Executive Department

G.R. No. L-46440          January 18, 1939CARMEN PLANAS, petitioner, vs. JOSE GIL, Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.

67 Phil. 62 – Political Law – Separation of Powers – Rule of Non-InterferenceIn November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative in character.ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity

of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.Myers v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of the first class in Oregon was forced to resign.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution “grants to the President the executive power of the government- i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that article 2 excludes the exercise of legislative power by Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the Senate’s consent; that the provisions of the second section of article 2, which blend action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive, are limitations to be strictly construed, and not to be extended by implication; that the President’s power of removal is further established as an incident to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not by implication extend to removals the Senate’s power of checking appointments.”

Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get the Senate’s permission to remove the postmaster of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed with the Senate’s advice and consent. The President asked for the individual’s resignation without consulting the Senate first, and the Senate refused the President permission to do so.

Issue. “[W]hether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

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Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (the Supreme Court) produced a long-winded opinion, examining the legislative and adjudicative history of executive appointments, including Marbury v. Madison. It concluded that Tenure of Office Act of 1867, “in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so.” Dissent. Justice McReynolds found that “it is impossible for me to accept the view that the President may dismiss, as caprice may suggest, any inferior officer whom he has appointed with consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy review of precedent. Justice Brandeis felt that the central issue was “May the President, having acted under the statute in so far as it creates the office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the Senate is in session, the provision which prescribes the condition under which a removal may take place?” Justice Holmes emphasized the fact that the office was created by Congress.

Discussion. “To hold [an opposite rule] would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

[G.R. No. 125183. September 29, 1997]

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ADRIANO A. DELAMIDA, SR. CELSO T. TORRES, TARCILA V. ZATA, QUIRICO T. TORRES, CATALINA BONGAT, MILAGROS A. HERBOLARIO, ROSALINDA A. PIMENTAL, PURIFICACION MORELLA, FRANCISCO RENION, SR., MARCELINA CORPUZ, BENEDICTO FALCON, MAXIMO FALCON, MARIO BOLANOS, VICENTE T. SURIAO, ROSARIO GREGORIA G. DORADO, JEREMIAS Z. PATRON, ALEX RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LUISA ALPAPARA, HERMINIA C. RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIANO ESPANOL, MARIO L. AGUILAR, FREDDIE AMADOR, SILVERIO PURISIMA, JR., PROCOPIO B. PENARANDA, ELADIO MAGLUYAN, HELENITA GUEI, CELESTINO MONTANO, ROMEO GOMEZ, OFELIA LOGO, JIMMY MACION, DAISY A. MANGA, MAURO MANGA, ARTHUR HERBOLARIO, MANOLITO HERBOLARIO, ROSARIO ANCHETA, TERESITA A. VICTORIA, ROSALINA SAMPAGA, MARIQUITA RUADO, FELIPE ANCHETA, MAGDALENA CABREZA, MARIA BIANDILLA, NILDA ARENSOL, LORENZO S. TOLEDO, and NAPOLEON D. VILORIA, SR., respondents.

FACTS

MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks Service Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect excavationsat the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipesand tapping of water to the respective houses of water concessionaires.Only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires.Between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards thedirection of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She was with prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road wasflooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa wasfractured.Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila acomplaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal officials.After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS and theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. CA affirmed RTC with modification.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable

HELD:YES Jurisprudence[7]   teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189[8]   of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads,streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province,city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach thatthe defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. Whatsaid article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or roadWe must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, of the Local Government Code, the phrases“regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes”, and “adoptmeasures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life andproperty”, are not modified by the term “municipal road”. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provisionof Section 149 that petitioner’s power of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in caseswhere

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such activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the municipality’s liability for injuriescaused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long asthe same is within its territorial jurisdiction.Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of knowledge of the excavation and thecondition of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988 when the accident occurred. It mustbe borne in mind that the obligation of the [petitioner] to maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is acontinuing one which is not suspended while a street is being repaired

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]

Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling:  YES As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our

sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.

TITLE: MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989CAPTION: FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC,TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS,RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, ImmigrationCommissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

FACTS:In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from precidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exice.Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by politicalleaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the support of “Marcos loyalists” andthe unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to

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stirtrouble even from afar and to the fanatism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country.Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to bar thereturn of Marcos and his family.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcosesfrom retyrning to the Philippines.

RULING:The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of theliberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as agenerally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of theConstitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under theInternational Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is,under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn todefend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promotetheir welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation ofpower is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the peoplebecome rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authorityemanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism,the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented historyof the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against theState and instigate more chaos.The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gainsachieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and commonknowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with

grave abuse ofdiscretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under presentcircumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, theinstant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure) GR No. 121234  August 23, 1995  

FACTS:  On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.  

Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.  

Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.  

charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.  

Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.  

ISSUES:  

(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?  

