EU as a Security Actor Term Paper

Sean P. Maguire

EU: THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR

Final Paper

12/14/15

I. Introduction

A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of fear and insecurity presented by Islamic

terrorism. The ‗enemy‘, it appears, is able to strike both abroad and at home. With refugees

streaming in from conflict zones around the world and two blood-curling terrorist attacks

perpetrated in France in the past year by citizens of Europe, the EU finds itself in a crisis.

The EU finds itself in a crisis of its own making; a crisis wherein, as Angela Merkel so

delicately put it, integration has utterly failed. However, did this have to be the case? Is the

current predicament of Europe wherein failed integration of mostly Muslim minority groups

presents a security risk a foregone conclusion? In the opinion of this writer: no. Europe‘s

failed integration of minority groups, wherein they have now created multiple breeding

grounds for radicalization, is a direct outcome of the securitization of the issue of

immigration by the EU and the member states. In relying far too much on their ‗security

toolbox‘ and not enough on their ‗integration toolbox, they have in attempting to create

Fortress Europe they have also created Fortress Clichy-sous-Bois.

As such, I will demonstrate two points: the securitization of immigration at the EU level

has led to directly to the current security/insecurity nexus, wherein radicalization has found

multiple homes across Europe and that in order to unravel this nexus, the EU must drop its

‗security toolbox‘ and pick up its ‗integration toolbox. In doing so, the EU must assume new

competencies that were previously the reserve of the State. In order to demonstrate this I will

proceed in several delineated sections, drawing at a close with the necessary policy

suggestion. However, first the paper will begin with defining what I am arguing against

(securitization of immigration) and what I am arguing for (integration) and why this policy

change needs to be made (radicalization). I will then proceed with an examination of the

history of the securitization of immigration, demonstrating how this led to the failure of

integration, and, as such, radicalization.

I. Securitization, Integration, and Radicalization

The relationship between these three terms underlies all aspects of this paper. We need to

recognize that we are not discussing several stand-alone topics, each operating in a vacuum, but

that ―there is a comprehensive linkage made between immigration, national security, and

integration…A failure to understand that there is an important holistic linkage between the three

elements detracts from our understanding of how they influence each other‖.1 As such, we need

to define the pillars of our discussion for proper understanding to take place.

Securitization

It begins with a simple premise: the concept that the world, including threats to security,

is a social construct. As such, what matters is to what degree the issue is perceived as a threat.

Through securitization, security is defined as a speech act, ―with securitization referring to that

1 Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich “Immigration: Tensions, Dilemmas, and Unresolved Questions”, in

Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 321.

form of linguistic representation that positioned a particular issue as an existential threat‖.2

However, there is also an emphasis put on actions, practices, or ‗tools of securitization‘, wherein

we understand it to be a ―‗device embodying a specific threat image through which public

actions is configured in order to address a security issue‘…[they] are activities that, by their very

intrinsic qualities, convey the idea to those who observe them, directly or indirectly, that the

issue they are tackling is a security threat‖.3 Thus, you designate something as a threat through a

speech act, assume the powers needed to deal with this threat, the act of displaying these powers

demonstrates to the audience that the issue should be perceived as a threat, and now the audience

has a permanent association of the issue as that of a threat, wherein certain extraordinary

practices are justified.

The danger with securitization is that the issue is now construed in terms of survival.

Survival depends on both control and eliminating the source of the threat, whose mere existence

is enough to warrant concern and action.4 Securitization, in of itself, is not a bad thing. The point

must be stated that I am not all in all against securitization. The issue is when this is applied to

issues if immigration and asylum, this general definition conveys ―the idea that asylum-seekers

and migrants are a security threat to the EU‖.5 The image of these peoples as existential threats,

as standing apart and against the EU is incredibly hard to shake. Applied as such, securitization

creates the issue of internal security by not allowing proper integration to take place. You don‘t

integrate threats, you fight against them.

2 Matt McDonald. “Securitization and the Construction of Security.” European Journal of International Relations

vol. 14 no. 4 (December 2008), 5-6. 3 Sarah Leonard, “EU Border Security and Migration into the EU: FRONTEX and Securitization through Practices”,

European Security, 19 (2) (2010), 237. 4 Faist, Thomas. “Extension du Domaine de la Lutte: International Migration and Security Before and After 9/11.”

