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Ethnicity without groups

I. Common sense groupism

F science concepts would seem as basic, even indis-pensable, as that of group. In disciplinary terms, ‘group’ would appearto be a core concept for sociology, political science, anthropology,demography and social psychology. In substantive terms, it would seemto be fundamental to the study of political mobilization, cultural iden-tity, economic interests, social class, status groups, collective action,kinship, gender, religion, ethnicity, race, multiculturalism, and minori-ties of every kind.

Yet despite this seeming centrality, the concept ‘group’ has remainedcuriously unscrutinized in recent years. There is, to be sure, a substantialsocial psychological literature addressing the concept (Hamilton et al., McGrath ), but this has had little resonance outside thatsub-discipline. Elsewhere in the social sciences, the recent literatureaddressing the concept ‘group’ is sparse, especially by comparison withthe immense literature on such concepts as class, identity, gender, eth-nicity, or multiculturalism—topics in which the concept ‘group’ isimplicated, yet seldom analyzed its own terms (). ‘Group’ functions asa seemingly unproblematic, taken-for-granted concept, apparently in noneed of particular scrutiny or explication. As a result, we tend to take forgranted not only the concept ‘group’, but also ‘groups’—the putativethings-in-the-world to which the concept refers.

Earlier versions of this paper were presentedto the conference ‘Facing Ethnic Conflicts’,Center for Development Research, Universityof Bonn, December , ; the WorkingGroup on Ethnicity and Nationalism, UCLA,January , ; the Anthropology Collo-quium, University of Chicago, February ,; and the Central European University,Budapest, March , . Thanks to partici-pants in these events for their comments andcriticisms, and to Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox,

Liana Grancea, David Laitin, Mara Loveman,Emanuel Schegloff, Peter Stamatov, PeterWaldmann, and Andreas Wimmer for helpfulwritten comments.

() Foundational discussions include Coo-ley [], chapter and Homans insociology; Nadel , chapter in anthropo-logy; Bentley , chapter and Truman in political science. More recent discus-sions include Olson , Tilly andHechter .

Rogers B,Universityof California (LosAngeles).Arch.europ. sociol.,XLIII, (),-—-//-$.perart+$.perpage©A.E.S.

http://www.journals.cambridge.org


My aim in this paper is not to enter into conceptual or definitionalcasuistry about the concept of group. It is rather to address one problem-atic consequence of this tendency to take groups for granted in the studyof ethnicity, race and nationhood, and in the study of ethnic, racial andnational conflict in particular. This is what I will call groupism: thetendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homo-geneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of sociallife, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units ofsocial analysis (). In the domain of ethnicity, nationalism and race, Imean by ‘groupism’ the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations andraces as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attrib-uted. I mean the tendency to reify such groups, speaking of Serbs,Croats, Muslims and Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, of Catholicsand Protestants in Northern Ireland, of Jews and Palestinians in Israeland the occupied territories, of Turks and Kurds in Turkey, or ofBlacks, Whites, Asians, Hispanics and Native Americans in the U.S. as ifthey were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, evenunitary collective actors with common purposes. I mean the tendency torepresent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic ofmonochrome ethnic, racial or cultural blocs.

From the perspective of broader developments in social theory, thepersisting strength of groupism in this sense is surprising. After all,several distinct traditions of social analysis have challenged the treat-ment of groups as real, substantial things-in-the-world. These includesuch sharply differing enterprises as ethnomethodology and conversa-tion analysis, social network theory, cognitive theory, feminist theory,and individualist approaches such as rational choice and game theory.More generally, broadly structuralist approaches have yielded to avariety of more ‘constructivist’ theoretical stances, which tend—at thelevel of rhetoric, at least—to see groups as constructed, contingent, andfluctuating. And a diffuse postmodernist sensibility emphasizes thefragmentary, the ephemeral, and the erosion of fixed forms and clearboundaries. These developments are disparate, even contradictory inanalytical style, methodological orientation and epistemological com-mitments. Network theory, with its methodological (and sometimesontological) relationalism (Emirbayer and Goodwin ; Wellman

() In this very general sense, groupismextends well beyond the domain of ethnicity,race and nationalism to include accounts ofputative groups based on gender, sexuality,age, class, abledness, religion, minority status,and any kind of ‘culture’, as well as putative

groups based on combinations of these cat-egorical attributes. Yet while recognizing thatit is a wider tendency in social analysis, I limitmy discussion here to groupism in the study ofethnicity, race and nationalism.



) is opposed to rational choice theory, with its methodological (andsometimes ontological) individualism; both are sharply and similarlyopposed, in analytical style and epistemological commitments, to post-modernist approaches. Yet these and other developments have converg-ed in problematizing groupness and undermining axioms of stablegroup being.

Challenges to ‘groupism’, however, have been uneven. They havebeen striking—to take just one example—in the study of class, especiallyin the study of the working class, a term that is hard to use today withoutquotation marks or some other distancing device. Yet ethnic groupscontinue to be understood as entities and cast as actors. To be sure,constructivist approaches of one kind or another are now dominant inacademic discussions of ethnicity. Yet everyday talk, policy analysis,media reports, and even much ostensibly constructivist academic writ-ing routinely frame accounts of ethnic, racial and national conflict ingroupist terms as the struggles ‘of’ ethnic groups, races, and nations ().Somehow, when we talk about ethnicity, and even more so when we talkabout ethnic conflict, we almost automatically find ourselves talkingabout ethnic groups.

Now it might be asked: ‘What’s wrong with this?’ After all, it seemsto be mere common sense to treat ethnic struggles as the struggles ofethnic groups, and ethnic conflict as conflict between such groups. Iagree that this is the—or at least a—common-sense view of the matter.But we cannot rely on common sense here. Ethnic common sense—thetendency to partition the social world into putatively deeply constituted,quasi-natural intrinsic kinds (Hirschfeld )—is a key part of what wewant to explain, not what we want to explain things with; it belongs toour empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit (). Cognitive anthro-pologists and social psychologists have accumulated a good deal of evi-dence about common-sense ways of carving up the social world—aboutwhat Lawrence Hirschfeld () has called ‘folk sociologies’. The evi-dence suggests that some common sense social categories—and notably

() For useful critical analyses of mediarepresentations of ethnic violence, see the col-lection of essays in Allen and Seaton , aswell as Seaton .

