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European Helicopter Safety Team - EHEST

EHEST Analysis of 2006-2010 European Helicopter Accidents

Final EHSAT Analysis Report

Report Document ref. Status Date

Final 2015-08-11

Contact details for enquiries: European Helicopter Safety Team

[email protected] www.easa.europa.eu/essi

Disclaimer:

The safety improvement analyses and recommendations produced by EHEST are based on

expert judgement and are supplementary to the official reports of the accident investigation boards (AIB). Such recommendations, and the safety improvement actions that may follow,

are solely aimed at improving helicopter safety, are not binding and under no circumstances should be considered to take precedence over the official AIB reports. The adoption of such

safety improvement recommendations is subject to voluntary commitment, and engages only the responsibility of those who endorse these actions. The EHEST accepts no responsibility or

liability whatsoever with regard to the content or for any actions resulting from the use of the

information contained in these recommendations.

Name

Coordinated by Martin Bernandersson (EASA)

Reference group

Tony Eagles (UK CAA), Marc Greiller (Airbus Helicopters), Michel Masson (EASA), John Steel (IAA)

Reviewed by Andy Evans (Aerossurance), John Franklin (EASA), Yngvi Rafn Yngvason

(EASA)

1

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 2

1 Analysis Results ..................................................................................................... 3 1.1 Basic Data ..................................................................................................... 3 1.2 SPS Analysis – Time Period Comparison ............................................................. 7 1.3 SPS Analysis – Type of Operation Comparison ..................................................... 9 1.4 SPS Level 2 Analysis – Commercial Air Transport ............................................... 11 1.5 SPS Level 2 Analysis – Aerial Work .................................................................. 15 1.6 SPS Level 2 Analysis – General Aviation ........................................................... 17 1.7 HFACS Level 2 Analysis – Commercial Air Transport ........................................... 19 1.8 Intervention Recommendations Analysis ........................................................... 21

2 Concluding Remarks and Way Forward .................................................................... 25

2

Executive Summary

This report covers the work performed by the European Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (EHSAT), a sub-group of the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) – the rotorcraft pillar

of the European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI) and the European component of the

International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST).

This report is a follow-up on the first EHSAT report published in 2010 addressing 2000-2005 European Helicopter accidents. It covers the analyses performed by the EHSAT regional teams

of accidents that occurred in the years 2006-2010. It also provides comparisons between the two time periods 2000-2005 and 2006-2010 as well as some deeper analysis of results

covering the entire time period 2000-2010.

EHSAT Regional Teams were established in the following countries: Finland, France, Germany,

Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The analysis methodology used is the Standard Problem Statements (SPS) and Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). This methodology was presented in detail in the

first EHSAT report. For further information please consult that publication.

The continued analysis of Helicopter Accidents in the period 2006-2010 by the EHSAT Regional Teams and the comparison with the analysis of 200-2005 accidents have globally confirmed

that the issues identified in this first period continue to be of concern and that the safety

improvement actions decided and developed based on the first analysis period were still valid.

A few differences have been identified though and additional analyses have been conducted. These will help shaping up the future priorities of the European Helicopter Safety

Implementation Team (EHSIT) and its three Specialist Teams on Training, Ops & SMS and Technology.

This report will also be communicated to EASA and contribute developing the helicopter Safety

Risk Portfolio (SRP), which will help populating the helicopter section of the European Aviation

Safety plan (EASp).

Additional data on helicopter safety in Europe can also be found in the EASA Annual Safety Reviews published annually on the EASA website.

3

1 Analysis Results

1.1 Basic Data

Figure 1 shows the number of accidents that were analysed by the EHSAT Teams, broken down by year of occurrence.

Figure 1 – Number of analysed accidents per year of occurrence

In the period 2000-2005, 325 accidents were analysed. Some national teams were unable to

continue completing the analysis of accidents for the period 2006-2010, and therefore only

162 accidents were analysed in that period.

