dealt on the character of the TRO. But there is also a portion towards the end of hisdissenting opinion about the issuance of the TRO that was issued or released to the petitioners before

six oclock in the evening of November 15, even before petitioners compliance with the first two (2)

conditions.

Mr. Cuevas. So, there is nothing mentioned there about the alleged deliberation, the lack of oral

argument, the lack of notice and so on?

Ms. De Lima. It is not in the dissent of Justice Carpio.

Mr. Cuevas. I am very sure that you must have also gone over the dissenting opinion of the

Honorable Justice Reyes, the other dissenter. You must have gone over his dissenting opinion also.

Ms. De Lima. For the November, is it the December 13?

Mr. Cuevas. No. With respect to the grant of the restraining order which was the subject of

Ms. De Lima. Yes.

Mr. Cuevas. And I have examined it. Will you kindly go over it and tell us in what particular

portion of that dissenting opinion had the dates, the lack of notice and the irregularities you mentioned

before the Court were incorporated because I do not find any, for your information, Madam Secretary.

Ms. De Lima. There is none, Sir, because the dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes is the dissenting

opinion of November 15 or the dissenting opinion to the TRO itself where the very issue on the legal

status or efficacy was not yet there because we do not have the facts yetthe inside facts.

Mr. Cuevas. So, the basis of his dissent is that if the court acts on the application for the restraining

order, one way or the other, it will render moot and academic the principal issue in this case. That is

the substance of his dissent.


Mr. Cuevas. Thank you. If that is so, why have you laid too much an emphasis on the dissenting

opinion of the Honorable Justice Sereno? Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court the reason for your

giving too much emphasis and why you highly gravitate on that dissenting opinion?


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Ms. De Lima. I would gladly do that, Sir. I have given importance or I am highlighting the

dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno not because of the discussion there on the merits of her dissent to

the grant of the TRO. It is not actually about being the dissenting opinion or is not the dissenting opinion

per se but on the various disclosures or revelations that she had made, which gave us the picture of

the irregularities that were committed within the court insofar as the issuance of the TRO as well as the

interpretation of the legal status or effect of the TRO.

Mr. Cuevas. And these matters are now pending consideration before the Honorable

Supreme Court?

Ms. De Lima. The main petition, Sir.

Mr. Cuevas. Correct.

Ms. De Lima. Yes.

Mr. Cuevas. Together with the alleged errors or irregularities attendant to the grant of the

restraining order. Am I right?

Ms. De Lima. I am not sure if it is still being discussed or being deliberated upon by the Supreme

Courtthe alleged irregularities.

Mr. Cuevas. I am telling you now that it is one of the issues involved in that case and it is because

of the citation against the Honorable Secretary of Justice for contempt for having violated the order of

the Honorable Supreme Court in connection with the grant of a restraining order. Am I not correct?

Ms. De Lima. In a sense, Sir, yes, you are correct.

Mr. Cuevas. In what sense am I wrong?

Ms. De Lima. Because if you are referring, Sir, to my compliance to the show-cause order andthe grounds I cited there: (1) the lack of notice; and (2) is a conditional TRO, then the irregularities

within the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the legal status would not really have much bearing

on the issue of my noncompliance because, in the first place, when I submitted my compliance of the

show-cause order, I was not aware yet of those irregularities

Mr. Cuevas. Correct.

Ms. De Lima. until I saw the dissenting opinion in December 13 of Justice Sereno.

Mr. Cuevas. That is correct. And that was why I asked you the question, whether without having

come across with the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno, you would have not known all these

irregularities that you mentioned in your direct examination.


Mr. Cuevas. All right. Thank you.

Now, apparently, you gave us the impression in this Honorable Court thatpermit the language

you swallowed hook, line and sinker the truth of what is alleged or incorporated in that dissenting

opinion. Am I right or I am wrong?

Ms. De Lima. I am giving it credence, serious credence because it was never disputed or denied

by any other member of the court.


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Mr. Cuevas. But it remains to be a dissenting opinion up to now unless modified or reversed

by the Supreme Court in the final adjudication of a case.

Ms. De Lima. It is a dissenting opinion on the very issue at hand, which is the issuance

of the TRO on the propriety of a TRO. But it is not an ordinary dissenting opinion because it dwells

on those other matters.

Mr. Cuevas. And it almost exempts you from criminal liability for being declared or being asked

to show cause why you should not be punished for contempt.

Ms. De Lima. If that is your interpretation, Sir.

Mr. Cuevas. Yes, it saves you from the trouble of being made liable for having allegedly

disobeyed the order of the honorable Supreme Court because there is a restraining order, you issued

an order almost countermanding that order, is it not?

Ms. De Lima. The issue of my alleged defiance, Sir, would still be there notwithstanding or even

in the absence of these disclosures or revelations of internal matters.

Mr. Cuevas. All right, thank you.

So, let us get this clear then. Without going further into examining the depth and the width of the

dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno, you would not be able to tell the Court whether what were stated

in there, based on your testimony, are true, correct and accurate representation of the actual facts,

am I right?


Mr. Cuevas. Yes, Sir. So that your testimony therefore is solely based on what you have read

from that dissenting opinion.

Ms. De Lima. My testimony on those irregularities, yes, Sir.

Mr. Cuevas. All right. Did you bother to look into the other opinions incorporated in the decision

on the issue of the grant of the restraining order in order to verify the truth, the accuracy and the

authenticity of the statement of facts made by the honorable Justice Sereno?

Ms. De Lima. Yes, Sir, I did.

The Presiding Officer. Counsel, were there other opinions?

Mr. Cuevas. There were also.

The Presiding Officer. Apart from the main decision, there were concurrent opinions?

Mr. Cuevas. Yes, Your Honor, there was the opinion of Justice Brion; there was also the opinion

of Justice Velasco; and also the Rejoinder that he made for not having been able to answer the issues

raised in the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno.

The Presiding Officer. Rejoinder of whom?

Mr. Cuevas. Pardon, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. Rejoinder of whom?

Mr. Cuevas. By Justice Velasco, Your Honor, theponente of the case.


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Now, may I be permitted to go to another....

In that case, I will move, much to my regret, for the striking out of the entirety of the testimony of

the Witness on the ground that the same is hearsay insofar as the accuracy, the truth and the alleged

authenticity of what is alleged as basic facts for the dissenting opinion, Your Honor.

I regret to do that, Your Honor, but the rules of evidence and procedures compel me to do so.

I am not questioning that there is such a dissenting opinion. But I am not in conformity with what was

stated in there, together with the statement of facts made because they are controverted by the other

facts obtaining in this case, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. What is the pleasure....