() This is perhaps too sharply put. To theextent that such intrinsic-kind categories areindeed constitutive of common-sense under-standings of the social world, to the extent thatsuch categories are used as a resource for par-ticipants, and are demonstrably deployed ororiented to by participants in interaction, they

can also serve as a resource for analysts. But asEmanuel Schegloff notes in another context,with respect to the category ‘interruption’, thefact that this is a vernacular, common-sensecategory for participants ‘does not make it afirst-order category usable for professionalanalysis. Rather than being employed in pro-fessional analysis, it is better treated as a targetcategory for professional analysis’ (: ).The same might well be said of common senseethnic categories.



common sense ethnic and racial categories—tend to be essentializingand naturalizing (Rothbart and Taylor ; Hirschfeld ; Gil-White ). They are the vehicles of what has been called a ‘partici-pants’ primordialism’ (Smith : ) or a ‘psychological essential-ism’ (Medin ). We obviously cannot ignore such common senseprimordialism. But that does not mean we should simply replicate it inour scholarly analyses or policy assessments. As ‘analysts of naturaliz-ers’, we need not be ‘analytic naturalizers’ (Gil-White : ).

Instead, we need to break with vernacular categories and common-sense understandings. We need to break, for example, with the seeming-ly obvious and uncontroversial point that ethnic conflict involves conflictbetween ethnic groups. I want to suggest that ethnic conflict—or whatmight better be called ethnicized or ethnically framed conflict—neednot, and should not, be understood as conflict between ethnic groups, justas racial or racially framed conflict need not be understood as conflictbetween races, or nationally framed conflict as conflict between nations.

Participants, of course, regularly do represent ethnic, racial andnational conflict in such groupist, even primordialist terms. They oftencast ethnic groups, races or nations as the protagonists—the heroes andmartyrs—of such struggles. But this is no warrant for analysts to do so.We must, of course, take vernacular categories and participants’understandings seriously, for they are partly constitutive of our objectsof study. But we should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopoliticalpractice as our categories of social analysis. Apart from the general unre-liability of ethnic common sense as a guide for social analysis, we shouldremember that participants’ accounts—especially those of specialists inethnicity such as ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, who, unlike nonspecial-ists, may live ‘off’ as well as ‘for’ ethnicity—often have what PierreBourdieu has called a performative character. By invoking groups, theyseek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being. Their catego-ries are for doing—designed to stir, summon, justify, mobilize, kindle andenergize. By reifying groups, by treating them as substantial things-in-the-world, ethnopolitical entrepreneurs may, as Bourdieu notes,‘contribute to producing what they apparently describe or des-ignate’ (a: ) ().

Reification is a social process, not simply an intellectual bad habit. Asa social process, it is central to the practice of politicized ethnicity. And

() Such performative, group-making prac-tices, of course, are not specific to ethnicentrepreneurs, but generic to political mobili-

zation and representation (Bourdieu b:-).



appropriately so. To criticize ethnopolitical entrepreneurs for reifyingethnic groups would be a kind of category mistake. Reifying groups isprecisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are in the business of doing.When they are successful, the political fiction of the unified group can bemomentarily yet powerfully realized in practice. As analysts, we shouldcertainly try to account for the ways in which—and conditions underwhich—this practice of reification, this powerful crystallization ofgroup feeling, can work. This may be one of the most important tasks ofthe theory of ethnic conflict. But we should avoid unintentionally doub-ling or reinforcing the reification of ethnic groups in ethnopolitical prac-tice with a reification of such groups in social analysis.

II. Beyond groupism

How, then, are we to understand ethnic conflict, if not in commonsense terms as conflict between ethnic groups? And how can we gobeyond groupism? Here I sketch eight basic points and then, in the nextsection, draw out some implications of them. In the final section, Iillustrate the argument by considering one empirical case.

Rethinking ethnicity

We need to rethink not only ethnic conflict, but also what we mean byethnicity itself. This is not a matter of seeking agreement on a definition.The intricate and ever-recommencing definitional casuistry in studies ofethnicity, race and nationalism has done little to advance the discussion,and indeed can be viewed as a symptom of the non-cumulative nature ofresearch in the field. It is rather a matter of critically scrutinizing ourconceptual tools. Ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualizednot as substances or things or entities or organisms or collectiveindividuals—as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded andenduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do—but rather in relational, pro-cessual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms. This means think-ing of ethnicity, race and nation not in terms of substantial groups orentities but in terms of practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitiveschemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms,political projects and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization,racialization and nationalization as political, social, cultural and psycho-logical processes. And it means taking as a basic analytical category notthe ‘group’ as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating



conceptual variable. Stated baldly in this fashion, these are of coursemere slogans; I will try to fill them out a bit in what follows.

The reality of ethnicity

To rethink ethnicity, race and nationhood along these lines is in noway to dispute their reality, minimize their power or discount theirsignificance; it is to construe their reality, power and significance in adifferent way. Understanding the reality of race, for example, does notrequire us to posit the existence of races. Racial idioms, ideologies, nar-ratives, categories and systems of classification and racialized ways ofseeing, thinking, talking and framing claims are real and consequential,especially when they are embedded in powerful organizations. But thereality of race—and even its overwhelming coercive power in somesettings—does not depend on the existence of ‘races’. Similarly, thereality of ethnicity and nationhood —and the overriding power of ethnicand national identifications in some settings—does not depend on theexistence of ethnic groups or nations as substantial groups or entities.

Groupness as event

Shifting attention from groups to groupness and treating groupnessas variable and contingent rather than fixed and given (), allows us totake account of—and, potentially, to account for—phases of extraordi-nary cohesion and moments of intensely felt collective solidarity,without implicitly treating high levels of groupness as constant, endur-ing or definitionally present. It allows us to treat groupness as an event,as something that ‘happens’, as E. P. Thompson famously said aboutclass. At the same time, it keeps us analytically attuned to the possibilitythat groupness may not happen, that high levels of groupness may fail tocrystallize, despite the group-making efforts of ethnopolitical entrepre-neurs and even in situations of intense elite-level ethnopolitical conflict.Being analytically attuned to ‘negative’ instances in this way enlarges thedomain of relevant cases and helps correct for the bias in the literaturetoward the study of striking instances of high groupness, successfulmobilization or conspicuous violence—a bias that can engender an‘overethnicized’ view of the social world, a distorted representation ofwhole world regions as ‘seething cauldrons’ of ethnic tension (Brubaker) and an overestimation of the incidence of ethnic violence (Fearon

() For accounts (not focused specifically onethnicity) that treat groupness as variable, seeTilly : ff; Hechter : ; Hamilton etal. . These accounts, very different from

one another, focus on variability in groupnessacross cases; my concern is primarily withvariability in groupness over time.



and Laitin ). Sensitivity to such negative instances can also directpotentially fruitful analytical attention toward the problem of explainingfailed efforts at ethnopolitical mobilization.

Groups and categories

Much talk about ethnic, racial or national groups is obscured by thefailure to distinguish between groups and categories. If by ‘group’ wemean a mutually interacting, mutually recognizing, mutually oriented,effectively communicating, bounded collectivity with a sense of solidar-ity, corporate identity and capacity for concerted action, or even if weadopt a less exigent understanding of ‘group’, it should be clear that acategory is not a group (Sacks , I: , ; Handelman ;McKay and Lewins ; Jenkins : ff) (). It is at best a potentialbasis for group-formation or ‘groupness’ ().

