Esots Nuri Transcendent Philosophy Journal Volume 12 December 2011

Volume 12. December 2011

Transcendent Philosophy An International Journal for

Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism

Editor Seyed G. Safavi SOAS, University of London, UK

Book Review Editor Sajjad H. Rizvi Exeter University, UK

Editorial Board

G. Aawani, Iranian Institue of Philosophy, Iran

A. Acikgenc, Fatih University, Turkey

M. Araki, Islamic Centre England, UK

S. Chan, SOAS University of London, UK

W. Chittick, State University of New York, USA

R. Davari, Tehran University, Iran

G. Dinani, Tehran University, Iran

P.S. Fosl, Transylvania University, USA

M. Khamenei, SIPRIn, Iran

B. Kuspinar, McGill University, Canada

H. Landolt, McGill University, Canada

O. Leaman, University of Kentucky, USA

Y. Michot, Hartford Seminary, Macdonald Center, USA

M. Mohaghegh-Damad, Beheshti University, Iran

J. Morris, Boston College, USA

S.H. Nasr, The George Washington University,

USA

S. Pazouki, Iranian Institue of Philosophy, Iran

C. Turner, University of Durham, UK

H. Ziai, UCLA, USA

Assistant Editor:

Shahideh Safavi, University of London

Coordinator:

Seyed Sadreddin Safavi, University of London

Layout & Design

Mohamad A. Alavi, www.mediatics.net

Transcendent Philosophy Journal is an academic peer-reviewed journal published by the London Academy of Iranian Studies (LAIS) and aims to create a dialogue between Eastern, Western and Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism is published in December. Contributions to Transcendent Philosophy do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial board or the London Academy of Iranian Studies. Contributors are invited to submit papers on the following topics: Comparative studies on Islamic, Eastern and Western schools of Philosophy, Philosophical issues in history of Philosophy, Issues in contemporary Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Philosophy of science (physics, mathematics, biology, psychology, etc), Logic and philosophical logic, Philosophy of language, Ethics and moral philosophy, Theology and philosophy of religion, Sufism and mysticism, Eschatology, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Art and Metaphysics. The mailing address of the Transcendent Philosophy is:

Dr S.G. Safavi Journal of Transcendent Philosophy 121 Royal Langford 2 Greville Road London NW6 5HT UK Tel: (+44) 020 7692 2491 Fax: (+44) 020 7209 4727 Email: [email protected]

Submissions should be sent to the Editor. Books for review and completed reviews should be sent to the Book Review Editor. All other communication should be directed to the coordinator. Transcendent Philosophy is published in December. Annual subscription rates are: Institutions, 60.00; individuals, 30.00. Please add 6.00 for addresses outside the UK. The Journal is also accessible online at: www.iranianstudies.org.

London Academy of Iranian Studies ISSN 1471-3217

Articles

The Structure and Semiotics of the Second Book of Rumis Mathnawi as a Whole Mahvash Alavi [5-28] Ethics in the Protection of Environment Seyyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad [29-54] Mulla Ali Nuri as an Exponent of Mulla Sadras Teachings Janis Eshots [55-68] A Comparative Study of Faith from Kierkegaards and Rumis Perspective Masoumeh Bahram [69-92] Fundamentality of Existence Aziz Daftari [93-118] Mulla Sadra and the Unity and Multiplicity of Existence Karim Aghili [119-146] Avicenna on Matter, Matters Disobedience and Evil: Reconciling Metaphysical Stances and Quranic Perspective Maria De Cillis [147-168] Some Reflections upon Islamophobia as the Totally Other Seyed Javad Miri [169-184]

Religion and Artificial Intelligence Alireza Ghaeminia [185-200]

Suhrawardi and Mohaghegh Dawani on the Intuitive Knowledge of Soul Ebrahim Rezaie [201-222] Transcendence Model of Intellectual Evolution Seema Arif [223-252] Foundations and Development of Absurdism in Western Thought: Reflections from Perennialist Perspective Bilal Ahmad Dar [253-278]