Representative Daza. Yes, Mr. President. We would like to be heard.

As I understand, the Defense Counsel is moving to strike the testimony of the Witness on the

ground that her testimony is hearsay. The Court....

The Presiding Officer. No, no. I think the Counsel is saying that to the extent of the truth or

falsity of what Justice Sereno said in her dissenting opinion, that is the matter that is being covered by

the motion of the Counsel for the Defense.

Mr. Cuevas. Correct, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. As far as the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno is concerned, as far

as what she said in her dissenting opinion, that is within the competence of the Witness to state in her

answers to the questions of the Defense Counsel.

Representative Daza. In other words, the basis of the motion to strike or the object of the

motion to strike is the portion of the testimony of the Witness on the irregularities.

The Presiding Officer. To the extent of the truth

Representative Daza. Yes.

The Presiding Officer. or falsity of what was said by Justice Sereno in her dissenting opinion.

But as far as what Justice Sereno said in her dissenting opinion stays into the recordas a part

of the testimony of the Witness.

Representative Daza. Yes. We vigorously object to the motion, Mr. President, firstly, because

the dissenting opinion is, in fact, a matter of judicial notice.

The Presiding Officer. That is correct.

Representative Daza. And the facts that are stated therein in regard to the irregularities are

part of the dissenting opinion.

Firstly, Mr. President, these portions of the dissenting opinion are matters stated in the opinion

by a public official. Therefore, unless proven otherwise, they are entitled to a presumption of truth

and regularity.

The Presiding Officer. I will posit the question this way.

Whether what the Witness said as irregular is indeed irregular, they want to be stricken off the

record. But as far as the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno is concerned, what she stated in that

dissenting opinion will remain in the record as a part of the testimony of the Witness.


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Am I correct in understanding your position?

Mr. Cuevas. That is correct, Your Honor. We are not in anyway disputing the existence of the

dissenting opinion together with what is stated in there.

The Presiding Officer. In other words, the Counsel for the Defense said to the Court, Please

disregard the claim of the irregularity attributed to others by the dissenting opinion of Justice Serenobecause the Witness was not present when those acts were done and when they came to the

knowledge of Justice Sereno.

Representative Daza. In which case, Mr. President, these statements in the minority opinion,

apart from the fact that they are entitled to the presumption of truth and regularity, the fact is that those

statements are in their own right independently relevant statements made by a Justice of the Supreme

Court who herself was speaking of her own personal knowledge. Secondly....

The Presiding Officer. Anyway, this is sufficiently argued. The Chair will make a ruling unless

a Member of the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, would want to discuss this matter.

Mr. Cuevas. But before the ruling of the Honorable Court is made, may I be allowed one or twominutes for a rebuttal, Your Honor.

Representative Daza. Mr. President, I am not finished.

The Presiding Officer. Let us allow the Prosecutor to finish.

Representative Daza. Secondly, it is plain to us that the motion is actually in substance

raising an issue either of weight or defense. Now, whether it is a matter of weight or defense,

Mr. President, it is not a ground to strike whatever portion of the testimony has been made.

If it is a matter of weight, it is for the discretion of the Court to decide on whether to give it weight;

and if it is a matter of weight, how heavy the weight should be; and if it is a matter of defense,the Defense will have its turn to present evidence to impeach, discredit or overthrow the statements

on irregularities contained in the minority opinion.

Now, thirdly, Mr. President, I have read the concurring opinions myself, just like the Defense

Counsel, and it is there shown that these statements on irregularities or disclosures made by Justice

Sereno were not treated or met in those concurring opinions. There was silence in their opinions.

And we know that in a court of justice when such imputations are made, which are serious as against

others, there is silence, there is a presumption of truth. I mean, as they say in Spanish, no disputa,

se accepta. If you do not dispute, you accept. The other justices never disputed in their concurring

opinions these regulations made by Justice Sereno.

Mr. Cuevas. If the Counsel is through, Your Honor, may I be allowed a one-minute rebuttal?

The Presiding Officer. Just a minute. Is the gentleman from the Prosecution through?

Representative Daza. Yes, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer. The Defense Counsel.

Mr. Cuevas. If, Your Honor, please. The Honorable Court would notice that we have predicated

our motion to strike out on the basis of the admission made by the Honorable Secretary of Justice that

she has no personal knowledge of all these irregularities and infirmities and that this knowledge came

to her by reason of going over the dissenting opinion.


16/56


The Presiding Officer. By reading the dissenting opinion.

Mr. Cuevas. Correct, Your Honor. That is why we made the statement that all she testified to

in connection with the alleged irregularities or infirmities did not come from her own personal knowledge

but merely from a reading of the dissenting opinion.

The Presiding Officer. That was accepted by the Witness.Mr. Cuevas. Yes. So, the presumption of regularity and the fact that the dissenting opinion exists,

we never questioned that, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. All right.

Mr. Cuevas. We never questioned that. We were limiting ourselves to the character of the

evidence being elicited from the Witness, Your Honor, which in accordance with the evidence and law,

is decidedly hearsay. And if it is hearsay, then it may be the subject of motion to strike out.




Senator Sotto. Mr. President, Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago wants to be recognized

The Presiding Officer. The gentle lady from Iloilo is recognized.

Senator Sotto. before you make the ruling.

Senator Defensor Santiago. Mr. President, I am responding to your call for the Senator-Judges,

if any, to make an input on this question before you issue your ruling.

My first comment is this. Under the complaint, Article VII, the Defendant is charged with betraying

the public trust and I am reading now: Through his partiality in granting a TRO in favor of the President

and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo, et cetera.

So, the question under Article VII, simply is: Did the Chief Justice show any partiality when the

Temporary Restraining Order was granted, not by the Chief Justice alone, but by his colleagues in the

Supreme Court? That is the question today before us.

Now, I have a copy of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Rule XII is entitled Voting

Requirements and it is self-explanatory; and Rule XIII is entitled Decision-making Process.

It appears from what the Witness has said so far that she has never personally participated in eithercounting the votes or in the decision-making process of the Supreme Court. In fact, she has said she

has no personal knowledge. She has admitted that.

Now, according to the Rules of Court, Rule 130 on Rules of Admissibility, Section 36: Testimony

Generally Confined to Personal Knowledge, Hearsay Excluded. A witness can testify only to those

facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own

perception except thus otherwise provided in these rules. If she was absent, how could she have

personal knowledge? She is, in effect, therefore, offering to us her opinion.