International Migration Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, (2002), 11. 5 Sarah Leonard, “EU Border Security and Migration into the EU: FRONTEX and Securitization through Practices”,

European Security, 19 (2) (2010), 237.

Integration

It is an issue that is complicated in that is has both formal and informal characteristics. It

involves not only formal rights on paper but economic and social integration, raising ―issues of

poverty, social and urban exclusion, unemployment, civic participation, education and

religion…it questions the ability of national governments to address problems at the very heart of

their sovereignty‖.6 Yet, we need some anchor to address the issue of the roughly twenty million

Muslims living in Europe. As such, when we speak of integration, we speak of ―the processes

that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants to obtain the valued ‗stuff‘ of

a society…[it] implies parity of life chances with members of the native majority group and

being recognized as a legitimate part of the national community‖.7

As such, we are not speaking only of persons ‗fresh off the boat‘, but ―individuals who

are often citizens in name but do not exercise social citizenship and who, sometimes, are not

culturally integrated. It deals with the descendants of guest workers, who are born and raised in

Europe, who are socially and spatially excluded8…[people who] are not protected against

discrimination because [they] possess an identity card‖.9 The issue at hand is then in actuality

twenty million separate issues being rolled into one. This recognition of the individual level is

6 Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration,

Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 222. 7 Alba, Richard; Foner, Nancy. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America

and Western Europe. Prince ton University Press. Kindle Edition. 4-5. 8 Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration,

Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 223. 9 Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration,

Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 216.

necessary, because while we speak of the dangers of radicalization, we only need one person,

once action, to be construed as representative of a group.

Radicalization

A word often conflated with Islamic terrorism but in actuality only a stepping stone of the

path towards it. Radicalization is the process by which ―individuals are introduced to overtly

ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream

beliefs towards extreme views‖.10

This is not a process that takes place in a vacuum but in cities

and suburbs around Europe. A process that take place in an environment where ―security policies

[have] encourage[d] xenophobic tendencies, [while] the rhetoric of policymakers focus[ing] on

the need for assimilation and acceptance, and social policies that do not address the particular

needs of migrants and their descendants…often lead[ing] to widespread xenophobia one side and

violent radicalism on the other‖.11

Thus, Islamic terrorism is not a foregone conclusion of

radicalization.

Radicalization at its most basic is opposition to the status quo. However, in the current

context of pre-dominantly Muslim minority groups, Islamic fundamentalism becomes a much

more natural next step after radicalization. Radicalization manifests itself in a generation that ―

‗saw how their parents were treated and felt deeply resentful…[a] generation [that] felt excluded,

discriminated against, and most of all humiliated…[that feels] French, but [are] regarded as

Arabic…[that] have the sense that they are living in a disenfranchised ghetto and then there is the

10

Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, & Michael King. The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism. (London: Magdalen House, 2010), 18. 11

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich “Immigration: Tensions, Dilemmas, and Unresolved Questions”, in Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 322.

process of self-radicalization‖.12

This situation is a direct outcome of the securitization of

immigration and the subsequent failure of integration. Let us turn, first, to examine how this

came to be at the EU level.

II. The History of the Securitization of Immigration

First and foremost, the securitization of immigration at the EU level must be

recognized as a direct reflection of the interest of its member states. The provisions

introduced into the Schengen Agreement, reflective of the most restrictive national

polices at the time, are testimony to this.13

This was the outcome of a gradual change in

perception and willingness of the nations of Europe to play host to immigrant

communities. Immigrants were now perceived to be threatening access to both jobs and

social benefits for native communities as well as diluting national identity and tearing

apart social cohesion14

. As such, the first speech acts of the securitization of immigration

presented them as a threat to the perceived national understanding of society. Urban

problems such as, violence, segregation, and ―ghettoization‖ were being linked directly to

issues of immigration

Yet, individually, European states had come to the conclusion that they could not deal

with this newly determined security issue alone. They had spent the 1970s and early 80s

12

David Jones. “Inside the immigrant ghettoes where terror breeds: Concrete warren divided into 'boxes' houses 10,000 Muslims in grim Parisian enclave.” The Daily Mail 8 January 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2902690/The-immigrant-ghettoes-terror-breeds-Concrete-warren-divided-boxes-houses-10-000-Muslims-grim-Parisian-enclave.html. 11 December 2015. 13

