Experiential incrementalism: On the theory and technique

to implement transport plans and policies

ANTTI TALVITIESpringfield, Virginia and Helsinki, Finland (E-mail: atalvitie@worldbank.org)

Key words: planning method, planning theory, transport planning and policy

Abstract. The paper describes an approach to the vexing problem of transport planning and

policy. It deals jointly with three questions, which in today’s practice are addressed sepa-

rately: How are hypotheses about transport problems and alternatives to their solution

developed? How can a good plan or policy be identified? What is the process of implementing

a transport plan or policy? In doing this the paper has the ambitious objective of proposing a

new model and process for transport planning and policy. It is applicable in developed and

developing countries and is not restricted to the transport sector. The paper builds on, and is

a reinterpretation of two cornerstone transport planning and decision-making models � the

CATS (Chicago Area Transportation Study) Planning and Design Model and Braybrooke

and Lindblom’s Disjointed Incrementalism. It advances a technique of experiential incre-

mentalism (termed polisanalysis) to develop and implement plans and policies. It proposes

that problems should be diagnosed by observation and continuous data collection; that their

continuous analysis, finding the ‘‘cure’’, and implementation take place through the method

of experiential incrementalism. In this method interventions are grounded on the theories of

neoinstitutional economics and psychoanalysis and derived using contact function, explained

in the paper, which renders the method scientific replicability. Experiential incrementalism

can employ a wider array of options in planning and policy than is presently thought pos-

sible. Like other scientific methods, its application requires rigorous training.

1. Introduction

‘‘The Multiplication Table is in need of review and reform’’

August Strindberg

‘‘I live constantly in the fear of not being misunderstood’’

Oscar Wilde

The quotes reflect today’s dilemma in transportation planning and eco-

nomics: plans or policies recommended by (economic) theory are not trusted,

but often consciously rejected. Ironically, theorists have also occasionally

successfully rejected policies that work. Congestion tolls serve as an example

for the former and road funds for the latter. Wachs (1993) examines the

Transportation (2006) 33: 83�110 � Springer 2006DOI: 10.1007/s11116-005-5232-7

logic-defying transportation policies followed in Los Angeles. Experience

tells that such logic-defying policies are by no means restricted to California.

They are the rule rather than exception � everywhere.

The two examples show that the received (economic) theory rarely

‘‘works’’ to cure transport problems. Even when it ‘‘works’’, success may not

result. Arguments other than theory’s shortcomings have been entered to

defend the failure to gain acceptance for ‘‘rational’’ policies. Apropos of the

above examples, the technology for the congestion tolls was non-functional,

or the value of time was estimated wrong (Calfee & Winston 1998); or, that

the IMF and prominent professors have used their power to veto road funds

even when they seemed to ‘‘work’’.

The analytic shortcomings are certainly not restricted to transport poli-

cies. They are more pervasive. The notorious unreliability of travel forecasts,

the overwhelming importance of the unobserved variables and flawed data

cast doubt to the validity of the economic model of maximizing utility or net

present value of plans. Questions from transport models illustrate this: What

are the user costs and their magnitude for car drivers? What would be the

travel costs of a present car user if he changed to use public transit? What

would be these costs for transit riders switching to use the car? Answers to

these questions are mandatory for travel demand models, benefit-cost analy-

ses, and management systems. The reader best ascertains that these questions

are non-trivial by preparing the data himself and estimating and applying

the resulting models, including the benefit-cost analysis.

Finally, there is the problem of application. Participant experience teaches

that predictions and models have an ambiguous role in the choice of trans-

port plan or policy. The result is a paradox: variables suggested by the theory

are observationally unreliable contributing to large model errors; primarily

however, the model error is due to unobserved variables; but, the error-laden

models and variables do not matter to decisions made! (Talvitie 1997a).

Three complex questions are addressed in this paper to increase success

of planning and policy-making. How should hypotheses about transport

problems and alternatives to their solution developed? What identifies a

good plan or policy? What should be the process of obtaining acceptance for

a plan or policy? These three questions � problem definition and data col-

lection, analysis, planning and implementation (for ‘‘cure’’) � are often

asked and answered separately although they are inseparable and have an

integral effect on one other. This paper, which is based on observations and

experiences with failures and successes in both developed and developing

countries, and applicable in both of them, is a departure from that course.

The author acknowledges that the language and form of argument in the

paper are different from the ‘‘normal’’. Nonetheless, the hope is that readers

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are not lost; for all its shortcomings the paper deals with issues whose

importance is long acknowledged in the profession. It first discusses and

reinterprets the two cornerstone models of transport planning and decision-

making from which the present practices derive. It then builds on their

strengths and insights, and on recent articles on planning theory (Talvitie

1997a; Willson 2001; Willson et al. 2003), and proposes a new model for a

theory of planning and development: ‘‘experiential incrementalism’’, polis-

analysis to use Jonathan Lear’s (1998) term.

2. CATS’ long range planning and policy as vision and ‘‘cure’’

The Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS), while not the first to pon-

der transport policy but admittedly the first to develop and use modern ana-

lytical techniques in transport planning, contemplated the issue of

appropriate transport planning and policy admirably (Volumes I�III; 1958,1961, 1962). It concluded that ‘‘observations of survey data and a whole ser-

ies of contemporary and historical actions permit one to distill a series of

essential human values... The result is a list of six criteria which are pre-

sumed to be the popular ones toward which transportation planning should

strive... The six are:’’ (Volume III: 1962, p. 8)

(1) Greater speed;

(2) Increased safety;

(3) Lower operating costs;

(4) Economy in new construction;

(5) Minimizing disruption;

(6) Promoting better land development.

With the exception of the last two, these criteria are still in use. Of late,

the last two criteria have again gained importance and a seventh criterion

‘‘reducing air pollution and improving the environment’’ has been added.

The discussion and quantification of the six criteria in CATS documents

reveals a high degree of sophistication that existed in the early sixties: the

importance of the value of time and the costliness of congestion; the pain

and monetary losses of accidents; the relationship between speed cycles and

operating costs; the expense and nuisance of new construction; direct and

indirect effects of disruption, noise, and separation of pedestrian and surface

street traffic; and the need for compromise between conflicting demands.

To aid in reaching compromises the single objective of ‘‘provid[ing] that

transportation system for the region which will cost least to build and use

over a period of thirty years’’ (Vol. III, p. 15) incorporating the six criteria,

was chosen for guiding the planning and decision-making. The Chicago

planners also knew that plans were dynamic, ‘‘the transportation plan does

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not necessarily stay fixed but is subject to periodic revision. The process of

review and appraisal against objectives (which may be modified from time to

time by public decisions) are as essential as the plan itself’’ (Vol. I, p. 2).

Having appreciated the importance of the process and the fluidity of both

plans and objectives, stated the six criteria, articulated and quantified the sin-

gle objective, the authors of Volume III ‘‘stand back to see what kind of urban

region is likely to emerge if a transportation plan based on preceding objec-

tives is carried into being... Are plans based on such goals likely to produce a

desirable Chicago region?’’ (Vol. III, p. 18). This question is answered in the

affirmative: ‘‘image of the future city’’ does exist and it ‘‘is an important part

of every resident’s working and living equipment... and must influence the

plan’’. The image of the future city was elaborated in two dimensions: ‘‘The

City as a Productive Society’’ and ‘‘The Appearance of the Future City’’.