(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?  

(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation?  

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(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?  

HELD:  (1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.  

(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it.  

Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.”  

Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.  

(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. 

The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.  

(4) NO.  Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.  

In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators. 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case)

Brief Fact Summary. During the Korean War, President Truman in order to avoid a strike that would impede the war effort, issued an executive order seizing the mills and operating them under federal direction.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President has limited inherent authority. He may have a legislative power in “theaters of war”. The President can act without Congress when it is an emergency and Congress has not negated such action that the President wishes to undertake.

Facts. During the Korean War, President Truman seized the steel mills so that a strike would not impede the Korean War effort. The United Steel Workers were upset that they were not getting paid enough and wanted a raise. President Truman was afraid that a strike would cause the United States to run out of steel. Congress had allowed the strike with the Taft Hartley Act passed in 1947 over President Truman’s veto. The Act gave the president the power to get an injunction against such strikes but Congress had rejected an amendment to permit government seizures to avoid serious shutdowns.

Issue. Can President Truman acting under the aggregate of his powers, exercise a law making power independent of Congress in order to protect serious national interests?

Held. Justice Black opinion. No.

Although Article II Section: 1 grants executive power to the President to execute the laws. His general executive power is inapplicable since there was no relevant law here to execute. Under Section 2, the Commander in Chief power does not warrant the seizure here either, since it was lawmaking and too far removed from the “theater of war”. That power did not include the President being able to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. That is the job for the Nation’s lawmakers and not for its military authorities. The Founders of the Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in good and bad times.

Dissent. Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Reed and Minton dissenting.

There was legislation authorizing the supplying of the forces engaged in the Korean War. The President had a duty to execute the foregoing legislative programs and successful execution depended upon continued production of steel and stabilized prices for steel.

Work stoppage would have resulted in a serious curtailment of production of essential weapons and munitions of all kinds. The President was acting to save the legislative programs and in that sense he was there to take care that the laws were faithfully executed. He had to execute a defense program which Congress had enacted and strike would have had a disastrous effect on those programs. The President acted to preserve those programs by seizing the steel mills. It was temporary and subject to congressional direction. Presidents in the past have acted in the same way.

Concurrence. All of the Justices who joined Justice Black’s opinion for the Court also wrote individual concurring opinions.

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Justice Frankfurter stated that questions concerning the extent of the Presidential power in the absence of legislation were not before the Court. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was an explicit Congressional negation of the authority asserted by the seizure

Justice Burton stated that the controlling fact was that Congress had prescribed specific procedures and they did include seizure for this emergency.

Justice Douglas emphasized the Fifth Amendment’s requirement for compensation for takings of property.

Justice Jackson said that the President had inherent legislative powers to act in preserving the nation, but only when there was an absence of any provision passed by Congress purporting to deal with the situation.

Justice Clark stated that the President must follow the procedures laid down by Congress in the Act. If Congress had not acted, then in the absence of Congressional action, the President’s independent power to act depends on the gravity of the situation confronting the nation.

Discussion. The majority described this as inherent power, while the dissent argued this was implied power.

If there had been an emergency and Congress had declined or neglected to act, then the President would have had the narrow sliver of authority to seize the steel mills. This is inherent power.

The dissent argued that the President exercised his implied powers to take care that the laws were faithfully executed. Since the list in the United States Constitution of the President’s powers is not exclusive, then as long as the President’s act seems reasonably related to carrying out the laws made by Congress, the Court will not strike the act merely because it does not fall within any narrow enumerated presidential power.

Gonzales v Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts:On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit frompassing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through amandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names

of executive officialsholding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipientsof luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer.

Ratio Decidendi:The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner didnot in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they stillfall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does notpresent to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are inimmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted fromCongress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of itstaxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCR’s creation. Thepetitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest.With regards to the petitioner’s request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld thatcitizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceedinginvolves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by themere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent ExecutiveSecretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.

G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

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(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD

(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.

(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.

(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.

Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G. R. No. L-69137, August 6, 1986

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary." On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioner's position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission's order and the private respondent's title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the

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appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission's resolution is set aside.

HELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, Respondent.

FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. OnSeptember 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed theappointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998. Opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.

On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated inher appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.”Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit Enbanc.

On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.

In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion.

ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.

RULING:  The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.

G.R. No. 79974          December 17, 1987ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs.SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents,

156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Appointment of “Head of Bureaus” – Officers Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on

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Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.[G.R. No. 107369. August 11, 1999]JESULITO A. MANALO, Petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA. CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C. PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G. ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.

Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.Drilon vs Lim GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994

FACTS:Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.”

ISSUES:The issues in this case are

(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and

(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:

The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.

