23
EXPERIENCE AND INQUI ´ ETUDE 1 Introduction: Experience and Inqui ´ etude Sarah S. Willen Don Seeman Abstract In recent decades, human experience has become focus or frame for a wide variety of projects in psychological anthropology and beyond. Like “culture,” which it arguably seeks to either qualify or displace, the concept of “experience” has generated its own interpretive literature, competing schools of analysis, and internal resistances. We propose that the anthropology of experience has achieved a degree of recognition and maturity that renders genealogical reflection, stocktaking, and agenda setting both possible and necessary. Although the anthropology of experience, like experience itself, does not (and perhaps should not) lend itself to easy definition as a singular or unified theoretical paradigm, it does involve a fluid constellation of themes shared by what are traditionally regarded as parallel or divergent lines of inquiry: what might be glossed imperfectly as the phenomenological and psychoanalytic schools within sociocultural anthropology. Here we aim neither for na¨ ıve synthesis nor a mathematical sum of parts, but for more adequate ways of depicting and making sense of what Dewey calls “the inclusive integrity of ‘experience.’” This will require more concerted attention to the sources of ethnographic inqui´ etude—the gaps, silences, limits, and opacities—that either preoccupy or remain overlooked within both traditions. [experience, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, phenomenological anthropology, psychoanalytic anthropology, inqui´ etude] In recent decades, human experience has come to serve as either focus or frame for a wide variety of descriptive and theoretical projects within anthropology. Like “culture,” which it arguably seeks to qualify or displace as the central underlying theme of anthropological research, “experience” has by now generated its own interpretive literature within anthro- pology, complete with competing schools of analysis and various internal resistances. At times, the term experience has proven controversial because of the complicated relationship between its vernacular and theoretical uses, which can be difficult to disentangle. Many anthropologists have resisted or critiqued the presumptions of deep subjectivity, bounded interiority, purposefulness, and ineffability that tend to inhere in the term experience in its vernacular (esp. American) usage, a usage that evokes deeply rooted psychological and reli- gious models (Desjarlais 1997; Proudfoot 1985). Yet subjectivity, interiority, and purposeful agency are also among the very themes that draw many anthropologists and allied schol- ars to conclude that one cannot offer an adequate account of human being-in-the-world without some form of robust engagement with experience in its embodied, sociocultural, political, and—crucially—interpersonal dimensions. In part, it is precisely the interpersonal nature of the ethnographic project that undergirds these developments, for ethnography is not simply a methodological common denominator that binds anthropologists’ myriad tasks together in a common disciplinary rubric. It is also the empirical—we are tempted ETHOS, Vol. 40, Issue 1, pp. 1–23, ISSN 0091-2131 online ISSN 1548-1352. C 2012 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1352.2011.01228.x

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  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 1

    Introduction: Experience and Inquietude

    Sarah S. WillenDon Seeman

    Abstract In recent decades, human experience has become focus or frame for a wide variety of projects in

    psychological anthropology and beyond. Like culture, which it arguably seeks to either qualify or displace,

    the concept of experience has generated its own interpretive literature, competing schools of analysis, and

    internal resistances. We propose that the anthropology of experience has achieved a degree of recognition

    and maturity that renders genealogical reflection, stocktaking, and agenda setting both possible and necessary.

    Although the anthropology of experience, like experience itself, does not (and perhaps should not) lend itself to

    easy definition as a singular or unified theoretical paradigm, it does involve a fluid constellation of themes shared

    by what are traditionally regarded as parallel or divergent lines of inquiry: what might be glossed imperfectly

    as the phenomenological and psychoanalytic schools within sociocultural anthropology. Here we aim neither for

    nave synthesis nor a mathematical sum of parts, but for more adequate ways of depicting and making sense

    of what Dewey calls the inclusive integrity of experience. This will require more concerted attention to the

    sources of ethnographic inquietudethe gaps, silences, limits, and opacitiesthat either preoccupy or remain

    overlooked within both traditions. [experience, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, phenomenological anthropology,

    psychoanalytic anthropology, inquietude]

    In recent decades, human experience has come to serve as either focus or frame for a wide

    variety of descriptive and theoretical projects within anthropology. Like culture, which

    it arguably seeks to qualify or displace as the central underlying theme of anthropological

    research, experience has by now generated its own interpretive literature within anthro-

    pology, complete with competing schools of analysis and various internal resistances. At

    times, the term experience has proven controversial because of the complicated relationship

    between its vernacular and theoretical uses, which can be difficult to disentangle. Many

    anthropologists have resisted or critiqued the presumptions of deep subjectivity, bounded

    interiority, purposefulness, and ineffability that tend to inhere in the term experience in its

    vernacular (esp. American) usage, a usage that evokes deeply rooted psychological and reli-

    gious models (Desjarlais 1997; Proudfoot 1985). Yet subjectivity, interiority, and purposeful

    agency are also among the very themes that draw many anthropologists and allied schol-

    ars to conclude that one cannot offer an adequate account of human being-in-the-world

    without some form of robust engagement with experience in its embodied, sociocultural,

    political, andcruciallyinterpersonal dimensions. In part, it is precisely the interpersonal

    nature of the ethnographic project that undergirds these developments, for ethnography

    is not simply a methodological common denominator that binds anthropologists myriad

    tasks together in a common disciplinary rubric. It is also the empiricalwe are tempted

    ETHOS, Vol. 40, Issue 1, pp. 123, ISSN 0091-2131 online ISSN 1548-1352. C 2012 by the American AnthropologicalAssociation. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1352.2011.01228.x

  • 2 ETHOS

    to say moralleavening that continually interrupts and provokes scholars to improve their

    capacity to apprehend and describe human affairs in all their depth and complexity. The

    interpersonal, intersubjective nature of ethnographic practice lends immediacy to anthropo-

    logical research. Ethnographers are almost never mere observers; rather, they are engaged

    actors who become socially and intersubjectively linked, whether fleetingly or over years or

    even decades, to those whose lives they hope to understand. At the same time, the insights

    ethnography yields are always and inevitably partial and incomplete. However deep or long-

    standing anthropologists connection with their interlocutors, and however confident their

    interpretations, the thoroughness, validity, and coherence of anthropological interventions

    will always be limited by the analytic tools and research methods at their disposal and by

    epistemological limits on intersubjective understanding.

    Both the immediacy of ethnographic engagement and the uncertainty or, to borrow from

    EllenCorin (this issue), the inquietude it often engenders continually impel anthropologists to

    seekmodels bearing the analytic power and descriptive agility to do justice to the tremendous

    variety of ethnographic settings in which they are engaged. This search has pulled anthro-

    pologists in divergent directions, two of whichphenomenology and psychoanalysiswe

    have chosen to juxtapose in this special issue of Ethos. In this collection, we explore points

    of intersection among these traditions, each of which involves its own internal divisions and

    disputes, and strive to reach beyond preexisting theoretical commitments in search of more

    adequate ways of depicting and making sense of human experienceincluding both the

    intersubjective lifeworlds that humans inhabit and the uniquely individual life trajectories

    that ethnographers encounter and seek to understand.