By distinguishing consistently between categories and groups, we canproblematize—rather than presume—the relation between them. Wecan ask about the degree of groupness associated with a particular cat-egory in a particular setting and about the political, social, culturaland psychological processes through which categories get investedwith groupness (Petersen ). We can ask how people—andorganizations—do things with categories. This includes limiting access toscarce resources or particular domains of activity by excluding catego-rically distinguished outsiders (Weber []: ff, ff; Barth; Brubaker ; Tilly ), but it also includes more mundaneactions such as identifying or classifying oneself or others (Levine )or simply ‘doing being ethnic’ in an ethnomethodological sense (Moer-man ). We can analyze the organizational and discursive careers ofcategories—the processes through which they become institutionalizedand entrenched in administrative routines (Tilly ) and embedded inculturally powerful and symbolically resonant myths, memories andnarratives (Armstrong ; Smith ). We can study the politics of

() Fredrik Barth’s introductory essay tothe collection Ethnic Groups and Boundaries() was extraordinarily influential in direct-ing attention to the workings of categories ofself- and other-ascription. But Barth does notdistinguish sharply or consistently betweencategories and groups and his central metaphorof ‘boundary’ carries with it connotations ofboundedness, entitativity and groupness.

() This point was already made by MaxWeber, albeit in somewhat different terms.As Weber argued—in a passage obscured in

the English translation—ethnic commonality,based on belief in common descent, is ‘in itselfmere (putative) commonality [(geglaubte)Gemeinsamkeit], not community [Gemein-schaft] [...] but only a factor facilitating com-munal action [Vergemeinschaftung]’ (:; cf. : ). Ethnic commonality meansmore than mere category membership forWeber. It is—or rather involves—a categorythat is employed by members themselves. Butthis shows that even self-categorization doesnot create a ‘group’.



categories, both from above and from below. From above, we can focuson the ways in which categories are proposed, propagated, imposed,institutionalized, discursively articulated, organizationally entrenchedand generally embedded in multifarious forms of ‘governmentality’(Noiriel ; Slezkine ; Brubaker ; Torpey ; Martin). From below, we can study the ‘micropolitics’ of categories, theways in which the categorized appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade ortransform the categories that are imposed on them (Domınguez ).And drawing on advances in cognitive research, ethnomethodology andconversation analysis (), we can study the sociocognitive and interac-tional processes through which categories are used by individuals tomake sense of the social world; linked to stereotypical beliefs andexpectations about category members (); invested with emotionalassociations and evaluative judgments; deployed as resources in specificinteractional contexts; and activated by situational triggers or cues. Afocus on categories, in short, can illuminate the multifarious ways inwhich ethnicity, race and nationhood can exist and ‘work’ without theexistence of ethnic groups as substantial entities. It can help us envisionethnicity without groups.

Group-making as project

If we treat groupness as a variable and distinguish between groupsand categories, we can attend to the dynamics of group-making as asocial, cultural and political project, aimed at transforming categories

() Ethnomethodology and conversationanalysis have not focused on the use of ethniccategories as such, but Sacks, Schegloff andothers have addressed the problem of situatedcategorization in general, notably the questionof the procedures through which participantsin interaction, in deploying categories, chooseamong alternative sets of categories (sincethere is always more than one set of categoriesin terms of which any person can be correctlydescribed). The import of this problem hasbeen formulated as follows by Schegloff (:-): ‘And given the centrality of [...] cate-gories in organizing vernacular cultural‘knowledge’, this equivocality can be pro-foundly consequential, for which category isemployed will carry with it the invocation ofcommon-sense knowledge about that categoryof person and bring it to bear on the personreferred to on some occasion, rather thanbringing to bear the knowledge implicatedwith another category, of which the person

being referred to is equally a member’. ForSacks on categories, see : I, -, -, -, -; II, -.

() The language of ‘stereotypes’ is, ofcourse, that of cognitive social psychology (fora review of work in this tradition, see Hamiltonand Sherman ). But the general ethno-methodological emphasis on the crucialimportance of the rich though tacit back-ground knowledge that participants bring tointeraction and—more specifically—HarveySacks’ discussion of the ‘inference-rich’ cat-egories in terms of which much everyday socialknowledge is stored (: I, ff et passim; cf.Schegloff : ff) and of the way in whichthe knowledge thus organized is ‘protectedagainst induction’ (ibid., ff), suggest adomain of potentially converging concernbetween cognitive work on the one hand andethnomethodological and conversation-analytic work on the other—however differenttheir analytic stances and methodologies.



into groups or increasing levels of groupness (Bourdieu a, b).Sometimes this is done in quite a cynical fashion. Ethnic and otherinsurgencies, for example, often adopt what is called in French a politiquedu pire, a politics of seeking the worst outcome in the short run so as tobolster their legitimacy or improve their prospects in the longer run.When the small, ill-equipped, ragtag Kosovo Liberation Army steppedup its attacks on Serb policemen and other targets in early , forexample, this was done as a deliberate—and successful—strategy ofprovoking massive regime reprisals. As in many such situations, thebrunt of the reprisals was borne by civilians. The cycle of attacks andcounterattacks sharply increased groupness among both Kosovo Alban-ians and Kosovo Serbs, generated greater support for the KLA amongboth Kosovo and diaspora Albanians and bolstered KLA recruitmentand funding. This enabled the KLA to mount a more serious challengeto the regime, which in turn generated more brutal regime reprisals andso on. In this sense, group crystallization and polarization were theresult of violence, not the cause (Brubaker ).

Of course, this group-making strategy employed in the late s didnot start from scratch. It had already begun with relatively high levels ofgroupness, a legacy of earlier phases of conflict. The propitious ‘rawmaterials’ the KLA had to work with no doubt help explain the successof its strategy. Not all group-making projects succeed and those that dosucceed (more or less) do so in part as a result of the cultural and psy-chological materials they have to work with. These materials include notonly, or especially, ‘deep’, longue-durée cultural structures such as themythomoteurs highlighted by Armstrong () and Smith (), butalso the moderately durable ways of thinking and feeling that represent‘middle-range’ legacies of historical experience and political action. Yetwhile such raw materials—themselves the product and precipitate ofpast struggles and predicaments—constrain and condition the possibil-ities for group-making in the present, there remains considerable scopefor deliberate group-making strategies. Certain dramatic events, in par-ticular, can serve to galvanize and crystallize a potential group, or toratchet up pre-existing levels of groupness. This is why deliberate vio-lence, undertaken as a strategy of provocation, often by a very smallnumber of persons, can sometimes be an exceptionally effective strategyof group-making.

