Escalating Ethnic Tensions in Bosnia_Herzegovina

8/7/2019 Escalating Ethnic Tensions in Bosnia_Herzegovina

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Escalating Ethnic Tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina

April 3, 2011 | 1345 GMT

Bosnia-Herzegovina faces further destabilization after Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders

met in the city of Mostar on March 25 to announce plans to bring down the purportedlyillegally formed Bosniak-dominated government in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

Croat-Serbian alliance is a nightmare scenario for the Bosniaks, who could be forced to rethinktheir actions and work toward a compromise to prevent a political collapse in Bosnia-

Herzegovina.

Analysis

Ethnic tensions continued to simmer in Bosnia-Herzegovina as Bosnian Croat and Bosnian

Serb leaders met in the city of Mostar on March 25 to announce their plans to unseat theBosniak-dominated government in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Federation is

the Croat-Bosniak political entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina), which they have said wasillegally formed. (On March 17, a Bosniak-led political bloc, the Bosniak platform, formed a

government in the Federation without the necessary Croat representatives in the upper house.)The Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs said they plan to form a national government and have

encouraged other Bosniak parties to join them, but no government can be formed until thecrisis in the Federation is solved, thereby making political collapse a very real possibility and

creating a nightmare scenario for the Bosniaks.

There has not been a national government is Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor has there been agovernment within the Federation, for five and a half months. The long-standing tensions

between the Croats and Bosniaks which have been simmering for several years despiteGermanys signaling that it would help forge a compromise and despite the ushering of reforms

in Bosnia-Herzegovina are only part of the problem. The core of the dilemma is the politicalstructure of Bosnia-Herzegovina forged by the Bosnian war.


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Political Structure and Conflict

The Washington Agreement, signed in March 1994, ended the 1993-1994 Muslim-Croat war

and created the Muslim-Croat Federation. The pact granted Bosniaks and Croats some

autonomy and created an entity comprising 10 cantons (five Bosniak-majority and five Croat-majority at the time of the agreement) in a special arrangement with Croatia. The December1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian war completely, brought the Serb-

held territories now Republika Srpska (RS) under Sarajevos loose control, while theFederations close relationship with Croatia effectively ended. In accordance with the Dayton

agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovinas central government comprises a rotating three-chairpresidency, with a seat for each major ethnic group, and a weak bicameral parliament based in

Sarajevo. RS is a centralized de facto Serbian state within a state with its own parliament.

This is the complex political structure within which Muslim-Croat tensions have been risingsince the October 2010 national elections, in which Bosniaks, as they did in the 2006 election,

voted a Croat they favored Zeljko Komsic into the rotating presidency seat reserved forCroats, even though the overwhelming majority of Croats voted for two other candidates. This

was possible because Croats and Bosniaks, who outnumber the Croats, vote with the sameballot list in the Federation, and voters can choose any candidate regardless of their own

ethnicity. This recently created a standoff between the Bosniaks and Croats, as the Croatsrefused to acknowledge the election results.


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On March 15, Commissioner Valentin Inzko of the office of the High Representative the

international communitys overseer of Bosnia-Herzegovina sponsored talks between the twoBosniak-majority parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the party of Democratic

Change (SDA), and the two majority Croatian parties, the Croatian Democratic Union of

Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ B-H) and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina1990 (HDZ 1990). The two Bosniak parties, once bitter political rivals, offered four of the fiveconstitutionally guaranteed Croatian ministerial seats in the Federation government to HDZ B-

H and HDZ 1990, leaving one seat for a Croatian representative from the Bosniak-majoritySDP and giving the Croatian seat in the rotating presidency to Komsic. The talks ended without

an agreement, as the two majority Croatian parties wanted all of the ministerial seats and theCroat seat in the rotating presidency, citing the majority of Croat votes for their two parties.

With no agreement in place, at the March 17 government formation, the Bosniak platform

appointed Croats from fringe parties to the constitutionally guaranteed ministerial seatsreserved for Croats and named Zivko Budimir of the small, far-right Croatian Party of Rights

as Federation president in order to meet constitutional ethnic quotas. In response, Croatsprotested across the Federation on March 17; protests have continued in various Croatian towns

and cities across the Federation since then.

The Croatian parties filed a lawsuit with the Federations constitutional court and also appealed

to Zagreb for support immediately. Croatian President Ivo Josipovic and Prime MinisterJadranka Kosor called for the legitimate representatives of Croats to be present in the

Federation government, a direct swipe at the Bosniak platform and their fringe Croat partypartners. This was a major change from Croatias usual hands-off approach to the Bosnian

Croats, a policy that had been in place since 2000 and is essentially a prerequisite for Croatiasmembership in the European Union.