    Like other intersubjective engagements, ethnography is limited by the fact that any window

    onto the experience of another person, whether construed in terms of the Jamesian blooming

    and buzzing of the lifeworld or the psychodynamically forged individual ego, will inevitably

    prove deficientand not only in details like scope, temporal span, or perceptual depth, but

    also in more essential ways. Other constraints include the vicissitudes of circumstance, the

    complexity and inconstancy of moral commitments, the unpredictability of interpersonal

    dynamics (with their transferential and countertransferential potential), and the partial yet

    inevitable hiddenness of self to oneself, all of which lend structure and substance to human

    interactions in ways that are no less significant for their unpredictability.

    For ethnographers of experience, these factors pose serious and substantive constraints on

    the capacity to describeor as Desjarlais (this issue) suggests, following Rorty (1989), to

    redescribecomplex local worlds (Kleinman and Kleinman 1991) and the individuals who

    inhabit them. Yet they do not, of course, indicate wholesale abandonment of the project itself.

    To the contrary, we believe that ethnographic forays into the various realms and modes of

    experience can only be strengthened, not weakened, by forthright acknowledgment of these

    and other forms of contingency, uncertainty, and limit. To fully explore the implications

    of these impediments to ethnographic insight is to collect and give voice to the lingering

    disquiet that has long hovered around the ethnographic enterprise. It is precisely this anxiety

    or inquietude, conceptualized here at the juncture of two substantially different scholarly

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 3

    traditions, that provides the central challenge as well as the unifying thread among the

    articles collected here.

    It is also this disquiet, familiar from our own encounters with the simultaneous ephemer-

    ality and obduracy of human experience, its promise of intimacy but concomitant opacity

    (Seeman 1999, 2004, 2009), and its perpetual resistance to totalizing ethnographic encap-

    sulation, that drew the guest editors of this collection into conversation over a decade ago

    and, over time, helped catalyze a broader conversation of which the present collection is one

    intellectual fruit. A key moment in this unfolding dialogue took place at an SPA-sponsored

    session we organized at the 2007 American Anthropological Association meetings with the

    goal of taking stock of phenomenological approaches in anthropology. On that memorable

    occasion, medical anthropologist Byron Good surprised many by disclosing not only his

    mounting dissatisfaction with the cultural phenomenology he had helped pioneer (Good

    1994), but also his growing sense that psychoanalytic paradigms might offer a more useful

    set of tools for capturing andmaking sense of the ethnographic challenges most central to his

    current work in Indonesia. In particular andmost provocatively, he argued that working with

    informants who had survived trauma, either in childhood or as a result of political repression

    and violence, had engendered in him a sense, both analytic and moral, that anthropolo-

    gists of experience need better ways of talking about subjectivity and innerness, including

    the conflicted or injured self whose ongoing engagements with the suffered past require a

    more robust psychology than phenomenological anthropology can provide. This apparent

    turn of heartor, perhaps, shift in attentionsparked heated and ongoing debate among

    panelists and attendees about the dilemmas, the limitations, and the promise of current

    efforts to engage experience ethnographically. By suggesting, in effect, that phenomenolog-

    ical approaches to experience may be inadequate in many ethnographic settings precisely

    because they lack a full-blown psychology or theory of psychic causality, Goods comments

    revealed at once a profound sense of personal and professional disquiet and, more generally, a

    pressing need to revisit the fraught intersection of these approaches to human experience. Al-

    though initially expressed as an internal critique of phenomenological anthropology among

    like-minded scholars by one of its own, the need to frame a broader conversation among

    anthropologists with both phenomenological and psychoanalytic leanings was immediately

    apparent.

    The creation of the Society for Psychological Anthropologys Lemelson Conference Fund

    inspired us to broaden and expand this conversation in the context of a small interna-

    tional conference that brought together a number of people working on these or related

    themes.With generous support from the LemelsonConference Fund, the EmoryUniversity

    Provosts Conference Subvention Fund, and various academic departments and programs,

    we held the conference in the fall of 2008 at Emory University in Atlanta, where one of

    us [SSW] had trained as a graduate student and the other [DS] was a member of faculty.

    Our title, Whats At Stake in the Ethnography of Human Experience? Phenomenologi-

    cal and Psychoanalytic Perspectives, reflected our intention to stimulate conversation and

    debate about the current and potential relationship between two of the most articulate and

    well-defined theoretical trends contributing to todays anthropology of human experience.1

  • 4 ETHOS

    Far from proposing any sort of scripted dialogue between discrete camps, our goal instead

    was to convene a diverse group of anthropologists whose interests span these theoretical

    traditions, along with interested local scholars in related fields such as sociology, religion,

    ethics, and disability studies, for two days of intensive consideration of how phenomeno-

    logical and psychoanalytic approaches to experience have been given form and content. We

    organized the event around three broad lines of inquiry: (1) the role of interpretation and

    hermeneutic frameworks in the anthropology of lived experience; (2) the question of moral

    praxis, or what is at stake in the ethnographic encounter for research participants as well

    as ethnographers; and (3) questions of clinical or therapeutic relevance. The gathering in-

    cluded two round-table discussions (Depths and Surfaces: Bridging the Phenomenological

    and the Psychoanalytic in the Anthropology ofHuman Experience, and Culture and Expe-

    rience: Genealogies and Debates) and three thematically framed panels (Subjectivity and

    Experience in a Disordered World; Suffering, Healing, and Therapeutic Dynamics; and

    Religious Experience: A Special Case?), as well as a keynote lecture delivered by Michael

    Jackson (Existential Anthropology: An Itinerary of a Thought) and a screening of Rob

    Lemelsons film, Forty Years of Silence: An Indonesian Tragedy. We did not encourage

    participants to reach consensus or assume any particular stance with respect to the commen-

    surability of phenomenological and psychoanalytic perspectives. Rather, by exploring points

    of intersection among these traditions, broadly construed, our intent was and is to strive for

    more adequate ways of depicting and making sense of what it means to be human.

    If increasingly more adequate accounts of human life are our lodestone, then we need an an-

    thropology that is open to approaches highlighting different aspects of human experience

    including, for instance, not only Diltheys (1976) Erfahrung, or the quotidian unfolding of

    lifes routines, but also his Erlebnis, or the singular, discrete moments that stand out from

    Erfahrungs cumulative progression. To this we must add the immense interest in recent

    decades in the intersubjectively situated body and its habitus as an emergent locus of human

    experience that is no more reducible to the language of Erfahrung and Erlebnis than it is

    to the language of culture and symbolic forms. The burgeoning existential tradition within

    anthropology points elsewhere, toward universal human questions and predicaments as well

    as the human capacity to shape engagement with, and hence experience of, the realities we

    humans inhabit. Psychoanalytic scholarship, furthermore, demands attention to the internal

    complexity and deep layering of human experience in which personal history, including

    quotidian social experience as well as trauma, is sedimented and only partially accessible.