Groups and organizations

Although participants’ rhetoric and common sense accounts treatethnic groups as the protagonists of ethnic conflict, in fact the chief



protagonists of most ethnic conflict—and a fortiori of most ethnicviolence—are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of organiza-tions, broadly understood and their empowered and authorized incum-bents. These include states (or more broadly autonomous polities) andtheir organizational components such as particular ministries, of-fices, law enforcement agencies and armed forces units; they includeterrorist groups, paramilitary organizations, armed bands and looselystructured gangs; and they include political parties, ethnic associations,social movement organizations, churches, newspapers, radio and televi-sion stations and so on. Some of these organizations may representthemselves, or may be seen by others, as organizations of and for par-ticular ethnic groups (). But even when this is the case, organizationscannot be equated with ethnic groups. It is because and insofar as theyare organizations and possess certain material and organizationalresources, that they (or more precisely their incumbents) are capable oforganized action and thereby of acting as more or less coherent pro-tagonists in ethnic conflict (). Although common sense and partici-pants’ rhetoric attribute discrete existence, boundedness, coherence,identity, interest and agency to ethnic groups, these attributes are in factcharacteristic of organizations. The IRA, KLA and PKK claim to speakand act in the name of the (Catholic) Irish, the Kosovo Albanians andthe Kurds; but surely analysts must differentiate between such organi-zations and the putatively homogeneous and bounded groups in whosename they claim to act. The point applies not only to military, parami-litary and terrorist organizations, of course, but to all organizations thatclaim to speak and act in the name of ethnic, racial or national groups(Heisler ).

A fuller and more rounded treatment of this theme, to be sure, wouldrequire several qualifications that I can only gesture at here. Conflict andviolence vary in the degree to which, as well as the manner in which,organizations are involved. What Donald Horowitz () has called thedeadly ethnic riot, for example, differs sharply from organized ethnicinsurgencies or terrorist campaigns. Although organizations (sometimesephemeral ones) may play an important role in preparing, provoking andpermitting such riots, much of the actual violence is committed bybroader sets of participants acting in relatively spontaneous fashion andin starkly polarized situations characterized by high levels of groupness.

() One should remember, though, thatorganizations often compete with one anotherfor the monopolization of the right to re-present the same (putative) group.

() In this respect the resource mobiliza-

tion perspective on social movements, eclipsedin recent years by identity-oriented new socialmovement theory, has much to offer studentsof ethnicity. For an integrated statement, seeMcCarthy and Zald .



Moreover, even where organizations are the core protagonists, they maydepend on a penumbra of ancillary or supportive action on the partof sympathetic non-members. The ‘representativeness’ of organi-zations—the degree to which an organization can justifiably claim torepresent the will, express the interests and enjoy the active or passivesupport of its constituents—is enormously variable, not only betweenorganizations, but also over time and across domains. In addition, whileorganizations are ordinarily the protagonists of conflict and violence,they are not always the objects or targets of conflict and violence. Entirepopulation categories—or putative groups—can be the objects of organ-ized action, much more easily than they can be the subjects or underta-kers of such action. Finally, even apart from situations of violence, eth-nic conflict may be at least partly amorphous, carried out not by orga-nizationsas suchbutspontaneouslyby individuals throughsucheverydayactions as shunning, insults, demands for deference or conform-ity, or withholdings of routine interactional tokens of acknowledgmentor respect (Bailey ). Still, despite these qualifications, it is clear thatorganizations, not ethnic groups as such, are the chief protagonists ofethnic conflict and ethnic violence and that the relationship betweenorganizations and the groups they claim to represent is often deeplyambiguous.

Framing and coding ()

If the protagonists of ethnic conflict cannot, in general, be consideredethnic groups, then what makes such conflict count as ethnic conflict?And what makes violence count as ethnic violence? Similar questionscan be asked about racial and national conflict and violence. The answercannot be found in the intrinsic properties of behavior. The ‘ethnic’quality of ‘ethnic violence’, for example, is not intrinsic to violentconduct itself; it is attributed to instances of violent behavior by perpetra-tors, victims, politicians, officials, journalists, researchers, relief work-ers or others. Such acts of framing and narrative encoding do not simplyinterpret the violence; they constitute it as ethnic.

Framing may be a key mechanism through which groupness isconstructed. The metaphor of framing was popularized by Goffman(), drawing on Bateson []. The notion has been elaboratedchiefly in the social movement literature (Snow et al. ; Snow andBenford ; Gamson and Modigliani ; Gamson ; unitingrational choice and framing approaches, Esser ). When ethnic fram-

() These paragraphs draw on Brubaker and Laitin .



ing is successful, we may ‘see’ conflict and violence not only in ethnic,but in groupist terms. Although such imputed groupness is the productof prevailing interpretive frames, not necessarily a measure of thegroupness felt and experienced by the participants in an event, a com-pelling ex post interpretive framing or encoding may exercise a powerfulfeedback effect, shaping subsequent experience and increasing levels ofgroupness. A great deal is at stake, then, in struggles over the interpre-tive framing and narrative encoding of conflict and violence.

Interpretive framing, of course, is often contested. Violence—andmore generally, conflict—is regularly accompanied by social struggles tolabel, interpret and explain it. Such ‘metaconflicts’ or ‘conflict[s] overthe nature of the conflict’, as Donald Horowitz has called them (: ),do not simply shadow conflicts from the outside, but are integral andconsequential parts of the conflicts. To impose a label or prevailinginterpretive frame—to cause an event to be seen as a ‘pogrom’ or a ‘riot’or a ‘rebellion’—is no mere matter of external interpretation, but aconstitutive act of social definition that can have important conse-quences (Brass b). Social struggles over the proper coding andinterpretation of conflict and violence are therefore important subjectsof study in their own right (Brass a, , Abelmann and Lie ).

Coding and framing practices are heavily influenced by prevailinginterpretive frames. Today, ethnic and national frames are accessible andlegitimate, suggesting themselves to actors and analysts alike. Thisgenerates a ‘coding bias’ in the ethnic direction. And this, in turn, maylead us to overestimate the incidence of ethnic conflict and violence byunjustifiably seeing ethnicity everywhere at work (Bowen ). Actorsmay take advantage of this coding bias and of the generalized legitimacyof ethnic and national frames, by strategically using ethnic framing tomask the pursuit of clan, clique or class interests. The point here is notto suggest that clans, cliques or classes are somehow more real thanethnic groups, but simply to note the existence of structural and culturalincentives for strategic framing.

