I, Rodney F.. Stlch, Aviation Operatlans Special is t , Natlcmal F l igh t Inspec- tion Division, suknit-_the-follawins_to-JohnV-.Grariano, Chief, C o a p l i a n c e and Security S taf f , FAA Aeroarauticel Center. This statement and attachments i a submitted upoar your request t h a t I give cer ta in e t a t e s m t opinionu concerning the s e r i o u ~ ' m t t e r s we discusaed, My underetanding is that these rtatmtents and opiniars w i l l be foxwarded t o the Administrator via epprclpriate channels.

I have stated etrong opinians in certain erear t o convey the merimmema with which I view the problem. Far more can be sa id of the conditions effecting I

the Federal Aviation Agency and aviation safety, but su f f i c i en t infarmatian I 6 given here wherein an h e a t evaluaticm w i l l show the grave nature of condi t iars tha t rn exist , end the need for inmediate major corrective actionm. The terrible aad ludicrous lack of c red ib i l i t y in key positions is shown.

The m e a m t h a t you requested I cover were: I 1, What are the areas which you conclude from the recurds ttsma

strate the va l id i ty of yaur charges.

2. What remedial actions do you propose.

3, Since my a r r i v a l a t the Oklahoma City Academy, w h e t actiare I taken concerning my chargea against the Western R e g i o n .

Of necesd ty , the answers must be r e l a t ive ly b r i e f for ouch a I e x p e r i m n a have mhawn many areas of the Federal Aviation Agenc taino to a i r c a r r i e r operatione, t h a t ere in serious need of imr#aiatt corrective. actianu md which are jepordizing the lives of the a i r t ravelers . The S.1. Lake City and New York City W=-8 dias te re are good examples. Many of the problear have alrvedy been Identified and proven i n my safety grievar-

rt

To shmr the urgency of the problem, I have referred t o certain tangil in the attachment which shuwe grave minconduct urd t he existance of c a r r a m dangeroum cardlit ioole.

nw..

ble M - .

!!y prfmry in i t i a l complaint was of grave misconduct within the western reflecting of course upon the Washingtun management that all& t hoc d i t ioa r to cxiat. These carditicrrrs would, and did, effect the l i v e s travelera,

C d t i a r s that arose during and a f t e r t he hearing shewed the ai.canbuct u gravity of the problems t o be far w o r s e and more widespread that I dared t~ &lie- i n i t i a l l y , ao ref lected by the attachnent,

Govermmmt amagence, i n isolated but key areas, v i r t u a l crfmb- deodar with obviauo death of subsequent victims is suggeeted by th a t t a c M n t - one cwr deny that here is sham a major government scmrdal t h ~ t d l r ~ the lives of innocent a i r t ravelers .

Page 1 of 3 Pages

I heui ta te t o submit t h i s material because of cer ta in very shabby past incidcnta that occurred when a f a l s e i n t e r e s t was indicated. I was askad t o submit material t h a t was only desired t o be used against me. I n one example, a lengthy document tha t described v i r tua l ly every maknees that wee t o be associated with the Sa l t Lake City d i a s t e r was cal led a 17DiatribeT1 by the ': '

Hearing Officer. I fear hie a t t i t u d e r e f l e c t s those of others in key Agency positiaaa that seriously e f f ec t s a v i a t i m safety.

The val id i ty of my miginal charges are w e l l proven by the aafety grievance data that I ked t o force upon an unwilling Federal Aviation Agency. The a c t i o ~ of a ".elf acquital" group have not changed the obvious existance of u n ~ l f e and i l l e g a l practices. It has, however, shown t ha t f a r graver disregard of proper conduct ex is t s and tha t vfrtuelly no behavior is too low, regardless of the pr ice i n h\i~len blood t h a t would obviously be paid.

B e ~ i d e s the aeassiw proof of grave ccmditiana that I admit ted I n t o the forced Safety Hearing, we now have t h e subsequent period following the hearing, me of the darkest period8 i n a i r carrier history, t o fur ther prove the va l id i ty of my warninga and consequences of ignoring the obvious conditions. The Salt Lake City tragedy is especially indicative of the cmdi t ions t h a t I proved to exist and which were deLiberately ignored.

