AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENTPolicy Department External Policies

PARLIAMENTARy CONTROL Of DEfENCE AND SECURITy SECTOR IN

SOUTh EAST EUROPE

EN

STUDy

External Policies

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTDirectorate-General for External Policies of the Union

SEPTEMBER 2006

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B

- POLICY DEPARTMENT -

STUDY

PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

Abstract: This study is one of a series of papers requested by the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs in connection with its role as (rotating) chair of the Parliamentary Troika of the Stability Pact for South East Europe in 2006. The Committee has been organising four parliamentary seminars involving representatives from the relevant specialised parliamentary bodies (committees and sub-committees) from the region. This paper examines the role of parliaments in the democratic control of the defence and security sector in South East Europe. It will be presented and discussed at a workshop on the subject on 16 October 2006 in Zagreb, in the specific context of experience and challenges in countries in South East Europe.

EP/EXPOL/B/2005/34 07/09/2006 PE 381.387 EN

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Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. This study was requested by: the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) This paper is published in the following languages: English. Author: Dr. Vladimir Bilandzic, OSCE Mission to Serbia Belgrade Tel: +381 11 3606 139 E-mail: vladimir.bilandzic@osce.org Responsible Official: Karsten Mecklenburg DG External Policies, Policy Department ATR 09K054 Tel: +32 2 284 31 71 E-mail: Karsten.Mecklenburg@europarl.europa.eu Manuscript completed, September 2006. Copies can be obtained through: Karsten Mecklenburg Tel: +32 2 284 31 71 E-mail: Karsten.Mecklenburg@europarl.europa.eu Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

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Parliamentary Control of Defence and Security Sector in South East Europe

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Main problems of democratic control in the region of South East Europe (Western Balkans) 4 II. The achievements of parliamentary control of defence and security sectors in South East Europe 7 (a) The examples of Serbia and Montenegro 7 (b) Experience of the other SEE countries 9 III. Recommendations for the enhancement of the parliamentary role in oversight of defence and security sectors 12 Concluding Remarks 18

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Dr. Vladimir Bilandzic1

Parliamentary Control of Defence and Security Sector in South East Europe

I. Main problems of democratic control in the region of South East Europe (Western Balkans) The role of parliaments and parliamentarians in the oversight of defence and security sectors and security sector reform (SSR) is just one, albeit very important dimension of their place and role in transition processes as a whole in South East Europe (SEE), more specifically in the region of Western Balkans. The achievements of Parliaments in the democratic control of armed forces are therefore conditioned and limited by their overall performance in the political life of these transition countries. While since the year 2000 all countries of the region have finally embarked on building the viable liberal democracies and have successfully conducted a series of democratic and generally fair elections, the task of building sustainable and effective democratic institutions, including parliaments, is a long term process, where the results can not be attained overnight. The legislative-making performance of the parliaments in most of Western Balkans countries have improved significantly, largely as a result of the engagement of this institution in passing a number of reformist laws and regulations, necessary to bring in line domestic legislation with the requirements of the integration into the European Union. For example, the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia has passed over two hundred such laws since spring 2004, when the present Government was constituted following the elections in December 2003. However, in many cases these laws were passed without much debate or thorough analysis, since the aim was to adopt as swiftly as possible European standards and accelerate the process of negotiation of a stabilization and association agreement with the European Union (EU). This practice is not unique, since most other transition countries, now members of the EU or close to membership have gone through similar processes during the early stages of transition. However, this implies that the legislative role of the parliament, as of necessity, has been overshadowing its political role as a forum for debate, budgetary allocations and control of the executive.2 The debates occurred occasionally as a result of some political or corruption scandals, leading to acrimonious and often heated exchanges of views, more often than not harmful to the democratic legitimacy of the institution and its public image.

1 The author is a Special Advisor the OSCE Mission to Serbia. The views expressed in the text are his own

responsibility and do not necessarily reflect those of the OSCE Mission. 2 “Young parliaments spend a considerable amount of their time on approving legislation, because it is necessary,

and this is what parliaments are expected to do. Unfortunately, they tend to forget that even more important than drafting and approving legislation is to keep a critical eye on the well-being of the democracy and the people”. Peter Vanhoutte, “Parliamentary oversight of the Security Sector”, ASI Newsletter, July 2006, No. 23, p. 12.

