Ethics of Bhagavad Gita and Kant

7/22/2019 Ethics of Bhagavad Gita and Kant

1/12

The Ethics of the Bhagavadgita and KantAuthor(s): S. RadakrishnanSource: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Jul., 1911), pp. 465-475Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2376569.

Accessed: 06/01/2014 13:56

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

International Journal of Ethics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 134.161.28.20 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 13:56:10 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2376569?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2376569?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress


2/12

BHAGAVADGITA AND KANT. 465ness, and it is to this ever-evolvingnd developing on-ciousness,-with ullopportunitiesiven o it tomanifestits lifeat itsbest,-thatwe must ook for theemergenceof those higher ypeswhich his secret and mysteriousrealm holds within ts illimitable omain.It willbe obvious, think,romhispaper, hat heDar-winian heoryfevolution as enrichedhewholefield fethical tudy. It has brought ewethical roblems oournotice ndhas shown ow ntimatelyonnectedhe cienceofethicsswith volutionaryhought.Whether ur ndi-vidual standpoints naturalistic r spiritualistic, e can-notbut express ur ndebtednesso the aborsof the evo-lutionists,nd oin hands ogethernthework f endeavor-ing to solve theproblemswhich his great upheaval ofthought as broughtmorefully nd clearly ntothe ightof day. The cause of ethicalprogress s a platform nwhich ll can meet. RAMSDEN BALMFORTH.CAPE ToWN.

THE ETHICS OF THE BHAGAVADGITA ANDKANT.S. RADAKRISHNAN.MUCH has been made of the apparent imilaritybetween he ethicalsystemsof the Bhagavadgitaand Kant, the criticalphilosopher. To the superficialreader, he imilaritys nodoubt triking.Bothsystemspreachagainsttherule of the senses; bothare at one

in holding hatthemoral aw demandsdutyforduty'ssake. In spiteof the agreementsetween hetwo sys-tems,however,ober secondthoughtwilldisclosediffer-encesofgreatmoment. n thepresent rticle, hewriterhas neither he space,nor is he competent,o make acritical tudy f thetwosystems. All thathe can hopetodo, s to aybarethepractical ideof theVedanta sys-tem,or,more ccurately,heBhagavadgita, nd to com-

This content downloaded from 134.161.28.20 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 13:56:10 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/12

466 INTERNATIONAL JOURNALOF ETHICS.pare its teachingwiththat ofKant on thefundamentalquestionsof freewill, themoralproblem, nd thelawof duty.In the Vedanta system, eligion,metaphysics,ndethics re so closelyboundup, onewith nother,hat tis difficultorus to separatethem. One can,however,state,without earofcontradiction,hattheelementsfa science fethics, hough ota perfectedystem,re tobe found here. The mainquestions nd topicsof dis-pute are thesame as thosewhichoccupythe ttentionofthewesternmoralists. Hedonism nd rationalism,nall theirvarieties, truggle'forupremacy.The KathaUpanishaddeclares n unambiguous'language,hat thegood or theethical deal oughtnot to be identified ithpleasure: "The good is onething, hepleasant nother;these two,having different bjects, chain a man. It iswell with him who clings to the good; he who choosesthepleasant,misseshis end."'Ethics, ntheVedantasystem,ppears n thephenom-enal realm, r thesphereofrelativity.Reality, ccord-ingto theVedanta,has twoaspects, hehigher nd thelower, hefixed nd thechanging,he absolute nd therelative. The higher spectof reality s Brahman, heunconditioned,nfinite,nd perfect. The lower aspect,ortheuniverse,ppearsand disappears,n turns, n thehigher reality of Brahman. The theorydoes not denytherealityof theworld or theindividual souls in it. Theplurality of individual souls and the material universeare not real' in theabsolute ense oftheword, ortheyare subjectto change. They are onlyrelatively eal.Ethicsbelongs o thisworld,which s real forall prac-ticalpurposes. The late ProfessorMax Mullersays: "Forall practical purposes, theVedantistwould hold that thewhole phenomenalworld,both in its objective and sub-jective character,should be accepted as real. It is as

1Max Miuller, The Upanishads," p. 8 (Sacred Books of the East Series,Vol. XV).



