Exploring Climate Justice for Forest Communities Engaging in REDD+: Experiences from Tanzania

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Exploring Climate Justice for ForestCommunities Engaging in REDD+:Experiences from TanzaniaAnna Bolin a & Dominic Taku Tassa ba University of Leeds, School of Earth and Environment , Leeds ,UKb Department of Land, Environment, Agriculture and Forestry ,University of Padua , ItalyPublished online: 09 Feb 2012.

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Exploring Climate Justice for Forest Communities Engaging inREDD1: Experiences from Tanzania

Anna Bolina and Dominic Taku Tassab

aUniversity of Leeds, School of Earth and Environment, Leeds, UK; bDepartment of Land,Environment, Agriculture and Forestry, University of Padua, Italy

The last decade has seen a proliferation of initiatives and actors involved withpromoting alternative solutions to the problems of climate change and poverty.One such initiative is the Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation andDegradation (REDD (+)) mechanism. The REDD (+) mechanism containssimilar components to integrated conservation and development projects(ICDPS) and payment for environmental services (PES), where rewards forenvironmental conservation are supposed to bring co-benefits such as povertyreduction. However, there is little evidence to support this assumption. Insteadstudies suggest that pro-poor objectives within environmental policy deliverweak outcomes because they fail to acknowledge wider socio-economic contextsthat hinder poor people from engaging in opportunities and accessing benefits.This article seeks to link climate justice at the international level with the localcontext focusing on the REDD (+) mechanism, looking at rights-basedapproaches and the issue of procedural and distributional justice. Using Ribotand Peluso’s Access-theory (2003), the article explores justice and powerrelations in REDD (+) planning from a community perspective. The case study,Angai Village Land Forest Reserve (AVLFR) in south-eastern Tanzania, is aparticipatory forest management (PFM) area, currently under review to become aREDD (+) project site. The history of development intervention in Angai tells astory of donor dependency with limited participation by villagers. Our findingssuggest that supporting local organisation, through capacity building andcommunity networks, is a vital component of a more equitable and fair REDDclimate change agreement.

Keywords: climate justice; REDD (+); distributional justice; procedural justice;participation

Introduction

In recent years there has been a burgeoning interest in the role of deforestation and

degradation in climate change mitigation. Total greenhouse gas emissions from the

land-use, land-use change and forestry sector (LULUCF) amount to up to a fifth of

anthropogenic emissions annually (IPCC, 2007), yet there is no agreement in the

current Kyoto Protocol for how to reduce emissions from deforestation. The Clean

ISSN 0803-9410 print/ISSN 1891-1765 online

# 2012 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2011.635380http://www.tandfonline.com

Forum for Development StudiesVol. 39, No. 1, March 2012, 5–29

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Development Mechanism (CDM) currently included in the Kyoto Protocol rewards

emission reductions from afforestation and reforestation projects, but does not

prevent emissions from taking place in the first place through deforestation. The

REDD mechanism and the latest version, REDD (+), seek to address this problem

by reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) plus the sustainable

management of forests and enhancement of carbon stocks, which includes areas under

community forest management. In this article, REDD will be referred to general nego-

tiations and debates, and REDD (+) for its implementation at national and sub-national

level, that is in Tanzania and the Angai case study.

REDD has its roots in the Kyoto protocol, where the sustainable management and

protection of carbon sinks are outlined in Articles 2 and 3 as ways for Annex 1 countries

to achieve their emission targets. However, at the time parties opted to exclude REDD

because of the perceived challenges involved in addressing the many drivers of defor-

estation. It took until 2007 at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 13 in Bali for all

parties to agree that a comprehensive approach to climate change mitigation should

include ‘policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emis-

sions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries’ (Parker et al.,

2009, p. 12). In Bali it was recognised that REDD was needed in order to create an

incentive for tropical countries to preserve their forests and to further support the

second goal of the Kyoto protocol to achieve sustainable development. Since Bali,

the issue of indigenous and forest communities’ rights has been the subject of much

discussion and debate, however, without any real commitments as to what these

should be or how they should be secured. Thus, over the years, REDD has moved

from being a pure climate change mitigation mechanism, focusing on carbon

reductions, to incorporating other goals related to sustainable development, and more

recently issues of justice and human rights.

Because REDD (+) is being implemented in areas traditionally occupied by indi-

genous or forest communities, and because it requires clear and secure land rights, there

are both hopes and fears about what the mechanism can achieve. For example, since

REDD (+) involves local communities it is argued that it will not only achieve emis-

sion reductions but also other social and environmental co-benefits. Hence, REDD (+)

is seen as ‘an unprecedented opportunity for synergies between environmental and

social benefits’ (Okereke and Dooley, 2010, p. 83). However, there are also fears

that the mechanism will fail to deliver on these expectations. It involves a number of

actors at various levels – from international climate change negotiators, NGOs and

carbon brokers, to national politicians and local communities – displaying a wide

array of powers and relationships. Criticism has also been raised of the way REDD

is being developed, into yet another forest governance regime with little prospect of

changing the current marginal status of forest communities.

Experience from Payment for Environmental Services (PES) projects, such as the

CDM and other carbon forestry projects operating in the voluntary carbon market,

has given little indication that projects funded by market interest in carbon and emission

6 Anna Bolin and Dominic Taku Tassa

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reductions bring substantial benefits or empowerment to local communities (Boyd

et al., 2009; Bozmoski et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2004; Corbera et al., 2010; Lovbrand

et al., 2009). Similarly, there is little evidence of poverty reduction from community-

based forest management (CBFM) (Blaikie, 2006; Leach et al., 1999; White et al.,

2010) and integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) (Blom et al.,

2009), though there are clear elements of both approaches in REDD (+) (Blom

et al., 2009; REDD-net 2010). Too much focus on project goals, instead of the

process of policy formulation and implementation itself, has created a bias in outcomes

that do not represent local priorities and goals but those of project developers (Blaikie

and Springate-Baginski, 2008; Boyd, 2009). Studies have shown that, although sup-

porting legal structures and benefit-sharing mechanisms may be in place, other

socio-economic barriers prevent individuals from accessing benefits and engaging in

opportunities (Leach et al., 1999; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Mustalahti, 2007; Corbera

and Brown, 2010; Mustalahti and Lund, 2010). Although these problems have been

widely documented, the current REDD negotiations indicate a move towards yet

another form of forest governance, with little notion of lessons learned from past

experiences. In this article we argue that a failure to acknowledge local communities,

by not making them more fully involved in the process of decision-making (planning)

and implementation of REDD (+) projects, is a matter of injustice and a violation of

these people’s rights. Instead of focusing on policy alone, we suggest that direct

support to forest community networks and civil society organisations could help lever-

age current imbalances in power and representation in the ongoing REDD planning and

implementation processes.