Ethnicity as cognition ()

These observations about the constitutive significance of coding andframing suggest a final point about the cognitive dimension of ethnicity.Ethnicity, race and nationhood exist only in and through our percep-tions, interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifica-tions. They are not things in the world, but perspectives on the

() These paragraphs draw on Brubaker et al. .



world (). These include ethnicized ways of seeing (and ignoring), ofconstruing (and misconstruing), of inferring (and misinferring), ofremembering (and forgetting). They include ethnically oriented frames,schemas and narratives and the situational cues that activate them, suchas the ubiquitous televised images that have played such an importantrole in the latest intifada. They include systems of classification, cat-egorization and identification, formal and informal. And they includethe tacit, taken-for-granted background knowledge, embodied in per-sons and embedded in institutionalized routines and practices, throughwhich people recognize and experience objects, places, persons, actionsor situations as ethnically, racially or nationally marked or meaningful.

Cognitive perspectives, broadly understood (), can help advanceconstructivist research on ethnicity, race and nationhood, which hasstalled in recent years as it has grown complacent with success. Insteadof simply asserting that ethnicity, race and nationhood are constructed,they can help specify how they are constructed. They can help specifyhow—and when—people identify themselves, perceive others, ex-perience the world and interpret their predicaments in racial, ethnic ornational rather than other terms. They can help specify how ‘groupness’can ‘crystallize’ in some situations while remaining latent and merelypotential in others. And they can help link macro-level outcomes withmicro-level processes.

III. Implications

At this point a critic might interject: ‘What is the point of all this?Even if we can study ‘ethnicity without groups’, why should we?Concepts invariably simplify the world; that the concept of discrete andbounded ethnic groups does so, suggesting something more substantialand clear-cut than really exists, cannot be held against it. The concept of

() As Emanuel Schegloff reminded me ina different context, this formulation is poten-tially misleading, since perspectives on theworld—as every Sociology student istaught—are themselves in the world and everybit as ‘real’ and consequential as other sorts ofthings.

() Cognitive perspectives, in this broadsense, include not only those developed incognitive psychology and cognitive anthropo-logy but also those developed in the post- (and

anti-) Parsonian ‘cognitive turn’ (DiMaggioand Powell ) in sociological and (morebroadly) social theory, especially in response tothe influence of phenomenological and ethno-methodological work (Schutz ; Garfinkel; Heritage ). Cognitive perspectivesare central to the influential syntheses ofBourdieu and Giddens and—in a very differentform—to the enterprise of conversation analy-sis.



ethnic group may be a blunt instrument, but it is good enough as a firstapproximation. This talk about groupness and framing and practicalcategories and cognitive schemas is all well and good, but meanwhile thekilling goes on. Does the critique matter in the real world, or—if atall—only in the ivory tower? What practical difference does it make?

I believe the critique of groupism does have implications, albeitrather general ones, for the ways in which researchers, journalists, pol-icymakers, NGOs and others come to terms, analytically and practically,with what we ordinarily—though perhaps too readily—call ethnicconflict and ethnic violence. Here I would like to enumerate five of these,before going on in the final section to discuss an empirical case.

First, sensitivity to framing dynamics, to the generalized coding biasin favor of ethnicity and to the sometimes strategic or even cynical use ofethnic framing to mask the pursuit of clan, clique or class interests canalert us to the risk of over-ethnicized or overly groupist interpretationsof (and interventions in) situations of conflict and violence (Bowen). One need not subscribe to a reductionist ‘elite manipulation’ viewof politicized ethnicity (Brubaker ) to acknowledge that the ‘spin’put on conflicts by participants may conceal as much as it reveals andthat the representation of conflicts as conflicts between ethnic or nation-al groups may obscure the interests at stake and the dynamics involved.What is represented as ethnic conflict or ethnic war—such as the vio-lence in the former Yugoslavia, may have as much or more to do withthuggery, warlordship, opportunistic looting and black-market profi-teering than with ethnicity (Mueller ; cf. Collier ).

Second, recognition of the centrality of organizations in ethnicconflict and ethnic violence, of the often equivocal character of theirleaders’ claims to speak and act in the name of ethnic groups and of theperformative nature of ethnopolitical rhetoric, enlisted in the service ofgroup-making projects, can remind us not to mistake groupist rhetoricfor real groupness, the putative groups of ethnopolitical rhetoric forsubstantial things-in-the-world.

Third, awareness of the interest that ethnic and nationalist leadersmay have in living off politics, as well as for politics, to borrow the classicdistinction of Max Weber (: ), and awareness of the possibledivergence between the interests of leaders and those of their putativeconstituents, can keep us from accepting at face value leaders’ claimsabout the beliefs, desires and interests of their constituents.

Fourth, sensitivity to the variable and contingent, waxing and waningnature of groupness and to the fact that high levels of groupness may bemore the result of conflict (especially violent conflict) than its under-



lying cause, can focus our analytical attention and policy interventionson the processes through which groupness tends to develop and crys-tallize and those through which it may subside. Some attention has beengiven recently to the former, including tipping and cascade mechanisms(Laitin , Kuran ) and mechanisms governing the activation anddiffusion of schemas and the ‘epidemiology of representations’ (Sperber). But declining curves of groupness have not been studied system-atically, although they are just as important, theoretically and practically.Once ratcheted up to a high level, groupness does not remain there outof inertia. If not sustained at high levels through specific social andcognitive mechanisms, it will tend to decline, as everyday interestsreassert themselves, through a process of what Weber (in a different butapposite context [ (): -]) called ‘routinization’ (Verall-taeglichung, literally ‘towards everydayness’).

Lastly, a disaggregating, non-groupist approach can bring into ana-lytical and policy focus the critical importance of intra-ethnic mecha-nisms in generating and sustaining putatively interethnic conflict (Bru-baker and Laitin : ). These include in-group ‘policing,’monitoring, or sanctioning processes (Laitin ); the ‘ethnic outbid-ding’ through which electoral competition can foster extreme ethnici-zation (Rothschild ; Horowitz ); the calculated instigation orprovocation of conflict with outsiders by vulnerable incumbents seekingto deflect in-group challenges to their positions; and in-group processesbearing on the dynamics of recruitment into gangs, militias, terroristgroups or guerrilla armies, including honoring, shaming and shunningpractices, rituals of manhood, intergenerational tensions and the prom-ising and provision of material and symbolic rewards for martyrs.

IV. Ethnicity at work in a Transylvanian town

At this point, I would like to add some flesh to the bare-bones ana-lytical argument sketched above. It is tempting to comment on theUnited States. It would be easy to score rhetorical points by emphasiz-ing that the ‘groups’ taken to constitute the canonical ‘ethnoracial pen-tagon’ (Hollinger )—African Americans, Asian Americans, Whites,Native Americans and Latinos—are (with the partial exception ofAfrican Americans) not groups at all but categories, backed by politicalentrepreneurs and entrenched in governmental and other organizationalroutines of social counting and accounting (Office of Manage-



ment and Budget ). It would be easy to highlight the enormouscultural heterogeneity within these and other putative ‘groups,’ and theminimal degree of groupness associated with many ethnic categories inthe US (Gans ; Heisler ).

