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Project Completion Report Validation
Participatory Small-Scale Irrigation Development Programme (PASIDP)
Ethiopia
Date of validation by IOE: May 2017
I. Basic project data
Approval (US$
m) Actual (US$ m)
Region East and
Southern Africa Total project costs 57.765 55.1432
Country
Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia
IFAD loan and percentage of total
19.997 (34.62%)
39.860
(72.53%)
IFAD grant and percentage of total 19.998 (34.62%)
Loan number
Loan L-I-719-ET
Grant G-I-8004-ET Borrower 14.221 24,61% 14.460 26.22%
Type of project (subsector)
Rural development Cofinancier 1
Financing type Loan and Grant Cofinancier 2
Lending terms* 40 years Cofinancier 3
Date of approval 18 April 2007 Cofinancier 4
Date of loan signature 13 June 2007 Beneficiaries 3.5 6.34% 0.686 1.2%
Date of effectiveness 10 March 2008 Other sources
Loan amendments no
Number of beneficiaries 62,000 HH 61,625 HH
Loan closure extensions 6 months
Country programme managers
Ulac Demirag (since 2015)
Robson Mutandi Loan closing date
30 September
2015 31 March 2016
Regional director(s)
Sana Jatta
Périn Saint-Ange
Ides de Willebois Mid-term review April 2013
Project completion report reviewer Joana GUERRIN
IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)
Loan: 100%
Grant: 99.96%
Project completion report quality control panel
Michael CARBON
Date of the project completion report 13 June 2016
Source: President’s Report, Appraisal Report, Project Completion Report. * 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years, with a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum
.
2
II. Project outline 1. Introduction. The Participatory Small-Scale Irrigation Development Programme
(PASIDP) aimed at improving food security, family nutrition and income of poor
farmers living in drought-prone areas of Ethiopia.
2. IFAD’s Board approved the project on 18 April 2007. The loan and grant
agreements were signed on 13 June 2007 and became effective on 10 March 2008.
Programme completion was originally planned for 31 March 2015; but the
completion date was extended by six months to 30 September 2015. The loan
closed on 31 March 2016.
3. Project area. The project area covered a large part of the country. It included four
drought-prone regional States: Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and Southern Nation
Nationalities People’s Region. In 2007, Ethiopia was described as having great
potential for agricultural development. However, with a population of about 75
million, it was Africa’s second most populous country and one of the world’s
poorest countries with an annual per capita income of US$100. About 44 per cent
of the population was living below the national poverty line, and there were clear
disparities between rural and urban areas. Most rural households were living on a
per capita income of less than US$0.30 a day, and about 20 per cent of the
targeted households were headed by women1.
4. PASIDP was designed to target the drought-prone, food-insecure and densely
populated woredas (i.e. districts) of the mentioned regional states. The programme
planned to cover food deficit woredas with the aim of reducing poverty and risks
mainly through the development of irrigated land for agriculture. The aim of the
project was to reduce variations of agricultural output as a result of highly
changing rainfall conditions. Moreover, the project included specific activities for
women-headed households, unemployed young people and the landless.
5. Project goal, objectives and components. The goal of the programme was to
improve the food security, family nutrition and incomes of 62,000 poor rural
households living in drought-prone areas through a sustainable, farmer-owned and
famer-managed system of small-scale irrigated agriculture with scaling-up
potential. Policy and institutional objectives were to establish a participatory
process of small-scale irrigation development that reinforced the sense of
ownership. The objectives were supported by three key intervention components:
(i) institutional development; (ii) small-scale irrigation development; and (iii)
agricultural development. The three components were aimed at empowering
farmers and ensuring their participation in the design, construction and Operation
& Maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation scheme. They were also designed to improve
agricultural support services and strengthen institutions at all levels, particularly
the grass-roots level.
6. Target group. The target group consisted of 62,000 poor rural households living
in food-deficit, drought-prone areas and experiencing food insecurity. Their per
capita income was less than US$0.3 per day and their average landholding less
than 1 hectare. The programme included specific activities for women-headed
households, unemployed young people and the landless. The programme aimed at
selecting food deficit districts as identified under the Productive Safety Net
Programme (led by the International Development Association of the World Bank),
and selected households who already benefited from the Productive Safety Net
Programme. To enhance outreach, preference would be given to the most densely
populated districts. Targeting was not based only on irrigation potential but
attention was to be paid to ensuring that most food-insecure households, women-
headed households and more vulnerable groups would benefit from the programme
1 Appraisal Report.
3
– however, no specific methodology was apparently developed to identify these
targeted groups.
7. Financing. IFAD, the Government of Ethiopia and the beneficiaries financed the
Project jointly for an expected total amount of US$57,765,000. Total project
expenditure at closure was US$55,142,000. Table 1 summarizes project costs by
each financier. Table 2 shows the respective allocation of funds and expenditure of
project components.
Table 1 Project costs
Funding source Estimated amount
(m USD)
Estimated amount
(% of total)
Expenditure
(m USD)
Expenditure
(% of total)
Disbursement rate
IFAD 39.996 69.23% 39.996 69.23% 100%
Government 14.221 24.61% 14.460 25.03% 101%
Beneficiaries 3.547 6.14% 0.686 1.18% 19%
TOTAL 57.764 55.142
Source: Appraisal Report (estimated amount), PCR (Expenditure)
Table 2 Component costs
Component Estimated amount
(m US)
Estimated amount
(% of total)
Expenditure
(m US)
Expenditure
(% of total)
Disbursement rate
Institutional development
8.095 14% 10.616 19.2% 131%
Small-scale irrigation development
39.040 67.5% 41.016 74.4% 105%
Agricultural development
10.629 17.7% 3.510 6.4% 33%
TOTAL 57.664 55.142
Source: Appraisal Report (estimated), PCR (expenditure).
8. Project implementation and changes. It took 11 months from IFAD approval
(18 April 2007) to project effectiveness (10 March 2008) because of staff
recruitment issues2. Project completion was extended by six months due to
implementation delays.
9. The main change in project implementation regards funding reallocation.
Component costs analysis showed that small-scale irrigation development costs
were under-estimated (estimated at 67 per cent of total but 74 per cent of the
budget was used for this component), as were the costs of the Institutional
development component (14 per cent estimated and 19 per cent actually used).