Although climate justice is a much-debated subject at the international level, at the

sub-national level justice is a concept that is largely overlooked in REDD (+) proposals

(Griffiths, 2008; Okereke and Dooley, 2010). Proposals and negotiations pay little

attention to issues at the sub-national level, such as how to advance greater procedural

and distributional justice for local stakeholders (Griffiths, 2008; Okereke and Dooley,

2010). Numerous reports have been written on the practical and financial structures of

REDD (+) and how these should function and be implemented at the international and

national level. However, little attention has been paid to non-financial costs and benefits

such as power relations and procedural rights (REDD-net 2010). This article builds on

the perception that outcomes are directly associated with processes, and therefore pro-

jects that claim to have pro-poor objectives should also be inclusive of procedural

justice. Since there is an apparent neglect of this element in current REDD negotiations,

this article seeks to raise a critical discussion on the pro-poor ability of REDD (+). It

aims to extend the debate on climate justice and REDD from the international to the

sub-national level, by providing a local account of REDD (+) planning in Tanzania.

Through a case study, the Angai Village Land Forest Reserve (AVLFR), local level

inclusion and participation in REDD (+) planning will be examined; including the

role of local advocacy organisations MUHIMA, and the emerging Tanzanian forest

community network MJUMITA. The local account from Angai villages suggests that

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both distributional and procedural justice, in terms of local participation in forest gov-

ernance, is lacking.

In light of the above-mentioned issues and debates, this article is presented in three

parts. The first part provide a conceptual overview of climate justice and the state of

REDD negotiations and proposals. We look at the experience so far, with similar initiat-

ives and mechanisms containing pro-poor objectives, such as CBFM, ICDPs and market-

based mechanisms. The last section of the conceptual overview presents Ribot and

Peluso’s (2003) theory of access, as an analytical approach to power relations and con-

ditions of access to benefits. The second describes our research steps and methodology,

the case study and the context of REDD (+) planning in Tanzania. The third and final part

reports our research findings and analysis, with focus on the notions of justice, power

relations, and the role of community organisation in improving policy outcomes.

Conceptual overview

Climate justice

Climate justice has several layers and is a central theme in international climate change

negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

The highest layer is associated with the international arena and climate change mitiga-

tion, where the UNFCCC approach is that ‘parties should protect the climate system for

the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in

accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-

bilities’ (UNFCCC, Article 3.1). The second layer of climate justice is associated

with adaptation and the different adaptation needs of individual countries, more specifi-

cally the right of the least developed countries to demand financial aid towards the

adaptation needs of their economies and populations currently facing, or about to

experience, the adverse impacts of climate change. The lowest layer brings in justice

at the sub-national level, where individuals and groups in society are affected to differ-

ent degrees by climate change impacts and policy. Essentially climate justice is an

ethical issue that centres on the definition of sustainable development, as ‘development

that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gener-

ations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland Report, 1987) and the ‘right to develop-

ment’ (Baer et al., 2007). Depending on which layer it is applied to, ‘justice’ is

likely to have different meanings.

The issue of justice has been addressed in numerous theories and approaches

(Baer et al., 2007; Griffiths, 2008; Okereke and Dooley, 2010; Paavola and Adger,

2002). In this article we concentrate on two central themes: distributive justice and pro-

cedural justice. Distributive justice in the context of climate change concerns the equal

and fair distribution of adverse impacts of climate change among populations and over

time, as well as distribution of costs and benefits (support) to cope and adapt to these

changes (Paavola and Adger, 2002). Procedural justice refers to justice and equity in

policy processes (e.g. who is recognised during decision making and how stakeholders


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are implicated through participation). It is held that in order to fully realise distributive

justice, procedural justice must be advanced (Paavola and Adger, 2001; Polack, 2008).

Blaikie (2006) has argued that in order to have equitable outcomes you need to have

a process where all stakeholders’ goals and priorities are represented throughout;

since those perceptions and goals that are best represented are also likely to be

the main beneficiaries of the project. Despite this principle, international policy

proposals continue to ignore sub-national level representation (Klinski and

Dowlatabadi, 2009).

The concept of climate change justice is controversial and contested. It has several

meanings, depending on specific worldviews that shape perceptions of equity and fair-

ness, and because climate change has a multitude of human dimensions (Ford et al.,

2010; Polack, 2008). It is controversial because, in international debates, climate

justice is often discussed in North-South dynamics and climate change impacts at the

regional or national level, disregarding the differences in impacts among different

social groups and communities at the sub-national level. One of the reasons for this see-

mingly unbalanced debate is that the topic of rights is complex and often contested

between utilitarian values of the greater good for all and rights of individuals or groups:

The distinction between utilitarian and right-based approaches to equity is not merely anartefact for the history of ideas or a scholarly distinction of mere academic interest. It actu-ally lies at the heart of the crisis of governance that pervades the local, national, and globalcommunities. . .that is the tension between interdependence and independence, betweenpursuit of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the assertion of individual,local, or ethnic rights that ought not to be violated even at the expense of the aggregategood.

(Rayner and Malone, 2000, p. 219 in Paavola and Adger, 2002, p. 4)

Thus the dilemma is how to bridge the gap between powerful international discourses

of justice, as advanced during UNFCCC negotiations, and the experience of local com-

munities. Resource-dependent communities are likely to suffer the most from climate

change impacts, yet their limited access to policy negotiations means that the justice

debate becomes somewhat one-sided. Leach (2008) calls for a broadening of the knowl-

edge base in policy-making processes, as ‘failed’ projects are not a symptom of bad

policy but of a single-minded evaluation of project goals and outcomes (see also

Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 2007). According to Leach (2008) this single-

minded evaluation arises because participants from the scientific and conservationist

community, who represent one type of knowledge, dominate policy-making processes.

She argues that in order to achieve a more fair and informed debate about the nature and

use of forests other types of knowledge should be invited to the table, such as perspec-

tives from forest users and others that look at the history of forests and land-use. Thus,

imbalances in power and representation become an issue of equity and fairness. Just as

climate justice is used to leverage power imbalances at the international level it should

be extended to challenge power relations at the sub-national level.