When the city becomes ‘‘essentially a system of movements of people and vehi-

cles which must be accomplished with dispatch, safety and economy’’, a trans-

port planner becomes a bean counter. These two important viewpoints, a

‘‘future city’’ providing affective satisfaction to its residents and opportunity to

live in a vibrant and beautiful city should not be lost, but both are significant

human dimensions in transportation planning and public policy.

The CATS planners had a clear objective � minimization of the total

transportation costs � but set it in larger context with a comprehensive

‘‘image of the future city’’ and accounted for the long-term strategy by

means of periodic review and non-fixed goal set. It can be supposed that

CATS was � and is � an important milestone in the evolution of transpor-

tation policy process in the US and elsewhere. It contributed to the develop-

ment of the ‘‘3C Planning Process’’; to public participation in policy-making;

to systematic data collection and data visualization; and to modeling and the

roles of models in transport planning. The pioneer CATS planners were

emphatically not bean counters.1

3. Human behavior in planning and policy

The CATS plan soon fell off course. The ‘‘image of the city’’ and the

dynamic process envisioned were overtaken by a different kind of planning.

CATS legacy of appreciating the meaning the residents give to their environ-

ment, ‘‘the image of future city’’, coupled with impeccable analytic thinking,

innovative modeling and a dynamic process approach with changing goals,

the vision about ‘‘cure’’ to the transport problem, was watered down. A

mechanical ‘‘goal-oriented’’ model replaced the sophisticated CATS

approach; while retaining the CATS long-range, goal-oriented planning

approach, it ignored the behavior and images of individuals, ‘‘an important

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part of every resident’s living and working equipment.’’ Starting in the early

1970s transportation planning and policy began to focus mechanically on

quantifiable economic and environmental ‘‘results’’ and became removed

from the lives of citizens as a ‘‘study [of] blood circulation without the

body’’, to cite Coase (1987) out of context. Citizen participation counterbal-

anced these trends but, without dismissing its importance, has not acknowl-

edged prospects for both alloplastic and autoplastic change.2

Transportation policy proposals of the past two decades are based on

economic theory and the goals it espouses. In post-CATS policy-making

framework, free markets maximize the income a country or region can

derive from its resources and thus provide the highest welfare for its people.

The broad policy goals are prosperity, equity, and the twins of stability and

continuity (Dornbusch, 1993). Specifically for transport, goals are grouped

under three headings of sustainability: economic, environmental, and social,

each with specific recommendations (World Bank 1996). The process of

reaching these goals is normative: a description of policies for favorable cli-

mate for economic activity, and the end states desired. The former consists

of ‘‘good policy management’’,3 and the latter of (i) well defined property

rights, protected by a well-functioning legal system; (ii) competitive market

structures in managing transport organizations: (iii) market competition; (iv)

health and equity as distinct social goals; and (v) a participatory planning

system to complement the market.

In these descriptions, the problem is the solution. The assumption seems to

be that ‘‘good economic policy managers’’ and a ‘‘well-functioning legal sys-

tem’’ can be put in place by fiat, which in turn put good policies in place by

fiat. This does not accord with observations. The policy goal of pursuing pros-

perity, to take a single example, is not a goal in isolation. The institutional

economists � and the Marxists � have long argued that the authorizing policy

environments precede goal statements, which are responses from a political

process. Instead, ‘‘study[ing] blood circulation without the body’’, policy anal-

yses embody a tautology for human behavior: utility maximization. For trans-

portation, the best policy or plan is one that maximizes the net benefits

calculated from the usage of resources subject to safeguards. Market prices,

income distribution, behavior and authorizing environments, are ignored.

Recognizing the inseparability of human behavior from the aims of pol-

icy, most economists elaborate human motivation in the following way

(adapted from Dornbusch 1993): ‘‘The pursuit of prosperity is the deepest

motivation of individual economic behavior. Whatever philosophers say

about a society of consumers, individuals do want to increase their material

welfare. Governments can advance this by creating the environment that is

most hospitable to developing country’s resources. Equity is a no lesser goal

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than prosperity, although it is frequently neglected. The injustice and social

discontent inequity fosters are visible, and any economic policy must address

both equity and prosperity. However, equalizing income distribution has

negative effects that often lead to a lack of equity which can invite political

instability, and hurt economic performance. Stability and continuity are sub-

sidiary goals and people psychologically value stability and continuity per se

and hence they are policy goals on their own right.’’

There is reason to assert that (transport) economic planning and policy

making suffer from simplistic descriptions about the aims of human behav-

ior, and from their straightforward translation into policy by ‘‘advisors’’. It

is proposed that the methods of planning and policy analysis must embrace

the complexity of the context as well as the complexity of human behavior.

To show that there is an issue here, let us briefly speculate on the econo-

mists’ behavioral assumptions in a different theoretical framework. Is the

generalization that ‘‘the pursuit of prosperity is the deepest motivation of

individual economic behavior’’ true? From psychoanalytic perspective, a

well-established theory for human motivation, one could view the economic

hypothesis about human behavior symbolically as a reflection of libidinal

and aggressive forces. In this perspective ‘‘deepest motivation for the pursuit

of prosperity, regardless of what philosophers say’’ could reflect longings for

the preoedipal mother’s milk and the swipe at the philosophers an aggressive

sentiment toward siblings. In this perspective, ‘‘stability and continuity’’,

that people psychologically value, could be viewed as symbolic expressions

of longing for the same mother and continued prosperous and harmonious

flow of milk. This symbolism, an intellectual cover-up, accompanied with a

sprinkling of the emerging super-ego’s reproach, manifested as a demand for

equity, is then projected onto others as a generalization of objective reality

and translated into ‘‘scientific’’ language and an action program. In sum,

subjective reality is projected to be the objective reality of others.

Readers may protest the above model logic as farfetched and mystical,

ridiculous in a word. But is it more irrational than, say, the CEES model for

utility maximization, or the utility maximizing logit model for travel

demands? Are these models’ assumptions, and their underlying theory, which

are used in planning and policy-making, more rational than psychoanalytic

concepts in attempts to understand a person, which are not translated into

an action plan to cure him? Hardly.

Even if it is agreed that both types of models are farfetched and mystical,

there remains a critical difference. The economic model, both the general

and the specific, without denying its value, is not a means to understand but

to explain and prescribe. Its results lead to proposals for action. The psycho-

analytic model separates the general theory of character formation (e.g. ‘‘get

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the prices right’’ in economics) from the specific theory of how to ‘‘cure’’ a

person (e.g. how to get the prices right in Moscow’s public transport). Sym-

bolism and general theories remain in the background, but each case or

group is investigated starting from its own premises avoiding assumptions.The importance of underlying behavioral theory cannot be overempha-

sized, more often than not it is forgotten away; in addition plans or policies

that do not relate affectively to the present issues and their historical roots

will fail, even though it is impossible to go back and re-fix the root ills for a

person or a nation, agreements on a future course of action can be reached.

Do economic policies, mentioned earlier, yield affectionate satisfaction to

‘‘deepest motivations’’? Are the rules for good economic management suffi-

cient for the ‘‘pursuit of prosperity’’ and to curtail the private, public or

national excesses that often accompany them? Is the knock at philosophers

an attempt to deflect arguments against the simple aims of economic behav-

ior? And why the qualifier ‘‘economic’’ when early economists from

Marshall to Marx speculated in a complex way about the aims of human

behavior, which was far from bean counting?