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 220. 14

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 207.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2902690/The-immigrant-ghettoes-terror-breeds-Concrete-warren-divided-boxes-houses-10-000-Muslims-grim-Parisian-enclave.html



learning this the hard way: attempting to redefine nationality, create zero-migration, and

dealing with the rise of right-wing parties; all due to the perceived threat of immigrants to

social benefits and employment.15

Their coordination through the Schengen Agreements

and the Dublin Convention allowed for the exclusionary concept of the ―free movements

of persons‖.16

As a result, most notably with the 1990 Convention Applying the

Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, a formal-European-wide connection was made

between immigration & asylum, and terrorism, transnational crime, and border control.

As a result, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees were framed as a security problem

which entails a different toolbox and polices then if they were treated as labor or human

rights issues.17

There was a common security threat and, as such, a common security

policy was created to deal with it.

This intergovernmental cooperation was further solidified in the Maastricht Treaty

with the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Pillar of the EU. The placing of

immigration and asylum in the JHA pillar saw ―the creation of Europol [1999]…and the

implementation of the Grotius Program. [As such,] this increased amalgamation of

immigration and security issues (such as drug smuggling, organized crime, and terrorism)

fueled discrimination and encouraged extreme right-wing propaganda activities‖.18

Thus,

a situation was created wherein laws and policies meant to handle this ‗security issue‘

15

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 207-208, 16


Huysmans, Jef. “The EU and the Securitization of Migration.” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5,. (December 2000),757. 18


make the threat [migrants] even more noticeable as something alien and, in turn, amplify

the perception of them as a threat. While on the converse side, though not the target

audience, the migrant recognized these actions and the perception that drives them,

perceiving themselves to be more alienated as well and creating a more concrete divide.19

The securitization of immigration became complete with Treaty of Amsterdam (1999)

making the issues of immigration and asylum issues of common interest for the EU, to be

decided under the co-decision procedure (under the Treaty of Nice). This culmination

began with the introduction of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) by the

Treaty of Amsterdam and the subsequent reaffirmation in the AFSJ of the most restrictive

controls on immigration and asylum policy of the member states.20

First, the AFSJ‘s new institutional and policy initiatives focused primarily on external

border controls and the perceived correlation of the threat from terrorism. 21

Furthermore,

under the AFSJ a hierarchal system of right-holders has been reinforced with the creation

of a restrictive EU citizenship, wherein citizenship was seen as a way to properly

integrate these third country national (TCNS) legally residing in the EU. However, this

was counterproductive in two ways: the measure only dealt with a small number of

people and excluded the overwhelming majority of TCNs through creating a new ethnic

barrier; and secondly ―nationals of foreign origin are not protected against discrimination

because they possess an identity card. Young members of ethnic groups, especially young

Muslims, consequently feel they are being treated as second-class citizens. Meanwhile

19

Faist, Thomas. “Extension du Domaine de la Lutte: International Migration and Security Before and After 9/11.” International Migration Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2002), 12-13. 20


The completion of the creation of Fortress Europe.

TCNs continue to be denied EU citizenship and their access to specific social and

economic rights remain limited as a result of national legislation. They also reserve the

right to make special rules on employment access in the public sector or other activities

connected with the exercise of official authority‖.22

The result is an internal border demarcation within the EU of the presumed purpose

of an external border. Yes, you may reside in the EU but you, as an individual, are to be

treated as a living enclave of the world outside of Fortress Europe. It is a relationship

lacking any aura of legitimacy; there is little or no reciprocity on the part of the EU and

the member-state from their position as the governor. The degree to which these

individuals hold rights is tethered inversely to how much of a threat they are perceived to

be. A natural relationship built on reciprocity and respect is nearly impossible in this type

of situation.

III. The Current Security/Insecurity Nexus and Policy Suggestions

What can we make of the situation Europe finds itself in; lying in both the shadows of this

year‘s recent attacks in France and the recognition by European leaders, such as Angela Merkel,

that previous attempts at integration and multiculturalism have utterly failed?

