ERIC A. HEINZE

THE NEW UTOPIANISM: LIBERALISM, AMERICANFOREIGN POLICY, AND THE WAR IN IRAQ

ERIC A. HEINZE

Abstract: This article explores the extent to which the decision to invade Iraqin 2003 coheres with the normative precepts of liberalism as an internationalpolitical theory. Beginning with a Lockean liberal theory of the state, this articlefirst examines the evolution of international liberalism in order to identify thefundamental normative postulates of liberal theory as it pertains to internationalrelations, especially regarding the use of military force. The article then advancestwo interrelated arguments: First, that the underpinnings of the decision to invadeIraq embodied in the Bush Doctrine draw heavily from the liberal tradition,though still depart from it in important ways. Second, that the Bush Doctrineas manifested in the Iraq war reflects in many ways the liberal thinking thatprevailed during the interwar years and is therefore susceptible to a similarcharge of utopianism that was leveled against interwar liberalism by E. H. Carrin his Twenty Years Crisis.

Keywords: Bush Doctrine, E. H. Carr, Iraq War, liberalism, utopianism

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is likely to become one of the mostconsequential American foreign policy decisions of our time, yet the normativetheoretical basis for the invasion remains contested (see Boyle 2004). Wasthe decision to invade Iraq informed by realist thinking, whereby the UnitedStates sought to remove a grave threat to its vital national security interests, orare the dynamics of war better captured by the liberal tradition and thereforeimbued with a desire to plant the seed of liberty in the Middle-East regionand facilitate the proliferation of liberal values such as democracy and humanrights? The original justification for the invasion seemed to draw mostly fromrealist understandings of vital national interest, emphasising self-defence froma threatening and bellicose regime that was bent on acquiring weapons of

Journal of International Political Theory, 4(1) 2008, 105125DOI: 10.3366/E1755088208000116 Edinburgh Univeristy Press 2008

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mass destruction (WMD) and using them against the US and its allies. But thefailure of evidence to support this justificatory basis led to an emphasis of thehumanitarian argument for the invasion, thus couching the Iraq invasion withina different normative discourse with proponents mounting decidedly liberalarguments for deposing Saddam Hussein (e.g. Tesn 2005; Neal 2003).

The idea of liberal intervention philosophically rooted in Kantianinternationalism with its modern foreign policy application in Wilsonianidealism refers in a very general sense to intervening (usually militarily)in other countries in order to promote liberal values, such as democraticinstitutions, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and individual liberties.A species of liberal intervention referred to as humanitarian interventiongained popularity in the 1990s, suggesting that the principle of state sovereigntywas being redefined and could no longer be used as a shield behind whichgovernments could violate the fundamental rights of their people with impunity.According to this view, sovereignty entails a responsibility to respect humanrights, not a license to violate them with impunity, and states that do so possiblyrelinquish their sovereign right of nonintervention (Annan 1999; Barkin 1998).So when the George W. Bush administrations assertion that Saddam Husseinpossessed WMD that threatened vital US security interests was eventuallydiscredited, it made a good deal of sense for the Bush White House to emphasisethe humanitarian credentials of the invasion and justify the Iraq war usingthe moral discourse of liberal intervention as opposed to the narrow and self-interested power calculations of realist thought. To what extent, however, wasthe Iraq war a liberal intervention in the sense that it abided by principles ofinternational liberalism as this tradition pertains to the use of force? The purposeof this essay is to address this concern.

For even the casual reader of international relations theory, it will come asno surprise the ease with which liberal principles can be used to provide whatHans Morgenthau called ideological justifications to cloak what are otherwiseacts of narrow self-interest (Morgenthau 1993: 99; see also Mearsheimer 2001:257). This is largely a result of there being, as Michael Doyle (1986: 1152)rightly notes, no canonical description of liberalism, particularly as this termapplies to international theory. This essay therefore traces liberalism to itsphilosophical origins in Enlightenment thought, discusses how and why liberalprinciples drew the charge of being utopian during the interwar years, andoutlines the contemporary normative doctrine of international liberalism thatemerged. Following Doyles formulation of international liberalism as thatwhich seeks to protect human rights, support international cooperation, professinternational law, and support international norms (Doyle 1999: 213), I identifythe fundamental elements of international liberalism as it pertains to the use ofmilitary force and apply them to the underpinnings of the Iraq war, as embodiedin the Bush Doctrine, in order to ascertain the extent to which arguments infavour of this invasion conform to liberal principles. While the values that

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Liberalism, American Foreign Policy, and the War in Iraq

undergird and allegedly justify the Iraq war cohere with liberal principles inmany ways, I ultimately argue that the Bush administrations adaptation ofliberal interventionism is akin to the utopianism that E. H. Carr argued in hisTwenty Years Crisis characterised international liberalism during the interwaryears.

The Roots of International Liberalism

Central to liberal thought in its simplest form is a concern for individual liberty.With its intellectual roots in the early Enlightenment thought of John Locke,the liberal ideal posits a limited or conditional government whose job it is toprotect what Isaiah Berlin called a minimum area of personal freedom whichon no account must be violated (Quoted in Smith 1992: 201). The legitimacyof a government flows from the consent of the governed, over whom rulersmay not exercise coercion except through means established by law. Liberalismthus espouses a concept of the state as servant of society, whose job it is toremove obstacles to freedom and protect individuals from even majoritarianoppression. To prevent governments from exceeding these limits, of course,requires the familiar array of institutional constraints, checks and balances, andindividual rights that underlie the constitutional arrangements of nearly everyliberal democratic polity that exists today.