But I have already said several times in this Session Hall that no opinion is allowed by the rules

of evidence unless the expert has first been qualified as an expert witness. She has not been so


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qualified. She was not present when these so-called irregularities or discrepancies were taking place.

So, how can she be a witness on this instance, on the particular point of fact of whether the Chief Justice

took an active role in issuing the TRO all by himself when according to the Witness herself, according

to the internal rules of the Supreme Court, which are available to lawyers like us, no one justice is

allowed to issue the TRO all by himself?

So, Defense is correct in invoking the hearsay rule. There are exceptions to the hearsay rule. Thereare one to 11 exceptions. Which of these exceptions is the Prosecution trying to ground its position

on? The general rule of evidence is no hearsay. Only eyewitness can testify except one to 11. What

exception is being quoted? Why are we splitting hairs? It is very, very clear. A witness can only testify

as to what he perceived himself, except that there are 11 of these exceptions and none of them is being

cited by the Prosecution panel.

So, in effect, what we have been hearing is a series of opinions extrapolated or explained to us by

the witness but we have already seen that a witness is not allowed to express an opinion unless she

has been qualified as an expert witness. And there are rules for qualifying her.

Let me quote only one case, just one case, decided only this month, February 1, 2012, the case

ofMalayan Insurance Company v. Reyes. Here is the Supreme Court: Concomitantly, a witness may

not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told

or read or heard those matters. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as

proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.

Maybe just one other case,Estrada v. Desierto, 2001. But notice that what I cited was a case

issued only this month by the Supreme Court, educating all of us in the law profession and in the general

public. Estrada v. Desierto: There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: 1) absence of

cross examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of the oath.

The Witness insists that her opinions are well grounded on the dissenting opinion of a singular

Justice of the Supreme Court. So, we are now faced with the issue of what is the weight of adissenting opinion.

The Supreme Court itself said in the 2008 case concerning Mr. Amado Macasaet. The Supreme

Court stated that: Elementary decision-making teaches that we cite the majority opinion as precedent,

not lonely dissenting opinions. Another case, 2006, GSIS v. Kapisanan: It is the majority opinion

and not the dissenting opinion that is the controlling jurisprudence. These are accepted facts in law

school. Why do we have to debate these topics? We cannot simply take them for granted.

So, to return to Article VII, our quest here is factual in nature. Was the Chief Justice personally

and individually responsible for what are perceived deficiencies or irregularities in the issuance of the

TRO? The TRO is the subject matter and the target of this particular Article VII is the Chief Justice,the Respondent.

The issue therefore is: Can one judge be held liable for the decision of a collegial body? Here is

the Supreme Court speaking in an administrative case filed by an individual against certain justices of

the Supreme Court. And here is what the Supreme Court said: Although the Chief Justice isprimus

inter pares, first among equals, he cannot legally decide a case on his own because of the Courts

nature as a collegial body; neither can the Chief Justice, by himself, overturn the decision of the Court

whether by division or the en banc, whether by division or by the entire Supreme Court. And here

is an excerpt from the bookJudicial Opinion Writing by Joyce George in its 4th Edition as early as

1993: In writing an opinion, the writing judge is involved in a joint venture. The end-product is not

his opinion alone but rather that of all the members of the panel who formed the majority.


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So, I return to the issue at hand. The issue at hand is simply this: Is the witness qualified, under

the Rules of Court, to testify on this particular matter? The answer is no. She said no herself. She

said, I am not a member of the court, I have not been there, I was not present. I was just reading

the dissenting opinion of one of the dissenting justices. That is what she said. So, she is not testifying

according to her own personal knowledge. That falls under the hearsay rule.

As I said, I admit that there are 11 exceptions to the hearsay rule. Therefore, Prosecutor has theburden of showing that at least one of the 11 exceptions to the hearsay rule applies. Otherwise, there

is no point belaboring this issue. We can move on. Let us move on, Counsel. Thank you, Mr.

President.

The Presiding Officer. Thank you.

Representative Daza. Mr. President, may I react to the distinguished lady Senator, and now

international jurist?


Senator Defensor Santiago. Mr. President, point of order. He will engage on a colloquy withme, a Judge. The Judge has spoken. Now, the Judge is taking time to deliberate on what she has

just told the Court. I do not think this is proper. You should debate among yourselves. You do not

debate with a Judge.

The Presiding Officer. Counsel, I am sorry, a Member of the Court objects to any further

discussion. So, I will make a ruling.

Representative Daza. Mr. President, may I just add for two minutes a remark? Well, one of

the 11 exceptions to the hearsay rule, under Rule 130 is Section 44.

The Presiding Officer. And which says....

Representative Daza. Yes, let me read that. It says, Section 44, Rule 130. One of the 11

exceptions to the hearsay rule. And it says: Entries in Official Records. Entries in official records made

in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines or by a person in the performance

of a duty especially enjoined by law areprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. This is an

exception to the hearsay rule.


Representative Daza. And therefore, the burden of persuasion is shifted. We have exercised our

burden

Senator Defensor Santiago. Mr. President.

Representative Daza. then the burden is shifted to the Defense to point and demonstrate to

the Court that we do not fall within this exception.

The Presiding Officer. May I beg the indulgence of the lady Senator from Iloilo to let the counsel

finish and then I will recognize her.

Senator Defensor Santiago. Thank you.

The Presiding Officer. Yes, proceed.

Representative Daza. Yes, I am finished with my statement.


19/56


Senator Defensor Santiago. That does not apply, Counsel. Let me educate you. When an

official custodian or other representatives qualified by that office or authorized by that office to issue

an official record does so, then the presumption applies that what is stated in the official record is

correct, to that extent. Therefore, there is an exception to the hearsay rule. That person or that

custodian or that record keeper does not have to explain why his record is that way. You just have

to take it on its face. That is the meaning of that.

But we are talking of a dissenting opinion by a collegiate body, the Supreme Court. So, if the

dissenting opinion contains certain narrations of fact which, in fact, are intended to dispute what the

majority opinion has issued, you cannotprima facie presume that the dissenting opinion is correct and

the majority opinion is wrong. That is why I read you those cases where the Supreme Court repeatedly

said: You rely on the majority opinion, not on the dissenting opinion. That is why I was warning you

already, do not engage in a colloquy with the Judge. That is not allowed by the Rules of the

Impeachment Court. Put it in your memorandum.