Religious Studies and the Question of Transcendence Muhammad Maroof Shah [279-306] Relationship of Theoretical and Practical Rationality in the Philosophy of Kant and Mulla Sadra and Some of its Consequences Sima Mohammadpour Dehkordi [307-320]

Mysticism of Ferdowsis Shahnameh: An International Epic, Mystical and Sagacious Persian Masterpiece Seyed G Safavi [321-332]

Transcendent Philosophy London Academy of Iranian Studies

Mull Al Nr as an Exponent of

Mull Sadrs Teachings

Janis Eshots

University of Latvia, Latvia

Abstract

Mull Al Nr was an indispensable link in the transmission of

Mull Sadrs teachings and an important commentator of his works.

In my article, Ill focus on one of them a short treatise, entitled

Bast al-haqqa wa wahdat al-wujd, which deals with the modes of

thingness (shayiyya) and existence (wujd) in general, and the so-

called illuminative relation (al-idfa al-ishrqiyya) in particular.

The most significant statements Nr makes in this brief work consist

in the identification of thingness with existence and the breath of the

Merciful (nafas al-Rahmn) with the illuminative relation. I intend

to examine these two important points and the employed

argumentation in detail, showing how Nr exploited some ideas,

current in the Kalm and theoretical Sufism, to the benefit of the

doctrine of Mull Sadr.

Keywords: Nr, Sadr, existence, thingness, illuminative relation,

oneness, simplicity

I

Mull Al ibn Jamshd Nr Mzandarn Isfahn (d. 1246/1831) was

a disciple of Muhammad Bdbd (d. 1198/1783) and a teacher of Hjj

Mull Hd Sabzavr (d. 1289/1873), Mull Ismil (Whid al-Ayn)

56 Janis Eshots

(d. 1277/1861), Mull Abdallah Zunz (1257/1841), Sayyid Rd

Lrijn (d. 1270/1853) and Mull Muhammad Jafar Lhij Langard

(d. after 1255/1839), to mention just a few of his numerous students.

He was, thus, an indispensable link in the transmission of Mulla

Sadras teachings.

Nrs long life (the exact year, not to mention the date, of his birth is

not known but he is believed to have been at least ninety according to

some reports, more than a hundred years old when he died), it appears,

was not rich in external events. He is said to have studied first in his

native Nr (a small town on the shore of the Caspian sea), then for a

while in Qazwn, finally coming to Isfahn to complete his studies with

Bdbd.1

He taught philosophy in Isfahn for about sixty years. It is known that

Fath Al Shh Qjr invited him to come to teach to Tehrn, but Nr

declined his offer, because at that time he had almost two thousand (!)

students in Isfahn.2

According to his last will, Nrs remains were taken to Najaf and

buried in the precincts of the mausoleum of Imam Al (in the quarter

of the gate of Ts).3

Nr was an important interpreter of Mull Sadrs works. He wrote, in

particular, detailed glosses to Sadrs commentary on the Qurn,4 the

Asfr,5 Al-Shawhid al-rubbiyya, Asrr al-yt

6 and Mafth

al-ghayb.7 He also composed a number of treatises, in which he

expounded the tenets of Sadrs doctrine. Two of these treatises

[Rislat f] bast al-haqqa and [Rislat f] wahdat al-wujd were

published by the late S.J. Ashtiyn in the Anthology of the Iranian

Philosophers, from Mir Damad to our days.8

In my paper, Ill focus on these treatises,9 attempting to establish, how

faithful was Nr to Sadrs ideas and how insightfully he interpreted

them.

Mull Al Nr as an Exponent of Mull Sadrs Teachings 57

To begin, the title of the first treatise (perhaps not given by Nr

himself) - [Rislat f] bast al-haqqa does not reflect well the actual

content of the work, since only the first four pages, out of thirty, deal

with the principle of the simplicity of the reality directly. The rest is a

discussion on the modes of thingness (shayiyya) and existence (wujd),

and on the so-called illuminative relation (al-idfa al-ishrqiyya).

The discussion on the simplicity of reality is succinct and, in fact,

comes down to reproducing the basic version of the argument, provided

by Sadr himself in a number of his shorter treatises (eg, the

Arshiyya). Therefore, Ill focus on Nrs treatment of the issue of

thingness instead.