To be sure, Locke was espousing a political theory of the state using a well-known state of nature argument, though this condition was quite different thanthe vicious Hobbesian scenario of war of all against all. Indeed, the Lockeanstate of nature is governed by a God-given law of nature that is knowable toindividuals through their reason, wherein every individual possesses naturalrights to life, liberty, and property. Any person who deprives others of thesenatural rights sets himself outside the realm of reason and law and therefore maybe pursued and punished not just by those whose rights were unjustly deprived,but by any person who lives according to the laws of nature (Locke 1980: 910).The problem, of course, is that such individuals are unlikely to be fair andimpartial when punishing transgressors, which is precisely why Locke arguedthat rational individuals would establish civil government. Locke furthermorecontends that this state of nature is a real condition that actually exists-among thesavages of other lands as well as among the rulers of sovereign commonwealthsthroughout the world (Locke 1980: 13). While never systematically discussingrelations among commonwealths in light of this analogy, this formulation of astate of nature among sovereigns would be crucial in later developments of thelaw of nations, while other Lockean ideas would continue to permeate liberalEnlightenment thinking about international affairs, particularly the democraticpeace theory and political-economic theories about free trade and imperialism(Knutsen 1997: 150). The Lockean contribution to international liberalism is

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therefore fundamental, as it is from this common liberal root that emergesthe main branches of the liberal approach to international relations that wouldproduce twentieth century interwar utopianism and provide part of the normativebasis of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003.

Lockes contribution to international liberalism is embodied in threefoundational ideas that were adopted and refined by others to form thefundamental precepts of international liberalism. The first is Lockes uniquelaw-governed state of nature argument. As mentioned above, Locke arguesin his Second Treatise that in the state of nature all persons living accordingto the law of nature enjoy an equal right to punish the violators of this law.Lockes acknowledgment that a state of nature exists among the sovereign statesof the world is thus a reasonable basis to assert a liberal-Lockean argument fora unilateral right of law-abiding states to engage in the punitive use of militaryforce against states that violate the law of nations the precursor to internationallaw as derived from natural law. Better known for this view is Hugo Grotius,who (writing before Locke) advanced a more explicit argument in favour ofpunitive war, essentially arguing that a sovereign state may use military forceagainst another to redress violations of natural law and defend the peace andtranquility of international society (Grotius 1949; Lang 2005: 601). LocatingLocke and Grotius within a similar stratum of the Just War tradition, MichaelDoyle (1997: 220) attributes to Locke the view that a just conqueror has theright to punish transgressors of the law of nations in order to deter future suchacts and to exact reparations. The punitive application of military force as ameans of enforcing international law therefore seems to be an element of boththe Just War and liberal traditions, one that some contemporary theorists argueunderlies many of the arguments made by the US and UK for the war in Iraq(e.g. Lang 2005; OConnell 2006).

Others have argued that such an analysis is to read too much into Locke, andthat his views on punishment in the state of nature cannot be straightforwardlyapplied to modern international relations (e.g. Williams 2005: 23). While Grotiuswas advocating the right of states to individually undertake punitive force, it isfar less clear whether Locke would have gone as far, as Locke was arguably moreconcerned with justifying colonial projects than he was advocating a generalisedand private right of punishment against nations that violate natural law (Williams2005: 23; Tuck 1999: 177). Some scholars (e.g. Knutsen 1997: 120; Tuck 1999:195) have thus associated Emmerich de Vattel with specifically liberal-Lockeananalyses of international relations. Following the Lockean state of nature, Vattelposits that states have no government to rule over them or enforce their rights,but are governed by a universal natural law (the necessary law of nations)that is binding on all states and obligates them to respect the rights of oneanother (Vattel 1863). While Vattel argued that states have the private rightto resort to war to defend themselves and as a means of self-help for havingbeen individually wronged, he unequivocally rejected the Grotian conception of

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punitive war that permitted privately (unilaterally) enforcing the law of nationson behalf of all nations, since this would open the door to all the passions ofzealots and fanatics and give to ambitious men pretexts without number (Vattel1863: 161, 116). For Vattel, such punitive enforcement of the law must beimbued with the special authority of the community of nations, whereby theinterests of human society would authorise all the other nations to form a con-federacy in order to humble and chastise the delinquents . . . (Vattel 1863: 161).Paralleling Lockes concern that individuals in the state of nature are unlikelyto be fair and impartial when privately punishing transgressors of natural law inthe public interest, Vattel addresses a similar concern at the international levelby advancing what is for all intents and purposes an inchoate formulation ofcollective security as a means for enforcing what would become contemporaryinternational law. It is thus the liberal rights-based ethos bequeathed from Lockeand refined by Vattel that makes the sanctity of universal moral law and thecollective pursuit and punishment of its transgressors akin to what we wouldnow recognise as liberal prescriptions for international relations.