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One way of bridging the gap between the global and the local is through the

advancement of rights-based approaches. Inspired by Rawls’ (1971) theory of equity

and fairness and Sen’s (1981; 1999) entitlements and capabilities approach, rights-

based approaches call for the duty of institutions to fulfil the rights of individuals or

groups. Although rights issues have proven difficult to advance in international

arenas, since it is difficult to compromise rights, the type of approach fulfils an impor-

tant function (Paavola and Adger, 2002). It appeals to many audiences and can be used

to integrate otherwise sensitive issues into negotiations that influence policy. Polack

(2008, p.18) argues that rights-based approaches serve to politicise apparent injustices

and to draw the attention to duty bearers and causes of vulnerability. A Marxian analy-

sis would demand a deeper, more political and historical approach but, nevertheless, for

the purpose of advocacy and providing a link between real life experiences at the sub-

national level with discussions at the international level, rights-based approaches fill an

important function.

Climate justice in REDD negotiations

In terms of REDD (+), distributive justice is concentrated on who should bear the costs

of implementation and the allocation of benefits from project outcomes. Overall, there is

little discussion in current REDD debates about procedural justice or power imbalances

in the creation and implementation of policy (Okereke and Dooley, 2010; REDD-net,

2010). In a recent evaluation of a number of key REDD proposals Okereke and

Dooley (2010) found that while principles of justice and equity vary considerably

between proposals, neoliberal principles are dominant. This is demonstrated by the

emphasis on distribution according to efficiency and performance, and reliance on the

market to source and allocate funds (Dooley, 2010). There are few proposals, such as

that of Brazil and Bolivia, that completely reject the idea of a market-based approach

to funding due to historical debt and ‘polluter pays’ principles, but only Bolivia

appeals to notions of justice for indigenous people and forest dwellers. The government

of Tuvalu expressed scepticism towards the ability of the market to achieve optimal

outcomes in terms of equity and justice, and its proposal is the only one to suggest

how funding should be distributed fairly at the sub-national level (Griffiths, 2008).

Even though Bolivia and Tuvalu’s proposals come across as refreshing, the overall

trend shows a lack of commitment, as by lack of recognition, towards addressing

sub-national needs for distributive and procedural justice. Griffiths (2008) notes that

although several countries have expressed concerns for social implications and local

communities’ rights in REDD negotiations, none have been willing to put these con-

siderations for rights into legally-binding agreements. Instead they are proposing volun-

tary measures.

Neoliberal values of equity and justice present a sharp contrast to, for example,

rights-based approaches. Here, the main philosophy underpinning justice is that of

liberty and enterprise, where the right to property (commonly known as property


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rights) is derived from the application of labour and the market is the main agent of

wealth creation and (re)distribution (Okereke and Dooley, 2010). In this context

rights, equity and justice become strongly tied to the concepts of performance and effi-

ciency, which without doubt presents a challenge to the poor and more vulnerable in

society (Okereke and Dooley, 2010). Peskett et al. (2008) call this the equity/efficiency

trade-off and note that this is something that needs to be properly recognized in the

design of REDD. The apparent strong emphasis on neoliberal values of equity and

justice in REDD texts and proposals is perhaps not so strange, as one could argue

that these are the underpinning values of REDD in the first place. But for the

purpose of poverty reduction the results are likely to be dubious. There is a substantial

amount of research suggesting that rather than alleviating poverty, policies driven by

neoliberal ideals tend to aggravate it (Bush, 2007; Harvey, 2008). If these issues are

not seriously considered for the design of REDD there is a great risk of reproducing

‘unequal power relations between project actors’ (Corbera et al., 2007; Okereke and

Dooley, 2010, p. 378). The current planning phase leading up to 2012 presents a

golden opportunity to reflect on lessons learned, looking at past experiences in

CBFM, ICDPs, and, market-based approaches to carbon conservation such as

payment for environmental services (PES) projects.

Critical evaluations of the past: CBFM, ICDPs and PES

In many countries REDD (+) is being planned and implemented based on existing

forest governance frameworks. In Tanzania, PFM was developed with clear poverty

reduction goals, and it is a strategy that has been active for a long time now.

However, not all countries engaging with REDD (+) have a history of CBFM.

Thus, developers of national strategies have much to learn from previous experiences

of CBFM, whether it is from their own country or elsewhere. While CBFM is often

seen as a wider approach, ICDPs and PES operate at project level. Since REDD (+)

implementation has already started through pilot projects and projects funded by inves-

tors for the voluntary carbon market, there are important lessons to be learned from all

three forms.

Community-based forest management (CBFM)

Community-based forest management has been a popular form of forest conservation

since the early 1990s. The appellation, definition and purpose of CBFM varies

between countries but they all share similar characteristics in terms of: (i) local

community-based management of forest resources; (ii) decentralization of power to

the people; (iii) defined property rights and inclusion of and usage of traditional

values; and (iv) ecological knowledge in resource management (Kellert et al., 2000).

The initial drivers behind CBFM can be traced to the end of the Cold War and the emer-

gence of neoliberal ideology (as the dominant paradigm within world politics and


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economic policy), instigating a rapid de-construction of the state in developing

countries. The ‘rolling back’ of the state was prompted by the neoliberal policies of

the Bretton Woods institutions, through their structural adjustment programmes

(SAPs), where a lean government was seen as desirable for cutting government expen-

diture and increase efficiency. These programmes created an institutional void, in what

was previously managed by the state and the public sector, to be filled by private actors

including NGOs. Following this was the process of decentralization by devolution of

state-run activities and responsibilities, including handing over forest management

responsibilities to actors at the local level. This period is also associated with the emer-

gence of the concept of ‘sustainable development’, which encapsulates rights-based

and participatory approaches to development.

Despite three decades of practice, CBFM does not show convincing evidence of

poverty reduction or increased empowerment to local communities (Blaikie, 2006;

Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 2007; Leach et al., 1999; White et al., 2010). The

assumed benefits of decentralization by devolution are that communities gain

access to more secure tenure rights and income from forest proceeds. In reality this

has proved to be difficult. Studies have shown that a key characteristic of decentrali-

sation so far is a strong reluctance among central government authorities to give up

control over forest resources, especially in areas with valuable timber (Mustalahti

and Lund, 2010; Nelson, 2010; Ribot, 2004; Ribot et al. 2006). Ribot (2004) and

Ribot et al. (2006) suggest that decentralisation in the forestry sector is in effect a

mere ‘charade’; governments have adopted the rhetoric of empowerment and devolu-

tion, but rarely matched these promises with in-depth institutional reform (also in

Nelson, 2010, p. 5). Instead, reforms have been done in such a way as to ensure

that centralized government agencies maintain discretionary control over valuable

natural resources, leaving local tenure insecure (Mustalahti and Lund, 2010;

Nelson, 2010; Ribot et al., 2006). The outcome of what appears to be superficial or

incomplete reforms is a form of decentralisation that does not provide adequate

support and capacity at the local level (Mustalahti and Lund, 2010; Ribot, 2004;

Ribot et al. 2006).