But rather than take this tack, I will try to address a harder case,drawn from a region historically characterized by much higher degreesof ethnic and national groupness. I want to consider briefly how ethnic-ity works in an East Central European context characterized by contin-uous and often intense elite-level ethnonational conflict since the fall ofcommunism (and, of course, by a much longer history of ethnonationaltension). Here too, I want to suggest, we can fruitfully analyze ethnicitywithout groups.

The setting, familiar to me from field research conducted in thesecond half of the s, is the city of Cluj, the main administrative,economic and cultural center of the Transylvanian region of Romania.Of the approximately , residents, a substantial minority—somewhere between and percent—identify themselves as Hunga-rian by ethnocultural nationality (). The city, as I indicated, has beenthe site of protracted and seemingly intractable ethnonational conflictsince the collapse of the Ceausescu regime in December . But this isnot, I will argue, best understood as a conflict between ethnic or nationalgroups. To think of it as a conflict between groups is to conflate cate-gories (‘Hungarian’ and ‘Romanian’) with groups (‘the Hungarians’,‘the Romanians’); to obscure the generally low, though fluctuating,degree of groupness in this setting; to mistake the putative groupsinvoked by ethnonational rhetoric for substantial things-in-the-world;to accept, at least tacitly, the claims of nationalist organizations tospeak for the ‘groups’ they claim to represent; and to neglect the every-day contexts in which ethnic and national categories take on meaning

() In the US and much of northern andwestern Europe, ‘nationality’ ordinarily means‘citizenship’, that is, membership of the state;and ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are often used inter-changeably. In central and eastern Europe, bycontrast, ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ do not referin the first instance to the state, but ordinarilyinvoke an ethnocultural frame of referenceindependent of—and often cutting acrossthe boundaries of—statehood and citizen-ship. To identify oneself as Hungarian bynationality in Transylvania is to invoke astate-transcending Hungarian ethnocultural‘nation’. In the text, following the usage in thissetting, I use ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ inter-changeably.

At the last census, conducted in , %of the population of Cluj identified as Hungar-ian. More recent statistics, however, suggest asmaller population identifying as Hungarian,at least among younger age cohorts. Of personsgetting married in , .% identified theirnationality as Hungarian. Of primary, middleschool and secondary school students in -, .%, .% and .%, respectively,identified as Hungarian. Contextual differ-ences in identification may account for part ofthe difference, as might different age structuresof Romanian and Hungarian populations anddifferential emigration rates during thes.



and the processes through which ethnicity actually ‘works’ in everydaylife.

Here, as elsewhere, the protagonists of the conflict have been organi-zations, not groups. The conflict has pitted the town’s three-termmayor—the flamboyant Romanian nationalist Gheorghe Funar—andthe statewide Romanian nationalist parties against the Cluj-basedDemocratic Association of Hungarians of Romania (DAHR), at once astatewide political party with its electoral base in Transylvania and anorganization claiming to represent and further the interests of theHungarian minority in Romania. Rhetoric has been heated on bothsides. Mayor Funar has accused Hungary of harboring irredentistdesigns on Transylvania (); he has called the DAHR a ‘terroristorganization’; and he has accused Transylvanian Hungarians of secretlycollecting weapons, forming paramilitary detachments and planning anattack on Romanians. Funar has ordered bilingual signs removed fromthe few buildings that had them; banned proposed celebrations of theHungarian national holiday; called for the suspending of Hungarianlanguage broadcasts on Romanian state television; called for punish-ment of citizens for displaying the Hungarian flag or singing the Hun-garian anthem; and proposed to rename after Romanian personages thefew Cluj streets that bear the names of Hungarians.

The DAHR, for its part, is committed to a number of goals thatoutrage Romanian nationalists (). It characterizes Hungarians inRomania as an ‘indigenous community’ entitled to an equal partnershipwith the Romanian nation as a constituent element of the Transylvanianstate—thereby directly challenging the prevailing (and constitutionallyenshrined) Romanian understanding of the state as a unitary nation-state like France. At the same time, it characterizes Transylvanian Hun-garians as an ‘organic part of the Hungarian nation’ and as such claims theright to cultivate relations with the ‘mother country’ across the border,which leads Romanian nationalists to call into question their loyalty tothe Romanian state. It demands collective rights for Hungarians as anational minority and it demands autonomy, including territorial auto-nomy, for areas in which Hungarians live as a local majority, therebyraising the specter of separatism in the minds of Romanian nationalists.It demands that Hungarians have their own institutional system in thedomain of education and culture—yet that this institutional system

() Transylvania had belonged to Hungaryfor half a century before the First World Warand again for four years during the SecondWorld War.

() The DAHR program can be foundin English at http: //www.rmdsz.ro/angol/aboutus/prog.htm.



should be financed by the Romanian state. It demands the right topublic, state-funded education in Hungarian at every level and in everybranch of the educational system, including vocational education. Itdemands the right to take entrance exams to every school and universityin Hungarian, even if the school or department to which the student isapplying carries out instruction in Romanian. And it demands there-establishment of an independent Hungarian university in Cluj andthe establishment of publicly funded but independent Hungarian lan-guage radio and TV studios.

Like ethnic and nationalist organizations everywhere, the DAHRclaims to speak for the Hungarian minority in Romanian, often charac-terizing it as a singular entity, ‘the Hungariandom of Romania’ (aromániai magyarság). But no such entity exists (). The many Clujresidents who self-identify as Hungarian are often sharply critical of theDAHR and there is no evidence that the demands of the DAHR are thedemands of ‘the Hungarians’. On the question of a Hungarianuniversity—the most contentious political issue of the last few years—asurvey conducted by a Hungarian sociologist found that a plurality ofHungarian university students in Cluj preferred an autonomous systemof Hungarian-language education within the existing university to theDAHR goal of re-establishment of a separate Hungarian university(Magyari-Nándor and Péter ). Most Hungarians, like most Roma-nians, are largely indifferent to politics and preoccupied with problemsof everyday life—problems that are not interpreted in ethnic terms.Although survey data and election results suggest that they appear tovote en bloc for the DAHR, most Hungarians are familiar only in a vagueway with the DAHR program. Similarly, there is no evidence thatMayor Funar’s anti-Hungarian views are widely shared by the town’sRomanian residents. When Funar is praised, it is typically as a ‘goodhousekeeper’ (bun gospodar); he is given credit for sprucing up thetown’s appearance and for providing comparatively good municipalservices. Almost everyone—Romanian and Hungarian alike—talksabout ethnic conflict as something that ‘comes from above’ and is stirredup by politicians pursuing their own interests. The near-universalrefrain is that ethnicity is ‘not a problem’. To be sure, a similaridiom—or perhaps ideology—of everyday interethnic harmony can be

() Of course this point holds not only, orespecially, of the Hungarian minority, or ofminorities generally. In Romania as elsewhere,those who claim to speak for dominantnations—nations that are closely identifiedwith the states that bear their names, referred

to in German as Staatsvölker or ‘state peo-ples’—also routinely reify those ‘nations’ andcharacterize them as singular entities with acommon will and common interests, where infact no such entity exists.



found in many other settings, including some deeply divided, violence-plagued ones. So the idiom cannot be taken as evidence of the irrel-evance of ethnicity. The point here is simply to underscore the gapbetween nationalist organizations and the putative ‘groups’ in whosenames they claim to speak.