The second Lockean contribution to international liberalism comes from thetwin concepts of individual liberty and popular sovereignty, which form thefoundation of the Kantian democratic peace, as well as the corollary insight(usually credited to international liberalism) that the internal composition ofstates is a crucial component in their relations with one other. The idea thatthat democracies tend toward peace because the common people will bear thegreatest costs of war, and therefore always strive to avoid it, was shared bymany late-Enlightenment theorists, too numerous to adequately review here(e.g. Godwin 1985), though Kants is the most systematic and well-known ofthe Enlightenment theories of democratic peace. For Kant, liberal states withrepublican constitutions will gradually establish peace among themselves bymeans of a pacific federation, as described in the Second Definitive Article ofhis Perpetual Peace (Kant 1991: 102). Importantly, Kant is not calling for aworld government, but rather a union of nations which maintains itself, preventswars, and steadily expands (quoted in Hinsley 1963: 63) in essence, a furtherelaboration of the concept of collective security. While Kant indeed envisageda law-governed international organisation, he was notably ambiguous about thequestion of forcing states to adopt republican constitutions. These ambiguities inKants writings foreshadowed what would become a great debate within liberalthought about whether and the means by which liberal states should go to war toreform intolerant and aggressive autocracies.

The final influence of Locke on international liberalism was his conceptionof private property, to which Jeremy Bentham and others added the conceptsof economic utility and harmony of interests to mount powerful anti-imperialistarguments and lay the foundation for advocates of free trade and internationaleconomic cooperation. The Lockean concept of private property is a crucialcomponent of the optimistic anthropology of liberalism and in the liberal belief

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of progressive development of mankind (Puchala 2003: 189). With the advent ofprivate property, man is capable of pursuing his private ends and realising hisown happiness. Property also gives man an incentive to work, while the fruitsof this labour enhance his own well-being as well as that of society as a whole.Bentham picks up on this theme by arguing that only in an open and unimpededsociety can man maximise his pleasure and minimise his pain that is, pursuehis happiness to the greatest extent (Knutsen 1997: 151). In Benthams view, freeand open trade among nations has a general harmonising effect, since nationswould be facilitating the happiness of one anothers society. In other words,nations grow richer through commerce than through conquest or empire. Hereinlies Benthams advocacy of free trade as a force for international peace andstability and his staunch opposition to colonialism and mercantilism. In his Planfor a Universal and Perpetual Peace, Bentham argues the advantages of havingcolonies are outweighed by the military expenditures required to defend themand protect their trade (Bentham 1843: 54661). If colonial struggles ended, notonly would free and open trade have a pacifying effect on international relations,but international conflict could be reduced to a level where it could easily bemanaged by a Congress of States (Bentham 1843: 552).

Not only did Bentham help define the liberal tradition regarding the pacifyingeffects of free trade, his argument for the abolition of secret diplomacy andemphasis on the importance of international law (allegedly having coined thisterm) helped cement the tenets of a bourgeoning liberal theory of internationalrelations. Born out of a Lockean liberal theory of the state and honed byEnlightenment ideals, international liberalism of the mid- to late-nineteenthcentury espoused a strong preference for a law-governed society of states,cooperation in international organisations to collectively enforce this law, thespread of democracy and liberal ideals (therefore bringing about peace), and theenhancement global peace and prosperity by pursuing free trade. Internationalliberalism was deeply suspicious of the balance-of-power politics that dominatedinternational relations at this point in history and sought to replace war as atool of foreign policy with international cooperation, trade, and the eventualpacification of a world of liberal democratic nations. But consensus on theseissues, particularly on this latter point, was far from universal. While part ofthis debate centered on the proper role of the state in certain economic activitiesand whether state intervention was necessary to prevent social inequalities, arelated debate with more profound implications for international relations hadto do with whether democratic states should tolerate states that rejected theirliberal principles or use force to reform them (Knutsen 1997: 1712). In short,the debate was about the desirability of liberal interventionism.

What one might call status quo liberals took the non-interventionist stance,ridiculed balance-of-power interventionism, and argued, as Richard Cobdendid, that disarmament, arbitration and free trade would be the foundationalprinciples of any platform for peace (Howard 1978: 44). British liberals like

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Cobden and his colleague John Bright were in many ways emblematic of theliberal internationalism of the nineteenth century, arguing that [t]he progressof freedom depends . . . upon the maintenance of peace, the spread of commerce,and the diffusion of education . . . (Cobden 1903: 216). John Stuart Mill likewiseasserted that commerce was rapidly rendering war obsolete. Mills essay AFew Words on Non-Intervention, argues that it would be a mistake for a stateto intervene in a repressive state and establish free institutions because peoplegiven freedom by foreign intervention will be unable to hold on to it. It is onlyby having the will to fight for and win ones own freedom that people realisethe true value of liberty and are thus prepared to do what it takes to maintainit (Mill 1984: 122). Otherwise, a people set free by an external force will notvalue such freedom and will soon find themselves either oppressed by their newdemocratic rulers, struggling against one another for supremacy, or continuallyrelying on foreign support to maintain their freedom.

More revisionist liberals such as the Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini weremore sympathetic to balance-of-power politics and argued that the immediateinternational objective was not peace, but rather freedom (Vincent 1974: 61).Mazzini shared the liberal vision of a universal republic of free nations, but forhim, unlike his British contemporaries, this objective would have to be achievedby just and necessary foreign interventions aimed at liberating oppressed people what Kenneth Waltz later characterised as messianic interventionism (Waltz1959: 110). William Gladstone likewise was sympathetic to this more bellicoseform of international liberalism in his belief that the British people had a moralobligation to liberate people subjugated under a foreign or otherwise illegitimateyoke, and do so using a force armed with the highest sanction of law. . . [and]authorized and restrained by the Unified Powers of Europe (quoted in Howard1978: 56). So while the Gladstonian conception of international relations waspart and parcel of the liberal credo that peace depended on the spread ofdemocracy, it implied an abandonment of the heretofore liberal espousal of non-intervention and the non-use of force. Importantly, however, the Gladstonianconception of liberal interventionism rested upon collective legitimation andrecognized the existence of an international community, even if no institutionsyet existed to embody it, as well as an international morality, even if therewere no courts to codify and declare it (Howard 1978: 57). According to thisthinking, there indeed is a public international law that obliges a certain code ofcivilised internal conduct even if it does not exist in a treaty and if need be itshould be upheld by armed force.

