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Evolving Component Risks March 19, 2013

Barry Birdsong

Division Chief

MDA QSP

21st Annual Conference on Quality

in the Space and Defense Industries

Approved for Public Release

13-MDA-7210 (12 Mar 13)

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Ballistic Missile Threat To Homeland

And Pacific Region

• Growing and Unpredictable

• Threatens regional stability

North Korean

Road-mobile ICBM on parade

April 2012

North Korean

Taepo Dong-2

April 2012

Approved for Public Release

12-MDA-6778 (1 June 2012)

North Korean

SCUD-B

North Korean

No-Dong Ballistic Missile

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Today’s Ballistic Missile Defense System

Satellite

Surveillance

Sea-Based

X-Band Radar

Aegis BMD

SPY-1 Radar

Forward-Based Radar Early Warning

Radar

SENSORS

ASCENT DEFENSE SEGMENT

BMDS The Ballistic Missile Defense System

C2BMC Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications

NMCC USSTRATCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM EUCOM CENTCOM

Terminal High

Altitude Area

Defense

Ground-Based

Midcourse

Defense

Aegis Ballistic

Missile Defense Standard Missile-3

SM-3

DEFENSE SEGMENT

MIDCOURSE TERMINAL DEFENSE SEGMENT

GBI

Sea-Based

Terminal

Patriot Advanced

Capability-3

Approved for Public Release

12-MDA-6778 (1 June 2012)

Layered Ballistic Missile Defense

THAAD Fire Units

(2011)

Patriot Fire Units (2003)

Aegis Ships -SM-3 IA (2011) -SM-3 IB (2015) -SM-3 IIA (2018)

SM-2 (2008)

Ground-based Interceptor

(2008)

Vandenberg Air Force Base

C2BMC

(2011)

Early Warning Radars (2010)

Aegis Ashore

(2015)

Beale, Shemya,

Thule, Fylingdales

SRBM

Defense

ICBM Defense

Sea-based X-band Radar

(2011)

Ft. Greely

Ground-based Interceptor

(2010)

NATO ALTBMD

(2011-2018)

IRBM / MRBM

Defense

AN/TPY-2

(2009)

Israel Shariki, Japan

Kurecik, Turkey

SM-3 IIB

(2020)

Space-Based Infrared

(2007)

Includes European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missiles

MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missiles

IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

SRBMs

< 1,000 km

IRBMs /MRBMs 1,000-5,500 km

ICBMs

> 5,500 km

Precision Tracking

Space System

(2018)

Approved for Public Release

12-MDA-6778 (1 June 2012)

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Introduction

• Electronic Parts continue to move with the Commercial

Industry:

– Commercialization sometimes reduces servie life a reliability

for mIiitary applications

– Copper Wire Bonds, GaN transistors, BME Capacitors, Non-

traditional & 3D Packaging

• Expensive products (Au, Pd, Tantalum) removed from

commercial product to increase profit

• Counterfeiters continue to evolve, making it difficult to

detect using existing methods

• Lower tier contractors still do not understand the

counterfeit risk

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Copper Wire Bonding

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Qualification and Reliability of Base-

Metal-Electrode (BME) Capacitors

• The standard capacitor material for

commercial, automotive and medical

applications

– Aerospace industry the last to adopt

• Thin dielectric layers (~1um) cause concern for

historical precious metal (PME) based MIL-PRF

123 spec

– Oxygen vacancy driven long term failure

mechanism

• BME are critical part of power distribution

networks

– Degradation of BME impedance may impact signal

integrity for long term missions

• JPL qualification based on mission risk

– Statistical analysis of acceleration coefficients

(temperature and voltage) of precise dielectric

thickness is required

D. Sheldon - JPL

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Qualification of Non-traditional

Packaging for Complex Parts

• Now the exception, soon to be the rule.

– Packaging now fundamental part of complex device performance

• Successful qualification requires significant cooperation and

detailed engineering information from vendor.

• Individual device and board level stress tests now required.

• Military industry needs to fill in physics of failure mechanisms for

extended life missions

– Materials analysis of constituent layers

– Determine failure population statistics for accurate mission life prediction

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Reliability of TSV and 3D Packaging

• Gaining momentum in high

performance, high bandwidth

commercial applications.

• Defect density for 10K-100K via

connections need to be defined and

reviewed.

– Variations in materials and processing

from vendors

– How to determine extrinsic vs intrinsic

defects

• Temp cycle remains main screen and

life test evaluation tool

– Many interfaces mean Thermal Coefficient

of Expansion (TCE) will drive reliability

D. Sheldon - JPL

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Reliability and Radiation Capability

Of GaN Power and RF Transistors

• New GaN Transistors are becoming very

attractive for power and RF applications

• GaN HEMTs are currently only available

commercially

• Verified TID immune

• Vulnerable to SEDR from Drain to source,

40% of rated Vds for some devices

• Little reliability data available

• Process defects not fully understood

• What qualification process should be

applied

• Are the qualification processes of Mil-PRF-

19500 applicable for GaN

Dielectric

GaN

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Si

AlGaN Electron Generating Layer

DGS- - - -

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Counterfeit Part Mitigation Concerns

Clones with Malicious Intent (Replicated or

Emulated Parts) • Parts are undetectable by ‘refurbishment analysis’ (e.g.,

blacktop, re-tinned leads).

• Parts can be almost electrically identical to authentic parts.

• Detection methods like electrical test and decapsulation

may be only marginally effective or not at all.

• May be used to collect critical data or to cause mission

failure.

11 Excerpt from website of company offering legal cloning

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Cost of Implementing Robust Counterfeit Parts Plan • Risk of counterfeit parts is still poorly understood at lower tier

suppliers. - Cost of failures/rework/deaths not well-defined

- Reluctance to fund appropriately

- Interpreting third party lab test results

• Qualification of suppliers

• Inspection and test for purchases from unauthorized suppliers. - Obsolescence management and purchases from authorized

suppliers must minimize this cost

• Training.

• Multiple plan implementations. - Hundreds of critical subcontractors

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Counterfeit Part Mitigation Concerns

SOME CONTRACTORS BID EXCESSIVE COSTS WHILE OTHERS

CAN BE AS LOW AS $500K

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Insufficient Intra-Government and Government-

Industry Collaboration • DoD Components may implement their own avoidance and

detection requirements to comply with Policy. - Supplier approval and removal

- Documentation (traceability, test reports, etc.)

- Inspection and test

- Containment, reporting, and disposal

- Collaboration on all of the above would be most efficient

• Component manufacturers’ support becomes more critical

with the introduction of cloned parts. - Interpreting die markings and layout

• DoD must aggressively manage obsolescence and

procurement from authorized suppliers. - Encourages support from component manufacturers

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Counterfeit Part Mitigation Concerns

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Microblasted/Lapped Parts • Parts are undetectable by solvent methods (e.g.,

blacktop).

• Surface texture differences not detectable at low

magnification.

• Parts are exposed to mechanical, thermal, or

electrical stress.

Source: SMT Corporation

Evolving Counterfeit Concern

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Summary

• PMP products continue to move with the Commercial

Industry:

– Copper Wire Bonds,GaN transistors, BME Capacitors, Non-

traditional & 3D Packaging

• Prohibited materials (Pb) removed from commercial

product impact military product

• Expensive products (Au, Pd, Tantalum) removed from

commercial product to increase profit

• Counterfeiters continue to evolve, making it difficult to

detect using existing methods

• Lower tier contractors still do not understand risk

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