However, costs of the Agricultural development component were over-estimated
(only 6 per cent of total cost instead of the 10 per cent estimated at design). Those
re-allocations were realized following Mid-term Review (MTR) recommendations.
The under-spending on component 3 was related to delays in the construction of
irrigation schemes under component 2, which limited the time dedicated to
agricultural development activities.
10. If actual government expenditure was a little higher than envisaged at design (24
per cent estimated and 25 per cent allocated), communities participated much less
than planned to the costs of the programme (6 per cent estimated and 1 per cent
2 Personal communication from the Country Programme Manager.
4
allocated). Communities were expected to invest 10 per cent of the total cost, but
considering the high costs of the schemes and their low income this was reduced to
5 per cent after MTR3. But even this reduced participation was not achieved. In the
end, financial contributions from communities accounted for only 1.2 per cent of
the total expenditure. According to the MTR, the underlying reason was that the
targeted poor communities had less capacity and willingness to participate
financially to the irrigation development schemes than planned at design. However,
most of them participated through labour and/or by supplying local materials,
which was verified by the Project Completion Report (PCR) mission team in the
field and confirmed by the Country Programme Manager.
11. Intervention logic. PASIDP is based on the idea that irrigated agriculture
improves food security, family nutrition and incomes for poor rural households
located in drought-prone areas. Irrigation schemes increase water security and, as
such, limit variations in crop production. Moreover, associated with training about
irrigation techniques and agricultural good practices, irrigation schemes can
increase crop productivity and cultivated land. If marketing systems are developed,
and roads help linking schemes to markets, an increase in crop production can
enable an increase of income. Besides, the increase in irrigation schemes, along
with farming techniques training and nutrition awareness raising, can enable poor
farmers to diversify their food consumption through vegetables and, along with an
increase of income, favor food security. PASIDP aimed at targeting the most
vulnerable people such as women and young landless farmers in order to enable
their empowerment and increase their resilience. Likewise, the project aimed at
favoring empowerment and sustainability of impacts by enabling a great degree of
farmers’ participation at each stage of the process, through design, construction
and operation of irrigation schemes, including through the creation and
reinforcement of water users' associations (WUAs) institutionally recognized.
12. Delivery of outputs. This section indicates the delivery of outputs of the project
per component. It is worth noting beforehand that the project failed to implement
a proper system of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and the existing government
M&E system was inadequate to actually follow the progress of the output delivery
performances. As such, the figures regarding the delivery of outputs could not be
verified by the evaluator outside of the PCR statements. The data given regarding
the outputs delivery and the performance are based upon PCR declarations and
some of them are missing.
13. Institutional development component. At design, this component was intended to
reach a target of 75 per cent of staff and beneficiaries trained regarding different
subjects such as watershed management, irrigation agriculture techniques and
water management, home garden development, gender mainstreaming, HIV/AIDS
awareness, etc. The project trained 1,251 staffs from Regional water bureaux,
1,574 staffs from Regional agriculture bureaux, 10,335 woreda staff, and 11,804
Development Agents. The project realized 53,706 community sensitization, 23,637
Farmers Research Groups trainings, and 63,185 WUA trainings. According to PCR,
100 per cent of beneficiaries and staff were trained (compared to a 75 per cent
target), 78 per cent of WUAs were operational at programme end (compared to a
100 per cent target), and 66 per cent of farmers’ research group were operational
compared to a 75 per cent target).
14. According to the PCR, the performance of those outputs was far beyond the targets
at design, but the PCR recognizes that the staff training needs were highly
underestimated at design.
3 On the Government's request, this 5 per cent beneficiary participation limit and in-kind participation were replicated in
PASDIP II in view of its targeting of poor households in food deficit woredas.
5
15. However, 175 WUAs were established and strengthened, which represents a
performance of 78 per cent of the planned delivery. Besides, only 34 per cent of
the targeted women headed-household were trained in home-garden techniques,
although targeting women-headed households was a priority of the project. Only
66 per cent of farmers’ research groups were operational out of the 75 per cent
planned.
16. Small-scale irrigation development component. Regarding the quantitative data,
107 new community schemes were effectively completed out of the 125 planned,
but 84 per cent of them were constructed in the last two years of the project
because of implementation delays. On average, 300 farmers were actively farming
on each scheme after project completion, surpassing the 200 farmers target at
project design. Moreover, 100 per cent of the beneficiaries received first level and
land title certificates according to PCR. Other realizations of the project include: the
construction of 62 WUA offices, 23 WUA storage facilities, 12 nursery storage
facilities and three market sheds.
17. However, not a single market linkage infrastructure (such as roads linking schemes
to market places) was constructed, whereas one market linkage infrastructure was
supposed to be constructed on every scheme.
18. Agricultural development component. Under this component, at project completion
225 farmer research groups (FRGs) were operational over 230 FRGs intended at
design. But the latter were of little use within two out of the four project regions,
which is explained by low incentives for researchers to engage with farmers,
limited number of researchers available in the perimeter of the programme, and by
the delays in irrigation scheme construction. But the created FRGs were given
agricultural inputs.
19. Moreover, 3,368 improved stoves were introduced (compared to the 2,250
planned), 130 community nurseries were established (compared to the 225
planned) 883 irrigation pumps were purchased and distributed to the programme
regions (compared to the 600 planned). Finally, 152 Farmers’ training centers
(over 225 planned) were furnished with standard training material and more than
50 per cent of farmers adopted vegetable production, contributing to the objective
to achieve 50 per cent of farmers diversifying their production. Nevertheless, only
1,004 farmers adopted improved seeds production out of the 2,250 planned, and
only 539 home-gardens were developed (the target was that 20 per cent of
household (HH) would develop home gardens, that would have meant about
12,400).
20. Beyond the realizations of those outputs, the following data were missing to assess
the performance of output delivery because of absence of M&E system and of
baseline data: 75 per cent of farmers adopt demonstrated technologies; 50 per
cent of livestock owners use legumes for feed; an increase by 25 per cent of
improved seed production4.