De-securitizing Immigration and Asylum Policy

European policymakers need to begin with recognition that for decades now ―immigration

debates in Europe have largely been disconnected from—and often in conflict with—attempts to

22


integrate first-, second-, and even third generation immigrants‖.23

It is in this space that this

disconnect has created (whether they be Molenbek or Clichy-sous-Bois) a breeding ground for

radicalization, as both a physical and social construct: the ghetto. The notion of the ghetto is

more than that of a physical location but a mental one of separation from society of begin apart.

This viewpoint treads both ways. The securitization of immigration has created a perception

amongst the general public wherein ―[immigrant communities] are associated with support for

both the methods and objectives of Al Qaeda (and other terrorist groups) in Europe‖24

, while at

the same time it ―may support the radicalization of minority groups who feel alienated and are

actually suffering from discrimination. [As such,] the roots of insecurity are not only abroad but

also in [Europe‘s] backyard. Internal security is therefore more closely linked with the inability

to provide equal opportunities for all then is currently recognized‖.25

This begins with the de-

securitization of immigration and asylum policy.

The issue of immigration should be treated for what it really is: an issue of labor and

economics. When we speak of immigration, we should refer, as EU Justice Minister Franco

Frattini did in 2007, to it as an issue of ―mobility‖.26

As such, we can begin the de-securitization

of immigration the same way it began: with a speech act. The continuation of economic growth

in Europe that has underlined the social-welfare state system will soon be reaching a point of

crisis due to an aging Europe that. The majority of economic assessments are in agreement that

23

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich “Immigration: Tensions, Dilemmas, and Unresolved Questions”, in Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 322. 24



Shahid M. Amin. “The EU’s Global Approach to Migration: Towards an EU Immigration Policy With Particular Reference to Muslim Immigrants.” Journal of European Studies Vol.30, Issue 2, (Jul 2014), 10.

―in the medium to long term, the [EU], will need to attract significant numbers of skilled workers

from beyond its borders‖.27

As such, immigration should be moved from being an issue handled

by JHA to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council; any realistic long-term plan for Europe‘s

economy is going to have to include a common EU immigration policy that does not treat it as a

security issue but as an issue of economics and the continued validity of the social-welfare state

system.

The same should be done with the EU Asylum Policy, with the creation of a legitimate

Common European Asylum System (CEAS). What we have is a system that is common in name

only; experiences under the current regime have varied for both the member states and

individuals who find themselves caught up in the system. Issues of burden sharing and solidarity

remain hot issues between member states,28

evidenced by the arguments over the past summer

over that very issue between Germany and many of the new eastern editions to the EU. 29

The

CEAS states that ―EU Member States have a shared responsibility to welcome asylum seekers in

a dignified manner, ensuring they are treated fairly and that their case is examined to uniform

standards so that, no matter where an applicant applies, the outcome will be similar‖.30

One need

only look to the past summer to see the difference between paper and reality. As such, we should

recognize the failures of the member-state-centric Dublin system. As it stands, allowing the

member-states to handle the asylum process has not led to a uniform standard with similar

outcomes. Member states still have different definitions for the eligibility of asylum seekers,

27

Reuters Staff. “‘Rambo’ appeal, not the mosque, lures Brussels youths to Islamic State.” Reuters November 24, 2015. http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2015/11/24/rambo-appeal-not-the-mosque-lures-brussels-youths-to-islamic-state/. 12 December 2015. 28

Caitlin Katsiaficas. “The Common European Asylum System as a Protection Tool: Has the European Union Lived Up to Its Promised?” EU Migration Policy Working Paper, No.7. (2014), 5. 29

Ian Trayor. “EU plans migrant quotas forcing states to 'share' burden.” The Guardian 10 May 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/european-commission-migrant-quota-plan-mediterranean-crisis. 13 December 2015. 30

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm

http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2015/11/24/rambo-appeal-not-the-mosque-lures-brussels-youths-to-islamic-state/

http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2015/11/24/rambo-appeal-not-the-mosque-lures-brussels-youths-to-islamic-state/

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/european-commission-migrant-quota-plan-mediterranean-crisis

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/european-commission-migrant-quota-plan-mediterranean-crisis

with different acceptance rates in different member states for people of the same nationality.

