Eugenia Shanklin - The Profession of the Color Blind Sociocultural Anthropology and Racism in the 21st

The Profession of the Color Blind: Sociocultural Anthropology and Racism in the 21stCenturyAuthor(s): Eugenia ShanklinReviewed work(s):Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 669-679Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/682045 .

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EUGENLS SHANKLIN Department of Sociology and Anthropology The College of New Jersey Ewing, NJ 08628-0718

The Profession of the Color Blind:1 Sociocultural Anthropology and Racism in the 21st Century

In this essay, I suggest that American sociocultural anthropology has been a "color blind" profession for rlearly a half century and that, as a discipline, we need to restore and refine our color perceptions in order to fight the supposedly fixed opposition in American society between "black" and "white" and deal with the racist consequences of this folk opposition. In the first section, "How Anthropology Became 'Color Blind,"' I delineate the circumstances under which anthropology became the "color blind" profession. In the second section, "Teaching Color Blindness," I discuss the tendency, in teaching sociocultural anthropology, to ignore racism and its effects. In the final section, "Restoring Color Vision," I take up the questions of what the profession needs to do next to cope with racism and its consequences, emphasizing especially the issue of group identities, how they are formulated, inculcated, and overcome, and proposing a Foucauldian model-following Foucault's lead in analyzing relations of biopower and race for formulating new ways of responding to and resisting the inevitable recastings of racist ideas. [race and racism, sociocultural anthropology, group identities, Foucault, Boas]

How Axlthropology Became "Color Blind" Anthropology did not begin as a color blind discipline;

instead, it originated as a two-part study of the physical and mental dimensions of"human nature," variously defined. The first use of the term anthropology in a disciplinary sense comes in an anonymous book published in the fifteenth centuly; there, anthropology consisted of psychology, the "nature of the rational soul discoursed," and anatomy, "the structure of the body of man revealed in dis- section" (quoted in Penniman [1935]1952:53; cf. Degler 1991; Lieberman 1968). Over the next few centuries, many who would not have called themselves anthropologists had a go at defining the proper subject matter of the new discipline. The study of psychology was replaced by philosophy in Descartes's Meditations, Hume's Treatise of HumanNature, and Kant's Critique of PureReason; by laws in Montesquieu's SpiritofLaws; and by the "natural state" in Rousseau ' s Social Contract.

The study of "race" and physical differences among humans replaced anatomy as the proper anthropological study in the writings of Linnaeus, whin later editions of Systema Naturaedivided humans into subspecies, of Blumenbach, who categorized humans according to cra- nial features, and of Buffon, who studied regional vari- ations. The nineteenth century's intellectual ferment added new dimensions to the discussions: early render- ings had assumed a single origin for humans (monogene-

sis), while those of the nineteenth century elaborated endlessly on the multiple origins of various human races (polygenesis) and the consequences thereof. By 1853, six years before the publication of Darwin's On the Origin of Species, Count de Gobineau had added a hierarchical di- mension to the study of racial differences, proclaiming that there were "superior and inferior races, and that the majority of races were incapable of civilization" (quoted in Penniman [1935]1952:84). In Europe, the science of "race" was established long before anthropology found its disciplinary feet, under the aegis of E. B. Tylor's (1871 ) definition of culture (with nature as residual category) as the proper study of anthropologists.

In the late 1 800s, when Franz Boas undertook the estab- lishment of the discipline of anthropology in the United states,2 there were partisans from all sides of the political spectrum who could call themselves anthropologists. There were conservative zoologists like Charles Daven- port, who decried the interference of the government with the "natural" outcomes of the Social Darwinist struggle, or other devout eugenicists like Madison Grant, who believed that sterilizing the undesirable portions of the population would lead the nation to its perfected, golden future ---without malformation, retardation, poverty, immigrants, Jews, or skin-color differences. There were "an- throposociologists" like Carlos Closson, Herbert Spencer' s American "apostle," who "interpreted all history as a racial struggle which produced a constant redistribution of

American Anthropologist 100(3):669-679. Copyright i) 1999, American Anthropological Association



670 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST * VOL. 100, NO. 3 * SEPTEMBER 1998

the racial elements of nations according to various laws of 'social selection' " (Clossen, quoted in Stocking 1982:60; cf. Marks 1995). There were also prominent lay ide- ologues such as Andrew Carnegie, who wrote of an An- glo-American "master race" and assigned the "other" classes (immigrants and blacks) to permanent status at the bottom of the heap, doomed to die out, because "The pro- portion of the colored to the white element necessarily grows less and less.... the conclusion seems unavoidable that the colored race cannot hold its own numerically against the whites and must fall farther and farther behind . . . we can scarcely expect the hotter climate of the Southern States, in which the colored people live, to produce as hardy a race as that of the cooler States of the North" (Carnegie [l 886]1971 :4>45; cf. Wall 1970:679).

George Stocking has careful]y and instructively analyzed Boas's interest in physical anthropology: he points out that Boas "carried with him a residue of polygenist and evolutionary assumption," but that there were other diffi- culties with "racial" theory even before Boas's influence began to grow, and notes that"physical anthropology around l900 had wandered far into a blind alley from which it was not really to emerge for another fifty years" (1968: 163). Among the "pervasive difElculties'' in racial theory was the breakdown of any and all definitions of race, a weakness that Boas attacked often and vigorously in his writings.3 Boas introduced into the discipline he was carefully crafting a dynamic point of view about racial classifications, one that concentrated on "testing conflict- ing theories of heredity and environment" (Stocking 1968: 188) with the ultimate aim of shedding light on the problems of the "early history of mankind."

