Espas Report II

8/2/2019 Espas Report II

1/178

GLOBAL TRENDS

2030

Citizens in an Interconnectedand Polycentric world

EuropeanUnionInstitute forSecurity Studies


2/178

This report, edited by Alvaro de Vasconcelos, contains the fndings o the EuropeanStrategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) research project. The EUISS has been

commissioned to produce the ESPAS Report on Global Trends 2030 by an EU inter-institutional task orce. An interim version o this report was presented to the Euro-pean Union in October 2011.

The ESPAS research project is coordinated by lvaro de Vasconcelos (ESPAS andEUISS director), Giovanni Grevi, Luis Peral and Jean Pascal Zanders. Contributorsinclude Sami Andoura, Esra Bulut-Aymat, Nicola Casarini, Iana Dreyer, SabineFischer, Damien Helly, George Jo, Bernice Lee, Patryk Pawlak, iga Turk, AlcidesCosta Vaz and Catherine Withol de Wenden, as well as a pool o research assist-ants: Anna DallOca, Any Freitas (assistant to the Director), Sebastian Paulo, Amaia

Sanchez and Gerald Stang, supported by the ESPAS management unit, Luz EntrenaVazquez, Project Manager, and her assistant, Marija Atanaskova. Alexandra Bara-hona de Brito was responsible or the language editing o the report. The researchalso incorporates the work o a number o external contributors namely: Samina

Ahmed, William Dutton, Irene Lpez Mndez, Jayshree Segupta, Esraa Rashid, IjazShaf Gilani, Ingrid Therwath, Magdalena Sepulveda Carmona, Leszek Jeremi Bialy,Benjamin Preisler and Sania Nishtar.

The fndings o this ESPAS Report are the responsibility o theEUISS, and do not necessarily express the opinions o the EU in-stitutions. The EUISS was commissioned to produce the ESPAS

Report on Global trends 2030 by an inter-institutional task orce,with ull respect or the intellectual independence o the EUISS.

Institute for Security Studies

European Union

100, avenue de Suffren

75015 Paris

tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30

fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31

e-mail: [email protected] ISBN 978-92-9198-199-1

www.iss.europa.eu QN-31-12-525-EN-C

Director : lvaro de Vasconcelos doi:10.2815/27508


3/178

European Strategy and Policy Analysis

System (ESPAS)

Global trends 2030

Citizens in an interconnected and

polycentric world


4/178

Institute for Security StudiesEuropean Union

100, avenue de Suffren

75015 Paris

tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30

fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31

e-mail: [email protected] ISBN 978-92-9198-199-1

www.iss.europa.eu QN-31-12-525-EN-C

Director : lvaro de Vasconcelos doi:10.2815/27508

This report, edited by Alvaro de Vasconcelos, contains the ndings o the European Strat-egy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) research project. The EUISS has been commis-sioned to produce the ESPAS Report on Global Trends 2030 by an EU inter-institutional

task orce. An interim version o this report was presented to the European Union inOctober 2011.

The ESPAS research project is coordinated by lvaro de Vasconcelos (ESPAS and EUISSdirector), Giovanni Grevi, Luis Peral and Jean Pascal Zanders. Contributors include SamiAndoura, Esra Bulut-Aymat, Nicola Casarini, Iana Dreyer, Sabine Fischer, Damien Helly,George Jo, Bernice Lee, Patryk Pawlak, iga Turk, Alcides Costa Vaz and CatherineWithol de Wenden, as well as a pool o research assistants: Anna DallOca, Any Freitas(assistant to the Director), Sebastian Paulo, Amaia Sanchez and Gerald Stang, supported

by the ESPAS management unit, Luz Entrena Vazquez, Project Manager, and her assist-ant, Marija Atanaskova. Alexandra Barahona de Brito was responsible or the languageediting o the report. The research also incorporates the work o a number o externalcontributors namely: Samina Ahmed, William Dutton, Irene Lpez Mndez, JayshreeSegupta, Esraa Rashid, Ijaz Sha Gilani, Ingrid Therwath, Magdalena Sepulveda Car-mona, Leszek Jeremi Bialy, Benjamin Preisler and Sania Nishtar.

The ndings o this ESPAS Report are the responsibility o theEUISS, and do not necessarily express the opinions o the EU in-

stitutions. The EUISS was commissioned to produce the ESPASRe-

port on Global trends 2030 by an inter-institutional task orce, with

ull respect or the intellectual independence o the EUISS.


5/178

Foreword rom the ESPAS Inter-Institutional Task Force 5

ESPAS methodology 7Framework 7

Regional conerences 8

Side events 9

Focus groups 9

List o gures and tables 10

Executive Summary 11

Preamble 11

Three main global trends 11

Part I - The empowerment o individuals: a global human community but a growing expectations

gap 12

Part II. Greater human development but inequality, climate change and scarcity 15

Part III A polycentric world but a growing governance gap 18

Part IV Greater uncertainties but broader opportunities 20

1. The empowerment o individuals: key drivers 27

The global rise o the middle class 28

Education: The cornerstone o knowledge societies 31

The inormation age: empowerment but threats to privacy 32A universal inormation revolution: the new world o the internet 33

2. Converging values and demands, but risks o extremism 39

The universal spread o human rights and democracy 39

Womens rights 42

Sharing the earth 42

A post-Huntingtonian world 45

The expectations gap and the risk o extremism and nationalism 46

3. Demands or political participation but dangers o populism 49

Gender and politics 52

Multiple, non-conicting identities 53

Development with dignity 54

Participatory democracy 55

4. A rising middle class but persistent poverty and inequality 61

Rising wealth in developing economies 62

A shit o economic gravity to Asia and the developing world 63

Demographics: ageing and slow growth in the West and East Asia 64

Demography and migration 65

Ongoing nancial instability 67

Output and greening pressures 68

Less abject poverty, but persistent poverty and inequality 69

Contents


6/178

Women and development 74

Inequality and the hyper-rich 75

Social challenges in advanced economies 77

5. Climate change and scarcities: the challenges to human development 79

Climate change and scarcity 80

Water scarcity 81

Natural resource scarcity: energy 87

Other resource scarcities 89

Delivering the Green Industrial Revolution 89

6. Human security: protecting citizens 95

Major conict trends 96

Scarcity and strategic interests 98

Military technology and uture conicts 98

Regional conict trends 100

7. A power shit to Asia but greater uncertainty 107

A world o difuse power 108

Sot power 111

The great powers 112

Uncertainty or some great powers 118

Rising middle powers 119Uncertainty or some middle powers 122

Regionalism as a vector o power 125

8. Diusion o power but dangers o ragmentation 129

A world o networks 129

A world o private actors 131

A world o cities 134

9. Global initiatives but a governance gap 139

Global politics 139

Charting the uture: the governance actor 141

Governance and responsibility: normative competition and contamination 143

Reorming global governance: synthesis, resilience and airness 145

Towards governance hubs? 149

Annexes 155

10. Convergence and ragmentation 155

11. Human development and scarcity 156

12. Multilateralism and ragmentation 156

13. Monitoring the transition 157

List o Reerences 159

Abbreviations 173


7/178

5

Foreword rom the ESPASInter-Institutional Task Force

The 2010 European Union Budget provided or the European Commission to undertakea Pilot Project over two years, with the aim o exploring the possibility o establishingan inter-institutional system identiying long-term trends on major policy issues acingthe EU. This Pilot Project was proposed by the Parliament and adopted jointly with the

Council, as the twin arm o the budgetary authority.In practice, the central objective o the initiative is to develop a network or regular co-operation between ocials in the various EU institutions whose daily work involves re-searching orward-looking policy trends. As a rst step in this process, the Paris-basedEUISS was commissioned to do initial research, given its previous experience working inthe eld o long-term trends. Its contribution was to provide an initial assessment o thelong-term international and domestic political and economic environment acing theEU over the next 20 years.

The EUISS report Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World,edited by lvaro de Vasconcelos, contains the ndings o the project. Its uniqueness liesin the act that not only is this the rst time that the EU institutions have called upon anoutside body to give an independent view o long-term global trends, but also that thework was undertaken by a team o European researchers looking outward in search o aglobal perspective on the challenges ahead.