The process of decentralization by devolution involves expensive transaction costs

such as demarcation of forest reserves and implementation of forest management plans;

both time-consuming and resource intensive processes. These in effect transferred costs

to the local level, increased the role of donors and private actors to provide adequate

funding and resources. In many cases this has created a situation of dependency

rather than empowerment, with an adverse impact on poverty reduction, as rural com-

munities have had to invest both time and labour on management responsibilities

without any compensation (Bolin, 2010; Meschack et al., 2008; Mustalahti, 2007;

Taku Tassa, 2010; White et al., 2010).

Community-based forest management is to a large extent legitimized by its partici-

patory approach to development intervention. However, over the years it has become

apparent that ‘participation’ is a problematic concept because it has different meanings


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depending on perceptions and goals (Blaikie, 2006; Blaikie and Springate-Baginski,

2007). Although ‘participation’ was born out of a critique of top-down approaches to

development, proponents and practitioners have often failed to acknowledge their

own role in creating an externally driven discourse that does not necessarily represent

the knowledge and experiences of the locality. According to Cooke and Kothari (2001)

under these circumstances ‘participation’ becomes an abuse of power or a ‘tyranny’.

Building on the concept of discourse, Agrawal (2005) extends the classic theory of Fou-

cault on ‘Governmentality’ to ‘Environmentality’ to describe how project developers

and conservationists successfully use participation to advance their own goals and

interests.

Another criticism of ‘participation’ is that it is superficial because in many cases it

does not extend far enough to address deeper power inequalities:

Communities serve less as decision makers than those consulted, less as regulators thanrule-followers, less as licensing authorities than as licenses and less as enforcers thanas reporters of offences to still-dominant Government actors . . . even so-called jointforest management approaches have tended to allocate community partners high oper-ational responsibilities but minor powers to determine for example, who may use ornot use the forest, under what conditions, and to license and enforce accordingly.

(Wily, 2004, p. 3 in Sunseri, 2009)

Wily (2002, p. 9) makes a distinction between forest management approaches that focus

on: (a) benefit sharing; and (b) power sharing (in Vihemaki, 2009). The latter implies that

local communities should be forest managers in their own right, therefore giving them

more influence over the process, whereas the former implies that local communities

have the right to benefit because they provide a service towards a set goal, in a sense

fulfilling the goals of project developers as opposed to local stakeholders:

Social, economic, and environmental development programs have often become impo-sitions – treating forest areas as hinterlands to be exploited for the social and economicbenefit of others, to be protected on another’s behalf, or to provide environmental serviceson someone else’s terms. For the most part, indigenous and non-indigenous forest com-munities alike have been unable to use forest to pursue their own development.

(White et al., 2010, p. 287)

White et al. (2010) argue that CBFM policy and projects have been a failure due to: (a)

externally driven programmes that have failed to acknowledge the wider context, such

as taxes, policies and regulations that hinder local enterprise; and (b) a lack of attention

and support given to ‘empower forest communities to empower themselves economi-

cally and politically’ (p. 287). Mustalahti and Lund (2010) compared PFM in Laos,

Mozambique and Tanzania and concluded that a fundamental prerequisite for success-

ful outcomes is the building of advocacy organisations that can assist communities to

assert their legal rights. As an example, successful PFM outcomes in Nepal have been

ascribed to organized community forest networks that have managed to challenge


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power relations and secure community benefits (CIFOR, n.d; Cronkleton et al., 2008;

Mustalahti and Lund, 2010). Adding to this Corbera and Brown (2010) suggest that

actions should be taken to strengthen forest communities’ ability to access and exercise

their rights through investments in various forms of capacity building. These obser-

vations show that power relations have constantly been underplayed in policy and

development intervention, and this has contributed to keeping the status quo.

Perhaps one of the most important lessons learned from CBFM is that distributional

justice cannot be achieved without taking measures to ensure procedural justice.

Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs)

The purpose of ICDPs, commonly defined as conservation projects that include rural

development components (Blom et al., 2010), is to ‘combine goals for development

and conservation within the framework of individual projects as a means for achieving

sustainable development’ (McShane and Wells, 2004, in Blom et al., 2010, p. 2).

However, critical evaluations of ICDPs come up with similar conclusions as can be

found in CBFM and PES projects: it is not the policy that matters but the way projects

are designed and finally implemented (Blom et al., 2010; Boyd et al., 2007). Blom et al.

(2010), in a review of lessons from ICDPs for REDD (+), found that there needs to be

greater understanding and recognition of the trade-offs between conservation and devel-

opment. Trade-offs occur because the rewards for carbon conservation are likely to be

global and long-term, whereas costs of conservation occur locally and the need for

development and compensation is more immediate. A common way of calculating

trade-offs is through cost-benefit analysis where the concept of opportunity cost is

used to give an indication of how much incentive is needed in order for actors not to

deforest and to calculate overall costs of implementation. In the case of conservation

for REDD (+), opportunity cost include income/benefits that would have to be given

up if REDD (+) was to be implemented. This includes social, environmental and econ-

omic benefit flows and it is the perceived opportunity cost that decides how much each of

these benefits is valued. Although these values are known and appreciated, the challenge

remains how to achieve better representation of these values. The idea that REDD

benefits should be distributed equally among its stakeholders is a common theme in

REDD texts and negotiations. However, a full recognition, and therefore compensation,

of foregone livelihood opportunities in REDD-affected areas is lacking (Ghazoul et al.,

2010). Seymour (2008) argues that if REDD (+) does not provide adequate compen-

sation for lost opportunity it could block potential pathways out of poverty. These

issues present clear challenges to equity and justice for forest communities.

Market-based mechanisms for ecosystem (environmental) services

Market-based mechanisms for ecosystem services are conservation and development

initiatives aimed at commodifying the various elements of ecosystem services.


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In recent years, market-based mechanisms, such as PES, have received considerable

interest as a means of creating incentives for the sustainable management of natural

resources. PES projects include forestry and are designed to address livelihood

issues whilst providing sustainable financing for protected areas. The basic idea is

that those who provide environmental services by conserving and/or sustainably mana-

ging natural ecosystems should be compensated or rewarded by beneficiaries of the ser-

vices (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; WWF, 2006). It has been argued that the failure of

society to compensate service providers, such as land managers, for conserving these

services is a key contributory factor to environmental degradation (Pagiola et al.,

2005). While market-based PES schemes are not a panacea for the problems of environ-

mental degradation in rural areas, they can spur on efforts that improve rural livelihoods

through a comprehensive re-evaluation of the role of rural communities in natural

resource management (Rosa et al., 2003, p. 13). However, thus far, a rural community

perspective on market-based PES has not been dominant despite its importance for

pragmatic and ethical reasons (Rosa et al., 2003, p. 13).