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As a result of this relatively one-sided activity of the parliaments, this institution does not enjoy a high degree of trust among the voters in some, if not most countries of Western Balkans. According to the latest public opinion poll conducted by the reputable CESID Institute (Belgrade-based think tank), the group of least credible institutions in Serbia includes political parties and National Assembly, i.e. MPs elected by the people. Parties and the parliament are not trusted by 40-50% of citizens (depending on party orientation of respondents), while significant trust for them is expressed only by one quarter of the citizens. On the other hand, degree of trust into “institutions of state power”– police and particularly the Army, is more than three times bigger than the mistrust (59 percent to 18 percent). Although this is lower than in earlier years, it confirms that among citizens of Serbia there is a widespread, albeit diminishing, respect for the uniform, which is paralleled only by a similar respect and trust for the Church. These results are interpreted by CESID also by the fact that, in transition times, the deficiency of legitimacy affects above all the political and economic actors and institutions, perceived to be responsible for the low living standards and quality of life, rather than the institutions and actors responsible for security and "aid and care about soul and body". The low level of trust towards republic's parliament, the institution that has suffered the largest deficiency of legitimacy, is explained by the practice of political deals, unprincipled bargaining and trade in mandates and shifting supports among the MPs. Indicatively, the largest degree of lack of trust (around 50%) in a democratic institution such as a Parliament, is registered among the supporters of authoritarian oriented parties (Serbian Radical Party and Socialists Party of Serbia), and by abstainers (48 %), while the higher than above 50 percent of trust into the parliament comes from the supporters of main governmental party – Democratic Party of Serbia (53 %). While we have no similar recent data for the trust into institutions in some other South East European countries, the situation is not probably much different, having in mind history and political cultural milieu of these countries. In some countries, with less “traditionalist” attitude to soldier’s profession, the respect for this institution grew in the nineties as a result of the credit given to them in defending the newly acquired independence (Croatia, Bosnia). In any case, it is safe to assume that the Parliament cannot claim in any of the countries of the region the ranking among the highest trusted institutions. This is, after all, not unexpected, since the Parliaments reflect the political spectrum of the country. Another impediment for more effective control in post-Communist societies, especially of security and intelligence service, is the tradition of secrecy of these services and potential3 intimidation coming from them (having confidential information about citizens, including MPs, which could be used as compromising material, etc). Additionally, the rising concern for new global and regional threats, such as terrorism, and organized crime gave new importance to security and intelligence agencies,4 whereby request for their increased control are sometimes discouraged in the name of

3 Richard Cohen, “Civil-Military Relations: Continuity and Change in an age of Terror”, The Evolution of Civil-

Military Relations in South East Europe, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2005, p. 41. 4 Ibid. p. 46.

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not affecting the effectiveness of these organizations in their counter-terrorism activities. All this does not help the parliament in exercising its role in security sector oversight, especially when the branches of power it is supposed to control enjoy higher degree of trust and popularity than the Parliament itself. Internal organization and lack of democratic tradition of political parties in Western Balkans transition countries is another impediment to high motivation and capacity for democratic oversight. Strict party discipline and methods such as in some cases the control of the MPs by having them sign in advance blank letter of resignation (which can be activated at any time by the party leadership in case of “indiscipline” or potential defection) seriously limit he possibilities of MPs to challenge the policy of executive, especially if they belong to the governing party or coalition. A further limitative factor is poor preparedness and lack of expertise in the political parties for dealing with complex security and defence issues, since the focus of their interest is directed, for electoral purposes and demands by the economic transition agenda, to focus most on economic and social issues, or issues of national political importance (co-operation with the Hague Tribunal, state-building, territorial integrity, etc.). Despite these limitations, all countries of Western Balkans have proclaimed democratic civilian control of defence and security sectors as one of their reform priorities. This is partly due to the realization of the democratically oriented political parties that there is no genuine democratization of the society without proper reform and oversight of this sensitive and powerful factor, especially in societies where these services were a stronghold of authoritative political regimes (like in Milosevic’s Serbia). Another impetus for introducing democratic control is connected with the desire of these countries to join Euro-Atlantic security structures, such as the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), where the democratic civilian control of the armed forces in one of the key conditions. It is indicative that some of the countries of Western Balkans have raised democratic civilian control to the level of the constitutional principle, the case being the 2003 Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro (SaM), elaborated in consultation with the EU.