III. Review of findings 21. This Project Completion Report Validation (PCRV) was developed on the basis of
project documentation available (mainly the Country Strategic Opportunities
Programme (COSOP), the project design documents, the MTR, the 2013 and 2014
supervision reports, and the PCR), with a special focus on the PCR. During the desk
review all documents were examined with the aim of responding thoroughly to the
evaluative questions associated with each evaluation criterion. The review of
4 1,004 farmers engaged in improved seeds but there is no evidence that this figures means an increase of 25 per cent
since there is no baseline data available.
6
findings is realized by reference to the previous output delivery section, and
considering the missing data explained by the absence of an M&E system.
A. Core criteria
Relevance
22. The PASIDP objectives are mostly aligned with Government, IFAD, and other
International Financial Institutions’ objectives for promoting sustainable agriculture
development as well as the needs of the rural poor.
23. PASIDP focused on agricultural development, small-scale irrigation development in
moisture stress areas, and on training programme development towards farmers to
develop their capacity, and in particular towards women, with the Plan for
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) Government
strategy 2005-2009, and with the Government Growth and Transformation Plan
2010-2014.
24. In addition, PASIDP focuses on favouring food security, nutrition, and reduction of
hunger in rural areas through small scale agriculture, using approaches promoting
empowerment, focusing on vulnerable groups, such as women, landless and young
farmers, and strengthening climate resilience of poor rural farmers, promoting low-
cost technologies, within an objective of sustainability, in line with IFAD’s past and
present strategies (IFAD’s Strategic Framework 2007-2010; 2011-2015; 2016-
2025).
25. PASIDP objectives also contributed to several Millennium Development Goals such
as reducing by half the proportion of people living in hunger and poverty, empower
women, ensure environmental sustainability. In addition, PASIDP was in line with
more recent Sustainable Development Goals such as the reduction of poverty and
hunger, favouring women’s participation, increasing water-use efficiency,
protecting water-related ecosystems, developing resilient infrastructure, favouring
a sustainable use of natural resources, and strengthening resilience to climate-
related hazards such as droughts.
26. Most features of PASIDP design were aligned with challenges identified by the IFAD
COSOP. However, PASIDP mostly tackled the first two COSOP strategic objectives
(enhancing access by poor rural households to: (a) natural resources such as land
and water; (b) improved agricultural production technologies and support
services), but didn't address the third strategic objective (improved access to (c) a
broad range of financial services).
27. PASIDP design was well suited to the existing institutional structure of the country,
building on previous development plans based on agricultural trainings at local
levels. It tackles the main challenges identified by the COSOP through the
development of arable land, the diminution of crop productivity variation linked to
the occurrence of drought, the improvement of agricultural productivity and
techniques, the use of improved seeds, the development of stoves in order to limit
the degradation of land linked to the use of dung for fuel, the improvement of land
management practices and land use planning, the securitization of land rights, and
the specific targeting towards women and young landless farmers, the most
vulnerable people. Moreover, PASIDP built on reinforcing the presence of IFAD
within areas where it had developed a lead position as advised by the COSOP. Also,
it deeply invested in the development of participative methodologies to favour the
role of civil society and the local appropriation of agricultural development projects
and infrastructure.
28. However, some dimensions were less well developed, and they seem to account for
the limited performance of the project in several respects. Indeed, the project did
not focus on the development of financial services, taking for granted that the
beneficiaries would benefit from the existing strategies developed by other
7
programmes, even though the COSOP had already identified the limited access to
financial services as a reason for low agricultural productivity.
29. Another weak dimension of PASIDP at project design was the lack of investment in
agricultural market linkages. Outputs were planned within the second component
but this was not sufficiently developed to facilitate implementation.
30. Another weakness of PASIDP design was the fact that the COSOP had already
identified the weakness of the M&E system existing at government level, the
difficulty to find local reliable professionals specialized in M&E, and the lack of
baseline surveys to enable effective impact assessments of IFAD projects. Although
identified by the COSOP, those challenges were not seriously addressed at project
design or anticipated as risks that could create implementation issues.
31. The last PASIDP design weakness identified was the timing of the outputs delivery
regarding the irrigation schemes. Considering the high level of civil society
participation planned by the project design, the plan to construct 45 irrigation
schemes in the first three years of the project was highly unrealistic. As a matter of
fact, the timing foreseen by the project regarding the construction of irrigation
schemes was absolutely not respected, and this led to high delays in
implementation and explains the lack of effectiveness regarding other components
such as agricultural services development as also confirmed by the Country
Programme Evaluation (CPE) for Ethiopia conducted in 2015. These delays also
account for some of the changes made in financial allocation between components.
32. Finally, the CPE (p. 20) highlights the complexity of design of PASIDP that caused
delays in project implementation.
33. Though mostly aligned with Government and IFAD country priorities, due to some
shortcomings in the project’s design, the PCRV rates relevance as moderately
satisfactory (4), at the same level as the Programme Management Department
(PMD).
Effectiveness
34. This section presents the effectiveness of each component of the project, in
relation to the outcomes planned at project design, and considering the delivery of
outputs presented in section II.
35. Institutional development component. The effectiveness of this component
appears rather high when considering the relative importance of each indicator.
Training project staff to participatory techniques and establishing WUAs to scheme
and coordination management represents one of the most important keys for
success of maintained and well-managed small-scale irrigation schemes, which
represented the core of PASIDP. Moreover, these trainings favor reaching the first
intended outcome of the project: promoting a highly participatory approach to
small-scale irrigation development.
36. However, considering this outcome more globally, in many regions, the design and
construction of the project’s small-scale irrigation schemes were developed by
public or private agencies with no insurance that participative methods were
implemented. The PCR justifies this by the low-level quality of the design proposed
by the communities, which led to necessary re-design and delays in the
construction of schemes. To ensure stronger community participation, the project
could have planned to spend more time on design stages and support instead of
limiting participation to avoid construction delays.
37. The achievement of the second outcome, i.e. strengthening institutional capacity to
ensure effective coordination, was favored by the high level of training towards
staff agents. If the Programme Coordination and Management Unit (PCMU) was
understaffed this was corrected after MTR review and the staff training targets
redefined accordingly.