    It seems unlikely that any single ethnographic modality could consistently do justice to all

    of these and other possible approaches. Although their original architects may or may not

    agree, we perceive an important kind of family affinity among these various anthropologies

    of experiencerecognizing of course that family relationships imply genealogy, resem-

    blance, and solidarity as well as conflict. Rather than cleaving to old categorizations, which

    are likely to close off possibilities for representation and analysis, we argue instead that it is

    time, now more than ever, for classificatory doors to be flung open.

    Taking up this challenge, we contend, demands more concerted attention than has often

    been paid to the gaps, silences, and opacities that either preoccupy or remain overlooked

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 5

    within both of these traditions and, as we elaborate below, to the resulting inquietudes anthro-

    pology is left to confront. Although these pursuits are of particular concern to psychological

    anthropology and readers of Ethos, they touch upon many of the foremost epistemological

    and ethical dilemmas in contemporary ethnography at large, including not only the urgent

    need to account for individual and collective forms of experience in complex social, polit-

    ical, and economic contexts, but also the fraught relationship between text and observer,

    the debate over depth vs. surface accounts of human agency, and the perduring role of

    uncertainty, contingency, inaccessibility, anxiety, and other forms of limit in shaping what

    ethnographers might access, know, or write.

    To launch this multilogue, which introduces a few of the fruits of our Atlanta meeting, we

    begin by reflecting briefly on experience as a termbearing a degree (but only a degree) of shared

    analytic significance among participants, followed by a necessarily condensed discussion

    of psychoanalytic and phenomenological approaches and their influence on experience-

    oriented research and scholarship in anthropology. An overview of the collections central

    themes, as well as its four articles and three commentaries, follows. In closing, we reflect

    briefly on the broader implications of this conversation for the anthropology of experience

    in particular and for anthropology in general.

    Experience and Inquietude

    How does experience figure as a theme in contemporary anthropology? Working defini-

    tions of experience have been assayed by a variety of scholars (see, e.g., Crapanzano 1980;

    Csordas 1994b; Desjarlais 1997; Good 1994; James 1905; Kleinman 1997, 1998; Kleinman

    and Kleinman 1997; Scott 1991; Throop 2002a; Turner and Bruner 1986; Wikan 1991),

    but we approach experience in this collection ecumenically, as an open-ended point of de-

    parture for robust ethnographic inquiry into the fullness, complexity, and indeterminacy of

    human life, both individual and collective, as it unfolds in space, over time, across moods

    and modes, and within multidimensional local worlds that are defined as much by their bio-

    graphical and embodied particularity as by their intersubjective grounding. This implicitly

    pluralistic ethnographic stance makes no attempt to assert any orthodoxy of anthropological

    practice, still less to insist on any particular theoretical innovation that might be considered

    definitive. Indeed, one motivation for this collection is a sense that we needmore, and better,

    opportunities for conversation across and between the often insular and overly specialized

    moieties that shape todays scholarly landscape, especially those sometimes glossedinternal

    diversity notwithstandingas phenomenological and psychoanalytic anthropologies.2

    Not only have ethnographic approaches to experience contributed to a reevaluation of

    culture as a fundamental orienting frame, but they also have turned a spotlight on the

    formation of both subjectivity and intersubjectivity in social and political context and raised

    complex questions about the methodological challenges, the interpretive dilemmas, and the

    ethical stakes of exploring, responding to, and writing about the lived intimacies that animate

    ethnographic encounters. Anthropological engagement with experience has opened up new

    lines of inquiry in sociocultural anthropology writ large and in a range of anthropological

  • 6 ETHOS

    subfields, among them medical and psychological anthropology, the anthropology of reli-

    gion, and anthropological studies of power, politics, and social membership and exclusion.

    Contrary to the fears of its critics, the turn to experience in contemporary anthropology

    has not, for the most part, involved a collapse of concern for the whole gamut of social

    and cultural features of human life. Rather, it has more typically provided a conceptual

    bridge between individual lifeworlds and the much broader political-economic trends and

    cultural-symbolic systems that constrain and inform them. Such projects increasingly are

    embedded within strong accounts of political economy, structural inequality, and the lived

    experience of persons caught up in complex, threatening, and uncertain conditions of the

    contemporary world (Good et al. 2008a:11). At the same time, many of the conceptual

    hallmarks and heuristics of todays anthropology of experienceincluding contemporary

    understandings of embodiment, experience-nearness, social suffering, and the question of

    whats at stakehave become part and parcel of the broader anthropological lexicon.

    This area of inquiry has thus achieved a degree of recognition and maturity that makes

    it both possible and necessary to ask a number of broad, reflexive questions. Does the

    anthropology of experience have a center and a peripheryor, alternatively, might it be

    organized around multiple centers and peripheries? How do ethnographers of experience

    understand the genealogy of their field, its current contours and fissures, its most pressing

    challenges, and its future directions? Is it reasonable to speak of an experiential turn in

    psychological anthropology, or in sociocultural anthropology more broadly? If so, what

    areor ought to beits hallmarks?

    In this collection we consider several possible hallmarks including, most centrally, an en-

    during undercurrent of the ethnographic project that might even be described as a kind

    of epistemological third rail: the inevitably constrained nature of ethnographic appercep-

    tion and the incertitude, inquietude, and anxiety that can result. For some ethnographers

    of experience, this disquiet stems from a Foucauldian impulse to continually problematize

    assumptions and unmarked categories that otherwise appear self-evident (Corin this issue).

    For others it is prompted by a Levinasian ethics of intersubjective obligation to the other

    who must be allowed to remain other and, as such, outside the totalitarian impulses of mean-

    ing and control (Seeman 2004). Freudian disquiet gestures still elsewhere, toward hidden

    interiors, vestigial pasts, and the lurking immanence of dung and death (Obeyesekere

    1990:288). Whether individual ethnographers are most troubled by the limited represen-

    tational capacities of language, by the divided nature of the subject, by the idiosyncrasy of

    autopoesis, or by unconscious processes of transference and countertransference, there are

    ample reasons to feel unsettled.

    Phenomenological and Psychoanalytic Anthropologies: Contexts andConversations

    As we grapple with these varied sources of inquietude and think toward the future, it is

    worthwhile to reconsider the deep-rootedness of these concerns within the whole anthro-

    pological project. For more than half a century, experience has been central to what might

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 7

    be characterized, however imperfectly, as the psychoanalytic and phenomenological schools

    within sociocultural anthropology. Both stem from early 20th century expressions of dis-

    content with tradition (in psychology and philosophy respectively), and in anthropology

    they have struggled, at times amicably and on other occasions competitively, to stake out

    territory and mark key distinctions. Significantly, each of these broad schools exhibits con-

    siderable internal diversity; for example, relational and Lacanian psychoanalytic inclinations

    differ substantially, as do approaches that draw primarily on Merleau-Pontys concern for

    embodiment as compared with Arendts engagement with universal existential imperatives.

    These internal variations notwithstanding, we find it altogether too easy, and not analytically

    helpful, to either overemphasize the differences between psychoanalytic and phenomenolog-

    ical approaches within anthropology or presume that they are necessarily incommensurable.