Stocking also points out that "in general, much of twentieth-century American anthropology may be viewed as the working out in time of various implications of Boas's own position" ( l 974: 17). Another commentator observes that Boas's "anti-racist legacy stems as much from his ideas as from his actions to mobilize opinion among his peers and the public in favor of egalitarianism" (Barkan 1992:77). In carving out a liberal discipline and surrounding himself with those of a similar persuasion, Boas no doubt attracted students who were of the same liberal persuasion as he. He also impressed upon them the impor- tance of a "dynamic" point of view in the study of races. Boas himself was not color blind, nor was the first generation of his students.4 He was well aware of the folk conception of race that was operating in American society at the time but he taught that "scientific models which are de- rived from folk culture should be regarded with particular suspicion" (Moore 1981:37). Boas trained his students to renounce the scientific concepts of race that persisted, to ignore the folk concepts of race that existed, and to work toward an egalitarian ideal in society.

According to Elazar Barkan, Boas's impact on the idea of race was on three levels: "the 'expert,' whose scientiElc

work, theoretical and empirical, shaped the discipline; the 'professional,' as an active participant in the scientific community, . . . and the 'intellectual,' who participated directly in public and political discourse" (Barkan 1992: 77-78). Boas's last words concerned the need to combat racism by exposing it (Barkan 1992:77), and some of his students followed through on his aims but most of their criticisms of the race concept involved its nonexistence as a biologically useful idea and little or no emphasis on the study of the American folk conception of race. Many anthropologists behaved as scientific "experts," not as "intellectual[s] who participated in public and political discourse[s]"(Barkan 1992:78).

Both within Boas's lifetime and beyond, there were positive and negative responses to his ideas,5 but by the time of his death in 1942, sociocultural anthropology was thoroughly professionalized and well on its way to being color blind, indifferent to the skin-color differences that are and were the basis of the American "racial" (folk) clas- sif1cation. "Race" no longer mattered and if "race" could be demonstrated not to exist, then racism was an irrelevant response to skin-color differences, one doomed by its own (scientific) inexactitude to fade away. This proposition helped to ensure that American anthropology won the bat- tle and lost the war.

One positive response to Boas's thinking was the UNESCO Statement on Race, largely written by Boas's students and colleagues, Ashley Montagu, Theodosius Dobzhansky, L. C. Dunn, and Otto Klineberg. The State- ment (Montagu 195 1; UNESCO 1952) defined the scientific community's opposition to racial discrimination by repudiating three ideas: ( l ) that mental capacities forraces differed; (2) that hybridization produced biological deterioration of population groups; and (3) that national and religious groups were in any sense biological populations. The fourth premise advanced, that "race was less a biological fact than a social myth," was the most controver- sial at the time and, had American anthropologists wished to explore this premise, they could have begun an inten- sive investigation of the folk conceptions of race extant in their own society and publicly critiqued the racist ideas that pervaded institutional and legal thinking. Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Ashley Montagu concentrated on critiquing race as a scientific concept in their writings, but the idea of race as an American folk concept went largely unchallenged and unexplored. Boas trained very few physical anthropologists, and the cultural anthropologists he taught had a different mandate: "salvage ethnography" and the expansion of the field of ethnology or the study of small-scale societies. It is ironic that a profession dedicated to exploring the nuances of the ideas people hold failed to deal with a major idea their own countrypeople held, the equation of race with skin color. The study of small-scale societies provided a poor framework for investigating concepts of race, however, even



SHANKL1N / PROFESSION OF THE COLOR BLIND 671

though the societies themselves were often subject to racist policies.

I believe that the scientif1c expertise brought to bear on the "scientific" aspects of the race concept was effective and that the idea of race as a scientific category has virtually disappeared from ongoing contemporary public and political discourses. But the folk idea of race as skin color remains powerful in our society and racism has become part of legislation and institutions in ways that make it very difficult to extirpate. It is often said, "you can't kill a bad idea," but seldom noticed that this proposition is wrong. Ether, alchemy, a flat earth, and even some of the more overwrought tenets of creationism are quite dead.6 All were killed or rendered harrnless by scientific ad- vances in physics, chemistry, geography, and evolution. The facts that the folk idea of "race" is not dead and that racism thrives in our society are partly (but only partly, of course) attributable to the failure of anthropologists to follow through on Boas's example of public engagement in discourse and debate. The '9Os version of what race is even includes denial of race as a fact:

Neither an illusion nor a fact, race operates in a manner similar to gender as a complex of meanings transfoImed by political frameworks. Though race may be a fiction, in other words, it remains what Wallace Stevens called a Supreme Fiction that has exploited the coIporeal body to put in place, sustain, and justify powerful systems of inequality. [Gubar 1997:42]