The Presiding Officer. All right. May the Presiding Officer now make a ruling? Is there any

objection? All right. It is the ruling of the Chair that to the extent of the facts narrated by the Witness

on the basis of the dissenting opinion, let them remain as a part of her testimony. Let them remain asa part of the record as a consequence and part of her testimony here as a witness.

But to the extent of the truth or falsity of what the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno contains,

to the extent of those facts whether they are true or not that the Chief Justice influenced this or the Chief

Justice did that or somebody else did something else, then to that extent, it is hearsay, because the

Witness was not present when those things were being done or being said.

And so, I will allow the testimony of the Witness to remain into theRecordand suggest to the Court

to disregard whether the statement of the Chief Justice or what he did or other Justices did in the course

of their deliberation because those are not within the competence of the Witness to testify on. So

therefore, those are hearsay.

Mr. Cuevas. Thank you, Your Honor. I was about to make a short manifestation, Your Honor,

as to the effect of a declaration of statement being considered as hearsay.


Mr. Cuevas. Because there are plenty of jurisprudence to the effect that whether objected to

or not, if the testimony is hearsay, it shall not and must not be considered by the Court in rendering

a decision, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. Yes, but we must remember that we are not trying a criminal case. We

are trying an impeachment case. Although there is a penalty, the only penalty is not loss of freedomor infliction of an economic burden but the removal of the Respondent from his position and his

disqualification. And therefore, the hearsay rule contained in our rules of evidence does not apply

strictly in impeachment cases as far as I could remember what I read about the experience of the United

States in impeachment cases.

It is true that in a strictly criminal case, the hearsay rule is very strictly adhered to as a rule of

evidence but not in an impeachment case. That is why I made a distinction between the truth or falsity

of what was related by Justice Sereno in her dissenting opinion and what the Witness now said based

on what was contained or the information being presented to her on the basis of the dissenting opinion

of Justice Sereno.


20/56


To that extent and to the extent of the dissenting opinion, let it stay as a part of the testimony

of the Witness.

So ordered.

Mr. Cuevas. I am heavily thankful, Your Honor, for the announcement made by the Honorable

Presiding Justice but I am also thankful for being allowed to make that manifestation of record becausethat is a rule not only applicable to civil, criminal and other cases, Your Honor. And I am searching

in vain a ruling or a rule of procedure insofar as the Impeachment Court is concerned relative to hearsay

evidence. If we examine the rules of procedure, there is nothing in there, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. Counsel, I am going to ask you to read the book of Charles, the one

written by Charles Black.

Mr. Cuevas. Yes, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. And also the book written by Raoul Berger of Harvard. These two books

will tell you that the hearsay rule is not adhered to strictly in impeachment cases.

Mr. Cuevas. Thank you, Your Honor.

The Presiding Officer. If you want, I can bring them here. I think I have them in my

office upstairs.

Mr. Cuevas. I have gone over the first book, by Black, Your Honor, but the second one I have

not seen it. I do not know. Thank you for the information.

The Presiding Officer. Raoul Berger is a Harvard man who wrote a very extensive study on

impeachment trials in America. And he cited a lot of authorities to say that hearsay rule does not strictly

apply in impeachment cases.

And so I understand your position but we are not proving the guilt of the Respondent beyond

reasonable doubt. We are going to decide this case on the basis of the quantum of evidence that we

think is best to be used in determining whether he is guilty or not guilty, not beyond reasonable doubt

because this is not a criminal case. It is akin to a criminal case but not really a criminal case. And that

is why I made that ruling and so let it remain as a ruling of the Court.

Mr. Cuevas. Thank you, Your Honor. I am through with the Witness.

Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The Presiding Officer. Okay. Let us now discharge the distinguished Secretary of Justice.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, there are a number of Senators who have made reservations to ask

questions to the witness.


Senator Sotto. So, may we move to suspend the trial for 15 minutes before we proceed?


Madam Secretary, can you bear us out, bear with us rather?

Okay. The trial is suspended for 15 minutes.


21/56


The trial was suspended at 3:22 p.m.

At 3:45 p.m., the trial was resumed.

The Presiding Officer. The trial is resumed.


The Presiding Officer. The Floor Leader.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President. Now that the cross-examination has finished, there are a

number of Senator-Judges who wish to pose questions to the Witness. So, may we start off with Sen.

Panfilo Lacson.

The Presiding Officer. The gentleman from Cavite has the floor.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

Before I ask my questions to the Witness, I would like to address the Prosecution panel. If you

will allow me to do a Senator Miriam, I will just do or make some lecture.

It is true, I fully support the ruling of the Chair that as to the truthfulness and accurateness of the

contents of the documents marked as Exhibits TTTTTTTTT, UUUUUUUUU, VVVVVVVVV,

talagang hindi po pupuwede kasi hearsay because Secretary De Lima admitted that she was not

present during the en banc deliberation. But, if I may suggest, why do you not do it another way?

Assuming that Justice Serenobecause we have already ruled unanimously not to issue a subpoena to

any of the Associate Justices, that is foregone, wala na po iyon. But, for all you know, she brought

with her a clerk or her chief of staff or whatever. Baka naman po present siya during the en banc

and she would have personal knowledge, bakit hindi niyo alamin and then submit a motion to the

Court na mag-issue ng subpoena to the person concerned at baka mapayagan kayo? So, at least,

somebody, not Secretary De Lima, who has no personal knowledge on the contents or the truthfulnessof what transpired during the en banc sessions, the three en banc sessions of the Supreme Court, ay

baka naman makakuha kayo ng mayroong personal knowledge. It is just a suggestion just to ferret

out the truth, not for anything else.

Representative Daza.Maganda po sana iyan, Ginoong Senador. Kaya lamang ang balakid

ay ganito. Ang Korte Suprema, noong Valentines Day, birthday ng ating Pangulo, naglabas ng

isang resolution na kung saan ipinagbawal ng Korte Suprema na kahit na mayroong subpoena

na manggagaling dito sa Senado, sa Impeachment Court, para sa isang Mahistrado o isang

empleyado ng Korte Suprema na dito ay pumuntaupang magbigay ng saysay. Ang sabi po doon

sa resolution na iyon, may mga bagay na ang tawag ng Korte Suprema ay internal, na hindi

puwedeng ibunyag kahit dito po sa Impeachment Court. At saklaw po riyan hindi lamang isangMahistrado kung hindi ang kaniyang mga empleyado. Ngayon, kung ibig o kagustuhan ng isang

Mahistrado na sa kanyang ganang sarili ay pumunta rito at magsaysay, ang sabi po noong

resolution na iyon, kailangan humingi ng waiver or clearance sa husgado iyong Mahistradong iyon.