The Twenty Years Crisis and Interwar Utopianism

After the First World War and the spirited efforts of Woodrow Wilson onthe international scene, liberalism became the dominant approach to studying

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international relations during the interwar years. Disillusioned observers ofinternational affairs widely rejected the realist view of world politics and itsespousal of realpolitik and power politics, which critics argued had broughtabout the war. With the malfunctioning European balance of power largelyblamed for starting the Great War or at least failing to prevent it thenew discipline of International Relations was born amidst an urgent needto avoid another world war and gravitated toward the liberal vision beingchampioned by Wilson. The Wilsonian view of international relations at thistime was the undeniable heir to the international liberalism that evolved duringthe Enlightenment and had originated with Locke. Even Wilsons decision toenter the war in 1917 reflected an essentially Lockean understanding of worldaffairs, whereby the German Kaiser had violated the law of nature, placedhimself outside the realm of law and reason, and thus gave law-abiding statesthe right to pursue him for the sake of all humanity (Knutsen 1997: 209).Wilsons visionary plan for structuring world order after the war reflected thefamiliar international liberal ideas on war and peace namely, that war could beprevented by the spread of democracy (a goal that would be further facilitatedby membership in the League of Nations), fealty to international law and faithin free-market economics.

The new academic discipline of International Relations was therefore largelypreoccupied with those tenets of international liberalism being championedby Wilson and was greatly informed by the tradition of international law andthe anti-war societies of the early twentieth century. While a comprehensivereview of the thinkers of the interwar period is beyond the scope of this essay,the writings of liberal intellectuals like Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, andArnold Toynbee are most commonly associated with these ideas, and werealso famously depicted by E. H. Carr as manifestly utopian. In his importantbook The Great Illusion, Angell set out to debunk the illusion that war wasa profitable and useful tool for the conduct of state foreign policy, arguing thatwars of conquest between industrialised states had become futile, and that thebest solution to aggression was third party judgment within a collective system(Angell 1939; Miller 1995: 104). For Angell, states single-minded pursuit oftheir own security in a condition of anarchy led to war, thus security needed tobe provided internationally. After the Great War he became an ardent supporterof the League of Nations, suggesting that [t]he military power of the worldshould be so pooled by international agreement for supporting a common rule oflife for the nations as in fact to make it the police power of civilization (quotedin Miller 1995: 112).

International relations scholarship during this period thus consisted mainlyof forward-looking liberal conceptions of world federations, blueprints for amore perfect League of Nations, and the development of new internationalinstitutions and legal codes for interstate behavior, all amidst a strong normativedesire for the avoidance of great-power war (Wilson 1995: 303). While Zimmern

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and Toynbee echoed Angells calls for a robust League of Nations and sharedhis overarching aspirations to eradicate war and spread liberal values, theirideas, also like Angells, were seized upon by Carr, particularly Zimmernsemphasis upon the need for a long-term project of international re-educationand Toynbees advocacy of the Benthamite doctrine of harmony of interests(Zimmern 1931; Brewin 1995: 277301; Rich 2002; Carr 2001: 429, 75).Indeed, Carrs classic text is most famous for its attempt to debunk thepretensions of the liberal thinking that dominated the international relationsdiscourse during the twenty years crisis, between 1919 and 1939. Using atheoretical framework consisting of an alleged dialectic between utopia andreality, Carr attacked as utopian those thinkers whose theoretical traditionwas that of liberalism (Knutsen 1997: 211) and whose ideas were derivedfrom Locke and infused with the Enlightenment ideals of Vattel, Kant andBentham. Importantly, Carrs polemic was very context-specific and was inresponse to a particular group of liberal thinkers during a period of worldturmoil. Yet the basis of Carrs critique of this particular brand of liberalismwas fourfold. First, international liberalism was too preoccupied with whatinternational relations ought to resemble rather than what it actually resembled;second, it was based on a misplaced faith in a harmony of interests amongstates; third, it overemphasised the role of international law and morality andunderestimated the role of power; and finally, proponents of liberalism failed torecognise that their espousal of universal interests amounted to nothing morethan a promotion and defense of a particular status quo (Wilson 1995: 12).