II

The question of how thing (shay) relates to existent (mawjd), as

it is well known, provoked a heated and lasting debate among the

Mutazilites, some of whom proposed the concept of the non-existent

thing (al-shay al-madm), defining it as something fixed and

determined (shay thbit mutaqarrir).10

In the Avicennan tradition, the

thing/ existent distinction manifests itself as the distinction between

essence and existence.11

What meaning does Nr, a representative of the school of Sadr,

whose followers assert the primacy of existence (aslat al-wujd),

according to which quiddity (mhiya) is a shadow (zill) and an

imitation (hikya) of existence, ascribe to thingness? Can it be, in his

eyes, anything else than a shadow of existence, which alone possesses

true reality or, rather, coincides with the latter (wujd being an

equivalent of tahaqquq)?

Interestingly, our expectations are not quite fulfilled, because Nr

treats the issue of thingness in a somewhat different way. He begins the

discussion by stating that there are two kinds of thingness: one is

affirmative (thubtiyya) or conceptual (mafhmiyya), and the other

existential (wujdiyya). The former can be predicated to many and

appears to be identical with the mental existence (al-wujd al-dhihn);

58 Janis Eshots

in turn, the latter, which can only be predicated to a single individual, is,

no doubt, an equivalent of the objective external existence (al-wujd al-

ayn al-khrij). Nr describes these two kinds of thingness in the

following way:

Our intellect and intuition (wijdn) testify and confirm that there is

something in the unlimited (=absolute) reality (al-wqi al-mutlaq),

which, if it is considered in itself, without taking into account what is

external to it, can be predicated to many (l biyan an al-haml

al l-kathrn). If it is considered solely in itself, it appears as

something indefinite (mubham) that can be predicated to many and

describes itself as the universal (al-kull), i.e. as something to which

is attributed universality (kulliyya) We call this kind of thing and

thingness conceptual thing and conceptual thingness; and it is

[also] called affirmative thing and affirmative thingness

[Likewise, our intellect and intuition also confirm that] there is

something in the unlimited reality that is different from the thing that

was described above namely, if it is considered in itself, without

taking into account what is external to it, it cannot be predicated to

many. If it is considered solely in itself, it appears as an absolute

impossibility [to predicate it to many] and a pure negation of such

predication. Its reality is a particular and real one, an individuation

(tashakhuss) and entification (or: objectification. J.E.) (taayyun), in

the sense of the aforementioned negation and impossibility of

predication to many. Such a thing in itself negates the possibility to

predicate it to many. In turn, the thing which is different from it,

namely, the first one, which in itself can be predicated to many, does

not become something particular, real, individual and entified that

cannot be predicated to many, otherwise than through the second. We

call this second kind of thing and thingness existential thing and

existential thing; and it is also called [simply] existence. It has

been definitely proved that this second kind of thing is what is truly

real, while the first one, namely, the conceptual thing, can only exist

accidentally, and that the first individuates and becomes an

individuated affair through the second.12

The conceptual thing differs from the existential one (read: the concept

of the thing differs from its reality) in that it does not effect the traces

(thr) and properties (ahkm) of the thing, states Nr a few lines


below.13

This statement, together with the aforementioned proposition

of the universality of the conceptual thing (as opposed to the

particularity of the existential one) allows us to conclude that the

affirmation (thubt) Nr speaks about refers to nothing else but the

mental existence (al-wujd al-dhihn). The concept of mental

existence plays an important role in the thought of Mull Sadr, who

describes it as follows:

This kind of existence, in the aspect of which the things and

quiddities do not effect their proper traces when the soul conceives of

them and when they become present in the world of the soul, without

taking into account the external [objective world], is called the

mental and shadowy existence (wujdan dhihniyyan wa zilliyyan)

and the existence of the likeness (wujdan mithliyyan).14

The thing which possesses only mental existence effects no traces and

properties whatsoever. No doubt that the conceptual or affirmed

thing is exactly this sort of thing. One might wonder what prevented

Nr from employing the term mental existence (al-wujd al-dhihn)

in his discourse and made him speak, instead, about affirmation (ithbt/

thubt). I have no ready answer to this, but my guess is that he simply

reasoned in a somewhat different way than Sadr, eventually arriving at

the same basic conclusions. Nr might have used different terminology

in a number of cases and he might have had minor differences of

opinion with Sadr but, as I hope to demonstrate in this paper, he was

an entirely Sadrian thinker.