8
38. The main shortcoming of this component regards the third outcome, i.e. improving
M&E system. This was not achieved. The existing government M&E system was
used without improvement. The existing M&E system was unable to give enough
data to properly monitor and evaluate project achievements. Not enough attention
was given by the project team towards this activity, despite that several
supervision mission reports highlighted the problem. Also, no proper annual work
plan and budget to support M&E activities was developed to enable the
implementation of this activity. This failure had a huge impact on the quality of the
data produced to evaluate the impact of the project and its output delivery.
39. Small-scale irrigation development component. This component had a rather
high effectiveness if considering its main quantitative target, i.e. achieving an
additional irrigated area of 12,000 ha by the end of the project. According to the
PCR, the total area under irrigation was increased towards 14,676.7 ha, reaching
120 per cent of the initial target. However, the effectiveness of the qualitative
outcomes of this component is less straightforward.
40. The first outcome of this component was to improve catchments area planning.
Tools were indeed developed such as needs assessments, database management,
data analysis and catchment area planning, and by promoting water soil and water
conservation measures. However, the PCR gives no detailed information about how
the mentioned tools were implemented, nor did it provide evidence that these tools
locally improved catchment area planning.
41. The second outcome was to support planning, design, supervision and construction
of small-scale irrigation schemes. Indeed, a total of 575 structures were studied
and designed, and 107 were effectively completed. The quantitative effectiveness
has almost reached its target.
42. However, the main issue regards the implementation timing of the outputs.
According to the PCR, planning and design processes were organized in a highly
participative manner5, but the scheme design proposals were of low quality, the
PCMU and the Regional Programme Coordination and Management Unit were
understaffed, and the average cost per hectare stated at design for the irrigation
schemes was underestimated, reasons that led to substantive construction delays.
These implementation delays represented a major shortcoming of this component
(84 per cent of the community schemes were built during the last three years of
the program). A six-month extension of the project was needed to achieve the
outputs and additional costs were incurred. Moreover, this led to a weak
effectiveness of the Agricultural development component. However, we can
highlight the fact that the project team was flexible enough to respond to these
development limitations highlighted by MTR (by raising the costs per hectare used
as a ceiling, that were underestimated at design, and by lowering levels of
beneficiaries’ financial contribution to scheme development following their low
willingness to pay).
43. Another last doubt regarding the irrigation scheme constructions regards the level
of participation expected in the design and the construction of irrigation schemes.
One of the main aims of the project was to promote a highly participatory approach
to small-scale irrigation development. However, there is not enough information in
the project documents to evaluate the degree of participation achieved in those
processes. In each region, different contractors realized the construction and
sometimes the design implying that the communities may not have been very
active in the design process. Moreover, the low willingness of the communities to
pay may represent another sign of a limited participatory process, even if the PCR
5 However, it would be useful to get more information about how the project implementation led effectively this
participative processes.
9
and the Country Programme Manager confirm that beneficiaries participated in-kind
by bringing construction materials and manual labor.
44. The last outcome of this component was the improvement of scheme-to-market
access roads. No road was improved during the project with the aim of improving
scheme-to-market access roads and unfortunately no other measure was taken to
improve the physical linkages between markets and irrigation schemes.
45. Agricultural development component. The effectiveness of this component was
rather low because of implementation delays of the small-scale irrigation
component. Given that the majority of the irrigation schemes were constructed in
the last two years of the project, the activities supposed to train farmers to
agricultural techniques could not be organised as planned. The low level of
researchers in the project area and their weak availability limited the relations
between farmers and researchers intended by project design.
46. The first intended outcome of the project under this component was to strengthen
agricultural support services. The programme supported about 60 per cent of the
Farmers Trainings Centers it targeted. The second outcome was to improve
farming practices mainly through better soil and water conservation measures. No
evidence is found in the PCR that this outcome was reached. The third expected
outcome was to promote seed production: there is no baseline data to evaluate the
achievement of this outcome, but its realization suffered seed certification issues
and relational issues between seed production agencies. The fourth outcome of this
component was to promote the development of home gardens. If some were
created, the target was far from reached.
47. Broadly speaking, this component was poorly implemented, because of the delays
in irrigation scheme construction. Therefore, the priority was not on agricultural
development techniques. An advice of this PCRV would be to focus the next project
in the area on this dimension6.
48. The components were not achieved evenly, as confirmed by the CPE. However, the
effectiveness of the programme was rather high overall if we consider the
importance of each component. The main objective of PASIDP was to develop a
sustainable, farmer-owned and managed system of small-scale irrigated
agriculture, and this objective was rather well achieved. Therefore, the PCRV rates
project effectiveness as moderately satisfactory (4), in accordance with PMD (4).
Efficiency
49. The actual programme expenditure, as reported by the PCR, was US$55.14 million
compared to the estimated programme expenditure at design of US$57.76 million.
Therefore, the programme used 95.5 per cent of the estimated budget at design.
50. There were no loan amendments but financial reallocations were made based on
MTR recommendations. The institutional component used more resources (18.3 per
cent of the total program) than initially planned (13 per cent), whereas the
agricultural development component was under-used (6 per cent of total budget
instead of 17 per cent planned).
51. Regarding the participation of funders, IFAD disbursed 100 per cent of the planned
expenditure, the government 101 per cent (but the share between budget and
taxes7 changed after MTR because of delays in government payments, a measure
that proved efficient to enable the Government’s financial participation to the
programme). However, the beneficiaries’ participation initially planned to represent
6 This dimension was further developed in the design of PASIDP II.
7 The initial share was 71 per cent of the total government participation through direct budget participation and 30 per
cent through taxes and duties, and the final share was 54 per cent to budget participation and 45 per cent through taxes and duties (Source : PCR).
10
6.14 per cent of the total budget, and represented finally only 1.18 per cent of the
programme costs. The US$2 million difference between the total programme costs
at design and the actual expenditure can be explained by the low (19 per cent)
disbursement rate of the beneficiaries’ contribution. The PCR states that the latter
participated in-kind through labour and by supplying materials instead of
contributing cash as planned initially.
52. At design the average cost of the project per hectare was estimated at US$2,400
and according to PCR it was actually US$2,216, but these costs varied according to
scheme type and region. However, the costs of the small-scale irrigation
component were slightly (5 per cent) higher than initially planned because of this
discrepancy and because more hectares were finally covered by irrigation than
planned.