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II. The achievements of parliamentary control of defence and security sectors in South East Europe Having in mind the difficulties and limitations mentioned above, the parliaments in the SEE countries have made a significant progress in recent years in exercising their constitutional role in establishing and exercising their authority in the oversight of defence and security sectors and promote their reforms. (a) The examples of Serbia and Montenegro In Serbia and Montenegro5, the legal basis for the democratic control of the army has been provided in the 2003 Constitutional Charter. It proclaimed the principle of democratic and civilian control of the Army and guaranteed the right of conscientious objectors. The Charter has envisaged that the state union adopts its defence strategy. The three-member Supreme Defence Council (SDC), representing the union and the two member states, had the ultimate authority in defence matters, operating strictly on the basis of consensus. Military courts were being integrated into civilian judicial structure. SDC has put army security and intelligence services under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Some steps for the more effective oversight of the security services have been taken even before the passing of the Charter. The new law on military and civilian security services was adopted in 2002 in the then Parliament of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which introduced stricter control of security and intelligence services at the federal level. The activities of these services, which involve intelligence gathering affecting civil liberties, have to be approved by the court. Military intelligence services were put under the competence of the Federal Government and the Ministry of Defence. The law envisaged the formation of a special Commission of the Federal Assembly for the control and oversight of the security services, which supervises the constitutional and legal aspect of their work, their expenditures and their respect of human rights. This parliamentary commission has the right to examine all relevant documents. Individual citizens have the right to file complaint with the Commission in cases where their rights are affected. While this law has been considered as quite advanced, its implementation has not been complete. In particular, Commission on the Control of Security Services rarely met, while the Inspector General for internal control of security services was not appointed, mainly due to party politics reasons. In line with the Constitutional Charter, the Parliament embarked on the elaboration of a new national defence strategy. Reflecting increased recognition of the need for transparency, the draft strategy was presented publicly at a round table, involving experts from NGOs, civil society and selected international organizations. It drew upon

5 After the successful referendum for independence in Montenegro on 21 May 2006, the state Union of Serbia and

Montenegro ceased to exist. The competencies for the oversight of the defense sector, which has been vested with the union Parliament, are since then transferred to the defense committees of the Parliaments of the two former union members, now independent states. The experiences gained during the existence of the union parliaments could be of use for the work of the respective committees of the two state’s parliaments, in spite of the fact that Serbia will maintain a relatively sizeable army, while Montenegro will have only a small armed forces potential.

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similar documents in transition countries, introducing a new approach to defence and security matter, identifying as main security threats terrorism, organized crime, corruption, ethnic tensions, and other threats emanating from non-state actors. The neighbouring states and international organizations, including NATO, are treated in the Strategy as partners, while the readiness to participate in international security schemes, such as peacekeeping, is strongly stressed. Accordingly, the main mission of the Army is to promote and protect security, internally and internationally. The intention of joining Euro-Atlantic structures, in the first place Partnership for Peace, was explicitly stated. The Defence Strategy was adopted in the parliament in October 2004, after a thorough debate in which the parliamentarians showed quite keen interest for this document, although some of their suggestions and remarks were not always motivated to improve the document, but to gain some political points among the electorate (especially by the MPs from the parties which do not favour Euro-Atlantic integration). Nevertheless, this was a positive example of engagement of parliamentarians. On the other hand, such engagement of the parliamentarians was not registered in the oversight of the budget, largely due to the fact that financing of the union institutions, including the Army, was within the competence of the two Member states. (However, neither the committees at the republican level got actively engaged in this issues). Since the Constitutional Charter has not envisaged explicitly participation in peacekeeping operation by the SaM Army, a legal basis for this was provided in a decree by the state union Council of Ministers which approved the participation of the Army in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, "on the basis of professionalism and voluntary participation". Since then, the army members took part in the three UN-led peace keeping operations. Another positive example of the active engagement of the Committee on Defence has been tits involvement in the drafting of a law on democratic control of the SaM Army. The Committee relied in this project on the work of a drafting group, which included prominent domestic experts and representatives of international organizations (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - OSCE). The draft has been almost completed, but the process of the dissolution of the Union, which ceased to exist following the Montenegro independence referendum held on 21 May 2006, did not allow for the draft law to enter parliamentary procedure. Still, it is hoped that the draft, with necessary adjustment, could serve as a basis for the adoption of the appropriate law on democratic control both in the Republic of Serbia and in the Republic of Montenegro, now two independent states. Similar to other countries, the Committees at the union level and the republican level have a rather modest support staff and their members, lack expertise needed to engage more meaningfully in the oversight of defence, and in particular, security sector. Some positive measures to improve this have been registered. With the support of international organization (OSCE and DCAF) staffers for parliamentary committees have been provided. The parliamentarians also took an active part in a series of seminars and workshops, as well as study trips abroad, organized again to a large degree by international organizations (OSCE) and within bilateral programs with Western countries and international NGOs.