The Salt Lake City accident is a t e r r l b l e tragedy. If it had to occur it couldntt have been a t a more appropriate time t o i l l u s t r a t e the cloee associa- t im betuem the shoeking canditiona within the Federal Avietlar Agency and subsequent a i r m i e r d ias te rs , This relat ionship hao existed f o r sum tiwe and is even refcrred t o i n the Washingtan evaluatian repar t known as exhibi t

.

160. That S a l t Lake City tragedy and the condit iam t h a t preceded it, she the *mattew external s h e l l of the FAA hidm a t rag ic a t t i t ude .

T h i s shocking condition can be changed if m recognize the rtate of affairu, Meaningless self praise would stop u8 before we get s tar ted, Examhe tho attaehmmt, a mi ta l l pa r t of the.FAA story, and the bru ta l i ty is obvious.

Recogniring the gravity of cer ta in misconduct and taking the inmediate remwal action. i n abvlously necessary. Unless t h i s is done, the Agrncyta posi t ion continuer to be ane of condoning grave mfsconduct and i n m e meee actually rewarding those for such a c t i m e .

Beeid- the areas of misconduct t o be dea l t with, a massive chsnge l a attitude8 m a t accur which allows c o q l i a n c e with the existing FAA -fay dircctirca.

With aclaathing other than " l i p service11, grea t stride8 can a d oust k taken t o improve a i r ca r r i e r safety , FAA effectiveness and proper conduct w i t M n the Ag=cy

Certain actiaas must be taken regarding the seriouu hema that I and my family h d suffered since the FAA management warned t h a t I and they would be hurt, and were. Much of the harm is permanent due t o these actions and crrrnat be d m e any wore than the two Bennett daughers who perished in the Salt Lake City

Page 2 of 3 Pages

--

accident can be brought back t o l i f e by f i n a l l y recognizing the problem the t w e r e deliberately ignored p r io r t o the dias ter .

O f iwrediate concern t o me is my forced suspension from my proper job function and placement i n t o an area t h a t is not of my choosing, Inmediate actione are.necessary t o correct the defamation used by West- Region management conduct,

Theme described corrective actions a re only general. The upecific and necessary' corrective actions would of course be submitted, i f requested, 1. The family loss , the huge f inancial 108s cannot be corrected. T h i s 1. one of the pr ices f o r the past FAA actions. The one consolation is t h a t others have

I was aaked what I had done since arr iving i n Oklahana City t o correct the charges against the Western Region, Numerous preparatory steps have been taken due t o the dire needs and the savinge of l i v e s tha t a re being so recklessly endangered, Ncme have been taken aa yet i n t o the final i n i t i a t i o n stage but this must be done shor t ly i f correction cannot be obtained within the Agency.

..

I had prepared a l e t t e r t o the Utah Bar Association t o f ind an aviation minded, experienced attorney t o evaluate a poesible lega l action thet I m y have against certain individuals who had gravely conducted themselves with serioua harm t o me ,

paid f a r more than I f o r the exis t ing conditions. I

I have cartacted an attorney group who hes an aviation in t e re s t , far their views on possible l i b e l and slander a c t i m e and any other assistance they may suggeet o r offer.

A final dec is im a s t o what route t o follow has not yet been made. As in the past, I hope that the corrective actions can be made internal ly . The Agency's past performance does not of fe r much encouragement. /'

I hape the Agency recognizes w h a t serious pl ight t ha t now e x i s t s a t o be taken.

I a t t ee t to the accuracy of t h i s with my signature and given the 8 th b y of August, 1966

Witness \ John V, Graziano

--

Page 3 of 3 Pages

SYNOPSIS

a/Uni t ad ' s noncompl iance proved and tepor t ed i n t o official . recordr

b/Brazen disregard of f a c t s and official r eco rd r by FAA. Falsely - s t a t e d i n compliance since 1963 when o f f i c i a l recordo showed i n

: noncumpliarice Inc luding dur ing hearing, on May 14, 1965.

c/United ' s "ourvival le" acc iden t followed hea r ing . 43 dead(4lcraaated) 'L, -

RECORD INsP&L'IoN REFUSAL, UNITED AIR LINES -.-, . . . * ' - .