53. The economic rate of return of the project was estimated at 18 per cent at design,
however it was not re-estimated by the PCR in the absence of actual costs data
such as farm input costs and scheme O&M costs. Nonetheless, the PCR used farm
household level cash inflows and outflows to calculate the net present value of the
investment at the beneficiary household level.
54. The project spent about US$894 per beneficiary (and US$1,245 considering the
programme irrigation costs per direct beneficiary). According to PCR estimates, the
gains per direct beneficiary represent what is today approximately US$3,286.
Therefore, the net present value would be estimated at US$2,044 per direct
beneficiary8.
55. Regarding the IFAD loan and grant, the cost per beneficiary reaches US$649
compared to US$645 planned at design stage.
56. The PCR makes no mention of the project management costs.
57. Despite the rather positive net present value proposed by the PCR team, given the
low disbursement rate during the first five years of the project, the changes
regarding financial allocation, the low level of beneficiaries’ participation, and
missing data needed to evaluate efficiency, project efficiency is rated moderately
unsatisfactory (3), in accordance with the self-rating of PMD.
Rural poverty impact
58. As already mentioned in the Effectiveness section, the main difficulty to assess the
impact section is that the project did not develop an adequate M&E system to
properly give data on project outcomes and impact. In addition, no baseline study
was realized despite a COSOP recommendation. Therefore, the project team
realized a household-level impact survey. In the absence of a baseline survey, the
survey estimated the impact of the project by comparing the situation between
project household beneficiaries and two comparator groups in the same project
area: traditional irrigation scheme households not affected by the project and rain
fed irrigation households not affected by the project. However, there is little
evidence that the differences between project beneficiaries and the two control
groups can be attributed solely to the project. Finally, these impact evaluation
surveys9 were not available for the PCRV, therefore we only consider here the data
given by the PCR. These elements have to be kept in mind when considering the
rural poverty impact assessment below.
59. Household income and assets. The impact surveys showed that PASIDP
households benefit from higher incomes than non-PASIDP households. Annually,
8 The data came from the PCR where they are expressed in ETB (PCR, p.34).
9 An impact evaluation survey was realized by IFAD Strategy and Knowledge Department and another made by BDS-
CDR (Centre for Development Research) contracted by the Programme Management Unit for the realization of the PCR.
11
PASIDP households earn four times more than rain fed irrigation farmers and two
times more than traditional irrigation farmers. Also, PASIDP farmers show more
diversified types of crops. For example, considering the annual crop gross income
from vegetables, it must be noted that PASIDP farmers show a remarkable
difference compared to other farmers, with a 295 per cent difference between
PASIDP farmers and traditional irrigation farmers.
60. Regarding assets, the impact evaluation is less straightforward. The impact seems
high regarding the consumption assets, where PASIDP HHs hold higher-value
consumption assets (19 per cent) than rain fed HHs (12 per cent) and traditional
irrigation HHs (16 per cent).
61. However, regarding the productive assets, PASIDP HHs hold higher-value assets
(17 per cent) than rain fed HHs (7 per cent) but lower than traditional irrigated
agriculture (21 per cent). The PCR explains this by the implementation delays,
since the majority of the irrigation schemes were constructed in the last two years
of the project.
62. Regarding the livestock assets, the situation is even lower since PASIDP HHs hold
less high-value livestock assets (15 per cent) than traditional irrigation HHS (21
per cent) and rain fed HHs (31 per cent).This is explained by PCR through the
priority of rain fed farmers to build on livestock assets. Also, the PASIDP did not
prioritize livestock assets development.
63. Regarding income, the CPE states that PASIDP has created employment
opportunities for surrounding families as paid labour. Some farmers benefitting
from completed irrigation schemes reported increased income of ETB 15,000 to
50,000 per annum, used to improve housing, send children to school/college, buy
dairy cows, increase savings. Day workers employed in the project increased
significantly their earnings (CPE, p. 30).
64. Agricultural productivity and food security. The impact assessment proposed
by the PCR mentions an increase of the productivity in PASIDP irrigated areas
compared to rain fed areas: yields almost doubled for maize and sorghum. In
addition, PASIDP households realize two or three crop cycles per year compared to
a single cycle under rain fed conditions.
65. The food security impact of PASIDP seems rather high when considering the
Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) estimated by the BDS-CDR (BDS –
Center for Development Research) impact assessment study. PASIDP HH consume
more diversified food than control group (e.g. HH consuming between five and ten
different food groups during 24h are 280 per cent higher than in non-PASIDP
area). The average HDDS is 5.52 for PASIDP beneficiary HHs compared to 4.45
regarding non-beneficiary HHs. In addition, the average women’s HDDS among
PASIDP beneficiary HHs is 3.67 compared to 3.02 for non-beneficiary HHs.
Regarding children, within the PASIDP beneficiary HHs, children of 6-23 months
who receive food from four or more food groups are 20.5 per cent compared to
16.4 per cent for non-beneficiary HHs.
66. The PCR mentions more qualitative data about the livelihood changes for
beneficiary HHs that were revealed during focus group interviews. Beneficiaries
declared to have sufficient food for their family, owning a pair of owes or a cow for
milk, having additional cash to purchase inputs for irrigated and rain fed farming,
being able to send children to school, having separate rooms for the family and
domestic animals. Some farmers passed from grass roofs to iron sheet roofs,
women use more vegetables for HH food, and vegetables are sold to buy necessary
HH items and also to save money through microfinance institutions. However,
these data could not be verified for this PCRV and were not quantified by the PCR.
67. Human and Social capital, empowerment. The participative approach
undertaken by PASIDP, in addition to the numerous trainings realized, give the
12
project the potential for significant impact on human and social capital and
empowerment. However, the scant information provided in the PCR and other
reports reviewed, do not allow us to evaluate the extent of such impact.
68. However, the CPE (p. 32) notices interesting human and social capital impacts: The
strong participatory approach promoted strengthened the ownership of local
communities; the sense of community ownership of constructed schemes created
by WUAs; the capacity of beneficiaries to engage in the formulation, construction
and management of irrigation schemes; the water allocation conflict limitation
linked to WUAs positive action.