4/12

BHAGAVADGITA AND KANT. 467real as anything an be to the ordinarymind. It is notmere emptiness, s the Buddhistsmaintain." 2But it may seem to some that the very conceptionofthe ethicsof the Bhagavadgita is impossible,since it isincompatiblewith a belief in the doctrine of karma..What is the use of teaching and preaching about dutyif a man's predeterminedondition endershim ncapableof profiting y the counsel? 'What is theuse of applyingmoral judgments, f man's actions do not representhischaracter? Freedom of the will is the fundamentalpostulate of morality,withoutwhichthemoral life losesits integrity. Plainly, there can be no such thing asVedanta ethics. This idea is expressedin the tersestandmost extremeterms by Hegel, one of the greatest ofthe world's philosophers,when he says: "No morality,no determinationof freedom,no rights,no duties haveany place here; so that the people of India are sunk incomplete mmorality."But the cautious reader of the Bhagavadgita will findthatthe real meaning of karma.does not excludefreewill.In a verse of thatfamousbook we find t said: "Everysense has its affections nd aversionsto its objects fixed;one should not,become subject to them, for they areone's opponents."8 The law of karma, or necessity, strue. Every actionwill be followedby its proper result;every cause has an effect. Our actions in our past lifehave resulted in certain fixed tendencies, which aretermed affections'and 'aversions.' A Nyaya aphorismdeclares that "our actions,thoughapparentlydisappear-ing, remain,unperceived,and reappear in their effectsas tendencies" (pravrittis). But we must not become'subject to them. We are, so to say, tempted to actaccording to these tendencies; but we must not allowthemto have their ownway; we mustnot surrenderour-

2Max Miller, "The VedantaPhilosophy,"p. 161.8 I Bhagavadgita, p. 56. References re to Telang s translationn

Sacred Books of the East Series.



5/12

468 INTERNATIONAL JOURNALOF ETHICS.selves to the senses, throughwhich alone the tendenciesshow themselves.Karma, thus, s a name for the sumtotalof thetenden-cies with which a man is born; along the lines markedout forhimbyhis inner nature and outercircumstances,man has to develop a character,good or bad. The uni-versal of law of karma has nothingto do withthe realman, f he understandswhat is his real nature. We haveto throwoff heyoke of thepassions and rise to rationalfreedom; in exercisingthepower of reason to subjugatethe senses, or the given element,man is free. To adopta metaphor,wind and tide have to be controlled by thesteersman's mind; that is, he has to make use of themand see to it that theywill carry him to his goal. But,it is urged, should they prove too strong,what is he todo? In spite of the best intentions, wing to the "nig-gardly provisionofa stepmotherly ature, calamitymayovertakeus. Carve as we will the mysteriousblock ofwhich our life is made, the dark vein of destiny againand again appears in it. The forceof this objection ismuchweakened by the fact that,accQoxihgto the Gitaicideal, virtue consists,not so much in the achievementofany externalresults,qs in thenoble bearing of the agentamidst the vicissitudes and accidents of fortune. We areasked to do our duty without caring for the results."Blessed are the pure in heart." The soul, though itmaybe opposed in therealizationof its volitionbymanyuntowardoccurrences,would still shine, ike Kant's will,"by its own light, as a thingwhich has its whole valuein itself. 4

This reconciliationof freedom and necessity s some-times considered to be identicalwith Kant's, solution ofthe same problem. With Kant, freedom s a matter ofinference. SIn the "Principles of the Metaphysics ofEthics" he says: "Freedom, however, we could not'lKant's "Principlesof theMetaphysics f Ethics" (Abbott'stransla-tion),P. 11.



