EudaimoniaFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For the moth, see Eudaemonia (moth).

Eudaimonia or eudaemonia (Greek: εὐδαιμονία [eu̯dai̯monía]), sometimes anglicized as eudemonia (pron.: /juːdɨˈmoʊniə/), is a Greekword commonly translated as happiness or welfare; however, "human flourishing" has been proposed as a more accurate translation.[1]

Etymologically, it consists of the words "eu" ("good") and "daimōn" ("spirit"). It is a central concept in Aristotelian ethics and politicalphilosophy, along with the terms "aretē ", most often translated as "virtue" or "excellence", and "phronesis", often translated as "practicalor ethical wisdom".[2] In Aristotle's works, eudaimonia was (based on older Greek tradition) used as the term for the highest human good,and so it is the aim of practical philosophy, including ethics and political philosophy, to consider (and also experience) what it really is,and how it can be achieved.

Discussion of the links between virtue of character (ethikē aretē) and happiness (eudaimonia) is one of the central preoccupations ofancient ethics, and a subject of much disagreement. As a result there are many varieties of eudaimonism. Two of the most influentialforms are those of Aristotle[3] and the Stoics. Aristotle takes virtue and its exercise to be the most important constituent in eudaimonia butacknowledges also the importance of external goods such as health, wealth, and beauty. By contrast, the Stoics make virtue necessaryand sufficient for eudaimonia and thus deny the necessity of external goods.

Co nt ent s

1 Definition2 Main views on eudaimonia and its relation to areté

2.1 Socrates2.2 Plato2.3 Aristo tle2.4 Epicurus2.5 The Sto ics

3 Eudaimonia and modern moral philosophy4 Eudaimonia and modern psycho logy

4.1 Genetics5 Etymology and translation6 See also7 References

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7 References8 Further reading9 External links

Definit ionThe Definitions, a dictionary of Greek philosophical terms attributed to Plato himself but believed by modern scholars to have beenwritten by his immediate followers in the Academy, provides the following definition of the word eudaimonia:

The good composed of all goods; an ability which suffices for living well; perfection in respect of virtue; resources sufficientfor a living creature.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, (§21; 1095a15–22) Aristotle says that everyone agrees that eudaimonia is the highest good for human beings,but that there is substantial disagreement on what sort of life counts as doing and living well; i.e. eudaimon:

Verbally there is a very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is[eudaimonia], and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what [eudaimonia] is they differ, andthe many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing like pleasure,wealth or honour… [1095a17][4]

So, as Aristotle points out, saying that eudaimon life is a life which is objectively desirable, and means living well, is not saying verymuch. Everyone wants to be eudaimon; and everyone agrees that being eudaimon is related to faring well and to an individual’s wellbeing. The really difficult question is to specify just what sort of activities enable one to live well. Aristotle presents various popularconceptions of the best life for human beings. The candidates that he mentions are a (1) life of pleasure, (2) a life of political activity and(3) a philosophical life.

One important move in Greek philosophy to answer the question of how to achieve eudaimonia is to bring in another important conceptin ancient philosophy, "arete" ("virtue"). Aristotle says that the eudaimon life is one of “virtuous activity in accordance with reason”[1097b22–1098a20]. And even Epicurus who argues that the eudaimon life is the life of pleasure maintains that the life of pleasurecoincides with the life of virtue. So the ancient ethical theorists tend to agree that virtue is closely bound up with happiness (areté is boundup with eudaimonia). However, they disagree on the way in which this is so. We shall consider the main theories in a moment, but first awarning about the proper translation of areté.

As already noted, the Greek word areté is usually translated into English as virtue. One problem with this is that we are inclined tounderstand virtue in a moral sense, which is not always what the ancients had in mind. For a Greek, areté pertains to all sorts of qualitieswe would not regard as relevant to ethics, for example, physical beauty. So it is important to bear in mind that the sense of ‘virtue’operative in ancient ethics is not exclusively moral and includes more than states such as wisdom, courage and compassion. The senseof virtue which areté connotes would include saying something like "speed is a virtue in a horse", or "height is a virtue in a basketballplayer". Doing anything well requires virtue, and each characteristic activity (such as carpentry, flute playing, etc.) has its own set ofvirtues. The alternative translation excellence (or "a desirable quality") might be helpful in conveying this general meaning of the term.