Teaching Color Blindness

I turn now to the issue of teaching about race and racism, especially in introductory anthropology courses that reach the largest number of college students. If race as a Supreme Fiction is at issue, how have anthropologists contributed to understanding this folk dichotomy and to clarifying its consequences for a society that proclaims itself committed to egalitarian ideals? We have moved a long way from the sixties and seventies, when most textbook authors explained why race and racism were not ac- ceptable or scientific concepts, to the eighties and nineties when serious discussions of race or racism seem to be considered superfluous by most anthropology textbook authors and editors. These changes have been carefully analyzed elsewhere recently (Lieberman et al. 1992; Mukhopadhyay and Moses 1997), and I, too, have spelled out some of the shifts over the last few decades in teaching these concepts in both physical and sociocultural anthropology (Shanklin 1994). Therefore I will limit myself in this discussion to pointing out some of the "highs" and "lows" of the treatment of race and racism in a few recent cultural anthropology textbooks. Two caveats here: first, not all anthropologists use textbooks in introductory courses; and second, we do not know how many who teach introductory courses automatically include a segment on race and racism. Another gap in our knowledge, in this

multidisciplinary age, is what percentage of college students are exposed to anthropology as part of their distribution requirements, students who will never take another anthropology course but could well be influenced by what they heard in the course about race and racism. Patsy Evans (personal communication) of the American An- thropological Association notes that while we are certain that, in 1997, there were 8,000 anthropology majors graduated throughout the country, we do not know the number of students who take introductory anthropology as part of their distribution requirements and who might learn from us about new approaches to race and racism.7

In my own cursory survey of 1 1 introductory anthropology texts published in several editions since the late ' 80s, I found the issue of racism dealt with in only a distinct mi- nority, 4 out of the 1 1. Three of the four Marvin Harris ' s (1991), Conrad Kottak's (1987), and Serena Nanda's (1984) have the same title: Culhxral Anthropology. The fourth is James Peoples's Humanity: An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology. All four feature in-depth discussions of racism in Western industrial societies (Harris 1991:37-40, 46, 372-384; Kottak 1987:321-325; Nanda 1 984:1 7, 43-46, 25S258; Peoples 1 988:9, 38-39, 4s42), and all point to recent studies that refute racist claims and explanations for poverty based on skin color and unequal abilities. Harris, for example, attributes the rise of the "New Racism" in the 1980s in part to "the fact that Ronald Reagan's administrations devalued civil rights, encouraged resentment against affirmative action, and fostered racial polarization by cutting back on critical social programs" (1991:373) and goes on to explore a deeper level of sociocultural causation, that of the "marked deterioration in the economic prospects of the white majority" (1991:373). Others in this small group deal with different issues, i.e., Peoples ( 1988: 4>42) with whether blacks are natural athletes and Nanda (1984: 43-48) with the predicates of biological determinism. Most scatter their treatments of the topics of race and racism throughout their texts, a technique that offers several opportunities to discuss racism's consequences in context. This allows the subjects of race and racism to be raised for classroom discussion and debate, something I insist on in an anthropology text. Another text, one that I adopted for classroom use, Richley Crapo's Cultural An- thropology, had in its first edition ( 1987) an extensive de- scription of both evolution and the non-concept of race. Its second edition ( 1990), however, omitted the chapters that dealt with evolution or race; in response to my query, the publishers responded that this was an "oversight." Few texts ignore the issues entirely, but Haviland's (1987) text contains no index entries for race, racism, or ethnicity.

Writers of the other seven texts mostly contented themselves with an old-fashioned or faulty definition of race, e.g., "A race refers to a group of people who share a greater statistical frequency of genes and physical traits




discrimination, ' are in fact usually references to ethnicity" (1990:329-330). They proceed to discuss blacks and whites in several places (1990:332-333, 342-343) without further qualification, although they do mention Afri- can Americans once or twice.

Michael C. Howard begins Contemporary Cultural An- thropology (1989) by describing ethnicity as a way of drawing we-they distinctions but goes on to suggest that categorization of humans according to "physical or racial characteristics" began as early as prehistoric cave paint- ing and adds that "The concept of race, or categorization according to physical traits, is virtually universal, as is the belief that the features chosen for purposes of categorization parallel differences in behavior" (1989:273). Race and ethnicity are conflated in this discussion but the author does not say why he has done this, nor is enlightenment provided by the glossary definition of race as "a category based on physical traits" (1989:455).

These conflations and confusing discussions are dis- turbing, especially since most of these textbooks were published in the ' 90s, the same decade in which were published Dinesh D'Souza's fulminations on the politics of race and sex on campus (Illaberal Education, 1991), and Studs Terkel ' s book Race: How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession (1992). While these authors have very different interpretations of the origins of inequality in our society, both use the blacklwhite dichotomy unselfconsciously, as do a host of others, e.g., The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray 1994), The Al- chemy of Race and Rights (Williams 1991 ), Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (Hacker 1992), and Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (Edsall and Edsall 1 991 ).

Anthropology's apparent determination to write itself out of one of the most important discussions of the contemporary era seems perverse and badly timed but, more to the point in a discussion of teaching, students unless they have been exposed to Harris ' s, Kottak' s, Nanda' s, or Peoples's texts and/or thorough classroom discussions of these subjects-probably have little occasion to assume that anthropology has anything useful to say about race or racism. Nor have we given our students defenses against the racist charges they hear on campus, or any basis for confronting racism. A major consequence of anthropology' s color blindness is that students may absorb the discipline's liberal proclivities without understanding either the arguments, pro or con, or the political implications of a particular stance. Imagine the authors of some of these texts-excepting Hams, Kottak, Nanda, and Peoples- asked to participate in a panel discussion of whatever is the latest racist tract, say TheBell Curve or some of Rushton's rantings about the (inverse) correlation between penis size and capacity for civilization. Which of them seems pre- pared to say more than that race is an erroneous scientific concept or a gloss for ethnicity? In a decade in which "ethnic