" ... ; i /~i i 'nt~4's r e f u s a l proved and repor ted . I l l e g a l a c t i o n a. clear13 ,.

showed by FAA reguihbtions.

b/FM a t t o r n e y f i r s t implied inspector d i d n o t eutnnft r e p o r t ,

s t a t i n g management would have has t o fLLe a v i o l a t i o n r e p o r t i f

submit ted When discovery t h a t FM management Ir-now of refuaal by

United, change quick ly made t o e t a t e United proper ly refuse' '- ,

. \ ._ a l low record Fnspection. .-

e luni ted d i a e t e r a t S a l t Lake CLty foihlawod. Weaknesses fdent i f ic

i n a v i a t i o n jou rna l s with Unitcdta r e - eva lua t ion of its traJ-'--

v l a record inspectLons.

UiITED'S DANGEROUS TRAINING PROGRAM

- aldangerour n a t u r e of program f r equen t ly r epo r t ed i n to o f f i * -4w--"4---

records available t o and in posresr ion of FAA a t t o r n e y and :

--- Rear in~

b/Heacing o f f i c e r and FAA a t t o r n e y s t a t e d no r e p o r t s of c o n a l r r m - I

made. Ignored dangerou8 cond i t i ons .

, c/Subsequent S a l t Cdky C.:.ty t ragedy showed r e s u l t s of d a g s

t r a i n i n g program wi th 43 dea the , c l q s e l y a s soc i a t ed wi th kn ;I?

dangerous traj-ning program. . Defect Lvn t r a i n f n g program athlttsd I

SYNOPSIS

DANGEROUS COWANY CHECK AIRMEN. REFUSAL OF FAA TO ACT

a/massive number of o f f i c i a l r epor t s , messive d i e s a t i s f a c t i o n vLth

canyany check ai lment before New York Ci ty d i a e t e r and Sa l t Lake

City d i a a t e r , for s:x yea r s . Responsib i l i ty t o act apparently

i-gnored.. Unsafe p i l o t s deprived of needed t r a in ing , deprived of

proper s a f e t y etandards and t r a i n i n g

b/FAA s h i e l d s se r ious FAA r e f u s a l t o a c t , on excuee -- "personali ty

conf l i c t " . .

chlew Yorl: C i t y ' s DC-8 134 dead, (personal i ty c o n f l i c t ? ) . Sa l t

Lake Ci ty unsafe p i l o t s tandards continued, obviouely wi th knowledge

of "anything goes" company check p i l o t s .

DESCENDXNG BELOW MINIMUM SAFE APPROACH ALTITUDES

a/Repoi-ts of t h i s condit ion made i n t o FAA o f f i c i a l recoods. FAA

management ordered tnspector t o s top c o r r e c t i v e ac t ions . I. b/FAA at torney implled condit ion never observed and never reported.

Rearing o f f i c e r implied a hard t o g e t along with a t t i t u d e fo r p ramt ion

I of s a f e t y a c t i o n s .

c /Af ter t h e hear lng, descending below safe approach mLn1pume k i l i

55 a t C inc inna t t i and 83 a t Ardmore.

ILLEGAL S A F W PIWT AT UNITED FOR SIX YEARS

a/numerous reports submi-ttcd by inspector Btich i n t o FAA record6 of

i l l e g a l condit ion and of check p i l o t e grabbing contro l@ t o dam ship .

b / I l l l g e a l condit ion ignored by FAA a t to rneys .

c/FAA a t to rney and hearing o f f i c e r s t a t e d inspector S t i c h nevet

reported condi t ion when i n t h e i r psssession were namerour such peports .