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French painter David portrayed thephilosopher in The Death of Socrates(1787).

The moral virtues are simply a subset of the general sense in which a human being is capable of functioning well or excellently.

Main views on eudaimonia and its relat ion to areté

SocratesWhat we know of Socrates' philosophy is almost entirely derived from Plato’s writings. Scholarstypically divide Plato’s works into three periods: the early, middle, and late periods. They tend toagree also that Plato’s earliest works quite faithfully represent the teachings of Socrates and thatPlato’s own views, which go beyond those of Socrates, appear for the first time in the middleworks such as the Phaedo and the Republic. This division will be employed here in dividing upthe positions of Socrates and Plato on eudaimonia.

As with all other ancient ethical thinkers Socrates thought that all human beings wantedeudaimonia more than anything else. (see Plato, Apology 30b, Euthydemus 280d–282d, Meno87d–89a). However, Socrates adopted a quite radical form of eudaimonism (see above): heseems to have thought that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. Socrates isconvinced that virtues such as self- control, courage, justice, piety, wisdom and related qualitiesof mind and soul are absolutely crucial if a person is to lead a good and happy (eudaimon) life.Virtues guarantee a happy life eudaimonia. For example, in the Meno, with respect to wisdom,he says: “… everything the soul endeavours or endures under the guidance of wisdom ends inhappiness…”[Meno 88c].

In the Apology, Socrates clearly presents his disagreement with those who think that theeudaimon life is the life of honour or pleasure, when he chastises the Athenians for caring morefor riches and honour than the state of their souls.

Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are younot ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do not care fornor give thought to wisdom or truth or the best possible state of your soul [29d].[5]

… it does not seem like human nature for me to have neglected all my own affairs and to have tolerated this neglect for somany years while I was always concerned with you, approaching each one of you like a father or an elder brother topersuade you to care for virtue. [31a–b; italics added]

It emerges a bit further on that this concern for one’s soul, that one’s soul might be in the best possible state, amounts to acquiring moralvirtue. So Socrates’ point that the Athenians should care for their souls means that they should care for their virtue, rather than pursuinghonour or riches. Virtues are states of the soul. When a soul has been properly cared for and perfected it possesses the virtues.Moreover, according to Socrates, this state of the soul, moral virtue, is the most important good. The health of the soul is incomparablymore important for eudaimonia than (e.g.) wealth and political power. Someone with a virtuous soul is better off than someone who is

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wealthy and honoured but whose soul is corrupted by unjust actions. This view is confirmed in the Crito, where Socrates gets Crito toagree that the perfection of the soul, virtue, is the most important good:

And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits? Or do we thinkthat part of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is inferior to the body? Not at all. It is much morevaluable…? Much more… (47e–48a)

Here Socrates argues that life is not worth living if the soul is ruined by wrongdoing. [6] In summary, Socrates seems to think that virtue isboth necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. A person who is not virtuous cannot be happy, and a person with virtue cannot fail to behappy. We shall see later on that Stoic ethics takes its cue from this Socratic insight.

PlatoPlato’s great work of the middle period, the Republic, is devoted to answering a challenge made by a sophist Thrasymachus, thatconventional morality, particularly the ‘virtue’ of justice, actually prevents the strong man from achieving eudaimonia. Thrasymachus’sviews are restatements of a position which Plato discusses earlier on in his writings, in the Gorgias, through the mouthpiece of Callicles.The basic argument presented by Thrasymachus and Callicles is that justice (being just) hinders or prevents the achievement ofeudaimonia because conventional morality requires that we control ourselves and hence live with un-satiated desires. This idea is vividlyillustrated in book 2 of the Republic when Glaucon, taking up Thrasymachus’ challenge, recounts a myth of the magical ring of Gyges.According to the myth, Gyges becomes king of Lydia when he stumbles upon a magical ring, which, when he turns it a particular way,makes him invisible, so that he can satisfy any desire he wishes without fear of punishment. When he discovers the power of the ring hekills the king, marries his wife and takes over the throne. The thrust of Glaucon’s challenge is that no one would be just if he couldescape the retribution he would normally encounter for fulfilling his desires at whim. But if eudaimonia is to be achieved through thesatisfaction of desire, whereas being just or acting justly requires suppression of desire, then it is not in the interests of the strong man toact according to the dictates of conventional morality. (This general line of argument reoccurs much later in the philosophy of Nietzsche.)Throughout the rest of the Republic, Plato aims to refute this claim by showing that the virtue of justice is necessary for eudaimonia.