Difficulties to conceptualize and implement plans and policies derive from

both a flawed theory and an unsatisfactory application technique of ‘‘goal-

oriented’’ planning model. The next two sections discuss the second bench-

mark in policy analysis, evaluation and implementation: a (forward-seeking)

model whose strength is the technique of implementation. Disjointed Incre-

mentalism (Braybrooke & Lindblom 1963) emerged less than a decade after

the CATS model. Though radically different in approach it was smoothly

integrated into transportation systems analysis (Manheim 1979).

4. Disjointed incrementalism

In their significant book, Braybrooke and Lindblom review four methods of

policy analysis and evaluation: (1) Naive Criteria; (2) Naive Priorities; (3)

Rational-Reductive Ideal; and (4) Welfare Function. After finding them

wanting, they present a new method (5) Disjointed Incrementalism, DI for

short. These are discussed next briefly.

Naive Criteria method holds that by merely uttering general values,

‘‘keep budgets under control’’, ‘‘maintain the core road network’’, ‘‘avoid

poor technicians’’, etc., enough goal fabric is supplied for decision-making.

The conflicting goals and costs are ignored.

Naive priorities resolves conflicts by ranking the goals, e.g. (a) road main-

tenance is more important than (b) road construction. This does not, how-

ever, indicate how much more important (a) is over (b) and is any amount

of (a) preferred to any amount of (b)?

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Braybrooke and Lindblom do not consider these very common methods

a viable means for policy analysis and evaluation, and turn to two available

‘‘scientific’’ methods.

Rational-Reductive Ideal attempts to resolve every judgment by prior

reasoning. Ultimate values are expressed in general principles and stated so

‘‘exactly that they may be arranged intelligibly in an order of priority that

indicates precisely which principles govern the application of others and

when’’ (Braybrooke and Lindblom, p. 13).

‘‘Radical’’ Welfare Function consists of ranking all possible social states

in order of individual preferences. Ethical controversies are sidestepped using

individual ordering, not social ordering. This is an important and useful idea

and suggests an approach to incorporating values and affects into evaluation

in citizen participation.

These two methods are comprehensive: everything is connected to every-

thing else and, in theory, these connections are taken into account. The kind

of problem solving implied by these methods is termed ‘‘synoptic’’ and is

prevalent among economists and engineers. The prototype policy analysis

process is the following:

(1) The policy-maker should pursue an agreed upon value set.

(2) The aims of policy should be clearly formulated in advance.

(3) The policy-maker should attempt a broad overview of policy problems.

(4) Policy coordination should an explicit function of the policy-maker.

(5) Policy analysts should consider economic variables and values compre-

hensively.

According to Braybrooke and Lindblom the synoptic method has many

shortcomings, including man’s limited intellectual capacities; inadequacy and

cost of information; and difficulties in clearly defining the problem and interac-

tions between subsystems. They claim that these classical methods are not the-

oretically feasible because there are no workable rational-reductive systems or

welfare functions. And, they are not practically possible because of: (i) multi-

plicity of values; (ii) instability and fluidity of values; (iii) conflict among val-

ues; and (iv) social disagreement. For these reasons they propose a decision-

making strategy which does not separate evaluative and policy-analytical as-

pects of decision-making process. They conceive DI strategy, discussed in detail

next, as adaptations so that decision and evaluation are accomplished in one

step without working out evaluation first and then applying decision-making.

4.1. The strategy of disjointed incrementalism

Braybrooke and Lindblom distinguish between four types of decisions;

(a) decisions that effect large change and are guided by adequate informa-

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tion and understanding; (b) decisions that effect large change but are not

similarly guided; (c) decisions that effect only a small change and are guided

by adequate information and understanding; and (d) decisions that effect

small changes but are not similarly guided. They posit that the d-type deci-

sions are typical of ordinary political life.

‘‘Small change’’ is defined as a change in a relatively unimportant vari-

able or relatively unimportant, incremental change in an important variable.

Over the long term many incremental changes can be of no small conse-

quence. DI proceeds without a comprehensive program through a sequence

of incremental policy moves away from social ills rather than toward ‘‘cure’’.

A restricted number of policy alternatives differing incrementally from

the status quo are considered and margin-dependent choice is sufficient; non-

incremental alternatives are politically irrelevant. Examination of conse-

quences is also restricted. The omissions of unimportant and � inadvertently

� some important consequences are justified on grounds of simplification,

manageability and affording time to those aspects of policy, which are of

great importance. Completeness may mean a bad job in everything

attempted.

In DI ends adjust to means and changes in values. Policy objectives can

shift if, for example, one becomes prohibitively costly. Some policy objec-

tives become relevant once means are decided. Because only increments to

the present conditions are considered, advantage can be taken of the fact

institutions and values change at various rates and the shorter the time

increment the more variables can be treated as stable.

4.2. Other features of disjointed incrementalism

Policy analysis has definite starting points, initial conditions, but problems

may change in the course of the analysis as restructured fact-systems may

cause shifts in values, or shifts in values cause restructuring of ‘‘facts’’. Behav-

ior changes may become acceptable if they are expressed as themes of concern

rather than as prescriptions or goals. Themes invite exploratory responses to

data and foster attempts to meet concrete demands. This serial procedure is an

important feature of DI; problems are rarely ‘‘solved’’, only alleviated.

Since policy analysis is incremental, exploratory and serial, with adjust-

ments of means to ends, it is to be expected that long-term aspirations will

not appear as dominant values. DI encourages one to identify ills from

which to move away not goals toward which to move. Errors made today

can be corrected tomorrow. To attempt a grand solution may mean to risk

achieving tomorrow a solution to yesterday’s problem.

In summary, incremental analysis is an adaptation process between objec-

tives and policies in which the synoptic ideal failed. The disjointed incremen-

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talist simply omits (a) non-incremental policies, (b) many important conse-

quences, (c) objectives not attainable by present means, and (d) non-differing

aspects of policies or consequences. All these reduce the demand for intellec-

tual capacity and costly analyses. The problem has been simplified and the

analyst has to deal with concrete issues. Analysis is limited to what is famil-

iar with the belief that man knows his values best in concrete choice situa-

tions.

Braybrooke and Lindblom argue that ‘‘Disjointedness has its advantages

� the virtues of its defects � chief among them the advantage of preserving

a rich variety of impressions and insights that are liable to be ‘‘coordinated’’

out of sight by demands for a common plan attack. There are circumstances

to which no one plan is especially suited... Is not the strategy prepared for a

world of unremitting change. Once launched with the strategy on a course of

changing policy, where is the stopping place?’’

I have spent much time explaining the Disjointed Incrementalism model

not to spare the reader the effort to read the book but for its significance to

understand of what follows. Later I will propose modifications to the DI

model to integrate it better with data collection and citizen participation,

establish a process on it, incorporate CATS’ vision and ‘‘cure’’ within it, and

add human behavior: institutional/societal/individual resistance to it. As will

be seen, citizen participation based on contact function is the vehicle to

remove the disjointedness and connect the increments experientially.