with one another than they do with people outside the group" (Ferraro 1992:5). Then, as the author of this textbook, Cultural Anthropology: An Applied Perspective, does, they move on and never mention racism or its implications for modern societies. In his concluding chapter on the future of anthropology, Ferraro discusses the cultural survival of indigenous peoples, the study of complex societies (read the holistic study of small ethnic neighborhoods), and the greater utilization of anthropological knowledge, ending with the claim that his text illustrates "how anthropological knowledge can be used to solve problems by architects, businesspersons, medical person- nel . . . [and others]." Maybe, but I also think it is neces- sary to ask why racism is never mentioned as a contemporary problem, especially for indigenous peoples or those in small ethnic neighborhoods, or whether anthropologists might have some knowledge that could be applied to contemporary problems about in-groups and out-groups.

Rosman and Rubel (1995:302-304) offer a brief de- scription of race as "a cultural construction whose definition and form differs from society to society" and then- outstandingly, in my opinion go on to give an example of a society (Brazil) in which racial designations are not bipolar, as our own are, but they continue into discussions of ethnicity.

In another text, Emily Schultz and Robert Lavenda's Cultural Anthropology, despite a glossary definition of race as "a social grouping defined by observable physical features which its members possess and justified with ref- erence to biology" (1987:375), the word race is used in several contexts with different meanings and without bothering to define it in the text, beyond noting that "Physical anthropologists invented a series of elaborate techniques to measure different observable features of human populations-skin color, hair type, body type, and so forth [in the hope of classifying] the world's people into unambiguous racial categories" (1987:375). They add that "The traits traditionally used to identify races all de- pend on external, observable traits, such as skin color, which do not correlate well with other physical and biological traits. The concept of 'race' therefore does not re- flect a fact of nature, but instead is a label invented by humans that permits us to sort people into groups" (1987:7). Later, however, they mention race and ethnicity as involv- ing criteria of a biological and/or cultural nature (1987: 247) and then thoroughly confound earlier discussions by using class, race, and ethnicity as near synonyms, remark- ing that "the presence in a complex society of nonclass groupings based on race or ethnicity complicates, and may even contradict, a classification of people based on rela- tive wealth, power, or prestige" ( 1987:251 ).

An even less illuminating discussion is provided by Daniel Bates and Fred Plog ( 1 990:3 17) who, in their index entry for race, refer the reader to ethnicity and later explain that "references to race, as in 'racial equality' or 'racial



SHANKLIN / PROFESSION OF THE COLOR BLIND 673

cleansing" has become both a buzzword and a fact in widely separated parts of the world, the questions remain: how to deal with race as a "Supreme Fiction" and with racism as a fact or as part of the global order?

If anthropology is going to contribute in the twenty- first century-to the solution of the race/racism problems that plague our society now, attention must be paid to the political consequences of anthropology's color blind stance in the twentieth century. So far I have emphasized anthropology's- apparently scant attempts at teaching concepts of race and ethnicity and not directly discussed the political consequences of this teaching. But there are political consequences and I will confine myself here to a few comments on those consequences I believe to be most salient for the twenty-f?st century.

First, in textbook presentations and in public discussions, both physical and cultural anthropologists have been silent about the discipline' s own history of collusion with the ethnocentric tenets of Western colonialism, and, in these same contexts, we have largely failed to histo- ricize anthropology's role in the expansion of colonialism. A non-anthropologist, Richard Popkin, describes the theories that developed in the wake of Western expansion as being of two kinds: first, neutral scientific claims about human origins, and second, claims of Caucasian superiority. Both, he points out, were developed to justify Christian European dominance of the Third World and have caused an enormous toll in human suffering; they must be combated by a thoroughgoing cultural relativism and cultural pluralism, and until this is done, Western racism will continue to take its toll (1974: 1 52-153).

Richard Perry, author of Montgomery's Children, one of the first "postmodern" novels, suggests a different as- pect of the toll in human suffering racism has taken:

None of them, however, discussed with their children (some because they never thought about it, others because they did) the fact ffiat they were an African people and, through little fault of their own, were recently descended from slaves. Nor were the children aware ffiat social scientists made a living demonstrating ieir inferiority, or to what extent ffiey and their parents operated in ie national imagination as the ultimate in the comic, and the darkest, most labyrinthine symbol of evil. [1984: 12]

The "application of the theories" that Popkin describes took place in exactly these terms and some of the people who were "demonstrating the . . . inferiority" of others were anthropologists. Those of us in the profession know the names and notions of the people who were doing this, but how often and in what format do we tell our students about it? Writing about what anthropologists do in 1969 William Willis Jr. put the point very well: "anthropology has been the social science that studies dominated colored peoples and their ancestors living outside the bounda- ries of modern white societies" (1969: 122). These ideas

do not inform a single introductory anthropology text that has crossed my desk, and one must ask, why not? Or, how and when will such insights become commonplaces of the disciplinary literature? An excellent beginning is cur- rently being made in the professional literature (Current Anthropology 1996; Harrison 1995; Mukhopadhyay and Moses 1997), but this beginning must be translated into public discussions, as in the American Anthropological Association's (1997) recommendations about census categories, and the translations must be both frequently repeated and accessible to a general audience. The silence about anthropology's past has encouraged and perpetu- ated disciplinary conflations and confusions, but this is not its worst outcome. Our silence merely gives the impression that anthropologists don't know much about race or ethnicity. For those of us of a liberal persuasion, a worse outcome is that denial of the existence of race has become a rallying cry for segments of the extreme Right, who use it to justify cutting various social programs (cf. Omi and Wi- nant 1994). Continuing to endorse this idea of the nonexistence of race (and concomitant inconsequentiality of racism) makes us bedfellows with those who espouse the anti-egalitarian trends we oppose.