    Despite their important differences, each of these flourishing branches of anthropologi-

    cal scholarship has paid more consistent attention than others to questions of experience,

    subjectivity, and intersubjectivity in social and cultural settings and, at the same time, to

    the various reasons for, and sources of, ethnographic inquietude that concern us here. In-

    deed, some anthropologists already view them as elements of a common toolkit (Corin

    1998b; Mimica 2007:3; Parish 2008; see also Csordas, Hollan, and Jackson in this issue). If

    the ultimate interest lies in finding more descriptively adequate, theoretically precise, and

    humane approaches to the ethnographic complexities of experience, subjectivity, and inter-

    subjective engagement, then fresh consideration of the intersection of phenomenology and

    psychoanalysis within anthropology is long overdue.

    The conversation between anthropology and psychoanalysis follows no simple or straight-

    forward path (Corin this issue; LeVine and Sharma 1997; Paul 1989; see also Heald and

    Deluz 1994; Seeman 2005). Successive generations of anthropologists have looked to psy-

    choanalysis for method, theory, or inspiration in examining divergent facets of human exis-

    tence, among them putative relationships between culture and personality (Benedict 1934;

    Boyer 1979; Kardiner 1945; Spiro 1951) as well as patterns of child rearing and develop-

    ment (Kakar 1978; Spiro 1987; Whiting 1963; Whiting and Child 1962), ethnopsychology

    (Briggs 1970;Devereux 1961; Levy 1973), cultural and personal symbols (Corin 2008;Hollan

    1989; 1994, 1995; Obeyesekere 1981, 1990; Paul 1980, 1982, 1987, 1996), dreaming (De-

    vereux 1969; Groark 2009; Hollan 1989, 1995; Kracke 1979; Mittermaier 2011), ritual

    (Corin 1998a;Devisch 1998;Obeyesekere 1990), dissociation (Bilu 1980, 1985;Chapin 2008;

    Hollan 2000; Obeyesekere 1981, 1990; Rahimi 2007; Spiro 1997), ethnopsychiatric practice

    (Corin 1997; Giordano 2008; Sturm et al. 2011; Zajde 2011), and the psychodynamics of the

    ethnographic encounter (Corin 2007; Crapanzano 1980; Devereux 1967; Ewing 1987, 2006;

    LeVine 1982). Significantly, psychoanalytic approaches within anthropology have spanned

    the full spectrum of psychoanalytic theories, with some scholars engaged primarily with

    Freud, others looking to Lacan, Klein, or Winnicott, and still others inclined toward the

    American tradition of relational psychoanalysis.

    Fruitful as the intersection of psychoanalysis and anthropology may be, it is also beset

    with tension between what can be called, not pejoratively, [the] theological structure of

  • 8 ETHOS

    psychoanalytic theory and practice and anthropologys tendencies toward looseness, even

    chaos (Crapanzano 1992a:138). As Crapanzano observes, a key turning point in this rela-

    tionship involved the intersection of anthropologys interpretive turn with the florescence

    of psychoanalytic orientations that encouraged a relaxation of Freudian orthodoxies and the

    recognition, and acceptance, of an inescapable interpretive gap within both psychoanalytic

    and ethnographic encounters (cf. Kracke and Herdt 1987).

    The intersection of phenomenology with anthropology has been no less fruitful or complex

    (Desjarlais and Throop 2011; Fischer 2007; Jackson 1996; Throop 2002a, 2002b). Since

    the middle of the 20th century, two variants of Continental phenomenologySchutzs so-

    cial phenomenology (1967, 1970) and Merleau-Pontys attention to the body as a setting

    in relation to the world (1962:303)have been especially influential. Another influence

    is Heideggers (1962) concern with temporality, thrownness, being, and becoming. Key

    American influences include the pragmatism of James (1905) and Dewey (1925, 1934), as

    well as Hallowells (1955) attention to the relationship among culture, self, and experi-

    ence. For the LemelsonEmory conference, two paths of inquiry were especially significant.

    Beginning in the 1980s, medical anthropologists including Arthur Kleinman (e.g., 1988,

    1997, 1998, 2006) and Byron Good (e.g., 1977, 1994; Good et al. 1994, 2008b) sought to

    make room for the suffering of individuals, and later the shared suffering of social groups,

    within the largely experience-distant worlds of both biomedical and professional social sci-

    ence discourse. Concurrently, Michael Jackson (e.g., 1989, 1996, 2005) began crafting an

    existential-phenomenological approach that pivots on the ethnographic challenge to ex-

    plore human being-in-the-world through our ever changing capacity to create the conditions

    of viable existence and coexistence in relation to the given potentialities of our environment

    (2005: xv; see also Hage 2003, 2009).

    In the intervening decades, phenomenological questions have become increasingly main-

    stream, for instance among psychological and medical anthropologists who frame their work

    in existentialphenomenological terms, or as exercises in cultural phenomenology (Csordas

    1994a; Geurts 2002; Throop 2010) or critical phenomenology (Biehl 2005; Desjarlais 1997,

    2003; Good 1994; Willen 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). Key considerations include embodiment

    (Csordas 1990, 1993, 1994b, 2002), experience-nearness (Kleinman 1988; Kleinman and

    Kleinman 1991; Linger 2001; Seeman 1999, 2008, 2009; Wikan 1991, 1996), subjectivity

    and selfhood (Biehl 2005, Biehl et al. 2007; Csordas 1994a; Desjarlais 1997; Linger 2010),

    empathy (Throop andHollan 2008), healing (Csordas 1994a; Desjarlais 1992; Kleinman and

    Seeman 1998, 2000; Mattingly 1998, 2010; Mattingly and Garro 2000), the senses (Desjar-

    lais 2003; Geurts 2002; Howes 2005; Stoller 1989, 1997), morality and ethics (Benson and

    ONeill 2007; Kleinman 2006; Seeman 2004; Zigon 2007, 2008), marginalization and social

    exclusion (Biehl 2005; Das 1995, 2007; Pinto 2008; Seeman 2009; Willen 2007c, 2010),

    political disorder and state insecurity (Good et al. 2008bb; James 2010), and suffering in its

    many forms (Garcia 2009, 2010; Kleinman et al. 1997; Ozawa-de Silva 2006; Parish 2008;

    Seeman 2008; Throop 2010).

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 9

    As these telegraphic summaries suggest, questions of experience have provoked intense

    theoretical and ethnographic interest among scholars from a variety of perspectives and

    subfields. Curiously, however, the most prominent effort to announce and delineate an

    Anthropology of Experience, the title of Victor Turner and Edward Bruners (1986) edited

    collection, proved intellectually rich but ultimately short lived. Although the books central

    concernspractice, pragmatics, performance, hermeneutics, and ethnographic reflexivity

    only flourished and grew in the decades that followed, the books motivating concept gained

    little traction. Interestingly, Hallowells (1955) early anthropological phenomenology and

    Lienhardts (1961) classic work on the phenomenology of religious experience among the

    Dinka decades earlier similarly failed to generate sustained conversation around these issues.