In the period 2006-2010, 537 helicopter accidents occurred in the EASA Member States (Source: EASA ADREP Database), which means that the EHSAT teams analysed 30% of all

accidents that occurred in that time period. As not all of the 537 accidents have been investigated by an Accident Investigation Board, it would therefore not have been possible to

analyse all those accidents using the EHSAT methodology. However, the most serious accidents in the participating states are likely to have been investigated by AIBs and analysed

by the EHSAT Regional teams.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of top level Operation Types amongst the 487 analysed

accidents.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Nu

mb

er

of

anal

yse

d a

ccid

en

ts

Year

Number of analysed accidents per year of occurrence

4

Figure 2 – Operation Type distribution

20% of the analysed accidents were Commercial Air Transport operations, 31% were Aerial

Work, 45% were General Aviation and 4% were non-military State Flights. As fleet usage data per type of operation on a European Level is not available, it has not been possible to assess

whether any type of operation has a differing share of accidents compared to, for example, number of take-offs.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of Highest Injury Level recorded for the 487 analysed

accidents.

Figure 3 – Highest Injury Level distribution

30%

22%

44%

4%

Operation type distribution - 2000-2010 accidents

AW CAT GA State

24%

13%

20%

43%

0%

Highest Injury Level distribution, 2000-2010 accidents

Fatal Serious Minor None Unknown

5

24% of the analysed accidents were fatal, i.e. one or more persons involved in the accident died as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. On the other hand, in 43% of the

accidents there were no injuries. In 13% of the accidents the persons involved sustained serious injuries, and in 20% of the accidents minor injuries were sustained.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of aircraft damage levels in the 487 analysed accidents.

Figure 4 – Aircraft damage distribution

Damage levels are derived from the accident reports. It is worth noting that in 46% of the

accidents where the aircraft was destroyed, one or more persons involved sustained fatal injuries.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of the phase of flight in which the accident occurred.

48%

44%

3% 5%

Aircraft Damage distribution - 2000-2010 accidents

Destroyed Substantial Minor None

6

Figure 5 – Phase of Flight distribution

The Manoeuvring phase involves intentional low level, low speed flying in the vicinity of

obstacles and is the phase where most of the Aerial Work accidents occurred (39%). Also noteworthy is that 61% of all fatal accidents occurred in the En-route phase, whilst most

accidents with serious injuries occurred in the Manoeuvring phase (25%).

Figure 6 shows the distribution of engine configurations of the analysed accidents.

Figure 6 – Engine configuration distribution

4% 2%

15%

27%

1%

23%

10%

18%

Phase of Flight distribution, 2000-2010 accidents

Standing Taxi Take-off En route Hover Manoeuvring Approach Landing

40%

1%43%

16%

Engine Configuration distribution - 2000-2010 accidents

Single Piston Multi Piston Single Turb. Multi Turb.

7

Most analysed accidents occurred to single engine helicopters, who also comprise the majority

of the helicopter fleet in Europe.

1.2 SPS Analysis – Time Period Comparison

In this section, comparisons will be made between the initial time period of 2000-2005 and the second period of 2006-2010 to see whether there are any significant differences between

the two time periods. In order to facilitate easy comparison and reduce the impact of differing implementation of the coding instructions, the percentage of accidents where the SPS/HFACS

codes on Level 1 have been assigned at least once will be used in this section, as was the case

in the previous report.

Figure 7 shows the percentage of analysed accidents where SPS codes on the top level (Level 1) was assigned at least once, comparing the periods 2000-2005 with 2006-2010.

Figure 7 – Percentage of analysed accidents where SPS Level 1 was assigned at

least once

Figure 7 shows that there is a close correlation between the two analysed time periods; the

same areas are still of concern and the issues that were identified in the analysis of the 2000-

2005 accidents continue to be significant and the proposed mitigations are still valid.

The highest level of Standard Problem Statements, level 1, only provides information on a general level. To better understand what kind of factors played a role in the accident data set

one must look at a deeper level in the taxonomy, which will be done later in this report.

Figure 8 shows the distribution of the percentage of analysed accidents where the top level HFACS codes have been assigned at least once.