What we call conceptual/ affirmative thingness, is only a shadow of

existential thingness just as mental existence, which leaves no

traces in the outside, is a shadow of the external objective existence,

which does leave such traces. Therefore, the universal is, by necessity,

the shadow of its particular, as far as their existence is concerned.

But, a faithful follower of Sadr, Nr goes further than this. When we

are dealing with a contingent being, which does not actually enjoy

existence in the full and true sense of the term, both its existential and

conceptual thingnesses represent nothing more than shadows and

likenesses, states he.

60 Janis Eshots

Since the possible being cannot have a full and true existence, and

since it is impossible to conceive of it as of a thing, possessing the

reality of thingness, rather, since it can, by necessity, only enjoy an

illuminative relational existence (al-wujd al-idf al-ishrq),

possess a weak shadowy connective incomplete [mode of] being (al-

kawn al-nqis al-daf al-zill al-irtibt) and be a thing in the sense of

relational thingness (al-shayiyya al-idfiyya), namely, by means of

the relation that is called the illuminative relation and [by means of]

a shadowy unreal thingness, nothing is a real thing, except the

Necessary15

Not only cannot the contingent, according to Nr, exist in the true

sense of the word it also cannot be a thing in the real sense of

thingness. Such conclusion, as we saw above, can only be made if we

treat thingness as either being inseparable from existence or coinciding

with it fully. Ill postpone the discussion on the illuminative relation for

a while, until we turn to the oneness of existence, and will conclude the

discussion on thingness with what seems to be the ultimate result of

Nrs meditation on this issue.

The contingent lacks not only real existence and true thingness. As a

pure shadow and mere relation, it cannot even be called he or it.

Hence, it is impossible to refer to it properly, as to something (at least

relatively) independent - just as we cannot properly refer to the shadow,

if we do not take into account at all its owner and possessor.

The thing, whose quiddity is not fully identical with its being and

which is not itself because of itself, as well as the thing, whose it-ness

(huwiyya) depends on the other, is not it in the absolute sense.16

This allows us to turn to the discussion of Nrs treatment of the

oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujd), to which his second treatise is

devoted.

III

Nrs approach to the issue of the oneness of existence appears to be

more radical than that of Sadr: while the latter on different occasions


and in different aspects treats the oneness at issue either as the specific

oneness (i.e. the oneness of species) (al-wahda al-nawiyya), or as the

individual oneness (al-wahda al-shakhsiyya),17

Nr seems to be

concerned solely with the individual oneness: not surprisingly, he only

employs the expression wahdat al-wujd in order to refer to the

essential unification (al-tawhd al-dht al-marf bi wahdat al-wujd

wa l-mawjd).18

According to him, there are two levels of the oneness of existence or

mercy the level of the essence of the Merciful (dht al-Rahman),

which possesses true simplicity (al-basta al-haqqa), and the level of

the flowing through (sarayn) of the essence of the Merciful and its all-

encompassing mercy.19

The first level represents the true oneness,

while the second (that of the flowing through of existence/ mercy and

its being poured upon the contingents or the carcasses of the things

(haykil al-ashy)) refers to the oneness in manyness (al-wahda f l-

kathra).

This second level, upon an examination, turns out to be nothing but

shadow, relation and connection of the first.

The possible existence to which this group (the Sufis. J.E.)

habitually refer as the merciful breath is nothing else than

connection (irtibt).20

Since it is nothing more than connection and relation, it should not

actually be taken into consideration and paid attention to, in the same

way as ink is not taken into consideration when we read a letter that is

written with it.21

The nature of this relation or connection must now be explained, to

make Nrs point clearer. What he has in mind, is not the ordinary

categorical relation but the so-called illuminative one (al-idfa al-

ishrqiyya).22

The illuminative relation is the relation, which consists of

an illuminating thing (mushriq) and its illumination (ishrq) (e.g. the

sun and its ray). Properly speaking, it consists of one side only, because,

62 Janis Eshots

in it, the relation (idfa) is simultaneously also the related thing

(mudf).