For the purpose of this article we have reviewed literature on existing experiences

of market-based schemes (watershed, biodiversity, landscape beauty and carbon) as

well as small-scale carbon sink projects (CDM) containing community development

components; and we question the pro-poor ability of market-based top-down

approaches such as REDD (+). Landel-Mills and Porras (2002), in one of the most

robust studies available on market-based schemes and their impact on the poor,

found that markets could provide a sustained flow of services to beneficiaries.

However, factors such as lack of property rights, requisite skills and knowledge,

resources, and high transaction costs, greatly impinge on poor communities’ ability

to participate, and influence, the development of these markets. As a consequence par-

ticipating communities face real risk of being marginalized from expected benefits.

This limited influence highlights the importance of procedural justice. With respect

to small-scale carbon sink projects including REDD (+), analyses have indicated

that poorly designed and underfinanced projects posed livelihood risks (Smith and

Scherr 2002). The Global Forest Coalition (an international coalition of NGOs and

Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations) point out that market-based schemes will exacer-

bate many of the social and environmental problems that already exist in local com-

munities, increasing the marginalization of economically less powerful groups in

forest policy, such as indigenous people, women and the poor in general. Their ana-

lyses concluded that local communities are not strong enough to defend their commu-

nity’s interest against powerful corporate interest driving projects onto their land

(Global Forest Coalition, 2008; 2009). These mixed outcomes can be attributed to

the processes, which have so far been top-down with limited involvement of partici-

pant communities. This leads us to the question of what influences access to benefits,

and how barriers can be overcome. Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access pro-

vides a powerful tool for analyses in contexts where access to benefits appears to

be limited or constrained.


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The theory of access and power in natural resources management

Ribot and Peluso (2003) define access as ‘the ability to benefit from things’ (p. 153)

described by different access mechanisms that constitute different types of power. It

focuses on people’s ability to access rights rather than the rights themselves. Access

theory brings attention to ‘a wider range of social relationships that can constrain or

enable people to benefit from resources without focusing on property relations alone’

(ibid, p. 154). Access is directly related to power relationships and can be applied to

both procedural and distributive justice. It is delivered through various mechanisms,

such as rights-based access (sanctioned by law, custom or convention) or structural

and relational access (technology, markets, capital, labour, authority, identities and

social relations) that operate alongside rights-based mechanisms (ibid, p. 162). Access

theory is based on the notion that different people have different ‘bundles of power’,

made up of various materialistic (money, property) and non-materialistic resources

(social status, knowledge), that they use to negotiate with various actors and institutions

in order to gain, maintain and control access to resources. Even if a community or an indi-

vidual holds legal rights to benefit from a resource, for example through property rights,

the ability to benefit from it may be constrained by access to capital or labour. Building on

Marx’s notions of the relationship between capital and labour, actors either have the

power to control other’s access to capital and labour, or they possess enough power to

maintain their own access; and ‘it is in the relation between these two sets of actors

that the division of benefits is negotiated’ (ibid, p. 159).

REDD (+) procedures include measurement of carbon stocks, monitoring carbon

enhancement, and reporting to relevant bodies; requiring a substantial amount of

capital, technical skills, and labour at the local level. Since poor communities often

do not have these types of resources they become dependent on others to provide

them for them:

. . . landowners, communities, and project developers benefit from selling carbon insofaras there is someone who is able to mobilize funds to develop forest plantations and/orwilling to pay for such activities.

(Corbera and Brown, 2010, p. 1751)

The above statement is based on observations from carbon forestry projects in China,

Ecuador, and Mexico and fundamentally forces us to question the sustainability of

carbon projects. Similar observations have been found in our case study, Angai villages

in Tanzania, and as previously mentioned in Smith and Scherr’s (2002) analysis of

carbon forestry projects.

There are important lessons to be derived from these experiences. Above all, access

to resources and benefits is about power relations among and between actors. Rights-

based frameworks and externally designed benefit sharing mechanisms fulfil certain

functions for formal institutions, for human rights and justice purposes, and as manage-

ment guidelines for project developers. However, as explained by Ribot and Peluso’s


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theoretical analysis, the relationships and structures that conditions access are often

informal and dynamic by nature; therefore, often invisible to others than those directly

involved.

Previous sections have sought to show how policies to date have been insufficient in

their attention to issues of access, power relations and justice. Too much focus on

project outcomes instead of the processes that create them causes a perpetuation of

weak results for the poor. Instead, credible pro-poor objectives should be backed up

by actions that seek to strengthen forest communities’ voice and representation in

decision-making and implementation. In order to have an honest and just discussion

on poverty reduction and REDD (+), we need to improve access to decision-making

processes and enhance procedural justice. In the following sections we discuss

current REDD (+) planning in Tanzania, providing an account from a local forest com-

munity and its experience with development intervention and forest policy. We start

with an outline of the history of the case study area, from the beginning of forest-

development intervention up to present day, followed by research methodology and

findings.

Case study context and research methodology

Context: history of development intervention in the Angai Villages

In the early 1950s, the British colonial authority attempted and failed, amid stiff oppo-

sition from the local villagers, to create a state forest reserve in the Angai area (Sunseri,

2005, p. 632). Historical accounts and some scholars have argued that the 1970s

villagization reforms in Tanzania changed the dynamics with a proliferation of bureau-

cratic state power in pursuit of development (Ferguson, 1994; Sundstrom, 2010,

pp.74–5). Following this new order, in 1993, the Liwale District council proposed

to gazette a large forest area as a local government forest reserve (LGFR) and sought

assistance from the Finnish-funded Rural Integrated Project Support (RIPS) pro-

gramme. At the time, the RIPS programme put strong emphasis on local participation

and emancipation. Instead of providing assistance to the district it suggested that the

surrounding 13 villages should be involved in the management of the forest reserve,

arguing that local people’s participation in forest, management could improve the

incentives for local villages to protect forests, thereby preventing the degradation of

forest resources. This engendered a long series of negotiations and interventions that

culminated with the establishment in 2001 of a village land forest reserve (VLFR) to

be managed jointly by 13 villages under the recently formalised arrangement of

CBFM (Mustalahti, 2007, pp. 175–6). However, it took another 4 years until 2005

for the forest reserve to be demarcated and land certificates handed over to the 13 sur-

rounding villages. After more than a decade under the PFM process, the reserve is

largely excluded from use. This exclusion is largely due to a lack of forest management

plans (FMPs). Access to benefits, especially tangible benefits, such as commercial

timber harvesting, depends on approved FMPs. With these management plans now


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ready, gaining access to benefits from the reserve is just a question of time. From 2008

onwards, through a private research initiative1 and support from some donor organis-

ations,2 REDD (+) was introduced in the area. The aim is to build upon the current

PFM intervention by reinforcing the intended and expected benefits, as well as provid-

ing alternative income sources for the community.