In order to ensure this perspective, the debates held in the various regions were organised

with local think tanks, involving local experts on global trends rom the academic, civilsociety and policy spheres. You will nd the EUISS report and its relevant supportingdocuments on the ESPAS website (see, in particular, the Executive Summary).

The EUISS report raises a wide range o issues. Its aim was not to predict exactly how theworld will look in 2030, but rather to map major, existing trends that are likely to shapethe uture and will need to be taken into account by the Union as it denes coherentstrategic options or the next governance cycle.

The report identies several global trends that will shape the world in 2030. Theyinclude:


8/178

6

The empowerment of the individual, which may contribute to a growing sense obelonging to asingle human community;

Greater stress on sustainable development against a backdrop o greater resourcescarcityand persistent poverty, compounded by the consequences o climate change;

The emergence o a more

polycentric world characterized by a shit o power awayrom states, and growing governance gaps as the mechanisms or inter-state relationsail to respond adequately to global public demands.

As this project goes to the next phase a so-called Preparatory Action, with a view toputting in place an inter-institutional system at EU level by 2014 it would be o greatinterest to have eedback rom all individuals and organisations who read and refectupon this document, to learn whether you share the basic analysis set out. Are the mainglobal trends identied the right ones and the most important? Are there other long-

term changes that need to be addressed? Please let us have your views. These will be help-ul in contributing towards input or determining the challenges and the options or theEuropean Union over the next decade.

Global trends 2030 Citizens in an interconnected and polycentric world


9/178

7

ESPAS methodologyThe EUISS, in its role as the European agency or strategic studies, was identied as thecore institution o the trend-monitoring European Strategy and Policy Analysis System(ESPAS), which is steered by a quadrilateral inter-institutional task orce, composedby the Bureau o European Policy Advisers (BEPA), the European Parliament (EP), theCouncil o the European Union and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Theeventual aim is to build a permanent EU orecasting capacity based on an inter-institu-

tional and international network. As part o a one-year pilot study, ESPAS was taskedwith producing two separate reports:

A rst report assessing the long-term, international and domestic, political andeconomic environment acing the European Union over the next 20 years;

A second report identiying the main policy challenges and choices likely toconront EU institutions during the 2014-19 institutional cycle.

The ESPAS team systematically sought the close involvement o experts and think tanksrom outside Europe, namely rom the United States, Brazil, China, India and Russia,but also rom Arica, the Arab world and Turkey.

ESPAS used a mix o in house and contract-based expertise, and ully exploited the ex-pertise o EU institutions in the areas under study. Brainstorming and review workshopsdrawing rom a broader pool o expertise, and involving practitioners rom EU institu-tions and the EEAS where appropriate, have also contributed to completing and scruti-nising research and data-collection ndings.

FrameworkResearch has been organized by horizontal issue areas (core issues) and regions. Globalgovernance has been dealt with as a third overarching research area. Researchers wereasked to review and assess the existing literature orecasting global trends using this ana-lytical grid. The interim product resulted in twelve research papers, and an annotated listo the main challenges and problems identied by the experts. These interim contribu-tions constitute the backbone o this report.

TheESPAS Stage Two Guidelines were produced on the basis o the research, and presentedkey hypotheses. This document was presented and discussed at the Sixth Inter-Institu-


10/178

8


tional task orce (on 19 April 2011). A report on the preliminary ESPAS ndings was

produced ater an intensive two-day discussion among the project experts and a peerreviewer.

Regional conerencesThe preliminary ESPAS ndings were discussed at regional conerences in each o theseven regions identied by the inter-institutional task orce. Conerence programmeshave been closely linked to the research and networking requirements o the project. Themain role o the conerences has been to discuss the key ndings o the ESPAS prelimi-

nary report, which were circulated to the experts participating at each ESPAS researchconerence. The debates were organized with local think tanks, bringing together expertson global trends rom academia, civil society organizations, and civil services, most nota-bly policy planning departments. Their contribution has played a major role in ensuringthat the report has a truly global perspective rather than a Eurocentric bias. The coner-ences were held in 2011:

North Arica, the Middle East & the Gul Cairo, 30 May

Sub-Saharan Arica Pretoria, 5 July

United States & North America Washington DC, 11 July

China and & Asia Pacic Beijing, 20-21 July

Brazil & South America So Paulo, 1 September

Wider Europe Moscow, 9 September

Ankara, 11 September

Indian Sub-continent & Central Asia New Delhi, 24 September


11/178

9

ESPAS methodology

Side eventsBrainstorming sessions and working group meetings were also held at the margins osome regional conerences:

Brainstorming Sessions Brasilia, 2 September

Moscow, 9 September

Working group meetings New Delhi, 25-26 September

A nal conerence was organized in Brussels to allow or a critical overview and commento the main ndings, and or a discussion o its implications or the EU. The inputsgathered in these conerences and side-events were incorporated into this report, GlobalTrends 2030.

Focus groupsGiven the central role o younger generations in the recent democratic developments

across the Middle East and around the world, particular attention was given to the roleand example that empowered and connected youths might set in their societies todayand in decades to come. Young students, activists and members o civil society werethereore invited to attend ad hoc discussions (ocus groups) on questions o identity,the uture challenges and opportunities acing their countries, and political participa-tion and social networks. The main goal was to assess how they view important social,political and economic issues and the use o new technologies in their own country andabroad. Groups usually consisted o ve to ten individuals, aged 20-30. Participants werechosen according to the snow ball method (pointed out by local contacts because o

their prole). The selected young leaders were men and women who are expected to havea considerable impact on their countries and beyond because o their activities in busi-ness (innovative entrepreneurs), societies (social campaigners or activists), and politics(young politicians, politically engaged individuals). The ocus groups were held in Egypt,Pakistan, India, China, the US, Brazil, France, Russia and Turkey.


12/178

10

List o gures and tables

Figure 1: Population o 20 major countries in 2010 and 2030 27

Figure 2: Middle class growth to 2030 30Figure 3: Internet users 2010 34

Figure 4: Democracy around the world 41

Figure 5: Shares o world primary energy, 1970-2030 43

Figure 6: Youth population 2030 50

Figure 7: Social networkers 2010 51

Figure 8: Projected GDP and GDP per capita by 2030 64

Figure 9: Population age structure by 2030, by ve-year groups 66

Figure 10: Projected poverty in key regions 2030 70

Figure 11: Chronic diseases 74Figure 12: Rising income inequality in OECD countries 76

Figure 13: Projected demand or water by 2030 82

Figure 14: Long-term change in water stress 2025 83

Figure 15: Estimated drought requency in 2030 84

Figure 16: Water ootprints and trade 86

Figure 17: Distribution o proved reserves 88

Figure 18: Value o renewable energy capacity installed, by region ($bn) 90

Figure 19: Value o renewable energy capacity installed, by technology ($bn) 93

Figure 20: Confict around the world, 1946-2010 103Figure 21: The 15 largest economies in 2010 and 2030 109

Figure 22: Material power index 110

Figure 23: International public perceptions, a measure o sot power 112

Figure 24: The 20 largest cities in 2030 135

Table 1: Support or democracy 40

Table 2: 2030 Target investment budgets or renewable energy technologies 91



13/178

11

Executive Summary

PreambleThe ollowing is a summary o the main ndings o the ESPAS research project, groupedunder three key headings. The aim was not to predict how the world will look in 2030 butrather to map major, existing trends that are likely to shape the uture and must be takeninto account by the European Union in its attempt to dene coherent strategic options

or the next governance cycle.

The research is based on 12 research papers covering six core issues (climate changeand natural resources; energy; inormation technology; economic development; migra-tion; and disarmament) and seven world regions. As its title suggests, the report dealsprimarily with identiable trends taking shape across nations and continents ratherthan ocusing on international relations; as bets the normative civilian nature o theEU, the report ocuses clearly on the likely evolution o citizens rights, demands andexpectations, as opposed to adopting the more traditional ocus on inter-state rela-tions.

The rst step in the research process concentrated on analysing the existing literatureand identiying knowledge gaps; in the second phase, researchers attempted to ll thosegaps, and other experts were engaged to mobilize the best expertise available worldwide.The global trends identied during the rst stage o the research process were submittedto external scrutiny, in conerences held throughout the seven regions identied by theinter-institutional task orce overseeing the project. The input rom these conerences

was incorporated into the report Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected andPolycentric world. In order to ensure a genuinely global rather than limited Eurocen-tric perspective, the debates held in the various regions were organized with local thinktanks, and involved local experts on global trends rom the academic, civil society andpolicy spheres. Analysis o the impact o these trends on the EU and its policy options todeal with them are addressed in a second report.