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During these seminars an active dialogue between the parliamentarians and the officials of the Army, police, judiciary and security and intelligence services has been promoted. A new practice of visits of parliamentarians to military barracks has been introduced. While all these advances cannot be denied, the need for further improvement is obvious regarding the control of security and intelligences service, in particular state security. The insufficiency of such a control is due to a large extent to the inadequacy of legislation since the present Serbian Law on Security and Intelligence Agency is quite laconic on the instruments of in external oversight.6 Furthermore, the Committee lacks specialization and has administrative staff of only two. While it cannot be said that the Serbian Parliament’s Committee for Defence and Security has been inactive (on the contrary, it had periodical hearings with the heads of the Security Agency and Minister of Interior), most members of the Committee were reluctant to pose substantive question and challenge the reports. Instead, some MPs even took a priori uncritical position of full confidence into the security and law enforcement agency work, claiming that their role has to be unreservedly supported in view of the threats presented by terrorism, organized crime etc. Such an attitude illustrates inadequate understanding of the MPs for the notion of the division of power between the legislative and executive branches, where the control of the latter by the former is not a privilege but an obligation to their voters. However, the improvement in this respect is probably a matter of democratic maturity, which will give its results after a cycle of elections and through an educational process, where the international cooperation and exchange of experiences play an indispensable role. (b) Experience of the other SEE countries In Albania, the Constitution of 1998 has reinforced the prerogatives of the Parliament as the main institution of oversight and control of the armed forces. The parliament approves the strategic documents on national security and documents on defence policy, laws in the field of defence, approves the budget, decides on peacekeeping missions, allows the passage or stationing of foreign troops and their status, etc. The main body of the oversight is the Parliamentary Committee on Defence. The Ministry of Defence has an obligation to provide an annual budget and report on its work to the Defence Committee. However, in exercising these functions some shortcomings and deficiencies have been noted. For example, the Ministry of Defence tends to keep up to the practice of yearly reports, and not reporting in more frequent intervals. On its part, the Committee and the Parliament as a whole still have relatively limited capacity for engaging into a meaningful and substantive debate on defence and security related issues. The problem is not only connected with the lack of experience and knowledge of the MPs but also with the lack of a qualified support staff of the committee.7 This makes it difficult to

6 Sasa Jankovic, “Democratic Civil Control of Intelligence-Security Services in Serbia”, Word of Experts, Centre

for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade 2006, http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/word60print.htm 7 Blendi Kajsiu, “Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the

Security Sector in Albania”, in Philip H. Fluri, Gustav E.Gustenau and Plamen I. Pantev (eds.), The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 72-73.

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challenge the expertise of the Ministry of Defence and leads to practice that in most cases draft laws and other acts are prepared and presented by the Ministry of Defence. The oversight of the security and intelligence services became also the competence of the Parliament, which was an important step in demystifying this sector and breaking with the traditions of the past. A special committee established to control state intelligence service has been composed of three members belonging to the opposition, and two representing the majority. Still, the practice of oversight of security tends to be affected by the similar deficiencies as in the case of defence sector – the lack of expertise and inadequate support staff. Until recently, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the main problem of oversight has been the lack of competencies at the central state level. Since the armed forces have not been integrated, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was lacking a committee for defence and security.8 The most significant institution at the state level which dealt with military issues has been the Standing Committee on Military Matters but its involvement with civil-military relations has not been in the prime focus. On the other hand, the entity parliaments have been legally responsible for democratic control of armed forces and have exercised these functions in the practice, primarily through the respective Committees for Defence and Security, but without much co-ordination. With the defence reforms in 2005 and creation of a single military force at the state level the conditions were created for the introduction of proper democratic oversight of the military. It is claimed that with steady and considerable improvement and reform in recent years, supported by the OSCE Department of Security Co-operation, the parliamentary oversight in BiH is now a model for other countries in South East Europe.9 The twelve-member Joint Committee of the Bih Parliamentary Assembly oversees the work of the BiH Ministry of Defence and the BiH Ministry of Security, covering almost the entire security sector, except the BiH Intelligence Agency (OSA) which is subject to the oversight of another committee of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly. However, the problem of the control of the police force still remains on the agenda. Entity-level parliamentary committees maintain significant competencies to oversee the police sector in both the Federation BiH and RS. The Parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has also established two main bodies of parliamentary oversight - a Committee for the Defence and Security, which controls the work of Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, and the Commission for the control of security and intelligence services.10 The committees have been active not only in oversight, but in legislative activity. They have examined and participated in the drafting of the laws and other related relevant acts, often relying on independent experts, both national and international, and think tanks. However, similar to other experiences, it has been noted also in this case that the main deficiencies in exerting even more meaningful role of the parliament in this sector is the political and expert supremacy of the executive, lack of professional parliamentary support staff and the fact that some functions, such as the budgetary oversight, are exercised only once a year.