The possible existence, or the breath of the Merciful, or the illuminative

relation, does not have any reality of its own in the same way as the

shadow does not have any reality if considered without its owner and

the ray if taken without the sun. Hence, there is no dweller in the

abode, apart from Him. This is exactly the stance that Sadr had

earlier taken in the Asfr, at the end of discussion on causation,

arriving at a conclusion that

the existent (mawjd) and the existence (wujd) are confined to

one individual reality, which has no companion in true existentiality

(mawjdiyya) and has no peer in its entity, and there is no other

dweller in the dwelling of existence, apart from Him.23

Thus, we can conclude that Nr believed in the individual oneness of

existence, in the Sadrian sense.

Previous to Sadr, this attitude was typically associated with Muhy al-

Dn Ibn al-Arab, who taught that everything is a manifestation and

self-disclosure (tajall) of the Real.24

The Real is the entity of the wujd, not anything else, and [what is

known as] the attribution of the wujd to the contingents is [nothing

else but] the Reals manifestation to itself through their (i.e., the

contingents. J.E.) entities.25

However, as we see, unlike Sadr and Nr, who interpret wujd as

existence (hast), Ibn al-Arab takes the word, first and foremost, in its

literal sense, finding (yft). Finding, in turn, most have an object that

is being found hence, Ibn al-Arab seems to ascribe some reality to

the entities of contingent things (although the Real appears to find them

only accidentally, as mirrors, in which He finds (contemplates)

Himself).


The immediate source of Sadrs teaching on the individual oneness

might have been Dwd al-Qaysar, who, in the introduction to his

commentary on the Fuss, describes three kinds of limited (or quazi-)

existence according to him, the existence that is spread upon the

entities in knowledge is the shadow of the true existence, while, in turn,

the mental existence and the (created) external existence are the

shadows (zilln) of this shadow.26

One fine point of Sadr and Nrs treatment of the issue of the oneness

of existence, perhaps, consists in their describing this shadowy being

not merely as shadow (zill) but also as illuminative relation: in this

way, a bridge between the teachings of Ibn al-Arab and Shaykh al-

Ishrq was built and, gradually, in post-Sadrian thought, the doctrines

of the oneness of existence, on the one side, and the illumination, on

the other, penetrated into each other, making an integral whole.27

In

turn, certain Nrs insights on the common existence (al-wujd al-

mm) as connection (irtibt) have recently been developed by one of

the most influential living Iranian philosophers, Ghulm Rid Ibrhm

Dnn in his research on connected existence (al-wujd al-rbit).28

IV

The examples provided above should be sufficient to demonstrate that

Mull Al Nr was a thoughtful and insightful follower of Mull

Sadrs teachings and a skilful and innovative exponent of them. He

did not attempt to imitate the letter of Sadrs doctrine: instead, he

often employed new terms and even new proofs, or modified and

elaborated those provided by Sadr, in order to demonstrate the

veracity and vitality of his teaching. He was quite successful in this, as

we can conclude from the above analysis of his treatises, dealing with

thingness and the oneness of existence.

At the current stage, when a good number of Nrs works remain

unpublished29

and no attempts of a thorough and comprehensive

analysis of those published, to the best of my knowledge, have been

made, it is impossible to draw a sufficiently detailed picture of his

philosophical views and to properly register his contributions to the

64 Janis Eshots

development of the Sadrian school of thought. However, even a brief

analysis of some of his published treatises seems to provide

unquestionable evidence of the depth of his insight and the highly

refined character of his discourse. Hence, there is little doubt that the

sixty years long period, during which he transmitted Sadrs doctrine

to several generations of students, constitutes an indispensable and

extremely important stage in the development of Sadrs school of

thought and in the dissemination of his ideas among wider intellectual

circles of the Zand and Qajar Iran.