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%

Ground personnel

Infrastructure

Maintenance

Communications

Post-crash survival

Aircraft Design

Regulatory

Part/system failure

Mission Risk

Data issues

Pilot situation awareness

Ground Duties

Safety Management

Pilot judgment & actions

Percentage

SPS

Leve

l 1

Percentage of analysed accidents where SPS Level 1 was assigned at least once

2006-2010

2000-2005

8

Figure 8 - Percentage of analysed accidents where HFACS Level 1 was assigned at

least once

Also in Figure 8 the magnitude of the HFACS Level 1 codes correlate between the two periods. This is an indication that the problem areas and proposed mitigations identified in the first

time period are still valid.

Figure 9 shows the percentage of analysed accidents where HFACS Maintenance Extension (ME) Level 1 codes were assigned at least once.

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Pe

rce

nta

ge

HFACS Level 1

Percentage of analysed accidents where HFACS Level 1 was assigned at least once

2000-2005

2006-2010

9

Figure 9 - Percentage of analysed accidents where HFACS ME Level 1 was assigned

at least once

It should be noted that the number of accidents where Human Factors issues in maintenance were identified is small, slightly less than 10% of the analysed accidents had an HFACS ME

code assigned. Also noteworthy is the fact that accident investigations seldom go into the depth of identifying and analysing Human Factor issues in maintenance operations.

1.3 SPS Analysis – Type of Operation Comparison

Figure 10 shows the percentage of accidents where SPS Level 1 has been assigned at least once, split into types of operation (General Aviation, Aerial Work, Commercial Air Transport)

for the whole time period 2000-2010.

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

HFACS ME -Maintainer Acts

HFACS ME -MaintainerConditions

HFACS ME - WorkingConditions

HFACS ME -Management

Conditions

Pe

rce

nta

ge

HFACS ME Level 1

Percentage of analysed accidents where HFACS ME Level 1 was assigned at least once

2000-2005

2006-2010

10

Figure 10 - Percentage of analysed accidents per type of operation where SPS Level

1 was assigned at least once

Noteworthy is that Pilot Situation Awareness is featured most frequently in Commercial Air Transport accidents. Mission Risks shows the biggest difference between the three types of

operation. The high presence of Mission Risk SPS in Aerial Work is normal considering that Aerial Work operations are often complex, higher risk missions. The high presence of Data

Issues in General Aviation is also not surprising since Accident Investigations into General Aviation accidents normally don't go into as deep detail as for other accidents.

Figure 11 shows the percentage of accidents where HFACS Level 1 codes were assigned at least once, split by types of operation.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Ground Duties

Safety Management

Maintenance

Infrastructure

Pilot judgment & actions

Communications

Pilot situation awareness

Part/system failure

Mission Risk

Post-crash survival

Data issues

Ground personnel

Regulatory

Aircraft Design

Percentage

SPS

Leve

l 1Percentage of accidents with SPS Level 1 at least

once 2000-2010

GA AW CAT

11

Figure 11 - Percentage of analysed accidents per type of operation where HFACS

Level 1 was assigned at least once

The number of accidents where HFACS ME were identified is so small that it is deemed insignificant and is not further analysed in this report.

1.4 SPS Level 2 Analysis – Commercial Air Transport

The analysis in this and the following sections are based on total number of SPS assigned and

is split by type of operation. A selection of SPS on Level 1 have been analysed deeper into Level 2 to highlight areas of concern.

The Level 2 distribution for the Level 1 SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions" is shown in Figure 12.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

HFACS - Unsafe Acts - Errors

HFACS - Unsafe Acts - Violations

HFACS - Preconditions - Environmental Factors

HFACS - Preconditions - Condition of Individuals

HFACS - Preconditions - Personnel Factors

HFACS - Supervision

HFACS - Organizational Influences

Percentage

HFA

CS

Leve

l 1Percentage of accidents with HFACS Level 1 at

least once 2000-2010

GA AW CAT

12

Figure 12 – CAT SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Pilot decision making is the largest concern in this area. It should be noted that the relatively

small share of Crew Resource Management (CRM) issues is probably influenced by the majority of flights being flown in a single-pilot environment, approximately 70% of the

analysed CAT accidents were flown in a single-pilot environment.