Rather than teaching students that anthropology has always been the "scientific" or"apolitical" or"objective" or "neutral" study of humans in all times and placesefini- tions offered in many texts today - a socially relevant history of anthropology would be not only more appropriate but considerably more accurate. Further, an honest discussion in textbooks, not in specialized monographs or in professional journals, of anthropology ' s past errors and omis- sions, especially its failure to come to grips with racism, and the discipline's on-going efforts to redeem itself as a social science with a critical bent, might well serve as a guide for others in the social scientific community, not least of whom are our own students.

Second, our silence has contributed to our failure to participate in the ongoing intellectual debates surrounding the concepts of race and racism, allowing us to pass over in silence the many kinds of racism and racist discourses that have flourished in the past few decades. The many kinds of racism that abound in our world similarly unmen- tioned so far as I know in any introductory anthropology text must be pointed out to students. Here, David Gold- berg's ideas are illuminating as he talks about a "range of racisms":

no single mode of resistance to racism will succeed exhaus- tively. Racism's adaptive resilience entails that we have to re- spond wiffi sets of oppositions that are found in and through praxis to be appropriate to each form racism assumes. Institu- tionally, overcoming apartheid must take on forms different from opposition to racist jury practices or discriminatory em- ployment and housing practices in the United States; ideo- logically, the appropriate kinds of response to claims of racial superiority or inferiority will differ from those to racially




interpreted cultural differences; and scientifically, critical at- tack on racist metaphors and concepts insinuated into stan- dard ffieoretical articulation will differ from the responses appropriate to scientific ffieories supporting racist hypotheses. [1993:213-214]

Third, anthropologists have continued to teach dichoto- mous thinkintraditionalXmodern; civilized/primitive and hierarchical arrangements; for example, societies may be ranked according to the "developmental level" of their political institutions (bands, tribes, states). These metaphors and analogies contribute to the problem, to the assessment of the "rightness" of Western dominance and Caucasian superiority. Nancy Stepan, discussing metaphors to do with race and gender, observes that: "because a metaphor or analogy does not directly present a preexist- ing nature but instead helps 'construct' that nature, the metaphor generates data that conform to it, and accommo- dates data that are in apparent contradiction to it, so that nature is seen through the metaphor and the metaphor be- comes part of the logic of science itself3' (1990:51). This describes not only the process by which "race" became a scientific category but also the processes by which di- chotomous metaphors and hierarchically arranged categories, long disputed by anthropologists in the classroom, nonetheless pervade the worldviews of those who deal with non-Western nations- the World Bank, the IMS, and so on. Had anthropologists taken an active part in public debates early on, would anyone today use these terrns so unselfconsciously, so much as if they were facts and not specious dichotomies imposed to make audiences feel more comfortable, more empathetic toward those (needy) Others?

Fourth, anthropologists must teach by example, by active engagement in public intellectual discourse. Partici- pation in public debates entails considerably more than denouncing the scientific uselessness of race; it requires that we come to terrns with the American folk concept of race and what Black and White have come to mean in our society today and why. If we are committed to a post-racist society in the twenty-first century, how else can we teach those tenets to our audiences? Our profession ' s disdain for popularizers may have allowed us to stake our claim to being a "scientific" discipline, but it has also allowed a host of ill-inforrned popularizers to flourish and to speak as if in the name of anthropology.

We could begin by revising our textbooks to focus on and comment on the Black-White opposition that mes- merizes our own society; we could continue by resuming our place as commentators on the national "obsession," as Terkel calls it, analyzing it in terms of its constitutive com- ponents and discussing, among other things, the progress that has been made in understanding how to avoid socializing children into these prejudices. To accomplish these shifts, we must recast not only our introductory textbooks but our disciplinary teaching and thinking about race and

racism, removing these, as it were, from the grasp of the "dead hand of custom"(ary discourse) and placing them in our own (postmodern) terms. It would help if we stopped obsessing about where and when the origins of racism are and left off universalizing these speculations into state- ments about "racial distinctions" having been characteris- tic of humans "since the beginning," whenever that was. It would help, too, if we talked more about the things we are supposed to be able to analyze superlatively-the relation between categories like race and culture as reflected in media accounts of, say, the O.J. Simpson trial (which Ed- mundson describes as only one of the recent "Gothic" events in which race is a major element [ 1997: 1 78]), envi- ronmental racism, or the likely outcomes of the efforts of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Finally, we must situate our discussions in the terms of the late-twentieth-century intellectual debates about race and racisms and choose the kinds of resistance and response we wish to practice. Roger Sanjek observes ( 1994) that anthropologists have contributed little to the ongoing discussions of race and that we must look elsewhere for guidance to the thinking about race and racism that has developed in the last twenty years. I believe, on the contrary, that anthropology has several sources of guidance for thinking about race and racism in new ways, including, as models, the honest discussions of fieldwork dilemmas that have characterized so much recent professional writing, the recent analyses of gender relations, and the excellent postmodern discussions of colonialism (to mention a few important syntheses in these areaslifford and Marcus 1986; Comaroffand Comaroff 1991; Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974). We could do much better as a discipline, in putting forward our own ideas about race and racism, if we abandoned our snobbishness about popularizing and popularizers and set about the task of becoming cultural critics, bringing reasoned discussion and probing questions to issues such as race and racism that continue to plague our society.