On March 21, HDZ B-H President Dragan Covic announced a drive to form a Croat national

assembly for Croat-majority cantons and municipalities within the Federation (nine Croatianpolitical parties along with HDZ B-H and HDZ 1990 are scheduled to meet sometime after

April 16). HDZ 1990 President Bozo Ljubic and RS President (and president of the Alliance ofIndependent Social Democrats party) Milorad Dodik expressed support for the move. The

culmination of the Croats response came March 25, when Covic, Ljubic, Dodik and SerbianDemocratic Party President Mladen Bosic gathered in Mostar a meeting of the heads of the

two largest Bosnian Croat parties and the two largest RS parties. The four leaders issued a jointstatement calling on all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to engage in constructive talks,

denouncing what they called the illegal formation of the Federation government and

announcing that no national government would be formed until the crisis in the Federation isresolved. Covic said he would speak with Bosniak political leaders, but added that in forming aFederation government, Croatian interests had to be considered.

Serbian-Croatian Alliance: A Nightmare for Bosniaks

RS wants to devolve Bosniak-dominated Sarajevos central authority as much as possible.


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Dodik is therefore using the Croat-Bosniak tensions to illustrate to the international communitythat his approach of building a strong ethnic entity at the expense of the central Bosnian

government is in fact the only way to run Bosnia-Herzegovina, hence his encouraging theCroatian side to push for greater concessions from the Bosniaks. The Serbs see the Bosniaks as

attempting to impose their will within the Federation against Croat wishes and see RS as the

next possible victim.

The Croats are fighting for their government seats, taking an approach far different from their

declaration of self-administration in 2001 after what they considered systematic discrimination(which was followed by NATO troop deployments to Croat areas and the arrests of senior

Croat leaders). The election law changes by the Office of the High Representative in 2006, aswell as the 2006 and 2010 elections, have been fueling Croat discontent. Croats, and especially

Covic, are making sure to point out now that Croats want representation based on Croat votes,and that they want the rule of law followed.

It is still a major question whether the international community, especially a European Union

dominated by Germany, which has unofficially taken charge of political change in the Balkans,will support a centralized Bosnia-Herzegovina or allow Croats more autonomy in lieu of

Bosniak political gerrymandering within the Federation. The Council of Europe on March 21threatened sanctions if a national government was not formed, essentially encouraging the

Bosniak platform to continue its gamble in the Federation. On March 24, Bosnias CentralElection Commission annulled the formation of the government, as the minimal amount of

Croat seats needed to be present for the formation of a government were not present. TheOffice of the High Representative did not react to the Bosniak platforms maneuver initially,

but Inzko announced March 28 that the Central Election Commissions finding would besuspended until the Federations Constitutional Court made a decision a move for which the

U.S. Embassy expressed support.

Current Federation President and HDZ B-H member Borjana Kristo, along with two Croatian

ministers, tendered their resignations in protest. By suspension of the ruling of the CentralElection Commission, the only competent body to implement the election results, the rule of

law in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been reduced to the absurd, Kristo said. The ConstitutionalCourt suspended the proceedings March 30 after the Croats withdrew their two lawsuits, and,

in further protest of Inzkos decision, Kristo called the proceedings meaningless. On March31, Covic said in an interview that Croats would engage in civil disobedience if the Central

Election Commission ruling was not followed.

With the European Unions involvement in the Libyan intervention and the eurozone sovereign

debt crisis still unresolved, it is unclear whether the European Union can refocus on theBalkans. There seemed to be a push for it earlier in the year, but revolutionary activity in theArab world (and particularly Libya) has drawn the blocs attention elsewhere. If a centralized

Federation and Bosnian state dominated by Bosniaks are the European Unions goals, thenBosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, two old enemies, will more than likely form an even tighter

political alliance (as the March 25 Mostar meeting suggests), an alliance that will politicallyresist all centralization efforts.


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A Serbian-Croatian alliance would be a daunting scenario for the Bosniaks, who could end upreassessing their gamble to escalate and instead search for a compromise as suggested by a

small number of Bosniak journalists, academics and political parties. In light of theConstitutional Courts suspension of the proceedings, the Bosniak platforms decision to either

move forward with the government they formed or meet the demands of the overwhelming

majority of Croatian voters could determine whether the Federation and the Bosnian state itselfwill move forward or collapse politically.

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Escalating Ethnic Tensions in Bosnia_Herzegovina