69. Institutions and policies. The PASIDP made significant efforts regarding the
institutionalization of the participative approach. IFAD supported the successful
policy shift in Ethiopia to give WUAs a formally recognized legal status and enable
their members to financially contribute to the O&M scheme costs.
70. The intervention logic of the project seems sound, and its effectiveness was rather
good regarding the small-scale irrigation scheme construction component. The
impact assessment study suggests that there are some differences in living
conditions between beneficiary HHs and non-beneficiary HHs, which leads us to
believe that the project had a positive impact on rural poverty. The CPE highlights
positive income generation impact. However, the extent of this impact is difficult to
evaluate given the absence of baseline data, and the unclear methodology and
incompleteness of the impact assessment. Impact on human and social capital has
not been assessed, and there is no clear evidence that the improvements noticed in
the PASIDP area can be solely attributed to the programme. Therefore, Rural
poverty impact is rated as satisfactory (5) in accordance with the PMD self-rating.
Sustainability of benefits
71. PASIDP design was favouring the sustainability of benefits since it followed a
participatory approach to design and construct small-scale irrigation schemes,
implemented WUAs in all constructed schemes institutionally recognized, organized
trainings to communities and WUAs, and facilitated the issuing of land title
certificates for the land under irrigation.
72. However, during its implementation, some shortcomings appeared regarding the
sustainability of benefits. First, the late construction of irrigation schemes left
limited time to put in place proper O&M mechanisms. Second, the low financial
participation of beneficiaries in irrigation construction costs does not abide well for
future sustainability either, which is confirmed by the PCR stating the difficulties of
WUAs to collect O&M fees among farmers.
73. Regarding the participatory process, although the design and the construction
aimed at being participatory, the actual degree of participation of local
communities in the process could not be verified in the context of this PCRV.
Besides, if WUAs creation favours sustainability, it is important to observe the
actual functioning of WUAs, but the PCR provides little information on this point.
74. Regarding the irrigation schemes, in some of them the poor design and
construction had the effect of limiting water flow in downstream areas, which could
adversely affect the sustainability of the schemes by creating conflicts between
communities.
75. Another shortcoming of the sustainability side of the project is the absence of
activities developed regarding market connection to schemes. Also, the low
effectiveness of the Agricultural development component increases the risk of low
sustainability of potential benefits to agricultural productivity and incomes.
76. Finally, no proper sustainability strategy was planned for the post-programme
period. However, sustainability issues might be tackled through PASIDP Phase II.
This project intends to build on PASIDP Phase I to develop linkages (such as roads,
13
access to fertilizers and finance) between irrigated areas under PASIDP I and
markets. Moreover, PASIDP II will favour water productivity and strengthen WUAs
through trainings. The aim of PASIDP II is to invest in the same areas of PASIDP I
to strengthen the capacity-building of the beneficiaries.
77. In summary, while a follow-on phase might help consolidate achievements of the
first phase of PASIDP, there were several shortcomings in the project that have
affected sustainability: lack of proper O&M mechanisms for irrigation schemes,
limited participation of beneficiaries in local planning processes and irrigation
construction costs, sometimes poor design and construction of irrigation schemes,
market access difficulties, and rather limited progress on agricultural productivity.
This leads us to rate the sustainability of benefits as moderately unsatisfactory (3)
despite PMD's rating of moderately satisfactory (4).
B. Other performance criteria
Innovation and scaling up
78. Innovation. The main innovative element of the project regards its participatory
approach at every step of the process regarding design, construction and operation
of the schemes. However, as already stated, the implementation of such an
approach could not be verified, and some elements suggest in the PCR that in the
implementation some constraints limited the participatory characteristics of the
design and planning steps, such as the low quality of scheme designs, the late
infrastructure constructions, and the low willingness of farmers to contribute
financially.
79. The second innovative characteristic of the project was the adoption of indigenous
knowledge in implementing irrigation development. The programme aimed at
integrating the traditional organization of water users’ groups, their water
distribution practices and O&M procedures. Nevertheless, the achievement of such
an innovative procedure could not be verified by this PCRV.
80. The third innovation was the way to select the places where the irrigation schemes
would be constructed. Instead of focusing on technical criteria only, the project
team considered food security targets preferentially.
81. The last innovation of the project was the creation of at least two Farmer research
groups per scheme. If some of those groups were created, they were only actually
used in two out of the four regions of the project.
82. Considering these innovative features, the innovation criterion is rated satisfactory
(5), same as PMD.
83. Scaling up. Project design did not propose a concrete scaling-up strategy and
scaling up was also not considered during project implementation. However,
PASIDP delivered important lessons for scaling up, that were integrated within the
Phase II, which will replicate and upscale the participatory approach of PASIDP
Phase I. In addition, the small-scale irrigation component (with several
improvements) is being replicated by the Agricultural Growth Programme, a multi-
donor programme being led by the World Bank. However, beyond this, the
institutional conditions for up-scaling without donor support are not present, and
there is no evidence of actual up-scaling beyond other development programmes.
In summary, scaling up of the project is considered moderately satisfactory (4),
one point below the PMD rating for "potential for scaling up".
Gender equality and women’s empowerment
84. PASIDP did not have a specific gender strategy at design. The MTR advised that the
gender balance could be improved in PASIDP operations, but no monitoring of this
was done afterwards. The PCR does not mention this weakness. The programme
target was that at least 20 per cent of the beneficiaries would be women. In
14
reality, this modest target was not fully achieved for all components, with only 18
per cent of beneficiaries of the irrigation component being women.
85. However, according to the CPE, PASIDP included several proactive measures to
encourage participation by women such as seeking out female headed households
for inclusion in the irrigation scheme, including women in training, ensuring
women’s participation in decision making and designing home garden programmes
and introduction of improved stoves specifically to benefit women.
86. Overall, the programme is rated as moderately satisfactory (4) for gender equity
and women’s empowerment, in accordance with PMD rating.
Environment and natural resources management
87. The PASIDP programme was planning to have limited adverse impacts on the
environment (Category B). Therefore, an environmental assessment of the
programme was not mandatory. As such, the data about the environment and
natural resources management are rather limited.