Research methodology

The article is based on qualitative analysis of the Angai Villages Land Forest reserve

using the case study research approach. Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve

(AVLFR) is located in Liwale District in Lindi Region in south-eastern Tanzania. It is

owned and managed by 13 villages. Each of the 13 villages set aside a forest area,

creating the 139,420 ha forest reserve making it one of the largest PFM areas in

Tanzania. The case study was chosen according to the following criteria:

i) the research area has had long term experience with development intervention,

with REDD (+) being the latest;

ii) research outcomes could serve as a reference to other communities as well as

enrich the national debate: Angai is one of 3 nationally selected sites for

forest carbon monitoring in view of REDD (+) implementation; and

iii) the case study offers the possibility of analysing ongoing planning activities

including different stakeholders’ engagement.

The article is based on a specific internal documentation review and qualitative data col-

lected from fieldwork between May–July 2010. Primary data was collected using key

informant semi-structured interviews and participatory rural appraisal methods such as

focus group discussions in the context of participatory action research. We visited 9 of

the 13 villages that make up the project site and carried out in-depth studies in 3 of them

(Mihumu, Ngongowele and Lilombe). The 3 villages were selected based on their

involvement and knowledge of the REDD (+) processes and accessibility. In total

25 key informant interviews were conducted with actors at village, district and national

level– as well as international actors (donors). At local and district level, interviewees

were essentially village leaders (n ¼ 13), and district staffs (n ¼ 4) involved with

natural resources management and planning. Informal discussions were held with

some 18 randomly selected villagers. In addition, participant observation was carried

out at 2 inter-village meetings, where representatives from all 13 villages were

present, and at 3 village general assembly meetings of the case study villages.

1An action research project called ‘The Role of Participatory Forest Management in Mitigationof and Adaptation to Climate Change: Opportunities and Constrains’ aims to analyse how thecommunities could benefit from improved forest management through (REDD+). https://blogs.helsinki.fi/tzredd-actionresearch/.2Clinton Climate Initiative of the Clinton Foundation, IUCN and now the Finnish Ministry ofForeign Affairs through the LIMAS (Lindi and Mtwara Agri-business support) programme.


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https://blogs.helsinki.fi/tzredd-actionresearch/

https://blogs.helsinki.fi/tzredd-actionresearch/

In both interviews and discussions, themes included, but were not limited to, village

governance, intra and inter-village relationships, PFM and REDD processes etc. At

the national level, the interviewees were drawn from academia (n ¼ 2), NGOs (n ¼

3) and relevant government ministries (n ¼ 3) and chosen based on their knowledge

and expertise of the ongoing REDD (+) process. Interviewed international actors

were donor organisations supporting the process, especially the Clinton Climate

Change Initiative of the Clinton Foundation.

Findings and discussions

Following Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access findings are presented and ana-

lysed based on different ‘bundles of power’ and access mechanisms, such as knowl-

edge, local participation and relational dynamics between communities and external

actors, starting at the national level and gradually narrowing down to village and

intra-village dynamics.

Findings

In 2009 Tanzania embarked on the path of elaborating a national REDD (+) framework

directive. This directive serves as a template for the development of a comprehensive

national REDD (+) strategy. As part of the development process, several pilot projects

have already been or are at early implementation stages, and numerous in-depth studies

have been conducted. The vision of the strategy is to ensure that conservation and/or

enhancements of Tanzanian’s unique biodiversity values and forest ecosystems and the

corresponding benefits, goods and services are equitably shared by all involved stake-

holders, for adaptation, mitigation and adoption of a low carbon development

pathway, as prescribed by the UNFCCC. To achieve this vision, the strategy has a

number of specific objectives, including: a) to provide incentives for the effective partici-

pation of stakeholders in policy formulation; and (b) to implement a fair and transparent

payment mechanism that rewards stakeholders responsible for reduction in carbon losses.

However, issues of justice still abound despite this very progressive vision. Although the

Tanzanian REDD (+) strategy contains notions of equity and justice, these values are not

made explicit as seen by the actions of the national REDD (+) task force.

Knowledge about REDD (1): its implications as well as benefits to the community

As part of the national REDD strategy document of Tanzania, a comprehensive and

implementable national training programme for REDD (+) is envisaged. This pro-

gramme is to be accompanied by information sharing, knowledge dissemination and net-

working. However, from our observation, communication and information sharing in

Tanzania is currently poor. At the national level, we found that a few well-placed func-

tionaries understand and have knowledge of the mechanism, especially those working at

the national REDD (+) task force. However, knowledge and understanding about it is


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limited even at the ministries in charge. In Angai villages, knowledge about REDD is

limited to a few village government members who have attended meetings and some

members of the village natural resource management committee (VNRC). Some

members of the VNRC have been trained on forest inventorying and participatory

carbon monitoring. However, there is still an apparent lack of understanding of REDD

(+) among these privileged few. For the wider community, our interviews show that

there is no knowledge of the mechanism. Sound forest management practices, which

are a prerequisite for the success of REDD (+), demand a full knowledge and under-

standing of the mechanism, its implications as well as its benefits to the community.

REDD (+) is most likely to be performance-based and its sustainability demands:

† community commitments to fire fighting;

† improved ways of carrying out shifting cultivation;

† defence against illegal logging;

† encroachment, and so on.

These are all shared commitments and unless the community manages to fulfil the

requirements it risks losing out on expected benefits. For example, the risks of

leakage (when increased deforestation occurs elsewhere as a result of restrictions in

one area) and permanence (forest fires) and their consequences, are issues that need

to be understood by all members of the community. With an apparent lack of knowl-

edge and understanding about REDD (+), leakage and permanence present real

risks. The utilisation of the forest reserve and the unreserved village land form an inte-

gral part of the livelihoods and activities of the Angai communities. For this reason,

communication within and between villages is imperative, which is also why the

inter-village union MUHIMA3

is very important in the REDD (+) process.

From a justice perspective, MUHIMA is intended to function as ‘a round table for

discussion’ regarding all matters related to the Angai forest reserve, and is also a key

focal point for bringing local actors and external stakeholders together. However, in

order for the union to fulfil its role, discussions and decisions must be integrated with

the rest of the community at village level, which has been a problem in the past. At

this point MUHIMA consists of 65 members representing 5 members per village. The

selection of these members is based on terms and conditions laid down in the MoU,

and includes the VC, the VEO, 2 members from the VNRC and 1 ordinary villager.