Restoring Color Vision Beyond the suggestions proffered above for textbook

authors, restoring color vision to the profession demands some few adjustments in our current thinking and writing about race. Those adjustments are few because we have already done most of the work and the adjustments would be mainly a matter of changing emphasis. I will begin by looking at Foucault's ideas on race and racism and conclude by suggesting that anthropologists recast and re- study some of the insights already present in the field ' s vo- luminous literature, especially as these ideas have now entered the public discourse. Foucault believed that "race," like sexuality, was a social construction belonging to a historical moment (Foucault [ 1976] 1978: 152; Stoler




1995:2) and his reason for developing these ideas was un- abashedly political:

It seems to me . . . that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them. [quoted in Rabinow 1984:4]

Foucault should appeal to anthropologists for other reasons: first, as a "historian of the present," his aims fit nicely with those of sociocultural anthropology, to record the ways in which people think, talk about, mold, and reshape current ideas. Second, like Boas, he was uninter- ested in theory, saying that "the time for theory has not yet arrived" (quoted in Sheridan 1980:215). Finally, he provides us with a way of analyzing new racisms and old, those being born and those which are yet to come and which must be analyzed carefully in the twenty-first century if it is not to be a rewrite of the twentieth, with all the attendant racial strife-a framework for seeking out the "new, that which is coming to birth in the present-a present that most of us are unable to see because we see it through the eyes of the past, or through the eyes of a 'future' that is a projection of the past, which amounts to the same thing" (Sheridan 1980: 195).

When volume 1 of The History of Sexuality was published in 1976, a sixth volume was projected, Population and Races, which was to "examine the way in which trea- tises, both theoretical and practical, on the topics of both population and race were linked to the history of what Foucault had called 'biopolitics' " (Gutting 1994:117). Foucault, who died in 1984, completed only three vol- umes, but we have the benefit of his preliminary thinking on race from a series of lectures he gave in 1976 at the College de France (Foucault 1990) and from Ann Stoler's recent book, Race and the Education of Desire (1995), which contains a careful analysis of the tapes of those mostly unpublished lectures. Sexuality's "twin," according to Foucault, was race, one of the two instruments of the state ' s "biologizing" power, and in his final lecture, he ad- dressed "the birth of state racism, that historical moment when biopower transforms an earlier discourse into state racism and provides its unique form" (Stoler 1995:56). Stoler has written compellingly about Foucault' s analysis of the emergence of state racism and I will follow her analysis closely, even as I must adumbrate it.

Foucault said that his central aim was to show how "in the West, a certain critical, historical, and political analysis of the state, of its institutions, and its mechanisms of power appeared in binary terrns' (Foucault 1990:68). To achieve this, he proposed a new form of historical analysis, conceiving of social relations in binary terms that emerge when the state uses racism as a "tactic in the internal fission of society into binary oppositions, a means of

creating 'biologized' internal enemies, against whom society must defend itself' (Stoler 1995:59).

Here, Stoler says, Foucault has focused on the development "of an entirely new 'biologico-social racism'" predicated on the notion that "the other race is neither one arrived from somewhere else, nor one which at a certain moment triumphed and dominated, but instead one with a permanent presence, that incessantly infiltrates the social body that reproduces itself uninterruptedly within and out of the social fabric" (Stoler 1995: 62). Foucault carried his analysis further, using Nazi Germany as his example. He did not believe that modern racism broke with earlier forms: instead it was "the discursive bricolage whereby an older discourse of race is 'recovered,' 'modified,' 'en- cased,' and 'encrusted' in new forms" (Stoler 1995:61). Foucault drew most of his examples from the social wars of earlier centuries and discourses on sovereign power but he suggests that, in the nineteenth century, there were sub- sequent forms of social war that were represented in two distinct "transcriptions": the Elrst explicitly biological and the second sociological. The former, with its focus on anatomy and physiology, is the concern of physical anthropologists, but the latter is critical to sociocultural un- derstandings because it erases the notion of races, rewrit- ing them as class struggle (Foucault 1990:54). Stoler points out that Foucault is not involved in the study of suc- cessive meanings of race, but with race as part of the discourse of power, within which it is endlessly reconceived, redefined, and reconstrued.

Although Foucault's analytic terllls are useful for formulating our analyses, I believe anthropologists in their role as cultural critics have to go beyond these, especially when considering issues in which black and white are the operative terms. For example, the U.S. media re- ported the O. J. Simpson case in terms of two (Gothic, ad- versarial) positions: a white story in which O.J. Simpson was a white man with a monstrous black interior, and a black story in which O.J. Simpson was a black victim of monstrous white conspiracies (Edmundson 1997). While these may be the terms used in media accounts and in courtrooms, an (adult) anthropological analysis should go further than these simpleminded fairy stories and deal with the realities of a tragic incident, in which spousal abuse and insane jealousy, as well as the rules of evidence, may have had roles to play. It is useless to say that the Simpson case "exposed" a vast racial divide we knew that before the Simpson case and it is equally useless to conclude that blacks and whites are incapable of understanding one another. This case could have been a spring- board from which it might have been learned that the po- lice make mistakes and that we must work to correct that; or, we might have considered problems of on-going spousal abuse and concluded that we must work at finding better solutions to that problem. Instead, the general




public is left with the media's "conclusion" that blacks and whites are at odds with each other.