The Level 2 distribution of the SPS Level 1 "Safety Management" is shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13 – CAT SPS "Safety Management" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Human Factors -Pilot's Decision

43%

Human Factors -Pilot/Aircraft

Interface9%

Flight Profile17%

Landing Procedures12%

Crew Resource Management

7%

Procedure Implementation

12%

CAT SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Management31%

Safety Program14%

Equipment (Safety Management)

4%Pilot14%

Scheduling/Dispatch1%

Training Program Management

5%

Flight Procedure Training

9%

Transition Training1%

Inadequate Pilot Experience

20%

Ground/Passenger Training

0%Survival training

1%

CAT SPS "Safety Management" SPS Level 2 Distribution

13

The Management of the operations and the assignment of inexperienced pilots to difficult missions are the most prominent concerns in this area.

The Level 2 distribution of the SPS Level 1 "Pilot Situation awareness" is shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14 – CAT SPS "Pilot Situation Awareness" SPS Level 2 Distribution

The two most prominent concerns in this area are the External Environment Awareness and

the Weather and Visibility.

The Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 SPS "Ground Duties" is shown in Figure 15.

External Environment Awareness

50%

Internal Aircraft Awareness

7%

Visibility/Weather43%

CAT SPS "Pilot Situation Awareness" SPS Level 2 Distribution

14

Figure 15 – CAT SPS "Ground Duties" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Mission Planning is the area in which most Ground Duties SPS have been identified.

The Level 2 distribution of the SPS Level 1 "Part/System failure" is shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16 – CAT SPS "Part/System Failure" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Aircraft Preflight7%

Mission Planning80%

Preflight Briefings9%

Weight and Balance4%

CAT SPS "Ground Duties" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Part/system failure -Aircraft

83%

Part/system failure -Powerplant

11%

Part/system failure -Operational FOD

3%

Part/system failure -Mission Specific

Equipment3%

CAT SPS "Part/System Failure" SPS Level 2 Distribution

15

Failures of the airframe (rather than powerplant/engine failures) are the highest number

identified in this area.

1.5 SPS Level 2 Analysis – Aerial Work

This section deals with the SPS on Level 2 for Aerial Work, for selected Level 1 SPS. Figure 17 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 SPS "Pilot Judgement and Actions".

Figure 17 – AW SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions" SPS Level 2 Distribution

The top 3 issues identified in this area are Pilot's Decision, Flight Profile and Pilot/Aircraft Interface, with the latter noticeably higher than for CAT and GA.

Figure 18 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 SPS "Safety Management" for Aerial

Work.

Human Factors -Pilot's Decision

27%

Human Factors -Pilot/Aircraft

Interface21%

Flight Profile23%

Landing Procedures16%

Crew Resource Management

3%

Procedure Implementation

10%

AW SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions" SPS Level 2 Distribution

16

Figure 18 – AW SPS "Safety Management" SPS Level 2 Distribution

In this area, the top 3 identified issues are Management, Equipment (Helicopters not

adequately equipped for mission purposes and/or Personal protective equipment inadequate or unavailable) and Safety Program. Management is overall the third highest SPS Level 2 for

Aerial Work.

Figure 19 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 SPS "Mission Risk".

Figure 19 – AW SPS "Mission Risk" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Management31%

Safety Program10%

Equipment (Safety Management)

16%

Pilot9%

Scheduling/Dispatch4%

Training Program Management

3%

Flight Procedure Training

9%

Transition Training1%

Inadequate Pilot Experience

14%

Ground/Passenger Training

0%

Survival training3%

AW SPS "Safety Management" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Terrain/Obstacles58%

Pilot Intensive33%

Aircraft Intensive3%

Environment6%

Crew Intensive ( e.g. winching, HEMS, load lifting etc.)