Three main global trends

There are three main global trends emerging today that will shape the world in 2030:the empowerment o individuals, which contributes to a sense o belonging to a sin-gle human community; greater stress on sustainable development against a backdrop


14/178

12


o greater resource scarcity and persistent poverty, compounded by the consequences o

climate change; and the emergence o a more polycentric world characterized by a shit opower away rom states, and growing governance gaps as the mechanisms or inter-staterelations ail to respond adequately to global public demands.

Part I - The empowerment o individuals: a global human

community but a growing expectations gap

The empowerment o individuals: key drivers

According to the United Nations (UN), by 2030 the world population will reach 8.3 bil-lion. Millions o these individuals are being empowered by the social and technologicalprogress o the last decades. The main drivers o this trend are, rst and oremost, theglobal emergence o the middle class, particularly in Asia, near-universal access to edu-cation, the empowering eects o inormation and communications technology (ICT),and the evolution in the status o women in most countries. These transormations areincreasing the autonomy o individuals and powerul non-state actors vis--vis the state.

In 1990, about 73 percent o the world population was literate. In 2010, global literacyrates reached 84 percent and the literacy rate may pass the 90 percent mark in 2030.1

Women are becoming empowered throughout the world, a trend that is likely to continueinto the uture. Women now have better access to education, inormation, and economicand political opportunities, all o which contribute to greater gender equality. However,progress is very uneven rom region to region and between dierent social groups, withchildren, indigenous, immigrant or low-caste women remaining especially vulnerable.

The middle class will increase in infuence as its ranks swell to 3.2 billion by 2020 and

to 4.9 billion by 2030. The middle class will be the protagonist o the universal spreado inormation societies. Citizens will be interconnected by myriad networks and greaterinterpersonal trans-national fows. It can thereore be assumed that the citizens o 2030will want a greater say in their uture than those o previous generations.

More and more people will live in the inormation age as improved technology that ismore portable and aordable makes inormation more universally accessible. The dig-ital divide will not disappear over the next 20 years, but it will narrow considerably. By

1. See: UNESCO Institute or Statistics at http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=210,which provides data up to 2009; the projection or 2030 is based on predictions in the Roland Berger Trend Compendium2030, which predicts that primary school enrolment will be above 90% by that year. R. Berger,The Trend Compendium 2030,Global Knowledge Society, at http://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.html.
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=210http://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=210


15/178

13

Executive summary

2030, it is estimated that more than hal o the worlds population will have internet

access. However, new inormation technologies will remain unavailable to many peoplebecause o illiteracy and lack o access to electricity, although in regions as deprived asSub-Saharan Arica the availability o mobile phones may compensate or limited accessto electricity.

Converging values and demands but risks o extremism

By 2030, the demands and concerns o people in many dierent countries are likely toconverge, with a major impact on national politics and international relations. This will

be the result mainly o greater awareness among the worlds citizenry that their aspira-tions and grievances are shared. This awareness is already conguring a global citizensagenda that emphasizes undamental reedoms, economic and social rights and, increas-ingly, environmental issues. The citizens o 2030 will be very much more aware that theyare part o a single human community in a highly interconnected world. This may signalthe rise o a new age o convergence.

At the same time, however, distinctive cultural identities will remain. Indeed, demo-cratic aspirations will tend to be perceived as compatible with, and even as acilitat-

ing, a greater awareness o national and sub-national cultural identities. The declineo theories o con lict between civilizations and cultural relativism is thereore likely,although economic and social diiculties may reverse this positive trend in somecountries, and extremist identity politics and xenophobia will continue to leave amark on some parts o the world. Likewise, the reusal o the right to cultural andreligious reedom may promote radicalization and the rise o nationalism in someareas o the globe.

Whatever the actors dividing people, the pressing issues that must be conronted pov-erty, inequality, corruption, disease, climate change, water and energy scarcity, war andhumanitarian disasters, and the prolieration o weapons, including o small arms willbe perceived as shared challenges by a global public with access to new instruments ocommunication that enable it to express its concerns and dissent.

The convergence o concerns and increased vocalization o demands will contrastsharply with governments capacity to deliver public goods, particularly those relatingto improving quality o lie. This will generate an expectations gap that may become

a source o tension and social confict and which can be aggravated by ineective eco-nomic governance. Although such a gap may ultimately promote greater stability byorcing societies to work towards more eective and democratic policy-making and ac-


16/178

14


countability processes, it may initially become a source o riction, confict and even

revolt, and in some instances the result o such turmoil may be resurgent populism andrecurring confict.

Resurgent nationalism will remain the most potent challenge to democracies aroundthe world, and may cause societal ragmentation and confict. Equally, extremism willnot disappear and will remain a major threat to basic rights and reedoms; but it will bea minority phenomenon, and extremist nationalists are unlikely to rise to power in anyo the states perorming a greater international role. Although some view the Chinesemodel as an alternative, it is not likely to be sustainable in the long term. Indeed, the

emergence o a credible global alternative to a governance model based on human rightsand democracy is unlikely.

Demands or Political Participation but Dangers o Populism

The empowerment o individual and non-state actors, particularly civil society organi-sations, will have a signicant impact on how politics is conducted. There will be in-creased civil society pressure or direct participation in the political arena, in whichthe central infuence o traditional party politics and governance structures will tend

to wane.

Greater participation and knowledge coupled with a growing expectations gap maylead to tensions, revolt and conlict. The youth movements o 2011 rom the rankso which many members o the power elites o 2030 are likely to emerge are aware othe problems acing representative democracies. The traditional media will be orcedto adapt to citizen journalism that makes use o social networks, blogs and web-sites. Participatory orms o journalism are already part o a broader push by citizensto participate in public lie. New participatory mechanisms will likely be introducedby democratic and authoritarian regimes alike in response to pressure rom below.

While such mechanisms may have positive eects, they may also threaten representativeinstitutions and democratic political parties, and open the way or new orms o radi-cal populism. The scapegoating that oten accompanies nationalist populism may be atemptation or authoritarian regimes under stress rom dissident orces. In democraticsocieties, new orms o protest and anti-establishment politics may emerge in response toa growing expectations gap, deepening income disparities (the squeezing o the middle

class), and the power shits that are limiting the action o countries that have been usedto acting as major global players. In the US, the radical introversion and isolationismthat is currently maniested by the rise o populist movements with their appeals to old


17/178

15

Executive summary

myths that oer people a alse sense o security exempliy how the deep changes in the

political, social and economic spheres currently underway may destabilize traditionalliberal democratic politics.

Internet users are likely to become more engaged in politically-motivated networking,and will demand unettered access to the internet. But this will also increase threats toprivacy: internet companies are driven by economic interests, and citizens are thereorevulnerable to the abuse o stored inormation. The debate about privacy and accuracy oinormation will become more acute. Over the next two decades, the cyber-sphere is likelyto become an arena o confict and tension between states o all political stripes, not least

among those or which cyber security is a key component o intelligence and militarystrategy, and also between individuals or private companies. It is likely that some govern-ments will be more concerned with cyber security, control, surveillance and regulationthan with protecting reedom o access.

Part II. Greater human development but inequality, climate

change and scarcity

A rising middle class but persistent poverty and inequality

Abject poverty is likely to continue to decrease, and increasingly afuent societies drivenby a burgeoning middle class will emerge in Asia and Latin America. However, the con-sequences o the current economic crisis may partially reverse this trend, and overall in-equality will tend to increase. By the third decade o the century, Arica is also likely towitness the rise o a growing middle class as millions are lited out o poverty. But theMillennium Development Goals (MDGs) will probably not be ully achieved by the tar-get year 2015. Poverty and social exclusion will still aect a signicant proportion o the

world population.