-- SYNOPSIS 3

CowvEalElnr I W O R I M OF OTHER SERIOUS UNSAFE ItfgCAL PRACTlCES .

a/Bailure to canply with landing out o f circling approacbert 4

b/Posrible managehent perjury and lack of c r e d i b i l i t y tho

by records.

cfForced destruction of o f f i c i a l reports on dangerour trainfng

progran and unsafe pi lots by FAA manugernent.

d/Ordering inspectors to p a t t i c i p i t e in dangerow a td i l l e g r l

conditione;nonccmpliance w i t h aafsty pilot: requirement#.

e/Roncapapliance of crew maarbere Oral examintitlonu w i t h traintug/

f / U r r r m e n t of inspectors, reporting i n f l i g h t dangarr.

g/Violation and fining crewmearberr, victims of dangerow training DISASndfb OF xktw.v p ~ ~ ~ ~ d u ~ wp,*;r/d-

program exlating due to FAA ..-

~ / ' ' L O O ~ the other way" conditions forced upon i n s p e c t o r ~ .

i/Diaregprd of mars ive PI mloconduct . ffDirregard, condonemnt and reward of petty spy eyrtea and w e

againrt inrpectorr.

kt'Phreata against inrpector SrFch and fanf ly implisd..by trprd

telephone converration, and accomplirhed. FAA mana$epwat involved

l /Bcawal of lnrpeetors from check6 of weak dangerous piiletr.

m/fgnoring lnduatry threat8 againrt inspectors.

n/Condanement of ?AA m n n a m t aimconduct.

a/Requirements of sa fe ty , CAB and Civil Service is t h a t hearing

be of nonadversari na ture . -- b/Disregard of requirement@ by Hearing o f f i c e r , FAA attorney and

Washington.

c/"Wh~tewash" of i l l e g a l and unsafe condit ions t h a t ware t o becoore

Int imately involved in severa l t r a g i c a i r d i a s t e r e including 8alt

Lake City. .

SALT LAKE CITY 'I"RACEDY

a h a r n i n g s by inspector Stich of unsafe and i l l e g a l conditfcmr, such

a s i n a b i l i t y t o c o r r e c t hFgh s ink r a t e s due t o FAA management fnter-

ference; I l l e g a l Emergency t r a i n i n g evacuation program; Dangermu

t r a i n i n g program; Refusal t o allow record Lnspection;

b/Agcncy s t a t e d unsafe and i l lwgal condit ions don' t eximt or weren't

reported, contrary t o heacing testimony and official FAA reportr.

c/Cremation of 41 persons, 2 more died, o the r s pa in fu l ly burned.

Agency promotion of key peraronnel involved while passenger8 were

being removed in rubber containere.

EMERGENCY TRAINING EVACUATION PROGRAM

Thir mandatory air carr ie r safety requirement ir the moat strongly

worded FAA and CAB aafe ty d i r e c t i v e ever issued, t h a t CIJ3ARLI BQUATW

i ts cmpl iance ;-Lth the a c t u a l l i ve s of air travelera. For a rectlon of

t h e Federal Aviation Agency t o ignore or cover up obvious noncomplimcs

with t h i s l i f e aaving requirement would be a grave condition and reflect

a brazen contempt fo r the air t r a v e l e r s ent rus ted i n t o its care. Subre-

quent daathr from mieconduct in thee area, and others , would be r cawed

by t h e continuation of the unsafe or illegal prac t i ces and Ls clearly

implied in the FAA safety directivao.

Sworn testimony.was introduced i n t o t h e forced safety grievance

heating by Fnspector Rodney S t fch showing the exis tance of noncompliance

with the Emergency Training ~ v a c u a t i o n progrrmr at United A i r Lfnea during

t h e yoara 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1965. Rumerous off ic ia l government

documents wern also submitted i n t o the hearing record8 t o fu r the r aubrtcm-

tfate the exlrtance of there i l l e g a l condit ions and were dated:

Hay 14, 1965 ( t h i s repor t was offered during the hearing but

testimony given ins tead. Actual off icial report

them eu'mitted t o the Denver ACDO a f t e r the hearing.) /

September 20, 1964 (exhibi t 12 i n FAA Hearing E-2QG)

October Znd, 1964 (exhibit 31)

September 30, 1964 (exhibit 11)

October 2, 1364 (exhibi t 24)

t HgRCElilCY TRAZWR?G BVACU.4TION PROGRAM ' 2

#member 3, 1964 (axhfbit 31)

September 30, 1954 (exhibi t 38)

And others .