5. Transport planning and policy studies

In this section a (World Bank) transport project is used as a metaphor to

describe the implementation of a policy or project. It is the textbook model for

transport planning. A transport project is viewed as a response to a perceived

problem for which it is ‘‘cure’’. The hypothesis is that sovereign consumers,

acting in self-interest in markets and maximizing utility, will be able to engage

in beneficial activities through the usage of the completed project. The net ben-

efits from the project are then construed to lead to an increase in the standard

of living and welfare to satisfy the ‘‘deepest motivations’’ of individuals.

The project is cast as a linear problem, successively refined. This linear

problem is very similar to the Naive Criteria/Priorities methods, outlined

above (Figure 1).

IC identification preparation appraisal supervision ‘CURE’

(initial conditions) (planning) (evaluation) (implementation)

Figure 1. The linear model.

92

Experience proved this model unsatisfactory. Roads in many countries

continued to deteriorate. In the seventies, a synoptic model, now known as

HDM-4, was developed for project analysis to minimize the total transport

costs (Watanatada et al. 1987). HDM-4, which local professional are trained

to use, is conceptually simpler but technically more intricate version of the

CATS network model of the early 1960s. The linear structure for appraising

and implementing a project was preserved, Figure 2:

According to this model a project that maximizes net user benefits is

designed and implementing under competitive regime. Results are inconclu-

sive: in some countries road conditions and maintenance practices have

improved, in many others problems persist.

In both diagrams the process of design and implementation is not part of

the product or ‘‘cure’’. It is sought through an instrument (road), prepared

using the synoptic model, and implemented with international competition.

In the developed countries the diagram is more complex, though princi-

pally the same. The transport organizations use models and work with the

affected interests to gain acceptance for a plan. DI uses the idea of early

CATS planners � ‘‘the transportation plan... is subject to periodic revision,

[which] process [is] as essential as the plan itself’’ � and proceeds step wise

away from social ills guided by data collection, studies, analyses, public par-

ticipation, etc. as shown in Figure 3.

The success of the DI-model varies with the eyes of the beholder. For

some DI is a codification of the existing practice and there is no doubt that it

is DI model is pragmatic. However, DI has not lead to disavowal of ineffec-

tive policies in Los Angeles, as described by Wachs, or in numerous other

regions, because ‘‘moving away from ills’’ may not result in ‘‘cure’’ and

because decisions and changes, individual and collective, are not made

‘‘logically’’ on the basis of ‘‘convincing’’ evidence. Decisions and changes,

individual and collective, are made in response to emotional communications.

Right-timed interventions, symbolic rather than based on ‘‘facts’’, though a

combination is possible and desirable, connect the present with the past.

These aspects of human behavior were not well known in 1963 when Bray-

brooke and Lindblom wrote their book. Today policy analyses are still intel-

lectual exercises with the idea that once facts are ‘‘known and understood’’

max NPV = g[f(demand, road condition) - h(costs, road condition)]

IC identification preparation appraisal supervision ‘CURE’

(initial conditions) (implementation)

Figure 2. The synoptic model.

93

then wise decisions will be made and ineffective policies discarded. Wachs

(1993), focusing on facts and Richmond (1995), focusing on symbols, demon-

strate that ‘‘facts’’, even when known (it is unclear if they were understood),

and symbols when communicated cognitively do not effect desirable changes.

5.1. The informal model

Persistent problems in transport planning the world over calls for a new for-

mulation of the transport planning and policy problem. The new, informally

accepted formulation recognizes that the transport problem is both of

‘‘movements of people and vehicles which must be accomplished with dis-

patch, safety and economy’’ and of ‘‘image of the city’’, but that there are

resistances to ‘‘cure’’, which are collective, individual, and institutional, even

cultural. The existence of resistances, intractable with present analytical

planning methods, and an inability to deal with them is hypothesized

because, of a ‘‘grid-lock’’ in formulating implementable plans and policies,

and because of unanticipated side-effects. These observations are embodied

in the model (Figure 4).

Three comments are appropriate for Figure 4. First, the diagram is a

model where an effect (‘‘cure’’ or ‘‘outcome’’) is postulated from an action.

If this effect was not obtained an intervening force is believed to exist. If the

removal of resistance, the intervening force, leads to ‘‘cure’’, it is believed

that a (necessary) relationship from cause to effect is known. Second, if the

resistance is by-passed by moving away from it, unintended side-effects may

occur. These may be the most important outcomes of a project, an observa-

tion that prompted Hirschman (1967) to coin the phrase ‘‘the centrality of

the side-effects’’. For example, suppose the rehabilitation of certain rural

roads is the ‘‘cure’’ for a problem, but also an interurban road is built for

‘‘political reasons’’ (that being the resistance), then unintended side-effects

D #### D D ###

D ###

### ### D

D

D

D

###### D D ####

####

Time

Ills

Ills andResistances

Ills andResistance

Ills andResistances

IC

IC - initial conditions R - ### resistance/blockage D - Decision

Figure 3. Disjointed incrementalism model.

94

will result. Thirdly, and this is of utmost importance, by not investigating

the resistances but simply moving away from them, planners miss an oppor-

tunity to learn about the (necessary) causes for self-defeating plans and poli-

cies. An objective of the planning and implementation process should be,

therefore, to work on examining and removing resistances, rather than

‘‘moving away’’ to make plans to spend money or to study technical details

of possible solutions. If removal of resistance is successful and a ‘‘cure’’ is

achieved, then, it is argued, everyone involved has gained an improved

understanding about the functioning of the society, and the institution and

affected interests have matured to cope better with future problems.4

6. Discussion

Removal of individual, collective, or institutional resistances has, of course,

been attempted in the past although it has not been called by that name. The

most common way is a condition or a standard, which prescribes what must

be done. The second approach has been personnel training. Casual observa-

tion indicates that these interventions are ineffective but not unimportant.

The third approach, prominent in the developed countries where the first two

have outlived their usefulness, is interpretation and explanation, possibly

followed by institutional restructuring. The fourth approach has been sugges-

tion and re-education by means of expert information, study tours, and con-

ferences. The success rates of these approaches have not been documented.

Available evidence both from developed and developing countries counsels

that effectiveness is marginal unless there is a desire for change, in which case

the change might have happened anyway. Consultation of client by means of

workshops, surveys, and participation has also been employed to improve

interpretations, explanations and commitment for change.

Observations and near unanimity of professionals about the key role of

(transport sector) institutions for effective planning and policy-making is

probably correct but incomplete. There also is a lack of a theory and tech-

RESISTANCE###

IC ### ‘CURE’ (time delay) ‘CURE’(initial conditions) ###

###

Side effect Unintended outcome

Figure 4. Resistance model (leading to experiential incrementalism).

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nique how to enable a resistant road owner to reorganize in order to admin-

ister and manage better its transport system. As a rule, institutional prob-

lems are symptoms of more profound problems, as I discussed in an earlier

paper (Talvitie 1997a), perhaps indicating narrowness of this diagnosis,

which defy the success of timeless solutions embodied in Figure 4.

In sum, the hallmark of the transport problem is the existence of repeti-

tive and self-defeating decision patterns: persistent neglect of maintenance

causing deterioration of roads in the developing countries, and the habitual

plans of approach in the developed countries. Heggie (1994) elaborates this

problem � organization, management, and financing in road administrations

� for Africa. In developed countries, repetitive failing policies and plans are

described by Wachs (1993) and Pickrell (1989). The decision patterns have

not been directed toward ‘‘cure’’ but, consistent with DI, toward a path

‘‘away from ills’’ for which the will to implement is stronger than resistance

to examine the ‘‘ills’’. A hypothesis follows that the fundamental reasons for

these repetitive patterns lie in ‘‘deeper motivations’’.