In spite o progress, weak education systems and the prevalence o disease, both epi-demic and non-epidemic, will remain a major burden or human development. Currenteconomic policies and global patterns o development suggest that areas o extremewealth and dire poverty will continue to coexist. Corruption will severely hamper sus-tainable development, constituting one o the main hindrances to social inclusion. Thenancial crisis o 2008 could have an enduring impact on living standards in Europeand the US, creating a category o new poor, shrinking the middle class and trigger-ing new migratory fows, as well as a brain drain rom impoverished regions in EUcountries.


18/178

16


The current growth model is coming under increasingly critical scrutiny around the

world. A central issue or the uture is the extent to which the major economic powerso the past ty years the US, Europe and Japan will be capable o reormulatingtheir growth model in a sustainable direction, and building new competitive advan-tages.

Climate change and scarcities: the challenges to human development

Climate change will have serious consequences and aect living standards and publicsaety by exacerbating water and ood scarcity. Environmental degradation will contin-

ue to provoke humanitarian disasters, including desertication and foods o increas-ing magnitude. The severest impact will be elt in China, South Asia and the Sahel,where millions o people will be displaced; but no region o the world will be spared.Humanitarian crises due to water scarcity and related ood and health emergencies,some aecting millions o people, may become recurrent, particularly in some partso Arica.

Competition or resources is likely to exacerbate tensions and trigger conficts. Energycrises will heighten the sense that the world is entering an age o scarcity. As the con-

sequences o climate change and scarcity are elt more and more acutely, there will bea growing realization that this is indeed a global problem that concerns and aects allnations and peoples. The prevailing model o development may consequently be calledinto question.

In response to climate challenge, governments have become more willing to nance re-search and development (R&D) in clean energy and eciency-related technologies. Butthe impact that this will have in reducing climate change signicantly is likely to be in-sucient. Looking orward to 2030, the pace o change remains uncertain due to thewide range o possible technology and policy scenarios. Making substantial progress inlimiting the impact o climate change will require immediately scaling up the deploy-ment o existing clean technologies and signicant increases in energy eciency. Thetransormation o energy systems to address climate change concerns may be describedas the third industrial revolution, bringing transormation to global production sys-tems, especially in the energy sector.

Human security: protecting citizens

State security will remain a key issue into 2030, but it is not likely to dominate theinternational agenda. Wars among great powers are highly unlikely, given their overrid-


19/178

17

Executive summary

ing interest in preserving stability and sustaining growth to meet the needs and expec-

tations o their citizenries. A major confagration involving chemical, biological, radio-logical or nuclear weapons (CBRN) is not likely to happen over the next two decades.The ocus o long-term strategic planning is on global challenges such as prolieration(including by non-state actors), cyber security or instability emanating rom ailingstates humanitarian crises, piracy and organized crime and on the protection onatural resources and access to energy. But the possibility o inter-state confict cannotbe discounted entirely.

Border tensions, particularly in Asia, could trigger serious inter-state confict i measures

are not taken to address underlying causes. Looking ahead to 2030, the border tensionsbetween China and India over water resources have the greatest potential to disrupt in-ternational peace. Based on current trends, trouble is most likely to emerge as a result othe China-Vietnam confict over the disputed islands in the South China Sea; the Indo-Pakistani confict over Aghanistan; the confict between Algeria and Morocco over theWestern Sahara; the problems emerging as a result o the possible collapse o North Ko-rea; and unresolved conficts in Eastern Europe.

Tensions over raw materials may also cause confict and require new orms o crisis man-agement. State ragility and confict compounded by pervasive and possibly growing in-come inequality and a massive increase in the urban population will be most pronouncedin sub-Saharan Arica. Social vulnerabilities will increase the likelihood o strie, and thusreinorce the state ragility-confict cycle. Intra-Arican and trans-regional orced migra-tion due to economic actors, conficts and environmental degradation will tend to growor this reason.

Wars uelled by nationalism and extremist identity politics, and the associated dangers

o mass murder and genocide, will be the core security challenge o the coming decades.Criminal networks and populist nationalist movements will tend to make states morevulnerable. Terrorism will remain a concern, but low-intensity conficts such as urbanviolence will also require increased attention rom governments. Human security pro-tecting citizens in particular rom mass violence is likely to become the major driver ointernational security policies. But it is likely that states will concentrate their securityand even deence policies increasingly on domestic security. The tendency to securitizesocial and human issues may divide societies and lead to crisis and violence.


20/178

18


Part III A polycentric world but a growing governance gapA power shit to Asia but greater uncertainty

The world o 2030 will be diusely multipolar and polycentric. There will be a pluralityo actors, and no single world power will play a hegemonic role. This will generate greaterreedom o manoeuvre or all international actors and give middle powers a more promi-nent role on the world stage. Polycentrism will be accompanied by an economic power shittoward Asia, where over hal o the worlds population will be concentrated by 2030.

China is projected to be the largest economic power with a 19 percent share o worldgross domestic product (GDP), and India will continue to rise. Both countries will acemajor structural challenges, however. Brazil may become a successul example o sustain-able development during the next two decades.

There will be a shit in economic power to China and India rom the US, Europe andJapan but it is dicult to predict the long-term impact o the 2008 nancial crisis onthe world economy. It is uncertain how successul Russia will be in its eorts to mod-ernize. However, economic power does not correlate automatically with political infu-

ence: other dimensions matter, such as sot power and, to a declining extent, militarypower. Thus, the infuence o all powers will also depend crucially on their ability toact as models or economic, political and societal development, in particular in theirneighbourhoods.

The United States is likely to remain the worlds major military power, but Chinese mili-tary capabilities will very probably increase. Due to the many uncertainties about howthe major powers will evolve, it is impossible to predict the level o global infuence thateach one may have. However, present trends seem to suggest that there will be no singlehegemonic world power; that the US and China will be the most infuential actors; thatIndia will continue to rise; and that Russia and Japan will lose the great power status theyenjoyed in the twentieth century.

A constellation o rising middle powers, including Indonesia, Turkey, and South Arica,will become ever more prominent. Traditional middle powers such as Canada and Aus-tralia will sustain their level o infuence in global aairs, as may Mexico i it managesto overcome some o its present governance diculties. Europes leading states may also

be tempted to carve a niche or themselves as autonomous international players. I Pa-kistan, Nigeria and Egypt consolidate their democracies, they could also become impor-tant middle range powers, with a capacity to exert a very positive regional infuence.


21/178

19

Executive summary

Regionalism will be a power multiplier that is likely to avour international actors such

as Brazil, Indonesia and South Arica, but not necessarily India or China. The inter-national system that is likely to emerge as a result o all these shits will probably mixbalance-o-power politics and multilateralism, with states making issue-by-issue shitsand alliances. This will generate a higher level o unpredictability in international rela-tions, and make it harder to attain a broad consensus even on matters requiring urgentglobal action.

Difusion o power but dangers o ragmentation

Non-state actors, in particular national and transnational civil society networks and pri-vate corporations, will play a critical role in the coming decades. Their power and infu-ence will be greater than that o many states, and may lead to new orms o governanceand civic action. The devolution o power to ederated states and regional and local au-thorities will continue and even accelerate: this process will be particularly rapid in thecase o cities and extended metropolitan areas. By 2030, the ty greatest megacities inthe world will concentrate more resources than most small and middle-income states,and they will demand more autonomy and exert greater power, even taking on a moreprominent international role.

Preserving humane living conditions in the worlds megacities will be the major chal-lenge acing some states, since rapid urbanization will aggravate social exclusion andput intense pressure on public services. But afuent and dynamic cities worldwide willbe the powerhouses o new areas o prosperity; by contrast, other regions, even in devel-oped countries, will become depopulated due to decreasing work opportunities. Citieswill also absorb most national security resources. At the same time, the growing trendtowards the privatization o central state unctions will diminish the capacity o national

governments to regulate public lie or redistribute national resources. In extreme cases,this may entail the breakdown o state structures, and state ragility in some areas mayurther increase the disruptive powers o criminal or illegal networks exercising econom-ic and even territorial control, particularly in Central America and Sub-Saharan Aricabut possibly elsewhere.

Global initiatives but a governance gap

Greater awareness o the global nature o the worlds citizens topmost concerns will lead

to a greater demand or shared solutions. But the call or global solutions is unlikelyto be matched by supply, generating a governance gap. New constellations or hubs ostates inspired by the G20 model may emerge to address these challenges, but their ca-


22/178

20


pacity to nd shared solutions will be partial at best. However, oten global governance

structures will be unable to deliver many o the international public goods that citizenswill demand. This gap will be particularly evident when addressing economic and nan-cial crises, climate change and resource scarcity.