6/12

BHAGAVADGITA AND KANT. 469proveto be actually propertyfourselves,r ofhumannature; only,we saw, that t must be presupposed,fwe would conceive beingas rational, nd conscious fits causality n respectof its actions, . e., as endowedwith will" (p. 81). All thatwe know s thatwe havesuch a thing s an absolutely bligatory r categoricaljudgment:I ought o act in suchand such a way,re-gardlessof myinclinations.Thou oughtest;thereforethoucanst. But ifwe regardourselves s freeagents,how shall we avoid layingourselvesopen to criticismfromthe scientificphere? The foundationf scienceis the aw ofuniversal ausality,whichwe oughtnot toviolate. Someway to holdconjointly othfreedomndnecessitymustbe devised; or else ourmentalhousewillbe divided gainst tself.Kant holdsthatman s bothdeterminedndfree; de-termined, ithregardto his relations s a member fthephenomenalealm, nd free,withregard to his re-lationsas a member f thenoumenal ealm. The sameact is determined henregarded s belongingo theem-pirical series, nd freewhenwe consider t due to theunderlyingause, thenoumenon.Freedom, herefore,svested nman, henoumenon; hecause s noumenal,heeffect henomenal.The empirical eries of antecedentsand consequentss butthephenomenonf thenoumenalself.Whatshall wesay bywayof a relative stimate fthetwotheories?Whathave thetwosystemsn common?To thequestion fdeterminismrfreedom,'bothystemsreply,determinismnd freedom;butthesimilarityndsthere. On ultimate nalysis,we find hatKant offers sonlythe semblance f freedomand not the reality ofit. Moralrelations xist n thephenomenalealm; andthere, ccording o Kant, it is necessityhatrules. Be-sides,Kant Is solution eemsonlyanotherformof de-terminism.f the mpiricalhainofantecedentsnd con-sequents s butthephenomenonf thenoumenal elf, tis plain that t cannotbe other hanit is. On sucha



7/12

470 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.theory,moral regeneration nd moral progress seem outof place. As Schurmanremarks: "That Judas betrayedChrist,neither he himself,nor any other creature couldhave prevented; nevertheless,the betrayal was not anecessity,but an act of perfectfreedom."5 The free-domr hich Kant offers s is thus emptyand unreal. Thesolution offered by the Vedanta theory gives us realfreedom,freedomeven in the phenomenal realm, wherewe are powerful enough to check our impulses,to resistourpassions, and lead a. ife of satisfied elfhood n whichthe lowerpassions are regulatedby reason.Let us next turn our attention o the origin of the moralproblem and the law of morality. The opening sectionof the Bhagavadgita indicates to us that the problemofmorality arises only when there is a conflictbetweenreason and sense, duty and inclination. Had Arjuna beenmerereason, there couldhave been no Bliagavadgita. If,on the otherhand, he had been mere sensibility,whatwould have been the occasion for it? It is because hewas dominatedby both sensibilityand reason, and be-cause, there was a perpetual conflict etween them, thatwe have the Gita. In spite of all his knowledge,prowess,and otheradmirablequalities, Arjuna is just an ordinarymortal, endowed, among other things, with both reasonand sense. Fully convincedof the righteousnessof hiscause, he comes to the battlefieldof Kurukshetra, pre-pared to meet the enemy and fight to the bitter end.Taking a position between thehostile ranks, whom doeshe behold? The flowerand choice nobility of Indianchivalrydrawn up in the order of battle. Looking at thebeautiful array of- roops in his front,all come to fight.in this civil war in which every man's hand was to beturned against his brother's, Arjuna, smitten with de-spondency, lings way his arms and falls down. He caresnot for victory, throne,wealth, or glory, for they haveto be purchased at a great cost. They have to be won

5" Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution.," p. 7.



8/12

BRAGAVADGITA ND KANT. 471by profaning he religious ites,by destroyingo manyof God's children, y the regularslaughterof one'snearest and dearest. Arjuna,in deep distress nd de-spair,exclaims:

I do not wish for victory, Krishna Nor sovereignty,or pleasure.What s sovereigntyo us, 0 Govinda What enjoyments,nd even ife,Eventhose orwhose ake we desire overeignty,njoyments,nd pleasures,are standing here for battle, abandoning life and wealth. . . . It is notproper for us to kill our own kinsmen. . . For how, 0 Madhaval shallwe be happy, fterkilling ur ownrelatives?Arjuna had cometo thebattlefieldhinkinghat t washisreligious uty o fight ntotheverydeath; but nowthe claimsof bloodand friendshipssert themselvesnhim. Lowerpassions truggle or hemastery,nddoubtdivideshis mind. And to quell the qualmsof an edu-cated conscience, criptural exts are quoted. Be thecause'as righteouss it may,theeternal aw whichde-clares,Thoushaltdonomurder, as to beviolated. Bet-terwere t,then, o diethan o fight gainstpartof one'sownnature.Here is a situation, mostcriticalone, requiringsolution.Reasonstandsagainst ense; duty s opposedto inclination.Arjunarefers hematter o Krishna,hisdivineguide: "With a heartcontaminatedy the taintofhelplessness, itha mindconfoundeds tomyduty,I ask youto tellmewhat s assuredly ood for me. Iam yourdisciple. Instructme whohave thrownmyselfon your ndulgence."'>7 rishna asks Arjuna to be ofgood cheerand fight.He says: Thereis no cause forgrief: you cannotkill or'be killed,foryou and yourrelatives re all immortalouls, nd though hebody beslainin theperformancefyourduties n life,you andtheyare, in essence, ndestructible. f you shirkfrom,or decline o do, yourduty,you will sin. And,besides,youcan neverbe actionless. y shunning ction. Life isaction ndactionmustgo on. Comegoodorevil,wealthorpoverty,oyourduty egardless fresults.I"Bhagavadgita," pp. 40, 41. 7" Bhagavadgita," p. 43.Vol. XXI.-No. 4. 31