7. The new model

The new model is an elaboration of the informally accepted model in Figure 4.

It can incorporate the ideas of benefits through usage and competitive engi-

neering efficiency in implementation. Similarly, experts, involvement of

affected interests and other current practices, even cautious interpretations,

can be a part of the process. The DI idea about individual ordering of ‘‘social

states’’ is particularly relevant because planning process should consider auto-

plastic changes to be equally important as alloplastic changes.

Let us pause for a paragraph before proceeding. Figure 5, where I have

combined outcomes with objectives and resistances with intermediate perfor-

mance indicators, shows the current planning models, the backward-seeking

(CATS) and the forward-seeking (DI). Both models have many desirable fea-

tures to address the kinds of complex problems normal in transport plan-

ning. In the CATS model, the ‘‘image of the city’’, the need for periodic

revision of plans and objectives, and the analytic rigor offer conceptual tools

to the planner. In DI the strategy of proceeding step-by-step, combining

data collection, analysis, and implementation ‘‘to move away from ills’’ offer

a process to the planner. Nonetheless, goals, measuring performance in rela-

tion to objectives, and the emphasis on outputs and outcomes prevail. The

lesson to planners is that a linear, goal-directed approach and emphasis on

associated outcomes to implement long-shot plans fail.5

The new model in Figure 6 is deceptively simple. There is ‘‘only one trans-

port problem but it is huge’’ (OECD 1997). This problem, characterized as

96

resistance, is connected to everything else in people’s minds, and hence to their

decisions. The model postulates that to transform this resistance, to affect the

minds to modify the decision-making pattern to achieve ‘‘cure,’’ requires that

all aspects of the problem are discussed, examined and investigated. The par-

ticipants, individually or in groups, find out interconnections of these issues

and their value, ‘‘the ordering of the social states’’. There can be objectives,

but there need not be. The only thing present is the existence of the ‘‘huge’’

problem and the affected interests’ views about it. The analytic process of

investigation, planning, changes the problem and the affected interests’ choice

patterns, and lead to solutions. However, the process is not automatic with its

own program; a good transport analyst team is necessary.

The new planning model, whose details will be discussed below, is more

than an intellectual exercise. It recognizes that theories of how people make

Figure 5. Traditional planning models.

Figure 6. Experiential incrementalism.

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decisions, or at least the beliefs regarding them, have changed profoundly in

the past fifty years. The old and the new model parallel the evolution from a

mechanistic world view to a holistic view that has occurred in many fields in

the past five decades, for example in the field of psychoanalysis, a profession

committed unlike any other to finding the root causes and empowering

change.6 The present transport planning and policy analyses are grounded

on a mechanical idea about the world and employ methods found wanting

in other fields where human behavior is of central importance. In transport,

interpretation, forecasting, explanation and (re)construction of facts have

remained the major tools. Assisted by statistical methods and mathematical

models, benefits and costs are calculated in accordance with the Synoptic

Model. The idea still is that when the interpretation and construction of

facts is professional and coupled with professional advice, good decisions

will follow.7 This expectation does not tally with experience. The revised

planning model recognizes that the difficulties in planning, policy analysis

and evaluation are brought about by the shortcomings of received theory

and the technique how it is applied.

8. Experiential incrementalism and the concept of cure

This section contains a more detailed discussion of the model termed ‘‘expe-

riential incrementalism’’, or polisanalysis for short using a neat term Jona-

than Lear coined in the context of Plato’s republic. The CATS and DI

planning models, which underlie today’s planning practices in most coun-

tries, are the benchmark models and frame the discussion. The discussion of

the new model is packed. The major concerns with the benchmark models

are restated to be the following: (i) the institutional framework; (ii) replica-

bility: the scientific basis; (iii) collection of data and public participation; (iv)

the role and effect of goals in the model (omitted here, see OECD 1997);

and (v) treatment of resistances.

8.1. The institutional framework

‘‘Getting the prices right’’ was the prescription for ‘‘cure’’ to transport prob-

lems until the eighties when it was replaced by ‘‘getting the institutions

right’’. In the transport sector this was recognized but with the absence of

technique rather than the objective, progress has been slow. Policy prescrip-

tions are advanced � often in a monopoly framework � for competition

and property rights; ‘‘well-functioning legal systems’’ are proposed without

reference to rule of law in the country; and maintenance of existing (main)

roads is prioritized even if they have direct access from every land parcel or

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when segments of population do not even have poor roads. In short, plans

and policies are put forward without a technique to implement them, or pol-

icies are proposed for which the technique exists.

Clearly, ‘‘getting the institutions right’’ is an important element of

‘‘cure’’; equally clearly that has been a neglected dimension. Based on recent

works by Heggie (1994, 1999), Talvitie (1997b, 2002); Parkman et al. (2001);

Sikow-Magny and Talvitie (1997), Dunlop (1998), and Reja and Talvitie

(1998), characteristics for a good institutional framework can be put for-

ward. They include autonomy of decision-making; stability and equity of the

road budget based on user charges; decentralized, efficient organization

structure; competition or contestability; private sector service delivery; track-

ing of performance; public consultation with contact function; and profes-

sional competence.

Only a short explanation of this telegraphic language is possible here. The

benchmark models did not concern themselves with institutions, in spite of

their importance. Road administrations’ autonomy was limited and the rela-

tionship between user charges and road capacity was and remains tenuous. An

attractive solution would be a corporatized road administration with a well-

defined income source from user charges (Talvitie 2002). Decentralized organi-

zation is best able to bring local knowledge into planning, which should give a

greater emphasis on network � rather than link � capacity (the CATS net-

work design model!) The case for competition and private sector service deliv-

ery are commonly accepted, although world wide practice is less common.

Performance tracking is also necessary, and not principally for measuring per-

formance (OECD 1997). Finally, the competence for public participation is the

cornerstone for facilitating change in experiential incrementalism. Curiously, it

seems that road administrations’ capability to communicate with large num-

bers of people has declined in recent years.

Institutional change is the key for transport changes. The institutions

need to be resilient against market failures and respond with flexibility and

change. The present institutional framework in the transport sector needs, in

many countries, a paradigm shift for conceptualizing, administering, manag-

ing, regulating, financing and implementing the transport plans and policies

that give the meaning for ‘‘cure’’ for the transport problem. The technique

and process for institutional change, which is consistent with the present

paper, is discussed in Talvitie (1997b).

8.2. Replicability of analysis

Long range plans are updated periodically but implemented incrementally.

In that sense both CATS and DI models codify the extant practice. These

99

models are not, however, replicable by analysts and, therefore, lack in scien-

tific rigor. Different analysts employing them will proceed differently, ana-

lyze different issues, and suggest different policies and decisions. The key

concept, deceptively simple and remarkably difficult, which will make the

process replicable is the contact function (Figure 6).

Contact function was conceptualized by Spotnitz (1985). In lay terms it is

a technique in which the (transport) analyst inquires and explores in the

respondent’s terms his ideas about (transport) problems and their solutions

without suggestion, explanation or interpretation, and without his agenda.