The governance gap will likely weaken the legitimacy o national governments and in-ternational organizations alike. No single power will be able to play a leading role in thesearch or shared solutions to global problems. The key to success will be strengthenedlinks between national, regional and global governance, and between state and non-stateactors to build a consensus among the dierent players. Multilateral institutions may nd

it very dicult to adapt to a new global power landscape. The system is likely to have thecapacity to contain major wars but it will be unable to meet other global challenges duringthe next two decades, and there will be increasing pressure to reorm multilateral institu-tions to refect shiting power relations, including a drive towards greater inclusiveness.

The international agenda will very likely cease to be essentially Western-driven and willshit to accommodate and address the priorities o a much broader and more heteroge-neous range o states, and the concerns o citizens in newly-developed nations. Humandevelopment challenges are likely to gain increasing weight vis--vis traditional interna-tional security concerns. While the shit away rom the Atlantic will be contested andmay produce serious tensions, the overarching trend may well be towards convergence. Itis likely that this shit in the global agenda will make consensus on international militaryinterventions more dependent on a UN mandate than in the past, even i ewer statesmay be willing to provide the necessary means to make action possible. Other tests o theinfuence o the multilateral ramework will emerge, particularly where climate change,energy, internet, intellectual property rights, nancial regulation, and trade and socialstandards are concerned.

However, in a world characterized by the diusion o power, meeting the challenges ohuman development will depend increasingly on non-state actors, be they private com-panies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or philanthropic institutions. But notall contributions by private actors will be positive: extremist non-state actors are likely topresent a threat to the well-being o human communities.

Part IV Greater uncertainties but broader opportunities

The global trends identied in this report do not allow us to dene with certainty howthe world will look in 2030, as much will depend on unknown variables. The varioustrends identied are likely to be disrupted by unoreseen natural and man-made events,


23/178

21

Executive summary

but will also be shaped by policy options that are in most cases unpredictable. One way in

which policy makers can act is by ormulating options to deal with current global trendsthat will have a lasting impact on the uture o European citizens and citizens worldwide.Their uture will be shaped not only by trends that are already visible today, but also bychanges whose impact will depend on how societies respond to current challenges. Theopportunities opened up by the trends identied in this report are enormous but so arethe uncertainties and challenges to the well- being o citizens.

An age o convergence or conicting nationalisms?

The act that hundreds o millions o people are being lited out o poverty to join theranks o the middle classes, becoming more empowered and converging around a sense oa common humanity constitutes a strong oundation or the development o economicallyairer and politically more democratic societies. This creates an opportunity or nationaland global governance initiatives that are likely to nd strong support among citizens, inparticular among the younger generations, which are increasingly articulating their aspira-tion to a uture with more justice, dignity and political participation and demonstratingtheir ability to take ull advantage o the universalisation o the inormation society.

But an expectations gap is emerging because o the inability o governments to meetthe aspirations o citizens or a better lie. This gap may become a source o revolt anddespair. This era o convergence and greater relative peace may be ollowed by one oexacerbated nationalism i the expectations gap is not narrowed by national and globalinitiatives to deal with the pressing issues o undamental rights and participation in thepolitical process, poverty and inequality, climate change and scarcity, particularly waterscarcity, and to institute mechanisms to ensure greater transparency.

An age o scarcity or human development?Economic growth is very likely to remain a major objective o emerging economies intheir eorts to combat poverty and social injustice. But it is uncertain which kinds odevelopment policies will be adopted, and whether they will be sustainable. There is cur-rently a broad consensus about how climate change will evolve and what some o its con-sequences will be, in particular with regard to water and ood scarcity, but it is not certainwhat national and global responses will emerge to change the pace o global warming.There is today a quasi-global consensus that it is necessary to take decisive action regard-

ing climate change in this decade i we are to prevent humanitarian disasters o unore-seen dimensions in the latter part o this century. How governments will react to thischallenge is dicult to predict.


24/178

22


Awareness o the need to reduce dependence on ossil uel energy sources and o the

importance o investing in green technologies is well established. However the pace otechnological transormation is also dicult to predict and some new technologiesmerit more sustained in-depth study and committed investment strategies, given theirpotential impact on human development. This is the case with new alternative energytechnologies and biotechnology.

An age o multilateralism or ragmentation?

The act that interstate wars are becoming increasingly unlikely in this age o conver-

gence presents a major opportunity or deeper and more consistent cooperation amongthe major powers to build a airer, more secure and more prosperous world all o whichare key goals o European security policy.

However i the multilateral moment is lost, a more polarised and ragmented system islikely to emerge; and the resolution o various issues will be blocked by the great hetero-geneity o the actors that will exert infuence in a polycentric world. It is hard to predicthow the international system will evolve, primarily because o uncertainty about the evo-lution o the global economy and the power shits that may ollow. How China and India

deal with the daunting political challenges with which they are conronted is an openquestion, as is how and when the US and the EU will recover rom the severe economicand nancial crisis in which they are currently enguled.

Thus, major uncertainties prevail about the uture o global governance. Will the Ameri-can multilateral moment alter under strong isolationist pressures emerging in responseto the decline o its middle classes and the countrys diculties in achieving economicrecovery? What will be the multilateral agenda that will be shaped by the rise o the rest?What kind o global responsibilities will China, India and Brazil and other rising powerstake on? Will the dierent actors o a polycentric world be able to reorm multilateralinstitutions to deal inclusively with global challenges, particularly to promote a morestable and a airer economic and nancial system?

The uture o the EU is also uncertain. What will the Union do to address pressing struc-tural problems such as shrinking demographics, and to acilitate economic governance?To what extent will it manage to achieve policy-making coherence and consensus? Thechoices made will aect the uture well-being o European citizens, and the capacity o

the EU to orge an eective multilateral system.


25/178

23

Executive summary

A shit in trade and economic fows rom the Atlantic to the Pacic may contribute to the

relative marginalisation o the EU, but this scenario is not inevitable; it depends on howthe EU copes with the present economic crisis and uses its strengths to operate eectivelyin a polycentric world. I it rises to the challenge in a credible manner, the current crisiscould be reversed by a new European renaissance.

Monitoring the transition

The world, and Europe with it, is experiencing a period o transition, in particular opower, demographics, climate, urbanisation and technology. Transitions such as these

involve a higher than usual level o uncertainty. Thus, it is crucial or governments andcivil societies to invest in the study and monitoring o major trends. This report is anexample o the kind o orward policy thinking that has become increasingly necessaryin an uncertain world. The tracking o global trends is likely to increase worldwide; andit will be a undamental aspect o Europes ability to prepare and respond to comingchallenges.


26/178


27/178

Part I

The empowerment of

individuals: a globalhuman community

but a growing

expectations gap


28/178


29/178

27

1. The empowerment o individuals:key drivers

From 6.9 billion today, the UN estimates that the worlds population could reach 8.3 bil-lion by 2030 (see Figure 1).1 In sub-Saharan Arica, the population is projected to increase

by 500 million people by 2030. Southern Asias population is estimated to rise rom 1.7billion today to 2.1 billion by 2030. Chinas population is expected to stabilize, and thendecline starting around 2025 ater a peak o just below 1.4 billion. The aggregate EU-27population will rise rom 500 to 516 million in 2030; by contrast, Japans population willdecrease rom 126 million in 2010 to 120 million by 2030.

Figure 1: Population o 20 major countries in 2010 and 2030

Source: UN Department o Economic and Social Aairs (2011).

1. Medium variant projections. UN Department o Economic and Social Aairs, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revi-sion. Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, 2011. Available at:http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htmhttp://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htmhttp://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htmhttp://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm


30/178

28


Millions o individuals are being empowered by the social and technological progress o

the last decades. The main drivers o this trend are the global emergence o the middleclass with particular orce in Asia, near-universal access to education, the empoweringeects o ICT, and the betterment o the status o women around the world. Increas-ing numbers o people will live in the inormation age as more portable and aordabletechnologies make inormation nearly universally accessible, and as the number o poorand marginalized groups gradually decreases.