88. However, following national regulations, a feasibility and environmental impact
assessment study was undertaken for each scheme, and mitigation measures were
locally implemented.
89. The programme engaged communities in rehabilitating degraded upper-catchment
areas of the irrigation sites. According to an HH survey, 80 per cent of the
respondent observed an increased flow of water downstream and reduced
sediments loads. However, appropriate management practices of water are rather
limited according to PCR, which is unfavourable to resource use efficiency.
90. In addition, according to beneficiaries’ focus groups the PCR stated that the
programme had positive impacts on the environment, but without giving further
evidence of this impact.
91. Finally, the programme promoted improved stoves, with the aim of reducing dung
burning, freeing up dung for soil fertilisation. However, there is no evidence from
implementation that beneficiaries have changed their practices in accordance to the
use of those improved stoves.
92. According to the points highlighted above, the environment and natural resources
management criterion is rated moderately satisfactory (4) in accordance with PMD.
Adaptation to climate change
93. Climate issues are already creating troubles in Ethiopia, worsened by El Nino effect.
The 2016 serious drought – still ongoing - more than doubled the number of people
in need of assistance at the country level. In addition, Ethiopia experienced
massive flooding in the spring and summer of 2016 which had exacerbated
consequences on already drought affected populations10. Despite of a possible
increase in water availability, climate change scenarios predict future adverse
impacts on crop revenues per hectare11 as well as socioeconomic effects12 because
of a rise in temperatures by the years 2015-2100 and an increase of climatic
variation, meaning a rising frequency of extreme droughts and floods13.
94. The main activity of the programme, developing irrigation schemes, is in itself a
strategy to lower the vulnerability of farmers to climate change by improving water
security. However, the project did not focus on methods to limit the dependency of
farmers to water resources. In addition to water security improvements, the
10
According to the Embassy of the United States in Addis Ababa. 11
Deressa, Temesgen Tadesse, et Rashid M. Hassan. « Economic Impact of Climate Change on Crop Production in Ethiopia: Evidence from Cross-section Measures ». Journal of African Economies 18, no 4 (1 August 2009): 529-54. 12
Richler, Jenn. « Climate Vulnerability: Impacts on Rural Schooling ». Nature Climate Change 7, no 1 (January 2017). 13
Source: Institute of Development Studies (IDS), UK.
15
programme could have trained farmers about agricultural water savings practices
and the development of low water-demanding crops.
95. The adaptation to climate change criterion is rated moderately satisfactory (4) in
accordance with PMD.
C. Overall project achievement
96. PASIDP was rather successful regarding its main objective: constructing small-
scale irrigation schemes through a participative approach and reinforcing the
capacities of the communities.
97. However, the project missed some of its other objectives such as implementing an
M&E system or improving the existing one and developing baseline studies, which
led to difficulties to evaluate the impacts of the project.
98. Moreover, its design misjudged the time needed for a truly participatory approach,
which led to important delays and limited the effectiveness of the Agricultural
development component.
99. In the expectation that the Agricultural Marketing Improvement Program (AMIP)
would effectively link the beneficiaries to markets, and to avoid duplication of
IFAD’s intervention, the project did not develop enough activities such as linking
irrigation schemes to markets nor reinforcing financial capacities of farmers.
However, AMIP did not deliver against this expectation.
100. The project did not develop more activities specifically towards women and
regarding adaptation strategies to climate change, other than enhancing water
availability through infrastructures.
101. PASIDP had modest positive impacts in several domains, in particular household
income and consumption assets, on reinforcing local institutions such as WUAs, and
regarding nutrition improvements. However, the sustainability of benefits is
questionable.
102. Overall project achievement is rated moderately satisfactory (4), in accordance
with PMD.
D. Performance of partners
103. IFAD. IFAD’s role was relatively flexible in answering the difficulties met by the
project. However, this flexibility was sometimes rather slow. For example, the
PCMU was understaffed during the first four years of the project before more
recruitments were made. Nevertheless, IFAD was effective in implementing many
of the MTR recommendations such as improving the staff trainings, changing the
ceiling level regarding the construction cost per hectare of irrigation schemes, the
beneficiaries’ participation proportion, and the financial allocation between
components. However, more efforts could have been made on M&E development,
following the repeated recommendations made by MTR, supervision missions and
the COSOP. Therefore, IFAD’s performance is rated as satisfactory (5) in
accordance to PMD.
104. Government. Several government offices actively participated to PASIDP
implementation. However, some issues appeared regarding the National Steering
Committees that did not meet on a regular basis until MTR. Efforts were made after
MTR which eased the implementation process. One main shortcoming was related
to the low quality of M&E system proposed by the Government and the unqualified
staff to take charge of the monitoring of project achievements. Therefore,
Government performance is rated as satisfactory (5) in accordance to PMD.
16
IV. Assessment of PCR quality
Scope
105. The PCR includes relevant information but some is missing such as the project
implementation costs, the internal rate of return, and more annexes would have
been valuable to reinforce some of the statements of the PCR and giving qualitative
insights about the ways the project was actually implemented.
106. All standard criteria were discussed adequately in the PCR. However, factors such
as the quality of financial management, performance of partners, and the quality of
supervision and implementation support were all discussed under the effectiveness
criterion, creating some confusion.
107. The scope of the PCR is rated as moderately satisfactory (4).
Quality
108. The PCR does not always make reference to the sources of the data used.
Moreover, it does not state clearly when data are missing, which makes it
sometimes difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the project. Finally, it does not
always make reference to the targets set by the project. Weak M&E data was
complemented by an impact assessment. PCR quality is rated moderately
satisfactory (4).
Lessons
109. The PCR proposes detailed and accurate lessons related to the challenges faced by
the programme, even if some additional lessons are proposed in this PCRV. The
PCR lessons are rated as satisfactory (5).
Candour
110. The PCR was most of the time relatively candid in describing the issues
encountered by the project and highlighting the positive and negative sides of the
project. However, it sometimes gives a rather optimistic understanding of the
issues, but usually rates coherently the evaluation criteria. The PCR is rated
satisfactory (5) for its candour.