Senator Lacson. If I may.

Representative Daza. Yes.

Senator Lacson. We are not there yet. Assuming that there is a memo issued even to the

employees, not just an internal arrangement among the Justices of the Supreme Court, wala pa po tayo

doon because it is up to the Court, this Court, to determine if, when we ask questions or you ask, and


22/56


the Defense panel will ask their questions, it is up to us to decide whether or not he or she can decline

to answer the question.

Representative Daza. Ginoong Senador, ang akin pong iniisip na talagang ang may

personal knowledge dito ay si Justice Sereno. Kaya nga po iyon po ang....

Senator Lacson. That is accepted po. Pero,for all you know, hindi lang naman si JusticeSereno ang present doon.Baka mayroon siyang bitbit na Supreme Court employee, one member

of her staffna puwede ninyong

Representative Daza. Saklaw po iyong sa resolution ng Korte Suprema, pati mga empleyado

saklaw doon sa pagbabawal.

Senator Lacson. Well, I will say it again. This is an Impeachment Court, sui generis po ito. Ito

po ay supreme din on its own. Anyway, I will not belabor the issue.

Representative Daza. Baka po naman sa sariling kusa ni Justice Sereno dahil dito sa ating

usaping ito, ay baka naman sa kanyang kusa ay humingi siya ng waiver at harinawa mabigyan

ng waiver or clearance ng Korte Suprema at dito magbigay ng kanyang salaysay.

Senator Lacson. Anyway, Sir, that is just a side issue. I will now proceed to my main issue.

Tatanungin ko na po si Secretary De Lima.

Representative Daza. Maraming salamat po sa inyong payo, susubukin po namin iyan,

baka naman po maawa si Justice Sereno sa ngalan ng bayan na pumunta rito para magbigay ng

kanyang sariling salaysay.

Senator Lacson. But if you are waiting for the Impeachment Court to issue a subpoena

Representative Daza. Hindi po.

Senator Lacson. -wala na po iyon because we have unanimously supported the Presiding

Officer that we will not issue a subpoena to any Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

Representative Daza. Alam po namin na ganoon.

Senator Lacson. Now, Madam Witness, magandang hapon po.

Ms. De Lima. Magandang hapon din po, Your Honor.

Senator Lacson. When did you first learnkailan ninyo po unang nalaman na mayroong

TRO? Ayon po sa inyong salaysay mga one oclockng hapon ng November 15, tama po ba iyon?

Ms. De Lima. Opo, noong nag-press con posi G. Midas Marquez.

Senator Lacson. Now, when did you first learn about the conditions imposed by the Supreme

Court?

Ms. De Lima. Ah, nabanggit din ho iyon, kung hindi po ako nagkakamali, parang binasa

po iyon, binasa po iyon ni Midas Marquez.

Senator Lacson. Pero ayon din sa inyong pag-testify dito, una ninyong natanggap iyong

kopya ninyo around 8:16 a.m., the following day, November 16?

Ms. De Lima. Opo, 8:25 o 8:26.


23/56


Senator Lacson. Kailan ninyo po unang nalaman na mayroong irregularities, mayroong hindi

pagsunod doon sa mga conditions na na-impose?

Ms. De Lima. Noong natanggap ko na po iyong November 18 Resolution po.

Senator Lacson. November 18 Resolution?

Ms. De Lima. Opo, na natanggapkung hindi po ako nagkakamali, on the same day,November 18.

Senator Lacson. Kailan ninyo po pinagbawalan si Ginoong Arroyo na umalis ng bansa

papuntangkung saan mang lupalop iyon?

Ms. De Lima. Iyong attempt niya po noong November 15 ng gabi.

Senator Lacson. In other words, noong hindi ninyo siya pinayagan na umalis e hindi ninyo

pa alam na may mga kondisyon na hindi na-fulfill doon sa TRO?

Ms. De Lima. Hindi ko pa po alam kung talagang na-fulfill na iyong mga conditions as of

that time. Kasi ang alam ko po, Your Honor, is thatpag mayroon pong mga condition ang isangorder, kailangan mayroon hong confirmatory order iyong korte na itong mga conditions na

nakasaad dito ay na-comply na noong party concerned.

Senator Lacson. Pero hindi ninyo alam na mayroong condition, iyong condition no. 2,

requirement no. 2, iyong pag-assign ng legal representative ay hindi pala na-comply dahil mali iyong

isunumite noong kanyang lawyer, si Ferdinand Topacio, hindi ba?

Ms. De Lima. Opo, iyong gabi pong iyon, hindi ko po alam kung ano sa mga kundisyon

na iyon ang na-fulfill na. Maski nga po iyong bond, hindi ko pa rin ho iyon alam kung naibigay

na iyon noong araw na iyon.

Senator Lacson. So that prompted you to order the immigration officers at the airport including

the personnel of the NAIA Authority not to allow her to leave the country that evening?

Ms. De Lima. Opo.

Senator Lacson. Ano po ba ang diperensya ng WLO at saka ng HDO?

Ms. De Lima. Ang HDOpo, Hold Departure Order ay pinagbabawalan na umalis ang isang

either nasasakdal or respondent in a preliminary investigation case at ito ay may duration na limang

taon, five years, unless lifted or revoked.

Iyong WLO naman po, Watchlist Order ay essentially, ang effect ay hindi basta-basta

makakaalis unless makakuha rin po ng Lifting Order o Allow Departure Orderpero ito po ay only

for a period of 60 days and not five (5) years.

Senator Lacson. An HDO is issued by the Court, by the Regional Trial Court. Kapag nai-file

ang information, whether or not naisyuhan ng warrant of arrest, iyong korte po ay may kapangyarihan

sa ilalim ng batas na mag-issue ng Hold Departure Order.

Ms. De Lima. Opo, ang korte po ay may kapangyarihan na mag-issue ng HDO at iyong

Department of Justice din po, under Department Circular No. 41, ay mayroon din pong kapangyarihan.

Senator Lacson. Mayroon ding kapangyarihan?


24/56


Ms. De Lima. Opo.

Senator Lacson. Sino po ang nagbigay ng kapangyarihan sa DOJ na mag-issue ng

Watchlist Order?

Ms. De Lima. Nasa Circularpo iyan, No. 41, ito po ang basehan po nito, kasi ang Circular

No. 41 po ay kagaya ng sinabi ko po kahapon, ang nagpalabas po niyan ay iyong dating

Secretary of Justice, Alberto Agra, at iyong mga dati rin pong mga circulars before Circular No. 41

ay mayroon din po doon tungkol sa HDO, so iyong mga dating circulars in-issue rin po ng mga

dating Secretary of Justice. Ang batayan po ay iyong sa Administrative Code na kung saan....