8 Bisera Turkovic, “Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in. Philip Fluri et al. op. cit, p. 90-91. 9 Christian Haupt, “Experiences of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in Developing

Parliamentary Oversight of the BiH Security Sector”, ASI Newsletter, July 2006, No. 23, p. 22-23. 10 Talat Xharefi, “Parlament Makedonije”, in Miroslav Hadzic (ed.). Uloga parlamenta u reformi sektora

bezbednosti u drzavama Zapadnog Balkana, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Beograd 2004, p. 28.

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The Croatian Parliament’s supreme authority in the field of defence and security is reflected by its authority, similar to the models of other transition countries, to adopt the Strategy of National Security and Strategy of Defence. The practical oversight of military and security matters is performed by the Committee for Interior Policy and National Security, with certain competencies of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and the Committee for Finance and Budget. The Committee for Interior policy and National Security are authorized to hold the hearings of heads and officials of security services to discuss the legitimacy of financial and material transaction of these services. In addition, the extensive supervisory authority over security services is given also to a special Parliamentary Council for civilian control of these services. The Council is entitled to have the access to reports and other documents of the security services, conduct interviews with the heads and officials of the security services when considered necessary in order to evaluate the legitimacy of the service’s activities and performance. Recently, the Council has shown increased activism and secured the adoption of amendments to the new Intelligence Act, proposed by a member of the Council representing the NGO sector. The members of the Council were given the right (combined with the security check for Council members) to monitor confidential documents. In addition, new bill has better defined the informative talk’s procedure and the issue of tapped phone lines. 11

Still, as in earlier mentioned cases, it is perceived that even in the fairly advanced Croatian parliamentary practice, the lack of knowledge and expertise on part of the MPs present an obstacle for the full exercise of relatively wide reaching competencies for the parliament and its bodies in the realm of control of armed forces and security services.12

11 EUSAC Croatia SALW Weekly Monitoring Report, 26 June-3 July 2006 (original source: newspaper

“Slobodna Dalmacija”, 27 June 2006. 12 Mladen Stanicic, “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: the Case of Croatia”, in

Philip Fluri et al., op.cit, p. 117.

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III. Recommendations for the enhancement of the parliamentary role in oversight of defence and security sectors The recommendations on best ways of improving parliamentary oversight of defence and security sectors stem logically from the deficiencies identified in the practice so far, some of which were mentioned in the earlier part of the text.

• The efforts should concentrate both on enhancing the political will of MPs to exercise more effective control and on improving procedures and providing necessary assistance and support staff for the parliamentarians in their work. While the latter has been on the agenda of reforms and the international assistance and advice was provided in that respect, the former has not been dealt with in the proper way. Admittedly, this is more a long-term task and it is a reflection of the general democratic culture in the country, but that is the reason more for a sustainable and long-term action.

• First of all, it would seem that the training and preparation of parliamentarians

should start within their political parties, which themselves should function in democratic way and promote open and frank debate on any issue, including those dealing with security of country. Since most of the political parties of the region are members of international associations of the like-minded parties (Socialist International, European People‘s Party etc) the assistance of such parties from experienced democracies should be an important element of change and reform.

• Another political-procedural tool would be firmly establishing in practice (especially

in some transition counties, like Serbia) the principle that the MPs are the owners of their mandates, and that they can not be stripped of it in case they challenge the line or authority of their party, irrespective of whether it is in government or in the opposition.

• In order to exercise their oversight role, the parliamentarians should be not only

trained but also well informed. Therefore army and society service should provide or make available all necessary information, respecting the laws on free access of information, which all transition countries have developed, in one or another way. Of course, parliamentarians should be a privy of necessarily confidential information, provided that they abide by the obligation to withhold sensitive information from the general public.

• However, the notion of sensitive or confidential information should be defined

and interpreted in a restrictive, rather than an excessive way. It is paradoxical that in some cases the other states get more information about the armed forces and the defence budget of as given state (on the basis of exchange of information under the Vienna CSBM document) then the member of parliaments of that state.

• In addition to monitoring defence, security and intelligence sector, it would seem the

parliamentary committees should add to this list also private security companies, the growing, and possibly not adequately regulated sector in the world, including the Western Balkans. In this post-conflict region, private surety companies deserve

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additional scrutiny, since its ranks includes members with shady past which is hardly conducive to the respect for law and human rights. 13

• The committees on security and defence should inform other relevant committees in

the parliament of the schedule and agenda of their meetings and invite the members of other Committees to attend their sessions, without the right to decide. Minutes of the meetings should be exchanged between the respective Committees.