Bibliography

shtiyn, S.J. and H. Corbin (eds.). Anthologie des philosophes iraniens depuis le XVIIe sicle jusqu nos jours/Muntakhabt az thr-i hukam-i ilh-yi Irn az

asr-i Mr Dmd wa Mr Findirisk t zamn-i hdir. 4 vols., Paris and Tehran: Academie Imperiale Iranienne de Philosophie et Depositaire Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve 1971-79. shtiyn, S.J. Sharh-i muqaddima-i Qaysar bar Fuss al-hikam. 4th ed. Qum: Markaz-i intishrt-i daftar-i tablght-i islm 1375 S.H. Esots, Janis. Cosmic Imagination in the Thought of Ibn al-Arabi and al-Suhrawardi, in A. Asadova (ed.). East and West: Common Spiritual Values. Istanbul: Insan 2010. P. 237-248. Esots, Janis. The Gnostic Element of Sadras Doctrine on Causation, in Seyed G. Safavi (ed.), Mulla Sadra and Comparative Philosophy on Causation. London: Salman Azade Press 2003. P. 7389. Esots, Janis. Unification of Perceiver and Perceived and Unity of Being, in Transcendent Philosophy, vol. 1, 3 (December 2000). P. 17. Frank, Richard M. The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Ab l-Hudhayl al-Allf: A Philosophical Study of the Earliest Kalm. Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut in Het Nabije Oosten 1966. Ibn al-Arab, Muhy al-Dn. Al- Futht al-makkiyya. Beirt: Dr al-Sdir: non-dated. Ibrhm Dnn, Ghulm Rid. Wujd-i rbit wa mustaqil dar falsafa-i islm. Tehrn: Sahm 1362 S.H. Karbs-zda Isfahn, Al. Hakm-i mutaallih Bdbd - ihygar-i hikmat-i shi dar qarn-i davzdahum-i hijr. Tehrn: Pazhhishgh-i ulum-i insn wa mutlit-i farhang 1381 S.H. Mull Al Nr. Haqiqat-i Qurn, Irfn-i Irn. No. 8. Tehrn: Haqqat 1380 S.H. P. 88-96. Mull Al Nr. Rasil-i falsaf: Bast al-haqqa wa Wahdat al-wujd. khund Mull Nazar Al Gln. Tuhfa (published as one vol.). Ed. S.J. shtiyn. [Mashhad?]: Anjuman-i islm hikmat wa falsafa-i Irn 1357 S.H. Nj Isfahn, Hmid. Darmad, in Irfn-i Irn. No. 8. Tehrn: Haqqat 1380 S.H.


Qaysar, Dwd al-. Matla khuss al-kalam f man fuss al-hikam. Qum: Muassasa muhibbn li-tiba wa l-nashr 1423 L.H. Sadqh Suh, M. Tarikh-i hukam wa uraf-i mutaakhir. 2nd ed. Tehrn: Hikmat 1381 S.H. Shrz, Sadr al-Dn al-. Asrr al-yt. Ed. M.Khjav. Tehrn: Iranian Academy of Philosophy 1981. Shrz, Sadr al-Dn al-. Al-Hikma al-mutaliyya f l-asfr al-aqliyya al-arbaa. 9 vols. Eds. R.Lutf, I.Amn, and F.Ummd. 3rd edition, Beirt: Dr ihy al-turth al-arab 1981. Shrz, Sadr al-Dn al-. Mafth al-ghayb. 2 vols. Ed. M.Khjav. Beirt: Muassasat al-tarkh al-arab 1999. Shrz, Sadr al-Dn al-. Al-masil al-qudsiyya, in idem. Se risla-i falsaf. Ed. S.J. shtiyn. 3rd ed. Qum: Markaz-i intishrt-i daftar-i tablght-i islm hawza-i ilm-i Qum 1378 S.H. Shrz, Sadr al-Dn al-. Tafsr al-Qurn al-Karm. 7 vols. Ed. M. Khjav. Qum: Intishrt-i Bdr 1366/1987. Sohravardi, Sh.Y. Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques. Ed. Henry Corbin. 2nd edition. TehranParis: Academie Imperiale Iranienne de Philosophie et Depositaire Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve 1976.T. 1. Tunikbun, Muhammad. Qisas al-ulam. Tehrn: 1888 (lithogr. ed.). Wisnovsky, Robert. Notes on Avicennas Concept of Thingness, in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy. Vol. 10 (2000). P. 181-221.