The normative character of liberal International Relations scholarship wasCarrs first target. For Carr, sciences in their infancy such as the new disciplineof International Relations are always imbued with a sense of purpose. Inthis case, the purpose was to find reason-based substitutes for war. During thisutopian stage of development, investigators in these infant sciences will paylittle attention to existing facts or to the analysis of cause and effect, but willdevote themselves wholeheartedly to the elaboration of visionary projects forthe attainment of ends which they have in view projects whose simplicityand perfection give them an easy and universal appeal (Carr 2001: 6). In short,projects that were intended to alleviate war among states such as the Leagueof Nations, the strengthening of international law, the positing of a universaldemocratic ethic and the belief that free trade would lead to peace were nothingmore than highly imaginative solutions whose relation to existing facts wasone of flat negation (Carr 2001: 7). What transformed this mildly excusablenaivet into all-out crisis was the fact that such forward-looking and visionarythinking continued to dominate the international relations discourse even afterthe collapse of free trade in 1929, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931,and the rearmament and expansionist ambitions of Germany. The continueddiscussions of a global police force, world federation and legalistic argumentsabout dispute-settlement and strengthening the League were thus remarkably

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out of touch with these very real developments to the point of crisis. In Carrsanalysis, using principles of Lockean liberalism as the basis for internationalorder was utopian precisely because the visionary prescriptions and unverifiedassumptions about international relations being advocated by the likes of Angell,Zimmern and Toynbee overlooked these unfortunate but inescapable facts ofinternational life.

Foremost of these inescapable facts according to Carr is the fallacy ofliberalisms principal claim that there was a general harmony of interestsamong states. According to the liberal view on international politics thatprevailed during the interwar period, it was in the interests of every state toabide by rules that are made in the interests of the majority of states, while theminority of states (whose greatest good is ex hypothesi not pursued) submit tothese rules because in sacrificing their short-term interests to the interests ofthe majority they achieve an end that is in the interests of the community as awhole, which includes themselves. If states fail to realise this natural harmonyof interests and resort to conflict or war, it is because they are short-sighted,un-intellectual, or are failing to reason properly (Carr 2001: 43). The liberaladvocacy of universal free trade, for example, was justified on the Benthamitegrounds that the maximum economic interest of each state coincided with themaximum interest of the world as a whole. Similar formulations were madeabout submitting to international law, becoming party to the League of Nationsand renouncing war (Carr 2001: 501). For Carr, however, the doctrine ofharmony of interests was only tenable if one completely discounted the short-term interests of the minority, who really only submit to the will of the majoritybecause they are weak (Carr 2001: 42, 49). Furthermore, the common interestin peace allegedly held by all states masked the fact that some states wanted tomaintain the status quo while others wanted to change it, even though neithermay have been willing to go to war to do so (Carr 2001: 51). The doctrine ofharmony of interests was thus an illusion created by the existence of a powerasymmetry among states, where the strong did what they could and the weakdid what they had to in the quintessential Thucydidean fashion. This doctrinelikewise became the ideological basis for maintaining the status quo, wherebythe dominant powerful states sought to equate their interests with the interests ofinternational society as a whole and therefore maintain their dominant position(Carr 2001: 42, 45).

For Carr, there was no such natural harmony of interests among states, butrather a latent discord that was essentially kept in check by a balance of power.International law and appeals to universal interests alone could not solve theproblem of conflict among states as the utopians believed precisely because thisview discounted the crucial ingredient of state power. The very idea of lawassumes some sort of authority to enforce obedience to it. Such enforcementrequires power, which is possessed primarily, if not exclusively, by states. Assuch, law is very much an expression of the will of states, the most powerful of

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which will routinely use it as an instrument of coercion to serve their own ends.But this is not to say that international relations are defined by power alone.According to Carr, the fact that the exercise of state power so eagerly cloaksitself in ideologies of a professedly international character proves the existenceof an international stock of common ideas, however limited and however weaklyheld, and a belief that these common ideas stand somehow in the scale of valuesabove national interests (Carr 2001: 130). In other words, there does existsome sort of international morality, which, like state power, is also expressed ininternational law. So international law is a function of both power and morality,but of neither exclusively. But it is those who held that international law andorderly relations among states are solely a function of morality and reason whomCarr charged as utopian.

Power on one hand, and international law and morality on the other, aretherefore mutually reinforcing influences in international relations. Power ismost effectively exercised when it is legitimated by international law andmorality, while norms of international law and morality derive their contentand relevance from powerful states taking up and acting on them (Bull 2002:xii). For the utopians, it was the doctrine of harmony of interests that provideda rational basis for a common international morality, which would itself befacilitated by putting into practice the various liberal prescriptions for a peacefuland prosperous international order. But for Carr, all the utopians were doingwas espousing a particular set of values that belonged to a specific group ofprosperous and privileged states and portraying them as universal (Carr 2001:758). For these privileged states, maintaining the status quo is the key tomaintaining their dominant position. So by associating the specific interests ofdominant states with a universal interest of all states, the utopians unwittinglycreated a moral basis for dominant states to assail any attempt to alter the statusquo that favours them, while also advancing a moral basis for dominant statesto take action aimed at preserving a favourable status quo. As Woodrow Wilsonargued when he justified the USs entry into World War I, the United States hadbeen founded for the benefit of humanity, and the values we would be defendingwere not only American principles and American policies, but the principles ofall mankind, which must prevail (Carr 2001: 734). In this view, what is goodfor America is ipso facto good for the world, and therefore ought to be the basisof world order.

Liberalism, the War in Iraq, and the Bush Doctrine

From the discussion so far, one can ascertain roughly what a liberal theoryof military intervention might resemble. While much of the liberal project forInternational Relations has been informed by a desire to avoid war or at leastto monopolise the resort to military force in the hands of a collective security

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organisation there is still very much a basis for resorting to armed conflict inthe liberal tradition as it has been outlined above.1 Even then, the resort to forcein the short-term is said to be in the interests of a long-term peace, as the ultimategoal of such armed intervention would be to establish democracy in the targetstate, thus making it a part of the Kantian pacific federation of republican states.As such, if war is to be justified at all in the liberal view, it must first, either beintended to punish or repel a transgressor of international law or have the effectof promoting liberal values within the target state (e.g. democratic institutions,human rights, market economics), and second, it must be undertaken in the spiritof collective security and must be consistent with international law.