The respondents contact the transport analyst and this contact, which may

be positive or negative in tone, allows the planning process to coevolve when

met with an appropriate response. Gliserman (1993), writing about the his-

tory and theory of contact function, defines it as ‘‘the idea that the analyst is

authorized to address the analysand[s] when contacted’’ and it comprises

‘‘the entire surface content of the work [between the analyst and analysands]

and sees it as a dream, but we don’t interpret the dream... We accept it, hear

it, experience it, witness it, and in so doing transform it’’.8 That is, drives

and ‘‘dreams’’ propel and enact human behavior. If the ‘‘dream’’ transforms,

so does behavior. Attempts to change behavior or achieve goals with policies

and plans may not succeed, and unintended consequences will result instead.

Contact functioning means that what is heard is not believed literally, but

met with an ‘‘appropriate response’’. What is that response that transforms

the ‘‘dream’’? That is a response that enables progressive communication,

‘‘unpacks’’ the dream, and unhindered changes individual behavior and leads

to ‘‘effective community agreement’’, to use Manheim’s cogent words.

If the contact function is meticulously observed and employed with

affected interests, the definition of the ‘‘huge’’ transport problem and its pos-

sible solutions will evolve to be essentially the same regardless of the planner

or the policy analyst, even if the work path will differ in details. It follows

that data collection and problem definition have key roles in transport plan-

ning and policy through citizen participation and hearings.

8.3. Collection of data, defining the problem, and analysis of alternatives

Integration of data collection with evaluating a policy or a plan is currently

an ‘‘ad hoc’’ process. Data collection proceeds along its own path discon-

nected from the transport problems as experienced by the people and rather

aimed at satisfying the needs of the travel models and procedural require-

ments of environmental mandates. It is right to question if data collection is

simply an exercise of going through the appropriate motions instead learning

and exploring the nature of the transport problem.

100

The most obvious beginning application of the contact function is in

data collection among the affected groups. These programs need to be

designed as part of the process of change to define, analyze and solve

transport problems step by step (see Talvitie 1997b, for technique and pro-

cess of change in the context of reorganizing a road administration). In the

change process the analyst team cannot suggest, champion, or even require

focus on a particular plan or policy. Rather, the team would follow the

contact function, respond in a way that leads to progressive communica-

tion, both agreeable and disagreeable, and explore pertinent issues as expe-

rienced by the affected interests. Mathematical models, whose strong and

weak points need to be acknowledged, can be used as an aid in this profes-

sional reflection.

Richmond (1995), in writing about the symbolic processes in transport

planning, reasons that ‘‘we need to instill a process of psychotherapy to

bring to the surface the assumptions which constrain our creativity.’’ Freud

nurtured and anticipated similar ventures (Freud 1930 and discussion of it in

Talvitie 1997a). But, psychotherapy faces both practical and theoretical

obstacles in planning and policy process. Reflecting on experience in plan-

ning and design of an urban freeway and focusing on the practical (Talvitie

& Halonen 1997c), resistance to modifying the planning process is both

institutional and societal. There are several reasons for this: (i) there is no

precedent (and little capacity) for a bureaucracy to permit an open ended

exploration of problems and options, and to relinquish control of the objec-

tives of studies; (ii) there are binding time and budget constraints which

might ‘‘screw up’’ the project time table and affect funding or future work;

(iii) sectoral planning precludes following leads to ‘‘unrelated’’ areas, such as

housing, crime, education, or even public transit if the project/plan/policy

has to do with highways, or to topics where existing policy options are fuzzy

(e.g. land use); (iv) there may be powerful interests who refuse to engage in

the experiential process, (perhaps because of lack of trust) and see non-coop-

eration as the best way to participate; and finally (v) there is a lack of

trained transport professionals for planning in an experiential mode.9

A conclusion here is that DI, in ‘‘moving away from ills’’, can also be

viewed as a resistance against learning about transport problems in a funda-

mentally different way. Proceeding disjointed and with ‘‘mythical concep-

tions’’ (Richmond’s words) enables decisions and a minor remedial action; a

small change that may after a few decades end up as a big problem.10

The envisaged technical planning is not non-analytical in the sense the

word is used by the profession. In agreement with Manheim (1979), statisti-

cal data, models, benefit-cost analyses and other traditional planning tools

can be part of it. Their function and role is, however, shifted from being

101

viewed as providing information about ‘‘reality’’ toward being a ‘‘dream’’ in

Gliserman’s language. Data and studies are treated as metaphors and mir-

rored and reflected back to the group to study and explore their truthfulness

and implications (Talvitie 1976). This is part of the mechanism of the con-

tact function: models are not used for interpretation and (re)construction of

facts by the analysts but allowed for use in the planning group as a meta-

phor � in order to ‘‘accept it, hear it, experience it, witness it, and in so

doing transform it’’ (Gliserman, p. 233).

In polisanalysis, data collection, problem definition and analysis, formula-

tion and sharpening of alternatives, evaluation and choices and public

involvement form an integrated whole. Processes within that whole are dri-

ven by contact function and the analyst is both an objective and subjective

partaker holding the process together.

8.4. Dealing with resistances

The previous sections have attempted to conceptualize of how methods of

planning, policy, and implementation that work in practice would work out

in theory. This section gives some vignettes from literature and from per-

sonal experience how this new model, a theory and technique of planning,

has worked in the ‘‘real world’’ and then summarizes lessons for guidance. I

hasten to conclude ahead the reader the truth of the academic refrain: ‘‘more

research is needed’’.11

In an inspirational paper Richmond (1995) reports on discussions with a

devoted pro-rail official, who, after being listened to, listened to Richmond’s

theories about symbolism and began to change his views about the efficacy

of rail transit to solve transport problems in Los Angeles. Essentially the

same, though differently worded conclusion was reached by Alan Altschuler

(1965) whose experience in Minneapolis suggested to him that it was not the

plan but development of trust on an advisor-analyst which enabled the latter

to be an effective planner. Abraham Lincoln worded his emotional commu-

nication (to the temperance society) this way: ‘‘if you want to influence a

fellow man first become his friend.’’ The Greeks knew the importance of

emotional communication and used myths and symbolism, the same is true

of the advertising industry and the churches.

In a developing country (World Bank 2001) projects were conceptual-

ized, decided and implemented using continuous consultations with the

affected population, which were for communication purposes divided into

groups (the mayors, the mothers, and so on). The designs and locations of

the civil works were tailored to the needs of potential users. For example,

the projects included, initially against the professionals’ arguments, wide

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footpaths, which permitted the residents (with animals!) to travel late at

night without fear of falling into canyons; the improved vehicle roads

enabled daily round trips to markets (benefits included avoidance of hotel

and associated alcohol expenses, it was learned later). People also wanted

village-to-village roads to trade directly with neighbors without the need

for both to go to the city. In developed country context analogous needs

may exist: pedestrian and bicycle paths to schools and activities, ‘‘walking

trains’’, personal and familial safety, roads to open access for planned land

development without widening the ‘‘beltway’’, and so on. Such comments

and ‘‘dreams’’ are common in public hearings; the problem � ‘‘rails to

trails’’ notwithstanding � is to transform them into reality. Increasingly,

success stories are fewer and fewer.