Sworn testimony thowed t h a t verbal r epor t ing of t h i a s e r i o u s nm-

corapltance was made by inepector S t i c h during 1963, 1964 and 1965 t o

specif ic F U mmagement personnel who ignored t h e rerfoue condition md

obvious deadly consequences.

h e May 14, 1955 o f f i c i a l govervment report r e f l e c t e d an o f f i c i a l *I -.

inves t lgatior? of the ,Unitad Air Linee b a r g e n c y Trainfng program made

by inspeator Stfch who had the authority and resgonaibility to make a gc72rpn r ~ n d P

e t e r m i n ~ i f the condition^ of noncompliance did i n fact exirt . The

United ins t ruc to r responsible for this t r a i n i n g wae shown by name, and

statements made by him were ehown on the of f i c ia l investigation FAA report.

Such statements admitted the existance of 6 p e c i f t c de f fc ienc ie r and non-

compliance with the legally required Emergency Training EvacuatLon progrra

and indicated the noncompliance existed for t h e past th ree year., as

previouely repuzted by inlrpector Stfch in other o f f i c i a l gwernment reports.

Most of the o f f i c i a l Federal Aviation Agency repor t8 showing the c a y / r/M

exir tunce of this dangerous and i l l ega l coozd rtfm ident i f i ed by name

various United A i r Liner personnel in responsible positicma wtro identif ied 1 I

and a b l t t e d specilic requ?remente t h a t were i n nuncmpliance.

I f condit Lons i n the Federal Aviation Agency could be r o ludicroar ae i

t o deny the existance of unsafe and illesal condFtLons reported by the eafety

inspectors asaigaed the responsibility and au thor l ty t o make mach deter-'

mination 7J%e FAA cou ld have contacted s p e c i f i c ~ i i t s d Air Line. peraannel 1

i n rerponsible poritions shown i n theae official repor ts , to confirm the

sx l r t ance of the condit ions or the truth of the statement6 ehaun theraln.

Most of theee company pe r rmne l were located between SO and 1000 fear

from the Safety grievance heartng room.

This check was not made, apparently became t h e Pederr]. &vlatJnn

Agency knew t h a t the inrpectoSSreportr did iden t i fy an e x i s t f a g w a f a

and illegal condit ian, though it subeequmtly denied the ex f r t r nc s of

the conditione by brazenly s t a t i n g THE Z IBSPKlVX DUD HOT %% KXBTMCE

If the Federal Aviation Agency admitted the exiatance of thee

condit ions, it would have exposed a grave rsieconduct withfn the Federal I Aviation Agency t h a t would also r e f l e c t upon many other rlmilar caaditionr.

This would rafre the q u e r t l m just OJher.e t he Agency was camplying vftb

i t r grave rerponetbi l i t ier r . It may alao expose actual conditionr behind '

numeroan BLr diaeters ouch as t h e world's grea tea t a i r diaeter, tha DC-8

over Urn York City, t h a t have not as y e t been acpoaed.

Within 1000 feet of t he Denver FAA office and the United training

center, a praetuus "survivablet1 DC-8 accident resu l t ed in 8 tragedy wherein

many paaaengere were cremated before the horrified eyer of 8heit famtlire

due to weaknesr in t he area covered by the Emergency Training Ibacartim

program.

That DC-8 tragedy wae the c a t a l y r t for the atrongly wordad Isargency

Training EmcubtLon program. Several of the key Federal Aviation &enq

pereonnel who allowed or refused t o take corrective actions for thLl

reported noncompliance were witnesses to the ac tua l crsaurtim of thosll:

EM&RGENCY TRAINING EVACUATION PROGRAM 4

unfortunate pasaengere a t Denver's Stapleton Airport. A ehocking condltllon

exist if thcna erne personnel thereafter ignore or forcibly prevent the

correction of t h i s dangerous noncompliance &ich was threatening the livee

of the air travelers.