    One wonders whether this represented some scholars inability to cultivate institutional

    expressions of their theoretical concerns or, alternatively, whether it was due to the absence

    of the supportive zeitgeist that emerged in later decades.

    Defining Insights

    Todays flourishing discussion about anthropological approaches to human experience

    emerges as all the more striking in light of these earlier fits and starts. A few defining

    moments deserve particular attention. One early and pivotal contribution was Kleinmans

    (1973) distinction between disease in the biomedical sense and the illness of persons,

    families, or small social groups, which provided a vital corrective to an anthropology that

    was swinging boldly toward a largely Geertzian interpretation of culture that emphasized

    the suppression or transformation of individual suffering through the collective shoring up

    of cultural forms (Seeman 2004). Kleinman, Good, and others then went on to limn the

    complex relationships among culturally valorized metaphors like heart distress, nervios, and

    neurasthenia; the social conditions that supported them; and the imponderables of individual

    experience to which they give rise. Even when insufficiently conceptualized in itself, experi-

    ence became for many ethnographers the mediating lens through which otherwise opaque

    relationshipsfor instance, between disease and political economy (Farmer 1992) or per-

    sonal suffering and cultural category (Good et al. 1992; Young 1995)could be described

    and analyzed. Most of this research was nonpsychological in the sense of lacking (or, in

    some cases, actively refusing on theoretical or empirical grounds) an articulate psychology,

    by which we mean a systematic account of inner psychic processes or structures. Instead, the

    second and third generations of this anthropological approach to experience have tended to

    focus on the political and, to a certain extent, existential contexts of suffering and healing.

    In 1991, Arthur and Joan Kleinman published their influential essay, Suffering and Its

    Professional Transformation: Toward an Ethnography of Interpersonal Experience. The

    disquieting impact of this work at the time of its publication has not always been appreci-

    ated. Medical anthropology had already developed a strong critique of how biomedical and

    psychiatric discourses tend to not only reduce lived experience to a set of narrow profes-

    sional categories serving diagnostic or bureaucratic needs, but also shut down possibilities

    for broader understanding of human suffering and its sources. Provocatively, Kleinman and

  • 10 ETHOS

    Kleinman contended that anthropology is vulnerable to the same critique and, moreover,

    that the categories of professional anthropological analysis can be just as dehumanizing and

    experience-distant as those of biomedicineperhaps even with less justification. Their re-

    sponse, on both a theoretical and also a methodological level, was to reorient ethnography

    around the question of what is at stake for research subjects in the lived contexts that

    ethnographers seek to analyze and describe.

    In effect, this disarmingly simple intervention amounted to a reinvention of the anthropo-

    logical project, moving it away from interpretations of culture and toward the interpretation

    of fraught social engagements. From this perspective, culture emerges as but one among

    many interdependent forces at playand frequently not the most dominant. In terms of

    both choice of research topic and analytic disposition, this reorientation brought the sub-

    ject position of the ethnographer into closer contact with the existential position of the

    subjects of ethnographies. It also foregrounded ethnographys role in analyzing lifeworlds,

    including the intersections among different lifeworlds, in lieu of the distanced abstraction

    that culture represents (Good 1994). This reorientation influenced many subsequent an-

    thropological projects and, not incidentally, our choice of title for the LemelsonEmory

    conference (What is at Stake in the Ethnography of Human Experience?).

    Here we must pause to recognize that the reorientation of anthropology around the high

    stakes of living and dying, suffering and healing, and everything else we now gloss using

    the term lived experience puts anthropology in direct engagement with the full panoply

    of uncertainties and indeterminacies inherent in everyday life. This is true in the positive

    sense that life is open ended and largely underdetermined by what we might imagine to be

    its structural constraintsincluding culture, which only shapes the grammar and horizons

    of lived experience but never determines social life in any simplistic way. Yet anthropologys

    direct confrontation with unknowability also holds a more sobering set of implications.

    As social beings, humans struggle continuously to intuit the motivations and choices of

    those around them, knowing that failure may have humorous, disastrous, or unforeseen

    consequences. This can lend an unsettling opacity even to interactions with ones most

    intimate others; at times, even ones own choices and motivations can seem opaque upon

    reflection. Rarely do individuals know fully what is in store for them, what real costs their

    choices will incur, or whether their cherished life projects will succeed. Indeterminacy is thus

    the stuff not only of enthusiasm, creativity, and freedom but also, sometimes simultaneously,

    of anxiety, unease, even terror.

    Humans weather these indeterminacies on an everyday basis, typically without much re-

    flection. Why should ethnography be any different? A strong argument can be made that

    disciplined attention to the ellipses in knowledge and interpretive uncertainties inherent in

    ethnographic work helps to distinguish good ethnography from mere anecdotalism. Reflec-

    tion on these forms of inquietude may also help dispel allegations of what Ernst Gellner

    once dismissively characterized as ventriloquist anthropology, or the ever-present temp-

    tation to allow theory to overdetermine ethnography or, more bluntly, to allow our own

    theoretical, political, or personal commitments to overpower the subtle resistances offered

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 11

    by other peoples understandingswhether explicit or implicit, articulated or repressedof

    what is at stake in their lives and local worlds.

    Reinvigorating the Dialogue

    The anthropology of experience does not, and probably should not, lend itself to easy defi-

    nition as a singular or unified theoretical paradigm. Complex understandings of experience,

    subjectivity, and intersubjectivity now animate a diverse array of intellectual projects

    including some of the most exciting and provocative areas of contemporary ethnographic

    research. These projects do not, however, cluster around any single set of empirical questions

    or analytic paradigms; rather, they reflect a looser set of themes and questions and highlight

    the need for reinvigorated dialogue between what are traditionally regarded as parallel or

    divergent lines of inquiry. The energy generated by the LemelsonEmory conference and by

    recent standing-room-only SPA sponsored panels on phenomenological anthropology (in

    2007), moral experience (in 2010), and similar concerns suggest that these themes resonate

    with many contemporary scholars. Several such themes thread through the articles collected

    here, three of which we highlight below.

    Confronting Inquietude

    What forms of inquietude are engendered by phenomenological and psychoanalytic ap-

    proaches to experience? How might these forms of inquietudeand the gaps and opacities

    towhich they call attentionprompt us to rethink the possibilities and limits of ethnographic

    apperception?

    Engaging ethnographically with the immediacy of the here and now, or with the horizons,

    fringes, or edges of experience, as both of these approaches do, involves risk. With a limited

    set of tools and resourceslanguage, attention, curiosity, careresearchers grasp at escap-

    ing objects: perceptions, motivations, selves, relationships. Obstacles and opacities abound,

    beginning with alterity itself. When must the scholar be resigned to opacity, or to the in-

    accessibility of other minds, as opposed to experimenting with an alternative optics or a

    recalibration of attention? What is well captured and what is left out in choosing to fore-

    ground either lifeworlds or egos, intentions or drives, illusio or trauma? What can be made

    ethnographically of that which is unspeakable, unknowable, hidden, or repressed? What is

    at stake when the ethnographer shifts methodological gears to seek greater depth of insight,

    or a more panoramic understanding of lifeworld and circumstance, and how do these stakes

    vary from one ethnographic circumstance to the next?