The approach also works in policy matters. For example, in the case

above, both the World Bank and the government wanted the municipalities

to share a significant percentage of costs. In the co-financing discussions, the

desired, initially unspoken result of 35 percent share, was not the central

concern. The central concerns were discussions about what prevented the

municipalities from assuming cost-sharing responsibility, what where

the (many) implications, and what had to happen for them to maintain the

roads utilizing, in addition, competition as the mode of work.In another case, restructuring of Transport Ministry was the objective.

The consultant drove for results in order stay on schedule, but there was an

impasse. The Minister wanted something that was not good governance. The

consultant asked what constituted ‘‘success’’ in that project because he had a

deadline and limited budget. He was told that there was time and he should

quit pushing the Minister and his staff to decide. Instead of trying to con-

vince them, he should work to help the Minister postpone a ‘‘bad’’ decision.

He could do this by agreeing with the Minister that his concerns were real

and there were many unresolved issues; the matter was not ready for deci-

sion. These should be explored and discussed more. About a month later the

consultant called that the Minister was ready to make a ‘‘good’’ decision

and now wants his help to get it thorough the parliament! The story is long-

er, but the idea is clear.

These vignettes are consistent with Michael Porter’s and Peter Senge’s claims

(heard) in World Bank seminars around in 1999, that ‘‘for the future, right ques-

tions are more important than right answers’’, and that ‘‘change does not come

from pushing for change but from examining the limitations for decisions’’. The

most convincing cases for the model are, however, the restructurings of New

Zealand Highway Administration and Finnish Road Administration from

ten-thousand-strong institutions to lean few-hundred strong road administra-

tions in a period of 15 years (Rutledge 19xx; Talvitie 1997b).

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Reflection on successes and failures suggests that, at group or institution

level, there are three necessary conditions for success: a method for investi-

gating and analyzing motivations (contact function); a forum for exploring

both the behavior and plans over time (continuous consultations); and that

the affected interests are helped make reasonably correct hypotheses about

the ‘‘ills’’ and resistances and about their motivations for interventions �that is, they understood. Correct tally of cause and effect is found and dealt

with properly when the symptom of self-defeating decision pattern disap-

pears. A good intervention will emerge gradually and the resistances associ-

ated with the problems disappear as a by-product. Of course, there will be

no final solutions � only good, cost-effective compromise formations. This is

not a one-time achievement. The institution and individuals must become

capable of dealing with similar situations in the future and avoid repeating a

dysfunctional solution.

Dealing with resistances requires technique and a process and, perhaps, a

good overall goal. Recently, I proposed a holistic goal for a road adminis-

tration: creation of wealth � emotional, intellectual and material (Talvitie

2002, and 2004). It is simultaneously a clear and an unclear target because it

can never be achieved, but it is not an illusion.

8.5. What should a planner do?

Having persisted this far a reader may think with frustration, ‘‘This all is

interesting, but what should a planner do?’’ It would be inconsistent with the

paper’s message to give advice; it is for the planner to learn to find out what

is needed to maintain progressive communication in a particular context and

help bring about desirable alloplastic and autoplastic changes. It would

indeed be a sophisticated approach to leave the question what the planner

should do unanswered. But, owing to my engineering background I will list

a few propositions that I have found useful. As an initial condition the cli-

ent(s) should desire to change. If there is no such desire, or at least an

acceptance that a problem exists, it may not be meaningful to engage in

efforts to produce a plan or policy.12

� Help develop a competent planning organization. How to do that is dis-

cussed as a model and a process in Talvitie (1997b). Leadership, compe-

tent professionals, good organization, management and management

systems, and data are indispensable and must be worked on. It would be

disrespectful to expect to gain the public’s confidence with incompetence.

� Assist the organization to learn about other similar organizations and

about itself through benchmarking and tracking trends, including the

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public’s opinion about the organization. From experience, developing

performance indicators for an organization is a time-consuming task. It

is best to start with a few simple, measurable indices and assist manage-

ment to use them.

� View planning as an experiment, involve people from start to finish in it

and structure their involvement as continuous dialogue. It may sound

irresponsible and wasteful to ask a planner (organization) to approach its

task as an experiment. Public monies are involved. It would be downright

injurious to a planner’s self-esteem to view his work as an experiment.

However, it would be helpful to do so. After all, the outcome of the work

is not known in advance. The objectives may be fuzzy and varying. And

both the planner and his clients should accept that the results of the

experiment are unknown.

� Watch for the Huge Problem (remember: there is only one but huge

interconnected problem). This is part of planning being an experiment.

If a planner allows for flexibility in objectives, as these are bound to

exist, and observes the unfolding process he will gradually develop

hypotheses what is the huge problem. This diagnosis, never final, is use-

ful for him to develop a plan or policy that will be responsive to the

clients’ problems and issues.

� Interact with people in terms they understand. Planners use much jar-

gon. It is difficult for ordinary people to understand their concepts. An

example clarifies. In a public hearing an elderly man expressed a concern

that the many elderly drivers in the area would not be able find their

way in the ‘‘spaghetti’’ of ramps and roads in the plan. An esteemed

traffic engineer rose to answer. He explained with numbers how the new

ramps met all the AASHTO recommendations, enabled proper headways

in merge situations, and had proper geometry for deceleration from high

speeds without causing a traffic accident hazard. I wondered if the

answer was understood; no one asked more about the matter.

� Don’t focus on results and outcomes. This may sound the oddest guide-

post in today’s rapid results oriented environment. Nonetheless, it is

true. Focus on results is a sure way to be blind to (the centrality of) the

side-effects. Progressive talking (listening) and silent analyses at least at

the beginning, exploratory studies, and frank discussions about them are

more likely to lead to success than focusing on results. Results and out-

comes are just that: results and outcomes from doing right things right.

� Explore with interest successes and failures, and adjust. Mistakes and

errors, and successes and failures are normal. It is useful to examine the

nature and causes of such errors, failures and successes. Even when a

grave error is made, it is rarely fatal and it is possible to recover from it.

105

It is important that the planner’s ego is robust enough for open discus-

sion. Things that are said in such occasions may not be pleasant.

� Change is caused by emotional communications, rarely by ‘‘scientific’’

facts. There is a place for technical interpretations, but they must be

timed right. It is difficult to find right emotional responses. Observations

in public hearings or advisory groups suggest that planners are eager to

reply, answer and explain. Often silence or exploratory questions would

be more appropriate. A non-injurious question is a powerful communi-

cation to develop trust. It conveys multiple messages, one of them is that

the questioner’s concerns warrant investigation, not an answer.

� Paradoxically, however, behind everything must be a scientific explana-

tion � and the professionals must be capable for developing such (provi-

sional) explanations for (indirect) use in their work and client

interactions. It is advisable, however, to save explanations and interpreta-

tions toward the end of the work. Too early explanations, interpretations

and action plans are tantamount to suggestions. Results obtained by sug-

gestion and pushing are unlikely to be lasting and without side-effects.

9. Conclusions

Experiential incrementalism eliminates or alleviates the shortcomings of Dis-

jointed Incrementalism and CATS’ Long Range Planning Model in seven

ways. First, it is based on human behavior on what motivates people, how

they think and change their behavior. Second, it is scientific and replicable

by other analyst/planning teams. Third, the problems and goals are dynamic

and client defined (at times there may be no goals whatsoever). Fourth,

analysis, planning, decision-making and evaluation coincide, because data

collection and analysis are incorporated into the process through the contact

function. Fifth, it deals with fundamental resistances by preserving their cau-

ses and, hence, allows their study and resolution. Sixth, the concept of

‘‘cure’’ is, at least implicitly, addressed. And seventh, it includes the organi-

zation itself as an object of analysis and change.