• Another important condition for the continuity and professionalism in parliamentary

oversight of defence and security is the development of a competent and professional supports staff for the committees. It is rightly noted that “in transition environments, parliamentarians often come and go in rapid succession, whereas professional parliamentary staff remain and become a crucial in-house resource available to parliamentarians. Some of whom may lack significant parliamentary experience”. 14 The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the OSCE have done a useful work in supporting the development of such a staff in the parliaments of Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia, but involvement of other international donors and, in particular, domestic efforts seem to be necessary to ensure the continuity in this respect.

• The sessions and the hearings of the defence and security committees should be, as a

rule, open to the public. It would be useful to publish the deliberations at the hearing and other session, so that they are accessible to the media, civil society activists, think tanks and researchers, and the public in general.

• The necessary input of the civil society into the defence matters could be also

improved by establishing a practice of periodical meetings between the committees and representatives of interested non-governmental organizations and interest groups (the parliamentary practice that it particularly developed, for example, in Norway).

• The oversight would be implemented in a smoother and hopefully more intrusive way

if the relationship between the parliament and the armed forces and relevant

13 A study commissioned in 2005 by The South Eastern and Eastern European Clearinghouse for the Control of

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) found that there are around 200,000 private security guards working in the SEE region. The key conclusion of the study was that the regulatory authorities of each country, together with the most progressive members of the industry, should collaborate to develop and implement comprehensive but workable regulations and voluntary guidelines to ensure that the highest standards are maintained within the sector. In summer 2006, with financial and technical support from SEESAC, Saferworld and the Centre for Security Studies (Bosnia and Herzegovina) initiated the work that resulted in the Sarajevo Code of Conduct and the Sarajevo Guidelines for the Procurement of Private Security Companies.

The Sarajevo Code of Conduct contains a set of basic standards of professionalism and service delivery for

application by all employers and employees in the private security industry. The document is based on European and international best practice in this area and draws on international mechanisms such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; and United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.

The English language edition of the Sarajevo Code of Conduct can be downloaded from the SEESAC website (www.seesac.org).

14 Marc Remillard, “The Parliamentary Staff Advisors Program for oversight committees”, ASI Newsletter, July

2006, No. 23, p. 24.

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ministries and agencies were developed in a co-operative, not a confrontational way. This needs to be based on a clear and undisputed principle that there is clear division of competence between the legislative and executive branches (the former should not operationally get involved into the work and management of the latter), and that the supreme democratic authority of the parliament must not be challenged.

If the oversight is developed on such a basis, it is likely that it will be perceived as mutually beneficial. It would help the parliament to uphold its relevance in this sensitive sector and prevent or sanction potential abuses, and provide guidelines for improvement and reforms in the sector. For armed forces and security services, the control and oversight ensures that their problems are given due attention, that their functioning will be stable, that their politicization will be avoided and that their role in the state and society will be given legitimacy.

• Through a dialogue between the members of a parliament and defence and

security officials, a number of common criteria and ideas for the improvement of oversight can be developed. An example of a usefulness of such an approach has been noted in an OSCE-sponsored roundtable on parliamentary oversight of security and defence sectors in Serbia and Montenegro, which took place in 2003 and where a number of recommendations on improving the relationship between the parliaments, the Ministry of Defence and the security services have been adopted.15

• In the conclusions reached at the end of the round table, the participants agreed that

direct communication and open exchange of views between the parliamentarians, the executive and the civil society are very useful tools for achieving better mutual understanding, greater transparency and effective accountability of the defence and security sectors.

• Among a number of concrete recommendations for improvement of the work of the

Parliamentary Committees for Defence and Security and better oversight of the Armed Forces and Security Services, one should note a request that all strategic and doctrinal draft documents and laws, prior to their adoption in the plenary session by the Parliament, should be submitted by the relevant Ministries in a timely fashion to the competent Committees for review and scrutiny. All relevant draft laws and regulations on defence and security issues submitted to the Parliament that have passed the scrutiny of relevant Parliamentary Committees, should be accompanied by written commentaries from the Committees before undergoing further parliamentary procedure. The Committees can discuss with the minister in charge prior to writing the commentaries. In any case, discussion in the plenary should only take place after the procedures in the Committees.

15 A number of these recommendations have found their reflection in the practice of the work of relevant

committees in Serbia and Montenegro, while it was functioning as a state union (the notable example was the earlier mentioned case of debate on defence strategy and the elaboration of a draft law on democratic control of the army). After the process of the transfer of competencies from the dismantled state union to the independent states of Serbia and of Montenegro, it would be useful to revisit some of these recommendations in order to reflect them in the legislation and practices of the relevant institutions of the two states, first of all in the parliamentary committees of defence and security.