It would be a crhi.nal mieconduct to cover up for the condition that I

ElAD to result in further deaths by cremation. The death8 did follm i n

a gory manner wi th the cremation of a mother and her two -11 daughter.

while the father and hundreds of terminal onlookerr 8 t o d horrified, helpless

to a id those ~uf fer ing horribly in theLr last few moments of l i f e .

Apathy, misconduct and criminal mirconduct was the forarucmar to

their deathe . During the nearly four years of required compliance with the Brar-

g m q Training progrm only one of the many reported deficimcier war.

corrected. And i n a very loose manner, by changing the tralning manual

requirement with weak and delayed "corrective action" ammociatad wkth

that one change. This corr+tton, e after the n o n c a m p l i ~ bad a i r t e d

for alreocrt two years, war the training frequency change fbasa t k il-1 I

three year Lnterval t o the required one year between training. I

A t t h i s t h e it would be f a i r to estimate that hundrede, porribly I a6 many as two thousand UnLted A i r Lines f l ight crewmecaberr were deficient I

I in th le one area of noncmplFance, the frequency of training. It a u m t be I realiead that t h i s one area saved the air carrier substantial aacmay. This

change occurre6 in October 1964 after the FAA was "FORCED" t o do no by a /*a ,Vbpc.CF?

m e s of "unwar?ted" reports 1- into the offiaial record^ by inmpector

Stich. The safety hearing record showed he was told by F M management

h i s reports were n o t wanted, they would embaraas tho off ice should an

--

EMERGENCY TRAIIiIMG EVACUATION PROGRAM 5 .

accfdent inveatfgati-cm be made; 'Were a thorn In the s i d e of the Agemay",

with reference made t o some unknown incident that involved a key Washington I

official with arr air diastcr .

This was only ONE of the many reported noncampliancea with the

critical Ih~rgeiicy Training Evacuation program. Thir very partial

"co=.rectiva" action allowed 3 leisure pace to ba used to "correct" the

problem. During the long period of noncompliance with the training

program j.n violat ion of the regulatory requlrments, many of Bnited'r

f l i g h t crmembers were undoubtedly as much as two years late in thir

important trai.ni.ng rcqulremn-nt ~Jhfch would aeriouely ef fact the crew'a

proficiency levels in thjs area and cause a serious deter ia t ion of thelt

uwareness of the, problems ~_ssocia ted w i t h the life or death evacuation

procedures. A Captbin would fn effect be responafble for 8 safe operatian

&an 1113 and h i s crew had been danled the training benefits aarocfated with

a lkos t four yeare of yearly repeated training that they had not properly

recetved . Wumcrous other defici.encics and noncompliance with the emergency training

pevacuation program atill existed and were reported as such Into the

official govertmre~rt records and constituted o f f i c i a l findin68 of the

programs statue.

'JXESE OFFICIAL GOVERNMEm REPORTS INTRODUCED INTO THE FAA RtiWJ3LbB BY

IRSPtCTOB STICH, iZUTHOR1ZED TO nAKE SUCH EVALUATICMS AND REPORTS, UERE KHOUEf

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION AG23NCY, WERE DATED THROUGH 1954 Am) THE LAST @Vl!

W 14. 1965, during the Ilcaring.

EMERGENCY TRAINING EVACUATION PROGRAM

The callous disregard for human l i f e entrueted into i te care is shown

by these two Federal Aviation Agency re,preoentative --.-. . statearentat _ ,-__-_--_ _ ,.. - . - . .- , - 27-----,-*-'----

. " ". . . .IT WAS ALSO CLEARLY EVIDENT IN THIS HEARING THAT WHEN TBIS

,/ CONDITION WAS REPORTED BY THE GRIEVANT, JWXRLY TWO YEAR8 AGO. TBB

/

RECESSARY STEPS TO CORBECT THIS CaPlDITICIN WERE TAKEN BY THE -0NllEL

\ THEN ReSPONSIBLE. FURTHER. IT WAS ALSO EVIDENT THAT AT ALL TIMES \

SUBSEQUENT TO THE TIME THAT THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAI[E#. UNITED

i \ AIRLINES RAS BEEN FOUND TO BE MEETING ALL OF THE REQUIRF;HI89TS OF

k.