These 65 members make up the MUHIMA board. The MUHIMA board elects its

own executive committee, consisting of 17 members, to run the organisation on a

daily basis. All members have been elected through a democratic process in the villages,

with the exception of the VEO who is a government appointee. Thus, the board largely

consists of village government members, who most likely have been or are benefitting

from illegal activities in the forest reserve. The same applies to district actors who are

also likely to have some influence on the MUHIMA board. Because of the risk elements

3Muungano wa Hifadhi ya Msitu wa Angai (Union of Angai Forest Reserve).


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involved in REDD (+) it is imperative that elite capture and illegal forest profiteering do

not continue, as they may jeopardize the potential for wider community benefits. Thus,

even at the lowest layer of climate justice, at the local level, there are clear issues related

to distributional and procedural justice.

The issue of participation

Despite the emphasis on participation in both the REDD (+) framework and the REDD

(+) strategy, participation especially of concerned forest-dependent communities is still

lagging behind. The Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP) for the World Bank’s Forest

Carbon Partnership Facility stipulates that community groups, civil society organisations

and the private sector should be represented in whichever body is mandated to carry out

REDD activities. However, community groups and other civil society organisations are

not represented at all in the ongoing processes. Thus far, the national REDD (+) Task

Force appointed by the government has led the way in the drive toward REDD readiness

alone. This is why the main civil society groups in Tanzania have recommended that

membership of the task force should be extended. They propose to include community

groups and civil society organisations, in order to ensure comprehensive stakeholder rep-

resentation and improved information-flow between national and local levels on all

aspects of the REDD implementation. In Angai villages, participation in REDD (+) plan-

ning is more or less a replica of what is going on nationally; initiatives are essentially

driven by external actors (some donors and NGOs), and as a result community partici-

pation leaves much to be desired. REDD (+) was introduced in Angai in 2009

through a private research initiative with the support of international donors and organ-

isations.4 So far the implementation process has consisted of participatory forest carbon

monitoring (PFCM) activities in 3 of the 13 villages and a number of village meetings. In

these villages, permanent forest carbon monitoring sample plots have been established in

the village forest management areas and a few villagers have received training on PFCM.

Trainees were drawn essentially from the village natural resource committee. These

PFCM activities are carried out once a year and rely heavily on the availability of

funding. Although the communities have been part of participatory forest management

for more than a decade, the villages still participate in forest management issues not

through their own initiative but rather as dictated by outsiders. Community participation

is limited to attending meetings by some selected villages elites representing the village

government and at the mercy of funding from the main donor – the Clinton foundation.

Participating village governments and MUHIMA lack the necessary capacity and

resources to leverage the communities’ participation. MUHIMA as mentioned above

is a critical institution in addressing sustainable forest management activities as well

as dealing with local cost and benefit sharing issues. However, after several years of

inertia due to poor leadership and lack of financial resources, reviving MUHIMA

through capacity building in the current context of REDD (+) makes perfect sense.

4See notes 1 and 2.


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But it remains to be seen if it can stand up to the challenges of participation posed by

REDD (+). Similarly, there appear to be misunderstandings between the villages and

the district as to who is responsible for calling MUHIMA meetings. The villages

depend a great deal on external actors for resources and access to information such

as the legal processes and necessary documentation. So far, the interaction between

the different stakeholders at various levels, especially at the village level, has been

characterised by structural dependency, which ultimately appears to have impaired

local empowerment.

Discussions

The Angai case study in Tanzania tells a similar story to the one found all over the

world in forest management involving local communities. At its heart lie the issues

of power relations, imbalanced access to information and decision-making processes,

and limits to participation. As mentioned earlier, the issue of procedural and distribu-

tional rights, involving actions across scales from the national to the sub-national

level, is barely mentioned or discussed in current REDD negotiations and proposals.

Such disregard has led to a new surge in demand from civil society organisations

and scholars alike to include clearer directives on rights, recognition, and participation

in REDD (+). Sikor et al. (2010) suggest three broad principles under which REDD

(+) should operate in the future. The first principle refers to procedural justice and

the right of forest people to participate in decision-making regarding their own

affairs. The second principle refers to distributional justice and the right to an equitable

distribution of forest benefits, beyond just providing a minimum standard of living. The

third and final principle refers to the right to recognition of forest peoples’ identities,

visions and experiences as these differ from western or urban lifestyles and values.

Together they form the base for what could be called a pro-poor approach that not

only acknowledges distributional and procedural justice, but also uses them as

principles to guide policy and practice.

Others have called for the inclusion of already existing international human rights

frameworks, such as the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

(DECRIPS) and the 1989 International Labour Organization’s Convention (No. 169)

Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169)

(Lawler and Huberman, 2009; ACCRA, 2010). The UN DECRIPS builds on the

notion that indigenous people should be given legal title to their customary lands

and be given the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for any activity

due to take place on their lands or in the case of resettlement. However, the notions

of FPIC need to be defined properly and clarified in order to be effective. In addition,

the classification of ‘indigenous’ can be seen as problematic because it leaves out a

range of forest communities that live in or next to the forest and whose livelihoods

depend on it. For example, in Africa indigenous is not a term that is used or applied;

this therefore can become problematic if it is the only way forest-dependent people’s


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rights are recognized. For this purpose the ILO 169 could complement DECRIPS

(ACCRA, 2010; Lawler and Huberman, 2009). The below passage from ILO 169 illus-

trates how procedural and distributional justice could be included in REDD (+):

The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process ofdevelopment as it affects their lives . . . and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and toexercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and culturaldevelopment. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation andevaluation of plans and programs for national and regional development which mayaffect them directly.

(ILO 169, Article 7 in Lawler and Huberman, 2009)

Both DECRIPS and ILO 169 contain important rights-frameworks for local forest com-

munities. However, these must also be followed and practised at the sub-national level.

As explained by Ribot and Peluso (2003) and equally observed in the case of Angai,

legal rights do not necessary secure benefits unless you have access to exercise those

rights. Angai villages have had the complete set of forest and village-land rights for

years but they are still waiting for their rights to use and benefit from forest proceeds.

As long as communities are dependent on other actors that control their access to capital

and labour under REDD (+) they will be in a disadvantaged position to enter a state of

maintained access and ultimately greater benefit sharing. Therefore, alongside rights-

based mechanisms (as recognized by law) there should be appropriate investments in

improving structural and relational mechanisms of access-delivery, such as supporting

community organisation and capacity-building activities.