The argument of the Republic is lengthy, complex, and profound, and the present context

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The School of Athens by RaffaelloSanz io, 1509, showing Plato (left) andAristotle (right)

The argument of the Republic is lengthy, complex, and profound, and the present contextdoes not allow that we give it proper consideration. In a thumbnail sketch, Plato argues thatvirtues are states of the soul, and that the just person is someone whose soul is ordered andharmonious, with all its parts functioning properly to the person’s benefit. In contrast, Platoargues that the unjust man’s soul, without the virtues, is chaotic and at war with itself, so thateven if he were able to satisfy most of his desires, his lack of inner harmony and unity thwartany chance he has of achieving eudaimonia. Plato’s ethical theory is eudaimonistic becauseit maintains that eudaimonia depends on virtue. (Virtue is necessary for eudaimonia.) OnPlato’s version of the relationship, virtue is depicted as the most crucial and the dominantconstituent of eudaimonia.

AristotleAristotle’s account is articulated in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. Inoutline, for Aristotle, eudaimonia involves activity, exhibiting virtue (aretē sometimes translatedas excellence) in accordance with reason. This conception of eudaimonia derives fromAristotle’s essentialist understanding of human nature, the view that reason (logos sometimestranslated as rationality) is unique to human beings and that the ideal function or work (ergon)of a human being is the fullest or most perfect exercise of reason. Basically, well being(eudaimonia) is gained by proper development of one's highest and most humancapabilities and human beings are "the rational animal". It follows that eudaimonia for ahuman being is the attainment of excellence (areté) in reason.

According to Aristotle, eudaimonia actually requires activity, action, so that it is not sufficient for a person to possess a squandered abilityor disposition. Eudaimonia requires not only good character but rational activity. Aristotle clearly maintains that to live in accordance withreason means achieving excellence thereby. Moreover, he claims this excellence cannot be isolated and so competencies are alsorequired appropriate to related functions. For example, if being a truly outstanding scientist requires impressive math skills, so that onemight say "doing mathematics well is necessary to be a first rate scientist". From this it follows that eudaimonia, living well, consists inactivities exercising the rational part of the psyche in accordance with the virtues or excellency of reason [1097b22–1098a20]. Which is tosay, to be fully engaged in the intellectually stimulating and fulling work at which one achieves well- earned success. The rest of theNicomachean Ethics is devoted to filling out the claim that best life for a human being is the life of excellence in accordance with reason.Since reason for Aristotle is not only theoretical but practical also, he spends quite a bit of time discussing excellence of character whichenable a person to exercise his practical reason (i.e., reason relating to action) successfully.

Aristotle’s ethical theory is eudaimonist because it maintains that eudaimonia depends on virtue. However, it is Aristotle’s explicit viewthat virtue is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia. While emphasiz ing the importance of the rational aspect of the psyche, he doesnot ignore the importance of other ‘goods’ such as friends, wealth, and power in a life that is eudaimonic. He doubts the likelihood ofbeing eudaimonic if one lacks certain external goods such as ‘good birth, good children, and beauty’. So, a person who is hideously uglyor has “lost children or good friends through death” (1099b5–6), or who is isolated, is unlikely to be eudaimon. In this way, "dumb luck"

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Epicurus identified eudaimonia withthe life of pleasure.

(chance) can preempt one's attainment of eudaimonia.

EpicurusEpicurus’ ethical theory is hedonistic. (His view proved very influential on the founders and bestproponents of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill . See the article onutilitarianism.) Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that pain is theonly intrinsic bad. An object, experience or state of affairs is intrinsically valuable if it is goodsimply because of what it is. Intrinsic value is to be contrasted with instrumental value. An object,experience or state of affairs is instrumentally valuable if it serves as a means to what isintrinsically valuable. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose you spend yourdays and nights in an office, working at not entirely pleasant activities, such as entering data intoa computer, and this, all for money. Someone asks, “why do you want the money?” and youanswer, “So, I can buy an apartment overlooking the Mediterranean, and a red Ferrari.” Thisanswer expresses the point that money is instrumentally valuable because it is a means togetting your apartment and red Ferrari. The value of making money is dependent on the valueof commodities. It is instrumentally valuable: valuable only because of what one obtains bymeans of it[citation needed ].