The same drivers that spur the realization that citizens o all countries belong to the sameglobal community will also contribute to the ongoing empowerment o women. Today,

women already have better access to education, inormation (thanks to the internet) aswell as economic and political opportunities. This broadening o gender opportunities islikely to intensiy, contributing to more equality, improving the prospects or economicdevelopment and social advancement, and promoting the growth o the intellectual andcultural capacities o dierent societies.

The global rise o the middle classThe spectacular growth o the middle class2 in emerging countries is likely to have a ma-jor impact on global social and political developments (see Figure 2). The middle classwill increase in infuence as its ranks swell to 3.2 billion by 2020 and to 4.9 billion by 2030(out o a total population o 8.3 billion).3

Over the coming 20 years, the world will likely evolve rom being predominantly poor tomostly middle class, though the change will be geographically uneven. The year 2022 willmark the rst year when more people are middle class rather than poor. It is estimatedthat the size o the global middle class will increase rom 1.8 billion people in 2009 to 3.2

billion by 2020, and to 4.9 billion by 2030 with 85 percent o this growth taking placein Asia.4 The Arican Development Bank (ADB)5 estimates that the size o the Arican

2. There is no standard deinition o the middle class. Belonging to the middle class is usually associated with meetingbasic needs and aording a ew extras (Wheary). Relative approaches deine the middle class as a middle segment withinthe income distribution scale o a given country. Absolute approaches, however, are better suited or international compari-sons. For this report, Kharas and Gertzs deinition o middle class as people who spend between USD10 and USD100 aday in PPP terms. Another deinition is proposed by Wilson and Dragusanu, as people with annual incomes between USD6,000 and USD 30,000 at PPP in 2008. See J. Wheary, The Global Middle Class is Here: Now What?, World Policy Institute,2009; H. Kharas and G. Gertz, The New Global Middle Class: A Cross-Over from West to East. Washington DC: WolensohnCenter or Development, Brookings 2010, at www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_china_middle_class_kharas/03_china_middle_class_kharas.pd; D. Wilson & R. Dragusanu, The Expanding Middle: The Exploding World Mid-dle Class and Falling Global Inequality, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 170, 7 July 2008: 5.

3. H. Kharas and G. Gertz, ibid, p. 5.4. H. Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries, OECD Development Centre Working Paper 285, January,2010.

5. Arican Development Bank, The Middle o the Pyramid: Dynamics o the Middle Class in Arica,Market Brief, April 20,2011.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_china_middle_class_kharas/03_china_middle_class_kharas.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_china_middle_class_kharas/03_china_middle_class_kharas.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_china_middle_class_kharas/03_china_middle_class_kharas.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_china_middle_class_kharas/03_china_middle_class_kharas.pdf


31/178

29

1. The empowerment o individuals: key drivers

middle class will increase rom 111 million people in 1980 to 313 million people in 2010

(rom 26.2 to 34.3 percent o the population), with the greatest concentration occurringin northern Arica.

The biggest share o the global middle class will be in India and China. Chinas 157 millionstrong middle class is already the second largest in the world ater the US, but it representsonly 12 percent o the total Chinese population.6 Indias middle class may outnumber Chi-nas by 2020 even i India remains poorer. India is likely to experience a dramatic expansiono its middle class rom 5-10 percent o its current population to 90 percent in 30 years.Between 2015 and 2025, hal o its population will cross the USD 10 per day threshold.7

Absolute numbers do not adequately convey the economic weight o the rising middleclasses in emerging and developing countries since the purchasing power o the middleclass in advanced countries is disproportionately higher. However, Europes and NorthAmericas share o global middle class consumption is expected to decrease rom 64 percentin 2009 to 30 percent in 2030; by contrast, the share in consumption o the Asian Pacicmiddle class is estimated to increase rom 23 to 59 percent over the same period. In termso consumption expenditure, India and China will have by ar the biggest middle classes inthe world (23 and 18 percent o global middle class consumption in 2030, respectively). By2030, the US middle class will be ranked third in terms o consumption power; it will beollowed by Indonesia which does not even rank among the top ten today.

When measured as a share in the population, 74 percent o China will be middle class in2030 along with 88 percent in India and 69 percent in Brazil. In the EU and the US, closeto 100 percent o the population will count as either middle class or rich according to theabsolute denition o middle class used in this report (income between 10 and 100 USD/day). While this denition is useul to illustrate the massive reduction o abject poverty

in emerging and developing countries, it is less suitable to determine the relative size othe middle class in advanced economies. The emergence o a global middle class is likelyto narrow the material and cultural divides that slow the emergence o a global set o val-ues. The mass o global polling data collected in the World Values Survey (WVS) providesempirical evidence o how economic development leads to value changes conducive todemocracy.8 Thus, the emergence o a global middle class will not only narrow materialdierences but also promote an environment that is more likely to avour democracy andundamental rights.

6. H. Kharas, ibid., p. 30.

7. Ibid., pp. 35 and 38.

8. R. Inglehart & C. Welzel, How Development leads to Democracy: What we Know About Modernization, Foreign Aairs,March-April 2009.


32/178

30


Figure2:Middleclassgrowthto2030

Sourc

e:Kharas&Gertz(2010:5).


33/178

31


Education: The cornerstone o knowledge societiesIn 1990, about 73 percent o the world population was literate. In 2010, global literacyrates reached 84 percent and the literacy rate may pass the 90 percent mark in 2030.9Thereis still inequality between men and women with respect to literacy. According to data othe United Nations Educational, Scientic and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in theperiod rom 1985 to 1994 the literacy rate or men averaged 82.1 percent and or womenit averaged 69.2 percent, a dierence that barely declined in the period between 2005 and2009 (by that date, the rate was 88 percent or men and 79.2 percent or women). Theincrease in womens literacy rates and, more generally, their empowerment is very uneven

across regions: in Arica, or instance, the literacy rate o men averaged 63.1 percent in theperiod rom 1985 to 1994 compared to 41.6 percent o women; and rom 2005 to 2009,the literacy rate averaged 72.2 percent or men and to 54.6 percent or women.10

In 1995, 0.7 percent o the world population had internet access, which was unevenlydistributed across continents and regions, and in 2000 6.4 percent were connected. By2010, the gure had risen to 29.7 percent,11 and regional distribution had become lessuneven. It is expected that more than hal o the worlds population will be connected by2030. In practical terms, connectivity ultimately will be limited only by the availability opower supplies.

This will strengthen the interconnection between people, ostering sharing o inormationand values, and deepening awareness o common challenges. Cyberspace is largely andincreasingly an area o reedom o expression. A recent report analysing values shared byinternet users in 14 countries (Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico,Italy, Spain, China, India, South Arica, Canada, the US, the UK)12 suggests that reedomo expression and the right to privacy, trust and security are already shared concerns. Glo-

bal advocacy networks supporting human rights, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW)or Amnesty International (AI), are beneting enormously rom the amplier eects onew communication technologies. Micro-blogging tools such as Twitterand the ChineseWeibo are becoming ree speech platorms, a trend that is likely to intensiy.

9. See: UNESCO Institute or Statistics at http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=210,which provides data up to 2009; the projection or 2030 is based on predictions in the Roland BergerTrend Compendium

2030, which predicts that primary school enrolment will be above 90% by that year. R. Berger, The Trend Compendium 2030,Global Knowledge Society, at http://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.html.

10. UNESCO Institute or Statistics, available athttp://www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/deault.aspx.11. International Telecommunication Unit, World Telecommunication/ ICT Indicators database, 15th edition, June 2011.

12. S. Dutta, W. H. Dutton & G. Law, The New Internet World: A Global Perspective on Freedom o Expression, Privacy,Trust and Security Online, The Global Information Technology Report 2010-2011, World Economic Forum in collaboration withINSEAD, comScore, and the Oxord Internet Institute, April 2011, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810005.
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=210http://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/default.aspxhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1810005http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810005http://www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/default.aspxhttp://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/trend_compendium_2030/global_knowledge_society.htmlhttp://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=210


34/178

32


Global communication networks based in several countries inspired by the success oAl

Jazeera will challenge the Western-dominated global media and provide a variety o per-spectives on local and world events. Recourse to automatic online translation tools willhelp to overcome language barriers.