0%

AW SPS "Mission Risk" SPS Level 2 Distribution

17

Not surprisingly, the proximity to terrain and obstacles are the highest areas of concerns for

Aerial Work missions. Many Aerial Work missions are conducted at low height, for example Power line inspections, Reindeer herding and firefighting.

1.6 SPS Level 2 Analysis – General Aviation

This section deals with the SPS on Level 2 for General Aviation, for selected Level 1 SPS.

Figure 20 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions".

Figure 20 – GA SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions" SPS Level 2 Distribution

In this area, the top 3 issues are Pilot's decision, Flight Profile and Procedure Implementation.

Figure 21 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 SPS "Safety Management".

Human Factors -Pilot's Decision

41%

Human Factors -Pilot/Aircraft

Interface8%Flight Profile

16%

Landing Procedures13%

Crew Resource Management

6%

Procedure Implementation

16%

GA SPS "Pilot Judgement & Actions" SPS Level 2 Distribution

18

Figure 21 – GA SPS "Safety Management" SPS Level 2 Distribution

In this area, the top 3 issues are Inadequate Pilot Experience, Flight Procedure Training and

Pilot (disregard of known safety risk/self-induced pressure), with, as to be expected, less management issues in GA.

Figure 22 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 SPS "Ground Duties".

Figure 22 – GA SPS "Ground Duties" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Management12% Safety Program

5%Equipment (Safety

Management)3%

Pilot12%

Scheduling/Dispatch1%

Training Program Management

10%

Flight Procedure Training

17%

Transition Training3%

Inadequate Pilot Experience

36%

Ground/Passenger Training

0%

Survival training1%

GA SPS "Safety Management" SPS Level 2 Distribution

Mission Planning71%

Weight and Balance11%

Aircraft Preflight10%

Preflight Briefings7%

Postflight Duties1%

GA SPS "Ground duties" SPS Level 2 Distribution

19

Mission Planning is the main issue in this area, followed by Weight and Balance and Aircraft

preflight.

1.7 HFACS Level 2 Analysis – Commercial Air Transport

This section highlights the HFACS analysis performed by the regional teams on Commercial Air Transport accidents.

Figure 23 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 HFACS "Preconditions – Conditions of

Individuals".

Figure 23 – CAT HFACS "Preconditions – Conditions of individuals" HFACS Level 2

Distribution

Cognitive Factors, Psycho-Behavioural Factors and Perceptual Factors are the 3 main issues in this area.

Figure 24 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 HFACS "Unsafe acts – Errors".

Cognitive Factors38%

Psycho-Behavioural Factors

28%

Perceptual Factors17%

Physical/Mental Limitations

9%

Adverse Physiological States

8%

CAT HFACS "Preconditions - Conditions of individuals" HFACS Level 2 Distribution

20

Figure 24 – CAT HFACS "Unsafe acts – Errors" HFACS Level 2 Distribution

The Judgement and Decision-making Errors are the main issues in this area, followed by the

Skill-Based Errors.

Figure 25 shows the Level 2 distribution of the Level 1 HFACS "Organisational Influences".

Figure 25 – CAT HFACS "Organisational influences" Level 2 Distribution

Judgement & Decision-Making

Errors49%

Skill-based Errors40%

Perceptual Errors11%

CAT HFACS "Unsafe acts - Errors" HFACS Level 2 Distribution

Resource/Acquisition Management

27%

Organizational Climate

17%

Organizational Process

56%

CAT HFACS "Organisational Influences" Level 2 Distribution

21

The Organisational Process, which includes Workload issues, is the top issue of concern in this

area.

Figure 26 shows the Level 3 distribution of the Level 1 and Level 2 HFACS "Violations". There is no Level 2 HFACS categorisation under "Violations".

Figure 26 – CAT HFACS "Violations" Level 3 Distribution

1.8 Intervention Recommendations Analysis

This section reviews the Intervention Recommendations (IRs) assigned by the EHSAT national

teams. All IRs that have been assigned in the analysis of the 2006-2010 accidents have been collected and sent to the respective EHSIT implementation teams for further processing.