These are beginning, not ending, points for sociocultural anthropology' s treatment of race as it re-emerges in its different folllls in public discourse. Anthropologists have studied group behavior with excellent fieldwork techniques for almost a century now and focused, perhaps too long and too often, on the rules or on conformity to the rules. But there are other insights available from the anthropological literature, insights about nonconformity, about people making up their own minds for their own reasons, and these are what I propose we should now be fo- cusing on. Two examples will suffice as illustration: the first from the anthropological literature, the second from a best-selling novel, part of contenlporary public discourse.

At the end of his monograph, Knowing the Gururumba (1965: 10>105), Philip Newman tells the story of a man named DaBore, a Gururumba who did not share the Guru- rumba belief in lightning balls. Lightning balls were sought after storrns, during which it appeared that electri- cal discharges from lightning striking a tree would roll down the trunk into the ground. The Gururumba dug holes around the tree in the search for these objects (usually de- composed stone, wood or bone), which were supposed to guarantee to the finder excellent gardening results. DaBore, watching the digging one day with Newman, ob- served that "There are no lightning balls," and walked away. Try as he might, Newman could not Elnd another way DaBore differed from his fellow Gururumba and he notes that in studies of culture, this example "serves us here as a reminder that people see themselves apart from the patterns of their culture and to some extent mold those patterns to their own needs." It also reminds us that in every society there are people vvho disagree with one or more of the society's deeply hekl beliefs and that we, as a profession, have not spent enough effort tlying to delineate the bases of those disagreements, the clues that might allow us to discern where the disagreements are apt to lie, where the clues to the mechanics of transformation are apt to be found.

The second example is from Charles Frazier's Cold Mountain, a current best-seller about the Civil War, and is included in a dialogue between a Confederate deserter and a"wild" woman he meets in the woods. The woman asks:

"What I want to know is, was it worth it, all that fighting for the big man's nigger?"

"That's not the way I saw it." "What' s the other way?" She said, "I 've traveled a fair bit in

those low counties. Nigger-owning makes the rich man proud and ugly and it makes the poor man mean. It's a curse laid on the land. We've lit a fire and now it's burning us down. God is going to liberate niggers, and f1ghting to prevent it is against God. Did you own any?"

"No. Not hardly anybody I knew did." "Then what stirred you up enough for fighting and dying?"

"Four years ago I maybe could have told you. Now I don't know. I've had all of it I want, though."

"That's lacking some as an answer." "I reckon many of us fought to drive off invaders. One man

I knew had been north to the big cities, and he said it was every feature of such places that we were fighting to prevent. All I know is anyone thinking the Federals are willing to die to set loose slaves has got an overly merciful view of mankind."

. . . and so he told her what was in his heart. The shame he ielt now to think of his zeal in sixty-one to go off and fight the downtrodden mill workers of the Federal army. [Frazier 1997:217-218]

Anthropologists have defined and identified binary oppositions in most of the cultures we have studied, but we have not paid much attention to the circumstances in which people deny or deliberately flout that learning, those moments in which individuals assert that there are too many shades of grey for them to be able to define clearly what is black and what is white, what is right and what is wrong. The start I propose begins with a closer look at the issue of overcoming binary oppositions- blacklwhite, Us/Them and how, once they are built into worldviews, they are overturned or subverted, by whom and for what reasons. Let us, in our classes and in our own contributions to the public debate, take black/white in our society as a trope a deliberate misstatement or over- statement of the facts and discuss this dichotomy as a fallacy, pointing to the pink;/brown reality that underlies it, as well as to the harmful social consequences of maintain- ing it. To do this we must continue the kind of teaching that anthropologists have long engaged in, the inculcating of dispassionate views of our own society, and we must disseminate those dispassionate views on a wider scale, aim- ing to introduce them to members of the society at large. We regularly teach our students what Doris Lessing (1987:4) calls "the ability to observe ourselves from other viewpoints." The first steps in restoring color vision have already been taken: one of its more successful forms is the growing influence of multiculturalism in contemporary society. To that trend, I would only add that anthropologists ought to be more concerned with debating the binary opposition between black and white, with showing that opposition for what it is a false dichotomy that nonetheless helps individuals to forrnulate their thoughts, that gives them unreal categories into which to cast their obser- vations. The next steps must involve anthropologists in an effort to understand how to disseminate those dispassionate views more broadly.