Senator Lacson. 292? E.O. No. 292?

Ms. De Lima. Opo. Executive Order No. 292 po.

Senator Lacson. Pero basahin po natin iyong pinagkopyahan, iyong cited dito which is

Circular No. 18. Hindi po ba, iyon yata ang pinanggalingan nito eh.

Ms. De Lima. Opo.

Senator Lacson. Department Circular No. 18. At ang sinasabi doon, binibigyan ngwala

iyong notes kobinibigyan ng kapangyarihan ang Secretary of Justicepara utusan ang Immigration.

Pero kapag sinabing Immigration, iyon po ay patungkol lamang sa naturalization. Sa mga

naturalized at saka sa mga aliens, hindi po ba?

Ms. De Lima. Basically, opo.

Senator Lacson. So, ang sinabi niyo po kahapon sa mga pagtatanong ng aking ka-

probinsiya na si Sen. Bong Revilla, mayroong effects of a law ang Circular No. 41?

Ms. De Lima. Opo. It has force and effects of a law.

Senator Lacson. But it is not a law?

Ms. De Lima. It is not strictly a law.

Senator Lacson. Is there a law that authorizes Circular No. 41?

Ms. De Lima. Iyong batas po....

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, marami po akong mga katanungan.

The Presiding Officer. You can go on.

Senator Lacson. Thank you po.

Ms. De Lima. Wala pong batas expressly authorizing the Department of Justice, the Secretary

of Justice na mag-issue ng Hold Departure Order or Watchlist Orderpero ang batayan po diyan

ay iyong aming mandato under the Administrative Code at ito po under the rule-making powers din

po ng department for the effective implementation of mandate, of its mandate at saka po iyong

exercise ng police power.

Senator Lacson. May an agency, in this case the DOJ, grant to itself by issuing a circular that

power? Hindi po ba self-serving iyon kapag kayo mismo ang nag-grant ng power sa sarili ninyo

sa pamamagitan ng isang sirkular? Hindi po ba nararapat lamang, it is basic for that agency in

this case, again, the DOJ, to seek the support of Congress by way of an enactment, hindi po ba?


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Ms. De Lima. Iyan ho ang ideal situation. Kung mayroon po sana talagang batas na

talagang directly, expressly, categorically granting us that power, mas maganda po sana iyon. Pero

all these years nga po, wala pa,hindi pa po iyan binibigay o hindi pa po iyan pinapalabas ng

Kongreso pero mayroon po kaming batayan, iyong sinasabi ko po kanina sa Administrative Code,

mayroon po kaming kapangyarihan na mag-issue ng mga rules and regulations na sa tingin namin

ay makakatulong para talaga magawa namin nang maayos ang aming mandato which is to

administer the criminal justice system, investigate crimes and prosecute criminal offenders.

Senator Lacson. Have you even attempted to ask Congress to enact a lawpara mabigyan kayo

ng ganoong kapangyarihan sa ilalim ng ating batas?

Ms. De Lima. Mayroon pong mga ginagawa ngayon na mga bills omga draftsnaisa-submit

po namin na proposal sa Kongreso. At alam ko po na mayroon din mga pending bills tungkol

diyan, pero hindi ko po alam kung ano na pong pinaka-status, kung nakumpleto na po yung bill.

Senator Lacson. But in the meantime that there is no law, you cannot implement Circular No. 41.

Hindi po ba? Kasi hindi po kayo puwedeng mag-grant ng power sa inyong sarili at pagkatapos

kayo rin ang magpapa-implement. Parang wala po sa ating Saligang Batas iyan.

Ms. De Lima. Recognized po iyan, na kung mayroon po kaming rule-making power sa aming

paggawa ng aming mandato ay puwede po, and then police power. Kasi iyong police powerpo

ay nasa Kongreso nga po iyan, but it can be delegated. And it can be delegated through the power

of the agency concerned to issue rules, or to promulgate rules and regulations para mapadali ang

trabaho.

At iyong pagbibigay o pag-i-issuepo ng HDOs and WLOs ay long recognized institutional

practice na po iyan ng DOJ.Mulat sapol pa poay iyong mga dati pong mga secretaries of Justice,

kasama na rin po iyong lahat na mga secretaries of Justice na ina-appoint ng dating Pangulo,

they have been issuing Hold Departure Orders and Watchlist Orders bago pa man po iyongCircular No. 41.

Senator Lacson. Alam ko po iyon dahil ginamit po ito ni dating Pangulong Arroyo to

go against her perceived political enemies. Hindi po ba? Kasi, noong minsan, naabutan ko si

Cong.Satur Ocampo, kawawa. Nandoon sa isang kuwarto doon sa Immigration, at ang dahilan

lamang kung bakit hindi siya paalisin ay mayroon Watchlist Order.

Sa akin pong pagkaintindi as the name connotes, or as the nomenclature indicates, watchlist,

parang ang connotation lamang, bantayan ninyo iyan, alamin ninyo kung saan pupunta, alamin

ninyo kung kailan babalik, and nothing more. Hindi naman puwedeng pag-watchlist ay sasamahan

na ng hold. Kaya nga mayroon tayong tinatawag na Hold Departure Order at mayroon tayong

tinatawag na Watchlist Order, kasi magkaiba po iyong dalawa.

Kanina, tinanong ko sa inyo, anong diperensiya. Sa inyong paliwanag, wala akong nakitang

diperensiya. The difference is the same.

Ms. De Lima. It is just the period. Iyong epekto po ay parang....

Senator Lacson. Pati iyong epekto po dahil hino-hold iyong Filipino para hindi makaalis ng

bansa by virtue of a Watchlist Order.

Ms. De Lima. Iyong nga po ang nasabi ko kanina na Watchlist Order, pero iyong epekto

po ay halos pareho in the sense na hindi ho basta-basta makakaalis na hindi muna magpaalam


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sa Department of Justice sa pamamagitan ng pagkuha ng Lifting Order o ng Allow Departure

Order, and ang epekto nga po, ang duration is 60 days instead of the longer period kapag HDO

na five (5) years. Doon po sa sinasabi ninyo yung ginagamit po ng dating Pangulo against

perceived enemies, well, maaaring naabuso nga po yong poder na iyan. But an abuse....

Senator Lacson. At ngayon naman po, ginagamit naman natin doon sa ating perceived

political enemy rin. The same Circular.