Despite the continuous elite-level ethnopolitical conflict in Cluj sincethe fall of Ceausescu, ‘groupness’ has generally remained low. At notime did Hungarians and Romanians crystallize as distinct, solidary,bounded groups; in this sense groupness failed to ‘happen’. The contrastwith Târgu Mures, another Transylvanian city where groups did crys-tallize in , is instructive. In Târgu Mures, ethnically framed conflictover the control of a high school and over the control of local govern-ment in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Ceausescu intensified andbroadened into a generalized conflict over the ‘ownership’ and control ofthe ethnodemographically evenly divided city. The conflict culminatedin mass assemblies and two days of street fighting that left at least sixdead and injured. In the days leading up to the violent denouement,categories had become palpable, sharply bounded groups, united byintensely felt collective solidarity and animated by a single overridingdistinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The violence itself reinforced thissense of groupness, which then subsided gradually as life returned tonormal and no further Hungarian-Romanian violence occurred, here orelsewhere in Transylvania.

No such crystallization occurred in Cluj. There were, to be sure, afew moments of moderately heightened groupness. One suchmoment—among Hungarians—occurred when Mayor Funar ordered anew plaque installed on the base of a monumental equestrian statue ofMatthias Corvinus, celebrated king of Hungary during the late fifteenthcentury, in the town’s main square. The statue, erected at the turn of thelast century at a moment of and as a monument to, triumphant Hun-garian nationalism, is perceived by many Hungarians as ‘their own’ andthe new plaque deliberately affronted Hungarian national sensibilitiesby emphasizing the (partly) Romanian origin of Matthias Corvinus andrepresenting him—contrary to the triumphalist image projected by thestatue—as having been defeated in battle by ‘his own nation’, Moldavia(Feischmidt ). Another moment occurred when archeologicalexcavations were begun in front of the statue, again in a manner calcu-lated to affront Hungarian national sensibilities by highlighting the ear-lier Roman—and by extension, Romanian—presence on the site. A thirdmoment occurred in March , when Mayor Funar tried to barHungarians from carrying out their annual March celebration com-



memorating the revolution of , this year’s celebration, in the ses-quicentennial year, having special significance (Brubaker and Feisch-midt ) (). A final moment occurred in June at the time of amuch-hyped soccer match in Bucharest between the national teams ofRomania and Hungary. In Cluj, the match was televised on a hugeoutdoor screen in the main square and some fans chanted ‘Afara, afara,cu Ungurii din tara!’ (out, out, the Hungarians out of the country!)and vandalized cars with Hungarian license plates (Adevarul de Cluj).

In each of these cases, groupness—especially among Hungarians,though in the final case among Romanians as well—was heightened, butonly to a modest degree and only for a passing moment. The first eventoccasioned a substantial but isolated Hungarian protest, the second asmaller protest, the third some concern that the commemoration mightbe broken up (in the event it proceeded without serious incident) and thelast some moments of concern for those who happened to be in the towncenter during and immediately after the soccer match. But even at thesemaximally group-like moments, there was no overriding sense ofbounded and solidary groupness for those not immediately involved inthe events (). In short, when one shifts one’s focus from presupposedgroups to variable groupness and treats high levels of groupness as acontingent event, a crystallization, something that happens, then what isstriking about Cluj in the s is that groupness remained low andgroups failed to happen or to crystallize.

() To Romanian nationalists, Hunga-rians’ commemoration of is illegitimate,for it celebrates a regime that was as muchnationalist as revolutionary, aspiring to—andbriefly securing—unitary control over Tran-sylvania. Romanian nationalist mythologycommemorates not the revolution, but theguerilla struggle against the Hungarian revolu-tionary regime, led by Avram Iancu, to whom acolossal monument was erected under Funar’ssponsorship in .

() Even for those who were involved inthe events, one should be cautious about infer-ring an overriding sense of groupness. I was inCluj in the summer of , when excavationsin the main ‘Hungarian’ square were about tobegin. I was staying with the family of a lead-ing figure of the DAHR, albeit one of the moreliberal figures. At one point, he proposed:‘Menjünk ásni? [Shall we go dig?]’ At amoment of overriding groupness, such a jokewould be unthinkable; here, the nationalist

projects of Mayor Funar were—at least forsome—a joking matter. One further incident isworth mentioning in this connection. In ,a long-closed Hungarian consulate re-openedin Cluj, reflecting a warming of relationsbetween Budapest and the newly elected pro-western government in Bucharest. Funarprotested—in vain—against its opening andwhen it opened, tried to fine it for flying theHungarian flag. A few weeks after its opening,five men pulled up in a pickup truck, placed anextendable ladder against the side of the build-ing, and—removed the flag, in broad daylight,as a small crowd looked on. The next day, theywere apprehended by the police; Funar char-acterized them as ‘Romanian heroes’.Elsewhere, this sort of incident—which couldeasily be construed as involving the desecrationof a sacred national symbol—has been enoughto trigger a riot. Here, nobody paid muchattention; the incident was coded as farce, notas sacred drama.



To note the relatively low degree of groupness in Cluj and the gapbetween organizations and the putative groups they claim to represent, isnot to suggest that ethnicity is somehow not ‘real’ in this setting, or thatit is purely an elite phenomenon. Yet to understand how ethnicity works,it may help to begin not with ‘the Romanians’ and ‘the Hungarians’ asgroups, but with ‘Romanian’ and ‘Hungarian’ as categories. Doing sosuggests a different set of questions than those that come to mind whenwe begin with ‘groups’. Starting with groups, one is led to ask whatgroups want, demand or aspire towards; how they think of themselvesand others; and how they act in relation to other groups. One is ledalmost automatically by the substantialist language to attribute identity,agency, interests and will to groups. Starting with categories, bycontrast, invites us to focus on processes and relations rather thansubstances. It invites us to specify how people and organizations dothings with and to ethnic and national categories; how such categoriesare used to channel and organize processes and relations; and how cat-egories get institutionalized and with what consequences. It invites us toask how, why and in what contexts ethnic categories are used—or notused—to make sense of problems and predicaments, to articulate affin-ities and affiliations, to identify commonalities and connections, and toframe stories and self-understandings.

