Exercising the System:The Federal/State/Local Response to Terrorist

AttackMichael May

Stanford UniversityMay 13, 2004

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Outline of Talk

• Structure of Exercise• Scenario and Questions• Risk Assessment and

Communication• Some General Observations:

– International Coordination – Short-Term versus Long-Term– How Do Organizations Learn?

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Structure of Exercise

• Simultaneous radioactive attack in Seattle and biological attack in Chicago

• Practice coordination of federal, state and local responders over first 30 days

• Carried out in multiple locations over several months in 2002-2003

• One of a series of exercises

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Stanford Participation

• Provided observers to most locales during the exercise trained in radioactivity and biological sciences, risk evaluation and communication

• Provided feedback in planning phase• Provided a final report with

recommendations to DHS (initially DOJ, State and others)

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Acknowledgments

This presentation is based on the work of many people including:•Laura Donohue, the project leader•Tonya Putnam, the main report author•Chris Chyba, Mariano Cuellar, Lynn Eden, Michael Lynn, Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, Julie Pullen, Margaret Race, Amy Stuart, Larry Wein, Dean Wilkening and others

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Scenario 1: The Dirty Bomb

• NOT a nuclear explosion: • Regular explosive laced with as

much radioactive material as “feasible”

• Detonated in a building lot• Scenario considered first

responses, whom to evacuate, when to return

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Radiation Dangers and Evacuation

• Few immediate radiation casualties

• People about a mile downwind would receive dangerous doses if they stayed

• But contamination would be measurable over a much larger area

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Things to Work Out Ahead of Time

• Criteria for evacuation: The risks of evacuation and rerouting can exceed the risks of staying!

• Mechanisms to monitor and guide what people actually do

• Criteria for telling people they can return

• Clean up standards

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Average US Background

Cleanup Costs Depend on Standard

AverageDental X-ray

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How Easy Is This Attack?

• Radioactive materials as contrasted with nuclear weapons materials are in worldwide industrial and medical use

• Some control of major sources in developed countries. Otherwise not.

• Making a big bomb requires skill, care.

• But a smaller attack is all too likely.

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Most Portable Sources are Weaker than Scenario Source

Larger sources are much heavier:10-20 Ci 340 lbs total225 lbs DU

A Typical Capsule:

10 Ci Cs-137Ceramic matrixWelded double SS Tested to 25,000 psi

Portable sources have limited activity:<100 mCi Co-6040 – 50 lbs30 – 40 lbs DU

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Scenario 2: The Plague Attack

• Pneumonic plague release in a hockey arena rest room

• First observed as people became ill• Plague is highly contagious, requires

prompt medical attention for survival• Illness spread over first two weeks,

tailed off gradually with remedial measures

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Things to Work Out Ahead of Time

• Criteria for identifying attacks:– Early identification important– Systematic syndrome surveillance can

help

• Triage plans• Infectious waste disposal plans• Thought-through options and criteria:

– Partial v total quarantines? Forced inoculations? Schools and other closures?

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Things to Work Out Ahead of Time

• Mechanisms for timely, clear, accurate communication with press and public– Monitor communications and their effects– Monitor unforeseen public reactions

• Capabilities questions:– First responders – Backup facilities, public and private– CDC, WHO

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Wider Consequences

• Closure of transport from affected sites– National– International

• Disruption of necessary deliveries• Need for international cooperation

on several areas

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How Easy Is Bio-Attack?

• Several cases have occurred historically

• The most sophisticated and lethal agents could be controlled with better international cooperation than exists

• For more routine agents, prevention may be very difficult

• Good worldwide system against disease is most effective precaution

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A Typical Technical Problem: Plume Models• Most attacks involve atmospheric

dispersion of some agent • Different models were developed

by different agencies for different purposes

• There is a lot of technical info. How to make it useful to users is the issue

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Slightly Different Models Lead to Wide Consensus

Area

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In Some Regions, Changing Scale of

Observations Makes a Big Difference

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Buildings Make a Big Difference

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How To Deal With This?

• Pre-calculate complex urban situations so end users need only plug in new data

• Assure models use the same inputs• Update results as data come in• Convey uncertainty and changes in

uncertainty as data come in• Track new developments in state of the

art

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Risk Assessment and Communication

• Virtual News Network coverage was monitored for each of the four days of the FSE, and an account compiled of what happened from the perspective of the viewer

• Detailed observations and recommendations were given to DHS

• Testing and assessing how to communicate risk to media and public is essential: poor risk communication can wreck best laid plans

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Some Features of Effective Public Communications

• Responsible agencies should appear early, update often, be realistic rather than overly reassuring, avoid “mixed messages”

• One Joint Information Center where the media can get at it would be helpful

• Recommendations to public should give enough context to be actionable

• Misinformation will occur and should be countered as soon as possible

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More Specifically ...

• Pre-informing the media, via workshops and info packets, is useful

• Pre-informing all government agency spokespeople is the most essential

• Establish a government web site with constantly updated information and peg public statements to it

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Example: Radioactive Contamination

• Risk will vary from serious (for a small number) to negligible (to most)

• There will be no lack of “experts,” some helpful and knowledgeable, some not

• Public will rapidly educate itself, using right or wrong information

• Government should maintain a steady informed presence on TV, etc.

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Obstacles

• Changes in threat levels can confuse• Government officials at all levels will

speculate, often at cross-purposes• Cities and counties may not coordinate

or establish a single usable JIC• Public may not know how the official

warning system works

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International Coordination Is

Required ...• Dealing with travelers and other

public health implications, WHO warnings

• Control on radioactive sources• Law enforcement and intelligence• Commercial and financial impact• Possible new diplomatic

agreements

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Short Term versus Long Term

• Emergency actions have longer-term consequences:– Economic– Legal– Environmental– Bureaucratic and diplomatic

• Exercises surface some of those, not all• Risk assessors and lawyers should be

part of the emergency response team

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Some Artificialities

• Can’t run a no-notice exercise• Could run a “source unknown” exercise• Can’t fully model media presence or

effect of media coverage on public, such as difficulties with medical triage

• Time frame necessarily artificial• Transport stoppages and gridlocks

cannot be fully modeled

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Organizational Learning

• Personnel learned a great deal planning for the exercise, through assessing procedures, planning seminars

• They learned even more during the exercise, including who their counterparts were at various levels

• Follow-on analysis is needed so as not to learn wrong or idiosyncratic lessons

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Organizational Learning: Future Work

• Prepare for next exercise (Topoff 3)• Develop metrics to evaluate best

practices• Recognize and deal with competing

organizational interests• Evaluate learning by “competitive”

organizations (terrorists)