9/12

472 INTERNATIONAL JOURNALOF ETHICS.Therefore, rise, thou son of Kunti braceThine arm for conflict, erve thyheart to meetAs things like to thee-pleasureor pain,Profitor ruin,victory r defeat;So minded, ird theeto the fight; for soThoushalt not sin.8

The demands of the lower self, or sense, have to besubordinated o thedictatesof reason.The case of Arjuna is typical of what is taking placeeveryminuteof our lives. It expresseswhat every oneof us has often felt, t points out to us how our morallife is, after all, a conflict etweenduty and inclination,a struggle betweenreason and sense, and impressivelyinstills nto our mindsthe great truth, hatmoralitycon-sists in doing one's duty. What is the battlefieldofKurukshetraif it is not the battlefield f life? Who isArjuna if he is not an ordinarymortal endowed withbothreason and sense? Who are theKauravas and othersstanding n arraybeforeArjuna if they are notthe lowerpassions and temptations? Who is Krishna if he is notthe voice of God echoing in every man? Each one ofus standsin thebattlefield f life, n his chariot ofmortalfleshdrawnby thehorsesof his passions and sense facul-ties. These faculties, according to the ethics of theBhagavadgita, are to be controlled nd intelligentlyuidedby reason and are not to be allowed to carryhim to theabysmal depthsof ruin.Kant declares that theproblemofmoralityarises onlyfor beings in whom thereis a conflict etweenduty and

8Edwin Arnold, " The Song Celestial," p. 16. Compare: " You havegrieved for those who deserve no grief, and you talk words of wisdom-learned men grieve not for the living nor the dead-never did I not exist,nor you, nor these rulers of men; nor will any one of us ever hereaftercease to be ... therefore do engage in battle. . . . He who thinks to bethe killer and he who thinks to be killed, both know nothing.. . . There-fore you ought not to grieve for any being. Having regard to your ownduty also, you ought not to falter. .. . But if you will not fight thisrighteous battle, then you will have abandoned your own duty"("Bhagavadgita," pp. 43-47).



10/12

BHAGAVADGITA ND KANT. 473inclination, en nwhom eason nd sense tandopposed.Werewe completely embersfthe rationalworld, uractionswouldtallywith he aw of reasonor duty. Andagain, fwe weremerelymembers ftheworldofsense,our actionswouldtake place according o the laws ofsense, ndcouldneverbe madeto conformo duty. "If,therefore,wereonly member fthe worldofunder-standing,hen ll my actionswouldperfectlyonformotheprinciples f autonomy fpure will; if I wereonlya partof theworldof sense, heywouldnecessarily eassumed o conform holly o the natural aw of desiresand nclinations" Kant s Ethics,page 7).Thuswe find hatboth heBhagavadgita ndKant holdthat theconflictetween utyand inclinations thees-sential ule ofmorality,ndthe uppressionf nclinationby duty, hecondition f moralworth. Thoughmenmayagree todiffernthispoint, t is,nonethe ess,truethatonly n such- conflictan true moral character e re-vealed. As Professor aulsenhas said: "Where therehas neverbeen a conflictetween nclination nd duty,where he willhas neverhad an opportunityfdecidingagainst nclination nd forduty, he characterhas notbeentested."Turning ur attention o themoral aw,we find hatbothGitaand Kant preachdutyforduty's ake. "Yourbusinessswith ction lone,notby anymeanswith ruit.Let not thefruit f actionbe your motive o action."9"That an actiondonefrom uty, erives ts moralworth,notfrom he purposewhich s to be attained y it,butfrom hemaxim y which t is determined,nd thereforedoes notdependon therealization f the object of theaction, utmerely n theprinciple fvolition, ywhichtheactionhas takenplace,without egardto anyobjectof desire."0 Thus according o both Gita and Kant,thehighest ypeofmorality onsists n doing dutyfor

"' Bhagavadgita," p. 48.'Abbott's translation of Kant's Ethics, p. 19.