'"2m RISGUWTI(HS". (wphaaim added to show gravity . . ~t a&ut&nk&ta). -- -.

. . ,... . ~ .-. . -.

The Federal Aviation Agency attorney representative was etating in

ef fect the Emergency grainin8 Evacuation Program had been corrected early -"*. , . - "-.' 'r- n . .I 4 .I .&. .. - ". ..

in 1963 and that the FAA inspectora, during authorized Lnrpections had ---,&..----&. - ." -I--"-.---

Qound thia to be true. The FAA record8 as available during the safety

grievance shared thia to be otherwise.

Thie PAA.statement was .contradicted by o f f i c i a l government inrpaatiun

reports signed by the reporting inspectors, including even the mrn

tertimony of FAA management, biased witneeeee, and waa also cantrary t o

the sworn statements of inspector Stich who was intimately involved wtth

the Emergency Training Evacuation program and the pexeon the Federal

AvLation Agency authorired and requited t o make the d e t ~ r m i n a t h of muah

condition.

LUDICROUS, AND EVER SO DEADLY 1111

EMERGEFlCY TRAININS EVACUATION PROI=R(W

Even the government document and exh ib i t showing the date of the

change from th ree year i n t e r v a l e t o t h e mandatory one year in te rva l ,

Implied t h e FAA's stand t o bc wrong. Thfe In i t s e l f proved the atat-t

of the FAA at torney representative t o be f a l s e .

Throughout the c l o e i n ~ brief and Bearing deci8ion report of the I ' Federal Aviation Agency representa t ives these type of incredible etatements 1

-&L and their consequences, f o r c q t h e continuation of k n m unsafe and

i l l e g a l practices.

O f f i c i a l government records showced and proved' the noncompliance t o

exist even durtng the safety grievance hearing, on Hay 14, 1965. Thir

reoord i repect ton cons t i tu ted an o f f i c i a l government evaluation of that 1 Emergency Trahing Evacuation requirement. The program was sham t o be+

noncompliance ~ L t h t h e name of the UnStad key person who admittad t h e I&- compliance t o e x i s t , and the stetements made during such inspection. I.

This Hay 14, 1965 officLa1 FAA repor t and evaluation, in a h o t tuo 1 years a f t e r t h e date t h e Federal Aviation Agency at torney s t a t e d , with no I facts t o make ouch statement, that t he Emergency Training Progrm war Ln I compliance. Thia da te is also three yeara after the required t r a f n i n g became

mandatory. Fl igh t crews would the re fo re be very d e f i c i e n t in the amrrgency

training evaluation requirements t h e CAB and t h e FAA e ta ted war esBential t o

.the savfng of l i v e e of paaeengcrs i n survivable air carrier accidents. The

lives of the air travelers were therefore being endangered. S i x m t h r later I 43 would d i e a t S a l t Lake City, a f t e r boarding a plane In tke saas building

0 . , ~

complex i n which inrpector St fch was "pleading" t o c o r r e c t the dungereus l

and i l l e g a l p rac t i ces . ,

Washington evaluation repor t , known na exhibi t 78 and attached t o a

aover l e t t e r dated November 10, 1964 rhowed noncompliance with t b i r import-

a n t requirement did exist i n o ther areas of the Federal AvfPtion Agemcy.

I n o ther words, the Federal Aviation Agency "hproper ly" atated that i n 1963

the Emergency Training Evacuatian program was i n nancwpliancm when 1U

off leial intapection svaluat ion report., prepared by 'the spscial1.t

it authorirem t o make such determinations, dound the program t o be in

m u m noncdmpliance. Further, the r tatements of s p e c i f i c United A i r Liaar

personnel i n key pos i t ions a l s o e ta ted condi t ions t h a t s h m d the ex i~ t ing

noncomplimce . .