Endnotes

1 Among his other teachers, the biographers have mentioned Mrz Ab l-Qsim

Mudarris Isfahn and Muhammad Ibrhm Jadd Gulpyagn Isfahn (d. 1199/ 1785) (see: Hmid Nj Isfahn. Darmad// Irfn-i Irn. No. 8. Tehrn: Haqqat 1380 S.H. P. 81; M. Sadqh Suh. Tarikh-i hukam wa uraf-i mutaakhir. 2nd ed. Tehrn: Hikmat 1381 S.H. Chapter 5. P. 144).

2 Al Karbs-zda Isfahn. Hakm-i mutaallih Bdbd - ihygar-i hikmat-i shi dar qarn-i davzdahum-i hijr. Tehrn: Pazhhishgh-i ulum-i insn wa mutlit-i farhang 1381 S.H. P. 121-122.

3 Muhammad Tunikbun. Qisas al-ulam. Tehrn: 1888 (lithogr. ed.) P. 150-151. For more sources on Nrs life, see: Hmid Nj. Darmad. P. 81-82, note 1. The most recent attempt to present a detailed account on Nrs life, apparently, was made by M. Sadqh Suh in his Tarikh-i hukam wa uraf. Chapter 5. P. 143-160. However, almost the entire chapter consists of (badly arranged) quotations from earlier sources and a list of Nrs most prominent students (even a tentative list of Nrs writings is absent!).

4 Published in: Sadr al-Dn al-Shrz. Tafsr al-Qurn al-Karm. 7 vols. Ed. M.Khjav. Qum: Intishrt-i Bdr 1366/1987.

5 Published in: Sadr al-Dn al-Shrz. Al-Hikma al-mutaliyya f l-asfr al-aqliyya

66 Janis Eshots

al-arbaa. 9 vols. Eds. R.Lutf, I.Amn, and F.Ummd. 3rd edition, Beirt: Dr ihy al-turth al-arab 1981.

6 Published in: Sadr al-Dn al-Shrz. Asrr al-yt. Ed. M.Khjav. Tehrn: Iranian Academy of Philosophy 1981.

7 Published in: Sadr al-Dn al-Shrz. Mafth al-ghayb. 2 vols. Ed. M.Khjav. Beirt: Muassasat al-tarkh al-arab 1999.

8 S.J. shtiyn and H. Corbin (eds.). Anthologie des philosophes iraniens depuis le XVIIe sicle jusqu nos jours/Muntakhabt az thr-i hukam-i ilh-yi Irn az

asr-i Mr Dmd wa Mr Findirisk t zamn-i hdir. 4 vols., Paris and Tehran: Academie Imperiale Iranienne de Philosophie et Depositaire Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve 1971-79. Vol. 4. P. 545-598. Another treatise of Nr, Haqqat-i Qurn (in Persian), was published by Hmid Nj Isfahn a few years ago (Mull Al Nr. Haqiqat-i Qurn, Irfn-i Irn. No. 8. Tehrn: Haqqat 1380 S.H. P. 88-96).

9 I was using the book: khund Mull Al Nr. Rasil-i falsaf: Bast al-haqqa wa Wahdat al-wujd. khund Mull Nazar Al Gln. Tuhfa (published as one vol.). Ed. S.J. shtiyn. [Mashhad?]: Anjuman-i islm hikmat wa falsafa-i Irn 1357 S.H. P. 9-33 and 34-62. (It is impossible to establish, whether this edition actually preceded the 4th vol. of the Muntakhabt az thr-i hukam or it is a pirated edition that has appeared after it. In any case, the texts seem to coincide exactly with those found in the Muntakhabt.)