11/12

474 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.duty's sake, withoutany personal attachment or hopeof reward. The moralman mustdo his duty imply e-cause it is duty. A man's will is good,"not becauseofwhat t performs r effects, otby its aptnessfor theattainmentof some proposed end, but simply by virtueof the volition, . e., it is good in itself." 1Thus far the twosystemsre agreed; butas we pro-ceed we find that Kant excludes frommoral actions,actionswhich re consistent ithduty, ut yet are donefrom nclination.A trader s honestfromgood policy;a manpreserves is life as dutyrequires'and not be-causeduty equires.' "It is a duty omaintain ne's ife;and, n addition, veryone has also a direct nclinationto do so. But on this account, he often nxious carewhichmostmentakefor t,has no intrinsic orth, ndtheirmaximhas nomoral mport. They preserve heirlife,as duty requires,no doubt,but not because dutyrequires." 12 Actsdonefrom nclination,re not, ccord-ingto Kant,moral. It is a defect f Kant's ethical heorythathe conceives n act ofduty s positivelyndifferent,nay,disagreeable othe senses. He evendefines uty s"compulsion o a purposeunwillinglydopted."The Gita ethics, n the otherhand,does not ask ustodestroyhe mpulses, utasksus only ocontrol hem,to keepthem n theirproperorder, o see thatthey realwayssubordinatedo and regulated y reason. By alifeof reasontheGita ethicsdoes notmean a passion-lesslife, ut one nwhich assion s transcended. Greatare thesenses; greater han he senses s the mind; andgreater hanthemind s the understanding."3 Thoughthe Gita ethicsdoes not enjoinupon us the completeeradicationfthe ensuousmpulses,hedemand or heircontrol s so insistent s to lead us to think hat t alsoadvocates heir otalsuppression.How shall we explainthis outcry gainstthe sensesTheVedanta doesscorn he sway of thesenses. The Ve-

t Ibid., p. 11. " P. 16. 13 elang 's translation, p. 57.



12/12

THE UNWRITTEN OUBLE STANDARD. 475dantinfliesfrom ensuouspleasurein everyform, otbecause t is sinfuln itself, utbecause t is too apt toendanger hesoul by fetteringtto thatwhichs earthlyand perishable. "Pleasure," says Professor aulsen inhis descriptionf theChristianonceptionf ife,.is thebait withwhich he devilensnares hesoul to chain t totheworld." Thingsof the earthare theburdens hatweighus downand crushourhearts. Every greatre-ligiousteacherhas taught hisimportantruth. Jesusrightly erceived hatit was easier for a camelto gothrough heeyeofa needle hanfora richman to enterinto hekingdomfGod. Wealth lienates sfromGod.1Butthisdoesnotmean hatwemust ive a life of passion-less quietism.We are not asked to uprootall desires;forthatwould mply hecessation f all activity.Butlife s actionand actionmustgo on. The Vedantadoesnot see anyevil in theearthlyifeas such. It doesnotask us to withdraw rom heordinary ursuitsof life;but it does ask us to renounce he uxuriesof life. Weare askedto live thespiritualor theunworldlyife intheworld. The asceticism,f we may say so, which sinsisted ponin theGitaethics, s theasceticismftheinner pirit nd notoftheoutward onduct.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, MADRAS, INDIA.

THE WRITTEN LAW AND THE UNWRITTENDOUBLE STANDARD.ADA ELIOT SHEFFIELD.T HE enforcementf a law has itsmost far-reachingeffectn drivinghometo thepublicmind moralstandard. Crudethough he legal distinctionsetweenright nd wrongmaybe, they on the wholereflecthescruplesof theaverageman,and theygo to form he

" Paulsen's "Systemof Ethics" (Thilly's translation,p. 88fl).

Documents

Ethics of Bhagavad Gita and Kant