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• Parliamentary Committees should always be consulted regarding the conclusion and implementation of all international agreements regarding defence and security issues, especially those regarding the participation of armed forces in peacekeeping operations.

• The Minister of Defence should provide, on a quarterly basis, the Parliamentary

Committee for Defence and Security with updated and detailed reports on the process of defence sector reform, including its financial implications. The Committee should then give its comments and recommendations to the Minister and members of the Committee should play an active role in the parliamentary debates on these issues.

• The Minister of Defence and the Minister of Interior, or their Deputies, should appear

at the hearings in the relevant Parliamentary Committees at regular intervals, and at least once every three months. These hearings could coincide with the three months reports on the process of defence and security sector reform.

• The Parliament should give particular attention to the implementation of the principle

of political and ideological neutrality of members of the armed forces and security services, as well as to the protection of human rights in defence and security sector, including the rights of military personnel and civilian staff.

• Since reform and effective oversight of the Defence and Security Sectors greatly

depends on full confidence and mutual information between the defence and security sector and the parliamentary sector, the practice of regular visits to the institutions in both branches and joint participation at seminars and round tables should be further encouraged as a means of creating synergy. The Ministry of Defence is recommended to organise informative debates in the units and institutions of the Army, with an aim to introduce military and civilian personnel to the content and progress of the army reform and to the basic elements of democratic civilian oversight.

• Some of these and other recommendations and ideas reached at national level could be

useful for consideration also in a regional context. It is safe to assume that, in spite of different levels of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures of different South East European states, their problems in oversight are similar to those encountered in other transition states Consequently, the exchange the views in a regional and wider European framework remains of critical importance for the improved oversight.

• The practice of experienced democracies in effective oversight could also be

transferred to the SEE region. For example, in Norway, the budgetary control of the Government is strengthened by the fact that the Auditor General is directly placed under the Parliament. Also, the opportunity for hearings and question time, not only on the Committees level, but also in plenary sessions give additional weight to the control function of the Parliament, especially in case of sensitive issues such as the peace keeping operations participation, international defence related arrangements and agreements, etc.

• A useful work of a number of international organizations in SSR provides also

invaluable resources of guidelines and recommendations for improved parliamentary oversight of defence and security sectors.

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• In this regard, it would seem that the potential of the OSCE Code of Conduct in

Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which is an outstanding instrument of democratic control, could be more used in promotion of parliamentary oversight in the countries of the region. On could, for example, consider establishing a practice of regional debates which in an unobtrusive and confidential way assess the developments regarding the implementation of the Code in the states of the region and draw attention to the problems or situations of inadequate or weakened democratic control over the armed forces, in the widest definition of the word.

• Increased public awareness about the Code, both within the armed forces, and in the

public in general, would also be of a direct relevance for exercising effective oversight over the security sector as a whole, and thus prevent its getting out of the civilian control. In this context, relevant NGOs, both national and international, should be encouraged to refer to the Code in their activities and projects.

• Seminars for the parliamentarians and defence and security sector officials on the

national experience in the Code of Conduct implementation could be also a useful tool for its more effective use in practice, and for the better parliamentary oversight.

• Some of these seminars and round tables, which gather representatives of then defence

sector and the executive and legislative branches, could focus on some specific issues, such as the comparing national security policies and military doctrines, thus making them more transparent and better known to neighbouring countries. Further, more ambitious steps, could lead to recommendations for harmonization of military doctrines in the region. In addition to that, increased budget transparency, acquired by exchanges of national experiences of controlling the defence expenditures, could be another contribution to more effective implementation of the Code of Conduct and the principles of democratic control of the armed forces in the region.

• Such wider knowledge about this document and its relevance, as well as the exchange

of information among the parliaments in the region on their experiences and identifying the “best practices" for its use, would be an important step leading to a greater affirmation of this unique document within the OSCE community of states, and towards making the principle of democratic control a firmly established practice in the region.

• The members of the parliaments should be the promoters of the norms of this

document in their respective countries and active advocates of democratic control and regular oversight of defence and security sectors.

• In view of the increased role and authority of security services in the fight against

terrorism and other trans-national threats, the need for their more effective democratic control is also internationally recognized, and should be taken into account also by the Parliaments in the SEE.