The inormation age: empowerment but threats to privacyCommunication is vital or human groups, be it amilies, businesses, communities,states, or global groups. In the past, political, economic, military, and cultural develop-ment was based on a material economy and on analogue communications technology.

Location and borders mattered and could be policed. In the new digital world, distancesand borders are becoming less relevant. The digital economy is a small but increasing13part o the global economy. Material that can be digitized knowledge and meaning constitutes a rapidly growing share o the added value o products and services. Thedemocratization o internet access and the exponential development o web-based com-munication tools (blogs, social networks or micro-blogging) are radically transormingthe way inormation is produced, reproduced and disseminated worldwide. The socialdynamics o the internet are likely to intensiy ever urther with the new generation o

users who have been using the internet since primary school.The inormation and communications technology (ICT) revolution will be a key driver oindividual empowerment, acilitating the way people share ideas and arm their rights.Historically, control o the mass media and o access to computer technology such asmainrame computers, has served to enhance the power o those at the top o the pyra-mid. However, as new communications technologies become increasingly wireless andmobile, citizens will have greater access to new technologies worldwide. This will con-tinue to disrupt the traditional model o infuence o the mass media. The democratiza-

tion o inormation-sharing via the internet, and o computing power via the spread omobile computing, ensures that individuals will become relatively more empowered.

The ICT revolution is giving people access to vast stores o knowledge, and enabling newand transormative people-to-people connections. It is likely that this revolution will be-come practically universal over the next two decades, and that individuals and powerulprivate groups will consequently gain increased autonomyvis--vis states in most regionso the world. Knowledge is no longer concentrated in the hands o a ew; it can be createdand shared by ordinary citizens everywhere, challenging the very legitimacy o traditional

sites o knowledge and inormation production such as universities and the media.

13. US smart phones and tablets sales in 2011 break revenue records. Forecasts predict a 5.6% rise to a record high o$190bn (www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/18/us-tablets-smartphones-record).
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/18/us-tablets-smartphones-recordhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/18/us-tablets-smartphones-record


35/178

33


Empowered by these new technologies, individuals are able to communicate instanta-

neously with virtually anyone anywhere, and determine the nature and content o theinormation delivered. In a world where knowledge is power, this has important conse-quences. People can turn these online tools into instruments or political and civic pro-test, bringing to light what is oten concealed and repressed by public or governmentalinstitutions and ocial media channels. New technological tools are enabling people toact-check, share inormation, disseminate news, and produce views o events that wouldnormally be hidden or banned rom the public space. Although the inormation revolu-tion is most likely to empower individuals, there will also be erce battles over issues oreedom and control.

A universal inormation revolution: the new world o the

internetThe global growth o internet use has been and will continue to be exponential (see Figure3). In 2011, 28 percent o the world population had access to the internet. The developedworld, including Europe, the United States, South Korea, and Japan, account or over 60percent o global users. China is catching up rapidly while India lags urther behind with

just 6.9 percent o global users. Looking towards 2030, there will be three major trends:

A shiting centre o gravity

Emerging states, particularly in Asia, are likely to become very infuential in the digitalworld as their huge populations become connected. Given their early adoption o the in-ternet, hitherto North American and Western European users have dominated the cybersphere. But in terms o absolute numbers, the centre o gravity has shited to Asia, whichalready hosted 42 percent o internet users in 2010.14 In 2002, North America accounted

or 37 percent o the worlds internet users, but by 2010, its share had declined to 14percent.

This shit will continue and is most dramatically illustrated by the act that in 2010there were more internet users in China than there were people in the US, despite thear lower level o internet penetration in China. Given user numbers, the emerging na-tions may present a challenge in terms o internet services, as exemplied by Sina andRenRen, the Chinese equivalents to Google and Facebook, respectively. The emergenceo new internet services could challenge the universal integrated use o the internet andavour the prolieration o ragmented and even closed communities, but users are likely

14. See World Internet Stats at: www.internetstatsinternetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
http://www.internetstatsinternetworldstats.com/stats.htmhttp://www.internetstatsinternetworldstats.com/stats.htm


36/178

34


to nd ways to overcome such limitations and to connect to global networks. However, it

is unlikely that the superior innovation capacities and coverage o US companies will bechallenged in the near uture.15

Figure 3: Internet users 2010

Source: ITU (2011).

Emerging nations as leading internet use innovators

Internet users in emerging states are more innovative in their patterns o use. They are

more likely to produce rather than merely consume content; they are more likely to com-municate actively online through social networking sites; and they are more likely to beWeb 2.0 enthusiasts than users in the developed nations, who are more accustomed toe-mail and Web 1.0 and are less trusting o social media.

15. The August 2011 survey in Foreign Policydescribes the US as by ar the most innovative in terms o internet technology,although the use o technology diers rom country to country. It may be that the likelihood o using social media online is

related to the cultural and political limits placed on reedom o expression oline. Users in countries that become increas-ingly ree will have dierent incentives to use online systems. See: Foreign Policy, The FP Survey: The Internet, Foreign Policy,September-October 2010, at www.oreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_p_survey_the_internet. A McKinsey reportsuggests that the economic beneits o ICT are going mostly to leading western and East Asian technological leaders. McK-insey Global Institute, Internet Matters: The Nets Sweeping Impact on Growth, Jobs and Prosperity, May 2011, at www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/internet_matters/pds/MGI_internet_matters_ull_report.pd.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_fp_survey_the_internethttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_fp_survey_the_internethttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_fp_survey_the_internethttp://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/internet_matters/pdfs/MGI_internet_matters_full_report.pdfhttp://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/internet_matters/pdfs/MGI_internet_matters_full_report.pdfhttp://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/internet_matters/pdfs/MGI_internet_matters_full_report.pdfhttp://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/internet_matters/pdfs/MGI_internet_matters_full_report.pdfhttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_fp_survey_the_internethttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_fp_survey_the_internet


37/178

35


Narrowing the digital divide

The digital divide will not disappear completely over the next twenty years but the digitalworld will become increasingly fat. The key benets o a networked society near reecommunication, and access to essential business and educational content will becomecheap enough or even or the most marginalized groups in the least developed coun-tries, opening up opportunities or political participation and giving them a culturalvoice in the global arena. Computer prices have already allen by 90 percent over thelast decade, and will continue to do so in coming decades.16 However, i knowledge andnot just inormation is taken into account, deeper hierarchies will emerge between the

companies, governments, and regions that produce and control strategic knowledge andthose that do not.

Technological leaprogging

Landline copper wire networks are being by-passed because wireless data and voice net-works are cheaper and more eective.17WiMax in India and the explosion o mobile te-lephony in Arica exempliy this trend. Mobile networks are likely to prolierate in thevery near uture, making most low to medium bandwidth services available or mass use.

This will happen even in countries with poor governance and limited inrastructures, be-cause mobile networks only require radio transmitters. Developing countries with goodgovernance structures will install high-speed optical networks, and 4G technology is like-ly to become widely available. By contrast, countries such as the US have a technologicallegacy-base which can present regulatory and logistical obstacles to developing wirelessnetworks.

ICT will increasingly include services such as cloud computing. Clouds will be global,urther equalising the availability o services around the world. Cloud computing willallow a business or an individual in an undeveloped country to have the same digital in-rastructure as their competitors in the developed world in ways that will not be possiblein areas o physical or governance inrastructure, such as roads, building, healthcare andother social services.

16. Today, 30.2% o the world population has access to the Internet, with an average growth rate o 480.4 % over the pe-riod 2000-2011. Following exponential growth rate, by 2030 99% o the global population will have access to the Internet,especially i Internet access is regarded as a public good and is provided by the state or ree. Following Moores law, by2030 computer devices will be aordable or almost 100% o the global population. Smart phones and tablets will be sold

over the counter at a kiosk or a price we cannot imagine today, ollowing the same path o pocket calculators rom the1970s and 1980s (See wallstreetpit.com/4300-computer-prices-have-allen-by-90-over-the-last-ten-years-is-that-evidence-o-monopoly-power).

17. C.-Y. Huang, Rethinking Leaprogging in the End-User Telecom Market,Technological Forecasting and Social Change 78(4)May 2011: 703-712.