No testimony or exhibits of any kind were eubmitted o r known t o

be ava i l ab le t h a t would have made t h a t Federal Aviation Agency attorney

statement of compliance va l id . The consequences of the FM'r statement

would force the continuation of a known unsafe and i l l e g a l p r a c t i c e

mince the Agency was now officially a t a t i n g t h e noncwpliance d id not

eximt. It w r e l y could not now t u r n around and force the air carrier

t o comply with a condit ion t h a t was fo rc ib ly s t a t e d t o be Ln legal

compliance s ince 1963.

Numeroum FAA safety d i r e c t i v e s and "appeals" fram the FAA AQninir-

t r a t o r t o LnOustry c l e a r l y irnplted l i v e r would be l o s t i f noncolaplianee

with t h a Emergency Training Evacuation Program ex l s ted . This price

of pasamger cremation vae obvious t o the Federal Aviation Agency whm

it engaged in the decep twe p rac t i ce of s t a t i n g compliance e x i r t e d in &

EMERGENCY TRAINING EVACUATION PROGRAM 9

1963 when i ts official records showed the program had never been complied

. th einca Lta adoption acveral yeare ago.

This brazen = obvious d isregard for the t r u e fact., the c o n d o n n t

and forced continuation of death causing i l l e g a l condit ione and miecm&uct,

the obvl.oua lose of l i f e t h a t would n a t u r a l l y follow, show6 the treacherous

condfttone axieting wi.thin the Federal Aviation Agency today.

The Administrator 's representative rea l i zed theme condLtLona, and

i n the Agency's ''self fudging" capact ty and his posi t ion a s Hearing

Officer , implied the Emergency Training Evacuation Program t o be Ln

compliance, as s t a t e d by the Federal Aviation Agency's a t to rney and

s ta ted :

'For Mrs. Bennett, her two he lp less l t t t l e daughters, on United's

jet fiasco a t Salt Lake City , t h e crew gufdance and aoeistance that a

proper functioning traFning.program would have provided, never arrived.

For than, t h e i r f i n a l departure from United's j e t was i n a v e q imperrme1

rubber.sack. A c e r t a i n FAA official would probably call thir subjective

thinking, and dimnisa the e n t i r e matter as nonsense or ''diatrita, It

wasn't nonsense t o those 91 s o u l l ~ on board, any more than it war nonrense

&an 134 persona lost the+-r lives due t o United's DC-8 Fiasco over W e m

York City t h a t was precesdcd by known unsafe condit ion# rhom by FAA

o f f i c t a l documents and :nspector ' s knowledgo.

h e Federal Avi.ati.on Agency's ac t ions were done with full knwwladge.

of other FAA employees, loca l ly and a t d i s t a n t locat ions , and known Eo

many industry employeer. Besides forcing a continuation of tbo practieea

- .-

EHERGENCY TRAINING EVACUATION PROGRAM 1 0

and condoncrncnt of the ent ire proceedings, the FAA wae forcing upon

inrpectora an6 att i tude of dl.sregard for virtuatlly m y death eausiq

condition, a practtce that was already too far instilled Lnta the mhde

of the FAA safety inspectors.

If and when the Federal Aviation Agency ever forced United Air Liner

t o comply with t h i s Emergency Training Evacuation Program it: w i l l taka

several yeare for the crewmanbere to acquire the proflciencv that ocgura

from a r;el>etition of t x a m and awaremeas of the evacuation procesr a#

would have occurred if the Federal Aviation Agency had not condoned t h

serious noncompliance for aeveral years. Other unsafe and illegal prrctica

were alro condoned.

Depicting again the past action9 of the present controlled FAA

~ ~ r n t , promotior~e occurred af those under whom the unrafe and

i l legal practice wae occuring, or who FORCED THE COWTINUATICN OF TRIS

DANGEROUS AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES In t h i s and other areas.