Furthermore, some member states simply don‘t have the capacity, or desire, to run a quality

asylum system; a recent report by the European Court of Human Rights calling migrant detention

in Greece ‗inhumane and degrading‘ testimony to the fact.31

Therefore, I am advocating for the creation of a Common European Asylum Service. I am in

full agreement with the CEPS in their position on the matter, that the CEAS should be

―responsible for processing asylum applications and determining responsibilities across the EU,

and with competence for overseeing a uniform application of EU asylum law. The Service could

be modelled along the lines of the European Central Bank or, to be more precise, the European

System of Central Banks (the Eurosystem). The Service would be financed either directly by the

EU budget or via contributions from member states, which would be proportional to their

GDP‖.32

A centralized system would make previous national-laws null and void. Furthermore, it

would decrease tensions by establishing a permanent burden-sharing system, undercutting the

current tensions faced under the Dublin Convention in the desire by certain member-states to

‗kick the can‘. We turn the issue from being a ‗burden‘ into a ‗responsibility.

EU Citizenship

We must address the issue of citizenship and what in entails; for it is only through

citizenship that we can begin to break down the barriers and dismantle the ―us‖ and ―others‖

narrative. As it stands, national governments have preserved their competencies under the EU in

many areas necessary to integration: ―social policy, citizenship requirements, housing policy, and

31

Caitlin Katsiaficas. “The Common European Asylum System as a Protection Tool: Has the European Union Lived Up to Its Promised?” EU Migration Policy Working Paper, No.7. (2014), 11. 32

Elspeth Guild, Cathryn Costello, Madeline Garlick and Violeta Moreno-Lax. “Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin.” CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No.83 (September 2015), 38.

education. The failure of integration [so far] this reflects the failure of these governments to

maintain national cohesion, social equity, economic equity, and respect for fundamental

rights‖.33

Of course issues of social equity, economic equity, and respect for fundamental rights

are questions of: rights for whom and based off of who are right-holders, how do we the states‘

duties to them visa vi social and economic equity?

That is why the issue of citizenship is so important. It is an issue of establishing who is

not a member of the [EU] community, who is ‗in‘ and who is ‗out,‘ translating into drawing the

line between who is and who is not a right holder‖.34

We need to speak of rights because without

rights, we cannot speak of justice. A designation as a TCN is a designation of either not being a

right-holder or to being subject to hierarchy of right-holders of which you have no say in your

position. The legal recognition of a minority of the affected party has done nothing to abate the

discrimination they face on a daily basis nor has it stopped EU-member states from placing a

multitude of formal restrictions on the rights of TCNs.35

Furthermore, the restriction on EU

citizenship through the citizenship of an EU-member state has given member-states the ability to

determine their own duties in the relationship with the people they govern.

Given such circumstances, it would seem paradoxical to hold up EU citizenship as a

pillar for the new order we are attempting at. Yet, the issue of EU citizenship, as often is the case

with the EU, is how shallow it has been. What is needed to make EU citizenship more effective

33


Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics, trans. David Ames Curtis (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2002), 66. 35


and legitimate, is to widen the scope to include all legally-residing TCNs and decouple it from

the prerequisite of being a national of a member-state. Without EU citizenship, TCNs will

continue to have their rights trampled upon. EU citizenship can change that, first and foremost,

by putting them within the prerogative of justice, i.e. being considered right-holders in a society.

This is a needed first step, but beyond that it is a step that can effect further integration because

―the governors enjoy a secure and stable situation only when the roots of their powers plunge

deeply into the society they rule and whose activities they coordinate‖.36

The inclusion of

TCNs37

legally into EU society would make the meeting of their concerns a prerogative of those

in power so as to secure their positions. One of the main concerns of the author is the severe lack

of democratic-agency that these people have. As such, currently with no possibility for

democratic-agency, the path of radicalization becomes much easier to conceptually rationalize

for these individuals. It often said that violence is the voice of the voiceless, we can attempt then

through citizenship and its widening scope to simultaneously drown the voice that rationalizes

violence and presents a new voice and a new agency through the democratic process. Electoral

enfranchisement of the disenfranchised masses can give their concerns an appropriate voice and

at the very least interject their concerns into the discourse. For too long have integration policies

failed because of their exclusive nature.