Ms. De Lima. Sa akin po, you do not have to worry about that, Sir.

Senator Lacson. Pero nangyari po, eh.

Ms. De Lima. I do not use my power for any improper motive, especially for any, as you say,

political vendetta. I do not do that.

Senator Lacson. Hindi po ba maliwanag sa ating Saligang Batas, Article III, Section 6, na

iyong right to travel ay dapat nating i-uphold.Maliwanag po iyon dahil hindi ko na po kailangan

basahin iyong provision , dahil alam ninyo naman po iyon.

Ms. De Lima. Opo. Mayroon ho talagang right to travel

Senator Lacson. May mga exception lang.

Ms. De Lima. just like any other rights, mayroon pong mga exception. It is not unlimited.

Senator Lacson. Yang national security, public health, and public safety.

Ms. De Lima. Opo.

Senator Lacson. Saan po pumasok si Ginang Arroyo doon sa tatlo na exception?

Ms. De Lima. Doon sa tatlo po, strictly speaking, hindi ho natin puwedeng itugma iyon. Butang argument po naming doon sa kaso naming sa Supreme Court is that, it is not meant to be an

exclusive enumeration of those exceptions. Kasi mayroon nga pong mga recognized exceptions

ngayon. The fact that the court itself, the regular court can issue HDOs in cases pending before them,

kahit wala doon sa tatlong stated exceptions ay puwede.

Senator Lacson. Iyong sa korte, kasi ang sinabi ng Konstitusyon as may be provided

by law.

Ms. De Lima. Opo.

Senator Lacson. Ito po bang Circular 41, meron po bang batas, tulad ng tanong ko kanina,

is there a law authorizing it?

Ms. De Lima. Wala po.

Senator Lacson. Wala po.

Ms. De Lima. Wala po, pero mayroon po tayong mga jurisprudence katulad po noong tungkol

sa power ng PCGG. Ang isang kaso po, Kant Kwong case, ay hindi nila pinakialaman iyong

power of the PCGG to issue Hold Departure Order kahit wala po iyan sa batas ng PCGG. At iyong

batas po ng PCGG is Executive Order No. 1. Pero meron pong ilang kaso, iyong isa nga po ay

nakarating sa Supreme Court na in-affirmponila ang power ng PCGG to issue HDO kahit wala

pong batas na nagsasabi tungkol doon. Another examplepo iyong mga travel ban. In another


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case, PASEI v. then Secretary Drilon, in-affirm po iyon, the authority to impose travel ban. Now,

travel banpo, that is tantamount to restraining the right to travel. May ilan-ilan pa pong example.

Senator Lacson.Nabanggit po ninyo ang E.O. No. 292. Ito po iyong sinasabing probisyon.

Babasahin ko po para maliwanag, para lamang maiparating ko sa inyo na hindi ninyo puwedeng

gawing basehan iyon.

Ang pinagbasehan dito ay iyong Circular No. 18, which in part cited Section 3, paragraph (1),

subparagraphs (2) and (6), Chapter I, Title 3, Book 4 of E.O. No. 292. Iyon ang source ng authority

ng Department Circular No. 41, tama po ba?

Ms. De Lima. Opo, I do not have the....

Senator Lacson. Ang sinasabi po ng Section 3, paragraph (6): It authorizes the DOJ to provide

immigration and naturalization services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission

of stay of aliens.Eh, hindi naman po alien si GinangArroyo.

Ms. De Lima. Mayroon pa hong mga ibang basehan iyong Circular No. 41.

Senator Lacson. For my education, puwede ninyo po bang banggitin. Ang kinu-quote ko podito ay si Fr. Bernas. Baka nakalimutan niyang isulat iyong sinasabi ninyong ibang....

Ms. De Lima.Mayroon pa hong ibang basehan iyong Circular No. 41. Iyong mga probisyon

po tungkol doon sa mgamandato, sa mga powers and functions of DOJ, lalo na po iyong tungkol

sa the DOJ administers the criminal justice system, in accordance with the accepted processes;

investigate crimes and prosecute criminal offenders, et cetera. Now, because of that mandate

mayroon din po kami under the EO, under the Administrative Code, in another provision of the

Administrative Code, the rule-making powers. So, doon po namin ipinasok o doon ipinasok nung

mga nag-draft ng Circular No. 41 iyong the power to issue rules and regulations. Ito nga po Circular

No. 41, the power to issue HDO and WLO for the effective discharge of the mandate of the powers

and functions of the DOJ under the Administrative Code.

Senator Lacson. Rule-making power of the DOJ, tama po iyon.

Ms. De Lima. Opo.

Senator Lacson. Pero dapat po ay may pinagbabasehang batas iyon. Kung hindi man

Saligang Batas ay batas na ipinasa ng Kongreso. Sa ngayon po, ayon sa inyong pagsang-ayon

kanina ay wala naman pong lumalabas pang batas ang Kongreso, bakit naglabas na kayo ng

Department Circular No. 41? Hindi ko po sinasabing hindi ako sumasang-ayon sa inyo na

napigilan si Mrs. Arroyo. Maliwanag po iyon. Sumasang-ayon po ako sa inyo, pero hindi ako

sumasang-ayon sa ligalidad ng inyong ginawa.

Ms. De Lima. Iyong Circular No. 41 po, gusto ko pong ulitin na hindi ko po iyan gawa-

gawa. Pagdating ko po sa Department of Justice nandiyan na po iyan and nakita ko naman po

na malaking tulong iyong pag-i-issue ng HDOs and WLOs and, sa tingin ko po, it enjoys the

presumption of constitutionality and validity. So, until otherwise declared, until declared by the Supreme

Court as unconstitutional or invalid, we should assume that Circular No. 41 is a valid exercise of the

rule-making powers of the DOJ and also the exercise of police power of the State through the

Executive department.

Senator Lacson. You cited national interest. Correct me if I am wrong,pero iyon ang narinig

ko sa interview ninyo na you cited national interest as your justificationpara pigilan si Mrs. Arroyo

at i-implement iyong WLO.


28/56


Ms. De Lima. Isa po iyan sa mga nabanggit ko dati.

Senator Lacson. Pero wala naman po sa Constitution iyong national interest kasi tatlo lamang

po ang nakalahad doon. Kung gusto nating i-expand na isama iyong national interest baka po

puwedeng pag-usapan natin sa KongresoLower House and Upper House para ma-expand

kung gusto nitong.Bastat hindi lamang contrary sa provision ng Constitution, baka puwede

nating gawing isangjustification. But in the meantime that it is limited to three public safety, publichealth at saka national security ay wala po tayong magagawa kundi sundin iyong Article III,

Section 6 ng Constitution at sundin iyong mga umiiral na batas tungkol dito.