10 This definition is believed to belong to Ab Yaqb al-Shahhm (d. after 257/871), a disciple of Ab l-Hudhayl al-Allf (d. 227/841 ?) (see: Richard M. Frank. The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Ab l-Hudhayl al-Allf: A Philosophical Study of the Earliest Kalm. Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut in Het Nabije Oosten 1966. P. 47 (see also the references to Shahrastn in footnote 6)). A most useful review (together with a detailed list of the sources on the history of the issue of thingness) is provided by Robert Wisnovsky.in his Notes on Avicennas Concept of Thingness (Arabic Sciences and Philosophy. Vol. 10 (2000). P. 181-221, See P. 185-186 and notes 8 and 9). Moreover, the issue is discussed in great detail by the eminent Russian scholar A.V. Smirnov in his monograph: .. . : . : 2001. . 293-317.

11 As R. Wisnovsky puts it, for Ibn Sn, thing and existent are identical extensionally but different intensionally (Wisnovsky. Notes. P. 190.).

12 Nr. Rasil. P. 34-35. 13 Nr. Rasil. P. 35. 14 Sadr al-Dn al-Shrz. Al-masil al-qudsiyya (Chapter 3. F ithbt al-wujd al-

dhihn), in idem. Se risla-i falsaf. Ed. S.J. shtiyn. 3rd ed. Qum: Markaz-i intishrt-i daftar-i tablght-i islm hawza-i ilm-i Qum 1378 S.H. P. 220.

15 Nr. Rasil. P. 32.


16 Nr. Rasil. P. 58. 17 I have discussed Sadrs views on the oneness of existence in my earlier article

The Gnostic Element of Sadras Doctrine on Causation, in Seyed G. Safavi (ed.),

Mulla Sadra and Comparative Philosophy on Causation. London: Salman Azade

Press 2003. P. 7389. 18 Nr. Rasil. P. 58. 19 Ibid. 20 Nr. Rasil. P. 28. 21 Nr. Rasil. P. 19. 22 The term illuminative relation (al-idfa al-ishrqiyya) apparently was first used

by Suhraward (see: Sh.Y. Sohravardi. Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques. Ed. Henry Corbin. 2nd edition. TehranParis: Academie Imperiale Iranienne de Philosophie et Depositaire Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve 1976.T. 1. P. 487). However, Sadr and his followers interpret it in a very different way (see my article Unification of Perceiver and Perceived and Unity of Being, in Transcendent Philosophy, vol. 1, 3 (December 2000). P. 17).

23 Sadr. Asfr. Part 2. P. 292. 24 We are not discussing here popular ecstatic mysticism, whose slogan and

catchword was all is He, without making any differentiation between the Real proper and His shadows and manifestations.

25 Muhy al-Dn Ibn al-Arab. Al- Futht al-makkiyya. Beirt: Dr al-Sdir: non-dated. Vol 1. P. 328.

26 Dwd al-Qaysar. Matla khuss al-kalam f man fuss al-hikam. Qum: Muassasa muhibbn li-tiba wa l-nashr 1423 L.H. Vol. 1. P. 17. See also S.J. shtiyns commentary on this passage: S.J. shtiyn. Sharh-i muqaddima-i Qaysar bar Fuss al-hikam. 4th ed. Qum: Markaz-i intishrt-i daftar-i tablght-i islm 1375 S.H. P. 117-118.

27 I have referred to some results of this integration in my article Cosmic Imagination in the Thought of Ibn al-Arabi and al-Suhrawardi, in A. Asadova (ed.). East and West: Common Spiritual Values. Istanbul: Insan 2010. P. 237-248.

28 Ghulm Rid Ibrhm Dnn. Wujd-i rbit wa mustaqil dar falsafa-i islm. Tehrn: Sahm 1362 S.H.

29 See the list in: Hmid Nj Isfahn. Darmad. P. 82-83. In this article, Hmid Nj writes (P. 82, note 2) that he is preparing a collection of Nrs works. I do not know, how far this project has advanced since then (the article was published in early 1380 S.H., i.e., some ten years ago).

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Esots Nuri Transcendent Philosophy Journal Volume 12 December 2011