What we are fighting against is the permanent stature and designation of an underclass

and the dangers it entails. Underclasses are formed ―wherever exclusions – from the employment

system, from higher education, from the benefits of transfer payments, from housing markets,

from family resources, and so on – are compounded. Impoverished social groups, largely

36

Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics, trans. David Ames Curtis (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2002), 66. 37

As such, the designation of TCN would not be used, but is helpful for the discussion here.

cordoned off from the broader society, can no longer improve their social position through their

own efforts. In the long run, a loss of solidarity such as this will inevitably destroy a liberal

political culture whose universalistic self-understanding democratic societies depend on‖.38

Thus, radicalization begins, and the policymakers in turn become the harbinger of their own

insecurity through their actions of securitization. Through the social construction and

externalization of our fears through the process of securitization we have made our own

nightmares into reality. Of course, increased access to and legitimacy of citizenship also

involves social and economic components in two ways: a piece of paper and formal rights

doesn‘t stop discrimination and while expanding citizenship increases its legitimacy, it doesn‘t

suddenly make all other issues disappear. Cherif Kouachi was a French citizen but when asked

by the local Imam to register to vote, he replied that he was not a French citizen and wanted

nothing to do with the democratic process.39

Enfranchisement alone is not enough.

Education & Xenophobia

An often repeated line over the course of the past is that of the perplexing situation

wherein several American students are now left with a larger knowledge base of the EU then the

typical citizen of the EU. A EU-wide core-curriculum must be established in some capacity. It

must accomplish three things: establish an EU standard, teach the history of the EU, and,

recognizing that integration is a two-way street, teach the ‗native‘ populations about these

different cultures.

38

Jurgen Habermas. The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). (Boston: The MIT Press, 2001), 50. 39

David Jones. “Inside the immigrant ghettoes where terror breeds: Concrete warren divided into 'boxes' houses 10,000 Muslims in grim Parisian enclave.” The Daily Mail 8 January 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2902690/The-immigrant-ghettoes-terror-breeds-Concrete-warren-divided-boxes-houses-10-000-Muslims-grim-Parisian-enclave.html. 11 December 2015.




Educational system can play a major and positive role in integration, but as it stands they

―play a major role in generating, indeed perpetuating, inequalities in a new generation. All

studies show that educational outcomes reflect social origins to a greater or lesser extent. Not

surprisingly, schools tend to reproduce inequalities, at least in the aggregate, between native and

immigrant-origin students‖.40

This is so because the degree of standardization has the ability to

have ―significant repercussions for the children of low-status immigrant parents. Insofar as

education is not standardized, immigrant-origin students may attend schools of less-than-average

quality and receive and education inferior to what is available to middle class members of the

native majority‖.41

Groomed to fail by society from the beginning, certain outcomes become

predictable. As such, the EU need assume this competency to ensure that education systems

actually meet the EU legal requirement of ―equal treatment‖.

On the other side of the spectrum, what we have is a lack of knowledge of the history of

the EU and the role immigrants played in the revitalization of Western Europe after WWII. To

put it in the most straight-forward of terms possible: for the European countries rebuilding their

economies and infrastructures after wartime destruction, the immigrants were a godsend.42

The

benefits of immigrants in ensuring the creation of the social-welfare state, which European

peace and prosperity (not to mention the EU) is predicated on is a fact that should be taught in

every classroom in the EU as well a history and respect for these cultures.

40

Alba, Richard; Foner, Nancy. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe. Prince ton University Press. Kindle Edition. 168-169. 41

Alba, Richard; Foner, Nancy. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe. Prince ton University Press. Kindle Edition. 170-171. 42

Alba, Richard; Foner, Nancy. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe. Prince ton University Press. Kindle Edition. 221.

As it stands, the scope of xenophobia is increasing and anti-immigrant sentiments have

been growing for years.43

These communities are faced with the legitimately debilitating issue of

widespread discrimination and profiling. As such, education and public awareness policies need

to be created to combat what constitutes a major road block to integration and a large push factor

in alienation and subsequent radicalization. However, this may perhaps be one of the more

difficult tasks for the EU, as both the EU and member-states have pushed a series of anti-

discrimination measures since 2000.44

However, as evidenced, they have proven ineffective,

particularly due to lack of recognition that ―discrimination is based on prejudices that often have

more to do with the characteristics of host societies than those of immigrants…[it] is rooted in a

series of factors: dissatisfaction with life circumstances, fear of unemployment, insecurity about

the future, and a low confidence in public authorities‖.45

Any and all education/anti-

discrimination programs will be doomed to failure if they do not take these factors into account.