Epicurus identifies the eudaimon life with the life of pleasure. He understands eudaimonia as amore or less continuous experience of pleasure, and also, freedom from pain and distress. Butit is important to notice that Epicurus does not advocate that one pursue any and everypleasure. Rather, he recommends a policy whereby pleasures are maximized “in the long run.”In other words, Epicuric claims that some pleasures are not worth having because they lead togreater pains, and some pains are worthwhile when they lead to greater pleasures. The beststrategy for attaining a maximal amount of pleasure overall is not to seek instant gratification butto work out a sensible long term policy.

Ancient Greek ethics is eudaimonist because it links virtue and eudaimonia, where eudaimoniarefers to an individual’s (objective) well being. Epicurus' doctrine can be considered eudaimonist

since Epicurus argues that a life of pleasure will coincide with a life of virtue. He believes that we do and ought to seek virtue becausevirtue brings pleasure. Epicurus’ basic doctrine is that a life of virtue is the life which generates the most amount of pleasure, and it is forthis reason that we ought to be virtuous. This thesis—the eudaimon life is the pleasurable life—is not a tautology as “eudaimonia is thegood life” would be: rather, it is the substantive and controversial claim that a life of pleasure and absence of pain is what eudaimoniaconsists in.

One important difference between Epicurus’ eudaimonism and that of Plato and Aristotle is that for the latter virtue is a constituent ofeudaimonia, whereas Epicurus makes virtue a means to happiness. To this difference, consider Aristotle’s theory. Aristotle maintains thateudaimonia is what everyone wants (and Epicurus would agree). He also thinks that eudaimonia is best achieved by a life of virtuousactivity in accordance with reason. The virtuous person takes pleasure in doing the right thing as a result of a proper training of moral and

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Zeno, thought happiness was a"good flow of life."

intellectual character (See e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 1099a5). However, Aristotle does not think that virtuous activity is pursued for thesake of pleasure. Pleasure is a byproduct of virtuous action: it does not enter at all into the reasons why virtuous action is virtuous.Aristotle does not think that we literally aim for eudaimonia. Rather, eudaimonia is what we achieve (assuming that we aren’t particularlyunfortunate in the possession of external goods) when we live according to the requirements of reason. Virtue is the largest constituent ina eudaimon life. By contrast, Epicurus holds that virtue is the means to achieve happiness. His theory is eudaimonist in that he holds thatvirtue is indispensable to happiness; but virtue is not a constituent of a eudaimon life, and being virtuous is not (external goods aside)identical with being eudaimon. Rather, according to Epicurus, virtue is only instrumentally related to happiness. So whereas Aristotle wouldnot say that one ought to aim for virtue in order to attain pleasure, Epicurus would endorse this claim.

The StoicsStoic philosophy begins with Zeno of Citium c.300 BCE, and was developed by Cleanthes (331–232 BCE) and Chrysippus (c.280–c.206 BCE) into a formidable systematic unity.[7] Zenobelieved happiness was a "good flow of life"; Cleanthes suggested it was "living in agreementwith nature", and Chrysippus believed it was "living in accordance with experience of whathappens by nature."[7] Stoic ethics is a particularly strong version of eudaimonism. According tothe Stoics, virtue is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. (This thesis is generally regardedas stemming from the Socrates of Plato’s earlier dialogues.) We saw earlier that theconventional Greek concept of arete is not quite the same as that denoted by virtue, which hasChristian connotations of charity, patience, and uprightness, since arete includes many non-moral virtues such as physical strength and beauty. However, the Stoic concept of arete is muchnearer to the Christian conception of virtue, which refers to the moral virtues. However, unlikeChristian understandings of virtue, righteousness or piety, the Stoic conception does not placeas great an emphasis on mercy, forgiveness, self- abasement (i.e. the ritual process of declaringcomplete powerlessness and humility before God), charity and self- sacrificial love, though thesebehaviors/mentalities are not necessarily spurned by the Stoics (they are spurned by otherphilosophers of Antiquity). Rather Stoicism emphasizes states such as justice, honesty,moderation, simplicity, self- discipline, resolve, fortitude, and courage (states which Christianityalso encourages).