Consider here just two of the many ways of pursuing a category-centered rather than a group-centered approach to ethnicity in Cluj.First, a good deal of common-sense cultural knowledge about the socialworld and one’s place in it, here as in other settings, is organized aroundethnonational categories (). This includes knowledge of one’s ownand others’ ethnocultural nationality and the ability to assign unknownothers to ethnonational categories on the basis of cues such as language,accent, name, sometimes dress, hair style, and even phenotype. Itincludes knowledge of what incumbents of such categories are like (),how they typically behave and how ethnonational category membershipmatters in various spheres of life. Such common-sense category-based

() On categories as ‘repositor[ies] forcommon sense knowledge’ generally (Sche-gloff : ), see Sacks , I, -, -. For cognitive perspectives on social cat-egories as structures of knowledge, with spe-cial regard to ethnic, racial and other ‘naturalkind’, like categories, see Rothbart and Taylor; Hamilton and Sherman ; Hirsch-feld .

() Even when such common-sense,category-based stereotypical knowledge isoverridden, the very manner of overriding may

testify to the existence (and the content) of thecategory-based knowledge that is being over-ridden. On the general phenomenon of‘modifiers’ that work by asserting that whatis generally known about members of acategory is not applicable to some particularmember, see Sacks (), I, -. AmongHungarians—even liberal, cosmopolitan Hun-garians—I have on several occasions heardsomeone referred to as ‘Román, de rendes’(Romanian, but quite all right) or something tothat effect.



knowledge shapes everyday interaction, figures in stories people tellabout themselves and others and provides ready-made explanations forcertain events or states of affairs. For Hungarians, for example, catego-rizing an unknown person as Hungarian or Romanian may govern howone interacts with him or her, determining not only the language but alsothe manner in which one will speak, a more personal and confidential(bizalmas) style often being employed with fellow Hungarians. Or forRomanians, categorizing two persons speaking Hungarian in a mixed-language setting as Hungarian (rather than, for example, as friends whohappen to be speaking Hungarian) provides a ready-made explanationfor their conduct, it being common-sense knowledge about Hungariansthat they will form a bisericuta (clique, literally: small church) withothers of their kind, excluding co-present Romanians, whenever theyhave the chance. Or again for Hungarians, categorically organizedcommon-sense knowledge provides a ready-made framework for per-ceiving differential educational and economic opportunities as structur-ed along ethnic lines, explaining such differentials in terms of what theyknow about the bearing of ethnic nationality on grading, admissions,hiring, promotion and firing decisions and justifying the commonlyvoiced opinion that ‘we [Hungarians] have to work twice as hard’ to getahead (Feischmidt ; Fox ). These and many other examplessuggest that ethnicity is, in important part, a cognitive phenomenon, away of seeing and interpreting the world and that, as such, it works inand through categories and category-based common sense knowledge.

Ethnic categories shape institutional as well as informal cognition andrecognition. They not only structure perception and interpretation inthe ebb and flow of everyday interaction but channel conduct throughofficial classifications and organizational routines. Thus ethnic (andother) categories may be used to allocate rights, regulate actions, distri-bute benefits and burdens, construct category-specific institutions,identify particular persons as bearers of categorical attributes, ‘cultivate’populations or, at the extreme, ‘eradicate’ unwanted ‘elements’ ().

In Cluj—as in Romania generally—ethnic categories are not institu-tionalized in dramatic ways. Yet there is one important set of institutionsbuilt, in part, around ethnic categories. This is the school system ().

() On ‘population politics’ and the meta-phor of the gardening state, see Holquist :; Bauman ; Weiner . Genocide, asBauman observes, ‘differs from other murdersin having a category for its object’ (: ,italics in original).

() Traditional churches, too, are built

around ethnic categories, with two ‘Hungar-ian’ churches (Roman Catholic and Calvinist)and two ‘Romanian’ churches (Orthodox andGreek-Catholic or Uniate). With aging con-gregations, dwindling influence and increasedcompetition from less ethnically markedneo-Protestant denominations, the traditional



In Cluj, as in other Transylvanian cities, there is a separate Hungarian-language school system paralleling the mainstream system and runningfrom preschool through high school. These are not private schools, butpart of the state school system. Not all persons identifying themselves asHungarian attend Hungarian schools, but most do (- percent ingrades -, smaller proportions, though still substantial majorities, inlater grades) (). In Cluj, moreover, there are also parallel tracks at theuniversity level in many fields of study.

Categories need ecological niches in which to survive and flourish;the parallel school system provides such a niche for ‘Hungarian’ as anethnonational category. It is a strategically positioned niche. Hungarianschools not only provide a legitimate institutional home and a protectedpublic space for the category. They also generate the social structuralfoundations for a small Hungarian world within the larger Romanianone (Feischmidt ). Since the schools shape opportunity structuresand contact probabilities and thereby influence friendship patterns (and,at the high school and university level, marriage patterns as well), thisworld is to a certain extent a self-reproducing one. Note that the (partial)reproduction of this social world—this interlocking set of social rela-tionships linking school, friendship circles and family—does not requirestrong nationalist commitments or group loyalties. Ethnic networks canbe reproduced without high degrees of groupness, largely through thelogic of contact probabilities and opportunity structures and the resul-ting moderately high degrees of ethnic endogamy ().

This brief case study has sought to suggest that even in a setting ofintense elite-level ethnic conflict and (by comparison to the UnitedStates) deeply rooted and stable ethnic identifications, one can analyzethe workings of ethnicity without employing the language of boundedgroups.

V. Conclusion

What are we studying when we study ethnicity and ethnic conflict?This paper has suggested that we need not frame our analyses in terms

churches are less significant than schools asinstitutional loci of ethnic categories.

() Data are drawn from figures providedby the School Inspectorate of Cluj County.

() Of the Hungarians who married inCluj in , nearly percent married otherHungarians, while about percent married

Romanians. This suggests a moderately highdegree of ethnic endogamy, but only modera-tely high, for about percent of all marriagesinvolving Hungarians were mixed marriages.Data were compiled from forms filled out bycouples, consulted at the Cluj branch of theNational Commission for Statistics.



of ethnic groups and that it may be more productive to focus on practicalcategories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, commonsenseknowledge, organizational routines and resources, discursive frames,institutionalized forms, political projects, contingent events and vari-able groupness. It should be noted in closing, however, that by framingour inquiry in this way and by bringing to bear a set of analytical pers-pectives not ordinarily associated with the study of ethnicity—cognitivetheory, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, network analysis,organizational analysis and institutional theory, for example—we mayend up not studying ethnicity at all. It may be that ‘ethnicity’ is simply aconvenient—though in certain respects misleading—rubric under whichto group phenomena that, on the one hand, are highly disparate and, onthe other, have a great deal in common with phenomena that are notordinarily subsumed under the rubric of ethnicity (). In other words,by raising questions about the unit of analysis—the ethnic group—wemay end up questioning the domain of analysis: ethnicity itself. But thatis an argument for another occasion.

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