Two other popular novelists, one a South African writing about the issue of belief, the other an English woman writing about the mechanics of group identity, have raised these questions in the domain of public discourse. First, Doris Lessing from South Africa:

Let us take what we know about how we function in groups. People in groups we now know are likely to behave in fairly




stereotyped ways that are predictable. Yet when citizens join together to set up, let us say, a society for the protection of the unicorn, they do not say, this organism we're setting up is likely to develop in one of several ways. Let us take this into account and watch how we behave so that we control the society and the society does not control us. As another example, the Left might find it useful to say something like this, "It has been easily observable for some time that groups like ours always split and then the two new groups become enemies eguipped with leaders who hurl abuse at each other. If we remain aware of ffiis apparently inbuilt drive that makes groups split and split again we may perhaps behave less mechani- cally." [Lessing 1987:2>21 ]

Lessing continues with her wish for what we should be teaching the young:

Perhaps it is not too much to say that in these violent times the kindest, wisest wish we have for the young must be: "We hope that your period of immersion in group lunacy, group self- righteousness, will not coincide with some period of your country's history when you can put your murderous and stu- pid ideas into practice. If you are lucky, you will emerge much enlarged by your experience of what you are capable of in the way of bigotry and intolerance. You will understand abso- lutely how sane people, in periods of public insanity, can mur- der, destroy, lie, swear black is white." [ 1987: 30]

Second, an English writer, speculating on the predicates of group identity: in Margaret Drabble's novel, The Gates of Ivory, the author asks,

How long would it take, how much social engineering would be required to convert a community of pacifist American Quakers into order-obeying anti-Semitic officers of the SchutzstaXel? Or the SS into loyal members of the Red Cross? Would there always be a handful which would refuse to convert? And would they be heroes or villains? Why did the Ger- mans so willingly kill the Jews? Why did the Italians refuse to kill Jews? Which is more surprising, the willingness or the re- fusal? Was the charismatic leadership of Pol Pot a socializing influence, binding the exploited peasant of Cambodia into a purposeful society? Or was it a barbaric primitive influence, deconstructing the institutions of society and family into "pure unmitigated savagery," into the killing fields of geno- cide? Is "good" group behaviour generated and fostered by "good" institutions or are institutions in themselves morally neutral?[1991:174 175]

These bits and pieces are part of the public discourse about group identities and loyalties. How does one set about dissolving a haITnful opposition? First, by recogniz- ing it for what it is not black and white, but pink and brown, humanity's shades, not those of our monstrous creations; and then by taking steps to insure that the wider public understands not only the opposition's fallacious nature but its harmful consequences. Second, by insisting that scholars and the general public recognize the incon- sistency between their own egalitarian ideals and their discriminatory institutions/acts. The task remains for anthropologists to take up these questions in serious comparative

ways, lest we find the next generation asking nineteenth- century questions (eugenics) and answering with twenty- first-century technology (cloning). If we anthropologists do not want to see repeated the racist predicates of the twentieth century, we must explain, clarify, and reiterate the non-racist ideals we hope will guide the future.

In sum, then, there is a lot of work to be done. Whether our goal is to restore color vision or, put aurally, to reintro- duce an anthropological voice into contemporary conver- sations about race, the ways in which anthropologists can do so are clearly visible and available, either within our own disciplinary boundariesoroutside them. It is simply a matter of choosing our forrns of response and resistance and making a start.

Notes

Acknowledgments. I am indebted to Eugene Cohen, Faye Harrison, Mary FIuber, Leonard Lieberman, Alvin H. Schul- man, Pauline Siegel, and Robert W. Sussman, both for their helpful comments and their patience.

1. My title is taken from Oliver Sacks's The Island of the ColorBlind (1997), a book I liked more in prospect than in fact, partly because my fantasy about an island culture devoid of color categories was destroyed early on in the book since only 5% of the islanders of Pingelap are achromatopes.

2. George Stocking points out that "As early as 1885, during his first visit to this country, Boas discussed his scientific plans in a specifically organizational context . . . and later worked out a broad-ranging plan for the development of American anthropology, . . . which presupposed the theoretical orientation that emerged in the course of his critique of evolutionism in the early 1890s, which included a definite set of research priorities" (1968:28>281).

3. Apart from his critique of "racial formalism," the two other thrusts of Boas's work in physical anthropology empirical studies of growth in schoolchildren and studies of Native American populations (Stocking 1968:179, 172Ware suffi- ciently well known to allow passing over them without comment.

4. It is my impression that even though anthropology has long been considered a profession that attracts "marginals," the discipline has not done much better in attracting students of other skin-color persuasions than, say, history or economics. In the list that follows, for example, where Boas's "students" are catalogued (listing some colleagues who were not students), only one is pointed out as a "Negro," and he is Panamanian. Ac- cording to Carleton Putnam, author of a deeply anti-socialist, anti-Boasian book (1967), Boas's students were Ruth Benedict, Isadore Chein, K. B. Clark ("a Negro"), Theodosius Dobzhan- sky, L. C. Dunn, Melville Herskovits, Otto Klineberg, Margaret Mead, Ashley Montagu, and Gene Weltfish. Putnam says of them that "Even a cursory inspection of their names and connec- tions suggested the nature of the [Jewish socialist] forces acting on most of these individuals, and the impression could be forti- Eled by a review of some of their activities" ( I 967:21 ).

5. Stocking has described the organizing of the Galton Soci- ety of New York in 1 917-1 920: its founders, Charles Davenport




and Madison Grant, dedicated the Society to the study of"racial anthropology" and noted that its membership "was to be con- fined to 'native' Americans who were anthropologically, socially, and politically 'sound' " (Stocking 1968:289).

6. The fact that there are still believers in some of these propositions is not as important as the fact that society as a whole does not behave as if these were eternal verities, nor do they en- ter the realms of scientific discourse.

7. At my own college, which has neither an anthropology major nor minor, the number of those taking sociology or anthropology courses as part of their non-Western distribution requirements is 1 W20% greater than the number of sociology majors who must take these courses as part of their major requirements.

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