    Unsettling Categories

    How might dissatisfaction with such basic categories as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and

    culture spur new ways of understanding and depicting human experience?

  • 12 ETHOS

    Analytic categories emerge from within particular cultural lifeworlds; like lights waves and

    particles, they capture certain dimensions of human experience while failing to account

    for others. Energizing as current debates about subjectivity and intersubjectivity may be,

    it seems worth asking whether these concepts might still be held captive by their contexts

    of origin. In the wake of the LemelsonEmory conference, for instance, Michael M. J.

    Fischer facilitated an illuminating participatory discussion at a session of Harvards Friday

    Morning Seminar that explored how the American English notion of experience is signaled,

    subdivided, recast, socialized, theologized, and lived in the lifeworlds limned by a diversity

    of other languages, among them German, French, Italian, Latin, Greek, Persian, Turkish,

    Arabic, Hebrew, Urdu, Hindi, Chinese, and Cambodian. Beyond Diltheys Erfahrung and

    Erlebnis, what might an ethnographer of experience make of the sense of experimentation

    implicit in the approximations of Romance languages, the emotional traces in the Persian

    imtihan, the inflections of mood and personality invoked by the Sanskrit-derived Hindi term

    bhav, or the sense of perpetual return to the senses, the body, and the here and now inherent

    in the Pali (Cambodian Buddhist) satdi?3 Rather than building toward closure, this sort of

    free-ranging discussion can instead illuminate the risk of hasty translational moves as well

    as the value of recasting philosophical questions using ethnographys empirical tools.

    Where might parallel conversations about subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and culture lead

    or, even before opening the door to the Whorfian hypothesis, what do the languages of

    phenomenology and psychoanalysis have to say? Does phenomenological anthropology

    truly lack a theory of subjectivity, as Good asserts in his contribution, or a psychic motor,

    as Desjarlais wonders in his? If so, then might Jacksons notion of existential imperatives

    (Jackson 2005), for instance, provide a useful analogue to the energetics suggested by psy-

    choanalytic conceptions of drive or instinct (Willen n.d.)? And what about culture itself?

    Would culture as noun seem less objectionable if reimagined as a kind of malleable capacity,

    for instance, in terms of Freuds Kulturarbeit (Corin this issue), Winnicotts transitional

    phenomena (Jackson this issue), or Hollans subjectivity potential (2000, this issue)? At

    times, the search for more precise conceptual categories may best be bracketed in favor of

    open-ended, associative reflection on the conceptual categories we otherwise risk reifying.

    Ethnographic Intimacy as Ethical Challenge

    What are the ethical stakes of seeking out, encountering, and writing about peoples lives

    through the intimate frame of experience?

    Anthropologists pursue their metier by the grace of their research participants; unlike psy-

    chotherapists, no one has sought them out from a place of pain, or with therapeutic hopes

    or at least that is what anthropologists typically tell themselves. What, if anything, ought

    ethnographers make of the cryptotherapeutic dimensions (Willen n.d.) of ethnographic

    engagement, the hidden motives and meaningspossibly but not necessarily traceable to

    relations of transference and counter-transferencethat affect why a particular person is

    having a particular conversation with a particular ethnographer at a particular moment in

    time (Crapanzano 1992b; Hollan this issue)? What are the ethics of disclosure, of probing,

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 13

    of revealing achieved insights to our interlocutors, and how do these ethical guidelines vary

    either across sociocultural settings or between methodological approaches? How might the

    nature of an ethnographic relationship, its duration, or its level of intimacy influence these

    guidelines? What forms of risk and obligation do different ethnographic strategies entail,

    and when, if ever, does one risk doing violence by striving to access or interpret the un-

    speakable, unknowable, or otherwise inaccessible (Good this volume; Throop this volume)?

    When might the ethically or politically appropriate course of action involve interpretive

    restraint (Seeman 2009)? Ethnography as ethical practice raises myriad theoretical, method-

    ological, and pragmatic dilemmas that extend far beyond earlier debates about the politics

    of representation and that generate still more reasons for incertitude and disquiet.

    The Multilogue: An Overview

    This trio of themes threads through the four articles and three commentaries assembled in

    the present collection. In the first article, Phenomenology, Psychoanalysis, and Postcolonial

    Subjectivities in Indonesia, Byron Good revisits the initial provocationin Levinas terms,

    the moment of rupturethat sparked the present conversation about the relationship be-

    tween phenomenological and psychoanalytic approaches to the ethnography of experience.

    Elaborating upon the 2007 AAA presentation mentioned above, Good notes his dissatis-

    faction with phenomenology as a theory of subjectivity because of its failure to account for

    two key concerns: complex psychological experience and political subjectivity. He traces the

    trajectory of his own work from a cultural phenomenological engagement with individual

    lifeworlds shaped by illness, injury, and chronic pain, to a psychoanalytic focus on that which

    is repressed, unknown, and unspeakable (or perhaps unspoken) in complex cultural and po-

    litical contexts. Drawing upon a decade of fieldwork on mental health and social suffering

    in Indonesia, he explains his disappointment with phenomenological approaches to subjec-

    tivity, particularly in postcolonial settings like this one. In Indonesia and more generally, he

    contends, disordered subjectivity is best approachedand, in fact, may only be accessible

    through a psychodynamic entree that attends both to biographical experience and to that

    which is repressed or unspeakable. Goods contribution raises important questions not only

    about the adequacy and the limits of psychoanalytic and phenomenological approaches but

    also, and more fundamentally, about the deeper need in anthropology for a robust theory of

    subjectivity. So, too, does it offer an intimate window onto the potentially game-changing

    implications of one scholars personal struggle with ethnographic inquietude.

    In the second article, On the Varieties and Particularities of Cultural Experience, Douglas

    Hollan offers an appreciative outsiders critique of phenomenological approaches to the

    ethnography of experience and a productive counterpoint to the intellectual frustration

    that has pulled Good away from phenomenology and toward psychoanalysis. Writing as

    a relational psychoanalyst and anthropologist who remains untethered to psychoanalytic

    orthodoxies, Hollan suggests that what we call experience is ever hovering between poles of

    situatedness and particularity, and that a robust and satisfying approach to the ethnography

    of experience must account simultaneously for both. Without losing sight of the diversity

  • 14 ETHOS

    of positions assembled under the psychoanalytic and phenomenological umbrellas, he notes

    that phenomenological approaches excel in elucidating the first of these polesthe human

    condition of situatedness, or being-in-the-worldwhile often floundering in relation to the

    latter. Psychoanalytic approaches, in contrast, may masterfully portray the particular, but

    tend to neglect the complex contextual fabric of individual lifeworlds. Hollan thus calls for

    an approach to the ethnography of experience that can account simultaneously for individual

    and group modes of situatedness as well as the crises, exceptions, and other particularities

    that comprise what William James identifies as every individuals unique pinch of destiny.