White et al. (2010) argue that examples of successful external intervention include

those that have been able to influence underlying power structures; either through direct

support for legal action, or indirectly by supporting local organisations. In Nepal local

forest community network Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal (FECOFUN)

has received considerable donor support, which has lead to a re-balance in power relations

in favour of forest communities (CIFOR, n.d.). Similar observations have been made in

Guatemala where forest community network the Association of Forest Communities of

the Peten, Guatemala (ACOFOP) has been successful in securing funding and develop-

ment directly to forest communities as stewards of the forest (Cronkleton et al., 2008).

In addition, ACOFOP has substantially improved local forest enterprise by investing in

technological and educational capacity, so that forest communities can demand and sell

their services on better terms than before, when they were dependent on external NGOs

(see Cronkleton et al., 2008 for further information). In Tanzania community forest

network MJUMITA (Mtandao wa Jamii wa Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania) is actively

engaged with the national REDD (+) planning process. One of its capacity building activi-

ties includes setting up training academies, where local communities, project developers

and district officials would receive training about climate change and REDD (+).

Another initiative is the establishment of a ‘carbon cooperative’, which will function simi-

larly as agricultural marketing co-operatives and would be owned by and managed on


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behalf of participating forest communities. It remains to be seen what impact MJUMITA

will have on policy processes and negotiations but if MJUMITA manages to grow and gain

enough support it may well serve to challenge existing power balances. Individual com-

munity organisations like MUHIMA in Angai also play an important function.

However, it is questionable whether MUHIMA is likely to gain sufficient power to be

less dependent on external donors, or attract sufficient political attention to influence

policy outcomes. There are reasons for being sceptical about the potential power of

MUHIMA. First, MUHIMA lacks the necessary funds and resources to effectively

perform its governance and management duties. Second, because of its relative isolation

from decision-making powers in Dar Es Salaam it is questionable how much impact it can

have on policy processes. Finally, currently MUHIMA is not part of MJUMITA.

Presently, it is unclear whether in the future there could be collaboration between

MUHIMA and MJUMITA to improve any weaknesses in political representation or

advocacy. Current membership of MJUMITA is in the form of community-based

organisations (CBO), which differ slightly in their definition and operational activities

to MUHIMA. Another important difference is that MUHIMA largely consists of village

government representatives. The largest CBO to have MJUMITA membership consists

of 13 villages, which is similar to Angai. However, as explained by MJUMITA’s

executive director, granting of membership is context dependent, and in the case of

such large CBOs the organisation holds some reservations. This is mainly because of

the complications involved with managing different views and reaching consensus.

However, at least MJUMITA, with its national scope, could provide some important

connections for Angai villages outside the usual donor community and district auth-

orities. Hence, membership or not, the presence of MJUMITA could have a positive

impact on improving procedural justice conditions, not just at the higher layers of

climate justice but also at the sub-national level, where its actions directly or indirectly

can support unions such as MUHIMA.

Conclusion

This article has sought to extend the debate on climate justice and REDD from the inter-

national to the sub-national level, by providing a local account of REDD (+) planning

in Tanzania. By exploring the concept of climate justice, focusing on rights-based

approaches and the principles of procedural and distributive justice, we have argued

that sub-national justice in REDD negotiations cannot be achieved without appropriate

support and inclusion of procedural justice throughout the whole process of planning

and implementation. Drawing on evidence from CBFM, ICDPs, and existing PES,

this article has illustrated why pro-poor objectives should not be accepted at face

value without an appropriate enquiry into how structural inequalities and power imbal-

ances are acknowledged and addressed. The case study from Angai Village Land Forest

Reserve has provided an example of how rights and benefits are often entangled in more

complex socio-economic structures where forest communities become dependent on


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outside actors to enable their access to information and benefits. If these wider policy

contexts are not acknowledged, REDD (+) risks repeating the mistakes of CBFM,

ICDPs and PES; making little if any improvement to the lives of forest peoples, focus-

ing only on the global goal of mitigating climate change. REDD (+) is being designed

to monitor and report on carbon reductions, not the social implications or impacts on

forest communities. Increasingly the need to add social monitoring and safeguards is

being acknowledged, but it would be unfair to say it receives anywhere near as

much attention as issues related to cost-benefits or governance matters. In this

context we have provided examples of how rights-based access mechanisms, such as

the UN DECRIPS and ILO 169, could be used to engage international REDD nego-

tiations with climate justice at the sub-national level, and ultimately provide a frame-

work to improve procedural and distributional justice.

However, these are still top-down frameworks that mean little at the local level

unless matched with policy and actions on the ground. One of the key barriers to

achieving a more equitable and just climate-and-forest governance regime lies in the

apparent incapacity of international policy-makers and donor institutions alike to

switch their focus from project outcomes to actual processes. This article calls for a

paradigm shift, from outcome to process-focus interventions, and from benefit-

sharing arrangements to procedural justice, ultimately leading to greater distributional

justice. Our suggestion is that while international human rights frameworks are impor-

tant, in order to truly link international rights with sub-national justice, greater attention

needs to be geared towards supporting local organisation. Actions to improve structural

and relational access mechanisms, such as improving the political leverage of commu-

nity forest networks and organisations, need to be taken to ensure rights-frameworks

are aligned with local level capacity. Thus, sub-national investments in capacity build-

ing and local organisation are vital components for a more equitable and just climate

change agreement involving REDD (+).

Acknowledgements

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the people of Angai Villages and Liwale district forparticipating in this study. To the University of Leeds (UK) and University of Padua (Italy) for pro-viding funding, and to Irmeli Mustalahti from the University of Helsinki for her valuable ideas,support and suggestions. Finally, we would like to thank Ellen Brown and Laura Secco (Universityof Padua) and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Notes on contributors

Anna Bolin was born in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1982. She has an MSc in sustainability (climatechange) from the University of Leeds (2010). Her main research interests include the governanceof natural resources, community forest management, and issues of justice and distribution ofrights to land and resource benefits. Anna recently co-authored an article in a joint collaborationbetween the University of Helsinki, University of Leeds and University of Reading for theJournal Ecology and Society.


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Dominic Taku Tassa was born in Mamfe, Cameroon, in 1978. He has a joint MSc degree insustainable forest management (2010) from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, and Uni-versity of Padua, Italy and is currently living in Copenhagen. His research interests span a widerange of issues in tropical forestry, including but not limited to forest policy and governance,emerging economic mechanisms in the forestry sector (PES, forest certification and REDD+)and participatory processes in natural resources management. Recent publications include‘Analysis of three crucial elements of REDD+ in participatory forest management’ publishedin Scandinavian Journal of Forest Research (2011).

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Documents

Exploring Climate Justice for Forest Communities Engaging in REDD+: Experiences from Tanzania