Certain contemporary international liberals have all but endorsed this formu-lation of liberal intervention, though with notably less deference to positivistinternational law. The argument of these theorists is essentially that onlythose states whose institutions satisfy the appropriate principles of justice canlegitimately demand to be respected as autonomous sources of ends thatis, to claim the right of nonintervention (Beitz 1979a: 81; see also Tesn1988: 15). In other words, regimes that violate the civil and political rights oftheir people have no moral claim to sovereignty and therefore forfeit the rightof nonintervention. Because the ultimate justification for the existence of statesis the protection and enforcement of individual rights, a government that abusesthese rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists and therefore shouldnot be protected by international law and does not have the right to be free fromintervention aimed at reforming its institutions (Tesn 1988: 15; see also Tesn2003: 93; Beitz 1979b: 415).

The US invasion of Iraq potentially finds some grounding on this liberal basis.Even if this was not the primary reason put forth publicly when the invasionwas being considered, an examination of the policy guidelines that informed thedecision to invade suggest that it nevertheless played an important role.2 If oneexamines the policy guidelines pronounced by President George W. Bush in hisJune 2002 speech at West Point and outlined in the National Security Strategy ofthe United States published in September 2002 collectively labelled the BushDoctrine one can observe a set of ideas that not only foreshadow the invasionof Iraq in 2003, but that also draw heavily from liberal thinking (PresidentBush 2002; National Security Strategy, 2002). While the Bush Doctrine is bestknown for outlining a policy of preventive war and declaring that the US willact unilaterally to defend itself when it must (Record 2003: 421), it also entailsan ambitious agenda to champion the cause of human dignity and oppose thosewho resist it, while encouraging the advancement of democracy and economicopenness (National Security Strategy 2002: 4). This latter aspect of the BushDoctrine is a function of two important principles of neoconservative thoughton foreign policy: first, that the internal character of regimes matters and USforeign policy must reflect the values of liberal democratic societies, and second,

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that American power can be used to achieve such moral purposes (Fukuyama2006: 48).

Examined in light of its neoconservative intellectual underpinnings, thisaspect of the Bush Doctrine is decidedly liberal, if not Wilsonian or even outrightKantian. Kant, of course, argued that the spread of democratic states would resultin the pacification of the world, but he also left room for liberal states to wagewar, and he indeed feared that states would find liberal reasons to go to war(Pangle 1999: 1959; Doyle 1986: 1152, 1160). While Kant never explicitlyadvocated going to war for the purpose of changing the civil constitution ofstates, he did argue that the civil constitution of a vanquished unjust enemycould be forcibly changed if the defeated nation displays a maxim which wouldmake peace among nations impossible and would lead to a perpetual state ofnature if it were made into a general rule, which according to Kant includesviolations of public treaties (Kant 1991: 170). So a regime vanquished in anarmed conflict that had a different purpose such as self-defence may be forcedto adopt a republican constitution to discourage its warlike inclinations. SaddamHusseins Iraq seems to fit the bill of Kants unjust enemy. Iraq routinelyinvaded and threatened its neighbors and had been in breach of its internationalobligations for over a decade a maxim that if made into a general rule,would preclude meaningful peace among states. Thus, when the US went towar against Iraq in self-defence, it had the right to change the constitution ofa vanquished Iraq to discourage its warlike inclinations, which was to have theeffect of enlarging the democratic pacific federation. Likewise, Saddam Husseinhad unlawfully invaded his neighbors in the past (namely Kuwait in 1990),flouted international law by violating dozens of UN Security Council resolutionsconcerning his weapons programmes, kicked out UN weapons inspectors, andwas said to be unlawfully pursuing WMD. So to the extent that the goals ofthe Iraq war included enforcing these aspects of international law that Iraq hadbreached, upholding universal moral norms regarding human rights and dignity,and spreading liberal values such as democracy and liberty to Iraq, then there isan undeniable normative basis for the Iraq war in international liberalism.

Other aspects of the Bush Doctrine put into practice are decidedly less liberal.To be sure, the punitive dimension of the war has certain affinities with the liberaltradition insofar as the war was fought as a means of holding Iraq to accountfor violations of international law. Both Bush and Tony Blair forcefully pressedthe case that the war against Iraq was at least in part intended to reaffirm andvindicate the various UN resolutions that Iraq had flouted (ODriscoll, 2006:408). While such an argument for punitive war against Iraq certainly findsgrounding in Grotian Just War principles and perhaps Lockean liberalism toa lesser degree the alleged unilateral and illegal nature of the Iraq warstand it in stark contradistinction to the preoccupation with collective securityand fealty to international law espoused by international liberalism. Indeed, theright to act unilaterally (and preventively) is a fundamental principle of the