    In his view, complementary attention to both might provide a bulwark against the disquiet

    engendered when each is deployed alone.

    In Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology, Thomas Csordas borrows Walter Benjamins

    arcade metaphor as inspiration for a comparative portrait of phenomenology and psycho-

    analysis as traditions that stand not in antagonistic but rather symmetrical, and dialogical,

    relation to one another. The first half of his article explores this thesis by experimenting

    with a series of conceptual correspondences, among them existence and unconscious, inten-

    tionality and drive, being-in-the-world and human nature. In the second half of his work,

    Csordas examines one largely forgotten attempt to develop a negotiable route across this

    arcade in parallel: the tradition of phenomenological or existential psychiatry advanced in

    the early 20th century by Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger. In revisiting Binswangers

    provocative alternative to psychoanalytic psychiatry, Csordas uses a fascinating but, he ad-

    mits, ultimately unsatisfying historical precedent to invite reconsideration of the relationship

    between these two intellectual projects. Beyond its consideration of potentially negotiable

    routes, Csordas also interrogates a core metaphor that has long irked some ethnographers

    of experience: the notion that phenomenological approaches can only engage the surface

    of experience, whereas their psychoanalytic counterparts plumb depth. For Csordas, the

    appropriate juxtaposition warps time and space; rather than contrasting depth and surface,

    he instead contrasts depth and immediacy.

    Like Hollan and Csordas, C. Jason Throop is intrigued by the possibility of rediscovering

    missed opportunities for conceptual cross-fertilization. His contribution, On Inaccessibil-

    ity and Vulnerability: Horizons of Compatibility between Phenomenological and Psycho-

    dynamic Accounts of Lived Experience, pivots on the collections central concern: the

    question of what can and cannot be known about anothers experience and, implicitly, the

    anxiety that emerges at the limits of ethnographic apperception. Throop acknowledges that

    these two traditions espouse substantially different views of both subjectivity and intersub-

    jectivity and, furthermore, divergent understandings of two key obstacles to any satisfactory

    ethnography of experience: mutual inaccessibility and vulnerability. He regards psycho-

    analytic and phenomenological anthropology as contrapuntal approaches involving either

    a (psychoanalytic) hermeneutics of suspicion, which listens against the grain for gaps and

    aporias that destabilize knowledge of self and other, or a (phenomenological) hermeneutics

    of reclamation that brackets the critical impulse in order to return, in Husserlian fashion,

    to lucid description of things in themselves. For Throop, each stance entails a substantially

    different mode of inquiry, different presumed points of access to experience, and different

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 15

    interpretive strategies. Methodologically, each points toward a different kind of epoche, sug-

    gesting distinct ways of bracketing what appears as self-evident. Throops exploration of

    how forms of attention, bracketing, and rupture can affect the knowability of both self and

    ethnographic other raises important questions not only of epistemology and method, but

    also of the ethical obligations and risks inherent in what Levinas (1998) calls interhuman

    spaces.

    The final contributions reflect critically on the relative merits and limitations of the four

    preceding articles, and on the collection at large, through the respective lenses of critical

    phenomenology, French psychoanalysis, and existentialphenomenological anthropology.

    First, Robert Desjarlais ponders the rupture provoked by Goods shift from phenomenology

    toward psychoanalysis and poses several provocative questions in response. The ethnogra-

    phy of experience, as understood in the present context, can be traced to the late 1980s

    and early 1990s, when a number of psychological, medical, and cultural anthropologists

    sought alternatives to their disciplines core concerns: meaning, structural relations, dis-

    course, psychodynamics. As Desjarlais notes, most of these pioneering efforts were largely

    nonpsychologicalat least in light of then-prevailing notions of the psychological. Why,

    we must ask, did certain anthropologists turn away from psychological models in the first

    place? Desjarlais reads Goods intellectual shift less as a unilateral break than a pendulum

    swing within a longer debate about how anthropology can best capture the intricacies and

    indeterminacies of human life. He further characterizes phenomenology as less a theory

    than a method which, used in conjunction with other approaches, can exert an efferves-

    cent force on the ethnographic project. An anthropological formulary might therefore

    include amalgams of phenomenology and various ethnographic and theoretical schools

    for instance, those focusing on political economy, discursive pragmatics, performance, or

    psychodynamics.

    For Ellen Corin, whose innovations at this intellectual juncture long precede the present

    conversation, and whose psychoanalytic leanings are more classical than Hollans, this col-

    lection opens up worthwhile questions but offers no final verdict on how best to frame

    cross-disciplinary dialogue. Indeed, she is less interested in the dialogue between phe-

    nomenological and psychoanalytic anthropologies than between anthropology and psycho-

    analysis. Drawing from the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition with which she identifies,

    Corin proposes several alternative models, beginning with psychoanalyst Andre Greens

    (1999) proposal that anthropologists cultivate self-estrangement by stepping out of the

    flow of familiar discourse, then reentering it with fresh attentionperhaps as one might

    plunge into, and strive to comprehend, a foreign language. Another model (also invoked

    in the final commentary by Jackson) stems from psychoanalytic anthropologist George De-

    vereuxs (1978) notion of complementarist ethnopsychoanalysis. Yet psychoanalysis has

    much more to offer, Corin contends, than just models for cross-disciplinary dialogue. She

    finds in the Lacanian tradition several especially productive sources of destabilizing poten-

    tial for ethnographers of experience: emphasis on an essential discontinuity between the

    conscious and the unconscious; attention to the energetic dynamics of unconscious motiva-

    tion; and a deliberate channeling of inquietude involving active redirection of ethnographic

  • 16 ETHOS

    attention to fissures, silences, and paradoxes as well as unexpected recurrences across seem-

    ingly unconnected domains of human activity. Ultimately, Corin suggests, anthropology and

    psychoanalysis are reciprocally linked by a common focus on the destabilizing power associ-

    ated with Othernessa disposition she finds especially timely in a world where opacifying

    the others Otherness parallels a difficulty making room for otherness within ourselves.

    In the final commentary, Michael Jackson reads this collection of works as a contemporary

    incarnation of a century-old struggle to overcome the chasm between the psychological and

    social sciences of the psychenotwithstanding the fact that a long list of luminaries has

    deemed this dichotomy a false one. Jackson recalls, for example, William James proposi-

    tion that the intrapsychic and the intersubjective are dialectically interrelated, and George

    Devereuxs (1967) methodological observation that sociologistic and psychologistic models

    cannot be employed simultaneously, only in sequence. While celebrating the underlying

    impulse to broaden anthropologys horizons beyond reifications of subject and culture to

    consider the enactment and expression of human potentialities, he nonetheless cautions

    against overinvestment in epistemological struggles that can become overburdened with

    the weight of what he has elsewhere described as intellectual lumber.4 As counterpoint,

    Jackson renders a plea for the judicious deployment of methodological orientations with

    attention to the particular therapeutic, analytic, or intellectual aims at hand.