The Stoics make a radical claim that the eudaimon life is the morally virtuous life. Moral virtue is good, and moral vice is bad, andeverything else, such as health, honour and riches, are merely ‘neutral’.[7] The Stoics therefore are committed to saying that externalgoods such as wealth and physical beauty are not really good at all. Moral virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. In this,they are akin to Cynic philosophers such as Antisthenes and Diogenes in denying the importance to eudaimonia of external goods andcircumstances, such as were recognized by Aristotle, who thought that severe misfortune (such as the death of one’s family and friends)could rob even the most virtuous person of eudaimonia. This Stoic doctrine re-emerges later in the history of ethical philosophy in thewritings of Immanuel Kant, who argues that the possession of a "good will" is the only unconditional good. One difference is that whereasthe Stoics regard external goods as neutral, as neither good nor bad, Kant’s position seems to be that external goods are good, but only

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so far as they are a condition to achieving happiness.

Eudaimonia and modern moral philosophyInterest in the concept of eudaimonia and ancient ethical theory more generally enjoyed a revival in the twentieth century. ElizabethAnscombe in her article "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) argued that duty based conceptions of morality are conceptually incoherentfor they are based on the idea of a "law without a lawgiver".[8] She claims a system of morality conceived along the lines of the TenCommandments depends on someone having made these rules.[9] Anscombe recommends a return to the eudaimonistic ethical theoriesof the ancients, particularly Aristotle, which ground morality in the interests and well being of human moral agents, and can do so withoutappealing to any such lawgiver.

Julia Driver in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains:

Anscombe's article Modern Moral Philosophy stimulated the development of virtue ethics as an alternative to Utilitarianism,Kantian Ethics, and Social Contract theories. Her primary charge in the article is that, as secular approaches to moral theory,they are without foundation. They use concepts such as ‘morally ought,’ ‘morally obligated,’ ‘morally right,’ and so forth thatare legalistic and require a legislator as the source of moral authority. In the past God occupied that role, but systems thatdispense with God as part of the theory are lacking the proper foundation for meaningful employment of those concepts.[10]

Eudaimonia and modern psychologyFurther information: Psychological well-being

Models of eudaimonia in psychology emerged out of early work on self- actualisation and the means of its accomplishment byresearchers such as Erikson, Allport, and Maslow.[11] The psychologist C. D. Ryff highlighted the distinction between eudaimoniawellbeing, which she identified as psychological well- being, and hedonic wellbeing or pleasure. Building on Aristotelian ideals of belongingand benefiting others, flourishing, thriving and exercising excellence, she conceptualised eudaimonia as a six- factor structure :

1. Autonomy2. Personal growth3. Self-acceptance4. Purpose in life5. Environmental mastery6. Positive relations with others.

Importantly, she also produced scales for assessing mental health.[11]

This factor structure has been debated, [12][13] but has generated much research in wellbeing, health and successful aging.

GeneticsIndividual differences in both overall Eudaimonia, identified loosely with self- control and in the facets of eudaimonia are heritable.

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Evidence from one study supports 5 independent genetic mechanisms underlying the Ryff facets of this trait, leading to a genetic constructof eudaimonia in terms of general self- control, and four subsidiary biological mechanisms enabling the psychological capabilities ofpurpose, agency, growth, and positive social relations [14]

Etymology and translat ionIn terms of its etymology, eudaimonia is an abstract noun derived from eu meaning “well” and daimon (daemon), which refers to a minordeity or a guardian spirit.[3]

Eudaimonia implies a positive and divine state of being that man is able to strive toward and possibly reach. A literal view of eudaimoniameans achieving a state of being similar to benevolent deity, or being protected and looked after by a benevolent deity. As this would beconsidered the most positive state to be in, the word is often translated as 'happiness' although incorporating the divine nature of the wordextends the meaning to also include the concepts of being fortunate, or blessed. Despite this etymology, however, discussions ofeudaimonia in ancient Greek ethics are often conducted independently of any super-natural significance.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, (1095a15–22) Aristotle says that eudaimonia means ’doing and living well’. It is significant that synonyms foreudaimonia are living well and doing well. On the standard English translation, this would be to say that ‘happiness is doing well and livingwell’. The word ‘happiness’ does not entirely capture the meaning of the Greek word. One important difference is that happiness oftenconnotes being or tending to be in a certain pleasant state of consciousness. For example, when we say of someone that “he is a veryhappy man,” we usually mean that he seems subjectively contented with the way things are going in his life. We mean to imply that hefeels good about the way things are going for him. In contrast, eudaimonia is a more encompassing notion than feeling happy sinceevents that do not contribute to one’s experience of feeling happy may affect one’s eudaimonia.