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Bush Doctrine, while its neoconservative intellectual underpinnings include aprofound skepticism about the legitimacy and efficacy of international law andinstitutions in achieving international security and justice (National SecurityStrategy 2002: 6; Fukuyama 2006: 49). That the US invasion of Iraq took placeoutside of the formal collective security institutions in place today (namely, theUN Security Council, but also possibly NATO) make it very much antitheticalto liberal thinking about international peace and security. Far from the brandof collective security envisaged by liberals from Bentham to Wilson, so-calledcoalitions of the willing are more akin the sort of balance-of-power politicsthat liberal thinking has rejected since the Enlightenment.3 Having not beenauthorised by the UN Security Council, the Iraq invasion was therefore alsoa violation of UN Charter provisions on the use of force. While a detailedlegal analysis of the US invasion of Iraq is beyond the scope of the presentessay, most international law experts are of the view that the USs use of forcewithout explicit approval by the UN Security Council was indeed a violation ofinternational law (OConnell 2003; Iraq War 2004). This aspect of the BushDoctrine the primacy of American power over trust in international law andinstitutions is unequivocally contrary to international liberalism.

The New Utopianism

The US invasion of Iraq and the policy guidelines that led to it thus reflect aworldview whereby the United States is thought to be both so powerful andso benevolent that it has the ability to spread democracy throughout the world,which can be achieved by military force if necessary (Leiven and Hulsman 2006:xi). This approach attempts to achieve what are essentially liberal goals by usingrealist means. That is, the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq war are reflections ofliberalism in the sense that they recognise that the internal nature of states isas important as ever to international peace and security. Therefore, promotingdemocracy and liberal values has become central to US foreign policy, especiallyin the Middle East. On the other hand, this approach is realist in the sense thatit repudiates international law and institutions as means to achieving these goalsand instead focuses on the primacy of military power, though paradoxically, thistransgression of the law was supposedly undertaken to enforce and vindicateinternational law. While the Bush Doctrine and its expression in the Iraq warcontain elements of liberalism, realism, as well as the Just War tradition, it alsoinvites the criticism of being utopian in a very similar sense as E. H. Carrscriticism of interwar liberalism over two generations ago.

First is the Bush administrations preoccupation with a forward-looking andvisionary goals about what the world (especially the Middle East) ought toresemble under the influence of benevolent American hegemony. As with Carrscritique of interwar liberalism for its preoccupation with what the world ought

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to resemble rather than confronting the realities of the world as it is, the messagefrom the Bush administration even after things started going badly in Iraq wasto not let unpleasant realities get in the way of visionary hopes for a Western-style democratic Iraq that is a partner in the US global war on terror. As Bushstated in May 2004, [o]ur actions . . . are guided by a vision . . . that freedomcan advance and change lives in the greater Middle East, just as it has advancedand changed lives in Asia, and Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and Africa(President Outlines 2004). Similar to what Carr accused interwar liberals ofdoing, the Bush administration and others in the US foreign policy establishmentfound it much easier to imagine this alternative and ideal vision for Iraq and thegreater Middle East rather than admitting the very real limitations of Americanmilitary might and reexamining the role that it can and should play in bringingabout progressive change in international relations. At the time of this writing, inmid-2007, the limitations of American power in bringing about positive changein Iraq have become all too real, yet the solution to the Iraq crisis advocated bythe Bush administration has been to intensify the war by sending more troopsin a so-called surge effort (Sanger 2007) in short, to exercise more power inthe hopes that this will create space in which political reconciliation can beginto take place.

A related charge of utopianism could be leveled against the US administrationfor overestimating the role of state power and underestimating the importanceof international law and institutions. While Carr criticised the interwar liberalsfor doing precisely the opposite, he also understood that power and internationallaw are two sides of the same coin (Carr 2001: 130). If it was navely utopianfor certain interwar liberals to believe that international law and institutionsalone could secure international peace and prosperity, then it is similarlyutopian to believe that military power can be effectively exercised withoutbeing legitimated by principles of international law, which according to Carrexist to ensure that power is exercised for the common good and not solelyfor self-aggrandisement (Carr 2001: 164). The lesson is that no matter howoverwhelmingly powerful a state is, those witnessing the exercise of such power(including the alleged beneficiaries of it) are bound to resist it if they perceive itto be fundamentally self-serving. It is not enough to justify the use of militaryforce by appealing to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, particularlyif the rule of law which is supposed to act as a check on self-serving militaryadventurism becomes the first casualty of the resort to using force.

Another area in which the US policy in Iraq draws the charge of utopianism isthe assumption that what is good for America is good for the world a viewthat parallels the notion of harmony of interests professed by a number ofinterwar liberals. To be sure, there are grounds for suggesting that states do sharecommon interests in pursuing liberal values such as free trade, democracy, andhuman rights. But the proliferation of these values and the eventual underminingof tyrannical regimes like Iraq and North Korea through the force of Americas

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democratic and free market example are quite different than militarily invadingIraq and overthrowing Saddam Hussein in order to facilitate the spread of suchvalues. The US invaded Iraq under the supposition that since it would (allegedly)benefit US and its security, then it would ipso facto benefit all of humanity.4After all, some 40 states who presumably shared this view lent political supportto the US-led invasion. While many governments would disagree with US policyin the short term, eventually, the administration assumed, they would realisethat the removal of a tyrant in the heart of the Middle East would accruebenefits to all states and especially to the Iraqi people, who would greet theAmericans as liberators. Of course those states that were opposed to the USinvasion eventually allowed it to happen, while members of the coalition of thewilling not providing actual military support cheered from the sidelines. But anapplication of Carrs logic would suggest that this had little to do with a beliefon the part of these states that deposing Saddam would eventually benefit them.Rather, it was really a function of their economic and military weakness vis vis the dominant United States, which rendered them powerless to do anythingto stop it. Better to lend political support to the superpower than risk billions ofdollars in foreign aid and valuable economic relations by opposing it (Andersonet al. 2003).