The issues of education and xenophobia run in conjunction and notably exert their influence on

the next area of policy recommendation: socioeconomics.

Socioeconomic Policy

In discussing needed changes to socioeconomic policy, I will be highlighting three sub-

policy areas: employment, housing, and prison reform. The securitization of immigration began

and is still abetted by fears of unemployment for the ‗native‘ workforce. Yet, in fact, youth

43

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 219-220. 44



unemployment in migrant communities, as indicated by former EC head Jose Barrosso, is a

serious problem.46

Going beyond simply the youth, Eurostat data from 2014 shows that, all in all,

unemployment is a serious issue for non-EU citizens, running 10% higher than EU nationals.47

Furthermore, these numbers do not even take into account the chronically high unemployment

for EU-nationals who are a member of a minority group. Left unaddressed, these issues can lead

to groups of people very susceptible for radicalization; unemployed, discriminated against, and

alienated in their communities, their daily lives become a demonstration that the status-quo is not

working in their favor. All in all, most would say that Europe is in need of a jobs program.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to postulate on the issue of austerity in Europe but

suffice to say economic and social integration will not likely happen in an austerity environment.

That being said, recommendations can still be made for the EU. First, the EU, should make

illegal all employment restrictions on TCNs48

. No categories of individuals should be excluded

from anything for economic reasons. I offer one problem as a new solution to this crisis.

European cities have seen a substantial rise in socio-economic segregation over the past several

decades, creating spatial isolation and distance that reinforces this divide. This divide carries an

extreme correlation with ethnic divides.49

As such, the current blueprints of many major

European cities do not offer a pathway towards integration. National mandates should be

established to make more integrated cities: more public housing in central locations, expansions

46

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 223-224. 47

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explainedg/index.php/Migrant_integration_statistics_-_employment#Main_statistical_findings 48

Those who have not met the new requirement for citizenship, as well as recognizing certain national security restrictions. 49

Richard Florida. “Economic Segregation and Inequality in Europe's Cities.” The Atlantic 16 Nov 2015. http://www.citylab.com/work/2015/11/economic-segregation-and-inequality-in-europes-cities/415920/. 13 December 2015.

http://www.citylab.com/work/2015/11/economic-segregation-and-inequality-in-europes-cities/415920/

of public transportation systems, tax-breaks for housing-builders who reserve subsidized

housing, etc. No longer should the states of Europe be able to cordon off these communities or

push them out of view to the periphery. At the same time, this can be presented as a jobs

program for the affected communities.

Obviously, this alone will not solve the issue of unemployment in these communities. It

is, however, a positive first step. What is needed quite bluntly is a Stimulus Bill, such as the one

the EC prescribed in 2008.50

At the time, the plan already included a major employment support

system. The blueprints for these original initiatives need to be seized upon and expanded. At the

same time, stipulations must be written in, that in order to access these funds a certain percentage

of these funds must be spent on public-works projects focused on integration, job-training for

immigrant communities, and minimum employment quota of minority groups. However, it must

not be presented as an ‗immigrant-stimulus bill‘ but as a Pan-European one: we rise together, we

sink together.

IV. Conclusion

Therein lies the paradox of my argument. I have spent these past twenty odd pages

rallying against securitization but I now must make clear that we need securitization for

integration to work; that is to say to justify the transferring of competencies to the EU and the

enhancing of the ones they have. What must be presented as the threat is the collapse of the

European-welfare state system. Integration must then be presented as part of the solution, as the

necessary security act to enhance the validity of the economy. Immigration debates were

detached from integration due to the securitization of immigration by the EU and its member-

50

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-735_en.htm

states; integration was obstructed and fell to the side. We cannot rewrite our histories or erase the

past, but we can learn from it. It is my hopes that the combination of historical analysis and

policy prescription can do just that. The world is what we perceive it to be and as such what we

can make it to be but that cannot be done if we erect boundaries against ourselves.

Documents

EU as a Security Actor Term Paper