    Conclusion

    Whatever else an anthropology of experiencemight be, it is clear that it is, like experienceas such, abundant, multiform, and a bit out-of-hand. Wherever we are, it is not at thegates of paradigm-land. Clifford Geertz, 1986, p. 375

    If one undercurrent of the present dialogue involves the relative adequacy of phenomenology

    and psychoanalysis as theories of subjectivity, then another involves the broader challenge of

    doing justice to the inclusive integrity of experience (Dewey 1925:9), which can never be

    represented by a single pattern of research. Nearly a century ago, Dewey issued a trenchant

    critique of the philosophers of his day, suggesting that

    Gross experience is loaded with the tangled and complex; hence philosophy hurries awayfrom it to search out something so simple that the mind can rest trustfully in it, knowingthat it has no surprises in store, that it will not spring anything to make trouble, that itwill stay put, having no potentialities in reserve. [Dewey 1925:26]

    In its day, Deweys critique would likely have applied to anthropologists as much as the

    philosophers to whom it was addressed. Todays anthropologists of experience, in contrast,

    are less likely to hurry away from such tangles, complexities, potentialities, and surprises.

    Their aim is not to rein in chaos, model it, or capture it like a fly in amber. They are

    more likely to confront the unruliness of human experience head on, including the every-

    day circumstances into which people are thrown as well as their efforts to inhabit, resist,

    and transform the palpable realities they inhabit. Arguably, this emerging anthropological

  • EXPERIENCE AND INQUIETUDE 17

    tradition is well positioned to provide an innovative, if belated, response to Deweys critique:

    a robust open-air laboratory for empirically grounded exploration of substantive philosoph-

    ical questions (see, e.g., Csordas this issue; Jackson 2009; Mattingly 2010).

    The best exemplars of this tradition to date depict experience not only with patience and

    imagination, but also with attention to the kinds of uncertainty and anxiety that ethnographic

    fieldwork readily engenders. Ethnographic engagement with other peopleespecially in

    times as turbulent as ourspushes anthropologists continually to revise, rethink, and recon-

    sider nearly every aspect of our scholarly practice. Ethnography is, among other things, a

    deeply interpersonal affair that can place steep demands on ethnographic subject and inquirer

    alike. As a result, the stakes of such encounters are not only analytic and theoretical, but

    also moral and psychological. As Jackson puts it, Understanding others requires more than

    an intellectual movement from ones own position to theirs; it involves physical upheaval,

    psychological turmoil, and moral confusion (2009:239).

    A handful of ethnographers, like Jackson, have been able to return to the same field settings

    at multiple stages of a professional lifetime. For more of us, however, communities of mean-

    ing and friendship that were developed during fieldwork disappear as people move on, find

    themselves displaced or deported, or meet lifes end. In other instances, ethnographers and

    the communities they study simply grow apart once the original impetus for ethnographic

    research has been qualified or removed. But to the extent that anthropologies of experi-

    ence call attention to whole experiential settings in which researchers and informants both

    participate, scholars need to pay closer attention to the relationship between the contexts

    in which ethnographic knowledge is generated and the theoretical dispositions that emerge

    from its practice. This is more than the now well-accepted call for a degree of reflexivity in

    ethnographic writing; essentially, it involves a reorientation of the whole practice of ethnog-

    raphy around consequential relationships that include the anthropologist and his or her

    intended readers as well as the ostensible subjects of ethnographic research. Psychoanalytic

    approaches may be especially attuned to these dimensions of understanding, which have

    parallels in the analytic encounter, but they also hold much broader significance for the field

    of anthropology as scholars confront the epistemic contingency and indeterminacythe

    inquietudesgenerated by the ethnographic project as they have come to know it.

    Under these conditions, it would be foolhardy to declare that psychoanalysis, phenomenol-

    ogy, or any amalgamation of the two might definitively settle questions of adequate repre-

    sentation or analysis of ethnographic phenomena.What emerges, instead, are multiple com-

    pelling reasons to seek renewed and reinvigorated dialogue between these two traditions for

    which experience, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity hold pride of place. As the articles in this

    issue attest, the tensions between themand among the various orientations aligned within

    eachare at least as important as their convergences and complementarities. Bringing them

    into sustained dialogue, as we attempt to do in these pages, will arguably strengthen both

    and resonate more widely among anthropologistsnot only through cross-fertilization of

    insight but also by calling attention to pivotal gaps and presumptions in methodology and

    analytic frame like those highlighted here. Having laid the groundwork for more robust

  • 18 ETHOS

    consideration of what it means to approach experience ethnographically, we are hopeful that

    other, equally provocative conversations may follow. For experience is like an itch anthro-

    pology will always struggle to scratch5; or, perhaps, like the tiny grain of sand that irritates

    its way into a thing of luminous fascination, at times even beauty.

    SARAH S. WILLEN is Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology at the Univer-

    sity of Connecticut.

    DON SEEMAN is Associate Professor in the Department of Religion and the Institute for

    Jewish Studies, Emory University.

    Notes1. The 2008 conference Whats At Stake in the Ethnography of Human Experience? Phenomenological and

    Psychoanalytic Perspectives was supported by the Lemelson/Society for Psychological Anthropology Conference

    Fund, made possible by a generous donation from The Robert Lemelson Foundation and additional funding from

    the Emory University Provosts Conference Subvention Fund. Other sponsors at Emory included the Gradu-

    ate Division of Religion; the Department of Religion; the Psychoanalytic Studies Program; the Tam Institute

    for Jewish Studies; the Ethics and Servant Leadership Program; the Center for Health, Culture, and Society;

    and the Department of Anthropology. The full conference program and participant list are available online at

    http://www.aaanet.org/sections/SPA/files/whatsatstake.pdf.

    2. We recognize that our own intellectual genealogy tilts disproportionately toward the tradition of phenomeno-

    logical anthropology. One reason we began this project was to more deeply explore how this tradition, with its

    own internal variety, might be brought into more fruitful conversation with the psychoanalytic anthropological

    tradition. We did not attempt, and cannot claim, to have adequately accounted for the full range of diversity in

    either tradition, especially the psychoanalytic.

    3. For insight into these terms, thanks are due respectively to Michael M. J. Fischer, Orkideh Behrouzan, and

    Sadeq Rahimi (Persian), Sarah Pinto (Hindi), and Devon Hinton (Pali).

    4. Jackson employed this felicitous phrase in responding, impromptu, to a 2008 AAA panel designed to explore

    how anthropologists have engaged the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.

    5. We thank Robert Desjarlais (personal communication) for this apt metaphor.

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    Correction added after online publication [April 3, 2012]:

    The acknowledgments in the Special Issue introduction note the generous support from

    the Lemelson Conference Fund of the Society for Psychological Anthropology. We offer

    additional details with new wording for the first sentence of the acknowledgments as follows:

    The 2008 conference Whats At Stake in the Ethnography of Human Experience? Phe-

    nomenological and Psychoanalytic Perspectives was supported by the Lemelson/Society

    for Psychological Anthropology Conference Fund, made possible by a generous donation

    from The Robert Lemelson Foundation and additional funding from the Emory University

    Provosts Conference Subvention Fund.