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An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

G.R. No. L-27811      November 17, 1967LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees

21 SCRA 895 – Political Law – Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary

Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request.  The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that  the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate

powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.206 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Control Power – Doctrine of Qualified Political

AgencyIn 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person,  he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive,  “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and

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agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.G.R. No. 171396             May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out

PowerBill of Rights - Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.  Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;Resolution by the SC   on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.  Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.  

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Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.  Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.   However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth TheoryFirst and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.   It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power DoctrineOn the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017.  The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers.  From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.Resolution by the SC on the Take Care DoctrinePursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,

orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).  The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’  Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.  Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’  To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power DoctrineThe president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:(1) There must be a war or other emergency.(2)   The delegation must be for a limited period only.(3)  The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.(4)  The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law DeclarationThe SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.G.R. No. L-37364 May 9, 1975BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., petitioner,  vs.MILITARY COMMISSION 2, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, and SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 

Martial Law – Open Court Theory – Military CourtsIn September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the

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same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the “open court’ theory observed in the USA.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), was a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that the application of military tribunals to citizens when civilian courts are still operating is unconstitutional. It was also controversial because it was one of the first cases after the end of the American Civil War.

Background of the case[edit]

Lambdin P. Milligan and four others were accused of planning to steal Union weapons and invade Union prisoner-of-war camps. Once the first prisoner of war camp was liberated, they planned to use the liberated soldiers to help fight against the Government of Indianaand free other camps of Confederate soldiers. They also planned to take over the state governments of Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. When the plan leaked, they were charged, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged by a military court in 1864. However, their execution was not set until May 1865, so they were able to argue the case after the Civil War ended.

The Court's decision[edit]

The Supreme Court decided that the suspension of habeas corpus was lawful, but military tribunals did not apply to citizens in states that had upheld the authority of the Constitution and where civilian courts were still operating.

It observed further that during the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, citizens may be only held without charges, not tried, and certainly not executed by military tribunals; the writ of habeas corpus is not the right itself but merely the ability to issue orders demanding the right's enforcement.

It is important to note the political environment of the decision. Post-Civil War, under a Republican Congress, the Court was reluctant to hand down any decision that questioned the legitimacy of military courts, especially in the occupied

South. The President's ability to suspend habeas corpus independently of Congress, a central issue, was not addressed, probably because it was moot with respect to the case at hand. Though President Lincoln suspended the writ nationwide on September 24, 1862,[1] Congress ratified this action almost six months later, on March 3, 1863, with the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. Milligan was detained in 1864, well after Congress formally suspended the writ. That notwithstanding, military jurisdiction had been limited.

G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V. JIMENEZ, ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ, CARLOS LAZARO, REYNALDO MACLANG, MAGDALENA DE LOS SANTOS-MACLANG, TEODORICO N. DIESMOS, RENE J. MARCIANO, DANILO R. DE OCAMPO, VICTORIANO C. AMADO and MAC ACERON, petitioners,vs.MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, THE TRIAL COUNSEL OF MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, and THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.

Habeas CorpusIn 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.

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HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.IBP VS ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,  directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1)  the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the

exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question  is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.  The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.  The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.  Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.  Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners, vs.HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,

Martial Law – Habeas Corpus – Power of the President to Order ArrestsEnrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law.ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.] 

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Executive Department

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO,petitioners vs. SECRETARYHERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDOBERROYA respondents

 FACTS:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting andattempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in NCR. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress therebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court. The case at bar is for prohibition,injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basisboth in fact and in law.On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in MetroManila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners'claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justifywarrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specificpersons in connection with the "rebellion."

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.

HELD: No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantlessarrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on thedeclaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remediesof  mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not withoutadequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is improperat this time. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declarednull and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of thesubject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave thecountry in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedingsinitiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for theissuance of a writ of  habeas corpus, it is manifest that the

writ is not called for since its purpose is torelieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertakingearlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in theirbehalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant forall acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

G.R. No. 2808           September 30, 1905FELIX BARCELON, petitioner, vs.DAVID J. BAKER, JR., AND JOHN DOE THOMPSON, respondents.Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus  as a Political Question

being a Prerogative by the PresidentIn the early 1900’s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelon’s lawyers petitioned before the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelon’s arrest and it was w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gen’s resolution in 1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence he should be set free.ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process.HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of the grounds specified in the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power is discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace and order condition of the country. Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country.G.R. No. L-4221             August 30, 1952MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant, vs.GEN. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, respondents-appellees.Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus  as a Political Question

being a Prerogative by the PresidentIn October 1950, Montenegro’s son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free

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for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his son’s body and explain his detention. Castaňeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted.HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegro’s petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt.G.R. No. L-33964, G.R. No. L-33965, G.R. No. L-33973  December 11, 1971IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI, ALCALA, petitioners, vs.BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,

Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro CaseDue to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG,

NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA GARCIA PADILLA, petitioner, vs.MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in theBarcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC  was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection. NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”

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