Eudaimonia depends on all the things that would make us happy if we knew of their existence, but quite independently of whether we doknow about them. Ascribing eudaimonia to a person, then, may include ascribing such things as being virtuous, being loved and havinggood friends. But these are all objective judgments about someone’s life: they concern a person’s really being virtuous, really beingloved, and really having fine friends. This implies that a person who has evil sons and daughters will not be judged to be eudaimoniceven if he or she does not know that they are evil and feels pleased and contented with the way they have turned out (happy).Conversely, being loved by your children would not count towards your happiness if you did not know that they loved you (and perhapsthought that they did not), but it would count towards your eudaimonia. So eudaimonia corresponds to the idea of having an objectivelygood or desirable life, to some extent independently of whether one knows that certain things exist or not. It includes consciousexperiences of well being, success, and failure, but also a whole lot more. (See Aristotle’s discussion: Nicomachean Ethics, book 1.10–1.11.)

Because of this discrepancy between the meaning of eudaimonia and happiness, some alternative translations have been proposed.W.D. Ross suggests "well- being" and John Cooper proposes "flourishing". These translations may avoid some of the misleadingassociations carried by "happiness" although each tends to raise some problems of its own. In some modern texts therefore, the otheralternative is to leave the term in an English form of the original Greek, as "eudaimonia".

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Eudaemon (mythology)EupraxsophyFellowship of ReasonHumanismNicomachean EthicsPhronesisSummum bonumVirtue ethics

References1. ^ Daniel N. Robinson. (1999). Aristo tle's Psycho logy. Published by Daniel N. Robinson. ISBN 0-9672066-0-X ISBN 978-09672066082. ^ Rosalind Hursthouse (July 18, 2007). "Virtue Ethics" . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Retrieved 2010-06-05. "But although modern

virtue ethics does not have to take the form known as "neo-Aristo telian", almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancientGreek philosophy by the employment o f three concepts derived from it. These are areté (excellence or virtue) phronesis (practical o r moralwisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing.) As modern virtue ethics has grown and more people have becomefamiliar with its literature, the understanding o f these terms has increased, but it is still the case that readers familiar only with modernphilosophy tend to misinterpret them."

3. ^ a b Verena von Pfetten (09-4-08). "5 Things Happy People Do" . Huffington Post. Retrieved 2010-06-05. "But researchers now believe thateudaimonic well-being may be more important. Cobbled from the Greek eu ("good") and daimon ("spirit" o r "deity"), eudaimonia meansstriving toward excellence based on one's unique talents and potential—Aristo tle considered it to be the noblest goal in life. In his time, theGreeks believed that each child was blessed at birth with a personal daimon embodying the highest possible expression o f his or her nature.One way they envisioned the daimon was as a go lden figurine that would be revealed by cracking away an outer layer o f cheap pottery (theperson's baser exterio r). The effort to know and realize one's most go lden self—"personal growth," in today's vernacular—is now the centralconcept o f eudaimonia, which has also come to include continually taking on new challenges and fulfilling one's sense o f purpose in life."

4. ^ Aristo tle, also David Ross, Lesley Brown (1980). "The Nicomachean Ethics" . Oxford University Press. Retrieved 2010-06-05. "Verballythere is very general agreement, fo r both the general run o f men and people o f superior refinement..."

5. ^ Uncertain (19 September 2008). "How "God" functioned in Socrates' life" . DD:Religion. Retrieved 2010-06-05. "Men o f Athens, I amgrateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall no t cease to practicephilosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to po int out to any o f you whom I happen to meet: "Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen o fthe greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth,reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state o f your soul?""

6 . ^ Richard Parry (Aug 7, 2009). "Ancient Ethical Theory" . Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy. Retrieved 2010-06-05. "Socrates says that aman worth anything at all does not reckon whether his course o f action endangers his life or threatens death. He looks only at one thing —whether what he does is just or not, the work o f a good or o f a bad man (28b–c)."