V. Final remarks and lessons learned
Final remarks
111. This PCRV was realized solely based on desk review by considering the project
documents made available by PMD. The Country Programme Manager was
interviewed to provide additional clarification. However, adequate M&E and impact
assessment data were missing to allow for a more in-depth evaluation of the PCR.
Lessons learned
112. The PCR proposes valuable lessons and recommendations such as: (i)
strengthening WUA capacity in basic enterprise selection, preparation of cropping
calendars and financial management in order to build resilient irrigation groups that
can participate in commercial agriculture; (ii) the registration of WUAs has proved
more appropriate than water users’ cooperatives; (iii) when calculating the
community contribution to the programme, the high cost of the schemes should be
taken into account; (iv) the importance of defining the required community
contribution before any commitments are made.
113. In addition, the following four lessons are proposed:
a. The Government's M&E system proved inadequate for project monitoring,
generated delays and made completion reporting and evaluation more
difficult. For future projects, when considering to build/rely on an existing M&E
system, its strengths and weaknesses should be properly assessed at the
17
project design stage, and strengthening the system as well as collection of
baseline data should be planned as project output.14
b. Participative methods proved cost-effective in the context of PASIDP but more
time-consuming than expected, which created delays in implementation. As
such, future projects should foresee more time and support to implement
participative methods effectively.15
c. PASIDP counted on other programmes to secure the implementation of some
components such as access to markets. However, AMIP failed and the
component was not implemented, reducing effectiveness and limiting
impact/sustainability of the project. Therefore, future projects in the same
area should either internalize this type of activities instead of counting on
other programmes, or, at least, obtain stronger reassurances from
development partners that the components will be covered by them in
accordance with the project's implementation schedule.
d. PASIDP counted on a rather high financial contribution of beneficiaries to the
irrigation schemes. However, the beneficiaries resisted this attempt, which
created implementation delays. The project team reacted efficiently after MTR
by making beneficiaries conditions more flexible. Future projects should
assess more closely the beneficiaries' capacity and willingness to share costs
before setting a financial participation rate, and enable them to participate in-
kind, but develop a system to monitor their participation to favour equity
among participants.
14
PASIDP II has an M&E plan, and PMD is providing technical assistance during implementation as well as additional resources for measuring impact of the project. 15
PASIDP II seeks to strengthen the participatory processes, on the one hand through enhanced procedures, and on the other hand through an earlier involvement of the WUAs (at scheme selection and prefeasibility) providing clear process structure and earlier engagement with beneficiaries.
Annex I
18
Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE
Criteria Definition * Mandatory To be rated
Rural poverty impact Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
X Yes
Four impact domains
Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.
No
Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor’s individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.
No
Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.
No
Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and
policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
No
Project performance Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. X Yes
Relevance The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.
X Yes
Effectiveness The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
X
Yes
Efficiency
Sustainability of benefits
A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project’s life.
X
X
Yes
Yes
Other performance criteria
Gender equality and women’s empowerment
Innovation and scaling up
The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women’s empowerment, for example, in terms of women’s access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women’s incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.
The extent to which IFAD development interventions:
(i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
X
X
Yes
Yes
Environment and natural resources management
The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.
X Yes
Adaptation to climate change
The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures X Yes
Annex I
19
Criteria Definition * Mandatory To be rated
Overall project achievement
This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women’s empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.
X Yes
Performance of partners
IFAD
Government
This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner’s expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.
X
X
Yes
Yes
* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE’s evaluation criteria and key questions.
Annex II
20
Rating comparisona
Criteria
Programme Management
Department (PMD) rating
IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRV)
rating
Net rating disconnect
(PCRV-PMD)
Rural poverty impact 5 5 0
Project performance
Relevance 4 4 0
Effectiveness 4 4 0
Efficiency 3 3 0
Sustainability of benefits 4 3 -1
Project performanceb 3.75 3.5 -0.25
Other performance criteria
Gender equality and women's empowerment 4 4 0
Innovation 5 5 0
Scaling up 5 4 -1
Environment and natural resources management 4 4 0
Adaptation to climate change 4 4 0
Overall project achievementc 4 4 0
Performance of partnersd
IFAD 5 5 0
Government 5 5 0
Average net disconnect -2/12 = -0.17
a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 =
satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable. b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon
the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change. d The rating for partners’ performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.
Ratings of the project completion report quality
PMD rating IOE PCRV rating Net disconnect
Candour 5
Lessons 5
Quality (methods, data, participatory process) 4
Scope 4
Overall rating of the project completion report 4
Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.
Annex III
21
Bibliography
Context
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2008. Ethiopia Country strategic
opportunities programme, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2016. Ethiopia Country Programme Evaluation, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2005. Participatory Small-Scale Irrigation Development Programme (PASIDP).
Inception Report, Vol. I & II, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2006. PASIDP. Formulation Report, Vol. I & II, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2007. PASIDP. President’s Report, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2007. PASIDP. Appraisal Report, Vol. I & II, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2007. PASIDP Programme Financing Agreement, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2013. PASIDP Mid-Term Review, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014. PASIDP Results and impact management system,
Rome: IFAD
_____. 2014. PASIDP Supervision Report, Rome: IFAD.
_____. 2016. PASIDP Project Completion Report, Rome: IFAD.
Other sources
Deressa, Temesgen Tadesse, et Rashid M. Hassan. (1 August 2009). Economic Impact of
Climate Change on Crop Production in Ethiopia: Evidence from Cross-section
Measures. Journal of African Economies 18, no 4: 529-54.
Richler, Jenn. (January 2017). Climate Vulnerability: Impacts on Rural Schooling. Nature
Climate Change 7, no 1.
Annex III
22
Abbreviations
AMIP Agricultural Marketing Improvement Program
BDS-CDR BDS-Centre for Development Research
COSOP Country Strategic Opportunities Programme
CPE Country Programme Evaluation
FRG Farmers’ research group
HDDS Household dietary diversity score
HH Household
M&E Monitoring and evaluation
MTR Mid-term review
O&M Operation and maintenance
PASIDP Participatory Small-Scale Irrigation Development Programme
PCMU Programme coordination and management unit
PCR Project completion report
PMD Programme Management Department
WUA Water users’ association