Ms. De Lima. Meron po tayong Circular No. 41 at iyan po ay.

Senator Lacson.Hindi nga po batas iyon, Ginang Secretary. Nagkasundo na po tayo doon.

Hindi po batas iyon at walang batas authorizing Circular No. 41.

Ms. De Lima. Administrative issuancepo iyan. Kahit hindi po siya batas but it also enjoys the

presumption of constitutionality and validity dahil, sa tingin po namin, sakop po iyan talaga ng

kapangyarihan ng DOJ under E.O. No. 292 and it is actually in the exercise of police power.

Now, iyong delegated authority po ng isang ahensiya ng gobyerno na ipatupad ang isang

batas, provided na may mga reasonable standard na nakalagay diyan sa batas at doon din sa

administrative issuance, iyon po ang posisyon naminofficial positionna ipinaglalaban namin sa

Supreme Court dito sa consolidated cases.

Senator Lacson.Balik po tayo doon sa hindi ninyo pagsunod sa TRO. So, noong November

15, maliwanag na hindi pa ninyo alam iyong mga kondisyon na na-violate or one of the conditions

that was not fulfilled anyway. Just the same, sinuway ninyo iyong TRO. So, can you now confirm that

you defied the TRO issued by the Supreme Court?

Ms. De Lima. Whether or not it will be called as defiance, I am not

Senator Lacson. Okay. You did not follow.

Ms. De Lima. Yes.

Senator Lacson. You did not abide by the TRO.


Senator Lacson. Nagkakasundo po tayo doon?

Ms. De Lima.Hindi po namin sinunod iyong TRO dahil nga po noong oras na iyon, noong

gabi po na magtangkang umalis iyong dating Pangulo, wala pa kaming official copy noong TRO.

At pangalawa po, since alam ko noong in-announce nga po ni Midas Marquez na maymga kondisyon, hindi ko pa rin alam, hindi pa rin namin alam kung natupad na iyong conditions

na iyon.

Senator Lacson.Maraming salamat po. Thank you, Mr. President.

Ms. De Lima. Salamat din po.

The Presiding Officer. Thank you. The Floor Leader.

Senator Sotto. Senator Santiago has withdrawn, Mr. President. Senator Drilon wishes to be

recognized aside from Senators Legarda and Estrada.


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The Presiding Officer. The gentleman from Iloilo, Senator Drilon.

Senator Sotto. And then Senators Legarda and Estrada.

Senator Drilon. Madam Witness, correct me if my recollection is wrong, but I seem to recall that

in yesterdays hearing, in response to a question on why you are holding the Chief Justice responsible

on what appears to be a collegial decision, you substantially answered that the Chief Justice has someascendancy over the Justices. Is my recollection correct?

Ms. De Lima. In so many words, yes, po.

Senator Drilon. Yes. Because I have not reviewed the transcript. But is my recollection of your

answer correct?

Ms. De Lima. Opo.

Senator Drilon. Can you elaborate on what exactly do you mean by this because, really, if it was

a collegial decision, there seems to be a basis on its face on the assertion that you cannot blame the

Chief Justice on a collegial decision. Can you elaborate on this?

Ms. De Lima. Salamat po, Your Honor.Iyon nga po ang sinasabi ko kanina during the cross

na medyo mahaba-haba nga pong kuwento, although I did not exactly mention the word

ascendancy or something but I was saying that sa pagdi-desisyon po, isang boto nga lamang po

ang Chief Justice. Sa pagdi-desisyon. Pero meron pong mga bagay-bagay, meron pong matters,

sa workings ng Korte Suprema na since si Chief Justicepo, siya ay primus inter pares, at siya rin

iyong puwede nating matawag na Chief Executive or Administrative Officer ng Korte, siya lamang

ang puwedeng mag-utos.

Binasa ko po iyong internal rules ng Supreme Court at ilan po sa mga bagay na siya lamang

ang puwedeng gumawa ay iyong katulad po ng pagpapalagay, iyong directing the immediateinclusion of any matter in the agenda. So, kung meron po siyang gustong ipa-special raffle, siya po

ang puwedeng magpagawa niyan. Kung meron po siyang gustong matter na iti-take up o

ipapasingit sa agenda, siya po iyan. Ang sabi po ng internal rules, siya rin po ang nagbibigay sa

Clerk of Court ng kaniyang mga notes on the actions taken by the Court. Siya iyong nagti-take

down ng notes. At iyong copy ng agenda na naglalaman ng handwritten notes ng Chief Justice, iyan

ang magsisilbing basehan doon sa preparasyon ng minutes.

Binabasa ko po iyong relevant portions ng internal rules, tinatagalog ko lamang po. Iyan po

ang magiging basehan ng preparasyon ng minutes ng proceedings.

Siya rin po ang nag-a-approve ng draft minutes at siya ang nagbibigay ng final approval doon

sa paglalabas ng mga resolusyon kasama na diyan iyong minute resolutions and extended unsigned

resolutions.

Now, kailangan po kasing matandaan natin ang mga function na iyan o kapangyarihan na

iyan ng Chief Justice sa internal workings ng Supreme Court dahil nga po doon sa mga nalaman

natin na mga iregularidad na ibinunyag ni Justice Sereno. Kasi nga po, kung ang Chief Justice,

at siya lamang ang mag-a-approve finally ng pagpapalabas ng isang resolusyon, siya iyong

nakakaalam kung tama o hindi iyong ilalabas na resolusyon, lalo na po, based din po sa internal

rules, at sinabi din po iyan, kung hindi ako nagkakamali, sa parehong dissenting opinions ni Justice

Sereno and Justice Carpio, ay iyong unsigned extended resolutions at saka minute resolutions, hindi

na ito pinapaikot sa kanila, sa other members of the Court bago ito pinapalabas. Klarado po iyan.


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Now, iyong TRO, November 15, klarado po na subject to conditions. At sabi po sa dissenting

opinion ni Justice Carpio, may isang portion, iyong November 15 TRO, doon sa number one

condition, isang portionpo doon, I am just lookingpo, Your Honor, for the TRO.

Ito po ang number one condition:

The PETITIONERS SHALL post a cash bond of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00)payable to this Court within five (5) days from notice hereof. Failure to post the bond within

the aforesaid period will result in the automatic lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order.

Iyong pangalawa

Documents

Feb 23 Senate impeachment court record