In a “Resolution on Strengthening Effective Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies”, adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at its recent session in Brussels, (3-7 July 2006), it is emphasized that the necessity of effective democratic oversight of security and intelligence services is an essential element of

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preserving core values of human rights, and that such oversight is possible only through the involvement of democratically elected members of community. The respect of fundamental international human rights standards in all security and intelligence services’ activities is underlined. Consequently, the parliamentarians are called upon to address the matter of parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence services as a matter of priority and as a means to ensure respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The national parliaments are urged to ensure effective oversight of security and intelligence agencies by establishing and strengthening special parliamentary bodies for a priori and ex post facto scrutiny of security and intelligence services’ activities and providing them with appropriate resources. Parliamentarians are advised to use democratic principles as basic guidelines in striking a balance between the essential need for secrecy and confidentiality of security and intelligence services’ activities and for transparency in exercising parliamentary oversight.

• The European Union, as an organization which probably has the biggest potential on

generating democratic change in the SEE countries, due to the fact that all of them aspire to the EU membership, has indeed also engaged itself in promoting democratic oversight and security sector reform in the region. In this respect, the recently adopted "Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform", elaborated by the Commission of the European Communities in May 2006, appropriately reminds that SSR is an important part of conflict prevention, peace-building and democratization and contributes to sustainable development.16 Particularly relevant for the SEE countries seem to be a formulation that the EC concept focuses on human security (freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf), putting the security of citizens at the centre and thus complementing state’s security. It is emphasized that for the EC, the objective is to contribute explicitly to strengthening of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the efficient use of public resources. In this respect, it is noted that civilian control and Parliamentary oversight are key aspects of SSR.

• The concept developed by another organization – OECD (Organization for Economic

Co-operation and Development), also treats SSR as a key components of the broader human security agenda.17 In this context, one should note the OECD’s emphasis on importance of establishing domestic ownership in SSR and oversight, role of civil society, including gender perspective, and regional dimension.

• As an organization militarily present in the region and with a potential to exert

political influence on its prospective members, NATO has through its Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) documents and programs encouraged SSR and more effective parliamentary oversight in the countries of Western Balkans. PFP explicitly mentions “democratic control of defence forces” as one of its key objectives and contains references to the OSCE Code of Conduct. The PFP Work Programme for 2000-2001, replicated also in later years, contains a section on democratic control of armed forces and defence structures, emphasizing, inter alia, the need for military’s political neutrality, the importance of the role of media and

16 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – A Concept for European

Community Support fro Security Sector Reform, Brussels, 24.5.2006, COM (2006) 253 final. 17 Security System Reform and Governance – DAC Guidelines, 2005. (www.oecd.org/dac/copnflict/ssr)

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independent civilian expertise on security and encouraging defence and security related education of civilian cadres and staff in Government and Parliament.18

Combined with individual countries’ experiences and sharing of best practices at a regional level, these international inputs and recommendations would give the best results if they develop national ownership in SSR and thus put parliamentary oversight into a framework that is conducive to its steady and sustainable improvement. Concluding Remarks In conclusion, it should be again repeated that documents, international and national, as well as procedures and rules, no matter how elaborate and advanced they might be, do not guarantee by themselves an effective and influential role of MPs and the Parliamentary committees in exercising their oversight function. A member of the parliament should not have only the legal authority, but also the democratic legitimacy and full moral integrity in order to be able to constructively confront government institutions, particularly such as the armed forces and security, with their criticism and proposals for improvement or correction of their activities. “However elegant a legal architecture of oversight is built, it depends crucially on the ability of those who conduct the process and their political will to use their powers to do the job effectively”.19 While fully agreeing with this observation, one could add that political will requires both the knowledge and intellectual and political courage, and moral authority. It is unrealistic to expect a perfect oversight, even in established democracies, but in transition democracies the advance towards higher standards requires that MPs, especially those given the task to control the armed forces and society structures, should be beyond any doubt regarding their past and their democratic credentials (unfinished or unattempted lustration in some of the SEE countries does not help in this respect). An effective democratic control also depends on the general democratic recovery of societies who have gone through a period of an authoritarian rule and conflicts and whose democratic tradition is modest. In other words, the degree of democratic civilian control and effective oversight is a variable dependent on the general state of democracy in a given country, but it is also a factor which can promote or restrict the advance of democratic standards and internalization of democratic values. This formidable task is primarily a responsibility of national political elites, but also a task in which they need the continued support and advice at international level. Building of democracy requires democratically committed political parties and courageous political activists and leaders who are keen not only to please and win their electorate but also to change it for the better. The people’s representatives are no doubt among those who have been given the special mission in this respect. The parliaments and parliamentarians are the reflection of a society, while the degree of their engagement in the democratic oversight is an indicator of relevance of this institution and of a democratic capacity of the political system.

18 http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990616a.htm, p.6. 19 Peter Gill, “Parliamentary Oversight, not Operational Insight – the case for oversight of the security and

intelligence services”, paper at the Workshop on “Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies”, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-125 June 2006, p. 3.