This section covers IRs assigned to accidents in the time period 2000-2010. IRs are

categorised in two levels, and Figure 27 shows the number of IRs per Level 1 category.

Violation - Based on Risk Assessment

28%

Violation -Routine/Widespread

43%

Violation - Lack of Discipline

29%

CAT HFACS "Violations" Level 3 Distribution

22

Figure 27 – Number of IRs Level 1 – All accidents 2000-2010

The top 3 categories of Intervention Recommendations are Operations, Training/Instructional

and Regulatory. This was already seen in the analysis of the 2000-2005 accidents and the EHSIT teams were formed accordingly.

Figure 28 shows a time period comparison on the average number of IRs assigned per

accident. The average has decreased slightly in the 2006-2010 period.

Figure 28 – Time period comparison – Average number of IRs per accident

The Intervention Recommendations are scored, based on the judgement of the EHSAT

Analysis Team performing the analysis, on their Ability and Usage. Ability being how effective the proposed intervention would be in mitigating the problem, and Usage being the how

probable it is that the proposed intervention will be implemented. Both Ability and Usage are

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Number of IRs Level 1 - All accidents 2000-2010

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

2000-2005 2006-2010

Nu

mb

er

of

IRs

pe

r ac

cid

en

t

Year

Average number of IRs per accident

23

scored from 0 to 4. Figure 29 shows the percentage distribution of the Ability scoring for each

IR Level 1 category.

Figure 29 – Distribution of IR Ability scoring per IR Level 1 category – All accidents

2000-2010

The highest Ability IRs have been given in the Maintenance category, with more than 80% of

those IRs scoring 3 or 4. Data or Information issues, which mainly covers the availability of data to accident investigators, also have more than 80% scoring 3 or 4. The lowest Ability IR

category is the Search and Rescue, with no IRs scoring 3 or 4. It should however be noted

that only 3 Search and Rescue IRs were proposed.

Figure 30 shows the precentage distribution of the Usage scoring fore each IR Level 1 category.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Training_Instructional

Search_and_Rescue

Research

Regulatory

Operations

Manufacturing

Maintenance

Infrastructure

Data_or_Information_Issues

Aircraft_System_Equipment_Design

Aircraft_Design

IR Ability scoring - All accidents 2000-2010

0 1 2 3 4

24

Figure 30 – Distribution of IR Usage scoring per IR Level 1 category – All accidents

2000-2010

The Usage scoring is generally lower than the Ability scoring. Infrastructure IRs (Search and Rescue excluded) have the lowest usage scoring, with only just over 30% scoring 3 or 4.

Many IR categories, for example Operations, Training/Instructional and Data/Information Issues also have just over 30% scoring 3 or 4. The highest usage scorings are in the

Manufacturing and Regulatory categories with over 50% scoring 3 or 4.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Training_Instructional

Search_and_Rescue

Research

Regulatory

Operations

Manufacturing

Maintenance

Infrastructure

Data_or_Information_Issues

Aircraft_System_Equipment_Design

Aircraft_Design

IR Usage scoring - All accidents 2000-2010

0 1 2 3 4

25

2 Concluding Remarks and Way Forward The continued analysis of Helicopter Accidents in the period 2006-2010 by the EHSAT Teams

and the comparison with the analysis of 2000-2005 accidents have confirmed that the issues identified in this first period continue to be of concern and that the safety improvement

actions decided based on the first analysis period are still valid.

Since this first analysis report was published, the EHSIT Specialist Teams Training, Ops & SMS and Technology have produced a number of safety promotion material in the form of leaflets,

videos, toolkits, manuals and reports. That material addresses and provides ways to mitigate

the top safety issues and intervention recommendations identified in the analysis of the 2000-2005 accidents.

This work continues and the results of the analysis of the 2006-2010 accidents will be

communicated to the EHSIT STs and will contribute to shaping the future priorities and actions of the EHIST Specialist Teams.

Results will also be shared within EASA and contribute to defining the helicopter Safety Risk

Portfolio, which will serve as a basis to develop the helicopter section of the European Aviation

Safety plan (EASp).