Finally, while Carr argued that the interwar liberals visionary plans forinternational order were nothing more than a promotion and defence of aparticular status quo that favoured dominant (liberal) states, one could likewiseargue that the USs espousal and pursuit of its visionary goals of democracy andfreedom for Iraq is of a similar nature. The US is the richest, most powerfuland most dominant state in the world a privileged position that any stateshould want to preserve as long as possible. Accordingly, the US invasion ofIraq could be interpreted as a policy of preserving and entrenching the status quoof American global predominance. By invading Iraq and installing a democraticregime, the US would not only be removing a threat to itself, but also expandingthe democratic pacific community to the benefit of all humanity. Since thespread of liberal values is allegedly a universal common interest of all states,any attempt to assail the interests of the dominant US incurs the odium ofassailing the alleged common interest of the whole community (Carr 2001: 75).Extolling the virtues of purportedly universal values like human rights, freedomand democracy therefore becomes a special vested interest of the dominant, asit creates a basis for the US to throw moral discredit on any state that opposesit or otherwise wants to alter the status quo, while it also provides a moral basisfor the US to take action aimed at preserving the status quo that favours it. Sofar all the talk about the invasion of Iraq being a catalyst for progressive andmeaningful change in the Middle East, applying Carrs logic suggests that theinvasion was an attempt by the US to preserve and entrench a situation of grosspower inequality wherein the US remains predominant and wields its influencethroughout the globe without limitation.

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Conclusion

The new utopianism espoused by the Bush administration in its foreign policyon Iraq has a number of affinities with international liberalism. While the BushDoctrine, as expressed in the Iraq war, indicates a desire on the part of the USto spread liberal values such as human rights, democratic institutions and evenfree-market economics, the repudiation of collective security institutions andthe apparent violation of international law that accompanied the Iraq invasionare unequivocal departures from liberal thinking on international relations. Ittherefore follows that the Bush Doctrine that informed the US Iraq policydoes not necessarily draw the charge of utopianism because of its affinitieswith liberalism, in which it is only partially grounded. Similarly, E. H. Carrscritique of the interwar liberals was not necessarily a critique of liberalismqua liberalism. Rather, the charge of utopianism comes from the fact that theapproaches to international relations championed by both the interwar liberalsand the Bush administration professed fealty to prescriptive principles thatwere/are antithetical to prevailing international realities. In this sense, talk ofspreading freedom and liberty throughout the greater Middle East while the USfinds itself in the middle of brutal sectarian killings and an increasingly violentinsurgency in Iraq is just as utopian as continuing to develop plans for worldfederation and global economic cooperation amidst the collapse of the worldeconomy and an increasingly re-armed and bellicose Germany. As a result, justas international liberalism fell from grace because of its association with theutopian visions of the interwar period, the current danger is that liberalismsassociation with social engineering run amok in Iraq will to do similar damage(Clark 2003).

None of this is to say that the liberal project of spreading democracy andhumane values throughout the world is not a worthwhile endeavor, but the Iraqwar may have put this project in serious peril. In the case of the interwar liberalswho elaborated their plans with an eye toward avoiding another global war,fealty to international institutions absent the element of state power ultimatelyfailed. As a result, the failure of liberal theory to predict international eventsor offer practical policy prescriptions for controlling them resulted in the riseto prominence of realism, whose preoccupation with cynical power politicshas dominated the discourse ever since, at least in the US (Wilson 1995: 2).But just as liberal thinking on international relations became fashionable againin the aftermath of the Cold War, and certain Western states began to movebeyond narrow realism to accept wider humanitarian responsibilities as partof progressive and inherently liberal foreign policies, the scourge of terrorismemerged as the new global threat.

The Bush administration believes with some reason that the proliferationof liberal values will diminish the appeal of the fanatical ideologies that engenderterrorism. But as evidenced by setbacks in Iraq, relying on military power alone

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in this new context seems an unlikely method for enlarging the democraticcommunity, and has arguably to date had counter-productive results. So justas the failed visions for international order espoused by the utopian interwarliberals marginalised international liberalism, the current association of theliberal project with the USs similarly utopian vision for Iraq is potentiallyyet another setback to the promise of perpetual peace.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank David Clinton, Greg Russell, Harry Gould, and theanonymous referees at JIPT for helpful comments and suggestions on thisarticle. All views and any mistakes remain mine alone.

Notes1 Michael J. Smith (1992: 2123) has argued that the dominant strand in the liberal tradition

appears to be noninterventionist, though admits a certain ambivalence and disagreementwithin liberal thought about whether liberal states may militarily intervene in illiberal states.

2 George Packer 2005: chs. 12) seems to suggest that spreading liberal values was actually theprimary reason for invading Iraq, but that terrorism and WMD were a more palatable publicjustification for going to war.

3 The text of the National Security Strategy (2002: 25) suggests as much: America willimplement its strategies by organising coalitions as broad as practical of states able andwilling to promote a balance of power that favors freedom (emphasis added).

4I fully understand the consequences of what were doing. Were changing the world. Andthe world will be better off and America will be more secure as a result of the actions weretaking (President Addresses 2004).

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