38/178

36


Individual rights, privacy and data protection

There is a clear trend or corporations and governments o all political stripes to usedigitalization and computerization to exert greater control over citizens and consum-ers. Thus, rom a citizens point o view, the cyber world can also be a threat. Conversely,the increasing use o ICT by citizens to share inormation and organize non-state activi-ties will be seen as a potential danger by some governments, particularly authoritarianregimes. Some states will make eorts to limit citizen access to politically threateningideas although such eorts are likely to met with only very partial success. In additionto outright censorship, states may use the internet to hone surveillance techniques, dis-

seminate cutting-edge propaganda, and paciy populations with digital entertainment,directing rather than constraining online development.

Overall, increasing digitalization and computerization o dierent aspects o daily liewill contribute to individual empowerment and democratization. Oppressive regimesmay be weakened as the result o contestation using new technologies. In some coun-tries, governments regularly inltrate online groups used by the opposition. To controlcitizens online world they block or lter content, criminalize legitimate expression, im-pose intermediate liability or completely disconnect people rom the internet. They may

also use o-line surveillance and control. But digital communication and inormation isdicult to control because o the decentralized nature o the internet. Even in the mostrestrictive states internet users can nd ways to circumvent controls with technologicaland organizational innovation.

Concern with security threats is not limited to illiberal regimes. As new technologies be-come more ubiquitous, their use will become normalized in a broad range o social, po-litical and economic activities, creating new points o vulnerability. Strategically, ICT willbe essential or economic development and military advancement. Networked militariesand businesses will rely increasingly on seamless and secure communications systems,creating opportunities or those who seek to disrupt these systems. As the shit to wire-less technology gathers pace, such systems will become more reliant on a limited numbero potentially vulnerable nodes such as satellites and transmission towers.

Cyber-attacks are likely to increase. Militaries may ocus on cyber-warare when they lackconventional arms superiority. Cyber-crime by organized groups and anarchic disruptorsis likely to threaten businesses, individuals and governments relying on digital systems.

World nancial systems, with their massive digitized capital fows, could be at risk romcyber-crime. These kinds o threats may encourage the balkanization o the internet, aspolitical and economic actors seal o portions o cyberspace to protect their realms, cre-


39/178

37


ating small intranets that change the nature o the global internet.18 China is already

attempting to do this as it tries to seal o its citizens rom contaminating external in-fuences. But overall networks are becoming global and the users o social networks arecontinually nding new ways to circumvent the lters that authoritarian (and, indeed,less authoritarian) regimes seek to impose.

New technologies will raise questions o privacy and social control. As personal and eco-nomic worlds become digitized, people become more vulnerable to attack and manipula-tion by others in new ways. The spread o cloud computing networks will increase thisvulnerability as users become increasingly reliant on the operation o systems outside

their physical control. Issues o personal privacy protection will become more important,and governments, societies and businesses must nd ways to maintain the balance be-tween openness and privacy.

There are also questions about where and how to tax digital content, where and how dig-ital nomads people who work at a distance digitally should pay their social securitycontributions, what national law applies or content on the internet, how to manageintellectual property rights. It is dicult to determine what local law applies to a serviceprovided by a cloud with unclear geographic properties, and to apply classical deterrenceand counterattack measures in cyberspace where attacks happen by proxy and are di-cult to trace. Working out how to deal with these issues will become an ever more centraltopic in international negotiations.

Thus ar, the internet has been an open network with ew nancial restrictions. A poten-tially worrisome possibility is that the internet may develop into a number o closed net-works dominated by commercial players instead o operating as an open platorm, as aninternational public good.19 Disturbingly, large companies like Google are increasingly

seeking to understand and utilize the specic interests o individuals, and providing ac-cess primarily to the material that matches those interests. This process o personali-zation can limit the possibilities or individual exploration and create barriers betweenpeople.

18. While only a small percentage o Chinese use these tools to sidestep government ilters, the ease with which they can

do it illustrates the diiculty any government aces in enorcing the type o strict censorship that was possible only a ewyears ago. B. Stone & D. Barboza, Scaling the Digital Wall in China, The New York Times, 15 January 2010, atwww.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/internet/16evade.html?pagewanted=all.

19. . J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet, and How to Stop It. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008, at utureotheinternet.org/download.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/internet/16evade.html?pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/internet/16evade.html?pagewanted=allhttp://futureoftheinternet.org/downloadhttp://futureoftheinternet.org/downloadhttp://futureoftheinternet.org/downloadhttp://futureoftheinternet.org/downloadhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/internet/16evade.html?pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/internet/16evade.html?pagewanted=all


40/178


41/178

39

2. Converging values and demands,but risks o extremism

The realization that there is ultimately one global community will come about primarilybecause o the collective realization that people share similar aspirations and dicul-ties. This trend is likely to be reinorced by increased global mobility (acilitated by lowertransportation costs) and the instantaneity with witch inormation reaches people sepa-

rated by large distances. These processes will increase the sense o aunied time and space.This may urther contribute to the idea that peace, reedom, dignity and justice shouldbe available to all people

Over the next 20 years it is likely that a set o ever broader universal values will be sharedby a growing number o citizens around the world. Distinctive cultural identities willalso thrive, and citizens will perceive democratic aspirations as being compatible withthe right to arm cultural identities. This trend was quite clear in China and Egypt, butis also the case o India. The quite widespread thesis during the 1990s that Asian values

were distinct rom universal ones seems to be no longer valid, and more and more humanrights and democracy are presented in public debates as part o Universal values insteado Western ones.

The universal spread o human rights and democracyA study conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2009 shows that the middle classes inthirteen countries (Chile, Ukraine, Russia, Venezuela, Poland, South Arica, Malaysia,Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, Argentina, India and Bulgaria) attach increasing importance tocompetitive elections and individual liberties and are less inclined to accept gender dis-crimination.20

Current trends suggest that the values o democracy, human rights and reedom o ex-pression will become more widespread (see Figure 4). Today, around our in every vepeople worldwide believe that democracy is the best available system o government. Thisview holds across dierences in region, religion, gender and age.

20. Pew Research Centre, The Global Middle Class: Views on Democracy, Religion, Values, and Life Satisfaction in Emerging Na-tions, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 12 February 2009, athttp://www.pewglobal.org/2009/02/12/the-global-middle-class;Asian Development Bank, The Rise o Asias Middle Class, Special Chapter in Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010,2010: 48.
http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/02/12/the-global-middle-classhttp://www.pewglobal.org/2009/02/12/the-global-middle-class


42/178

40


Opinion surveys consistently show that those opposed to the universal spread o unda-

mental rights are in a shrinking minority.21

Table 1: Support or democracy

Source: Gilani (2007).

Global survey data taken around the world in recent years by the Pew Research Centreand the World Values Survey conclude that increasing prosperity acts as a catalyst orgradual value change, with the development o a greater attachment to democratic insti-tutions and individual liberties and greater environmental concerns.22 Earlier versions omodernization theory inaccurately proclaimed an expectation o economic developmentleading to Westernization, democracy and socio-cultural change. Today, a more nuanced,and empirically supported, modernization theory describes how economic progress (i.e.joining the middle class) opens up new avenues or reedom o action among individualcitizens. Modernization does not automatically bring democratization, but only the socialand cultural changes that are conducive to democracy, especially the syndrome o sel-expression values, which accord high priority to ree choice and motivate political action.

In propitious conditions, the middle class can become a potent orce pushing or im-proved governance and public services, or greater public sector accountability and trans-parency.23 The middle classes tend to be aware o their rights, are usually well disposedtowards gender equality, and well organized. They are currently a source o leadershipand social activism in southern NGOs, although their role diers in intensity.

21. I.S. Gilani, Global Trends on Human rights and Extremism: Which One is on the Rise? ESPAS Commissioned Paper(Chairman-Gallup Pakistan), 2011.

22. Pew Research Centre, ibid, 2009; Inglehart & Welzel, op. cit.

23. Asian Development Bank, op. cit.


43/178

41

2. Converging values and demands, but risks o extremism

Figure 4: Democracy around the world

Source: WVSA (2009).

There is, however, no automaticity between economic progress and democratization; ur-ther, there can be democracy, however imperect, in societies that have not reached stipu-lated thresholds o development. Democratization is not only a matter o a rising GDP

per capita, but involves proou

Documents

Espas Report II