7. ^ a b c Dirk Baltzly (Feb 7, 2008). "Sto icism" . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Retrieved 2010-06-05. "But what is happiness? TheEpicureans' answer was deceptively straightforward: the happy life is the one which is most pleasant. (But their account o f what the highestpleasure consists in was not at all straightforward.) Zeno 's answer was "a good flow o f life" (Arius Didymus, 63A) or "living in agreement", andCleanthes clarified that with the formulation that the end was "living in agreement with nature" (Arius Didymus, 63B). Chrysippus amplified this

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to (among o ther fo rmulations) "living in accordance with experience o f what happens by nature"; later Sto ics inadvisably, in response toAcademic attacks, substituted such formulations as "the rational selection o f the primary things according to nature." The Sto ics' specificationof what happiness consists in cannot be adequately understood apart from their views about value and human psycho logy."

8 . ^ "The ethics o f virtue: The Ethics o f Virtue and the Ethics o f Right Action" . wutsamada.com. 2010-06-05. Retrieved 2010-06-05. "legalisticethics rest on the incoherent notion o f a "law" without a lawgiver: DCT unacceptable; and the alternative sources o f moral "legislation" areinadequate substitutes"

9 . ^ G. E. M. Anscombe (January 1958). "Modern Moral Philosophy" . Philosophy 33, No. 124. Retrieved 2010-06-05. "Originally published inPhilosophy 33, No. 124 (January 1958). ... The first is that it is not pro fitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid asideat any rate until we have an adequate philosophy o f psycho logy, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts o fobligation, and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and o f the moral sense o f"ought", ought to be jettisoned if this is psycho logically possible; because they are survivals, o r derivatives from survivals, from an earlierconception o f ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between thewell‑known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are o f little importance."

10. ^ Julia Driver (Jul 21, 2009). "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe: 5.1 Virtue Ethics" . Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy. Retrieved2010-06-05. "In the past God occupied that ro le, but systems that dispense with God as part o f the theory are lacking the proper foundationfor meaningful employment o f those concepts."

11. ^ a b C. D. Ryff. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning o f psycho logical well-being. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology , 57 , 1069-1081.

12. ^ K. W. Springer, R. M. Hauser and J. Freese. (2006). Bad news indeed for Ryff's six-factor model o f well-being. Social Science Research , 35 ,1120-1131.

13. ^ C. D. Ryff and B. H. Singer. (2006). Best news yet on the six-factor model o f well-being. Social Science Research , 35 , 1103-1119.14. ^ D. Archontaki, G. J. Lewis and T. C. Bates. (2012). Genetic influences on psycho logical well-being: A nationally representative twin study.

Journal of Personality 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2012.00787.x

Further readingAckrill, J. L. (1981) Aristotle the Philosopher . Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-289118-9Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) Modern Moral Philosophy . Philosophy 33; repr. in G.E.M. Anscombe (1981), vol. 3, 26–42.Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics, translated by Martin Oswald (1962). New York: The Bobs-Merrill Company.Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1 and 2 , rev. ed. Jonathan Barnes, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1984].Bollingen Foundation, 1995. ASIN: B000J0HP5EBroadie, Sarah W. (1991) Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ASIN: B000VM6T34Cicero. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum : "On Ends", H. Rackham, trans. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1914). Latin text with old- fashioned and not always philosophically precise English translation.Epicurus. "Letter to Menoeceus, Principal Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings," 28–40 in B. Inwood and L. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy:Introductory Readings, Second Edition Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998. ISBN 0-87220-378-6Irwin, T. H. (1995) Plato’s Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Long, A. A., and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol 1 and 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)Norton, David L. (1976) Personal Destinies , Princeton University Press.

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Plato. Plato's Complete Works, John M. Cooper, ed. Translated by D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997. ISBN0-87220-349-2Urmson, J. O. (1988) Aristotle’s Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.Vlastos, G. (1991) Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-9787-6McMahon, Darrin M., Happiness: A History , Atlantic Monthly Press, November 28, 2005. ISBN 0-87113-886-7McMahon, Darrin M., The History of Happiness: 400 B.C. – A.D. 1780 , Daedalus journal, Spring 2004.

External linksAncient Ethical Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyAristotle's Ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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