These ways and the attendant institutional functioning pose challenges to

transport planners. The evidence over a centuries points out that people do

not change their behavior or make decisions on the basis of ‘‘rational evi-

dence’’ or ‘‘rational expectations’’ if that evidence or expectation is incom-

patible with their wishes, fears and beliefs, and not framed according to their

thoughts about causes and effects. That is, the ‘‘rational’’ evidence or

‘‘expectation’’ is not related to their experience.

Experiential incrementalism cannot be applied in a vacuum. Institutional

restructuring and other compatible changes that encourage learning, innova-

106

tion and least cost planning (re: CATS) must accompany it. The ‘‘cure’’ of

the transport problem also includes the institutional framework and its func-

tioning. This issue is, perhaps, the most fundamental one. How can an insti-

tution or organization restructure itself and commit to trying a new

approach and, concurrently, train its professionals. For most institutions the

new model for developing and implementing plans and policies will require

departures from current practice. For gaining the cooperation of a client, of

citizens, for obtaining experiential understanding of the problems, for being

able to make effective communications and an agent of constructive change,

require frequent contacts, personal partnerships, and, very likely, in the

developing countries, a greater presence of analyst teams in the country or

greater use of videoconferencing to facilitate face-to-face contact.

Polisanalysis � the appropriate term for the method being proposed � sim-

ply means that the client’s views of the problems, goals, interventions and their

anticipated consequences form the starting point, and are accepted, explored

using the contact function and analyzed without suggestion, without pre-

mature interpretations or explanations, and without mechanistic conditions.

(Transport) organizations would need to evolve concurrently to institutional-

ize a new mode of functioning. The word ‘‘transport’’ in the previous sentence

was put in parentheses because the proposed method has much wider applica-

bility than in the transport sector. In a real sense it constitutes a new model for

development (economics) and beginnings of a planning theory. The practitio-

ners must acquire appropriate training because application of this scientific

method is not easy. Fortunately, although not a commonplace, there is gradu-

ate level training available in experiential learning and analysis.

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to thank two anonymous referees for very useful comm-

ents and suggestions to improve the paper.

Notes

1. Newsweek (May 15, 1995) ran a cover story Bye-Bye, Suburban Dream. Quoting Architect

Andres Duany, interviewed for the story: ‘‘Any town-planning text prior to 1935 has refer-

ences to social issues, to technical issues, to aesthetic issues.’’ But after the war, specialists and

bean counters took over. It was as if America had suffered a stroke: ‘‘We lost language, we lost

the ability to think complexly... [as a result]... the suburbs we have are cartoons of planning.’’

2. Alloplastic change refers to changes in the environment; autoplastic changes (emotional and

intellectual) occur within without a change in the environment. The former assumes unchange-

able preferences, the latter not. These two kinds of changes are not independent of each other.

3. In Dornbusch (1993) there are fourteen rules for good economic policy management, the

first two of which are: ‘‘Avoid poor technicians in policy-making’’; and ‘‘Keep budgets

under adequate control’’.

107

4. When a resistance is removed the end result is not the same as without it owing to the

evolution of societies in time. However, it can be argued that if the removal of the resistance

was genuine � that is, not based on suggestion, for example � the repetitive cycle of

malfeasant decision patterns is broken and the path to ‘‘cure’’ is opened.

5. An issue which I raised long ago (Talvitie 1997a) of whether goals should be given a promi-

nent position, or whether such teleological behavior is even possible in transport planning is

worth a good debate. It need not be done here.

6. This parallel is discussed in Spotnitz (1985, Chapter 4). He notes that in Freud’s time

psychoanalysis was an intellectual exercise. Using data extracted from the analysand it

focused on interpretation and reconstruction of the early causes of resistances. Freud’s aim

was to remove the resistance by putting ‘‘ego where id once was’’, an institutional reform so

to speak. However, Freud was the first to know that interpretive knowledge was not enough

for this ‘‘institutional reform’’, or that suggestion did not bring lasting results. For results

to last, the analysand had to understand emotionally. In Freud’s time this emotional under-

standing was achieved by the analyst communicating the interpretations at the ‘‘right time’’.

Psychoanalysis has evolved. It now employs a variety of emotional communications and

intellectual interpretations in individual or group settings to achieve autoplastic or alloplas-

tic change. Also see my discussion of Willson’s (2001) paper in Transportation.

7. It has not been sufficiently appreciated that advice and suggestion, by experts or marketing

initiatives, plays an important role in economic policy-making. The potential of suggestion

and ‘‘re-education’’ for producing unsustainable ‘‘results’’ has not received the kind of criti-

cal analysis it deserves. In the face of unsatisfactory results, the client is often simply blamed

for failing to follow the expert advice given.

8. Some readers may feel offended that any aspect of transportation planning � citizen partici-

pation, scientific studies, models, and ‘‘systematic’’ planning processes � are called a

‘‘dream’’. But, the word is surprisingly appropriate. For example, Pickrell’s review (1989) of

several urban rail projects documents that travel demand and system cost were both

mis-estimated by hundred percent or more; reviews show that long range transport plans

are never implemented; World Bank appraisal reports often forecast, after several years of

decline, a sustained growth in a country’s economy for two decades coinciding with the con-

templated project; and most comments in citizen participation meetings are ‘‘dreams’’.

Perhaps the most compelling example is that the pursuit of prosperity, ‘‘the deepest motiva-

tion of individual economic behavior’’ is literally called ‘‘the (American) dream’’.

9. This experience is similar that appears to have occurred in the planning of a new road

across Potomac west of Washington DC, and is taking place in planning the expansion of

the Beltway in Virginia.

10. This may have happened in (southern) UK where environmentalists have for decades

blocked meaningful expansion of road capacity. To today’s visitor, the result appears as

irreparably congested residential streets and destructed livable neighborhoods � the oppo-

site of what was wanted.

11. The brief treatment of ‘‘trust’’ and importance of emotional � and rational � relationship

between the planner and his clients in this section bears no relationship to their importance

and complexity. The author is working on a paper on the topic.

12. In an urban transport study a representative of the client announced in the first meeting

that the study would be useless if it did not result in a recommendation and financing to

buy large buses to replace the old ones. After a lot convincing the study proceeded without

such requirement. However, when the final report made no (unsustainable) recommendation

for big buses, the management disowned it. Much more time should have been spent on

discussing the Terms of Reference for the study and the ‘‘dream’’ of the managers. The

study was unnecessary or ahead of its time.

108

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About the author

Antti Petri Talvitie is an independent consultant. Prior to that, he worked at the

World Bank, in the private sector, served as Director of Highway Construction and

Maintenance in the Finnish Road Administration, and as Professor in the US,

including Chairmanship of Civil Engineering at the University of Buffalo. Mr. Talvi-

tie holds Ph.D. in Civil Engineering from Northwestern University, Evanston, IL,

and Certificate in Psychoanalysis from the Boston Graduate School of Psychoanaly-

sis. He has published numerous papers in his area of expertise.

110